JPRS L/10370

4 March 1982

Sub-Saharan Africa Report

FOUO No. 765

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SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA REPORT

FOUO No. 765

CONTENTS

SWISS FOREIGN TRADE WITH AFRICA REVIEWED

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1887, 8 Jan 82 pp 68-71

[Excerpt] The flow of trade to and from Africa remains modest. But it is certainly improving and expanding since in 1979 the African continent accounted for 3.08 percent of the Swiss Confederation's total foreign trade while in 1980 that percentage had increased to 3.6 percent. During these 2 years, the value of Swiss imports increased at a faster rate (up by 44.7 percent) than the value of exports (up by 35.7 percent) but, in the view of some observers, the significance of that progression is limited and they point out that it is mainly the result of Switzerland purchasing energy products from four of five African countries. They also note that the trade gap between Switzerland and Africa indicates a big surplus in favor of Switzerland (a cover percentage of 154.37 in 1980). But it must be noted that in 1979 that rate was even higher (164.61 percent).

Table CE-SS-B

Switzerland's Top 20 Suppliers in the World
(Millions of Swiss francs)

		1980	1979	1978
1.	FRG	16,766.32	13,946.48	12,233.51
2.	France	7,461.85	6,273.34	5,285.61
3.	Italy	5,844.62	5,054.87	4,147.71
4.	Great Britain	5,072.59	3,754.94	3,377.62
5.	United States	4,104.94	3,048.84	3,170.81
6.	UEBL [Belgium-Luxembourg]	2,502.46	2,003.16	1,629.85
7.	Holland	2,469.64	2,089.28	1,544.90
8.	Austria	2,184.42	1,830.03	1,649.39
9.	Japan	1,989.76	1,338.60	1,220.23
10.	USSR	1,607.95	1,296.70	917.47
11.	Sweden	1,229.41	1,041,11	875.40
12.	Spain	578.82	490.88	439.97
13.	Hong-Kong	572.42	378.86	323.61
14.	Libya	516.50	258.64	190.49
15.	Denmark	508.82	417.67	383.71
16.	Nigeria	356.51	136.95	118.05
17.	Finland	342.52	273.98	230.49
18.	Canada	339.24	220.02	202.86
19.	Brazil	263.56	210.35	143.90
20.	Saudi Arabia	257.33	186.46	71.99

Table CE-SS-C

Switzerland's Top 20 Clients in the World
(Millions of Swiss francs)

		1980	1979	1978
1.	FRG	9,749.82	8,642.59	7,537.22
2.	France	4,547.61	3,845.21	3,612.49
3.	Italy	3,898.84	1,298.81	1,063.32
4.	United States	3,552.02	2,992.79	2,974.19
5.	Great Britain	3,134.43	3,090.88	2,869.32
6.	Austria	2,271.03	2,010.84	1,938.77
7.	UEBL [Belgium-Luxembourg]	1,565.24	1,255.46	1,185.79
8.	Holland	1,383.65	1,240.95	1,210.21
9.	Japan	1,273.31	1,300.41	1,185.02
10.	Saudi Arabia	1,042.44	951.61	928.92
11.	Sweden	1,024.55	933.11	889.39
12.	Hong-Kong	934.64	800.68	766.08
13.	Spain	903.09	840.82	763.32
14.	Israel	871.68	972.97	963.40
15.	Denmark	548.41	532.46	583.46
16.	Nigeria	530.46	263.17	421.41
17.	South Africa	499.30	382.69	362.37
18.	Brazil	497.57	483.80	446.69
19.	Iran	463.75	368.o2	686.17
20.	Norway	428.93	373.12	395.70

Table CE-SS-E

Distribution of Swiss Foreign Trade in 1980 by Goods Categories
(In millions of Swiss francs)

	Crude Materials & Semimanufactures	Energy Products	Equipment Goods	Consumer Goods
Imports				
Europe	20,965.3	4772.0	8,064.9	14,510.7
Africa	471.9	958.3	2.1	129.1
Asia	1,797.8	695.4	449.5	2,230.3
America	2,579.8	69.8	1,596.2	1,455.6
Australia	82.0	--	3.5	25.2
Total	25,896.8	6,495.5	10,116.1	18,351.0
Exports				
Europe	14,291.5	55.42	10,604.0	8,374.1
Africa	683.3	1.2	1,187.8	538.1
Asia	2,818.0	2.8	2,048.5	2,375.9
America	1,790.1	1,015.6	2,788.3	1,684.9
Australia	103.7	0.2	155.2	103.5
Total	19,686.6	60.7[sic]	16,783.8	13,076.0

Table CE-SS-D

Switzerland's 10 Major African Partners
(in millions of Swiss francs)

Suppliers	1980	1979	1978
1. Libya	516.50	258.64	190.49
2. Nigeria	356.51	136.95	118.05
3. South Africa	212.16	142.75	109.05
4. Egypt	71.47	33.51	42.74
5. Algeria	67.38	151.38	34.77
6. Ghana	48.91	42.83	55.84
7. Morocco	46.12	28.30	27.74
8. Ivory Coast	35.87	37.93	54.62
9. Kenya	33.74	19.62	23.16
10. Zambia	21.91	32.39	23.25

Clients	1980	1979	1978
1. Nigeria	530.46	263.17	421.41
2. South Africa	499.30	382.69	362.37
3. Egypt	306.37	280.0	221.23
4. Algeria	276.19	231.40	197.07
5. Libya	143.62	89.70	188.63
6. Morocco	66.42	73.70	84.99
7. Angola	52.58	19.02	35.61
8. Kenya	48.12	38.26	31.74
9. Tunisia	46.76	35.79	33.30
10. Cameroon	43.09	30.74	22.67

Swiss Imports From Africa

Swiss imports of African products in 1980 (1,561.44 million Swiss francs [SF]) were divided as follows: 61.4 percent were energy products worth 958.3 million SF; 18.3 percent were meat and vegetable foodstuffs, worth 285.9 million SF; 8.75 percent were gems and precious metals, worth 136.6 million SF; 5.75 percent were crude materials other than foodstuffs, worth 90 million SF; 2.1 percent were semimanufactures, worth 33.3 million SF; 3.7 percent were finished manufactures and miscellaneous, worth 58.3 million SF.

Energy products were imported from the following countries:

	Tons	Million SF
Petroleum Crude Oils		
Libya	1,098,833	516.29
Nigeria	744,276	346.44
Algeria	131,263	60.07
Tunisia	1,034	0.33

	Tons	Million SF
Coal		
South Africa	337,096	34.97
Refined Oils		
Morocco	41,316	19.46
South Africa	4	0.03

The three main categories of vegetable foodstuffs imported by Switzerland were: coffee (plus tea and spices), 87.57 million SF; cocoa and its by-products, 74.77 million SF; all kinds of fruits, 46.78 million SF.

Switzerland's Foreign Trade



Distribution by Product Categories



Key:
1. Crude or semi-finished materials
2. Energy products
3. Consumer goods
4. Equipment goods

Coffee (12,500 tons; 21.5 million SF) was imported from 15 countries, in some cases in small amounts: Kenya (3,093 tons), Cameroon (1,984 tons), Angola (1,870 tons), Zaire (1,729 tons), Togo (1,246 tons), Mozambique (568 tons), Ethiopia (465 tons), Ivory Coast (348 tons), Uganda (318 tons), Zimbabwe (300 tons), Tanzania (219 tons), Central African Republic (203 tons), South Africa (129 tons), Madagascar (20 tons), Guinea (7 tons).

Tea (less than 40 tons, worth 150,000 SF) was purchased from (ranked in order of importance): Zimbabwe, Malawi, Kenya, Tanzania, Mozambique and Cameroon.

Madagascar is the major supplier of spices (3.66 million SF): 113 tons of pepper and red pimentoes, 18 tons of vanilla and 26 tons of cloves. Other countries which sold appreciable amounts were the Comoro Islands (0.29 million) and Tanzania (0.13 million).

Cocoa and its by-products were only purchased in the following six countries: Ghana (47.66 million SF), Ivory Coast (17.32 million), Nigeria (9.33 million), Sao Tome (0.38 million), Guinea (0.31 million) and Togo (0.25 million).

South Africa stands way ahead as a supplier of fruits. The shipments included a great variety:

	Tons	Millions of SF
Fruits and tropical nuts	620	2.25
Citrus fruits	8,029	9.66
Grapes	221	0.87
Apples, pears and fresh quinces	11,719	20.60
Fresh stone fruits	60	0.23
Fresh berries	11	0.08
Other fresh fruits	215	0.79
Subtotal	20,875	34.45
Dry fruits	206	1.70
Overall total	21,081	36.15

Other noteworthy suppliers: Ivory Coast (4.96 million), Morocco (2.61 million), Kenya (1.29 million), Mozambique (0.65 million), Tunisia (0.41 million), Egypt (0.21 million), Mali (0.12 million), Algeria (0.10 million).

Besides coffee, tea, spices, cocoa and fruits, Switzerland's purchases of African foodstuffs involved the following products (figures given in millions of Swiss francs):

--Vegetable products: canned vegetables or fruits, worth 20.93 million, from among other countries, South Africa (19.41) and Morocco (0.93); oil-producing seeds and fruits worth 13.46 million, mostly from Gambia (11.87), Nigeria (0.51), Egypt (0.3), Sudan (0.21), Cameroon (0.2), Algeria (0.15); fresh vegetables and pulses worth 11.97 million, mostly from Morocco (7.68), Egypt (2.27), South Africa (0.9), Kenya (0.7), Senegal (0.2) and Upper Volta (0.1).

--Animal products: meats and offal worth 7.05 million, mostly from South Africa (3.8), Zimbabwe (2.08), and Namibia (1.12); fresh or dried fish worth 4.5 million, mostly from South Africa (1.99), Morocco (1.86), Senegal (0.31), Tunisia (0.28); canned meat or canned fish worth 1.66 million, mostly from Morocco (1.02), Kenya (0.28), Senegal (0.19), South Africa (0.08); live animals worth 0.09 million; eggs worth 0.08 million (South Africa).

--Livestock feed: milling by-products, oil-cakes, molasses-based fodder, fish meal for a total of 1.59 million, chiefly from Mauritius (1.29), Mauritania (0.2), Egypt (0.1).

--Beverages and tobacco: beverages (wine and wine alcohol) worth 8.56 million, mostly from Algeria (6.53, wine), Morocco (0.4, wine), Tunisia (0.3, wine), South Africa (0.32 for wine and 0.72 for wine spirits); tobacco and by-products worth 6.53 million, mostly from Zimbabwe (1.81), Malawi (1.62), Cameroon (0.55), Tunisia (0.26).

Other foodstuffs--grains and by-products, sugar and sweets, sauces, soups, oils and so on--only amounted to the negligible sum of 550,000 SF.

Gems and precious metals (imports worth 136.6 million SF) were purchased in variable amounts from 23 countries. The biggest purchases were made in South Africa (75.58 million), Zambia (21.13), Morocco (21.12), Kenya (5.67), Cameroon (2.68), Mali (2.12), Zaire (2.08), Zimbabwe (1.85), Liberia (0.93), Tanzania (0.72), Senegal (0.59), Togo (0.47), Egypt (0.4) and Sierra Leone (0.32).

Here are details of imports from the three major suppliers:

--South Africa: 75.58 million, including 36.27 million worth of precious stones; 0.02 million of gem dust; 0.02 million of silver; 2.91 million worth of gold; 35.93 million worth of platinum; 0.43 million worth of jewelry and goldsmith articles.

--Zambia: 21.13 million, including 21.12 million worth of precious stones; 0.01 million worth of gold and silver.

--Morocco: 21.12 million (silver and alloys).

Crude Materials Other Than Foodstuffs

The leading Swiss imports of African crude materials other than foodstuffs (representing 90 million SF) are animal or plant fibers. These are followed by sawmill products, nonmetallic ores, metal ores and various products.

Among imports of textile fibers, cotton ranks first with 10,765 tons (46.1 million SF) imported from Egypt (5,313 tons), South Africa (2,808 tons), Sudan (742 tons), the Central African Republic (391 tons), the Ivory Coast (388 tons), Uganda (358 tons), Cameroon (318), Tanzania (208 tons), Kenya (198 tons), Ethiopia (81 tons) and Chad (60 tons). Wool (490 tons worth 3.4 million) was purchased in South Africa (329 tons), Kenya (142 tons) and Egypt (19 tons). Mozambique was Switzerland's sole supplier of sisal (65 tons worth 83.8 million).

Crude lumber (40,735 tons for a total of 23.4 million SF) was supplied by the Ivory Coast (16.117 tons), Gabon (8,395 tons), Zaire (4,910 tons), Cameroon (4,410 tons), Congo (3,694 tons), Liberia (1,694 tons), Ghana (1,288 tons) and the Central African Republic (227 tons). Crude cork (400 tons worth 120,000 SF) and paper pulp (200 tons worth 220,000 SF) were imported exclusively from Tunisia. Crude natural rubber was only purchased from Zaire (96 tons worth 220,000 SF) and from Nigeria (30 tons worth 70,000 SF).

Minerals

Nonmetallic and metallic ores were imported in small amounts and only from Morocco, Rwanda and South Africa. Morocco supplied 10,652 tons (1.47 million SF) of calcium phosphate and 40 tons (20,000 SF) of barium sulfate or carbonate. Rwanda and South Africa sold to Switzerland almost equal amounts of pyrite ashes for a total volume of 10,250 tons worth 1.77 million SF. South Africa's main sales were of asbestos (3,752 tons worth 5.12 million SF) and small amounts of quartz, feldspar, clays, granite and various other ores.

Mention must be made of imports of ivory, shell, horns, various by-products of animal source (1 million SF) and live plants or cut flowers (3.95 million). Plants and flowers came mainly from South Africa (2.12 million), Kenya (0.96 million), Ivory Coast (0.47 million) and Morocco (0.35 million).

Purchases of materials for braiding or carving work were negligible. On the other hand, gums and other forest products accounted for purchases worth 900,000 SF (mainly for Sudan: 282 tons worth 770,000 SF).

Semi-Processed Products, Chiefly Metallic Ones

African semi-processed products imported by Switzerland (those categories which are unquestionably semi-processed) accounted for around 30 million SF and most of this sum represents metal products (23.5 million). These metal products were chiefly: aluminum (17.23 million SF) most of which came from Egypt (6,238 tons; 17.2 million SF); copper (626 tons; 2.41 tons million SF) from South Africa (500 tons) and Zambia (126 tons); nickel (77 tons; 800,000 SF) from South Africa and zinc (253 tons; 300,000 SF) from South Africa and Algeria. There were also purchases of unspecified nonferrous metals totalling 1.9 million SF.

South Africa and Zambia were the only suppliers of ferrous metal products: 565 tons (730,000 SF) of iron alloys from Zambia and 3,192 tons (2.05 million SF) of various products from South Africa including 1,126 tons of pig iron, 685 tons of iron alloys, 1,300 tons of rods, 50 tons of sheets, 23 tons of thin carbon steel.

Other semimanufactured products imported from Africa by Switzerland were: sawed lumber or veneer woods (5.25 million SF) supplied by Zaire (1.54 million), the Congo (1.41 million), the Ivory Coast (1.07 million), Ghana (0.41 million), Liberia (0.35 million), Uganda (0.28 million), and Kenya (0.14 million); textile thread, worth 2.05 million SF, almost all of which was cotton thread from Egypt (1.27 million), Tunisia (0.37 million), Morocco (0.15) and others; essential oils, worth 2.07 million SF, bought in Morocco (0.43 million), Ivory Coast (0.43 million), Madagascar (0.34 million), Egypt (0.31 million), South Africa (0.28 million) and Tunisia (0.27 million).

Manufactured and other products imported from Africa (not counting foodstuffs which are listed separately) consist of cotton fabrics, a few items of clothing, wood articles, jewelry articles, rubber articles, handicraft items and collector's items.

Swiss Exports to Africa

Regarding exports, we will not review Switzerland's trade with its 54 African clients. We shall examine only exports to the 25 major clients, pointing out that the purchases made by these countries amount to 2,352.7 million SF and represent 97.6 percent of the Swiss sales to the Black Continent. The figures given are, therefore, highly significant. We could have almost restricted our survey to the five top African clients of Switzerland--Nigeria, South Africa, Egypt, Algeria and Libya--which, in 1980, accounted for 1,766 million SF worth of goods representing 72.85 percent of all Swiss exports to that part of the world.

Swiss sales to Africa can be classified under 15 or so categories (in parentheses, chapters of the NdB [Brussels list]; figures rounded up in millions of Swiss francs):

1. Nonelectrical machinery and devices (84)	798
2. Chemical products (28 to 38)	575
3. Electrical machines and electrical material (85)	295
4. Watches and clocks (91)	134.5
5. Metals and metal goods (73 to 83)	118.5
6. Foodstuffs and related products (01 to 04, 0.7 to 12, 15 to 24)	103.5
7. Textiles, clothing articles and accessories (50 to 67)	95
8. Optical, photographic, measuring and precision instruments (90)	85.5
9. Resins and plastic goods (39)	26
10. Paper and paper goods (47 to 49)	22
11. Precious metals, gems, jewelry, goldsmith articles (71)	20
12. Means of transportation (86 to 89)	19
13. Construction materials (68 to 70)	10
14. Musical instruments and sound equipment (92)	8
15. Rubber and rubber goods (40)	4
16. Wood and wooden goods (44 to 46)	3.6
17. Miscellaneous and unspecified	35.2

Outstanding Position of Textile Industry Machinery

One can see the outstanding position occupied by nonelectrical machines and instruments (33.1 percent of all exports) and by chemical products (23.85 percent).

Under the category of nonelectrical machines and instruments, there are two or three main types of goods. A detailed study of the purchases made by the six major African clients of Switzerland (for these machines)--South Africa, Nigeria, Algeria, Egypt, Libya and Cameroon--shows that their aggregated imports totaled 667.3 million SF distributed as follows: textile machinery, 347.18 million (52 percent); turbines and motors, 70.5 million (10.6 percent); machine tools, 38.95 million (5.84 percent); pumps and powerdriven pumps, 29.21 million; packaging machines, 27.08 million; lifting and handling TP [expansion unknown] machines, mechanical diggers, 26.61 million; food industry machinery, 22.47 million; furnaces, air conditioning units, refrigerators, 16.67 million; machines for the paper and printing industry, 16.21 million; plumbing supplies, joints, braces, 15.44 million; office machines, 11.52 million; quarry machinery, 4.9 million; rolling mills, converters, 3.3 million; other unspecified equipment, 37.26 million.

Textile machinery occupies a very strong position with 122.32 million SF worth of exports to Algeria; 102.43 million to Nigeria; 67.97 million to South Africa; 52.7 million to Egypt, and so on. These purchases cover a wide range of equipment. For instance, the following export orders went to Algeria (in millions of Swiss francs):

Weaving looms, knitting and embroidery machines	57.40
Spinning machines	39.80
Washing, cleaning, drying, dyeing machines	20.87
Auxiliary machines required by weaving looms, embroidery machines, etc	4.13
Sewing machines	0.02
Machines to work on leather	0.10

Besides the four major buyers already mentioned, the best African buyers of Swiss textile machinery were Morocco (11.25 million), Tanzania (9.26 million), Zimbabwe (7.72 million), Kenya (6.08 million), Madagascar (5.52 million) and Cameroon (1.51 million).

