

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

JPRS L/10399

18 March 1982

West Europe Report

(FOUO 17/82)



FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

NOTE

JPRS publications contain information primarily from foreign newspapers, periodicals and books, but also from news agency transmissions and broadcasts. Materials from foreign-language sources are translated; those from English-language sources are transcribed or reprinted, with the original phrasing and other characteristics retained.

Headlines, editorial reports, and material enclosed in brackets [] are supplied by JPRS. Processing indicators such as [Text] or [Excerpt] in the first line of each item, or following the last line of a brief, indicate how the original information was processed. Where no processing indicator is given, the information was summarized or extracted.

Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically or transliterated are enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a question mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear in the original but have been supplied as appropriate in context. Other unattributed parenthetical notes within the body of an item originate with the source. Times within items are as given by source.

The contents of this publication in no way represent the policies, views or attitudes of the U.S. Government.

COPYRIGHT LAWS AND REGULATIONS GOVERNING OWNERSHIP OF MATERIALS REPRODUCED HEREIN REQUIRE THAT DISSEMINATION OF THIS PUBLICATION BE RESTRICTED FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY.

JPRS L/10399

18 March 1982

WEST EUROPE REPORT

(FOUO 17/82)

CONTENTS

THEATER FORCES

UNITED KINGDOM

- 'SUNDAY TIMES' Urges Government To Abandon Trident
(Editorial; THE SUNDAY TIMES, 28 Feb 82) 1

POLITICAL

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

- Inner-German Relations Since Schmidt-Honecker Meeting Viewed
(Peter Jochen Schmidt; EUROPA ARCHIV, 10 Feb 82) 3

FRANCE

- Government Characteristics, Continuity, Conflicts Viewed
(Olivier Duhamel; POUVOIRS, No 20, 1982) 11
- Dissident Hincker Examines PCF Crisis, Future
(Francois Hincker; PROJET, Jan 82) 19
- PSF Competence, Ability To Apply Policies Examined
(Roland Cayrol; PROJET, Jan 82) 25
- PCF Decline, Resources for Recovery Viewed
(Jean Baudouin; POUVOIRS, No 20, 1982) 34
- Krasucki Purpose: Reinforce CGT, Wage PCF Attack
(Franz-Olivier Giesbert, Claude-Francois Jullien; LE NOUVEL
OBSERVATEUR, 6 Feb 82) 42
- PSF Deputies' Factions, Geographic Distribution Surveyed
(David Hanley; POUVOIRS, No 20, 1982) 46

ITALY

- DC's Piccoli on Party Clashes Over El Salvador
(Flaminio Piccoli Interview; LA STAMPA, 16 Feb 82) 57

- a -

[III - WE - 150 FOUO]

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

SPAIN

Maneuverings for Possible UCD-AP Coalition Described (Antxon Sarasqueta; CAMBIO 16, 8 Feb 82)	59
PSOE Bides Its Time in Midst of UCD Defections (Antxon Sarasqueta; CAMBIO 16, 1 Feb 82)	65

MILITARY

FRANCE

Defense Budget for 1982 Stresses Employment, Equipment (ARMEES D'AUJOURD'HUI, Jan-Feb 82)	68
General Describes Air Region's Logistical, Defense Functions (Jean Rajau Interview; ARMEES D'AUJOURD'HUI, Jan-Feb 82)	72
Air Region's Role in Air Defense Operations Described (Michel Garrelis; ARMEES D'AUJOURD'HUI, Jan-Feb 82)	79
Terrain-Following Radar Tested for Mirage 2000N Program (AIR ET COSMOS, 13 Feb 82)	83

UNITED KINGDOM

Home Guard, Expanded Territorial Army Advocated (Henry Stanhope; THE TIMES, 4 Mar 82)	85
Nott's Announcement on Reservists Welcome, But Not Enough (Editorial; THE TIMES, 5 Mar 82)	87

THEATER FORCES

UNITED KINGDOM

'SUNDAY TIMES' URGES GOVERNMENT TO ABANDON TRIDENT

PM011527 London THE SUNDAY TIMES in English 28 Feb 82 p 16

[Editorial: "Wrong Weapon, Wrong Price"]

[Text] Very soon, the government will announce its decision on the next generation of the British nuclear deterrent. In fact the decision has already been taken to buy the Trident D5, the most powerful and expensive weapon the Americans have ever begun to build. All that remains is for the best terms to be concluded, and for the cabinet and parliament to agree. We hope cabinet ministers think several times before accepting the case which the prime minister and the defence secretary are preparing to put to them. Trident is strategically unsound, financially beyond this country's reach, and, within the total pattern of defence, a gravely unbalancing element.

Possessing a nuclear deterrent now, Britain should not simply give it up. This would serve neither British interests nor the cause of world disarmament. If Polaris/Chevaline, the present weapon, is ever surrendered, it should be in exchange for a surrender on the other side. But this does not mean that Britain needs Trident. Trident is designed to hit Moscow and penetrate Soviet missile silos. It is a first-strike weapon. The U.S. needs this capacity, but not Britain. If Britain is in the deterrence business, the capacity to destroy a couple of Russian cities is deterrent enough: to cut off an arm of the bear, as General De Gaulle used to say. Lesser weapons than Trident--less vulnerable to constant technological change and not nearly so expensive--are capable of doing that: or rather, which is the point, of posing a threat to do so which the Russians cannot be certain of eliminating.

As Lord Carver argued on this page last week, the concept of a truly "independent" deterrent does not, in Britain's circumstances, stand up to serious examination. He contends that no situation exists in which the threat to use it would be credible if the Americans were not also ready to cross the nuclear threshold. On this analysis, purchase of Trident D5, costing perhaps 10,000 million pounds would increase the firepower but reduce independence still further. If independence is important, time and money would be better spent in the next few years uncoupling from reliance on Washington for the guidance systems, satellite targetting and other technology critical to missile operation.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Trident has become heavily favoured at the Ministry of Defence. It would keep Britain in the super-league. To hear some apologists, one might also imagine it had no side-effects. Mr Nott seems to have persuaded himself that it has absolutely no consequences for the rest of the defence budget. This is Whitehall casuistry at its most tendentious. Planning for Trident already means having a smaller navy, army and air force. All conventional arms are being weakened to satisfy the simplistic belief that "Moscow" will be frightened by Trident more than anything else.

If these arguments do not persuade a conservative cabinet minister, another one should. Hitherto Britain's nuclear defence programme has been pursued with bipartisan support. Labour's unilateralists have not managed to over-run the commitment of successive labour cabinets to the nuclear bombers and the Polaris submarine force. Sometimes this has been achieved by questionable secret dealings. But it has at least meant that nuclear decisions, with their long lead-times, have survived changes of government. Trident would not survive in the same way. The SDP-Liberal Alliance explicitly opposes it, as, of course, does the Labour Party. Linking Trident to British jobs, as the government is now attempting to do, is unlikely to change this. Unless the Tories win the next two elections outright, therefore, it is impossible to see how Britain will ever take delivery of the missiles. Yet a whole defence strategy will have been built around them. There will be no fall-back position. Recovering the ships and tanks, not to mention the strategic thinking, sacrificed to pay for Trident will be a long, if not impossible job. If they go along with Trident, the cabinet may go down in history as the agents of a paradox: wholly pledged to strengthening Britain's defence, they will have weakened it.

COPYRIGHT: Times Newspapers Limited, 1982

CSO: 3120/47

POLITICAL

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

INNER-GERMAN RELATIONS SINCE SCHMIDT-HONECKER MEETING VIEWED

Bonn EUROPA ARCHIV in German 10 Feb 82 pp 77-84

[Article by Peter Jochen Schmidt, member of FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE editorial staff: "Inner-German Relations Since Schmidt-Honecker Meeting"]

[Text] The meeting between Chancellor Helmut Schmidt and the general secretary of the SED and chairman of the GDR council of state Erich Honecker, which was finally arranged after three tries and was held between 11 and 13 December 1981 in the Schorfheide, northeast of Berlin, seems to have overcome the deadlock in inner-German relations occasioned by the sudden GDR change of policy vis-a-vis the FRG in October 1980.¹ The GDR let it be known that it was prepared to return to the basic precepts of the treaty and normalization policy between the two German states and at least for the present to drop the demand indirectly raised in Honecker's Gera speech of 13 October 1980² for a revision of the basic treaty document.

The joint communique issued at the close of the Werbellinsee meeting³ stated that Schmidt and Honecker had agreed that the basic treaty of 21 December 1972 as well as the agreements and arrangements worked out since have laid the groundwork for the solution of outstanding problems and created the "conditions necessary" for mutually advantageous and continuously increasing cooperation. "Despite continuing differences of opinion on fundamental issues," they underscored their desire "to persist in their efforts to attain good-neighborly relations." They further stated their intention "to continue negotiations and conversations in various fields, to overcome existing difficulties and to investigate possibilities for further developing their treaty relations."

Arms Control--A New Element

Overcoming the deadlock, however, does not mean that relations between Bonn and East Berlin can start right up again in early 1982 where they left off in the fall of 1980. The fact is that a new element has entered into the inner-German equation--that of arms control and disarmament. This "world policy" dimension of its dialogue is particularly dear to the GDR. For that matter, it has to be, if it does not wish to arouse the suspicions of the Soviet Union. In his Gera speech, Honecker had already made it clear that the GDR's treaty policy with the FRG is an integral part of the policy coordinated among the Warsaw Pact countries to secure peace. But securing peace, he said, was above all a political issue calling for measures in direct pursuit of solutions for the most important problem of our time--an end to the arms race and arms control. "It is above all for securing peace that the two German states bear a fair amount of responsibility."⁴

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

The SED general secretary returned to this theme in his report to the 10th SED party congress in April 1981. "In our policy toward the FRG, too, we are above all else committed to serving peace and securing it permanently," he said then. "Only that which serves the cause of peace is of advantage to people in both German states and to all peoples on our continent."⁵ These statements make it clear that the GDR's policy vis-a-vis the FRG has turned into an instrument of the Soviet Union's "peace policy" almost entirely. It is the priority goal of this Soviet policy to prevent the stationing of new American medium-range nuclear missiles in Western Europe.

