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# Near East/North Africa Report

(FOUO 10/82)

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## NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT

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### CONTENTS

#### INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS

Joint Arab Military Command, Arab Arms Industry (AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI, 27 Nov-3 Dec 81) .....	1
Arab Authorities Still Waging War Against Freedom of the Press (AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI, 8-14 Jan 82) .....	4
Briefs Plastics Industry Developing Rapidly .....	8

#### OPEC AFFAIRS

Oil Exporting Countries Sell Gold in Europe (David Marsh; FINANCIAL TIMES, 26 Feb 82) .....	9
--	---

#### AFGHANISTAN

Soviets Seen Using Carrot-Stick Method on Afghans (THE ECONOMIST, 27 Feb 82) .....	11
---	----

#### ALGERIA

Agricultural Policies Examined (MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 15 Jan 82) .....	13
--	----

#### EGYPT

Writer Expects No Immediate Shift Toward Strong Pan-Arab Policies (Amir Iskandar; AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI, 13-19 Nov 81) .....	16
---	----

#### LIBYA

Briefs Czech Road Contracts .....	21
Development Budget .....	21
Project To Transport Water .....	21

- a -

[III - NE & A - 121 FOUO]

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**MAURITANIA**

1982 Budget Approved, Policy Recommendations Noted  
(MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 25 Dec 81)..... 23

**MOROCCO**

Lumber Industry Reviewed  
(MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 15 Jan 82) ..... 25

**SUDAN**

Briefs  
Agricultural Equipment 27  
Petroleum Products 27  
Railway Equipment 27  
Transportation Equipment 27  
Nile Navigation Projects 28  
Textile Study 28  
Gum Arabic Production 28  
Arab Aid 28

**YEMEN ARAB REPUBLIC**

Briefs  
N. Yemenis Urged To Join Palestinians 29

- b -

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INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS

JOINT ARAB MILITARY COMMAND, ARAB ARMS INDUSTRY

Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic No 250, 27 Nov-3 Dec 81 pp 28-29

[Text] Arab relations were naturally the most prominent part of what the preparatory meeting for the summit studied. The file on these relations contains a number of memoranda, most of them "top secret," as follows:

- 1) Memorandum from Somalia demanding inclusion of the flood disaster on the summit's agenda.
- 2) Syrian memorandum demanding inclusion of the following four subjects at the same time:
  - a) Arab-Israeli struggle and its development and the search for responsible ways of achieving a strategic balance between Syria and the Israeli enemy.
  - b) Action to adopt a common Arab stand on the participation of some European and other powers in the multinational force to be stationed in Sinai.
  - c) American-Israeli strategic cooperation.
  - d) Arab-American relations.

Within the same framework, Sudan submitted a memorandum about the Syrian regime's striking a blow at Arab solidarity and it called for the council of the League to take whatever action it deems appropriate in this connection.

The council of the League presented an independent study on the building of the League's new headquarters.

Libya submitted a memorandum expressing its view on "the Sudanese regime's violation of the charter of the Arab League, joint Arab defense treaty, and decisions of the Arab summit conferences by allying itself with the Egyptian regime and strengthening relations with it at a time when this regime is suffering from isolation within Egypt and abroad." Libya urged the Arab governments to recall their ambassadors and break relations with Khartoum.

In the same spirit, Damascus submitted a memorandum condemning President al-Numayri for disrupting the Arab consensus.

Sudan prepared a memorandum on the Libyan Jamahiriya's providing military bases for a foreign power.

From an examination of the Libyan complaint against Sudan as well as the Syrian complaints, then the Sudanese complaints against both Libya and Syria, one can judge the extent to which fragmentation and dissension have spread among our brothers.

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**Joint Command**

Let us now pause to consider the most significant matter raised in these memoranda and refrain from pouring oil on the fire of the known Arab disputes. The most important memorandum deals with the Arab-Israeli struggle and methods of preparing the people for the fateful confrontation. We read in the recommendations of the military advisory committee made up of the chiefs of staff of the Arab armies, which met in the League's headquarters in Tunis 20-29 April 1981 to discuss the situation in which military security finds itself, about the formation of a joint Arab command. The recommendations are as follows:

- 1) The joint command will assume the leadership of the Arab armed forces through the command of the fronts and forces placed directly under its command.
- 2) The joint command will be headed by a supreme commander.
- 3) The joint command will prepare military plans to implement the Arab political decisions.
- 4) It will direct strategic operations in accordance with the prepared plans.
- 5) It will furnish the necessary instructions for operational and administrative coordination between the subordinate fronts and forces.
- 6) It will submit an annual budget to meet the needs of the command and the front commands.
- 7) The joint Arab command will be directly linked to the joint Arab defense council.
- 8) The principal headquarters of the joint command will be located near the region of the main threat to the Arab nation.
- 9) The troops will be moved from the original places to mobilization areas through the subordinate army commands.
- 10) The troops will be placed under the direct operational command of the joint command as soon as they reach the places assigned to them and until other orders are issued by the command.

The recommendations also require that the supreme commander be appointed by the council of kings and presidents after the defense council nominates him, on the condition that all Arab states share the responsibility with it. The period of service in the command is 3 years for all positions, and it can be renewed. Upon confirmation of the formation of the command, the defense council will allocate a million dollars for the expenses involved in organizing it, on the condition that the secretary general work out the financial arrangements.

**Military Industrialization**

As a step to supplement the creation of the joint command, the secretariat general proposes that an Arab organization be created for an arms industry in order to limit the dependence of the Arab states on the foreign powers that produce arms and lessen the foreign pressure on Arab decisions. It is stated in the plan (and it is top secret) that this measure is aimed at saving the enormous sums spent by the Arabs on arms, which amounted to about \$20 billion in 1979, and bringing about a large degree of integration of the Arab industrial establishments. It will also guarantee the maximum employment of Arab capabilities that will result in a reduction of costs over the long term and in the acquisition of experience...and, consequently, transformation of the Arab states from importers to exporters of arms.

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The plan restricts the fields of activity of the new organization to conventional weapons and equipment, systems of integrated arms, complementary and supplier engineering industries like specialized electronic and optical industries, and chemical industry...It adds that the most important prerequisite for the continued functioning of the Arab organization for the arms industry under all kinds of circumstances is to secure and protect it against the danger of destruction in case of armed conflict with any foreign enemy. The most effective way to guarantee its protection is to distribute it geographically over a wide area and avoid concentrating it in any one particular region. It is suggested in this connection that three forms of distribution be studied.

The first is distribution of parts of the single industrial system to a number of states and setting up of an assembly line in each one. The second is distribution of different kinds of systems to the participating states in such a way that each kind is specifically assigned to a predetermined state. The third involves complete duplication of production lines in more than one place...In the event that at least 4 states agree, the organization shall be considered to be in existence and \$4 billion will be earmarked to cover the expenses of studies and the necessary administrative outlays to create the organization.