Turbines and motors were mostly bought by Cameroon (18.12 million), Egypt (13.85 million), Nigeria (13.42 million), South Africa (12.17 million), Libya (11.24 million), Sierra Leone (10.08 million), Liberia (2.72 million) and Madagascar (1.66 million).

Most of the exports of machine tools went to South Africa (26.46 million), Egypt (5.26 million), and Nigeria (4.10 million).

Chemical Products

Chemical products (chapters 28 to 38 of the Brussels' List [NdB]) were exported to many African countries (see Table CE-SS-F) but more particularly to Nigeria (116.45 million), South Africa (111.03 million), Egypt (75.5 million), Angola (40.44 million), Sudan (32.02 million) and Libya (24.61 million).

Four categories of chemical products occupy a very strong position: basic organic compounds, coloring substances and disinfectants. Practically every country bought drugs but the biggest buyers were Nigeria (32.74 million), Angola (26.09 million), South Africa (24.4 million), Sudan (18.37 million), Libya (15.70 million) and Egypt (15.1 million).

The organic compounds, for the most part diazine, azide, azoxide compounds, compounds with amide, amine and oxygenated functions, heterocyclic compounds, sulfonamides, and others were purchased in large amounts by South Africa (34.28 million), Nigeria (33.99 million), Egypt (26.02 million), the Ivory Coast (8.05 million) and Morocco (6.66 million).

Table CE-SS-F

Purchases Made by the Top 25 African Clients of Switzerland of a Few Noteworthy Products (in millions of Swiss francs)

	Nonelectrical Machinery (chapter 84)	Chemicals (chapters 28-38)	Electrical Machinery & Equipment (chapter 85)	Watches, Clocks (chapter 91)	Metals & Goods (chapter 73 to 83)	Foodstuffs and Related Products
South Africa	181.6	111.03	95.05	28.86	19.84	2.54
Nigeria	166.68	116.45	42.82	58.26	43.64	62.44
Algiera	152.53	18.32	21.73	2.24	15.35	0.96
Egypt	120.20	75.70	51.95	12.23	11.85	5.15
Libya	26.17	24.61	40.17	9.29	11.33	9.31
Cameroon	20.15	16.44	1.61	0.64	1.31	1.88
Morocco	20.05	16.50	4.10	8.27	2.04	0.90
Kenya	17.35	16.51	3.96	2.77	2.01	0.35
Tunisia	13.29	7.29	2.79	0.98	2.02	1.14
Zimbabwe	11.21	1	0.22	0.62	0.58	0.02
Sierra Leone	11.07	0.70	2.74	0.30	0.31	4.14
Tanzania	10.67	15.13	1.15	0.74	0.48	0.11
Madagascar	8.37	3.36	0.16	0.06	0.03	0.16
Ivory Coast	6.32	17.71	1.67	2.76	0.52	2.23
Liberia	6.23	0.51	0.15	0.30	1.21	5.44
Zaire	4.85	10.04	0.96	0.48	1.06	1.47
Zambia	3.94	7.69	0.35	0.54	0.10	0.03
Togo	3.78	0.30	20.56	0.08	0.27	0.05
Sudan	3.58	32.02	0.64	0.86	1.36	0.11
Mozambique	2.24	16.80	0.12	0.05	0.40	0.02
Angola	2.14	40.44	0.43	1.01	0.38	4.98
Ghana	1.67	16.59	0.39	0.23	0.69	0.07
Benin	1.50	2.46	--	0.41	--	--
Senegal	1.02	2.22	0.11	1.05	0.08	0.05
Guinea	0.74	3.23	0.58	1.01	2.33	--

Coloring substances went mainly to Nigeria (27.40 million), South Africa (27.2 million), Egypt (15.16 million), Algeria (5.67 million), Kenya (5.66 million), Morocco (5.27 million), the Ivory Coast (4.14 million).

Finally, disinfectants were sold to Egypt (13.09 million), Angola (12.16 million), Sudan (11.45 million), Nigeria (5.7 million), Libya (5.2 million) and South Africa (4.09 million).

Some countries purchased significant quantities of perfumes or aromatic substances: South Africa (10.37 million), Nigeria (9.42 million), Egypt (2.55 million).

Table CE-SS-F indicates the composition of African imports under the chapters of electrical equipment, watches, metals and metal goods, foodstuffs. Of the Swiss machinery and electrical equipment imported by Africa, the greatest demand was for two types of equipment--current generators and transformers, and circuit breakers. Here are a few examples (in millions of Swiss francs);

Countries	Generators, etc. (85-01)	Circuit Breakers (85-19)
South Africa	28.76	45.57
Nigeria	13.13	11.24
Egypt	11.83	23.18
Libya	14.51	7.83
Algeria	0.92	6.27

Radio equipment, partly for professional purposes, was also purchased chiefly by Libya (13.5 million SF).

It should be noted that most of the foodstuffs which Africa imported from Switzerland fall under Chapter 21 of the Brussels List (concentrated coffee and tea, beef broth, condiments, sauces and so on). Nigeria, for instance, made purchases amounting to 51.21 million SF, Liberia bought 5.32 million, Sierra Leone 4.04 million and Egypt 3.61 million.

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INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS

ITALIAN TRADE WITH AFRICA REVIEWED

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1886, 1 Jan 82 pp 11-14

[Excerpt] The following observations may be made with regard to Africa (Table COM-IT-E and Chart COM-IT-1): Italy's overall trade with this continent increased in total value by 36.06 percent over 1979; as a percentage of Italy's total foreign trade, it has gone from 9.57 to 10.66; the trade balance, however, which is still generally in Africa's favor, lost 3.7 points from 1979, with the percent of Italian imports covered by African exports to Italy falling from 140.39 to 136.66

Italian Imports From Africa

Crude Oil: 62.8 Percent of Total Purchases

Italian imports from Africa in 1980 can be broken down as follows (in billion lire):

1. Fuel products	5,885
2. Nonfood and nonfuel raw materials	974
3. Food products, raw or processed	643
4. Semifinished or finished manufactured products (not including food products), including:	1,771
Metallurgical products	(1,110)
Refined petroleum products	(370)
Chemical products	(115)
Textile and related products	(81)
Leather and hide products	(38)
Wood products	(37)
Construction materials	(12)
Paper products	(8)
5. Imported or reimported mechanical products	43
Transport equipment	(36)
Machines and equipment	(7)
6. Miscellaneous and indeterminate	44

Table COM-IT-F gives the details of petroleum and coal purchases which represent, in value, close to two-thirds of Italy's total imports from Africa (62.9 percent). The leading position of Libya, a former Italian colony which covers practically half of the peninsula's purchases of African petroleum, will be noted. The largest supplier of coal is South Africa, of course.

COM-IT-D

Italy's Principal World Customers in 1980 (and 1979)

Country	(Billion lire) 1980	1979
1. West Germany	12,211.40	11,336.09
2. France	10,101.49	8,873.20
3. Great Britain	4,064.25	3,916.10
4. United States	3,544	3,876.84
5. Switzerland	2,939.35	2,561.81
6. Netherlands	2,461.63	2,746.68
7. Belgium-Luxembourg Economic Union	2,219.26	2,046.81
8. Libya	2,195.17	1,597.88
9. Austria	1,787.81	1,506.53
10. Saudi Arabia	1,781.82	1,563.27
11. Spain	1,270.84	1,107.08
12. Algeria	1,109.06	888.78
13. USSR	1,091.99	1,014.63
14. Yugoslavia	1,046.24	1,037.69
15. Greece	1,021.87	1,009.96
16. Iraq	813.58	558.39
17. Sweden	711.46	572.61
18. Japan	605.84	650.11
19. Nigeria	589.71	381.83
20. Egypt	565.23	431.38
21. Argentina	543.52	395.10
22. South Africa	507.76	268.28
23. Venezuela	498.15	354.86
24. Iran	490.72	342.37
25. Denmark	462.29	446.84

COM-IT-E

Italy's Principal African Trade Partners in 1980 (and 1979)

Suppliers	(Billion lire) 1980	1979	Customers	(Billion lire) 1980	1979
Libya	2,981.79	2,144.45	Libya	2,195.17	1,597.88
Egypt	1,350.76	894.54	Algeria	1,109.06	888.78
South Africa	1,261.62	1,393.52	Nigeria	589.71	381.83
Nigeria	822.95	380.41	Egypt	565.23	431.38
Algeria	608.58	439.74	South Africa	507.76	268.28
Tunisia	530.21	342.56	Tunisia	450.98	281.38
Ivory Coast	389.68	308.40	Morocco	202.11	216.20
Congo	218.75	110.68	Somalia	153.31	112.37
Zambia	151.87	107.38	Ivory Coast	96.59	75.17
Morocco	138.09	107.05	Kenya	84.10	57.99
Zaire	130.27	98.81	Ethiopia	71.18	53.50
Gabon	109.95	18.03	Canary Islands	65.68	59.86
Cameroon	106.57	76.57	Cameroon	61.67	52.55
Liberia	97.53	71.53	Zaire	61.03	34.38
Sudan	86.61	85.73	Angola	56.71	37.13

361 Billion Lire in Coffee and Cocoa Purchases

Second, we will examine raw or processed food products (643 billion lire), although they are normally found only in third position after nonfood raw materials (974 billion). This will enable us to free the "raw materials" sector of any items for human or animal consumption, including manufactured products.

Three categories of food products must be distinguished: 1) raw agricultural products, 442 billion lire; 2) processed agricultural products, 143 billion; and 3) raw or processed animal products, 58 billion.

Among the raw agricultural products, two categories are conspicuous, coffee and cocoa: coffee (275 billion lire); cocoa (86); tropical fruits (29); grain (13.2); dried vegetables (10.4); oil seeds (6.3); fresh vegetables (5.8); citrus fruit (5.1); tea, spices (1.9); temperate zone fruit (1.6); and other miscellaneous products (7.7).

The principal African suppliers of coffee and cocoa to Italy are shown in Table COM-IT-G. The Ivory Coast is the leader by far for both products. After the Ivory Coast, the countries which supplied the most unroasted coffee to Italy in 1980 were: Zaire, Cameroon, Kenya, Tanzania, Ethiopia and Uganda. The principal suppliers of cocoa, besides the Ivory Coast, were: Nigeria, Benin, Cameroon, Ghana and Togo.

COM-IT-F

Italian Imports of African Energy Products in 1980

Crude Oil	Tons	Billion lire
Libya	11,689,788	2,690.95
Egypt	6,069,086	1,196.03
Nigeria	3,335,305	766.25
Algeria	2,212,353	480.78
Tunisia	1,422,950	321.96
Congo	1,077,569	202.04
Gabon	408,884	84.98
Cameroon	54,498	8.23
Total	26,270,433	5,758.22

Coal	Tons	Billion lire
South Africa	3,058,495	120.05
Liberia	52,025	5.76
Morocco	8,140	0.80
Total	3,118,660	126.61

Tropical fruits (53,300 metric tons) basically came from Somalia (26,331 metric tons of bananas) and the Ivory Coast (24,312 metric tons of miscellaneous fruit: pineapple, coconuts, cashews). Other significant suppliers: Tunisia (1,121 metric tons of dates), Madagascar (675 metric tons), Cameroon (310 metric tons), Mozambique (175 metric tons), Algeria (156 metric tons), etc.

Grain mostly came from South Africa (buckwheat: 98,267 metric tons); dried vegetables (27,650 metric tons) from Morocco (16,855 metric tons) and from Tunisia (9,763 metric tons); oil seeds (11,890 metric tons) from Sudan (5,890 metric tons), from Gambia (4,199 metric tons) and from Egypt (1,349 metric tons); fresh vegetables (8,220 metric tons), from Morocco (5,715 metric tons), from Egypt (1,812 metric tons) and from Tunisia (626 metric tons); citrus fruit (10,280 metric tons), from South Africa (7,562 metric tons) and Swaziland (2,717 metric tons); tea and spices (1,827 million lire) from Madagascar (1,383), from Tunisia (232), from Morocco (146), and from Egypt (65); temperate zone fruit (1,500 metric tons) from Egypt (738 metric tons), South Africa (502 metric tons) and Morocco (260 metric tons).

Italian purchases of African processed food products amounted to approximately 150 billion lire, including 111 billion lire in vegetable oils, 15 in sugar and sugar products, and 9 in canned fruits and vegetables.

COM-IT-G

Principal African Suppliers of Coffee and Cocoa to Italy in 1980

Country	Coffee Metric tons	Coffee Million lire	Cocoa Metric tons	Cocoa Million lire
Ivory Coast	23,712	81,201.4	12,195	36,013.7
Zaire	17,400	53,760.9	340	717.2
Cameroon	16,653	52,830.1	1,979	5,419.2
Kenya	6,232	21,436.2	--	--
Tanzania	5,096	18,051.3	--	--
Ethiopia	5,189	17,454.8	--	--
Uganda	4,409	13,721	--	--
Madagascar	1,611	5,017.5	74	212.1
CAR	1,347	4,185.9	--	--
Burundi	633	2,002.9	--	--
Congo	607	1,868.4	228	624.5
Rwanda	469	1,355.1	--	--
Togo	230	743.6	1,306	3,653
Sao Tome	115	293.4	--	--
Gabon	78	231.4	513	1,353.3
Angola	24	68.9	--	--
Liberia	23	68.8	50	154.7
Nigeria	--	--	8,188	25,450.3
Benin	--	--	1,984	6,188.7
Ghana	--	--	1,936	5,259.4

Olive oil came from Tunisia (79.3 billion lire), Morocco (12.65) and Algeria; other oils (peanut, palm, etc.) came from the Ivory Coast (9.9), Senegal (3.6), Benin (2), Cameroon (1.4), Zaire (1), Gambia and Mali.

Sugar or sugar products were purchased from Reunion (6.6 billion lire of sugar), Cameroon (4.6 billion lire of sugar products) and the Ivory Coast (3.7 billion lire of sugar products). Canned fruit or juices came from the Ivory Coast (4.1 billion) and Kenya (1.8). Egypt sold Italy 6,774 metric tons of long grain husked rice for 2,058.7 million lire. There were no imports of wheat flour (grown in North Africa), miscellaneous grains or related products.

In the area of animal products, the largest purchases involved canned fish, (8.5 billion lire) supplied by Morocco (6.2), Ivory Coast (1.9) and Cape Verde (0.4). There were no imports of canned meat or dairy products.

Imports of Nonfood Raw Materials

Nonfood and nonfuel raw materials (974 billion lire) include five categories in particular: 1) timber and cork, 246 billion lire; 2) nonmetal minerals, 244 billion; 3) metal-bearing ores, 189 billion; 4) natural textile fibers, 132 billion; 5) leather and hides, 110 billion.

The principal African suppliers of common and rare timber in 1980 were: Ivory Coast (199,065 million lire), Congo (11,431), Cameroon (11,277), South Africa (8,119), Gabon (6,261), Ghana (3,000), Equatorial Guinea (857), and Liberia (563).

In the nonmetal mineral category are found phosphates, sulfur, sea salt, clay, pumice, abrasives, asbestos, mica, fluorspar, etc. The principal suppliers of these various materials were: Libya (139.2 billion lire) for 1,102,831 metric tons of methane gas, South Africa (43.4 billion), Morocco (43.3), Togo (6.7), Liberia (5.8), and Tunisia (2.7).

Metal-bearing ores primarily included iron ore (125.6 billion lire) from: Liberia (71.64 billion for 3,116,336 metric tons); Mauritania (36.74 billion; 1,957,997 metric tons); South Africa (14.04 billion; 699,971 metric tons); Algeria (2.88 billion; 243,673 metric tons). The other most imported metal-bearing ores were aluminum, copper, manganese, zinc and tin (63.5 billion) primarily from South Africa (17.8 billion), Guinea (15.9), Gabon (10.8), Morocco (9.5), Algeria (6.3), Tunisia (2.2), etc.

Leather and hides came from a large group of countries (29 different suppliers), but particularly from South Africa (40.9 billion lire), Nigeria (17.9), Ethiopia (13.6), Kenya (6.1) and Somalia (4.4).

Cotton, Sisal and Flax

The other nonfuel, nonfood raw materials imported from Africa were natural textile fibers: cotton, sisal and flax. Purchases of cotton (128.7 billion lire) primarily involved Sudan (43.6 billion; 21,212 metric tons), Egypt (35.94; 14,636), South Africa (26.36; 14,450), Zambia (3.86; 2,376), Tanzania (1.52; 1,256), Cameroon (1.43; 914), Ivory Coast (1.33; 825), Upper Volta (1.08; 749), Zimbabwe, Burundi, Ethiopia, the Congo, the CAR, Botswana, Senegal, Zaire and Nigeria. (A total of 60,275 metric tons). Purchases of sisal (3.34 billion) had only two origins: Kenya: 2,646 metric tons, 1,240.7 million lire and Tanzania: 2.572 metric tons, 1,598.9 million lire. The flax came from Egypt (1,398 metric tons; 1,444.7 million lire).

South Africa is the largest supplier of raw wool (10,052 metric tons; 29.65 billion lire). Tunisia contributed a small amount (20 metric tons; 89.7 million lire).

Rubber (15,120 metric tons; 12.7 billion lire) was supplied by the Ivory Coast (4,941 metric tons), Liberia (4,830 metric tons), Zaire (3,891 metric tons), Cameroon (1,290 metric tons) and Nigeria (168 metric tons). Almost all gum (2,340 million lire) came from Sudan (2,235 million) and Senegal (98 million).

1,771 Billion Lire in Industrial Products

Semi-finished or finished industrial products constituted a significant share of Italy's imports from Africa (18.9 percent or 1,771 billion lire). However, it must be noted that most of the purchases were in common or precious metals and refined petroleum products.

Purchases of gold, silver and platinum from South Africa (practically the only supplier) amounted to 712.37 billion lire. Imports of copper and alloys (230 billion lire) came from Zambia (143.6), Zaire (59.5), South Africa (24.1) and various other countries (Tanzania, Burundi, Uganda). Lead (39.9) purchased by Italy was of South African (15.5), Moroccan (14.5), Tunisian (6.5), Zambian (2.6), or Libyan (0.7) origin. Nickel (23.8) came from South Africa (22.5) and Zimbabwe (1.2). Other nonferrous metals represented 16 billion lire in purchases.

As for ferrous metals (pig iron, iron and steel in billets, bars and sections) and their alloys, Italian imports amounted to 82.5 billion lire.

Refined petroleum products (light, gas, oil and fuel products) represented 370 billion lire in imports. The major sources of the purchases were the following: Libya (134.7 billion), Algeria (96.7), Egypt (80.2), Kenya (17.7), Tanzania (7), Ivory Coast (5.8), Gabon (5.2), Zaire (4.9), Liberia (3.6), Mozambique (3.6), Somalia (3), etc.