Despite sealing itself off toward the FRG, the GDR has nonetheless been consistently trying since the fall of 1980 to draw the FRG into talks about arms control and disarmament and about their joint responsibility for peace. Although the FRG knows full well that the two German states are not in the least competent to discuss arms control and disarmament issues and that the FRG might even run into additional problems with the United States, if it did honor the GDR's wishes, it finally agreed to talk about these issues with East Berlin. Only in this way, the feeling was in Bonn, could the line to the GDR be opened up again at all and was there a chance of overcoming the deadlock in inner-German treaty negotiations about easing human hardship in the divided country. The FRG plenipotentiary for disarmament and arms control issues, ambassador Friedrich Ruth, went to East Berlin on 3 July 1981 for talks with the GDR disarmament expert, ambassador Ernst Krabatsch; and on 4 September 1981, Egon Bahr, chairman of the Bundestag subcommittee on disarmament and arms control, met with Krabatsch in East Berlin as well as with Honecker and with Hermann Axen, a member of the Politburo and central committee secretary for international liaison.

The fact that the December meeting between Schmidt and Honecker took place, however, cannot be termed a result of the FRG's permitting the GDR to draw it into discussions about disarmament and arms control. The decisive factor was that the Soviet Union wished to have the meeting between the chancellor and the SED general secretary take place immediately following the Bonn visit of Soviet party boss and chief of state Brezhnev and prior to the dramatic crisis in Poland which could already be foreseen. As a target of Moscow's "peace policy" the FRG has played an important role all along as evidenced by the fact that Brezhnev's first foreign visit following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan took him to Bonn of all places where the Soviet leader hoped to enlist chancellor Schmidt as a "mediator" between Washington and Moscow. Even if the chancellor did not turn out to be a "mediator" but merely an "interpreter,"⁶ the meeting with Brezhnev did open the way for the meeting with Honecker on Werbellinsee.

In his talks with Honecker—as in the chancellor's earlier meetings with Brezhnev—security, arms limitation and disarmament problems played a prominent part. Lengthy passages of the joint communique referred to discussions about "topical international problems within a European and worldwide context." The communique's very first paragraph states that Honecker and Schmidt voiced their firm resolve "that war should never again start out from German soil" and that both sides are aware of their great responsibility for securing peace in Europe. "Fully conscious of the fact that differing social systems exist in both states and that they belong

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

to two different alliances, they made known their desire actively to promote the process of detente and to contribute to securing permanent peace and stability in international affairs."

The Shadow of the Events in Poland

This "internationalization" of inner-German relations serves to strengthen the self-esteem of the GDR which feels that it has thus come one step closer to full recognition by the FRG. Such language also makes it possible for the GDR to introduce international issues into the inner-German dialogue with greater intensity than heretofore and at any time and thereby to distract attention from inner-German issues whenever this seems advisable. In his toast at the guest house of the council of state on the Doellnsee, Honecker said: "Good-neighborly relations cannot thrive in the shadow of new U.S. nuclear missiles. We cannot disengage ourselves from world politics."⁷ The SED general secretary used even plainer language in an interview with NEUES DEUTSCHLAND a few days later.⁸ "Our talks were dominated by the interrelationship—adduced to more than once before—between the bilateral and the international aspects of our relations. As we have said before, they are of the utmost importance for peace and detente which far exceed the bilateral aspects. On the other hand, neither of the two states can disengage itself from world politics. They would not remain untouched, if there were a general world crisis." This makes it plain that the GDR's leeway in working for an improvement in inner-German relations has virtually been reduced to zero and that such improvement can come about only, if the "world situation" or the conduct of the FRG permit it—in Moscow's view.

In his article at year's end 1981/82, Honecker said: "No one can ignore the fact that the deterioration of the world situation is casting its shadow."⁹ First of all, there is the long Polish shadow. It fell on the inner-German relationship even as Schmidt and Honecker were meeting. It was on the last day of the chancellor's GDR visit that the Polish council of state declared martial law throughout the country and that PZPR first secretary, General Jaruzelski, assumed dictatorial power in Poland as chairman of a "Military Council for National Salvation." Critics above all in the CDU/CSU said the chancellor should have broken off the visit as soon as these developments became known. The chancellor did not but went through with his program.

And so, Germans in the East and in the West were able to see those macabre pictures on their television screens showing uniformed and civilian security forces of the GDR as they occupied the Mecklenburg city of Gueströw which made it more than plain just how stable the relationship of trust between the GDR leadership and the people is of which the SED has boasted so many times. The Gueströw visit in spite of the events in Poland was necessary for the sake of the citizens of the GDR—and because of the meeting in Gueströw cathedral between the chancellor and Heinrich Rathke, the bishop of the evangelical-lutheran church for Mecklenburg. Throughout the chancellor's entire visit, the bishop was the only German from the GDR able to speak freely with him—without acting on behalf of the party or the government.¹⁰ "I, too, would have done the same thing because I, too, would have felt that the Germans in East Berlin and the GDR, who were unhappy enough about the trip being cancelled twice, would have failed to understand that he

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

would leave so abruptly without waiting to see whether this attempt had a chance of succeeding. These were the words used later by Richard von Weizsaecker (CDU), the lord mayor of Berlin, in support of the chancellor's decision not to break off the trip.¹¹ Further developments in Poland will show in part what the potential consequences of the Werbellinsee meeting turn out to be.

Exchange of Views But No Concrete Results

The chancellor and the SED general secretary did not conduct negotiations when they met but did engage in an exchange of views, supported by their respective delegations. Given the type of meeting it was, concrete results were not to be immediately expected. But starts were made on how a number of difficult issues might be brought closer to resolution. It is worth recalling what Honecker said in a toast at a dinner in the Hubertusstock hunting lodge: "Let me say that we managed to make out certain areas in very important issues affecting the thoughts and emotions of the citizens both of the FRG and the GDR upon which should build, where we should come even closer and which constitute a ray of hope for a future in peace and closer cooperation...I think that the exchange of views we had on these issues will contribute in various ways to our achieving fruitful results in the future."¹² These statements and another point made by Honecker in his NEUES DEUTSCHLAND interview—"We wish to carry the treaty policy with the FRG further...This may very well include the resolution of practical issues in which the other side has expressed an interest."—may be termed signals or advance notices addressed to the citizens of the GDR that the GDR intends to reach further accommodations with the FRG relating to an easing of human hardships.

This would include the minimum exchange of currency provision first of all. As a consequence of the Werbellinsee meeting, the FRG has good reason to hope that the GDR will at least partially rescind the drastic, increased minimum exchange rates for visitors to East Berlin and the GDR that were instituted on 9 October 1980 and then expanded to young people and retired persons by the middle of 1982. These twin measures have caused a sharp drop in visitors, with visits to Berlin down by more than 50 percent. One of the reasons the chancellor went to the Schorfheide was to arrest this trend and to get travel to the GDR to increase again. Ever since the start of the treaty policy with the 4-power agreement, the currency exchange minimums were declared to be an "internal affair" of the GDR and thus not an issue subject to treaty regulation. As a means of making the FRG's wishes more palatable to the GDR, Bonn agreed to let the no-interest overdraft ("swing") credit in inner-German trade amounting to DM 850 million annually run beyond the 31 December 1981 deadline until 30 June 1982.¹³ Until that time, both sides are to work out in negotiations whether and to what an extent the "swing" credit should continue. Both the chancellor and the minister of economics who accompanied him impressed upon their GDR counterparts that there exists a "psychological-political relationship" between the extension of the "swing" credits and the reduction of the minimum exchange regulations. But they, too, know that it is not only the GDR that is interested in the continuation of the no-interest overdraft credits but West German firms active in inner-German trade as well, in view of economic conditions.

In the discussions between the chancellor and the SED general secretary the Bonn side also tried to ascertain whether the GDR really intends to make the demands raised by Honecker in his Gera speech a precondition for the continuation of the treaty policy: the recognition of GDR citizenship; the conversion of the permanent missions in embassies; the firm establishment of the frontier along the Elbe between Schnakenburg and Lauenburg in the middle of the river, and the dissolution of the central registration office of the Land justice administration in Salzgitter. The result was that the GDR does not wish to do so. Although Honecker spoke to all four points at some length, he also said that the GDR was not setting any preconditions. These issues will remain a part of the inner-German dialogue. As far as the Elbe frontier and the Salzgitter matter are concerned, the GDR may be hoping to achieve its aims in the long term.