As for military cooperation between the Arab armies in the field of training and exchange of information, the study suggests that the task of standardizing combat and training methods be entrusted to the joint command, which is to carry it out provided that the technical military terms and military documents are standardized. The military secretariat will furnish the joint command with ample general information about the Israeli enemy and other foreign armies in order to organize a complete archive on Israel for its incorporation into the mechanical information system now being used in the secretariat general of the League. It relies on a computer to store the information.

As for the building and equipping of headquarters for the secretariat general of the League, we read in a special memorandum that the total amount required for the structure has been estimated to be \$30 million. The secretariat approached the Arab Economic and Social Development Fund, the Saudi Development Fund, the Kuwaiti Development Fund, the Iraqi Fund, and the Abu Dhabi Fund to cover the financing. The Tunisian-Saudi Corporation for the Promotion of Investment and the Iraqi Fund agreed in principle to share in the financing.

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INTER-ARAB

ARAB AUTHORITIES STILL WAGING WAR AGAINST FREEDOM OF THE PRESS

Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic No 256, 8-14 Jan 82 p 72

[Article: "An Arab Journalist Disappears Every 2 Months"]

[Text] There are two new studies by the General Federation of Arab Journalists, the first about "the responsibility of the Arab journalist in the Arab homeland," and the second about "the responsibility of the Arab journalist in bringing about world peace and solidarity." We will cover just the first study in a quick survey of the relationship of the authorities with the press in the Arab countries.

The study says that the campaign by the authorities against freedom of the press has been unceasing and attempts to replace a dialogue of words with a dialogue of bullets have been constant. The number of Arab journalists killed during the past 2 years is higher than at any time in the past or in any place in the world. The best way to express the present state of our Arab press is the response of one of our journalist colleagues when he was asked to discuss a report by the committee on freedom of the press. Our colleague responded: "What will you say? I suggest that you submit 10 blank sheets of paper."

Despite all the expressions of sympathy with freedom of the press put out by governments, the facts show that the war against this freedom has not stopped and that Arab journalists constitute its primary arena. It should be noted that the study drew on official information made public by the unions of journalists or news agencies and newspapers and, consequently, is not all the information about incidents involving attacks on freedom of the press. Also, this study did not cover the situation of Arab journalists inside occupied Palestine.

1. Assassinations: During the past 2 years, nine Arab journalists have been killed; this figure is higher than the number of journalists killed at any time in the past and also is higher than the number of journalists killed anywhere else in the world. A number of journalists have been the target of assassination attempts and some preferred to cover them up.

2. Kidnappings: Some have been the target of kidnappings. Some returned, the fate of two is still unknown and one came back as a corpse.

So, statistics show that we are losing an Arab journalist every 2 months as a victim to the climate of freedom and democracy prevailing in the Arab homeland.

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3. Arrests and expulsions: Arab prisons have received many journalists. Although the bulk of the arrests take place in secret, dozens of journalists have asked the federation to intercede to save them from prison.
4. A number of journalists have been subjected to exile from their place of residence. In some Arab countries, the authorities have barred journalists from entering and have refused to grant them visas.
5. Arab "democracy" has not spared press establishments from closure and confiscation. During the past 2 years, the following establishments have been shut down:

The Kuwaiti magazine AL-TALI'AH has been closed three times.  
The Kuwaiti magazine AL-HADAF was shut down.  
The magazine AL-AZMINAH AL-'ARABIYAH (published in al-Shariqah) was closed.  
The offices of the newspaper AL-MUHARRIR in Beirut were blown up.  
The presses of the newspaper AL-SAFIR in Beirut were blown up.  
The presses of the newspaper AL-RA'Y AL-'AMM in Kuwait were blown up.  
Three newspapers in Tunisia were closed.  
The offices and presses of the magazine AL-KIFAH AL-'ARABI in Beirut were the target of more than one attack.  
The union organizations have encountered forms of pressure and suppression all to prevent them from exercising their democratic rights. This year has witnessed the heroic battle waged by the Egyptian union and also the attack against the journalists union in Sudan.

The report gives examples of press conditions in certain countries, including:

The Lebanese press: The press of Lebanon used to be given the label "the face of democracy in the Arab homeland" because of the climate of freedom that it enjoyed, in addition to its technical accomplishments. The tribulations of this press began at the Riyadh summit conference in 1970 when Egyptian President Anwar al-Sadat accused it of being responsible for the civil war. Decree No 1 of 1977 was the first step in imposing military censorship on Lebanese newspapers and magazines. The Lebanese journalists and press establishments were early victims of the civil war; during the past 7 years, 80 percent of the press establishments have been the targets of robbery, looting, bombing, shelling and intimidation. Up to now, the Lebanese press has given up 40 martyrs, including its late dean Riyadh Taha, who fell a few hundred meters from his union headquarters. Edward Sa'ab also fell victim to a sniper's bullet which ended the work of dozens of years and the photographer, Elyas al-Jawhari fell on top of the tool of his trade with which he had been trying to capture this state of decline being experienced by the Lebanese citizen. Also in Lebanon fell the Egyptian journalist, Ibrahim 'Amir, throttled by the blaze of ink and paper. The Palestinian journalists, Nayif Shibliq and Talal Rahmah, fell victim, as did others, brought together by their one profession and their one Arab democracy.

The declared war against Lebanese journalism uses various forms of coercion, terror and enticement and this war has not let up for a moment, even with any halt in the civil war or with any ceasefire in Lebanon. The press in occupied Palestine: The condition of the Arab press in the shadow of the Zionist occupation can be summarized as follows:

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1. Papers published by anti-regime forces, principally AL-ITTIHAD and AL-GHAD.
2. Papers published by puppet and pro-establishment forces, principally AL-ANBA'.
3. Daily papers in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip which have been published in the shadow of the occupation in Jerusalem, namely AL-SHA'B and AL-FAJR, two nationalist papers that have constantly been subjected to threats by the Zionist authorities because of their nationalist stands. Then there is the newspaper, AL-QUDS, which is dominated by a materialistic, opportunistic and political climber stamp, and the newspaper AL-TALI'AH, which speaks for the Palestinian Communist Party (formerly the Jordanian).
4. Monthly and serialized magazines specializing in literature, religion, industry, agriculture and womens' affairs which are aperiodic.

Since 1967, the press throughout the West Bank and the Gaza Strip has been subjected to various types of coercion. It is subject to the publications law that was passed by the British mandate in 1933 and which imposes censorship on all articles and advertising material.

This press is deprived of facilities enjoyed by other papers in the occupied territory, taxes, fees and official announcements, and the newspapers, AL-FAJR and AL-SHA'B are barred from the Zionist jails, while Hebrew newspapers and AL-QUDS are allowed in, on the argument that those two newspapers incite against the occupation and pose a threat to the nation. All these papers are subject to harsh military censorship.