Chemical Products

Imports of chemical products (171 billion lire) principally involved: miscellaneous inorganic products (50.6 billion lire) from Tunisia (phosphoric acid: 116,808 metric tons, 25.3 billion; and aluminum flouride: 6,210 metric tons; 4.73 billion lire), from Morocco (59,479 metric tons, 12.28 billion lire of phosphoric acid), from Guinea (4.06 billion), from Libya (1.76), and from South Africa (1.28); fertilizers (33.3 billion) imported from Tunisia in particular (162,445 metric tons; 32.68 billion); miscellaneous organic products (19.9 billion) from Egypt (10.21), Algeria (8.8) and South Africa (0.85); dyes and tanning liquors (5.02 billion), South Africa; insecticides, disinfectants, etc. (1.5 billion), Kenya (1.4); and plastics (1.3 billion) from South Africa.

As for textile industry products (81 billion lire), most were purchased from South Africa, thread and cloth (28.3); Egypt, cotton cloth (7.4); Tunisia, cotton, wool or synthetic articles (20.5); and Mauritius, hosiery (6.4).

Other industrial products imported from Africa involved particularly: the leather and hide industry, 38 billion lire; the lumber industry, 37 billion; construction materials, 12 billion; and the paper industry, 8 billion.

Transactions between Africa and Italy amounting to 36 billion lire involving transport equipment (including 9.25 billion in shipping equipment from Liberia and 7.95 billion in road equipment from South Africa), and 7 billion lire in purchases of machines and equipment, are noted, but a certain amount of these transactions seem to be reimports.

Italian Exports to Africa

98 Percent Industrial Products

Almost all of the Italian exports to Africa consisted of industrial products: 98 percent of the total value.

Agricultural and mineral raw materials did not exceed 66.2 billion lire and were distributed as follows: agricultural products, 36; animal husbandry, 6.4; forestry, 0.4; fishing and hunting, 0.2; metal-bearing ores, 0.5; nonmetal minerals, 21.9.

For agricultural products, the 36.8 billion lire included grain (13.03), fruit (9.9), vegetables (6.94), spices (1.1), miscellaneous products (5.83).

Nonmetal materials, especially marble, mostly went to Libya (7.22), Algeria (5.68) and Egypt (2.4).

The breakdown of exports of industrial products is as follows (in billion lire);

Machinery	3,303.5
Chemical products	1,035.5
Metallurgical products	629
Food industry products	392
Textiles and related products	379.2
Construction materials	281.4
Lumber products	187.8
Paper industry products	56.1
Animal or vegetable processed waste	42.9
Printing industry products	20.6
Alcohol and tobacco	9.3
Leather and hides	8
Miscellaneous and indeterminate	375.6

Under machinery there are four categories: machines and equipment, 1,407.5 billion lire; optical, watchmaking, precision and measuring instruments, 128.2 billion; transport equipment, 1,079.3 billion; other products such as hardware, tools, nails, screws and bolts, etc., 688.5 billion.

Machines and Equipment

Nonelectric machines and equipment (1,088.12 billion lire) were exported much more than electrical equipment (319.36 billion). Table COM-IT-H shows the purchases of Italy's top 20 African customers in these categories.

As far as nonelectric machines and equipment are concerned, the breakdown of sales by type of equipment is rather difficult to establish, since almost

50 percent of the equipment exported is not specifically classified. Here is the classification supplied by Italian statistics (in billion lire):

--Machines for mineral mining and processing (107): Libya (25.91), Algeria (17.76), Nigeria (12.91), Angola (9.4), Ethiopia (6.46), South Africa (6.34).

--Machines for the textile and clothing industries (63.94): Algeria (20.81), South Africa (9.94), Egypt (8.67), Morocco (7.91).

--Machine tools for metalworking (47.34): South Africa (20.89), Libya (5.63), Algeria (5.05), Tunisia (4.14), Nigeria (3.29).

--Nonelectric motors (39.91): Algeria (12.65), Morocco (9.01), Tunisia (7.09), Libya (6.43).

--Machine tools, other than for metal (35.99): South Africa (5.28), Egypt (5.12), Algeria (4.24), Tunisia (4.2), Nigeria (3.8).

--Agricultural machines and equipment (26.29): Libya (9.22), Algeria (3.45), Nigeria (3.23), Egypt (3.03).

--Machines and equipment for the food industry (17.5): Algeria (7.56), Tunisia (4.08), Libya (1.32).

--Machines for paper and cardboard production (9.17): Libya (2.6), Kenya (2.13), Algeria (1.85).

--Ball bearings (5.76): South Africa (2.39).

--Machines for the printing industry (4.91): South Africa (1.39), Egypt (0.83).

--Other nonelectrical machines and equipment (501.32): Libya (126.39), Algeria (90.69), Nigeria (51.83), South Africa (51.12), Egypt (50), Tunisia (27.06), Morocco (20.78), Ivory Coast (14.87).

--Pieces and spare parts for nonelectrical machines and equipment (228.94): Libya (51.43), Algeria (31.99), Nigeria (31.11), South Africa (24.65), Egypt (22.86), Morocco (17.41), Tunisia (14.26).

COM-IT-H

The Top 20 African Purchasers of Italian Machines and Equipment in 1980

(in billion lire)

Country	Nonelectrical Machines and Equipment	Electrical Equipment and Machines	Precision and Measuring, Watchmaking, and Office Equipment
Libya	237.29	99.36	45.80
Algeria	196.39	38.38	11.50
South Africa	126.49	31.39	25.43
Nigeria	110.04	38.46	7.95
Egypt	103.19	39.74	9.02
Tunisia	67.80	21.11	4.03
Morocco	63.02	14.11	3.20
Ivory Coast	20.90	3.82	0.43
Angola	19.48	1.71	4.61
Ethiopia	15.52	2.45	0.46
Kenya	14.49	1.98	1.82
Cameroon	13.35	1.35	0.47
Tanzania	12.32	1.27	0.95
Somalia	11.83	7.55	1.01
Canary Islands	10.30	3.63	0.82
Zaire	5.71	10.26	3.14
Sudan	5.14	0.63	0.72
Senegal	4.72	0.76	2.46
Reunion	4.47	0.75	0.26
Gabon	4.40	0.13	0.06

In the category of electrical equipment, exports of telecommunications equipment and parts dominate (70.57 billion lire): Libya (22.45), Nigeria (13.01), South Africa (6.71), Egypt (6.28), Tunisia (6.19). They are followed by motors and generators (63.19 billion lire): Libya (20.46), Algeria (11.24), Nigeria (10.85), Morocco (6.65), Egypt (6.53). Also noted are 185.60 billion lire of exports of other electrical equipment, parts and pieces: Libya (56.45), Egypt (26.93), Algeria (25.84), South Africa (20.68), Nigeria (14.60), Tunisia (12.10).

In the group of equipment whose exports are tabulated in the last column of Table COM-IT-H, precision and measuring instruments occupy the first place (89.64 billion lire). This equipment was sold primarily to Libya (44.01). Office equipment, in second place (37.25 billion), was supplied to 29 African countries, but in large quantities to South Africa (17.09). Sales of watchmaking equipment were weak: 1.33 billion (purchased by eight countries).

Transport Equipment

The 20 top African purchasers of Italian transport equipment are shown in Table COM-IT-I, along with the amount of the purchases. Total exports of this equipment in 1980 represented 1,079.25 billion lire: 83.5 percent road equipment, 16.5 percent other.

Sales of road equipment (902.72 billion lire) are distributed as follows (in billion lire):

--Automobiles (private cars and commercial vehicles), 415.20, including: Libya (114.53), Algeria (52.67), Somalia (44.95), South Africa (37.53), Egypt (35.26), Nigeria (23.99).

--Tractors, 166.43, including: South Africa (60.86) and Nigeria (58.79).

--Motorcycles and parts, 20.18, including: Nigeria (7.68) and South Africa (4.19).

--Bicycles and parts, 6.86.

--Spare parts for automobiles, 294.05, including: Algeria (80.74), Libya (55.42), Nigeria (45.91), South Africa (19.35).

Exports of transport equipment other than road equipment were as follows (in billion lire):

--Railway equipment, 8.02. Only Algeria imported a significant quantity (4.90).

--Aeronautical equipment, 91.54, including: Libya (39.48), Somalia (19.12), Tunisia (12.32), Zaire (10.78).

--Shipping equipment, 76.97, including: Liberia (26.91), Libya (22.48), Ghana (14.66).

Italy exported 688.5 billion lire of other "metal-mechanical" equipment (in billion lire):

Pig iron	5.42
Tools & instruments for handicrafts and agriculture	28.41
Bolts, screws, small hardware	15.78
Miscellaneous	638.84

to Libya (295.03), Algeria (84.46), Nigeria (59.48), Egypt (43.51).

COM-IT-I

The Top 20 African Purchasers of Italian Transport Equipment in 1980

(Ranked according to automobile imports) (in billion lire)

Country	Two-Wheel Vehicles	Tractors	Autos & Parts	Railway Equip.	Aero. Equip.	Shipping Equip.
Libya	1.48	10.02	169.95	--	39.48	22.48
Algeria	2.13	11.05	133.41	4.90	0.21	1.77
Nigeria	7.88	58.79	69.90	0.12	--	2.57
Egypt	2.55	0.49	56.88	0.06	--	5.02
South Africa	5.64	60.86	56.88	--	3.44	0.12
Somalia	0.30	1.77	53.33	0.04	19.12	0.38
Tunisia	0.94	4.49	34.07	1.02	12.32	0.66
Ethiopia	0.09	1	21.71	--	--	--
Morocco	0.68	4.18	19.98	0.14	4.97	0.31
Zambia	--	0.69	13.76	--	0.29	--
Tanzania	0.04	0.75	12.66	--	0.16	--
Canary Islands	0.57	0.25	12.64	0.07	0.05	--
Angola	0.03	0.16	9.77	0.05	--	0.07
Kenya	0.21	5.77	9.64	--	0.22	--
Zaire	0.53	0.56	6.32	--	10.78	--
Uganda	0.12	--	4.17	--	--	--
Ivory Coast	1.05	2.56	3.09	--	--	0.91
Sudan	0.09	--	3.09	--	0.17	--
Rwanda	--	0.06	2.69	--	0.10	--
Reunion	0.33	--	2.47	--	--	--

Sales to Africa of Italian nonmachine, nonfood manufactured products were mentioned above, but several details must be clarified here, although not stressed:

--Products of the chemical industry in general, 1,035.5 billion lire, including: petroleum derivatives, 610.3; plastics, 90.71; pharmaceuticals, 56.55; dyes, 27.24; soaps, detergents, etc., 23.33; chemical fertilizers, 21.02; chemical products for agricultural use, 14.88; synthetic rubber, 12.38; perfume products, 8.23; ink, adhesives, etc., 7.39; explosives, matches, 3.84; other organic chemical products, 20.86; other inorganic products, 45.66; miscellaneous chemical products, 78.71.

--Metallurgical products: 629 billion lire, including: ferrous metals, 517.95; Libya (221.67), Algeria (104.48), Tunisia (51.69), Nigeria (50.27); aluminum and aluminum alloys, 16.27; copper, 23.18; other nonferrous metals, 71.54.

--Textiles and related products: 379.2 billion lire, including: thread, 55.05; cloth, 51.10; hosiery, 34.73; fabric other than for clothing, 24.02; clothing and accessories, 213.37.

Products of miscellaneous manufacturing industries (375.4 billion lire) do not all fall under specific categories, but 108.76 billion included electric cable and wire, electric bulbs and musical instruments.

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CSO: 4719/444

BELGIAN, LUXEMBOURG TRADE WITH AFRICA REVIEWED

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1885, 25 Dec 81 pp 3415-3418

[Excerpts] The table below allows one to determine the distribution of the UEBL [Belgium-Luxembourg Economic Union] foreign trade among the various continents (figures given in billions of Belgian francs):

	Imports			Exports		
	1978	1979	1980	1978	1979	1980
Total	1,526.04	1,769.5	2,096.12	1,410.26	1,648.13	1,886.14
Europe	1,172.10	1,336.1	1,518.45	1,145.11	1,374.38	1,530.25
Africa	60.71	83.79	94.77	60.11	65.43	87.42
America	127.4	165.97	218.12	82.80	90.0	95.86
Asia	157.37	173.61	253.22	106.69	103.93	114.93
Oceania	7.45	8.83	10.1	4.62	4.24	5.2
Various	1.01	1.19	1.47	10.93	10.15	14.21

Trade exchanges between the UEBL and continents other than Europe represent the following percentages of the total transactions:

	Imports			Exports		
	1978	1979	1980	1978	1979	1980
America	8.35	9.38	10.4	5.9	5.5	5.1
Asia	10.31	9.81	12.1	7.8	6.3	6.1
Africa	3.98	4.74	4.5	4.3	3.97	4.6
Oceania and various	0.49	0.57	0.5	0.3	0.9	0.3

The 12 Major Partners of the UEBL in 1979
(figures in billions of Belgian francs)

Suppliers		Clients	
1) FRG	350.3	1) FRG	321.9
2) Holland	250	2) France	268.4
3) France	249.7	3) Holland	231.8
4) Great Britain	127.8	4) Great Britain	101.7
5) United States	116.9	5) Italy	64.5
6) Italy	61.2	6) United States	61.7
7) Saudi Arabia	58.9	7) Switzerland	47.03
8) Switzerland	35.2	8) Sweden	28.2
9) Japan	29.8	9) Denmark	16.6
10) Zaire	28.1	10) Algeria	14.8
11) Sweden	27.1	11) Saudi Arabia	14.2
12) USSR	17.4	12) Spain and Algeria (equal)	17.4

The 12 Major Partners of the UEBL in 1980
(figures in billions of Belgian francs)

Suppliers		Clients	
1) FRG	412.1	1) FRG	410.1
2) Holland	343.2	2) France	366.2
3) France	302.8	3) Holland	286.6
4) Great Britain	141.5	4) Great Britain	160.
5) United States	160.6	5) Italy	104.2
6) Saudi Arabia	121.1	6) Switzerland	72.1
7) Italy	75.2	7) United States	63.2
8) Switzerland	57.6	8) Sweden	30.7
9) Japan	41.9	9) Denmark	22.5
10) Zaire	36.2	10) USSR	18.1
11) Sweden	30.5	11) Nigeria	17.5
12) USSR	32.3	12) Spain and Algeria	17.4

Although steadily growing, the volume of trade between the UEBL and the African continent is still low--4.5 percent of the union's purchases all over the world, and 4.6 percent of its sales. One notices that the total value of the UEBL's transactions with its top partner is 4.5 times higher than its transactions with the entire African continent (South Africa included).

Trade Between the UEBL and Africa

The policy followed by Belgium and Luxembourg in their trade with Africa countries is the result of two basic features. First, there is the legacy of the colonial period; because of it, Belgium has large interests in Zaire, Rwanda, and Burundi despite nationalization measures, particularly in the mining companies of Shaba Province. This channeling of foreign trade toward former colonies is now curtailed by Zaire's financial difficulties.

Second, there is the fact that, after making several attempts to penetrate the African market--some more successful than others--Belgium has considerably increased its activities in the three countries that have the best development potential or the most prosperous financial situation, meaning Nigeria, Libya, and Algeria. Algeria and Nigeria were among the world's 12 top clients of the UEBL in 1980.

In these countries, Belgian companies conduct their operations mainly in the sectors of public works and construction, engineering, and transportation. On the other hand, these three countries provide a good part of the UEBL's supplies of oil and natural gas.

Overall, the UEBL's imports from Africa are marked by the predominance of a single industrial sector. It is the nonferrous industry in the case of Zaire, phosphates for Morocco, and textiles for Tunisia. Liberia sells diamonds and nonferrous metals to the UEBL.

A large portion of the UEBL's sales to Africa consists of products from its metal-transforming industry (such as automobiles and other transport vehicles, and the iron and steel industry) and of products from its chemical industry.

Imports From Africa

Over 50 percent of the UEBL's imports from Africa fall under three large categories of commodities: mineral products, including petroleum products, worth 28,297,760,000 Belgian francs and representing 29.9 percent of all imports from Africa; common metals and goods made of these metals, worth 18,656,470,000 and representing 19.7 percent; gems and precious metals, worth 5,896,000,000 or 6.2 percent.

Other groups of some importance are: textile materials and goods, worth 3,144.18 million (3.3 percent of the imports); products from the plant kingdom, mostly food products worth 2,515.34 million (2.7 percent); processed food products, beverages, tobacco worth 2,096.12 million (2.2 percent).

These products make up 64 percent of all of the purchases in Africa by the UEBL.

The Top 20 African Suppliers of the UEBL
(figures in millions of Belgian francs)

		1980	1979	1978	1977
1)	Zaire	36,155.4	28,072.8	24,134.3	22,684.8
2)	South Africa	12,967	12,498.8	10,894.7	10,584.7
3)	Nigeria	12,715.5	15,472	7,218.8	6,470.8
4)	Algeria	6,070.2	3,972.1	2,282.1	2,533.4
5)	Morocco	4,087.8	3,080.9	2,827.3	3,312.2
6)	Liberia	2,172.7	2,272.3	1,855.3	985
7)	Tunisia	2,067.3	1,645.0	1,270.5	1,324.6
8)	Ivory Coast	1,750.3	1,521.6	1,157.4	1,197.9
9)	Libya	1,735.6	2,859.6	366.8	678.5
10)	Zambia	1,681.7	1,647.	782.2	1,744.4
11)	Egypt	1,611.2	929.4	1,562.8	1,537.

Table continued

		1980	1979	1978	1977
12)	Congo	1,367.3	523.3	286.2	242.6
13)	Cameroon	1,072.9	1,523.3	855.7	783.9
14)	Gabon	990.5	583.7	37.2	246.6
15)	Burundi	807.3	529.1	526.9	299.7
16)	Mauritania	710.1	721.9	345.0	785.3
17)	Ghana	708.4	441.2	340.	578.4
18)	Mali	685.8	22.7	11.	11.9
19)	Togo	649.3	323.9	250.5	314.4
20)	Tanzania	607.2	981.5	416.2	568.1

Mineral products purchased in Africa are mostly energy producing: hydrocarbons, coal, and coke. The main suppliers of hydrocarbons are Nigeria, with 1,591,955.6 tons (12.03 billion Belgian francs); Algeria, 623,829 tons (5.5 billion); Libya, 206,261.3 tons (1.7 billion); Gabon, 119,903.1 tons (878.9 million); Angola, 35,597.3 tons (282.6 million).

Coal comes from South Africa, which supplies 2,092,046 tons (worth 2.6 billion Belgian francs); no coal was imported from Zaire in 1980.