As to the most important of the issues—citizenship—that does not come in for mention in the joint communique at all. In the NEUES DEUTSCHLAND interview, Honecker took a guarded view. "For the GDR," he said, "citizenship is not a matter for negotiation. The FRG should at long last accept this simple truth. The GDR exists and in the whole world there is no state that does not have citizens. What we expect of the FRG is that it respect GDR citizenship without reservations." Respecting GDR citizenship is a different matter from recognition of it. The latter would mean restricting German citizenship—which binds all Germans in the FRG, in the GDR and in West Berlin together—to the inhabitants of the FRG alone. But, according to the basic law and the constitutional court's opinion on that law, there can be no question of that. As for respecting GDR citizenship, that is already being done by the FRG authorities. German citizenship, which all GDR citizens possess according to our laws, entails no duties for them but is a privilege of which they may but do not have to avail themselves, if and when they find themselves under the jurisdiction of the basic law. The FRG cannot give up its claim to this particular aspect of the citizenship issue. "It is necessary... to discontinue the issuance of temporary FRG travel documents to citizens of the GDR on short-term visits in the FRG as well as the issuance of FRG passports to citizens of the GDR by FRG embassies in third countries," Honecker also said in the interview. This issue as well as the demand for conversion of the permanent missions into embassies must be classified as "continuing matters of dispute on fundamental questions" with treaty policy being pursued "irrespective" of the differences.

Efforts to "Ease Human Hardships"

The joint communique stated that efforts aimed at re-uniting families, mitigating hardship and resolving other humanitarian issues would be "carried forward in a constructive spirit." In this field, however, there was no standstill or reversal despite the sudden shift in GDR policy in October 1980. In fact, the number of families re-united in 1981 was a good deal higher than in all previous years—or rather the number of GDR citizens below retirement age given permission to make a legal move to the FRG or to West Berlin. One can only hope that the 1981 total will be repeated in the years to come. In the Schorfheide, discussions were also held on expanding the GDR citizens' possibilities to travel to the West. But the chancellor did not return from the GDR with more than the hope that GDR citizens' travel on urgent family business which has recently decreased will rise sharply once again.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Continued Development of Relations

Schmidt and Honecker agreed at their Werbellinsee meeting to strengthen and expand the contractual framework existing between the two German states. As for the GDR, it is primarily interested as before in agreements that are to its advantage in economic and financial terms, while the FRG aims at an expansion of the area of freedom for the inhabitants of the GDR. In concrete terms, there was an agreement to start negotiations on a long-term framework for economic and industrial cooperation—also including third markets—in which the GDR has expressed great interest. But such a cooperation agreement is fraught with political dangers. The legal base for inner-German trade—which thereby has become a special trade arrangement between two different currency areas—was laid by the "Berlin Agreement" of 1951 which provides a long-term, stable foundation for trade relations between the two Germanies. This legal foundation is shaken once it is "supplemented" by an agreement between two states and not two different currency areas. Such a cooperation agreement would turn inner-German trade into foreign trade. Furthermore, West Berlin would have to be included on the basis of the Frank-Falin formula. According to the "Berlin Agreement," however, it is an integral part of the DM currency area.

In the joint communique, Honecker and Schmidt expressed the belief "that the ongoing discussions by experts on water safety would soon lead to concrete solutions." These discussions concern desalination of the Werra river and purification of the Havel and the Spree. There already is agreement on the technical aspects. The main problem in the upcoming negotiations will be to agree on how to share costs. In connection with the natural gas pipeline deal between an energy firm in the FRG and a natural gas exporting firm in the Soviet Union, natural gas is also to be supplied to West Berlin via a pipeline from Czechoslovakia which leads through the GDR. At Werbellinsee, the GDR confirmed its intention to negotiate with the contractual partners and the Berlin gas works about this natural gas transit pipeline. On the other hand, there was no further discussion about a plan still being aired when the chancellor's visit was scheduled in the summer of 1980 which called for the construction of a soft-coal electric power plant near Leipzig which was to have been paid for by the GDR among other things by supplying electricity to West Berlin. But there is talk once again about the electrification project for the railroad transit routes between Berlin and the FRG.

The meeting between the chancellor and the SED general secretary is to provide new impetus for the negotiations on a scientific agreement and an agreement on cultural cooperation which have been stalled for years. The science agreement, which is to regulate cooperation in science and technology as well as education, has broken down on the issue of including FRG institutions located in West Berlin. Work on the cultural agreement has been blocked by the GDR's demand for "return" of the former Prussian cultural holdings. An agreement with the GDR—and prior to that with the Soviet Union—on the science agreement appears possible. As for concluding a cultural agreement, there are no chances of that happening. In the joint communique then, Schmidt and Honecker stated their intention of expanding cultural cooperation as well as exchanges in other areas "within the framework of existing possibilities." There are a number of possibilities in fact. One may recall the proposal made by the former head of the FRG permanent mission in East

Berlin, Guenter Gaus, who used the forum of the Berlin SPD's Land party congress in November 1981 to call for the establishment of a top-level inner-German commission to arrange for the exchange of cultural holdings removed for safekeeping during wartime—other than the collections which are part of the Prussian cultural holdings foundation.¹⁴

There is no shortage of initiatives with the aim of furthering bilateral relations. Berlin, too, asked the chancellor to raise a number of issues at his meeting with Honecker—like the inclusion of the GDR-operated S-Bahn in a West Berlin mass transport system and the retention beyond 1984 of the Staaken border crossing point to serve transit traffic to Hamburg, a point the GDR wishes to discuss as well. Both Schmidt and Honecker clearly indicated their good will with regard to carrying the normalization process in Germany further. In that sense, the prospects for Germany are less somber at the start of 1982 than they were in early 1981. But the express desire of both sides to improve relations does not offer a guarantee of success. Success will depend more on how the world situation develops.

FOOTNOTES

1. Cf Winters: East Berlin Policy Change Vis-a-Vis Bonn, EUROPA ARCHIV 1/1981, p 31 ff
2. NEUES DEUTSCHLAND, 14 Nov 80
3. Verbatim text on p D 79ff
4. NEUES DEUTSCHLAND, 14 Oct 80
5. NEUES DEUTSCHLAND, 12 Apr 81
6. Cf Documents on Brezhnev Visit, EUROPA ARCHIV 1/1982, p D 1ff
7. NEUES DEUTSCHLAND, 14 Dec 81
8. Cf excerpts, p D 82ff
9. NEUES DEUTSCHLAND, 31 Dec 81
10. FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE, 19 Dec 81
11. Speech of Lord Mayor at Annual Dinner of Berlin Press Association on 14 Dec 81 in Berlin Land Press Service AKTUELLES DER WOCHE, special edition VI No 51, 18 Dec 81
12. NEUES DEUTSCHLAND, 14 Dec 81

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

13. The agreement in question was signed on 17 Dec 81 in East Berlin by the head of the former "trusteeship office for interzonal trade--the name of which was changed to "trusteeship office for industry and trade" following the Schmidt-Honecker meeting--and an official of the GDR ministry of foreign trade.
14. Guenter Gaus: Peace Policy for Germany in BERLINER STIMME, supplement to No 46, 12 Nov 81

COPYRIGHT: 1982 Verlag fuer Internationale Politik GmbH, Bonn

9478
CSO: 3103/286

POLITICAL

FRANCE

GOVERNMENT CHARACTERISTICS, CONTINUITY, CONFLICTS VIEWED

Paris POUVOIRS in French No 20, 1982 pp 127-135

[Article by Olivier Duhamel, professor of public law at the University of Franche-Comte and author of "La gauche et la V^e Republique," 1980, and "Histoire des idees politiques," 1982]

[Text] The winning of government power by the socialists in 1981 completes the Fifth Republic. The Fifth Republic is finished,¹ even if it still requires certain modulations and still poses certain problems.

1. The Legitimate Fifth Republic

This republic, the product of a swift maneuver and one which had been stabilized by a number of violations of the letter of the constitution, is more accepted than ever by the main political forces. Where the left wing is concerned, the 10 May 1981 presidential victory brings to its conclusion a long rallying process, which was implemented, moreover, through successive presidential elections.² It is definite evidence that the Fifth Republic allows alternation in power, which is not reserved to the one faction more often than the other. As to the opposition, it is difficult for it to challenge a regime which it founded, and one in which it hopes again to hold power one day.

The roots sunk by the Fifth Republic are not solely the product of the consensus which it enjoys where the political actors are concerned, but also its integration with the people governed. Now and henceforth they pursue the majority logic (see section 5 below), the characteristic of a new political culture. In expanding their 10 May presidential choice to the legislative realm on 14 June, the voters were not only affected by the socialist "grace,"³ but were also faithful to the logic of the regime, and to that extent contributing to its survival.

2. The Useful Fifth Republic

Giving the lie to the political criticisms and complex technical scenarios structured on the subject of the change in governments,⁴ the winning of power by the opposition came about practically without institutional problems. Its adversaries of yesterday have today become those who make use of it, and feel entirely comfortable in so doing, beginning with F. Mitterrand. "The institutions were not designed for my purposes. However, they suit me well."⁵

3. The Fully Utilized Fifth Republic

Procedures decried of old and not so long ago have been proved since 10 May to be very helpful. The lack of concern with constitutionalism on the part of the left wing has become total, confirming that constitutional concepts are dictated by the distance from power.⁶ For example, the new president has made full use of the resource of article 8, by appointing his sole choice of prime minister on 21 May 1981; those of article 49, paragraph 1, continuing the Gaullist interpretation to the effect that the assumption of responsibility by a new prime minister is not compulsory; and those of article 12, by dissolving the National Assembly, etc, on 21 May, pending recourse to a referendum when circumstances are favorable to it. The socialist government announced that it would utilize article 38, at the end of its first 6 months in office, making it possible to implement measures normally within the purview of the law by ordinance. Daily it is implementing the provision which the constitution and the assembly regulations confer upon the government to limit parliamentary authority. The socialist leaders have lost any parliamentary complex, because socialism takes the 10 May concepts, that is to say the "president-people" pairing, as its basis.