Palestinian journalists have been the targets of killings, kidnappings and expulsions. The latest incident was the imposition of house arrest on the editors of AL-FAJR, AL-SHA'B and AL-TALI'AH.

The Tunisian press: Last March, three papers were shut down at once for periods of 6 months to a year.

In addition to confiscations and shutdowns, journalists in Tunisia are the targets of much abuse, such as arrests and prison which have hit many. Egyptian journalists working abroad, namely:

1. They view their struggle as part of the struggle of their colleagues working in Egypt on the premise that the battlefield for all Arab journalists is a pan-Arab arena, not a regional one.
2. Their position outside the constraints of the al-Sadat regime permits them to speak out more frankly because they are free of the extraordinary laws under which the writer inside Egypt suffers.
3. Newspapers of the nationalist Egyptian opposition constantly face forcible shutdowns as happened to all opposition papers when a decree closing them was promulgated last September.
4. There are more than 1.5 million Egyptians working in the Arab world outside the borders of Egypt and they need information media linking them with their nationalist and pan-Arab cause.

The activity of Egyptian journalists working abroad is an essential activity complementing the patriotic work inside Egypt.

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The Sudanese press: President Gaafar Nimeiri has taken an array of arbitrary actions against the journalists' union. After the union sent a note to the president last August protesting the law imposing press censorship, the authorities fired the journalist, 'Umar 'Abd-al-Tam, from his job as a reporter on the newspaper, AL-AYYAM, and retired three members of the union council.

When the elections of the journalists' unions were held during January of last year, the elections that resulted in the victory of the members of the opposition in the old council, the president responded the day after the results appeared by issuing a decree dissolving the union in his capacity as chairman of the Socialist Union and forming a committee to reconsider the press law of 1977 so as to ensure that the union would adhere to the political line dictated by the government.

The decree to dissolve the union came as a response to its rejection of the regime's policy and its adoption of a clear stance condemning the Camp David agreements and denouncing al-Sadat's actions in normalizing relations with the Zionist entity. Also, in its note, the union had revealed the regime's responsibility for the deteriorating economic, political and social conditions and had denounced its information policy which misled the masses and concealed facts from them.

Hence there have been the attempts to contain the Arab press to justify the capitulatory solutions which have been a prime objective the conspiracy has been working to achieve and hence the suppressive measures in various forms which have been applied against the journalists who have rejected these capitulatory solutions and have tried to expose them to Arab public opinion.

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INTER-ARAB

BRIEFS

PLASTICS INDUSTRY DEVELOPING RAPIDLY--In 1985, the Arab countries will be able to export manufactured plastic goods worth \$550 million and will export \$1.8 billion worth of these materials in 1990 out of a total production which at that time is estimated will exceed \$5 billion. The Imperial British Chemical Corporation expects Arab plastic products to compete with European and American production in Third World markets. [Text] [Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic No 256, 8-14 Jan. 82 p 56] [COPYRIGHT: 1982 AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI] 8389

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OPEC AFFAIRS

OIL EXPORTING COUNTRIES SELL GOLD IN EUROPE

PM261637 London FINANCIAL TIMES in English 26 Feb 82 p 38

[Report by David Marsh: "Gold Sales by Oil Exporters Depress Market"]

[Text] Oil exporting countries, headed by Iran have been selling gold in Europe in the past few weeks to alleviate balance of payments difficulties caused by the sharp fall in the oil price.

Persistent sales from the Middle East, combined with offloading by the main producers, South Africa and the Soviet Union, have been a principal factor driving the gold price down to a 2 1/2 year low this month, according to international bullion dealers.

Apart from Iran, Iraq is also thought to have been selling gold although details are unclear. These two countries led a string of buyers from the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) in 1980, when the gold price was about double its present level of \$360-\$370 an ounce.

A Zurich dealer said last night: "They did not make a very good investment."

Dealers do not rule out the possibility that Libya--which bought a lot in London at the beginning of last year--may also have been selling recently.

News of the sales has emerged as the OPEC surplus has been rapidly diminishing. The oil states as a group are now again net borrowers from the international banking system.

Apart from the falling oil price both Tehran and Baghdad have been hard hit financially by the 18-month war between them.

The change in OPEC's fortunes is having widespread repercussions on financial markets. Yesterday fears that Kuwait might start selling Japanese stocks because of its weakening finances were among the factors behind a sharp fall on the Tokyo stock market.

According to one dealer the Iranian gold has been dumped on the market by Bank Markazi, the country's central bank, in a "rather uneducated" fashion.

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Iran and several other OPEC nations--including Indonesia, which also made big bullion purchases in 1980--have been sounding out Western banks about raising gold-backed credits.

Bank Markazi would prefer to use its gold as collateral rather than selling it outright, in order to avoid further downward pressure on the price.

Many European banks approached by Tehran have been reluctant to lend because of fears about the country's ability to repay. The advantages of gold collateral are greatly reduced when the bullion price is weak.

A London bullion banker said: "I wouldn't like to be sitting on a pile of gold from Iran. They don't know where their next dollar is coming from."

According to one estimate of the 60-90 tonnes of gold Iran previously had stored in Europe--some of which was held at the Bank of England--35 tonnes may have been used in collateral deals. The rest is being sold, and may be almost exhausted.

The Tehran government is believed to have at least 200 tonnes more in Iran. But the country's rulers are not likely to move this "bedrock reserve" to the West for selling or collateral use unless all other financing channels are blocked.

The large amount of gold bought by both official and private investors in the Middle East in 1979/80 was seen as a significant prop for the price at the time. But it is now regarded by bullion dealers as a dangerous overhang threatening the market.

A European dealer said: "As soon as they (OPEC) started to buy, they became potential sellers."

Another said that the further the gold price went down the more bullion would be sold by disappointed Middle East holders. "There are certainly investors around wanting to buy--but they are waiting for the price to become cheaper."

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## AFGHANISTAN

## SOVIETS SEEN USING CARROT-STICK METHOD ON AFGHANS

London THE ECONOMIST in English 27 Feb 82 pp 53-54

[Text]

The Russians seem to be trying new tactics in Afghanistan. Afghans prepared to co-operate with the communist government and its Russian protectors are offered a remarkable amount of freedom, while those who resist continue to be punished ruthlessly: The stick and the carrot is taking over from the stick and the stick.

Kandahar, Afghanistan's second largest city, has been a particular victim of the stick, according to reports reaching Peshawar, the refugee centre in Pakistan. Until recently, guerrillas were able to move freely in parts of Kandahar, occasionally firing on Russian soldiers without suffering serious reprisals. However, after the most recent attack, when two armoured cars were knocked out and several Russians killed, the reaction was fierce. The old city and its bazaars were shelled and bombed and several hundred Kandaharis were reported killed or wounded. The local people persuaded the guerrillas to cease operations and since then the city has been calm.