Next in the list are the metal ores. Iron ore comes from: Liberia, 1,269,125 tons (832.2 million); Mauritania, 882.455 tons (700.2 million); Algeria, 805,253 tons (441.5 million); South Africa, 343.250 tons (254.4 million). In 1980, overall imports of iron ore dropped by 22 percent compared to 1979. This decline applies to all four countries.

Manganese ore comes from South Africa, 122,097 tons (214.8 million); Gabon (transported through the Congo), 63,467 tons (128.2 million); Ghana, 13,908 tons (28 million); Zaire, 33,634 tons (68.4 million).

Lead ore comes from Morocco, 5,528 tons (137.6 million), as does zinc ore, 475 tons (4.1 million).

Most of the phosphate comes from Morocco, which accounts for 1,450,073 tons (2.5 billion Belgian francs), but it is also imported from Tunisia, 45,161 tons (47.6 million), and from Togo, 213,815 tons (418.5 million).

It should be noted that 1,983.5 tons of ceramic clay were imported from Mozambique, but this was much less than the amount imported in 1979 (down by 54 percent in terms of tons).

Common metals and metal goods imported by the UEBL from Africa involve only some specific metals (copper, iron, nickel, aluminum) and the suppliers are few in number. Most of the purchases (over 90 percent) consist of copper from Zaire, 253,546.5 tons (16 billion Belgian francs), South Africa, 43,426.5 tons (3.2 billion), and Zambia, 21,533.2 tons (1.5 billion).

Ferrous products come from Egypt, which provides 6,956 tons of sheet metal (71.6 million), and from South Africa, which supplies 8,^39 tons (220.4 million) of metal bars and sections, and particularly alloys.

In 1980, the amount of aluminum and aluminum goods purchased by the UEBL increased sharply. These purchases were made in Ghana, 10,052 tons (512.3 million); in Egypt, 1,271 tons (66 million); and in Zaire (16 tons).

Purchases of precious metals, gems, jewels, and coins represent 5,112,820,000 Belgian francs and were mostly diamonds. It should be noted that no purchases were made in the Central African Republic in 1980 under this category. These purchases are as follows (in millions of Belgian francs): South Africa, 3,259.3; Congo, 1,001.4; Sierra Leone, 372.3; Tanzania, 234.2; Mauritius Island, 99.1; Tunisia, 88.3; Ghana, 38.5; Liberia, 15.4; Burundi, 4.3 (only coins).

Let us point out that the products known as tropical and Mediterranean products, which represent, as a rule, the largest part of the purchases made by European countries in Africa, account for less than 10 percent of the UEBL's total purchases in that continent. In the case of the union, Africa is chiefly a supplier of raw materials for its industry--and particularly for its metal industry.

Purchases of fruit amount to some 1.4 billion Belgian francs. Purchases made in South Africa totaled 50,150 tons and included 22,361 tons of citrus fruit (346.6 million Belgian francs), 19,512 tons of potatoes (443.5 million), 3,553 tons of pears (93.9 million), and 3,231.2 tons of grapes (151.2 million). Morocco supplied 15,911 tons of citrus and other fruits (238.4 million); the Ivory Coast, 4,660.5 tons of tropical fruits (107.5 million); and Swaziland, 507.8 tons of citrus fruits (8.5 million).

The UEBL buys its supplies of coffee mainly from six countries, and the total amount purchased was 7,648 tons. The purchases are distributed as follows: Kenya with 2,654 tons (322.9 million Belgian francs); Zaire with 1,652.6 tons (153.8 million); Cameroon with 1,512.5 tons (151.4 million); Uganda with 768.7 tons (72.8 million); Ethiopia with 667.3 tons (74.7 million); Burundi with 392.9 tons (40.1 million).

A total of 27 million Belgian francs were spent in purchases of spices from Madagascar (24.7 million) and Rwanda.

Imports of cocoa and cocoa-flavored products are rather low. They are worth 780.5 million Belgian francs and come from the Ivory Coast, with 3,813.4 tons; Nigeria, with 1,886.4 tons; Zaire, with 1,137.3 tons; Ghana, with 590.6 tons; Togo, with 465.1 tons.

Grain imports worth 152.3 million Belgian francs come from Tanzania (15,654.4 tons), Sudan (5,980.3 tons), Morocco (2,401.4 tons); 766.7 tons of rice come from Egypt (6.2 million).

Imports of pulses from Tanzania, which were particularly high in 1979 (34,739 tons), amounted to only 8,301 tons in 1980. The amount purchased in Morocco also dropped sharply--from 3,133 tons in 1979 to 1,673.3 tons in 1980. On the other hand, 2,945.8 tons of pulses were purchased from Ethiopia, 3,575.2 tons from the Canary Islands, 927.6 tons from Kenya, and 287.4 tons from Egypt.

Overall, purchases of pulses accounted for 252.9 million Belgian francs, compared to 414 million in 1979.

Vegetable oils (worth 156 million Belgian francs) were purchased from South Africa, 1,690.9 tons; the Ivory Coast, 2,029.2 tons; Senegal, 1,812.3 tons; Zaire, 1,771 tons; Morocco, 40.8 tons.

It should be noted that 270.7 million Belgian francs were spent to purchase pharmaceutical plants and cinchona bark. They were purchased in the following countries: Cameroon, Zaire, Rwanda, and Burundi.

Several sugar-producing countries sold molasses. These countries are: Mauritius Island (3,823.2 tons), Madagascar (8,862.7 tons), Kenya (5,390.2 tons), and Sudan (1,697.9 tons).

Oilcake was bought from Sudan (3,158.9 tons), Zaire (1,489.8 tons), and Ghana (180 tons).

The North African countries sell wine to the UEBL. The value of these sales is divided as follows: 136.4 million Belgian francs for Tunisia, 50.8 million for Morocco, and 21.1 million for Algeria.

There are six major suppliers of raw or manufactured tobacco: South Africa, 12,084.1 tons; Cameroon, 1,060.2 tons; Malawi, 893.3 tons; Mozambique, 236.6 tons; Tanzania, 130.3 tons; Madagascar, 38.4 tons. This represents purchases with a total value of 653 million Belgian francs.

Under the heading of textiles, the raw materials purchased by the UEBL in Africa consist, for the most part, of cotton, wool and sisal.

In 1980, purchases of raw and unginned cotton, cotton fibers and cotton fabrics basically amounted to 1.21 billion Belgian francs. They are distributed as follows (in tons):

Raw and Unginned Cotton:	
Egypt	2,631.4
Sudan	1,635.4
Chad	1,437.1
Mali	207.1
Togo	100
South Africa	23.7
Nigeria	3.4

Cotton Fabrics:	
Tunisia	2,446.7
Ivory Coast	218.5
South Africa	192.6
Egypt	27.9
Cotton fibers:	
Egypt	3,197.6
Ivory Coast	527.5
South Africa	176.3

Wool was purchased in South Africa: 1,671.1 tons (172.3 million Belgian francs). Sisal imports came from Madagascar, Tanzania, Mozambique, and Kenya and had a total value of 76.3 million. Flax was bought in Egypt for a total value of 78.3 million.

Items made of textiles accounted essentially for 1,302.7 million Belgian francs and they were imported from Tunisia (1,157.6 million) and Morocco (145.1 million). They consisted of hosiery items and clothing.

In the sphere of timber, for which Africa is a major world exporter, purchases were made in 10 countries--with particularly large amounts in two--for a total value of 1,868,000,000 Belgian francs.

	Tons	Million Belgian Francs
Cameroon	63,451.6	619.9
Ivory Coast	45,327.1	568.8
South Africa	17,759.1	127.7
Liberia	16,095.9	153.9
Congo	15,138.6	187.9
Zaire	10,038.4	126.
Gabon	6,514.2	74.3
Ghana	608.8	6.3
Nigeria	124.5	1.6
Mozambique	85.8	1.6

The UEBL's purchases of raw rubber in Africa came mostly from Zaire (572.4 tons), Cameroon (311.8 tons), the Ivory Coast (148.9 tons), and Liberia (32 tons). They represent a total value of 45.4 million Belgian francs.

The UEBL does not import many processed chemical products from Africa, except for phosphate byproducts such as anhydride or phosphoric acid from South Africa (19,993.6 tons, worth 106.3 million Belgian francs) and from Tunisia (7,251.6 tons, worth 53.4 million).

Exports to Africa

We will not give the details of the UEBL's exports to Africa. It is sufficient to know that, although they are rather well distributed on the whole, these exports involve mostly machinery and common metal products, meaning capital goods generally intended for the industrial sector. These items represent approximately one-third of the sales.

Top 20 African Clients of the UEBL
(in millions of Belgian francs)

	1980	1979	1978	19/7
1) Nigeria	17,549.2	10,333.6	9,263.2	8,405.3
2) Algeria	17,356.	14,820.7	12,825.4	10,286.4
3) Libya	8,196.5	3,809.7	4,235.3	8,253.4
4) Zaire	7,637.	5,778.4	5,606.2	6,467.5
5) South Africa	7,404.9	5,037.	4,578.2	4,808.6
6) Egypt	6,217.8	4,611.3	2,775.9	2,537.9
7) Morocco	3,098.3	4,283.2	3,290.1	4,410.3
8) Tunisia	3,096.3	2,086.9	2,066.7	83.7

Table continued

		1980	1979	1978	1977
9)	Ivory Coast	1,715.3	1,690.7	1,865.5	1,060.7
10)	Sudan	1,056.4	1,289.5	631.8	1,121.4
11)	Kenya	828.5	940.6	953.5	594.2
12)	Angola	818.2	907.1	1,212.5	838.3
13)	Canary Islands	772.	639.1	438.9	17.2
14)	Tanzania	768.2	908.9	923.9	1,029.7
15)	Rwanda	727.7	704.1	844.8	618.6
16)	Senegal	662.6	655.1	478.2	629.9
17)	Mauritania	661.4	523.2	729.4	285.1
18)	Burundi	616.3	545.6	412.5	362.2
19)	Liberia	585.6	931.7	422.5	718.6
20)	Zambia	584.2	484.7	314.5	362.2

A more detailed survey of each country or group of countries would reveal that a large amount of the purchases made by OPEC countries involve commodities from the iron and steel industry, the metal-transforming industry, and the food and textile industries.

The table above shows the evolution in purchases made by the top 20 African clients of the UEBL during the past 4 years.

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WISEMAN HAMPATE BA ON LIFE IN AFRICA

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/Interview with Prof Amadou Hampate Ba on life in Africa and prospects for 1982, by JEUNE AFRIQUE correspondent Siradiou Diallo; date and place not given/

> /Text/ From every part of the continent they come to Abidjan to absorb eagerly the words of the "eldest son of the century." For he is the memory of the black people. And one of their messengers of hope.

Born at the dawn of 1900, he is pleased with the title, "eldest son of the century." His eyes still lively and mobile behind the fine glasses of a retired professor, his face round and his chin adorned with a white goatee, Amadou Hampate Ba sometimes resembles an elderly wiseman who has just emerged from an oriental tale and at other times a dervish telling his beads without regard for the passage of time. But he is above all a wiseman in the ancient sense of the term, a scholar, that is, a man who has a precise knowledge of creatures and things.

Descendant of a great Peulvan family from Macina, this Malian is, in fact, a poet when he so desires, a philosopher, writer, imam and talented storyteller. Former member of the Executive Council of UNESCO, Hampate Ba, who was also Modibo Keita's ambassador to Ivory Coast, settled in Abidjan many years ago. More precisely, he settled in the popular sector of the Marcory quarter where his modest villa is both a haven of peace and an extraordinary crossroads of African thought.

Visitors of all ages and conditions come there. Some to request the "Master's" advice full of wisdom, others eagerly to absorb his words. And thus renew, if only during a moment's escape from the office, friendship with this inexhaustible well of African wisdom.

During the three conversation meetings we had with this elderly scholar with the alert mind and charming observations, we met up with top officials, students, businessmen and politicians. We even came across the daughter of "Wangrin," the hero of Hampate Ba's latest novel.

Sitting enthroned on the divan-bed of the living room where he receives his visitors or seated in front of a desk buried beneath piles of books and documents of all sorts and times, this astonishing person displays amazing activity despite his age. And without ever losing his pleasant mood or sense of humor. His observations, studded with African proverbs and maxims, sometimes give way to apt formulas some of which have made their way around the world. "In Africa," he wrote some years ago to UNESCO, "every time an old man dies, it is a library which burns!"

Since one never tires of hearing Hampate Ba, we are pleased to announce that the eminent "Mawdo" (elderly wiseman in the Peulvan language) is preparing an autobiography in three volumes. This work will not only improve the mind but also find its place in libraries throughout the world. While awaiting this enriching reading material, let us listen to the interview which, in the form of wishes for 1982, Hampate Ba was kind enough to grant us.

JEUNE AFRIQUE /JA/: As 1982 dawns, most of the African states are 21 years old. What lesson do you draw from these years of independence?

Amadou Hampate Ba /AHB/: In my opinion, this period represents a great school more than anything else, the school of life. It has permitted all Africans who think to become better acquainted. And also to become better acquainted with the rest of the world where they had little opportunity to go during the colonial period.

By discovering our differences, we can understand the causes of our mutual lack of understanding. And make the necessary effort not only to overcome our backwardness but also to live in peace with the other peoples of the world.

JA: Are Africans living better now than 21 years ago?

AHB: It all depends on what you mean by living better. Does it mean living in more comfortable houses and partaking of tasty foods, or else, living in peace with oneself? In my opinion, living well infers that one has a comfortable material life and a well-rounded spiritual life, but free of all bigotry.

JA: Do you think we are better off materially than before?

AHB: I am not too sure... (Silence) I believe that a large number of Africans have acquired a certain amount of material comfort they did not even think existed in the past.

JA: Is it bad to try to acquire material comfort?

AHB: Material comfort is necessary, for it represents good support for the body. And the body being our vehicle in our passage through life, it is essential that it be well cared for. But one should not forget that the body is not the entire man. Happiness is not confined to material comfort. If this were not so, how do you explain that millionaires commit suicide? Material comfort provides rest for the body; it does not bring peace to the heart. Multimillionaires often need tranquilizers and sleeping pills to sleep.

JA: Are the inhabitants of developed countries less happy because they do not have a tranquil existence?

AHB: Why, yes; because sleep is the thermometer of good health and, therefore, of body peace. The West no longer sleeps; it is ill.

JA: Africa sleeps but is not in better health.

AHB: Africa does not just sleep; it also laughs. Laughing, you see, is the thermometer of peace in the heart. Africa laughs; that is proof that it is in good health.

JA: In large African metropolises they have less and less time to laugh.

AHB: That is true. However, do not forget that African cities are only Africanized cities, for they are patterned after European or American cities. African wisdom would have us copy the technique of the whites to achieve comfort in our body while preserving peace in our heart. But I recognize that this is difficult.

JA: Do you consider yourself a happy man?

AHB: (Long silence)... Happiness is so relative! One can live with peace in one's heart without peace in one's body and be happy. One can live without comfort and be happy, because one has peace in one's heart. Inasmuch as--despite my age--I have no difficulty digesting my food, sleeping and laughing, I can say that I am a man approaching happiness.

JA: There are very few individuals who, like you, can aspire to happiness.

AHB: For my part, I consider myself a happy man, for I have no political problems, money matters or concerns about my security. I can even tell you that I am full of happiness, for I have the skin of a crocodile, the stomach of an ostrich and the heart of a turtledove.

Yes, I have the skin of a crocodile, for I can lie down anywhere without any problem; I do not need comfort to sleep well. I have the stomach of an ostrich in the sense that I eat anything without having any problem in digesting. Lastly, I have the heart of a turtledove, for I do not get angry and do not fight with anyone.

JA: All that is also the secret of your longevity, is it not?

AHB: If you wish. In any case, I consider that the secret of my happiness, which is perhaps that of my longevity, rests as much on my desire and need to serve (God and my fellow man) as on the strong aversion I have to ordering others about, which I refuse to do.

JA: During the past 20 years have Africans done all they should have done to get Africa out of the rut?

AHB: I believe that the Africans devoted enough effort but were lacking in means. We had freedom of speech but not freedom of action. We are still dependent in that respect, for one is always the son of one's instructor. The educator takes precedence over the producer.

JA: That is one of the biggest weaknesses of Africans.

AHB: It is all the more serious in that we have been conditioned not to be able to do without what we do not produce.

JA: We are also reproached with being lazy...

AHB: That is only a slogan which has no meaning and, in a word, is said to make our life more complicated. Are not those who reproach us for our alleged laziness the same ones who invented the expression: "to work like a nigger"? You know, one does not sow in unplowed land. The West arrived in Africa with its norms and ideals to try to make a clean sweep of our customs, ideas and habits. Let the West help us use the tractor or penicillin, agreed. But, for goodness' sake, let it keep its hands off our customs and values!

JA: What does time represent for you?

AHB: In traditional Africa time did not count. That is why I think that anyone who constantly says he has no time to lose should not come to Africa. Having said that, I recognize that bad use of time does not promote development. Africans who have received modern education should take that into consideration in acting and behaving in accordance with the modern norms which imply that "time is money."

JA: How do you explain the instability of African regimes?

AHB: I know that everything is not perfect in those regimes. There are even many weaknesses, injustices and errors. But, believe me, most of the coups d'etat and other attacks to which the African governments are subject stem from the passion, longing and desire to govern. The famous "Get out of there and leave me some room" has, alas, become a law of contemporary Africa, a product of the times.

JA: Nevertheless, there are certain abuses one cannot accept. Everything must have limits, even the power of our heads of state.

AHB: It is true that excesses are committed by certain African regimes. I know that in a democracy those who are elected comply with the wishes of the voters, and not the opposite. But, with some exceptions, it is not this or that head of state who is a despot or tyrant. It is the regime itself which, in essence, is despotic, tyrannical.

JA: When the regime is tyrannical, it is normal for one to want to change it, even if one has no political ambition.

AHB: In any case, people are always glad to change leaders. It amuses them. Like a little girl who tirelessly beheads her doll so that each time her parents will buy her a new one. If it were up to the people, the leader would be killed every day to find them a new replacement. The misfortune of important individuals always gives pleasure to the unimportant. It is the people who are unstable; that is why the leaders mistrust them.

JA: What, then, is the nature of power?

AHB: Power is, alas, like alcohol. After the first glass, one is as merry as a lamb. With the second, it is as though one had eaten the flesh of a lion. One feels so strong that one is no longer willing to be challenged. One wants to lord it over everyone like the lion on the plain. With the third glass, one is like a pig; one can do only indecent things.

JA: Then, there are at least three phases of power?

AHB: Yes. The first phase corresponds to the period when the leader is as kind and gentle as a lamb. The second is when the leader, considering himself an absolute monarch, becomes formidable. But at that point he is only feared. Finally, when the leader reaches the third phase of his power, he is not only feared but detested by his people.

JA: Is it not because they remain in power too long that many African leaders end up being hated?

AHB: You know, there is no good leader but a future one. Despotism is part of being human. What I resent in the present African leaders is less their despotism than their lies. Every day they lie to their people, while nothing obliges them to do so. As they are despots, they do not have many accounts to render to their people. They do as they please. Since that is the case, I do not see why they feel the need to lie. That is both sad and humiliating for us.