4. The Monist Fifth Republic

As an extension to the reference to Carre de Malberg,⁷ monism is reversed, such that the parliament is only the agent of the president, through government interposition. F. Mitterrand implicitly endorsed this hierarchy in his first message to the parliament on 8 July 1981. "The change I proposed to the country during the presidential campaign, which the men and women of France approved, which the majority in the National Assembly has endorsed, will henceforth dictate your steps... My commitments constitute the charter for governmental action. I would add, since universal suffrage has been proclaimed a second time, that these commitments have become the charter for our legislative action."

The pyramid is clear and presidential supremacy confirmed, not only over the parliament, but over the ministers--for example, the communists, as well. "No one in the cabinet, or elsewhere, is unaware that the president of the republic can at any time ensure that his view, in the national interest, prevails" (interview in LE MONDE, 2 July 1981).

The continuity of the presidential-monist interpretation is also typical of the relations between the president and the prime minister:

The responsibility of the president is "the outcome, that is to say the long-range view and continuity" (deGaulle, "Memories of Hope," Vol II, 1971, p 68). The president "concerns himself with the essentials" (Pompidou, 18 August 1980). His role "is to concern himself with the long run" (V. Giscard d'Estaing, press conference on 21 November 1978). "I act or I intervene in what might be called the main guidelines, the major directions" (Mitterrand, BBC interview, 8 September 1981).

The prime minister, "the second in command, pursues the activities of the moment and directs those who carry them out" (deGaulle). He "rows the boat" (Barre, 5 March 1979). He may "act entirely as he wishes with regard to the problems of daily life" (Mitterrand to the BBC). This overall distribution does not, however, prevent occasional intervention by the president, of which no one learns except when it comes too late.⁸

Within this unchanged framework, shadings may occur, not only because of the personalities of the leaders, but also the rhythm imposed by the system on their 7-year terms. In this connection, Pierre Avril detected "a typical fluctuation in presidential practice"⁹ which one can extend to the entire Fifth Republic, and which could be schematized as follows:

Presidential Term of Office	Phase 1-- Political Prime Minister (President Less Active)	Phase 2-- Less Active Prime Minister (President Active)	Phase 3-- Balance Between President and Prime Minister
De Gaulle (1959-1969)	Michel Debre	Pompidou I	Pompidou II and III
Pompidou (1969-1973)	J. Chaban-Delmas	Messmer I and II	Messmer III
Giscard (1974-1981)	Jacques Chirac	Barre I	Barre II and III
Mitterrand (1981...)	Pierre Mauroy	?	?

The paradox of the initial presidential hesitation is explained by the proximity of the election. The new presidential legitimacy makes his intervention unprofitable, not to mention the fact that the relations between the two men have not yet had the time to deteriorate with the exercise of power.

Thus the unequal dyarchy,¹⁰ or in reality monocracy,¹¹ is perpetuated. It is the more pronounced since the votes on 10 May and 14-21 June were homogeneous and gave the president a clear and massive majority.

5. Majority Fifth Republic

The socialist victory brings us back to the norm in the present French regime, in other words a government unified by an identical policy on the part of the president, the cabinet and the National Assembly. After the promulgation of the 1958 constitution, it took 4 years, during which the strength of General de Gaulle was dominant, with recourse to full powers, to article 16, to a referendum, to the 1962 revision and dissolution in order to establish the new majority regime, unprecedented in France. This the period between 1958 and 1962 was not an exception, but a foundation. And it was the 7-year term of Giscard d'Estaing which was "abnormal," because it began with a minority president with a parliamentary majority, interrupted by the resignation of J. Chirac (August 1976), and it ended without a majority. This anomaly underlay Giscard d'Estaing's failure.

The error comes from another anomaly: the marvel of his election without a party in 1974. The former president did not want to dissolve the assembly elected in 1973. He was not able to win the 1978 legislative elections clearly and personally. He either did not want to or could not create a large political party. Without a party, and thus a fortiori with a dominant party, he lost government office.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Francois Mitterrand did the exact opposite:¹²

1. He asserted his leadership over the noncommunist left wing through candidacy in the presidential election (1965).
2. He won over the Socialist Party, which was then transformed into a government party, or more exactly, the party of the president.¹³
3. He won partial control of the government through the presidential election, and with a presidential party.
4. He gained total control of the political power through the dissolution and the absolute majority of the president's party.

Francois Mitterrand, by dint of remarkable persistence and by taking the risks that imposed, assured himself of a dominant party. He did this like the first two presidents of the Fifth Republic--like them, but in reverse order--first of all the creation and conquest of the party, and then the winning of power. And it is precisely the reverse of that order which is likely to change the course of the Fifth Republic.

6. The Partisan Fifth Republic

The Fifth Republic is partisan in the sense in which political scientists use this term (the Portuguese call "partisan" that which functions through a party). Indeed, the cabinet does not represent the Socialist Party alone but includes members of other parties, mainly the PCF (as in the past the UNR [Union for the New Republic] provided assistance to the Independent Republicans), and secondarily the MIG (as during the presidency of G. Pompidou, when the centrists of the CDP [Democratic and Progress Center] conferred a tripartisan dimension upon the cabinet) and independent personalities (as always within the presidentialist logic).¹⁴ Indeed, in 1981, the parliamentary majority included 44 communist deputies. But it was above all made up of 285 socialist (or similar) deputies, representing 39 seats more than the absolute majority needed. And the Socialist Party, if indeed it was profoundly renewed by F. Mitterrand, existed before he came to head it in 1971. It has existed since 1905 and will continue to exist after Mitterrand's 7-year term. Put in another way, it is not merely a question of a president's party created ex nihilo by or for a chief of state, as was the case with the UNR in 1958.

This unprecedented relationship between the president and his party, between the party and its president, might to some extent weaken the rigidity of the monist pyramid and lead to some friction.

7. A Fifth Republic in Conflict

In 1981, the disagreements between the Socialist Party or the PCF and the regime were much less important than the conflict between the majority and the opposition. These latter differences were not fully the product of the apprenticeship necessary because of the new distribution of the roles between the majority and the opposition,¹⁵ but in a deeper sense from the election of government leaders with a determination to change French society. Now reform is, at least when it is in progress, less likely to involve a consensus than the pursuit of the established order.

Where the strictly institutional level is concerned, it is nonetheless striking to note that the clashes on legitimacy (presidential or parliamentary, arbitral or partisan, etc) have yielded to procedural conflicts. There are no longer any clashes about who the cabinet members should be, but the majority and the opposition insult each other on the subject of the twists in parliamentary procedure and the subtleties of obstruction.

It is entirely possible, therefore, that more serious conflicts will develop with the two institutions which in the short run might function as counter-authorities--the Senate and the Constitutional Council. But urgings to wisdom are not lacking, on the one hand because the government leaders have no nonbrutal means of reforming these institutions (the normal procedure according to article 89 allows the Senate to block a constitutional revision), and on the other hand, because neither the senators nor the members of the Constitutional Council have any interest subtle opposition leading to the risk of their conversion (by the "extraordinary" referendum procedure of article 11). The risks of a conflict are modified by the advantages of compromise and limited by the weight of the majority (see number 5 above). But when that no longer exists....

8. Toward an Unstructured Fifth Republic?

On the institutional level with which we are concerned here, the French regime could be profoundly altered by the adoption of proportional representation. The adoption of this system has been a part of all the programs of the left wing--socialist, communist and joint--since 1971, and is the model of the promises made by Francois Mitterrand as a candidate.¹⁶ Without any need to examine all of its effects, we know that it would profoundly alter the articulation of authority between the president and the parties. The chief of state would thus lose the majority premium but he would gain an unstructured assembly capable of yielding variable majorities. Instead of the majority "puzzle," which can be shaped in only one single way, he would have the proportional "erector set," which can be put together in various ways. But everything really depends on the type of proportional representation implemented, and the imagination of political economists in this field proves limitless. There is no reason not to think that if proportional representation is not postponed indefinitely,¹⁷ it will be conceived in such a way as to accommodate a majority premium. Whatever comes of this undertaking, the French regime will pose another difficulty when it comes to achieving the unity of authority between the president and the assembly.

9. The Semi-presidential Fifth Republic

The term suggested by Maurice Duverger is adopted here for the special problem of the noncoincidence between the presidential and parliamentary terms of office in a system in which the president is elected by the people, but the cabinet is responsible to the parliament. Lacking a constitutional revision, always a difficult matter because it is risky, only dissolution can offer a solution--if we set aside the improbable hypothesis of a presidential resignation and reelection. It may indeed seem absurd to refer to dissolution when President Mitterrand has such an imposing majority in the National Assembly. Let us recall, however, that dissolution serves several functions. It is one of the possible methods of recourse to the people in the event of political or social crisis (example, May 1968). It also represents a sword of Damocles for resolving possible conflicts with the majority party or parties, or better still, it remains as a constant threat to limit them

at the source. Article 12, with its specifically presidential authority, functions like a strike force--the less it is used, the better it works.

But dissolution is not a matter solely of the dissuasive logic so characteristic of the Fifth Republic. It also provides a way of attempting to resolve the problem of the lack of synchronization in the terms of office.¹⁸ It settled this matter in June of 1981, entirely to the advantage of the president, but only temporarily. If he does not turn to dissolution again in the course of his 7-year term, the present president will find himself in 1986 with an assembly, whatever the exact majority within it may be, which has been elected for 5 years, while only 2 years of his term remain--or in other words, reduced authority--as was the case with V. Giscard d'Estaing in 1978-1981. The situation might be quite different in the event of dissolution at a favorable moment, if one such occurs (let us say toward 1983-1984). The president would then retain the means for guaranteeing his supremacy, and exerting control over who succeeds him, for example.