A few weeks later there was a minor guerrilla attack in Herat. Within hours the city was surrounded by Soviet troops, who carried out house-to-house searches. Thousands of men are said to have been arrested or press-ganged into the Afghan

army. Again the local population asked the guerrillas to withdraw. Again the guerrillas agreed.

The guerrillas were active last month in Parwan province, north-west of Kabul. Soviet troops moved in, bombarded villages, destroyed crops and carried out summary executions. The area is now quiet. Villages on the Kabul-to-Gardez road were told that for every convoy attacked a village would be destroyed. Most convoys are now getting through.

That's the stick, but the Russians make it clear that it can be avoided. Villagers who keep the guerrillas out of their areas can choose their own leaders, administrators, even governors. They can ask for money to build mosques and seek advice on their crops. There have been hints from the ministry of tribes that the Pathans may soon be given a degree of autonomy. Health centres are being built; so are kindergartens, libraries and schools. Consumer goods are subsidised. The Russians are buying themselves relative peace in some areas.



The Russians arrived in Afghanistan in December, 1979, expecting to be wel-

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comed. They are now facing reality. This week the Soviet army newspaper Red Star published an unusually frank account of the war in Afghanistan, conceding that Russian soldiers sometimes have a "very, very difficult life" there. It said that "thousands of bandits" are sent each day into Afghanistan and the "blood of innocent people is flowing". In one attack by guerrillas, hostages had been skinned alive, Red Star's correspondent said. This week a report reaching Delhi said that a Russian general had died in a helicopter brought down by a guerrilla rocket.

Some guerrilla groups based in Peshawar are advocating a spectacular operation, perhaps the seizing of a town. But this would lead to heavy civilian casualties for the unfortunate town se-

lected. Others want more raids on government installations and attacks on convoys. But the Russians are improving their defences: these days convoys are usually escorted by helicopter gunships.

The resistance is split between moderates and fundamentalists, who are themselves divided. Throughout the winter high-level meetings have been held in Peshawar to forge some kind of unity, particularly within the fundamentalists' ranks. They now have one flag and one slogan, and soon they will have one headed notepaper.

The fear in Peshawar is that guerrillas in the field will go their own way. Alliances have been created among fighting men which bear little relation to the factions in Peshawar, which many commanders regard as simply a source of arms.

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ALGERIA

AGRICULTURAL POLICIES EXAMINED

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1888, 15 Jan 82 p 125

[Text] In early autumn, the National Agrarian Revolution Commission (CNRA) made a practical evaluation of the agricultural sector. This evaluation showed both significant results and serious deficiencies.

Slightly more than 1.5 million hectares were recovered in the first 2 stages of the agrarian revolution; 93 percent of this area was redistributed to nearly 100,000 recipients; 132 farm villages were built and 224 are under construction. Nine-tenths of communes have a Communal Multi-Service Agricultural Cooperative (CAPCS).

However, many deficiencies still exist: Except in the governorate of Algiers, where first- and second-stage operations were completed as planned, survey and demarcation files are missing or are incomplete, appeal decisions are sometimes still not implemented and too many local officials seem unconcerned about the agrarian revolution. The CNRA will therefore continue its efforts for completion of the first and second stages throughout the country as soon as possible.

The reorganization of self-managed farms, scheduled to be completed by March 1982, is reportedly well underway in several governorates (Mostaganem, Annaba, Jijel, etc.) and the minister of agriculture and agrarian revolution, Mr Selim Saadi, is stepping up inspections. He has given special attention to the problem of supervision in particular: Engineers and technicians are apparently not always welcome in rural areas, where a new organization with differentiated functions must be achieved for the sake of the public interest. Modern production will require not only specialists in agronomy and hydrology, but also mechanics; as a result, farm equipment will no longer be unavailable and each reorganized farm will be required to outfit its own repair shop.

Mr Selim Saadi did not conceal his surprise that for nearly 20 years there have been groups organized according to bases to which no serious thought was given. He now intends to establish homogeneous and economically viable entities: For example, truck farms of approximately 100 hectares and grain farms of about 1,000 hectares.

The minister pointed out that we must not "consider the reorganization only from the standpoint of land; it involves a group of measures which are essential for reviving the agricultural sector" .... Unauthorized occupants must be evicted,

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the agricultural infrastructure must be restored, self-construction must be launched, and workers must be provided with parcels of land to mobilize the family's work potential. All of this is intended to improve living and working conditions and to achieve production that is better planned, making it possible to reach the targets established by the plan.

## Presidential Support

One result, among others, of President Chadli Bendjedid's inspections in the governorates of Annaba and Guelma in early autumn was to stress the necessity of giving priority in development to agriculture, the "priority of priorities ... the true wealth of future generations." A native of the Annaba area, having grown up in the agricultural community, the president is actually particularly well qualified to point out the agricultural orientation of the region and to stress, more generally, the major role which agriculture must resume in the Algerian economy.

Thus it has been found that despite the wealth of land, in the governorate of Annaba agriculture has been sacrificed to particularly intense industrialization. The capital of the governorate, which has become overpopulated and surrounded by shantytowns, has drained the rural population, who have been attracted by the prospect of steady, and hopefully well-paying, jobs; the countryside has been deserted, some villages are almost empty and there is no farm labor available.

The minister of agriculture and agrarian revolution emphasized the constant reduction of land under cultivation to the Council of Ministers, which met to evaluate the results of the president's inspection. In 3 years, from 1974 to 1977, agriculture lost 21,000 hectares of irrigated land. Farm area per inhabitant dropped from 0.75 hectare in 1963 to 0.40 hectare in 1979 and if this situation is not rectified, this figure will be only 0.14 hectare by the year 2000. The Council of Ministers has therefore decided to strictly apply legal measures for conserving farmlands, to eliminate encroachments on the agricultural sector, to provide for the resettlement of people in rural areas, in particular through the allocation of land for building, dwellings and self-construction facilities.

In some ways, the struggle of farmworkers to prevent their lands from being used for construction has already begun; such is the case of a farm in the commune of Cheraga, a portion of which was allocated to a building cooperative. There is actually talk in Algiers that the entire Mitidja may well be buried under a slab of concrete in 20 years; it currently provides one-third of Algerian production of vegetables and citrus fruits.

All leaders are now contributing to the agricultural campaign. Opening the Seventh Congress of the National Union of Algerian Farmers, Mr Mohammed Cherif Messadia, the regular secretary of the FLN Central Committee, stressed the need for cultural, political and ideological training of farmers: "The agricultural community must be turned into a real revolutionary force." Recalling that the agrarian revolution was aimed particularly at abolishing man's exploitation of man, he concluded: "One year we will make a profit, whereas another year we will have a loss, but that is not the most important thing; it is human development which must be considered."

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Mr Selim Saadi stated that in the future, each farmworker will have a parcel of land to cover his family needs: "This sight must be eliminated in the future: A farmer returning through the fields to his home, carrying a carton of eggs purchased in the capital of the governorate."