JA: In Africa, all the voices which are ordinarily inclined to be the conscience of the people became silent, one after the other, for fear of having to answer to those in power; this includes the unions, youth, students and even the elderly. What do you think of this submission?

AHB: The silence of the elderly is explained by a serious deception. During the colonial period, you remember, aware that they were risking their freedom and sometimes their life, the elderly were not afraid to speak, to criticize the government's excesses. Now that their children have replaced the colonial administrators, what do you expect the elderly to say?

The elderly are frankly troubled. All the more so, inasmuch as the children are proving to be more violent, more wicked and more brutal than the colonial administrators. The elderly are so astonished that they prefer to keep their mouth closed and die of chagrin rather than have to condemn their children.

JA: In the traditional Africa, did the government systems contain opposition?

AHB: Absolutely. With the "sanankoun," our traditional regimes had judicious and effective opposition. There were people who were permitted to tell the king a few plain truths with no risk whatever.

JA: Traditional regimes then admitted the existence of contradictions in society?

AHB: You know, horizontal uniformity and total harmony are not of this world. Absolute equality exists only at the horizon. But the horizon is never reached, for it recedes as one advances. That is why movement is mandatory. Our traditional societies were so aware of this that our wisemen said that life is movement and that movement begins with contradiction among the members (feet, legs, arms...)

To say that someone had died, one said that his feet were equal. Why? Because, so long as one is alive, one has unequal feet. It is contradiction which enables society to advance. Noncontradiction is the equivalent of death. Progress results from discussion and criticism, not to mention contradiction.

JA: Do you think communism has a future in Africa?

AHB: As soon as someone asks me to prophesy, I feel ill at ease. I cannot speak of the future, for, being a Muslim, I believe that the future belongs to Allah the All-Powerful. To return to the subject of communism, I shall say that Africa has no lesson in collectivism to receive from anyone. At all times Africans have basked in a communal world. Even if they wanted to break loose from that type of arrangement, they could not do so, for this system is an integral part of their life, of their manner of thinking, of their entire being.

JA: And what about capitalism?

AHB: I am not a capitalist and shall undoubtedly never be one. The old man, which I am, has always had a simple and modest life. But I am not ashamed to admit that between capitalism and communism my preferences are for the former.

I prefer capitalism because it promotes competition. Without considering that controlled finance has failed everywhere. Is it a risk? I do not believe so. I am convinced that only private ownership can enable a society to prosper, for the owner works first for himself.

JA: But capitalism also has its faults.

AHB: Of course; and I am not unaware of them. I shall even say that it is desirable, if not essential, to correct the excesses and faults inherent in capitalism, particularly the inequalities and injustices. Having said that, I must say that we must not lose sight of the fact that man is the most difficult animal to manage, if only because of his desire for change.

JA: Is it possible to preserve African culture at a time when television, videocassettes and satellites are invading the world?

AHB: Yes, so long as Africa becomes sufficiently well organized to be able to use those techniques wisely. Not only will it have nothing to fear from its influence but will even be able to use those techniques to do a better job in gathering and preserving the values of its thousand-year-old civilization.

JA: But how shall we prevent the youth, whose heads will be full of imported images, from thinking in terms of norms which are foreign to Africa?

AHB: It is up to the leaders of our countries to take measures, find methods and establish study programs designed to promote contacts between the young and the old, the modernists and the traditionalists. We must leave no stone unturned to see that the former maintain those contacts and are molded in the image of the latter.

You know, when a sheep is in the fold, there is no need to bleat in its place. Having greater knowledge of our traditions than the most qualified foreign Africanists, we are naturally in better position than they to put the modern techniques to the service of the African civilization. Africa must not be a well which is fed from the outside but, rather, a well which is fed by its own inner spring.

JA: In terms of civilization, do you think other countries of the Third World are better off than our country?

AHB: Other so-called Third World countries have done a better job preserving their civilizations because they have been less divided and less ill-treated physically and economically than we have. And particularly, they have been less conditioned than the Africans. Conditioning is to the spirit of a people what condiments are to cooking. It determines their tastes, ideas and aspirations.

JA: In Africa the colonizer was not content with occupying the land; he went so far as to confiscate our souls.

AHB: It is true that we Africans have reached the point of losing our traditions. So that if we now want to develop, we must begin by renewing our traditions, even if this means pruning certain ones. However, we must realize that pruning means cutting certain branches, not the trunk.

JA: If you were asked to define African civilization in a few words, what would you say?

AHB: I would define it as being the common reality of Africa and not how it appears to be. No one possesses the entire truth. One has only a smattering of truth.

JA: Do you sometimes think about death?

AHB: At least five times every day, that is, before and after each of the five prescribed prayers. I never travel without my shroud being properly placed at the bottom of my suitcase. For I await death at any moment. It will not take me by surprise.

JA: Nevertheless, are you afraid of death?

AHB: It is useless to want to turn one's back on what one cannot avoid. I am not afraid of death. Moreover, at my age a Muslim can hardly fear anything, except God. In my opinion, death is not an enemy.

JA: What does death represent for you?

AHB: Death does not exist in African civilization. It is perceived as a simple change of residence. One leaves one dwelling for another. In African philosophy death does not consume the soul, even though it consumes the body.

The soul is eternal. Authentic African tradition has it that death is even a form of liberation. That is why, with certain African peoples, death is an occasion for singing and dancing, not tears. The fate of the child who first sees life is more serious than that of the person who dies. At his first contact with life, a child cries. He is not wrong. After all, it is more painful to live than to die.

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CSO: 4719/501

INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS

BRIEFS

CEAO REPORT--In Dakar on 13 December, the Council of Ministers of the West African Economic Community (CEAO) adopted a report which had been presented to the summit of heads of state of the six member countries of the community (Ivory Coast, Upper Volta, Mali, Mauritania, Niger and Senegal) on 14 December. The report covers, among other things, financing and the implementation of community projects, cooperation in the field of communication and the establishment of multinational companies. The ministers and heads of state of CEAO also adopted the organization's 1982 budget and the program of activities for the Solidarity and Operations Fund for Community Development (FOSIDEC) relative to both national and communitywide projects. These community projects include creation of a fishing company, an advanced institute of fishery, advanced schools to teach management skills in mining and the textile industries, a regional solar energy center, and the implementation of a water program. These projects, which are planned for launching in 1982, are receiving 50 billion Fr CFA in external financial support. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1884, 18 Dec 81 p 3362] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981] 9516

UMOA MEMBERSHIP--The conference of heads of state of the West African Monetary Union (UMOA) announced, in a communique dated 15 December that after considering the issues submitted by the Council of Ministers on 14 December, it had decided to delay any decision on Mali's entry into the UMOA and to consider the matter further. Also, Abdoulaye Fadiga's term as governor of the BCEAO [Central Bank of the West African States] was extended to 31 December 1982. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1884, 18 Dec 81 p 3362] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981] 9516

BEAC MEETING--The board of directors of the Bank of Central African States (BEAC) has just finished meeting in Bangui. After reviewing the world economic situation with special attention to developments in the world market for raw materials, which are still grim, the council noted with interest signs confirming a partial upturn in economic activity throughout the states of the currency zone. The net external assets of the Bank, which serves the zone's financial institutions, continued to rise, going from 43.8 billion Fr CFA on 31 August 1980 to 127.7 billion on 31 August 1981. On 30 September 1981, the coverage rate (foreign exchange commitments) had risen from 46.3 percent to 54.17 percent over the past year. This consolidation of the reserve situation for the currency zone coincided with a significant increase in credit to the economy, going over 12 months from 20.2 percent to 31.5 percent. The council also reviewed quarterly activity reports from the national monetary committees and their implementation of its directives. It accepted proposals from certain committees suggesting establishment of overall ceilings for short- and medium-term credit. The council then approved the final accountings for the 1980-1981 fiscal year, authorized some not fully utilized credits be carried over to 1981-82 and decided to add to the reserves all available funds left over from 1980-81. The council decided to hold its next regular meeting at Libreville. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1884, 18 Dec 81 p 3372] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981] 9516

CSO: 4719/374

OAU ROLE IN NATION SAID TO HAVE SHORTCOMINGS

London NEW AFRICAN in English No 172, Jan 82 pp 10-12

[Article by Alem Mezgebe]

[Text] IT IS COMMONPLACE. Aircraft of different makes rub wing-tips daily at every international airport. But in this case it was symbolic.

The two aircraft parked at N'Djamena airport in the Chadian capital each personified the Super Power presence in Africa. One was unloading its cargo of uniformed men. The other was taking on a cargo of uniformed men.

It was Sunday, November 15, 1981. Mobutu's 272 paratroopers were spilling out of a US-made Air Zaire DC-10. At the same time, Gadaffi's last 150 soldiers in Chad were being airlifted home aboard a Russian-made Ilyouchine aircraft. It was a curious sight. A scene worth a thousand lectures in international relations.

The scenario was the beginning of what is hoped to be a happy ending to the Chad drama.

Mobutu's haste

Zaire's rush to the scene could account for President Mobutu's eccentricity in politics. Some would see it, perhaps, as an encouraging sign of some order coming out of the Chadian disorder.

Mobutu, more than any other African leader, has had close encounters with chaos and "peacekeeping" forces of all types, throughout the two decades of Zairean independence and 17 years of his reign.

Mobutu did not explain his haste. Some light on his decision to dispatch troops ahead of all other contingents was thrown by the President of the so-called Transitional Government of National Unity (GUNT), Goukouni Oueddei.

In an interview with the Zairean radio on November 26, Oueddei said: "Though the Libyans completed their withdrawal from the country about a month ago, we are left alone with the Zairean troops."

Whatever the motive, Mobutu's was a unilateral decision and caused a diplomatic flurry. It angered Nigerian President Shehu Shagari who had insisted that his forces, and not a contingent from a Francophone country, should set foot first on Chadian soil.

The Zairean leader followed that up with an unexpected call for a summit in Kinshasa on November 20 of the six troop-supplier countries – Nigeria, Senegal, Zaire, Togo, Benin and Guinea.

The move was strongly opposed by Nigeria which considered a summit redundant. It argued that a meeting of the foreign ministers of the six a week earlier had thrashed out the basics of the peacekeeping force.

The chairman of the OAU, Kenyan President Daniel arap Moi, was none too happy about Mobutu's impetuous move to assemble the heads of state.

In a veiled criticism of his peer, Moi said it was untimely to hold a meeting until a Nigerian-financed team of 14 officers from the donor countries despatched to Chad to examine ways of effectively deploying the peace-keeping force, returned with recommendations.

Nigeria and Kenya seem to have chosen a smooth way out to remind Mobutu that the peace-keeping mission was an OAU scheme. And that Chairman Moi was in command.

This was underscored by a meeting on November 27 in Nairobi of delegations from five of the six participating nations (Guinea was absent) to draw up a three-tier plan to complete by December 17 the deployment of the OAU force in Chad. The meeting was chaired by the Kenyan leader.

Placed under the command of a Nigerian general, the inter-African force consists of 5,000 troops, all of whom fall under the authority of OAU Secretary – General Edem Kodjo.

An Ethiopian, Gebregziabher Dawit will represent the OAU chief in Chad and will preside over an administrative committee comprising Benin, Congo, Guinea and Kenya. An observer team has also been appointed. Chaired by Kenya, its members include Algeria, Gabon, Congo, Guinea-Bissau and Zambia.

The OAU force, the first of its kind in Africa, has been received with mixed feelings in African quarters.

Optimists have welcomed the move. They say it is a sign of an organisation, if not a continent, coming of age. Chad today, tomorrow . . . who knows?

Stillborn

It appears, however, that Goukouni Oueddei counts himself among the legion of sceptics who have grave doubts about the OAU initiative.

On the eve of his departure for the Nairobi meeting, the Chadian leader did not mince his words.

He said: "I am not expecting anything from the OAU. Since 1979 the OAU has been dodging the issue of sending troops to Chad. We are henceforth determined to count on our own troops."

"I am obliged," Oueddei went on, "to be present in order not to annoy my fellow heads of state."

Goukouni Oueddei, as head of state, is a product of the Lagos accords of August 18, 1979. That was when Nigeria brought to the conference table all the warring factions to devise a *modus vivendi* between them that would ultimately lead to a *modus operandi* in the form of a national union government.

The warring factions formed GUNT. But on March 21, 1980, when fighting broke out between them, those factions went their separate ways.

Even if not stillborn, President Shagari's peace formula was bound to abort in some way. For one thing, the Chadian factions owed allegiance to foreign powers, mainly France and Libya. And, in one case, Nigeria itself. The *Mouvement Populaire pour la Libération du Tchad* (MPLT) was reportedly the warhorse of the African giant. And the African states that showed special concern for Chad had also their own foreign godfather – France.

There are serious doubts that the latest move in Chad was an African initiative.

Only days before Oueddei asked for a Libyan troop withdrawal after a five-hour Cabinet meeting on October 29, there were reports of a French proposal for an African peacekeeping force for Chad.

Reports said that French President François Mitterrand, who was then attending the North-South dialogue in Cancun (Mexico), had instructed his air force chiefs to stand by for an airlift into Chad of Nigerian and Senegalese troops.

The French leader also sent an urgent communication to Moi to authorise, in his capacity of OAU Chairman, deployment of an inter-African force to the war-torn state.

A US client

Mitterrand had cause for concern. Hisseine Habre, one of the Frolinat originals, was making a striking comeback in eastern Chad, along the Sudanese border. His *Forces Armées du Nord* (FAN) were to seize the sizeable town of Achebe and the smaller centres – Iriba, Adre and Guerada – only four days after the Libyan withdrawal. By then, the French had transferred their aegis to Goukouni Oueddei in N'Djamena. And for good reason, too.

Habre, who held an ambiguous pro-French stance during his days as Defence Minister in GUNT in 1979, had since his demise in late 1980 allegedly become a US client. He is believed to be receiving arms and expertise from Washington via the Egyptian and Sudanese regimes.

Habre's recent statement seems to confirm this suspicion. In fact, it looks as if he is doing a "Jonas Savimbi twist."

In an interview on November 1, with the French news agency AFP in his stronghold in eastern Chad, the rebel leader said the United States "cannot ignore Moscow's strategy because the destiny of freedom-loving people in Africa is at stake". An active American interest in the stability of this region was needed and was welcome, he added.

Press reports said Paris was concerned about a possible anti-Libyan rebellion inside Chad "financed from outside" – meaning, perhaps, the United States. Hence, the French leader's pressure on Moi and the African leaders who were present at the Cancun meeting in late October.

"There is," said French officials, "a grave deterioration of the civil struggle in Chad."

This perhaps explains Mobutu's dash to Chad. The French have footed the bill for his swift move. Other costs for the remaining five-nation contingent were expected to be covered by the United States and other European powers. Sudan had already announced that it was prepared to pay for Togolese forces on the OAU contingent.

Vast garrison

The unprecedented OAU force's mandate is rather ambiguous: It is to keep the peace, supervise elections, and to help the various factions in Chad to integrate their armies, says the directive.

Although the machinery for the mandate has now been put in place, the fact that the OAU has given its full backing to the Oueddei-Acyl GUNT at the expense of the plethora of other factions operating in the Chadian wilderness, defeats its own purpose.

Chad is a vast garrison with dozens of armies operating along ethnic or religious grounds. Some are splinter groups formed from personality clashes among the Chadian elite. As it is, it is easier to buy a gun in that country than a bowl of rice.

More significantly, "reconciliation" is being imposed on them when the will to do so is lacking in the country itself.

This reality makes the force's task of maintaining law and order in uranium-rich Chad virtually impossible. Lebanon is a case in point. The UN peace-keeping force there has hardly turned Lebanon into a haven of tranquility.

If Oueddei asked for assistance of the OAU force to crush Habre's forces, will it comply?

In his reply to newsmen in Nairobi after the summit of the six, OAU assistant secretary-general Peter Onu was vague.

"You may interpret the text in any way you want," was all he could say.

The text stated that the force would "assure the defence and security of the country (Chad) until the integration of the government forces."

Oueddei himself had a word of warning for the OAU after the meeting.

"If the OAU equivocates," he said, "the Government of Chad will have the right to seek help from its friends."

It is not clear, though, which of his friends Oueddei will approach in case of need. In a broadcast on November 28, the Libyan leader had pledged "to remain neutral if fights in Chad flare again".

So the germs of another armed confrontation are still there.

Apart from Hisseine Habre's swelling ranks of well-trained, well-equipped forces – estimated at more than 6,500 men – there are these forces:

- Goukouni Oueddei's *Forces Armées Populaires* (FAP) 3,000 men;
- Ahmat Acyl's *Front d'Action Commune* (FAC) 2,000 men;
- Former Chief of Gendarmerie Abdel Kader Kamougue's *Forces Armées Tchadiennes* (FAT) 2,000 men;
- Others: 2-3,000 men.

Deep hostility

Of these, Libya's man in N'Djamena, Foreign Minister Ahmat Acyl, has the strongest armed force of the lot. His arsenal is known to include Sam-7 ground-to-air missiles and flame throwers.

Although forced by circumstances to break bread together, there is no love lost between Oueddei and Acyl. Their hostility was violently manifested when their troops clashed on April 19 last year in Abeche, leaving many dead and wounded in both camps. This led to an angry Cabinet meeting between the GUNT president and his foreign minister.

Oueddei's hostility towards Habre will, some observers believe, cause problems for the OAU force in Chad. So deep is the hostility that Oueddei told a Zairean interviewer shortly before his departure for Nairobi that "Hissine Habre is a criminal with whom the people of Chad can never be reconciled."

He went on: "Sooner or later the Chadian people will catch and condemn him.

Even execute him." In June, a special court had condemned *in absentia* the rebel for armed rebellion, treason, murder, and intelligence with a foreign power.

This attitude might lead, it is feared, to the OAU force becoming an instrument for a witch-hunt rather than a contingent of armed doves.

As a *Jeune Afrique* correspondent put it: "Will the inter-African contingent die in Abeche on behalf of Oueddei?"

One would have thought that the OAU's wisest move would have been to call for a plebiscite in war-torn Chad rather than elections.

It seems the organisation has maintained its tradition of excluding the people of Africa from exercising their fundamental right to determine their own destiny. The fact that it elected to endorse a phantom government whose precarious existence was made possible only thanks to a Libyan occupation force of 4,000 men, throws its latest initiative to the winds.

Oueddei's complaint that since 1979 the OAU has been dodging the issue of sending troops into Chad is justified, perhaps, by the fact that the OAU always seems to need mentors from outside the continent to bless its actions. In July, 1979, it was seeking UN finances to send the same number of peacemakers to halt the strife in Chad.

Granted, the now fossilised principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of member-states has always been at the back of the organisation's mind. But the turn of events surrounding the Chad affair bring to mind the sort of contradictions that have blunted the effectiveness of the OAU.