10. The Social-Monarchist Fifth Republic

Above and beyond the efficiency of the system and the fact that it is more democratic than the preceding one, to the extent that unity of authority has its source in the expression of the will of the voters and in respect for the choices they make as to the allocation of power, the Fifth Republic also has a monarchistic trait in that it is the choice of a single man by all to represent and command them--what La Boetie calls voluntary servitude in his book "Contr'Un."¹⁹ To go back to the current problems of the Fifth Republic,²⁰ the election of a chief of state by the people for 7 years poses the problem of his successor.

The choice of candidates for the highest post in the land is not rationalized in France as it is in other countries.²¹ Indeed, the election of the socialist president changes little, to the extent that the Socialist Party is the only one to have organized internal competition in order to select its presidential candidate. The fact nonetheless remains that the length of the presidential term tend to accentuate its monarchist nature while at the same time--an inverse effect--it alters the possibility of reelection.²² The party, the cabinet, the prime minister or ministers (implicit heirs apparent by their functions, or who feel that they are) and all the institutions are characterized by an obsession about the succession, particularly since no juridical procedure regulates the choice from among the few pretenders to the highest post among whom the voters must choose. This process of filtering toward the top is basic. Should it be entrusted to the party members, or to their leaders? Should it be controlled more or less officially by the president in office? Should it be influenced by polls? Should it be entrusted to the voters? These questions obviously go beyond the framework of a brief presentation of the current characteristics of the Fifth Republic. But it is significant that it cannot be completed without asking them, to such an extent that the inadequacies in the French system introduce the worm of succession into the fruit of a new election at the outset.

FOOTNOTES

1. In the precise sense of the word--"to provide the last element necessary for the full completion of a state or deed," rather than its second meaning, reserved for individuals--"to deal the final blow (to someone)," Petit Robert.

2. See Olivier Duhamel, "The Left Wing and the Fifth Republic," PUF [University Presses of France], 1980, p 247 et seq.

One can note the communist paradox: in self-criticism, its leaders accuse themselves of having proposed no candidate at all in 1974, while at the same time they criticize the bipolarization phenomenon and urge the casting of effective votes in the presidential election.

3. See below, "Chronicle of Public Opinion," p 171 et seq.
4. See POUVOIRS, No 1, "Alternation," 1977, new edition, 1981.
5. Interview in LE MONDE, 2 July 1981.
6. See "The Left Wing and the Fifth Republic," op cit, pp 548-552.
7. See "Contribution to the General Theory of the State," Sirey, 1920, reissued by the CNRS [National Center for Scientific Research], in 2 volumes, 1962.
8. A typical example was the exemption from the capital levy granted for works of art on 29 October 1981, i.e., after the approval of the draft law by the Council of Ministers and after the committee discussion in the assembly. The minister delegate to the minister of economy and finance for budget and the socialist deputies on the committee were thus forced to support what they had just previously firmly rejected. This was the reason for the disillusioned comment by Mr Fabius: "I am only a minister."
9. Pierre Avril, "What Has Changed in the Fifth Republic," POUVOIRS, No 9, "The Giscard d'Estaing Policy," 1979, p 58.
10. See Jean Gicquel, "Constitutional Law and Political Institutions," published by Montchrestien, 7th ed, 1980, p 862, and for a less continuistic interpretation of presidentialism in the Mitterrand style, see "Addendum to 30 July 1981, p 21.
11. In this sense, presidential monism can be viewed as a variant of what Maurice Duverger calls "the semipresidential system," "Check to the King," Albin Michel, 1978. The terminological quarrels have not been settled.

Concerning the logic governing the systems of popular election of the president, seen Jean-Luc Parodi, "Effects and Noneffects of Presidential Election by Universal Direct Balloting," POUVOIRS, No 14, "To Elect a President," 1980, p 5 et seq.
12. And Jacques Chirac himself also pursues a "Mitterrand-type" strategy, that is to say within the logic of the Fifth Republic.
13. Concerning this transformation, see Hugues Portelli, "The Presidentialization of the French Parties," POUVOIRS, No 14, "To Elect a President," 1980, p 100 et seq, and "French Socialism as It Is Now," PUF, 1980.
14. Another indicator is the presence of nonparliamentarians in the cabinet. The proportion came to 30 percent in the first Mauroy cabinet and 23 percent in the second, formed after the elections (Jobert, Boudy, Badinter, Cheysson, Delors, Dreyfus, Lang, Henry, Dufoix and Fiterman, the latter having been defeated in the legislative elections).

15. Mentioned by F. Mitterrand on his return from Cancun on 25 October 1981, LE MONDE, 27 October 1981.
16. See below, Jean Gicquel, "References and Documents," "Creteil Manifesto," Point 47.
17. For a presentation of the different types of proportional representation, see Pierre Pactet, "Political Institutions--Constitutional Law," Masson, 5th printing, 1981, p 100 et seq.
18. See Jean-Lus Parodi, "On Several Institutional Lessons in French Style Alter-nation in Power," REVUE POLITIQUE ET PARLEMENTAIRE, No 892, May-June 1981, p 47.
19. Written in 1548 under the title "Discourse on Voluntary Servitude" and published in 1574 under the title "Contr'Un," and rediscovered by Miguel Abensour in the collection "Critique of Politics" (Payot, 1976, followed by analyses by Pierre Clastres and Claude Lefort).
20. Concerning the discussion of political ideas, see Francois Chatelet and Evelyne Pisier-Kouchner, "Political Concepts in the 20th Century," PUF, 1981, p 982 et seq, "Themis." See also Philippe Braud, "Universal Suffrage Against Democracy," PUF, 1980.
21. For example, in the United Kingdom (designation of leaders by the parliamentary group (conservatives) and the party (laborites), or the United States (primaries and conventions). See Marie-France Tounet, "The Designation of Presidential Candidates in the United States," POUVOIRS, No 14, "To Elect a President," 1980, pp 41-61.
22. Candidate Mitterrand's Manifesto called for either the reduction of the presi-dential term to 5 years or a ruling making a president who has served a 7-year term ineligible for reelection (see below, p 141). President Mitterrand opted for a nonrenewable 7-year term (see interview in LE MONDE, 2 July 1981).

COPYRIGHT: Presses Universitaires de France, 1982

5157

CSO: 3100/349

POLITICAL

FRANCE

DISSIDENT HINCKER EXAMINES PCF CRISIS, FUTURE

Paris PROJET in French Jan 82 pp 42-48

[Article by Francois Hincker, former member of the PCF Central Committee and a founding member of the dissident group Rencontres Communistes"]

[Text] The original title of this article ["The Communist Party at the Crossroads"] is the same as that of Francois Hincker's book published by Albin Michel in October 1981.

The French Communist Party is in a paradoxical situation today. France has four Communist ministers, and Communists are in senior government posts. Polls indicate that the public widely agrees with ideas which for a long time were popularized only by the Communists--among them the wealth tax and the nationalizations. The open expression of anticommunism has never been so weak--neither the government nor the left has anything to gain from pursuing it, while the rightwing opposition and the various brands of conservatism are concentrating their criticisms on the government and the Socialist Party.

But the PCF has lost one-fourth of its voters. On 26 April and in even greater numbers on 14 June, for the first time since 1945, many more voters voted Socialist (40 percent) than Communist (28 percent). The PCF can play a role in government and Parliament only to the extent that the Socialist Party is willing to permit it. L'HUMANITE is the only national newspaper that has not progressed since 10 May. Communist posters, tracts, meetings, and newspaper vendors are becoming very rare. Less perceptible from the standpoint of material indications, but even more serious, the Communist presence, Communist ideas, and Communist speeches, which once aroused as much hatred as enthusiasm and which in any case constituted unavoidable features of the French political landscape, are now marginal and trite. On the right, the presidential campaign was less anticommunist than simply acommunist. For the first time since 1934, the future of France can be imagined without a Communist Party.

Since the autumn of 1974, which was when the so-called polemics between the PS and the PCF began, and even more strongly since the autumn of 1977 and the breaking off of discussions on updating the Common Program, the PCF had not stopped emphasizing that it would be catastrophic for it and "for the workers" if the Socialist Party became capable of reducing it to a secondary role. But that is what has happened. The Communist strategy has therefore failed.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Lastly, despite the absence of figures provided by the PCF itself--if we except the information contained in the draft resolution on the congress, according to which the party has lost cells in the firms--there are many indications of a clear decline in communist militancy. It is unbelievable that the PCF still has 700,000 members when, from every direction, even the least critical members are reporting a drop in membership in their cells and, even more, the low rate of participation in meetings.

In short, despite its organization and its resources, which are still unequalled, despite its unequalled presence among the workers, whether directly or indirectly (through the CGT [General Confederation of Workers]), and despite the municipal offices it occupies, the PCF has been stricken with lifelessness.

Why? How are the Communists reacting to this attack of languor? What future possibilities can one foresee for the PCF? Those questions will be, or should be, debated during preparations for the next party congress. In any case, they are in the minds of all Communists.

How the Party Explains its "Decline"

The draft resolution in preparation for the next congress gives the party leadership's viewpoint on the causes of its electoral decline. I say electoral, because the draft denies any political decline--it denies the weakening of the PCF's ability to influence the balance of forces in France. Its reasoning goes as follows:

For too long the PCF was faithful to a strategy whose two pillars were, first, non-critical adherence to the Soviet model of revolution and socialism, and second, a popular front or union of the left policy. The first was unsuited to French society, and the second tended to do away with the party's identity. So when the Common Program was signed, the PCF found itself completely exposed: that which was proper to it repelled public opinion, and that which attracted public opinion--unity and the reforms contained in the program--belonged to the PS as much as to the PCF. The draft adds that confusion of the two leftwing parties occurred at the deepest level of awareness--precisely in the awareness that the Common Program was already quite a bit, while for the PCF, "the battle for socialism" was the order of the day. With the 22d Congress in 1976--where the Soviet model was repudiated and the broad outline of a French path to "democratic socialism" was laid down--and the 23rd Congress in 1979--where the PCF's autonomy was stressed--things were finally straightened out. But it was too late to benefit from that at the ballot box. Since the election system acts as an inducement to making one's vote count, the French who wanted to defeat the right at all costs voted for Francois Mitterrand and then for Socialist deputies.