Farmers Will Retain Tax Exemptions

In his "Speech to the Nation" of 20 December 1981, President Chadli Bendjedid stated that "Algeria's future basically lies in the dynamization and development of agriculture" by youth, who will be trained to work the land. In this regard, the president's tone was optimistic. He said that he believed that the agricultural sector is undergoing "a considerable improvement" as a result of recent measures: reorganization of the socialist sector, allocation of material and human resources, particularly technicians and professionals, etc. The growth rate of agricultural production is now higher than the rate of population growth.

The president expressly confirmed that "the farmer will continue to receive tax exemptions and material and financial services"; the earnings of farmers will not be affected at all, "regardless of the profit they make as a result of honest work devoid of all exploitation, increased production and improved productivity and the search for new resources ... in the context of direct or indirect agricultural work or traditional crafts."

These remarks give the impression of encouragement for the agricultural sector, but it is not the only one being considered: "These are," the president concluded, "the ultimate goals of the Agrarian Revolution," in support of which new efforts must be made.

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EGYPT

WRITER EXPECTS NO IMMEDIATE SHIFT TOWARD STRONG PAN-ARAB POLICIES

Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic No 248, 13-19 Nov 81 pp 78-79

[Article by Amir Iskandar: "Future of Intellectual Currents in Egypt"]

[Text] Perhaps talking about the future of the pan-Arab current in Egypt entails considerable risk because any words not carrying the emotional enthusiasm displayed by most of the Arab information media in the wake of al-Sadat's assassination or any words that do not follow the oratory processions urging the need of Egypt's return to the "Arab ranks" and that at times even hail "Egypt's actual return" on the basis of some public press statements, some rumors or some facts concerning secret contacts and visits--any such words may shock the reader who dreams of Egypt's resumption of its vanguard role in the Arab procession and who hopes that the Arab conflicts may have ended with an opportune strike of fate or luck.

I want to reassure the reader that this issue is not exactly what these lines seek to tackle. The series of events that have taken place and that are still taking place in Egypt haven't ended yet. The "scenario" whose implementation started on last 6 October--regardless of its author or authors--still has chapters that have not been completed yet. Completing these chapters may take some weeks or some months, regardless of the return of Egypt or of the return of the Arabs to Egypt in the coming days under the canopy of the existing political and social given facts. This helps to confirm or to doubt some analyses which assume that the events in Egypt will follow specific scenarios with the elimination of al-Sadat. The more important question pertains to Egypt's resumption of its vanguard pan-Arab role in the future that is more distant than the next few weeks or months. What are the possibilities of such resumption, what are its internal and external requirements and what spheres are open to it?

In fact, this question raises the issue, or dilemma, of the future of the pan-Arab current in Egypt because this current is the one that was linked, at least in the past, to the central role which Egypt played insofar as the Arab homeland as a whole is concerned. The defeat of this current has been accompanied by Egypt's retreat to within its shell, to its desertion of this role, or to withdrawing this role from it, and to the subsequent multiplicity of the centers of polarization in the Arab arena.

From the mid-1950's and until nearly the end of the 1960's, this current was tied to Nasirism. The current found in the personality of Jamal 'Abd al-Nasir the

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practical political leadership that proved its ability not only to crystallize this political current in Egypt alone but also to extend it beyond Egypt's borders and to penetrate with it the Arab homeland from one end to the other. Egypt's Arabism is definitely not of 'Abd al-Nasir's making. Even the very ideology of Arab nationalism is not his personal innovation. Moreover, at the outset of 'Abd al-Nasir's procession, Arabism was no more than one of three circles through which 'Abd al-Nasir believed Egypt had to move. But when the development of events and the progression of his own thought motivated 'Abd al-Nasir to consider Arabism the fundamental circle of Egypt and when he threw all his weight and all of Egypt's weight behind the center of this circle, the major transformation took place, not only in Egypt but throughout the entire Arab sphere. Egypt constitutes one-third of all the Arabs in terms of population. In terms of the old and contemporary cultural criterion, Egypt is the most advanced Arab country. It has a position and a status that have enabled it to be not just an Arab "country" but an Arab "role." Jamal 'Abd al-Nasir was certainly a great leader. But he would not have achieved a part of what he did achieve had not Egypt been behind him with all its historical, geographic, human and cultural weight. The essence of his greatness lies not only in the fact that he knew how to touch off all the latent capabilities but also in his enlightened awareness of the given facts of a specific historical moment at both the Arab and the international levels.

The Arab reality suffered at the time from some sort of ideological vacuum and lacked the leadership personality capable of uniting the Arab voice. The Arab reality [world] was a vast and tumultuous ocean seeking a "center." Cairo was able at the time to play the role of the center. It extended its hand wherever it could to every Arab uprising, movement and spark of struggle. Sparks flew off everywhere from Algiers to Baghdad. The reactionary forces retreated to their dark cells and the arena became free for the Arab liberation forces to wage their triumphant battle against imperialism and colonialism. The Egyptian media were not the only extremely sharp weapon brandished in the face of the nation's enemies. The military ammunition carried by the [Egyptian] military instructors and advisers [was another such weapon]. On the mountains of Yemen and the hills of Aden fell thousands of the martyrs of freedom and of enlightenment who had come from Egypt. However, it must be said that the historical moment was totally opportune at the international level, not only for the Arab homeland but perhaps for all the Third World countries. It was the moment of exact and precise international balance between the two superpowers and the blocs behind them. The fires of the Korean war had been extinguished in 1953 and the winds of the cold war began to blow actively in the international sphere, giving rise to the sharp rivalry between the two blocs--a rivalry which tickled the feelings of the Third World and whetted the appetite of its national liberation movements to make national gains through the cold-faced but raging conflicts between the two superpowers.

It was thus that the world witnessed at the time the birth of Bandung [conference], knew the breaking of the arms monopoly for the first time and heard the phrases of positive neutrality and independence of the national will from voices coming from the heart of the old continents. It was also thus that the world cleared a large and lighted part of its theater for personalities with dark, black and yellow faces to emerge surrounded by the halos of the struggle for liberation from the oppression of long centuries of colonialism. Perhaps it is

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not incompatible with the inevitability of that historical moment to say that the first modern Arab unity found under the canopy of the restraining international balance its secure way to realization and acceptance.

So in one sense, 'Abd al-Nasir, like Lumumba, Sukarno, Nkroma, Sekou Toure and even Nehru (may we add to them even Tito?), was a natural and logical product of certain international conditions and certain strategic balances. Naturally, all this doesn't abolish the individual's distinctive historical role and doesn't diminish the depth and importance of the popular or mass will. But it places the current in its true course, with the current's movement being governed by the distance between the two banks.