Very little attempt, if any, has so far been made to assist Mozambique and Angola – the two Frontline states whose sovereignty is repeatedly threatened by South Africa. Nor did the OAU envisage a defence force to resist mercenary attacks on member states. Seychelles is a case in point. Comoro fell to mercenaries and is still ruled by a handful of white adventurers.

What was behind the latest move? Was it to salvage Chad from Russo-Libyan clutches? Or was it concern for the future of a country torn to pieces by never-ending strife?

It must be recalled that Libya was condemned for sending troops into Chad. But it is also true that Oueddei had asked for them. What was objectionable in Libya's action, say observers, was its unilateral nature.

The OAU action, some observers maintain, is equally condemnable because there is no legally constituted government in Chad. The rag-tag administration of Goukouni Oueddei represents only itself, they say.

Self-defence

The fact that there are scores of armed groups in that unhappy country is proof that no government can exist or function with OAU or Libyan backing without the Chadian people. From the political landscape, each armed group represents an opinion that no one, including the OAU, should disregard.

Some observers believe the OAU set a dangerous precedent when it accepted requests by unpopular governments in Africa to send in "law-and-order" contingents to maintain those regimes in power.

The likelihood is that the OAU force will behave like an occupation force. In "self-defence", perhaps.

An old shopkeeper in N'Djamena is quoted as saying: "The last thing we want is to exchange one occupation force for another." This view is destined to become widespread.

A call for a revision of the OAU charter must be heeded before the organisation reaches the age of relative senility. As things stand, it is reviving the late President Kwame Nkrumah's plea for an African Defence Force. But for a different purpose.

Such a force must not be used against Africans, only against the enemies of Africa. It is high time, too, that the right of self-determination becomes a sacrosanct principle, not a non-interference dogma●

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CHAD

NO UNILATERAL SOLUTION TO PRESENT SITUATION CONSIDERED POSSIBLE

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French No 1096, 6 Jan 82 pp 56, 57

[Article by Francois Soudan "Goukouni Against Kodjo"]

[Text] Where will Hissein Habre stop? In just 2 months, since the withdrawal of Libyan troops fro. Chad in early November, seven eastern villages, including the important prefecture of Abeche and the strategic point of Oum Hadjer, have passed under the control of his Northern Armed Forces [FAN]. And with scarcely any fighting. Habre, now in control of more than 300,000 square kilometers of scraggy bush country and sandy trails, is camping at the doorstep of Ati and Mongo, the first line of defense for Ndjamena. It is a sort of playback in reverse of the long march he made just a year ago when Colonel Qadhdhafi's expeditionary force drove his men to the Sudan border. Today, the Libyans have returned to their native Jamahiriya. And Hissein Habre obviously intends to fill the vacuum.

Up to now FAN's November campaign has always been the same: a small group of motorized battalions (Toyotas equipped with mini Katyushas and Land Rovers armed with 75-mm cannon) comprising the bulk of Habre's "intervention force" have laid siege to each in turn of the eastern villages once the garrisons had departed. The fall of Abeche on 19 November was particularly significant: two mortar shells fired on the airport by the men of "Commandant" Abdel Assoul were enough to take this city of 30,000 inhabitants without a shot fired. Since then, Habre has set up his command post there in a spacious villa, abandoning his general headquarters at Kolbus. The first columns of refugees from El-Geneina soon arrived in Sudan.

Only two major skirmishes marred FAN's westward progress: between Biltine and Amzoer, in early November, and at Kotoro-Falata not far from Oum Hadjer in early December: the FAN offensive, under the command of the new chief of staff, Gouara Lassou (his predecessor, Taer Guenassou, is now a political commissar), has up to now gotten no further than the edges of the lowlands that descend to the capital, no further than the fates of Ati and Mongo, where since 8 December elements of the neutral "Eastern zone" OAU [Organization of African Unity] forces have been stationed. It is true that there is very little to oppose it. The weight of the fighting has been sustained by the troops of foreign affairs minister Acyl Ahmat, which rapidly dispersed before an adversary whose training, level of motivation and arms as well (since the fall of Abeche and the impressive arsenal that was strangely left behind by the Libyans) were superior.

The Integrated National Army, or ANI, theoretically includes all the Chadian factions opposed to Hissein Habre and should be engaging it on the ground. But militarily it does not yet exist: heterogeneous, poorly armed, it has only one leader, Lieutenant Colonel N'Golobaye Allafi, and a few hundred men. Finally--and this not an unimportant detail, though it has been kept from most observers--the FAN has some impressive communications equipment given to it in 1979 by French officers when they departed from Ndjamena. This equipment enabled them, up to last November, to monitor the radio communications of Libyan troops and pass the information to French military intelligence...

So it is hard to see why Hissein Habre would quit when he has so much going for him. After all, he had been the leading figure in the enemy coalition throughout 1980 until the Libyan contingent came to President Goukouni's aid. And it is no secret that within the Transitional National Unity Government (GUNT) there is occasional discord, as shown by the November confrontations between supporters of Mamamat Abba Said (minister of the interior) and supporters of Acyl Ahmat, not to mention the obvious aversion of Colonel Kamougue (who heads the most disciplined force in the coalition) to participating in the fighting in the east.

In reality, the new situation created by the arrival of the OAU peace force on 15 November and its subsequent deployment has completely dictated Hissein Habre's strategy: occupy the most terrain possible, taking advantage of the vacuum left by the Libyan withdrawal, but avoid any contact with the interafrican contingent. The objective: regain control of the regions formerly under his control, and force the OAU to see that there can be no "solution" to the Chadian problem without him. In carrying this out, FAN's forces have acted with considerable skill, going clearly on the offensive while at the same time maintaining from the start that they were prepared to work with the interafrican troops under Nigerian General Geoffrey Ejiga.

So one can understand the anxiety and nervousness shown by Goukouni Oueddei who, in the face of the danger Habre increasingly poses, has moved from vague warnings to leveling concrete threats. Aware of the ineffectiveness of the ANI and averse to seeing Acyl Ahmat assume the role of de facto military leader of the GUNT, the Chadian president has been appealing to the OAU with ever greater frequency since early December. His approach has been to make a very subtle and self-serving distinction. According to Goukouni, the peace force is above all a force for preserving order; thus it must combat disorder, i.e. Hissein Habre. On 20 December, in Libreville, Goukouni was even more direct: "The Chadian Government believes it is now pointless to maintain and keep such a force within its borders, since it is doing nothing to safeguard Chad's security and integrity." And one hears muttering within the head of state's camp that their Libyan "big brother" had a less squeamish view of its role and it might unfortunately be necessary to call on him again...

Now it is just this threat of "Libyanization" of the OAU contingent that its leaders, starting with Edem Kodjo, want above all to avoid: they especially want to avoid getting mired in a counter-guerrilla conflict which (according to Colonel Qadhdhafi himself) cost the Libyan army more than 300 lives even though its armament and especially its air cover were infinitely greater than those enjoyed by the Zairians, Nigerians and Senegalese in the OAU force. In the view of the authorities in the panafrican organization, if a town must be "recaptured"--as is the case, for example, with Abeche--it is solely the ANI's responsibility: Chad's affair, so to speak. The OAU force comes in only later, to keep the peace that has already been established.

This position is the outcome of a diplomatic balancing act, but it does have the virtue of pointing the finger at the real problem in Chad, the problem of reconciliation. It is a balancing act because everyone from Addis to Ndjamena knows that at least for the moment there is no ANI, and so it is incapable of retaking any positions at all. And even if it seems drole to watch Goukouni Oueddei, who not too long ago was claiming his men would riddle Habre's with Kalashnikovs, now confessing his military impotence to obtain the operational participation of the OAU troops, one can well understand that he might have some good reasons to be bitter.

Perhaps, in fact, he had been promised too much, led to expect too much, in September and October, when pressure was being put on him to demand the complete withdrawal of the Libyan expeditionary corps: "In exchange for this courageous act, Goukouni obtained assurances that he would not have to face Habre alone," said one of Goukouni's confidants in Paris recently. "Now look: everyone washes his hands of it and tells him he must himself take full responsibility for that decision; in my opinion, that is an irresponsible attitude."

And in private, at the Paris meeting where they were "playing the OAU game," the Chadian president was described as unusually violent.

However, the position taken by Edem Kodjo and the OAU contingent which he commands is perfectly logical from a juridical point of view; except for Korea, no international force has actually ever fought on the ground--except to defend itself--against external aggression, or, consequently, against internal dissidence. This is true in the present case of the United Nations troops in Lebanon who do not intervene either against the Israeli incursions or against Major Haddad's rebellion. And this is in fact what distinguishes, both formally and practically, an expeditionary type force (for example, the French in Shaba, the Cubans in Angola, or...the Libyans in Chad) from a peace force. In addition, the conflict--perhaps a temporary one--between the OAU and President Goukouni shows, if there were any further need of proof, that no unilateral solution that excludes one of the constituent elements of the political life of the state can be permanently imposed on a country. Today, whether one likes it or not, that element is Hissein Habre, as during the Malloum era it was Goukouni Oueddei...So what is needed is reconciliation. Unless that word has disappeared from the Chadian vocabulary...

9516
CSO: 4719/478

CHAD

BRIEFS

BRITISH, ALGERIAN AID--The London-based Overseas Development Administration announced on 8 January that on the following day it would be airlifting to Chad 35 tons of powdered milk to be distributed by the Red Cross to children under the age of 6 suffering from malnutrition. It also offered trucks to distribute that aid valued at $58,000. On the other hand, the Algerian daily EL MOUDJAHID announced on 7 January that large quantities of rolling stock, food and drugs were being transported every day from Algeria to Chad by Algerian military transport planes. According to Chadian officials, quoted by the Algerian newspaper's special correspondent in Ndjamena, "Algeria was the only country which, in December 1981, had fulfilled all its commitments to Chad." Bo Passiri, Chadian secretary of state for foreign affairs and cooperation--who had presided over the first meeting, held in Algiers, of the Algerian-Chadian Joint Cooperation Commission created by a decision made during President Goukouni Weddei's visit to Algiers in October--came to Algiers recently to ask President Chadli Bendjedid for Algerian help in the reconstruction of Chad. According to EL MOUDJAHID, many Chadians are currently undergoing training in various Algerian institutions and centers and more trainees are expected in coming months. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1888, 15 Jan 82 p 149] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1982.] 8796

CSO: 4719/500

COMORO ISLANDS

BRIEFS

NEW SINGLE PARTY--On 6 February, the new single party, Comoran Union for Progress (UCP, in Comoran Udzima) was formed, its by-laws officially submitted on 8 February. The UCP, which unites laborers, peasants, farmers, fishermen, craftmen, manual workers, and intellectuals, and Comoran cadres, without distinction of origin, sex, is founded on democratic socialism and Islamic values. [Excerpts] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 12 Feb 82 p 409] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1982]

CSO: 4719/606

EQUATORIAL GUINEA

BRIEFS

PETROLEUM EXPLORATION--The first exploration for petroleum off the coast of Equatorial Guinea started on 4 January 60 kms north of Biobo Island (formerly Fernando Po), just outside the territorial waters of Cameroon. The exploration is being done by the Guinean-Spanish Petroleum Company (GEPSA), a joint company with its capital equally divided between the Equatorial Guinean state and the Spanish company Hispanoil. The exploration area is in the vicinity of the Nigerian and Camerooian oilfields. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1888, 15 Jan 82 p 149] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1982.] 8796

CSO: 4719/500

IVORY COAST

BRIEFS

COOPERATION WITH INDIA--In the industrial sphere, the Ivory Coast prefers to seek assistance from countries such as India rather than from Western countries, whose aid is considered to be more costly, said Ivorian Minister of Commerce Amoakon Thiemele on 17 December, during his official visit to India. A. E. Thiemele, who met with representatives of the Association of Indian Equipment Industry (AIEI), suggested that India build in his country a "pilot village" with craft industries to allow all African nations to judge their potential. He also called on Indian businessmen to build four sugar cane refineries in the Ivory Coast. Finally, the Ivorian minister said that talks will soon start in Abidjan to hammer out the first trade agreement between the two countries. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1885, 25 Dec 81 p 3428] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981] 8796

OIL PALM--The Ivory Coast wants to prevent a decline in the production of its oil palm plantations, forecast for 1987, by renovating the groves. Oil palm trees now cover 102,000 hectares, of which 64,000 hectares are in industrial plantations and 38,000 hectares are in village plantations. The success of the various "palm" plans up to now has made it possible for the Ivory Coast to become the third largest producer of palm oil in the world, after Malaysia and Indonesia, and the second African producer of palm kernels after Nigeria. Since 1974, annual production has reached between 700,000 and 900,000 tons (the 700,000 tons arriving in the plants in 1980 will yield over 150,000 tons of oil). According to the experts, the production figure could be 1 million tons by 1984-1985, after which it could start declining very rapidly because more than 55 percent of the groves will have grown too old. That is why the Ministry of Agriculture has drawn up a timetable to plant new trees in an area of 112,000 hectares, and extend over a 20-year period, with the replanting done at the rate of 5,600 hectares a year. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1885, 25 Dec 81 p 3428] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981] 8796

NORTHERN PROJECTS--The steering committee of the Regional Rural Development Fund (FRAR) of the North Region in the Ivory Coast recently adopted its action program for the four departments of that region: 62 projects will be carried out at a total cost of 210 million CFA francs, of which around 137 million will be provided by the Ivorian Government and 83 million by the local rural population. This government grant of 137 million CFA francs represents over 19 percent of the 720 million CFA francs assigned to the FRAR program in 1981, and this puts the North Region in third place, after the Center and West regions. Between 1974 and 1980, the state has contributed a total of 603.8 million CFA francs (an annual average of 100.6 million) to the FRAR programs in the North Region for use in 263 projects, with a total cost of 887.8 million CFA francs; the rest of the cost was financed by the rural population. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1885, 25 Dec 81 p 3428] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981] 8796

TOTAL ACTIVITIES IN IVORY COAST--The Total group holds interests in three hydrocarbon exploration concessions in the Ivory Coast through the intermediary of the Total Petroleum Company for Exploration and Exploitation in the Ivory Coast (TEPCI). In the permit El Ml (obtained on 6 June 1981), covering an on-shore and offshore area of 6,020 square kms (75 percent interest), the first drilling operations are scheduled to start in the summer of 1982. For the second permit D1 (obtained on 13 September 1981), which covers 550 square kms offshore, two drillings are scheduled for 1982 and in the last permit A1 (obtained 23 November 1981) of 750 square kms offshore, the first drilling is scheduled for 1983. Total's interest in D1 and A1 is 17.5 percent and 21.5 percent respectively. In the marketing field, Total has been operating in the Ivory Coast since 1947. This year, TEPCI had a 12 percent increase in capital with only Ivorian private investors being allowed to buy shares. Other capital increases are planned to raise to 35 percent the amount of Ivorian held interest. Last year, this subsidiary company sold 198,000 tons of petroleum products, representing 16 percent of the sales, through its distribution chain of 88 service stations. The grou8p also holds interests in 3 companies: the Ivorian Lubricants Manufacturing Company (15 percent) with an output of 20,000 tons a year; the San Pedro Storing Company (14 percent) with a storage capacity of 1,000 cubic meters and the Ivorian Petroleum Products Storing Company (50 percent) with a storage capacity of 54,000 cubic meters. Finally, the Total group owns 10.1 percent of the Ivorian Refining Company with installation in Abidjan. The refinery capacity, which is now 2 million tons a year, will be expanded to 4 million tons. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1887, 6 Jan 82 p 81] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1982.] 8796

BUDGET FOR 1982 ADOPTED--The Ivory Coast Council of Ministers Meeting, under head of state Felix Houphouet-Boigny on 10 December, adopted the budget for the 1982 fiscal year, a budget which comes to 712.725 billion Fr CFA. The operating budget was fixed at 420.7 billion Fr CFA, an increase over the 1981 budget, which was 376 billion Fr CFA. The special investment and infrastructure budget (BSIE) is 292.025 billion Fr CFA, which is down from the 1981 BSIE of about 312 billion Fr CFA. Overall, the 1982 budget is 24 billion Fr CFA higher than the preceding budget. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1884, 18 Dec 81 p 3365] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie 1982.] 9516

CSO: 4719/374

MADAGASCAR

NATIONAL POPULAR ASSEMBLY ADOPTS NEW 5-YEAR PLAN

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1884, 18 Dec 81 p 3380

[Text] The National Popular Assembly of Madagascar [ANP], after considering and passing the 1982 finance bill on 6 December (see MTM of 11 December, p 3319), began consideration of another essential economic item: the second 5-year plan, covering the years 1982-1987. That plan is supposed to reflect in concrete terms the directions set forth by public law 77-002 on "socialist planning." According to that law, the structural and material foundation for socialist development during the current period is to be built around concrete action in five major sectors:

--In the agricultural sector, development of the productive forces that will assure the peasants a higher standing of living, through agrarian revolution, expanding the surface area under cultivation, creation of socialist cooperatives and state farms, and improvement of techniques.

--In the industrial sector, this period will see the establishment of basic industry (including mining and energy), which means production of raw materials and intermediate goods, and will also see expansion of the food processing industries, in the producing regions themselves wherever possible.

--In the service sector, socialist control and rationalization of foreign trade must be pursued; socialist control and rationalization of internal collection and distribution should be extended; measures to provide increasing socialist control over internal transport will be taken; the banking system will continue to be extended, as much as possible, all the way to the level of the firaisampokontany and access to loans for productive activity will be facilitated.

--From the point of view of infrastructure: existing infrastructure will be rehabilitated, better maintained and better utilized; the effort to complete the principal basic networks of intraregional and interregional communications and telecommunications will be given increasing emphasis.

--From the point of view of social improvements: an effective policy of fighting unemployment will be pursued; the work of establishing a basic social infrastructure will be completed, especially in basic education, health and culture;

the effort to build and rationalize mass communications facilities will be continued; the standard of living of the most disadvantaged strata of the populace will be significantly improved; in particular, state insurance will be extended and an adequate housing policy implemented.

The 1982-87 Plan, which the deputies adopted on 10 December in the form of public law no. 81-036, has not yet been made public. It is a voluminous work, comprised of 15 chapters dealing with major directions; with agriculture (training, improvement of yields--2.13 tons of rice per hectare, for example, as compared to the current level of 1.9 tons), with industry (creation of medium-sized industries to process food products at the production site), with mines (mining of the coal at Sakoa), with energy (building of dams), social improvements, means of communication, and so on.

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MADAGASCAR

DETAILS OF RATSIRAKA'S NEW YEAR'S SPEECH GIVEN

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1888, 15 Jan 82 p 156

[Text] In our issue of 8 January (page 96), we gave a very brief summary of President Ratsiraka's declaration on the occasion of the New Year. Since that time, we have received the text of that important declaration which merits review in greater detail.

President Ratsiraka insisted that besides some mistakes and blunders committed in the management of the economy, one cannot ignore the fact that the current problems are the result of:

1. the international economic crisis which has brought about constant increases in the cost of imported goods while, paradoxically, the prices of exported commodities fluctuate or decline;

2. the increase of interest rates on loans;

3. the heavy expenditures in the social sector, namely, education, health and higher salaries for civil servants;

4. the natural disasters such as drought which have seriously affect the crops;

5. the problems of foreign exchange.