In its internal structure, and independently of the facts, that reasoning holds water. But in reality, the facts contradict it.

Democratization, Then Retreat From Union

In the history of the PCF, the notion and practice of popular fronts and unions of the left (1935-1938, 1943, 1947, and 1972-1977) have marked off periods when, regardless of its loyalty to the USSR, the specific policy of the PCF was departing

from the Soviet model so far as to contradict it and foreshadowing precisely the "democratic socialism" of the 22d Congress: a reappropriation of democratic and national values, broad alliances (with intellectuals and believers), and openness to all social and national problems far removed from the sole area of exploitation of the workers. This was true of the period of the Common Program, in which the PCF changed its type of propaganda and its talk (debating assemblies, the "party speaking; frankly," and so on), drew up an original theory of present-day French society ("state monopoly capitalism"), formulated a great number of proposals of all kinds--especially that for the democratization of society (the "Charter of Freedoms" in 1975 and the 1977 statement on self-management)--and, lastly, adopted a point of view that was clearly and seriously critical of the USSR.

On the other hand, the breaks in the union of the left have always provoked a sectarian withdrawal by the PCF into a "class against class" strategy, a delimitation of "camps" (the "ideological war") that forbids broad alliances, an activism centered essentially on economic and even labor union activity (it could legitimately be said in 1979 that the PCF had become "a fifth central labor union"), and a rapprochement with the USSR (following the approval of Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, which occurred in the conditions known to everyone, all criticisms of the existing socialism disappeared).

Was the PCF more committed to the path of democratic socialism in 1977 than in 1980, and did it appear to be? There can be no doubt about the answer. In 1977, the PCF's political influence and its image were at their highest level. And the municipal elections were proof of that, incidentally. The tidal wave of lists presented by the union of the left put Communists and Socialists into the town halls without discrimination. Citadels of bourgeois France passed to the PCF--Rheims, Saint-Etienne, Bourges, or Beziers--while the old royalist country did not hesitate to vote for lists that would give the PCF deputy mayors (In Angers and Roche-sur-Yon!).

It is true that autonomous electoral influence--measurable in the legislative elections--did not follow, and from that standpoint, the official reasoning concerning the "lag" is not without value. But then what can one say about the policy after 1977, which, supposedly to make up for the lag, is now returning and pushing concepts and practices to the point of caricature, even though they were in fact what characterized that lag? What can one say about the assessment of the state of French society, which is correctly deemed to be advanced, developed, and democratic and one to which it would be wrong not to propose a hard and uncompromising revolutionary program?

The Real Lag in the PCF

Between 1967 and 1979 (the European elections), the PCF did not progress (1967: 22.5 percent; 1968: 20.5 percent; 1969: 21.5 percent; 1973: 21.5 percent; 1978: 20.5 percent; and 1979: 20.5 percent), but in 1981, and only in that year, it collapsed. Until 1981, the PS certainly progressed faster than the PCF, but in 1981 the PCF really lost. So something must necessarily have happened between 1979 and 1981.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

The involution described just now was prior to 1980, but it remained scarcely perceptible to a communist electorate whose relationship with the party differs in nature from that of other voters to their parties--a great deal is required to shake it. On the other hand, the presidential campaign--for the election that arouses the most public interest--brought the PCF's new sectarian line sharply into focus for everyone. That line was totally antiunitary and aimed solely at strengthening the PCF. And the communist voters, because they are workers and the masses, and because the common people know that their only weapon is unity, are passionately attached to that unity. In their eyes, the one who takes the initiative of breaking it is to be punished. It happened to the SFIO [French Section of the Workers International (French Socialist Party)] in 1969, and it happened to the PCF in 1981.

In the final analysis, the real question is this: how could the PCF leadership imagine that such a thoroughly antiunitary policy would pay off? How could that workers party make such a frontal assault on the basic structure of the communist people?

What it reveals is a dramatic break with the people the party is supposed to represent. It also reveals what constitutes the PCF's real lag beyond the other lags. The PCF has always judged and continues to judge the people's movement according to its own influence and that of the CGT. Whatever it controls is good and in the vanguard; whatever develops outside its control is dangerous and even a provocation. And it is certainly true that since 1967, the class struggles have been entered by types of workers, social categories, and regions where the PCF was involved in mission work: young workers from rural areas or those with a smattering of schooling through the technical education centers, clerical workers, working women, the French Coupling Company in the west, or Lip in the east. It is also very true that many new themes of struggle (more "qualitative" than economic--feminism, the quality of life, and so on) were viewed with mistrust by the PCF and the CGT and required a new approach to politics and new political practices.

So while historians and sociologists, but also the majority of the workers, view the period of the Common Program as one of unequaled growth by the working class movement, the PCF sees it as a period of stagnation and even of failure.

Party in Government

And that notion--I am coming to the PCF's attitude in the situation following 10 May--remains and has even grown stronger. The weakening of the PCF amounts to a vicious circle--the party knows that in the weakened state in which it finds itself, any working class movement today would benefit the PS even more. That is why it is not attempting to promote them, and even less to seek union at the rank-and-file level, although union theoretically exists at the very top--in the government. That passiveness is reinforced by the difficulty the party would experience in passing from "struggles against" to "struggles for"--even if it wanted to--so that government action would succeed, so that the experiment would lead as far as possible along the path to democratic socialism, and so that the workers would take over as many posts as possible. But does it want to? Wanting to would indicate PCF recognition that "change" is possible under the PS's leadership, that Francois Mitterrand is not the same thing as Giscard, and that the direction taken by its presidential campaign was totally wrong.

But the Communists are participating in the government, the government is adopting satisfactory measures, and quite obviously, the right and the employers do not at all seem to feel that Francois Mitterrand is governing from the right and that he, Giscard, and Chirac form a single "gang of three"---all of this leads party members to wonder, despite everything, about the rightness of a policy that had assumed the exact opposite.

Does this mean, as some commentators think, that the PCF leadership is hoping that the current government will fail and just waiting for an opportunity to pull its ministers out of the government? Not at all. For the PCF leadership, the Communist ministers are the only positive thing it can show the congress. Moreover, they give the PCF modest--the campaign about communist infiltration is ridiculous--but real positions of power, and those are always good things to accept. On a deeper level, the PCF leadership feels that the party will be in difficulty for many years to come. So it must do what every CP does in such cases: pull back to what is solid--the apparatus--and wait for better days. I do not think it feels--at least I hope it does not--that those better days would come about through the failure of the current government. As in Chile, that would be as disastrous for the PCF as for the PS. But the historic Messianism that is more or less shared by every communist may allow hope for a divine surprise. Meanwhile, the PCF leadership does not want to harm the experiment. Neither does it want to support all of its possible developments, because the credit would go to the PS. It is therefore emphasizing that the PCF is not a government party but a party in the government and that the government's program is not a common program (and it is in fact difficult to maintain that the protocol of agreement signed by the PCF and the PS in such haste on 23 June has anything in common with the Common Program). As a result, the PCF is not seeking to propose anything, but only to support and watch. While Communist legislative bills used to rain down during legislatures in which there was no chance of their being considered, there are practically none now, when they might be. With all the more reason, the PCF is not taking any initiative in connection with general conferences on working conditions, education, town planning, and so on.

Crisis of Diversity

It would be surprising if the PCF's strategic and electoral defeat, the current inactivity, the sharp changes in the party line, and certain instances of double talk until just before 10 May had not provoked a serious crisis within the party. Symptoms had appeared as early as 1978, but those were limited to intellectual circles. They disappeared in part because many party members, either because they respected the traditional silence within communist parties or because they were discouraged, or both, tiptoed away. But in 1979, the affair involving the Paris Federation--the PCF's largest--showed that the crisis was widespread. It exploded in 1981. Well-known Communists dared to organize a permanent center for debate known as Communist Encounters. On being punished, they received considerable support, including that from deputies, middle-rank cadres, and even party officials. They were not cast away from the communist people into outer darkness--far from it--and that is unprecedented. They were the visible portion of a vast iceberg of criticism. The criticism was diversified: some blamed the current leadership for its sectarianism after 1977, while others blamed it for its opportunism before 1977. But since

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

the same party leadership had presided over both the sectarianism and the opportunism, it was politically isolated, with the apparatus phenomenon partially masking that isolation and delaying--but thereby aggravating--the crisis point.

In those conditions, the only positive solution would be to redirect the PCF into positive action--participation in the government by Communist ministers should help, because governing means making choices, and before choosing, one must analyze, seek, and discuss--and for the party to undertake an uncompromising examination of conscience that would leave nothing covered. Exchange would then again be possible among the various components of the communist people, considering that their diversity is an asset and a source of cohesion, while divisions develop in the shadow of unanimism. It would be surprising if, in its formal proceedings, the congress itself were to give tangible signs of that double rectification, but it is not impossible that the ambient political conditions (within the party) might allow some hope to survive.

The men on the left and those militant for change ought to hope so, because it is not written anywhere that when the PCF's inheritance--a people's inheritance, an inheritance of social liberation values, and an inheritance of the working class's integration into the nation--is left without heirs, it can be taken up by others. If it could, everyone would be the loser.