The winds continued to blow as the ships wanted them to blow until nearly the mid-1960's and perhaps to the end of Khrushchev's and Kennedy's era. Then the temperature started to rise with the gradual transformation of the international struggle from the phase of peaceful coexistence to the phase of detente. The curtain began to fall slowly on the successful and exciting acts during which the skillful players reaped the fruits of their dazzling movements on the tightrope strung over two abysses. The rope was no longer as strong as it had been and those who tried to continue their game, being unaware of or ignoring the changes of the new historical moments, were heard falling hard in Africa and Asia. The dark shadows of history prevailed over their actual or symbolic ends.

Jamal 'Abd al-Nasir did not fall at the time but preparations were being made for his downfall. Perhaps it is not insignificant to recall now that the famous Mason mission sent by Kennedy near the end of his era demanded as the primary U.S. condition that Egypt leadership role in the Arab world be cut down to size and confined to Egypt's geographic borders. Naturally 'Abd al-Nasir refused to bring about his own end or to commit suicide willingly. Only 2 years later, Israel performed the role and the task for which it had been created and the catastrophe occurred on 5 June 1967. The painful catastrophe revealed not only the faulty internal calculations but also the destructive international calculations. Instead of continuing to play it coquettishly against the two camps, as he had done in the past, the most skilful player who had been weakened by his wounds had to accept reluctantly the pressures of both camps and of the masses themselves who had suddenly opened their eyes, while still in the trance of their faith in the historical hero and in the inevitability of the victory, to the debris of the dream. They also started to exert their pressure to demand their (relatively significant) and indefinitely suspended role.

The truth is that the historical hero exerted superhuman efforts in the 3 years following the 5 June defeat to rebuild his armed forces. He did actually realize an amazing accomplishment whose results emerged 3 years later in October 1973 when along with the Bar-lev line, the myth of the invincible Israeli army was destroyed. But fate did not wait for the hero to see with his own eyes his forces move to the usurped bank of the canal. He died at an inopportune moment. That was not the time for death but for living, or perhaps for regaining life. But who knows! Perhaps he preferred to depart, having become aware, through his bitter experience and his penetrating perception, that he could no longer continue to play the international game which had brought him at a historical moment the wreaths of victory from the ocean to the Gulf.

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Did Nasirism end with the end of its hero? Throughout the period in which he was in control of power, al-Sadat sentenced Nasirism to death. He tried to destroy it completely, holding it responsible for the mistakes of its domestic actions and for the sins of its era. Al-Sadat then pulled Egypt's reins, taking it out of the Arab homeland's broad spheres and leading it back to its isolated cocoon. Al-Sadat thus fulfilled all that Mason had demanded before and carried out the U.S. conditions in full. He even begged and tempted the United States to impose on Egypt harder conditions than the previous ones. He turned Egypt into an extremely pale star revolving without any will in the imperialist-Zionist sphere. Al-Sadat reduced to the point of feebleness Egypt's progressive Arab role. Thus, the tumultuous ocean lost its noble and influential center and numerous islands revolving around conflicting--at times to the point of armed hostility--centers emerged amidst the waves of this ocean. International polarization then started to play its ever-present game for further parasitic fragmentation and division.

But if it is true that talking about the modern pan-Arab current in Egypt means, in one way or another, talking about the Nasirist current, can it be said then that this current has reached a deadend? The posing of this question should not be understood to mean in any way casting doubts on Egypt's Arabism or its pan-Arab, civilizational or cultural identity. It should not be even understood to mean casting doubts on Egypt's suspended role in the Arab homeland. The question does not pertain to the Arabism of the masses or their emotional and intellectual inclinations. The question pertains to the pan-Arab intellectual current crystallized by Nasirism in a number of ideas, visualizations and concepts and transferred by Nasirism from the sphere of thought to the sphere of action, even though the current, as thought, preceded Nasirism by generations of thinkers and by several decades of time.

Al-Sadat is no more. The "family head," as he used to call himself, has died in the middle of his real family--the representatives of the imperialist and Western interests and of the multi-national companies. But has al-Sadatism ended? Has Egypt's isolation ended and is the road open to Egypt to regain its pan-Arab role? The answer to this question is not connected with the hopes and not even with the reports leaked here and there about secret visits and tacit agreements. All these [leaked reports] are the highest phase of al-Sadatism, if we may use the phrase. What do we see at the domestic level? The social structure--in its comprehensive sense--which projected, nurtured and brought to bloom the progressive pan-Arab current in Egypt in the 1950's and 1960's has been exposed, like it or not, to a complete domestic coup. The middlemen, speculators, representatives of the foreign monopolies and other parasitic groups--which altogether form the first base of al-Sadatist regime--have expanded the membership of society's top club. There are now in Egypt hundreds of millionnaires who have gathered, or looted, their fortunes in numerous spheres, such as financial firms, banks, tourism, consumer trade and farms within the framework of the so-called food security. This is in addition to the monies plundered from the Western aid, loans and grants. Behind these groups, there are the broader groups of the wealthy rural people who own the fruit, vegetable and medical and aromatic herb farms. Behind all these, there is an army of bank and tourist establishment employees and workers of the various service projects which pay high wages and which are connected with al-Sadat's "open-economy" era. If we add to all these the army of Egyptians working in the Arab countries and the families related to them inside Egypt and including

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millions of members, we can ultimately understand the extent of the change which has affected the Egyptian social structure from within.

Even though emphasis must be laid on this "internal picture," the dimensions of the external picture are also extremely influential and significant. With the strong international polarization, especially in the Reaganite phase, the emergence of the oil center tied to the West and embodied basically in financial-banking structures that are tantamount to stations [branches] of the major capitalist financial centers--the emergence of this oil center pulls strongly at the reins of most of the area's countries, bringing them closer together and driving them toward stronger ties with imperialism and stronger imperialist domination of their political, economic and ideological fates.

This certainly doesn't mean confiscation of the future because ultimately, history progresses from its worst sides. But the price being paid by the peoples seems to be more exorbitant than ever before. The image of the pan-Arab and progressive Egypt does definitely appear in the distant horizon. But the path toward this Egypt does not rely on a fortunate or lucky strike and is not expected of a new phase in which, some people dream, history will repeat itself. Egypt's army is certainly a national and pan-Arab army. But this army alone will not make the desired change that is compatible with the changes in the world and with the requirements of the phase. The army is truly the striking arm, but only in a body of forces led by a progressive national and pan-Arab front.

When this is realized, a new Horus will be born naturally and Egypt will regain its previous heart, its ever-living heart.