In his straightforward and courageous declaration, President Ratsiraka did not conceal the fact that embezzlement of public funds, corruption and the selfish attitude of some people have assumed serious proportions.

The only way to solve the problems, the only trump card for Madagascar, the head of state concluded, is to put into action the "revolutionary slogan" of "all-out production." The government, for its part, will assume its responsibilities in all spheres, be it economic, financial, social or cultural.... Details of the government action will be announced by the president of the Republic at a later date.

8796
CSO: 4719/502

MADAGASCAR

FIANARANTSOA PROVINCE'S POTENTIAL VIEWED AS GREAT

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1885, 25 Dec 81 p 3444

[Text] The faritany (province) of Fianarantsoa is still scarcely developed from the industrial standpoint: coffee merchandising, rice farming, the meat industry at the Vohimasina State Farm (FEV, formerly Rochefortaise), SOFINAC (Partnership Fievet Ramon and Co) and the Lachaise Company in Ambohimahasoa; a tea factory in Sahambavy with an annual capacity of 200 tons; a rubber-processing plant, the SMTC [Malagasy Rubber Processing Company] and so on.

Yet the industrial potential of the region is real, MADAGASCAR-MATIN points out in a supplement devoted to the province of Fianarantsoa. This province has mining resources which have been the subject of preliminary studies: the iron ore deposits of Bekisopa (70 million tons, with 48 percent iron content) and of Fasintsara (105 million tons, with 33 percent iron content); the bauxite deposits in Sandravinany (also 105 million tons, with 40 percent content)....

In another sphere, there is the SOPRAEX [expansion unknown] project to build a factory to process medicinal plants, now waiting to be implemented following ratification of a financing agreement between the Malagasy Government and the Italian company Inverni Belfa on 16 December 1980; Madagascar (BNI [National Bank for Industrial Development], Ny Havana) holds 16-percent interest in SOPRAEX, and realization of this project is expected to create 200 jobs.

Other projects under planning are: the paper-paste plant of Haute Matsiatra; a coffee-roasting plant in Mananjary; a tannery in Ambositra. Preliminary feasibility studies have been done or are in progress for projects involving an oil mill in Ambalavao, a coffee factory in Manakara, a sugar refinery in Vangaindrano, a plant to produce alcohol from cassava in Ifanadiana....

To this list we could add a factory for making electricity poles in Ambalamanakana, and the CODAL (Industrial Agency of Food Products) fruit juice plant.

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CSO: 4719/436

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MADAGASCAR

CCCE AID TO REFLOAT COMPANIES REPORTED

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1885, 25 Dec 81 p 3444

[Text] According to the terms of two agreements signed in Antananarivo on 11 December, the Central Fund for Economic Cooperation (CCCE, a French agency) will extend to Madagascar a loan of 2.5 billion Malagasy francs as urgent aid. This loan is repayable in 15 years, including a 5-year deferred-payment period, and carries an annual interest rate of 5.5 percent. The first agreement deals with the CCCE loan itself, while the second covers the transfer of the loan to four companies: SOLIMA [Malagasy Petroleum Company] (petroleum), PAPMAD (Malagasy Paper Company) and SNBCE (Nossi-Be East Coast Sugar Refineries). The loan will be divided as follows (in Malagasy francs): 880 million for SOLIMA (Toamasina refinery); 320 million for PAPMAD (Ambohimanambola plant); 985 million for SIRAMA [Malagasy Sugar Company]; and 295 million for SNBCE. The money will be used to purchase raw materials and spare parts now in short supply in most Malagasy enterprises due to the lack of foreign exchange.

The director of the Central Bank of Madagascar, Mr Bridier, noted that after this new loan, the total amount of aid granted in 1981 by the CCCE to the Great Island is 11 billion Malagasy francs, compared to 6 billion in 1980. This is in addition to assistance provided by the Aid and Cooperation Func (FAC) in the form of nonrepayable grants, which totaled more than 2 billion Malagasy francs for 1980. To this direct French aid must be added the coverage provided by the COFACE [French Insurance Company for Foreign Trade] for French exports to Madagascar to the tune of about 10 billion Malagasy francs.

French-Malagasy cooperation is doing well and, as pointed out by the governor of the Central Bank of Madagascar, Leon Rajaobelina, when the two agreements were signed, this cooperation increased even more after President Ratsiraka's working visit to Paris last October, Rajaobelina also mentioned another indirect method by which the French Government helps the Malagasy economy, which in recent months was illustrated by the easing of the burden of Madagascar's debt to France and to the Paris Club. Repayment of part of the public debt to France is spread over a fairly long period.

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MADAGASCAR

BRIEFS

FAO RESEARCH VESSEL--The research vessel Jurong which the FAO has put at the disposal of Madagascar for a 2-year period, arrived in Toamasina in December. The Jurong, with its home port in Nossi-Be, is a 35-meter long vessel outfitted with the most modern equipment to detect fishing banks, to catch, refrigerate and freeze the catches. Its mission is to pinpoint the fish-bearing areas off the coast of Grande-Ile, to explore the northwest coastal waters from Mahajanga to Nossi-Be, the Cape d'Ambre area, the Antongil Bay, the Nossi-Be Continental Shelf zone and, finally, the Toamasina area. The studies already made indicate, among other things, that the Antongil Bay is rich in sardines and anchovies. When the 2-year contract expires, Madagascar will have the choice of either renegotiating the contract, keeping the vessel or returning it to the FAO. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1888, 15 Jan 82 p 156] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1982.] 8796

ANTANANARIVO BUDGET--The budget of the "fivondroanana" of Antananarivo, adopted by the People's Council on 16 December, amounts to 9,174 million Malagasy francs. Revenues consist of 2,426.5 million from the original budget and 6,747.5 million from the additional budget. Under the heading of expenditures, there is a credit of 50 million Malagasy francs for the creation of a corporation which will be in charge of implementing projects to improve public transport. There is also a 70-million credit to start rebuilding the old Town Hall. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1885, 25 Dec 81 p 3444] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981] 8796

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NIGER

BCEAO ISSUES REPORT ON RECENT FACTORS IN ECONOMIC SITUATION

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1888, 15 Jan 82 p 140

[Text] One of the most recent economic and monetary statistics reports of the Central Bank of the West African States (BCEAO) was devoted to Niger.

During the 1980-81 agricultural year, the main crops produced were: 1,567 tons of shelled peanuts (down by 607 tons compared to the previous year) and 2,852 tons of cottonseed (down by 576 tons). The 1980 harvest of food crops (millet, sorghum and beans) totaled 129,000 tons with an overall value of 5.4 billion CFA francs. At the beginning of the 1980-81 season, the prices which the farmers received for their millet and sorghum were increased from 40 to 50 CFA francs per kilo.

In the first 6 months of 1981, 2,309 tons of uranium ore were mined (up by 220 tons compared to the same 6-month period of 1980).

During the first 5 months of 1981, 2,193 commercial flights and 39,067 passengers arrived and departed from Niamey International Airport. During that same 5-month period, the Joint Benin-Niger Railroad and Transport Organization (OCBN) carried, among other goods, 36,520 tons of fuel and 21,805 tons of grain on the way to Niger and 2,977 tons of merchandise out of Niger.

By the end of August 1981, the general consumer price index for an African household was 403.9 compared to 283 at the end of June 1980 (on the basis of the figure 100 established for 1970); the sharp increase registered in the index figure was mainly due to food prices.

The budget for the October 1980-September 1981 fiscal period was set, both for revenues and expenditures, at 80.6 billion CFA francs (an 8.5 billion increase compared to the previous budget) and included 8.7 billion for the public debt burden (up by 4.5 billion) and 26 billion for capital expenditures (unchanged). By the end of July 1981, receipts from custom duties and taxes totaled 17.7 billion CFA francs, 84 percent of which came from imports.

By the end of December 1980, Niger had an outstanding externaldebt equivalent to 86.4 billion CFA francs (up by 31.6 billion compared to the figure for end of 1979) with an available margin of 90.1 billion not yet withdrawn (up by 37 billion).

On 30 June 1981, the amount of money in circulation (bills and coins) was 32.7 billion CFA francs (up by 3.5 billion compared to end of June 1980). The value of demand and time deposits in banks and savings accounts was 56.1 billion CFA francs (down by 10.2 billion).

On that same date, the total amount of aid to the economy was 91.2 billion CFA francs (up by 1.2 billion compared to June 1980). Almost 66 percent had gone to the private sector (mostly the trade sector) while public enterprises accounted for close to 39 percent of the total.

Over the 12-month period, the domestic net balance position of the Nigerien Treasury had greatly imporved moving from a deficit of 12.9 billion CFA francs in June to a surplus of 0.1 billion by the end of June 1981.

The situation with regard to net external assets (Central Bank and commercial banks) had followed the opposite trend moving from a credit balance for the equivalent of 3 billion CFA francs in June 1980 to a debit balance of 1.8 billion CFA francs because the banks were forced to turn to foreign credit to finance their assistance to the economy.

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CSO: 4719/500

NIGER

BRIEFS

FRENCH CONSULATE IN ARLIT--Since 11 January there has been a French Consulate in the town of Arlit (population: around 20,000), a Saharian subprefecture in the department of Agadez and the chief uranium town of Niger. This consulate was opened because there is a large community of French technicians accompanied by their families (around 1,200 people) who work in that mining and industrial "heart" of Niger, said Alain Pierret, the French ambassador to Niger. It is also justified by the number of French tourists who travel down the Algiers-Agadez trans-Sahara highway (which passes through Arlit). For instance, during the Christmas holidays, as many as 50 passenger cars crossed the border between Algeria and Niger every day and more than half of these cars were driven by French nationals. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1888, 15 Jan 82 p 140] 8796

CSO: 4719/500

NIGERIA

NEW BOOK ON PRESIDENT SHAGARI REVIEWED

London NEW AFRICAN in English Jan 82 p 82

[Book review: "Shehu Shegari: A Man of Vision Speaks Out"]

[Text] NIGERIA'S PRESIDENT Shehu Shagari has already established himself as a world statesman. This book is a unique collection of the Nigerian President's speeches during various stages of his leadership – from the date when power was transferred from Nigeria's military rulers to the civilian government led by Alhaji Shagari, to topics on finance, Nigeria's role in Africa's unity, industry, politics, the press and religion.

In this selection, President Shagari preaches peace and understanding not only in Nigeria but universally. It also becomes clear that the Nigerian leader's hopes and aspirations concerning Nigeria have been established beyond doubt through his attitude, his strategy and his utterances both in private and public.

Aminu Tijjani, one of the editors says: "I strongly believe that the 'Shagari vision of Nigeria' will one day develop into an international slogan for peace and prosperity for all mankind."

Tijjani goes on to say: "One of the first things I observed about Shehu Shagari is that the intimately solemn and serious expression he wears hides a very strong but flexible mind; a mind full of positive and honest hopes about mankind generally."

David Williams, an English journalist, is the co-editor of this book. His intimate knowledge of West Africa, through his editorship of *West Africa* magazine, fully qualifies him to join Tijjani in writing this book.

Many of the speeches in the book have been reproduced by Nigeria's mass media and quoted in many parts of the world. This collection in a single volume makes it an easy reference book for anyone interested in Nigeria or Nigerian affairs.

What makes this book much more interesting is that, the speeches by President Shagari give a unique insight into the character of this teacher-turned-President. For instance, notes Mr Tijjani: "Shagari is a man who, though very serious-minded and serious-looking, has the most tantalising sense of humour. His jokes, which he cracks mostly with a small group or with individuals, are told in the most simple but funny way. To those who may be hearing him make a joke for the first time it always sounds funnier, perhaps because most people hardly expect such a serious-minded person to condescend to do so."

Although the selection from the President's speeches and writings covers only the first 18 months of his four-year term of office, they also look far forward – to what has been termed Shagari's vision of Nigeria. The two authors should be encouraged to write a second volume of President Shagari's speeches when he completes his first four years in office. They will have plenty to write about the achievements of one of Nigeria's illustrious sons – Alhaji Shehu Shagari.

This book will find a ready market not only in Nigeria but also in research libraries all over the world where President Shagari's Nigeria is already becoming a household name. Anyone interested in Nigeria should read this book

●Shehu Shagari – My Vision of Nigeria; edited by Aminu Tijjani and David Williams; published by Frank Cass, London.

CSO: 4700/772

NIGERIA

AFRICA SAID CORNERSTONE OF COUNTRY'S FOREIGN POLICY

London NEW AFRICAN in English Jan 82 p 90

[Interview with Alhaji Shehu Awak, Nigerian High Commissioner in London by Esther Ogunmodede; date and place not given]

[Text] AFRICA IS THE centrepiece and cornerstone of Nigeria's foreign policy. Nigerians have seized every opportunity around the world to state this, said Nigeria's new High Commissioner in London, Alhaji Shehu Awak, recently. Nigerians think that the world, the West in particular, is either not listening or has misunderstood its foreign policy; or at best supposes that Nigeria is engaged in a strategy of all talk and no action. So Alhaji Shehu was at pains to enumerate instances of action by Nigeria in support of what has now become the most important phase of its foreign policy.

Why, of all the other pressing matters that trouble the world – the threat of nuclear war for instance – is Nigeria harping on Africa? Alhaji Shehu gave the answer: "Nigeria neither has, nor wants, global responsibility, but prefers to play its part in its geographical sphere." That is not to say that Nigeria has ignored the rest of the world. Indeed says Alhaji Shehu, Nigeria is an active member of the Commonwealth, the United Nations and the Non-Aligned Movements.

Africa has been the main concern of successive Nigerian governments since the country became independent because, said Alhaji Shehu, quoting Nigeria's Vice-President, Dr Alex Ekwueme, "... so long as the blackman in South Africa is not free, we could not regard ourselves as being free. So long as our brothers in South Africa are still being trampled upon because of the colour of their skin, so long will those of us who share that trait with them suffer that indignity."

"But that is not all" added Alhaji Shehu, "Our interest in African affairs has been guided by the traditional concept of protecting and promoting our vital national interests, the most important of which are to create conditions at home and abroad and around us conducive to political stability."

So eager have Nigerians been to promote their concept of 'Africa first' that they have used economic muscle to ram home their points, expecially against the West, which the Nigerians are convinced, are in collusion with South Africa to maintain the status quo. Nigerians believe that the West with its massive investments in South Africa, has the economic weapon by which it can force South Africa to give up Namibia, renounce apartheid and adopt an egalitarian society.

Of all the problems in Africa, the South Africa, has the economic weapons by the greatest heartache for Nigerians who have become increasingly frustrated with the West. Nigeria's Foreign Affairs Minister once said to his British counterpart, Lord Carrington: "Your (British) credibility and integrity to act as an effective voice for peace, change and stability in Southern Africa will continue to be seriously in question and mistaken for complicity so long as you fail to prove your abhorrence of the policy of apartheid."

It is believed that Nigeria's President Shehu Shagari accepted the invitation for his state visit to Britain in order to use the publicity to further hammer his country's Africa policy. At a Buckingham Palace banquet and later when he addressed Britis bankers and businessmen and yet again at a press conference, President Shagari fed the Western world the diet of this policy – total liberation for all colonised parts of Africa. He repeated that mere condemnation of apartheid is neither effective nor adequate and that the racist minority regime in South Africa survives only with the collusion and encouragement of the Western powers who supply them arms and use their veto power at the United Nations to block the oil embargo. Nigeria, he promised will give aid to all the freedom fighters in Namibia and South Africa.

Although Nigerians at every level of authority and for more than two decades, have stated and re-stated their foreign policy, they are sure that the West thinks that it is all a lot of hot air. The West holds this view because Nigeria, like the rest of Africa, is only too aware of its own weakness. It cannot stake its national stability to fight a physical war so far away from home. With no certainty of the outcome or for how long it would be necessary to drain the country's resources in men and money, such an enterprise is bound to be suicidal.

In addition, there is a limit to which Nigeria can use its economic muscle to force the West to impose embargoes against South Africa. For, as Nigerians are fond of pointing out, no man is an island. Nigeria dneeds the West as much as the West needs Nigeria. So, barring an unforeseeable catastrophe overtaking South Africa, the West, due to their massive investment in the area, are quite happy to let matters continue at the present snails pace and regard the denunciations as no more than harmless nagging.

Southern Africa is not the only area of concern to Nigerians. Nigeria takes credit for bringing into being the Economic Commission of West African States (ECOWAS) as an expression of the continent's aspiration to "take into its own hands the control of its economic destiny".

Nigeria also justifiably points to the many economic and political measures it has taken to being relief to her neighbouring states: like being the chief contributor to the African Development Bank from which her neighbours draw development loans and accepting a large number of refugees from and giving aid to the drought affected Sahelian states.

Alhaji Awak stated, "Although we are not a rich country, and despite our own socio-economic and political problems, we realise that we are better placed than some of our brothers and therefore give assistance... financial, material and technical to newly independent African countries for example, Mozambique, Angola and Zimbabwe; we transfer resources to neighbouring countries through joint investments in agriculture and industrial projects... and give full support to the Lagos plan of the OAU Economic Summit because we believe that political independence without economic emancipation brings an incomplete independence."●

CSO: 4700/772

NIGERIA

COUNTRY WARNED TO FIND ALTERNATIVE ENERGY SOURCES

London NEW AFRICAN in English Jan 82 p 92

[Article: "Oil Slump Warning: The Bubble May Burst"]

[Text] NIGERIA CONTINUES to be very heavily dependent on oil revenues for its development needs despite the recent reduced earnings from this commodity.

During 1980, the oil price hikes increased the value of oil exports by 33 per cent yielding N13.5-billion ($21.2-billion) in spite of a nine per cent drop in the volume produced. Oil accounted for 96 per cent of export earnings and 80 per cent of government revenues during that calendar year.

However, although during the first half of 1981, oil revenue was valued at N6,760-million ($10,624-million), earnings dropped drastically in July to a mere N442.2-million ($695-million) and still further in August to N387.5-million ($609-million).

The 1982 budget is to be based on a production of 1.3-million barrels a day (bpd) at N22.9 ($36) per barrel. At the beginning of November, Nigeria effectively reduced its price again by offering buyers 120 days in which to pay instead of 30, equivalent to a credit of $1.50 a barrel. Thus the current price of N21.9 ($34.50) per barrel makes Nigerian oil competitive with Britain's North Sea oil, at a time when Libyan and Algerian crudes are still being offered at $40 per barrel.

The sensitivity of the Nigerian economy to the ups and downs of the international oil market was demonstrated in September when government expenditure cuts were announced. These came directly in the wake of the low July demand when production fell to about 770,000 bpd. Despite many developments as a result of oil wealth, so far few of these have become alternative sources of national revenue upon which the exchequer can rely and the dependence upon oil remains dangerously high.