COPYRIGHT: by CERAS, 15, rue R.-Marcheron, 92170 Vanves. 1981

11798

CSO: 3100/333

FRANCE

PSF COMPETENCE, ABILITY TO APPLY POLICIES EXAMINED

Paris PROJET in French Jan 82 pp 32-41

[Article by Roland Cayrol, of the National Foundation for the Political Sciences: "The Boot and the Political Commissar: Six Contradictions With Respect to the Socialist Party"; passages enclosed in slantlines printed in italics]

[Text] The hour for stocktaking has, to be sure, not yet arrived for the Socialist Party. Six months is too long a time to continue to be swayed solely by the moods and emotions of those first days, but it is too short a time to make a genuine analysis of an experiment.

Comment concerning the PS has, in fact, been muted. The fiery pronouncements of the "headhunters" saved the party's recent congress at Valence from the indifference of the majority of the intellectuals, who--it appears--took refuge either in the silence of a haughty skepticism or in the safety of conventional praise. It is indeed difficult to do otherwise: there are so many contradictions within the PS, in the relations between the PS and the government, and within the government itself, that it is risky to pin one's hopes today on a particular choice, on a particular mode of evolution, or--in short--on any particular method for resolution of these contradictions rather than on any other.

Under these conditions, the best way to initiate a debate is perhaps merely to try to focus attention on some of these contradictions, and to do so by challenging certain figures in our political system who are surrounded by excessive reverence. Let us dare to do so, to the extent that we are able.

From the Conquest of Power to the Exercise of Power

As a party the PS is very successful at winning elections to office, but how will it perform at the helm of government? This party--whose progress in terms of votes, members and intellectual influence during the past decade is a rare phenomenon in a developed country--actually welcomed its victories of May-June 1981 as a God-given surprise. Ever ready to conquer new positions of power, the PS was not prepared to exercise that power; it had never been placed in the role of a "government party." In party congress after party congress, however, the PS had been hearing some of its activists declare that it should "raise the question of governmental power." Today, it appears clear that with few exceptions what these party members wanted was more in the nature of a theoretical discussion of governmental power than the translation of party policy into terms of the exercise of that power.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Here we find the first apparent contradiction that one might wish to point out within the socialist experience: although armed with numerous--and authoritative--texts covering all sectors of social activity, the new socialist political and administrative officials are in general quite helpless as soon as it becomes a question of transforming these orientations into specific decisions for everyday problems. Moreover, these officials have not found--and often have not even thought to seek--support from the party for their action.

Our intent in this article is of course not to "hand out bad grades." Obviously, the absence of alternation in the ranks of government for so many years is largely responsible for this lack of synchronization between general discussion and the translation of that discussion into action. It is also true, however, that this phenomenon relates back to what can be regarded as a genuine shortcoming of the Socialist Party during these past few years: namely, the party's tendency--as a part of the opposition--to cover over with an ideological veneer a genuine weakness in sectorial analysis and in the formulation of precise proposals. The PS has been more successful at theorizing about reformism than at perfecting the basic framework of reforms.

Some will say: "But what about all the reforms carried out during the past 6 months, the nationalizations, the decentralization? Let me be understood correctly: it is not my intention to diminish the real merits of the work accomplished. I have determined, however, that even with respect to those themes that are a wholly familiar part of the socialist ritual--for example, the nationalizations and the decentralization--no precise plan had really been finalized before the party's ascension to power: the technical and political debates did not arise within the government and the ministerial offices until the moment it became necessary to undertake concrete measures. Moreover, neither the literature--nor the structures--of the PS were able at the time to serve as operative references.

To this initial contradiction we may add two problems which are unquestionably linked to it:

1. The problem of "competence": the adversaries of the socialist government (and certain of its principal supporters!) complain daily of the insufficient competence of the PS cadres who have been promoted to positions in the governmental apparatus. There, too, time will also see to it that our novices are endowed with experience, and therefore with competence. Speaking in more general terms, however, there is the problem of establishing the criteria for competence--notably economic competence. Pierre Mauroy has on several occasions (at the Valence congress, among others) explained that it would be impossible to formulate a critique on the basis of criteria of the type found in Raymond Barre's textbook on economics. Contrary to one journalist's recent assertion, it would appear not to be true that there is "only one way to manage the economy." Very well; but what exactly are these /other/ criteria?

The question appears to be all the more serious because in many matters (the budgetary procedure, for example) the PS cadres have poured themselves without apparent difficulty into the molds inherited from the preceding governments. What, then, would /another logic/ be, in terms of the management of the affairs of state?

2. While the responsibility of the PS in this situation is obvious, it cannot cause us to overlook the responsibility of its partners of the political and social Left. Take the case of the labor unions, for example. When their advice was asked (sometimes for the first time) about certain policies (on culture, for example), some large unions discovered that they had nothing to propose, not just with respect to methods of management (for that is assuredly not their role) but even with respect to overall guidelines. The French Left is definitely having difficulty being a Left in government, with the result that when it does win power there is an inevitable lack of synchronism between the party members appointed to positions in the governmental apparatus (who must thenceforth think in terms of governmental action) on the one hand, and those who remain within the party structures (where these terms are not normally in vogue and are therefore disconcerting).

From Double Talk to Simple Talk

Politics--European as well as French--had accustomed us to the famous "double talk" of the social democrats: a revolutionary thesis based on a strict Marxist orthodoxy (for the party congresses and the activist culture) on the one hand, and on the other hand the timidly reformist practice of "socialist management of capitalism."

The experiment of 1981 introduced (for the first time, perhaps?) a distortion into this pattern: what has happened is that the French socialists are intending to prove they have divorced themselves from the pattern. For years, as part of the opposition, the PS criticized its counterparts in the countries of northern Europe; Francois Mitterand himself has repeatedly rejected the Swedish model on grounds that it is not genuinely socialist. Calling for a veritable process of "breaking with capitalism," the authors of the "Socialist Plan" protested in advance against the suspicions (mostly on the part of the communists) that this is "double talk."

Indeed, we are in the presence of a corps of members and leaders of a Socialist Party that genuinely believes in the possibility of applying their doctrine, which is in part a doctrine that rejects the political practices of the social democrats. In fact (and to the surprise of many Center-Left voters who had voted for "change" but did not expect that the socialist platform would be implemented) the socialist government is carrying out the reforms promised by the socialist candidate during the presidential election campaign and by the PS during the legislative election campaign. There is genuine confidence among the socialists that it is possible to change French society, to "change the way of life": when someone replies by citing the existence of obstacles that have stood in the way of other experiments, they eagerly respond: "Yes, but we have the political will." For his part, the prime minister unceasingly declares: "I'm a man who stands his ground," and "I'm a fighter...."

In short, the language of the PS in power is a simple language which basically revives the language developed in the statutory texts of the party since 1971. Here indeed is something new in European socialism which abundantly justifies the impassioned attention aroused in the ranks of the Leftist socialist currents of thought outside our borders.

Not everything is necessarily so simple, however, and it is here that we find we are risking a second contradiction. The fact is that while hoping to break with

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

the social democratic "double talk," the PS remains today strongly conditioned by certain factors that have served to explain the "deviation" of other experiments and the inability of these experiments to "break" with capitalism. We should like here to mention only two of these factors.

Favoring the institutional approach (the system of elections, government, the assemblies, the changes in procedures), the PS has always felt a certain distrust of a civilian society that would be too autonomous vis-a-vis the world of politics. Because it rejects the leftist doctrine of the "creative spontaneity of the masses," because it fears the communists' ability to seize certain controls in society, and because it fears that a "liberal-libertarian" alliance--and even the reactionary Right--may intrude into overlarge spaces opened up in freedom, the PS does not propose to have the mechanisms of social change deviate overmuch from its plan. The policy followed during the first 6 months in the communications sector; the reticences with respect to the free radiobroadcasting stations; the change in tone toward the ecologists; and the strange procedure of dividing the decentralization bill into two parts are good examples of this institutional approach. But does this not therefore pose the danger of returning to the practices of the party-state and of placing definitive limits on the contours of change? We must be careful not to go so far as to hurl the accusation of "totalitarianism," and particularly not in the direction of the only political movement--democratic socialism--that has never given birth, anywhere in the world, to a repressive state. One should remain vigilant against this inevitable temptation--on the part of a majority party--to orient the mechanisms of change exclusively toward its own profit and to restrict change to the political aspect of society. One should also give thought to the significance of J. P. Chevenement's address to the Valence congress, in which he expressed the hope that greater efforts would be made "so that the government will truly be your government, so that this power will be your power, /so that this state will be your state/" (the emphasis is mine).

One of the theses of "activist talk" has tended to disappear from the official socialist line since last May: the concept of self-management. We are instead witnessing the reappearance, as a background theme in many of the speeches, of the old social democratic concept according to which the party, the government, or the administrative establishment should carry out a "political translation" of the aspirations of the masses and of the social struggles. There, too, does not one run the risk--without meaning to--of renouncing all dialectics of action that are based on political action and reverting to the concept that since the government is a government of the Left and therefore a "good" government in the service of the workers, the workers need only /place their confidence/ in that government so that it can change things to their benefit? And in so doing, does one not only risk eliminating much of the incentive for mobilization but also, once again, risk limiting the objectives of change to the traditional sphere of the politician? Does not a party that is largely dominated by teachers and middle-level cadres run the risk--by speaking in the name of the workers--of depriving the latter (without wishing to do so) of certain benefits which they have expected from the change? In short, the socialists should be particularly vigilant in order not to fall again into the familiar ruts of previous socialist experiments, even after having explicitly abandoned the practice of "double talk."