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LIBYA

## BRIEFS

CZECH ROAD CONTRACTS--The bulletin ECONOMIC DIGEST, published by the Czechoslovak Chamber of Commerce and Industry, emphasizes in its December 1981 issue that the construction of highways is one of the areas of collaboration between Czechoslovakia and Libya. This job is being done by the Strojexport foreign trade enterprise in coordination with the Olomouc Transport Construction Enterprise and the Doprastav Transport Construction Enterprise of Bratislava. One of the results of their common efforts is a section of 350 kilometers of road linking the towns of Nalut and Ghadames. Other contracts were signed between Strojexport and its Libyan partners, dealing with the construction of six highway sections with a total length of about 270 kilometers. The first section of 22 kilometers has already been completed; three sections are in the process of construction and the remaining two sections are in the preparation stage. The work is being done according to a specific work plan and will be finished by the specified target dates, that is, during 1982 and during the first half of 1983. Czechoslovak and Libyan officials are looking into possibilities of signing a new agreement under whose terms the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic would build an additional 250 kilometers of roads in Libya. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1888, 15 Jan 82 p 133] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1982] 5058

DEVELOPMENT BUDGET--Budget for 1982 trimmed. Libya's development budget for FY 1982 will be smaller than the one for the preceding FY, in other words, 2.4 billion Libyan dinars (about \$8 billion [as published]), as against 2.7 billion dinars (about \$9 billion [as published]) in 1981. The reduction of this budget was decided in view of the prospects of petroleum revenues. Petroleum exports, which had dropped to 600,000 barrels per day last October, have however been going up again since then. The sectors that received the most allocations under the 1982 development budget are agriculture (347 million dinars) and the heavy industry (493 million). [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1888, 15 Jan 82 p 133] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1982] 5058

PROJECT TO TRANSPORT WATER--Libya is thinking of carrying out a vast project for transporting sweet water from the desert regions of Tazirbu and Sarir toward the Gulf of Sidra for agricultural production and urban food supply. This project, which will be covered by between 100 and 200 contracts, is broken down as follows: equipment for 270 wells (a certain number of which has already been drilled); interconnection of various wells by means of a pipeline network with a diameter between 80 centimeters and 3.40 meters, made of prestressed concrete or steel

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(all pipes will have to be made in Libya; bidding invitations will be issued in the near future for the construction of six plants); construction of tanks; installation of all necessary secondary equipment for the generation and transmission of electric power, pumping stations, etc. New towns have also been planned (Tazirbu and Sarir, in particular) as well as roads, schools, hospitals, etc. [Excerpts] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1889, 22 Jan 82 p 193] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1982] 5058

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MAURITANIA

1982 BUDGET APPROVED, POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS NOTED

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1885, 25 Dec 81 p 3424

[Text] Adoption of the 1982 budget, 11.46 Billion Mauritanian Ouguiya (+ 11.3 Percent)

The Military Committee for National Salvation [CMSN] which met under the chairmanship of the Mauritanian head of state Lt Col Mohamed Khouna Ould Haidalla, has adopted the state budget for 1982. This budget has taken into consideration all of the recommendations contained in the plan for economic and financial recovery adopted in 1978 by the CMSN.

The 1982 budget of income and expenses amounts to 11,466,329,320 Mauritanian ouguiya, or an increase of 1,166,329,320 Mauritanian ouguiya in total value and 11.3 percent in relative value. The increase in anticipated income in 1982 involves customs receipts and direct taxes.

Placing the tax rolls on a computer, authorized auditing of collection, and improving taxation division operations justify an increase in tax revenues. Furthermore, actions will be undertaken to effectively combat tax fraud.

Reform of the general tax code tends toward a simplification of the tax base regulations and to tax relief by raising the income level exempt from general income tax from 45,000 to 80,000 Mauritanian ouguiya, lowering the BIC [Expansion unknown] rate, and lowering the property tax rate on rental properties from 15 to 12 percent, and on principal residence properties from 15 to 4 percent.

Social measures have been taken for 1982. They include a special increase in wages applying to all wage earners, as opposed to the contractual increases granted in 1980-81 which only involved those earning less than 10,000 and 15,000 Mauritanian ouguiya.

CMSN: Recommendations on the Economy, Administration and Housing

During its regular session from 8 to 11 December, the CMSN examined the overall situation of Mauritania and defined the broad lines of the political, economic and social program for 1982.

The CMSN recommended the immediate implementation of administrative decentralization initiated by the government, the methods for which have been defined by the

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interministerial commission created for this purpose. The committee further recommended that the government prepare economic programs of community interest for the regions and rigorously executed them.

The CMSN was obliged to note the disastrous situation of most public institutions: banks and other Mauritanian public companies. According to the committee, the financial difficulties in which the state companies find themselves are basically due to laxness and to granting abnormally high salaries and accommodating advantages such as high compensation benefits. The CMSN commits the government to take immediate steps to review the texts dealing with the deliberative assemblies of national enterprises.

Regarding housing, the CMSN finds, on the one hand, an alarming increase in rent from year to year, making gradual absorption of the budget deficit more difficult and, on the other hand, the existence of close to a thousand persons occupying government or official housing illegally under the terms of regulations currently in force, while thousands of others with legal claims are without housing. This situation is contrary to the CMSN's recommendations and has been since October 1979. Consequently, the CMSN requests the government to furnish a study proposing a final solution to this problem as quickly as possible.

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MOROCCO

LUMBER INDUSTRY REVIEWED

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1888, 15 Jan 82 p 131

[Text] The Moroccan lumber industry is still characterized by the existence of many small and medium-size manufacturing plants and some large companies. It is nevertheless a relatively developed industry which has grown considerably over the last 10 years, particularly as a result of the expansion of the construction sector, which determines the development of this industry to a large extent. In its study of the industry, the Moroccan Foreign Trade Bank (BMCE) lists detailed figures which cannot be reproduced here. However, the bank's introductory statement contains a summary of the report, which we have provided in full and which successively describes the industry's sources of supply, its structure and production, applications and market.

Sources of Supply

The lumber industry is supplied primarily by imported timber and secondarily by timber produced domestically.

The domestic source of supply is Moroccan forests, with timberland of 5.282 million hectares. Natural forests cover 4.912 million hectares, or 93 percent of wooded areas, comprising 2.730 million hectares of hardwoods (cork oak, evergreen oak, argan), 1.422 million hectares of conifers (thujas, juniper, cedar, pine ...) and 760,000 hectares of minor species (pistachio, tizra ...). Artificially planted forests cover 370,000 hectares or 7 percent of timberland, with 222,000 hectares of hardwoods (eucalyptus, poplars) and 148,000 hectares of conifers (pines).

This sizable potential helps to satisfy only a small percentage of structural and industrial timber needs, since most Moroccan timber is unsuitable for industrial use, with the exception of walnut used for veneering, eucalyptus used for pitprops and Zeen oak used for railroad ties. Thus most domestic production is used mainly to satisfy firewood needs.

One result of this situation is that imported timber plays an important role in supplying the lumber industry. Such imports amount to 300,000 to 400,000 tons annually and include conifers, common woods and mahogany in particular. Thus from 1976 to 1980, Moroccan imports of rough timber rose from 319,311 tons valued at 246 million dirhams (or an average price of 770.71 dirhams/ton) to 370,088 tons valued at 434 million dirhams (or an average price of 1,173.16 dirhams/ton). This was an increase of 15.9 percent in weight and 76.4 percent in value. Imported timber

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is subject to a customs duty of 10 percent upon entry, or 48.12 percent ad valorem with all taxes included, and comes from the USSR, Ivory Coast, Spain, Portugal, Gabon, France and Yugoslavia.