Oil reserves are expected to last for twenty years at current rates of extraction. Recoverable oil is now estimated at 18,000-million barrels. The tendency is to underestimate both the extent to which new finds are likely to be made and also – for the longer term – the extent to which improvements in technology will prolong the life of present fields. If these factors are taken into account, Nigeria's future as an oil producer could be extended considerably. On the other hand, Nigeria is herself rapidly developing into a major oil consumer.

The demand for petroleum products inside Nigeria has now nearly reached 250,000 bpd or one fifth of the current low rate of production. Further, one estimate suggests that Nigeria will be consuming 530,000 bpd by 1990 and as much as 950,000 bpd by the year 2000.

If this pattern does develop without any further significant finds then, as the stock of the country's oil resources moves towards depletion, the best part of half the production will be consumed locally. Consequently revenue from overseas sales available for development will have been greatly reduced much earlier than otherwise would have been the case. Assuming such a pattern will appear, it is imperative that alternative sources of revenue are developed as quickly as possible.

The Fourth Plan sets aside N6,575-

million for mining sector developments yet only N360-million of this is for non-oil projects, the rest for oil. Included in this is N3-billion to be spent on the refineries at Warri and Kaduna which are to be raised from a production level of 100,000 bpd to 120,000 bpd with the addition of petrochemical plants while a fourth refinery has been planned to produce 200,000 bpd.

The military government gave the oil industry a boost in 1977 resulting in a number of developments just coming to fruition at the present time. Thus in 1981 new fields are about to come on stream although unfortunately coinciding with the present slump; but the longer term prospects are good. Mobil expects that its Oso field will produce 100,000 bpd by 1983. Shell is increasing production from its Membe Creek field and a pipeline to Bonny may also be used to link up with other fields in the area. Shell has also ordered platforms for its field off Bonny. Other developments mean a rapid boom could take place once the present recession ends.

The Nigerian subsidiary of Mobil has recently made a major new find offshore with estimated reserves of 1000-million barrels. This is equivalent to 12 or 13 years of the company's production. The discovery, offshore from the Cross River State in eastern Nigeria, is one of the largest in the country.

A huge resource which still remains virtually untouched is Nigeria's natural gas. There is an estimated 90-trillion cubic feet of unexploited natural gas. Its development will cost an estimated N14-billion of which Nigeria is expected to put up 60 per cent and Shell, Agip, Elf, Phillips and BP the remaining 40 per cent. Nigeria has the potential to become a huge world gas exporter but the vast investment required is an unattractive proposition at the present time of recession. The gas is equivalent to 15-billion barrels of oil. It is hoped that development of the Bonny LNG plant will get underway in 1984. Meanwhile gas flaring continues at an estimated equivalent of 400,000 bpd of oil.

Nigeris requires a long-term policy to develop other energy resources such as coal, solar energy and hydro-electric power. She must do this so that she may continue to export the maximum volume of oil as long as possible and not find herself over-dependent upon oil for her own energy requirements when it really does begin to run out.

The recent ILO report for Nigeria – First Things First – argues that Nigeria's oil revenues would be wasted if they are not used to alleviate poverty, help increase food production, meet basic needs and assist people to develop their abilities. It suggests that after ten years of oil boom there is no obvious sign of generally better living conditions. It should not be forgotten that both in absolute terms and still more in relation to her huge population Nigeria has relatively small oil reserves. It is imperative that oil be turned into alternative productive sources of wealth at the earliest opportunity●

CSO: 4700/772

NIGERIA

TRADE IMBALANCE WITH FRANCE REDUCED FROM 1980 FIGURES

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1886 1 Jan 82 p 30

[Text] Trade between Nigeria and France, which was worth 8,903,000,000 francs in the first half of 1981, as opposed to 8.77 billion francs during the first half of 1980 (MTM 2 Oct p 2505), rose to 12,605,600,000 francs for the first 9 months of 1981, about the same as during the same period in 1980. There was a large gap between exports and imports in 1980 in favor of Nigeria; however, this gap diminished considerably during the first half of 1981 and was reduced still further over the 9-month period. During this time the reserve ratio was 95.4 percent for France, whereas for the same 9-month period in 1980 it was 44.7 percent.

Between the two [9-month] periods, France's sales rose from 3,963,300,000 francs to 6,153,500,000 francs (up 55.3 percent), while Nigeria's 8,200,600,000 francs in sales fell to 6,452,100,000 francs (down 27.1 percent). Thus, the deficit in the balance of trade, which was 4,238,300,000 francs for France during the 9-month period in 1980, fell to only 298.6 million during the same 9-month period in 1981. This represents a drop of 92 percent.

This favorable situation for France is the consequence of the many contracts that France has concluded, increasing its sales of material and equipment. It is also due to a sizable reduction in its purchases of oil.

The provisions of the new Nigerian budget, which comes into force on 1 January, are designed to reduce imports into Nigeria and will certainly result in a reduction in France's as well as other countries' sales; for our country, this could lead to a new imbalance in trade to our disadvantage in 1982. In London business circles, the feeling is that Great Britain's sales will be reduced to about 1.2 billion pounds this year because of these provisions. But it is also true that the balance of trade between Nigeria and Great Britain has so far always been considerably in favor of Great Britain, and to an extent that has often been cause for concern among Nigerians, who are more than ever desirous of establishing balanced relations will all of their trading partners (in this connection, see the recent statement by the minister of foreign trade in MTM of 20 November, p 2949).

9855
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NIGERIA

CONTRACTS SIGNED FOR EXTENSIVE MAPPING PROGRAM

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1886, 1 Jan 82 p 30

[Text] The Federal Government of Nigeria has embarked upon a vast mapping program and to this end has signed two series of contracts worth 39,352,480 nairas with specialized firms.

The first series of contracts is for the production of 1:25,000 maps to replace the old 1:50,000 maps, which were too small to be useful in economic planning projects. Five firms have been chosen, each for a specific sector. Their contracts add up to 14,028,480 nairas; a surface area of 69,230 square kilometers [will be covered].

Map Data Services: Sokoto region; cost: 2,660,882 nairas; time: 18 months.

Ertec West Africa: Kano region; cost: 3,454,416 nairas; time: 24 months.

A. A. Lakanu and Co/Gulf Consultants: Ijebu-Ode Epe region; cost: 2,260,612 nairas; time: 18 months.

Allied Surveys: Kainji/Borgu region; cost: 3,289,874 nairas; time: 24 months.

Pan African Surveys: Abeokuta region; cost: 2,362,694 nairas; time: 18 months.

The second series of contracts is for maps of six state capitals, with a 1:1,000 scale. These contracts amount to 25,324,000 nairas. The cities to be mapped are Akure, Bauchi, Ilorin (zones A and B), Minna, Owerri, and Sokoto. The firms these contracts were awarded to were not named, but we recall that for Owerri--the capital of the state of Imo--the firm Danz Surveys and Consultants of the consortium Danz and Setam Associates was designated. Its contract, signed on 4 December, amounts to 4.4 million nairas, and the work is to be carried out over the next 24 months (MTM 18 Dec p 3370).

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NIGERIA

COUNTRY AS MARKET FOR EXPORT EVALUATED

London NEW AFRICAN in English Jan 82 pp 59, 62

[Article: "Big Prizes for Those Who Can Master the Trading Hindrances"]

[Text] NIGERIA'S HUGE market – potentially 90-million, the size of its development plans at both federal and individual state levels, and its oil wealth – make it one of the most attractive trading areas anywhere in the world. The problems to be overcome when seeking a section of this market – it presents some notorious pitfalls for the unwary – are worth combating for the possible trading prizes at the end.

Despite 21 years of independence, Nigeria has not really changed her trading pattern except in volume and type of goods. The country remains an importer of manufactured goods and an exporter of raw materials. The significant change – apart from volume – has been in the nature of the raw materials exported: oil in place of agricultural commodities.

Overwhelmingly Nigeria's trade remains with Europe and North America. Despite the formation of ECOWAS very little of it is with either Nigeria's West African neighbours or the continent as a whole. There are one or two signs of possible breaks in this pattern: for example India is becoming a substantial parnter and there is a growing number of joint Indian-Nigerian ventures. Indians are increasingly taking up management contracts of the kind which formerly went almost exclusively to European companies.

Nigerian trade is far too dominated by oil for comfort. In 1980 oil accounted for 96.1 per cent of all export earnings. With these earnings, Nigeria is trying to create an industrial base at speed but the process is proving less straightforward than was at first imagined. The USA is by far the largest export partner for Nigerian oil and takes nearly half Nigeria's total output.

Major export partners for oil in 1980 were as follows: USA 44.3 per cent, Netherlands 12.1 per cent, France 11.2 per cent, West Germany 6.6 per cent, Italy 2.8 per cent and ECOWAS 2.8 per cent.

During 1980 Nigeria's non-oil exports dropped by 17 per cent. Here the trading pattern is somewhat different: Britain is the main export market taking 28.6 per cent of all non-oil exports, followed by the Netherlands – 17.6 per cent, West Germany – 17 per cent, the USA – 11.7 per cent, followed by France, Japan and Italy.

Main partners

Almost all of Nigeria's imports come from Europe, with Britain still well in the lead as a supplier although under increasing challenge from West Germany. Main import categories for 1980 were: machinery and transport equipment – valued at N4548-million; manufactured goods – N2076.5-million; food and live animals – N1091-million; chemicals – N734-million; miscellaneous manufactures – N666.4-million; and mineral fuels – N241.5-million.

The main import partners were: Britain – 22 per cent; West Germany 15 per cent; the USA 11.2 per cent; Japan 10.8 per cent; France 7.1 per cent; Italy 6.7 per cent and the Netherlands 4.1 per cent.

Oil enables Nigeria to import the

machinery and manufactures she needs for a process of rapid industrialisation. However, she seems to be as dependent as ever upon imports for far too wide a range of basic requirements and no change in this pattern is in sight on the present horizon.

Exporters to Nigeria face a wide range of often irksome controls while contracts worth N100,000 or more must be registered with the Ministry of Commerce. Nigeria uses the SGS (Societé Generale de Surveillance) to check goods being imported. While this helps protect Nigeria from malpractices, it also causes substantial delays. One result of the various restrictions which importers have to face has been to make major firms look far more closely at the possibility of local Nigerian companies supplying their needs before they turn to importers.

ECOWAS should be the obvious trading partner for Nigeria's slowly developing manufacturing sector whose products are unlikely to find outlets in Europe for a long time to come. Yet ECOWAS must first overcome a number of technical problems such as tariffs which so far have only partially been reduced and the problem of reconciling a series of divergent currencies. Nigerian imports from all over Africa probably amount to no more than 6 per cent of the total although exact figures are difficult to determine and are reduced by widespread smuggling.

Encouragement

Nigeria's non-oil exports to ECOWAS for 1980 came to only 1.6 per cent of her total exports while her oil exports to ECOWAS were only 2.8 per cent. Thus the ECOWAS market still has a long way to develop and it remains of only marginal importance at the present time.

Nigeria's main trading problem is how to diversify from oil dependence. In 1980, for example, while oil exports were worth N13.5-billion all other exports totalled only N554-million.

One result of the many difficulties which exporters to Nigeria face has led to the encouragement of direct investment in Nigeria as opposed to merely viewing it as an export market. This development is generally favoured in Lagos.

The main areas for foreign investment are vehicle components, agriculture and food processing, building materials, household goods, chemicals, telecommunications equipment and electrical goods. Over the next two years, for example, five new vehicle plants will be established in Nigeria in partnership with Japanese and French interests.

Of the many problems facing companies trading with Nigeria smuggling perhaps has become the most important. It affects government tax revenue as well as reducing the market for traditional suppliers from abroad. This year Nigeria has cut down imports as a result of the huge reduction in oil production. Yet frustrations apart, Nigeria remains the largest and most attractive long-term market in black Africa●

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NIGERIA

WOMEN'S ROLE IN POLITICS, ISLAM SPELLED OUT

London NEW AFRICAN in English No 172, Jan 82 p 46

[Report on interview with Alhaji Aminu Kano, PRP leader, by Esther Ogunmodede: "A Man Who Isn't Scared of Women"; date and place not given]

[Text] MALE POLITICIANS in Africa who ignore the influence and power of women, never make it to the top. That is why they pamper and generally make a show of promoting women's interests, especially at election time – or use women to generate the tempo of their campaigns.

One would expect that with such political power, women would put themselves forward as candidates, and that the men would field women in elections for parliamentary seats. The way in which women are relegated to the background in this regard suggests that either the men are too frightened of women's political influence or that they use women as tools to achieve their own ends.

They can decide

A rare man is Alhaji Aminu Kano, a highly respected party leader in Nigeria, and a lifelong campaigner for the emancipation and the rights of women, especially in the Moslem north of the country from whence he comes. We got together for a discussion on the problem recently. I put it to him that men seem to be frightened of women in politics.

He said: "I don't think it is a question of being afraid. Many men have made up their minds and judged women without giving them a chance to prove themselves. In the future, perhaps, men may come to fear women because of their number. And when women understand the political implication of this, they can decide the future of our country. They can decide the future of the President and change the course of political history."

When it was, religion-wise, taboo for women in the Moslem north to show their face in public, Aminu Kano stuck his neck out and encouraged women to join his party, the old NEPU, and they did so in their thousands. Why did he do it, especially in the face of the wrath of the aristocratic ruling party?

He replied: "People, especially among Moslem communities, tell falsehoods about women and the position of women in Islam. They try to con people into believing that the Koran directs that women be relegated to the background. Well, the Koran does nothing of the kind. And it was to free Islam from this kind of lie that I decided to come out with the truth. I recruited women to my party. Neither Islam nor the Koran – nor Sharia (Islamic law) – advocates that women should be relegated."

In Islamic history there are women who achieved greatness as scholars and in wars. In fact, the Koran specifically says that men should stand up for the rights of women and protect them – and this does not mean only in time of war. It means protection from illiteracy, from poverty and backwardness.

Aminu Kano, unable to recruit "respectable" women, who mainly were in *purdah*, had no option once he had committed himself to the emancipation of women but to recruit prostitutes.

"I didn't mind," he recalled, "I was looking for women. I couldn't reject the ones I found. And they played, and continue to play an important role in the party and in the country. They take courses in child care and community health care and learn to read and write. They play a useful role in helping their sisters who are in *purdah* by imparting the benefit of their education in family and health welfare. In the states where my party is in power, we set examples to the other states in the rest of the region by putting women up for membership of local authorities and government posts."

Public life

Women in public life would prove particularly useful in our health services and housing and sanitation. Why have successive Nigerian governments resisted the long-standing demand of women to set up a Women's National Commission to promote the interests of women?

According to Alhaji Aminu Kano the answer lies in the traditional neglect and underrating of women. Women, he said, do not know their own political strength.

"Women should assert themselves more and, with the help of men who support them, women should go out to prove that they are not mere objects of decoration. If women wish to be taken seriously as political contenders they should be prepared to make sacrifices."●

CSO: 4700/772

SENEGAMBIA

FEASIBILITY STUDY CONDUCTED ON IRON ORE DEPOSITS

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1888, 15 Jan 82 pp 135, 136

[Excerpts] The Eastern Senegal Iron Ore Mining Company (MIFERSO), created to exploit the mineral deposits discovered near the Faleme River, is a mixed economy company with a capital of 180.6 million CFA francs.

According to a recent report, the discovery in 1979 of large quantities of oxidized ores is what has created renewed interest in this project (see MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS of 1 August 1980, page 1915) which until then was based on the mining of magnetic ores which are less interesting because they require the building of a costly treatment plant where the ore is turned into pig iron before it can be marketed.

Ore reserves are estimated to be 216.7 million tons in the Koudekourou location, 55 million tons in the Karakaene location and 40 million tons in the Kouroudiako location, or a total of 311.7 million tons of ore with about 60 percent iron content.

The reserves of magnetic ores could be exploited later when the cost of building a port and a railroad has been covered. Reserves of these ores are estimated to amount to 126.9 million tons in Farangalia and 59.7 million tons in Goto, or a total of 186.6 million tons.

The mines are expected to yield 12 million tons of oxidized ore a year for, at least, 23 years. Mining the magnetic ores will prolong the lifespan of the mine.

The existence of all these reserves was established after conducting extensive boring explorations as well as chemical and mineralogical analyses; the deposits have also been the subject of a certification study and the French company SOCOMINE [expansion unknown] has conducted a preliminary feasibility study on the project.

A fully funded feasibility study on the railroad and port facilities is now being done by a group headed by the Central Office for Overseas Equipment with funding provided by the French Aid and Cooperation Fund (FAC) while the German Krupp Company is conducting the mining engineering studies financed by the Kreditanstalt fur Wiederaufbau [Reconstruction and Credit Bank] (KfW).

Not counting the above-mentioned studies on railroad and port facilities, 2.48 billion CFA francs have been spent so far on topographic and laboratory work, on testing and on pilot plants with funding provided by the state of Senegal, the French Republic, the Federal Republic of Germany and the European Economic Community (see MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS on 25 December 1981 p 3425).

Since the deposits are located several hundred kilometers from the sea, the most difficult problem being faced is how to transport the mined ore. There are several alternatives. The feasibility study will examine each of them.

The total investment required for the project is estimated to be $900 million, at their end of 1979 value, divided into mining costs ($250 million), railroad costs ($500 million) and port costs ($150 million).

The personnel required for the mining operations will be 1,670 people of which 30 will be in managerial level positions, 538 as supervisors and 1,102 workers.

Several alternatives are being considered for the railroad line: to build a metric and normal-gauge track capable of carrying 18,000-ton trains from the mine to the location selected for the port terminal; to use the existing railroad track of the Senegalese Railroad Administration after renovating it; or to go through the port of Buba in Guinea-Bissau. All these alternaitves will be examined in the feasibility study.

The railroad operations of MIFERSO will employ a staff of 1,335 of which 25 will be in managerial positions, 380 as supervisors and 930 workers and laborers.

There are three possible locations for the port terminal: in the port of Dakar, in Port Sedar (Mboro) or in Bargny.

The port terminal, where 175,000-ton ore tankers will be docking, must be able to accommodate vessels drawing at least 20 meters of water. To draw 20 meters of water, the wharf must be 1.8 kilometers long in Port Sedar and 4 kilometers long in Bargny while in Dakar it will have to be extended to the level of Goree Island.

The feasibility study will, therefore, try to determine the factors which will help to make the best selection. Port operations will require 311 people--6 in managerial positions, 88 supervisors and 217 workers.

The feasibility study will be ready at the beginning of 1983. Next comes the implementation stage and, if financing is obtained, this will last 3 years. The ore should start reaching the market in 5 years' time. In the opinion of the experts, this will be around the time when the world steel industry will start increasing its demand for iron ore.

Consequently, this project is of paramount importance for Senegal since it will create 3,316 jobs directly connected with the project; it will have an annual turnover of more than 50 billion CFA francs which will greatly improve Senegal's balance of payments, will bring in revenues from duties and taxes and will have side effects the importance of which cannot be fully assessed at this stage.

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