Structure and Production

The lumber industry is comprised of the following operations: production of dressed timber; veneering and production of plywood and panels; structural woodwork; manufacture of packing items; manufacture of furniture and padding.

All of these operations combined include 113 manufacturing plants, employ 5,683 persons and utilize the following equipment: conveyor-belt barkers for dressing, rotary lathes, slicers, presses and dryers for veneers and plywood, automatic staplers for packaging in wooden crates.

Based on the latest survey of processing industries, the lumber industry uses 56 percent of mechanical production capacity on the average and requires 23,550 dirhams to create 1 new job, whose apparent expected productivity is 21,260 dirhams/year. Lumber industry operations in 1977 had a turnover of 501 million dirhams, production of 482 million dirhams and investments of 22 million dirhams. This sector is characterized by a high concentration of its operations in large plants. Of the 113 plants mentioned, 12 companies accounted for 66.7 percent of sales, 65.6 percent of production and 64.6 percent of added value. Each of these 12 companies had a turnover of more than 10 million dirhams.

Following processing, the lumber has several applications. As a packing material, it is used to manufacture crates of sawn or reinforced lumber and blocks for packing citrus fruits, early fruits and vegetables and beverages. This market is estimated at 40/60 million units and is experiencing problems as a result of competition from cardboard and plastic. In the construction sector, which represents a very large outlet, the lumber is used to manufacture doors, windows, partitions .... This market is also experiencing a recovery. Finally, lumber is also used to manufacture furniture (wardrobes, armchairs, sofas, tables, desks, etc.). This market is experiencing substantial development, with a turnover of more than 188 million dirhams, accounting for nearly 30 million dirhams of exports.

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SUDAN

BRIEFS

AGRICULTURAL EQUIPMENT--During a visit to the Sudan in November, a delegation from the Daimler-Benz Company together with Sudanese authorities studied a project for the establishment of an assembly plant for tractors and other agricultural equipment. This project would be financed by Daimler-Benz, the Gezira Farmers Association, the government of the central region, and the Tractors and Agricultural Equipment Assembly Company. We recall that the Massey Ferguson Company in 1980 conducted talks and studies along these lines with the support of the Sudanese Development Corporation which however did not lead anywhere because of essentially financial problems. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1888, 15 Jan 82 p 134] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1982] 5058

PETROLEUM PRODUCTS--NAPCO (National Petroleum Company) distribution activities. The first of nine service stations of NAPCO has just been opened at Omdurman. The Sudanese company has also received a loan of \$1.5 million from the Spanish government, intended for the purchase of a dozen 8,000-gallon tank trucks which will be assigned to the transportation of petroleum products between Port-Sudan and the capital. Parallel to this, negotiations were started to transfer the share of 25 percent, held by the province of Khartum in NAPCO capital, to the General Petroleum Company of the Ministry of Energy and Mines. The other two stockholders, the People's Cooperative Bank and Total, will retain their shares of 37.5 percent. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1888, 22 Jan 82 p 193] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1982] 5058

RAILWAY EQUIPMENT--Equipment purchase. Among railroad equipment purchases announced in recent months by the Sudanese Railway Corporation, we note the following: 300 cattle cars (supplied by Belgium); 100 wheat [hopper] cars (Korea); 300 freight cars (Portugal); 30 locomotives (Henschel, FRG); spare parts from Egypt worth \$813,000. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1889, 22 Jan 82 p 193] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1982] 5058

TRANSPORTATION EQUIPMENT--Equipment purchases. The Shaykh Mustafa al-Amin business group, wholesale Sudanese exporters of peanuts and vegetable oils, negotiated with the American Mack Company for the purchase of 100 trucks to be used in transporting export products between Ghezira and Port-Sudan. On the other hand, the Sudan Ren Chemicals Company is looking for the best solutions for the transport of basic products for the fertilizer plant located south of Khartum, to go into production next May. At full capacity, this plant will annually consume 100,000 tons of naphtha and 104,000 tons of fuel imported through Port-Sudan. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1889, 22 Jan 82 p 193] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1982] 5058

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NILE NAVIGATION PROJECTS--Projects for Jonglei. The Sudanese-Egyptian Technical Authority for the Nile Water is studying a program for industrial facilities to be established in the zone through which the Jonglei Canal flows; this canal is now being improved in the southern part of the Sudan. The projects among other things would involve the construction of a lock, a pier, and bridges for a total of something like \$50 million to be financed through the EEC. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1889, 22 Jan 82 p 193] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1982] 5058

TEXTILE STUDY--Development of weaving industry. In cooperation with a team of German experts, the Sudanese Industrial Research and Consultancy Institute is conducting a study dealing with the development of the cotton weaving industry. The German technicians belong to the German Institute of Development, an agency specializing in the industrial problems of the Third World. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1889, 22 Jan 82 p 193] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1982] 5058

GUM ARABIC PRODUCTION--Output up, development projects. Sudanese production of gum arabic should, for 1981, be 10 percent higher than what it was during the preceding year. We note in this connection that exports of gum for the period of 12 months from September 1980 to September 1981 came to 39,000 tons as against 35,000 tons for the preceding 12-month period. Various projects were launched in recent months in connection with gum arabic. In addition to the two projects financed by the EEC (Sudanese Gum Belt and North Kordofan), we can report two others. The first one is financed by Finland and involves the introduction of new production methods in the province of the White Nile. If the results of this experiment are satisfactory, it will be extended to the entire Sudan. The second one consists of indirect aid for this production effort since it involves food donations under the WFP going to farmers who are interested in cropping gum. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1889, 22 Jan 82 p 193] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1982] 5058

ARAB AID--The Sudan on 15 December obtained a loan of \$6.5 million from the Arab Monetary Fund to make up for the deficit in its balance of payments. Since its establishment in 1977, the Arab Monetary Fund, whose headquarters is at Abu Dhabi, has granted Sudan loans in the amount of \$70 million. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1889, 22 Jan 82 p 193] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1982] 5058

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YEMEN ARAB REPUBLIC

BRIEFS

N. YEMENIS URGED TO JOIN PALESTINIANS--Beirut, 17 Feb (REUTER)--North Yemen is encouraging its nationals to join Palestinian guerrilla groups in Lebanon, North Yemeni President Ali Abdallah Salih was quoted as saying today. President Salih said in an interview with the Beirut magazine AL-JUMHOUR that a delegation from San'a' visited Lebanon recently to make arrangements for the transfer of such volunteers. "In the fact of Israeli intransigence and repeated Zionist aggression against the Arab nation, it has become crucial that able members of the Arab nation should join the battle of destiny," he said. Travellers in south Lebanon have already reported North Yemenis manning Palestinian checkpoints. [Text] [JN171123 London REUTER in English 0947 GMT 17 Feb 82]

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