From the Union of the Popular Forces to the Socialist Government

One of the original features (and one of the virtues) of the PS strategy during the past 10 years has been the policy of a united Left. The alliance with the PC [Communist Party] has at one and the same time made possible the reintegration of the communists into French political life; anchored the PS to the Left; helped the PS to break with the "social-centrist" practices; and made possible the election victory of the entire Left (and thereby reduced the electoral influence of the PC). Moreover, the inclusion of four communist ministers in the government is undoubtedly destined to play a definite role with respect to the public image of the PC and thereby help to bring about change in French politics. One of the unusual aspects of the Valence congress was the fact that Michel Rocard was the only speaker to include the communists' participation in the government among the gains made during the recent period.

The alliance with the PC, however, has never been described by the socialists as a mere electoral tactic. On the contrary: according to the PS texts the alliance is part of a unitary strategy, and party activists and leaders alike have called for a "new practice of unity." In the period leading up to the presidential election, F. Mitterrand and the PS adopted the concept of a "union of the popular forces," including the PS-PC alliance within the framework of a broader arrangement (both social and political) for the purpose of playing a leading role in the transformation of French society.

The problem posed here is one of knowing what this "union of the popular forces" can signify--and what the term "unitary strategy" can encompass--no longer during a period of winning election to public office but rather during a period when a socialist-led government is at the helm. The response today appears to be somewhat unclear, inasmuch as neither in the top echelons nor among the rank and file have the PC-PS discussions really been resumed. Not only is there no joint effort, or joint action, by the two parties but the very problem of the organization of their future relations (a question not taken up at the socialist congress) appears hardly even to have been included on the agenda of the various sections and federations of the PS. Must we await the preparations for the municipal elections in order to reactivate unity for the electoral event?

The PS response vis-a-vis its other partners of the political and social Left does not appear to be very clear either. With respect to the nature, and possible modalities, of the relations between the dominant party and the small groups of the Center-Left (the MRG [Radical Leftist Movement] and the PSU [Unified Socialist Party] (in other words, the extreme Left), one cannot say that either the ideas or the proposals have fused since May or June. With respect to the strategy for relations between the party and the labor unions, or between the government and the labor unions, there too (although this is not, to be sure, the classic but strongly reinvigorated practice of joint social effort) the current response of the Socialist Party is hardly visible (even though some observers believe they are witnessing the formation of a privileged PS-CGT [General Confederation of Labor] axis.

In fact, this question concerning the fate of the union of the popular forces and the unity of the Left bears on the questions that directly concern the PS itself: the PC-PS alliance (together with its variants) has helped greatly to give the Socialist Party a more precise image in the years since 1971. Depending on whether it remains a dominant party that conducts its experiment as it chooses, maintaining

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

only obligatory relations with its minority partners in the government, or whether instead it revives--not only in official sectors but throughout the nation--a policy of continuous (and possibly conflictual) relations with the other "popular forces," the PS will impart an entirely different coloration to its own actions and to those of the government.

From a Collection of Tendencies to... a Collection of Tendencies

Everyone knows the importance, the essential character, of the role played by ideological "tendencies" within the PS since the party's founding. Today, although they have theoretically been dissolved, one is struck by the persistence of their impact.

In the formation of the government, the different tendencies of the party were represented on a more or less proportional basis. The way in which the intragovernmental tensions are managed inevitably reminds knowledgeable observers of the way in which the resolutions committees have functioned during the national congresses of the PS.

These tendencies would seem to have disappeared, but it is unquestionably on the basis of these defunct groupings that F. Mitterrand and L. Jospin subtly formed the party's new leadership and federal teams while singling out the Rocard faction and diminishing (as is well known) its influence by comparison with the preceding congress at Metz.

The "tendencies" have therefore been relegated to the background, but one cannot converse for more than half an hour with a member of the former majority group without his explaining that the influence of the "Rocardians" should be reduced still further, or more than half an hour with a member of the former Rocardian group without his dreaming aloud of ways to stage a comeback.

The "tendencies" as such are no more, but the party activists are so accustomed to finding themselves in a small group that their personal and affective fellowships--from the rank and file to the top echelons--are more likely to consist of "the comrades of the group" than of "the comrades of the party." Moreover, everyone tries to preserve his own magazine, his own bulletin, or his own headquarters in order to perpetuate--insofar as possible--the spirit of the ancient chapels. And to keep the flame alive.

The tendencies are no longer in vogue, but everyone plans to use the government as a base from which to promote the influence of the former group to which he once belonged.

Having criticized the American Left, Jean-Pierre Chevenement, of Research, is now pointing an accusing finger at American sociology. He is happily rediscovering a proletarian science that would in time replace bourgeois science, and is attempting--by using the discredited devices introduced some time ago by A. Saunier-Seite--to place on the board of directors of the CNRS [National Center for Scientific Research] a member of the Editorial Committee of the magazine NON, an organ founded by CERES [Center for (Socialist) Studies, Research and Education].

At the very outset, Francois Mitterrand installed "Mitterrandists" of unquestioned loyalty in the state apparatus. The list of his guests at the luncheons and breakfasts in Elysee Palace attests (to no one's surprise) to the fact that the interests of the majority "current" (pardon me, the former majority current) of the PS are uppermost in his mind.

With the support of Michel de la Fourniere and Robert Chapuis, Michel Rocard is endeavoring to convince himself that the best way to resurface (some day, who knows?) at the head of a tendency which would finally constitute a majority within the party is to submerge himself in a "party of unanimity." Space is lacking here to discuss the question of what constitutes courage in politics, or whether it was more courageous--during the official preparation of the Valence congress--to remain silent or to defend one's positions regardless of the price one might have to pay during the short term.

So the tendencies are defunct--but are they? No, they are only asleep, thanks to a peculiar arrangement made at the highest level. Or rather they are as if "freeze-dried," waiting for a little boiling water in order to live once again, fresher than ever. One may either deplore this state of affairs or scoff at it, provided one is outside the PS, but it is nevertheless quite understandable: strong political and sentimental ties have existed for years, and one would have to be either a fool or naive to imagine that they could suddenly be loosened.

This is undoubtedly not the important question, however. I believe instead that at the present moment the most serious question facing the majority party is the fact that while the submerged tendencies await their opportunity to resurface--whenever one or the other of them believes conditions are favorable--the political debate concerning party orientations is ipso facto buried, deep within a party that does not know how to organize a confrontation that does not involve contests for positions of leadership in the party apparatus. Should not an authentically democratic and pluralistic party (as the PS uncontestedly is, more so than any other in France) be capable of debating in an open--and, if necessary, adversarial--manner the prizes and options or power? And if divergent policy lines manifest themselves with respect to these questions of today and tomorrow, should not the party be able to develop new internal currents of opinion, new "tendencies," rather than merely to reproduce, behind the scenes, the same opposing views of the same groups and the same personalities?

From the Culture of Activism to the Delights of Power

What, then, is the role of the socialist activists when their party is in power? In the opinion of some activists from the rank and file who spoke their minds at Valence, the response is clear: they must exercise surveillance over the comrade ministers, be the guardians of the party line, become genuine political commissars over those who are appointed to governmental office. In short, to quote one of their number: "The government must be the party's boot."

One can imagine that this role would be moderately satisfactory to the comrade ministers. They have often indicated--have, in fact, said in so many words--that they envisage things in another way. To quote Laurent Fabius: "In this new situation we are induced...to develop a new form of activism, which I should like to call an "activism of explanation".... Reality today, as you well know, is the

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

activists in the marketplace, in the workplace, being assailed by requests, objections and questions, to which they are as yet poorly equipped to respond.... This is the task for the coming months: the 'activism of explanation.' Here we have--in my opinion--the initial axis of change for the Party." Then there is the famous quip of Jean-Pierre Chevenement: "It is perhaps easy to proclaim that the Socialist Party is not a 'party-boot.' But, my dear comrades, not everyone has the talent to be a 'party-boot.' It's a fine, handsome piece of footgear."

The same speaker added, however: "The problem is to act in such a way that the government and the party--in carrying out their activities--will be united in the effort to anchor France to the Left, to change the way of life, to truly open the way to socialism." This indeed appears to be the problem. These activists are very often local elected officials who are in contact with the pressures, the petitions, the demands of the citizens, of the voters. How can they be made responsive to the problems and choices of a government of comrades--of a governmental structure which they already find to be very distant, with all those bureaucrats who appear to take themselves just as seriously as their predecessors?

To be sure, the party committees have the role of formulating initiatives: a role which is, moreover, not as simple as it seems, for how can anyone be sure that these committees will not outbid each other with respect to the latitude of action of the government, and how can anyone guarantee that these committees will not be staffed by activists who are disappointed or embittered at not having been snapped up by the state apparatus? To be true, the party has the task of serving as a transmission belt to the rank and file for presidential and governmental directives: the "activism of explanation" so dear to Laurent Fabius; and the team headed by Lionel Jospin is skillfully busying itself to perform that function.

This does not, however, fully satisfy a party in which the culture of activism has always been valued highly. Well, then? Then the party must specifically invent--if no serious internal problems are created for the future and if no serious demobilization is provoked in its ranks--ways and means for its followers to accomplish the tasks that Pierre Mauroy assigned to them at Valence: "A party in which no one wishes--and, moreover, would be unable--to serve as a docile spokesman for a governmental decision. There are more--and better--things to do. Wherever they may be, the socialist activists must launch ideas and proposals, experiments and initiatives. For to the extent that it is a structure of ideas, a great socialist party should be a vehicle for action wherever there are socialists. Activists and elected officials--in your neighborhoods, your towns, your city halls, your departments and your regions--it is your responsibility to change the way of life." This axis unquestionably corresponds to the activist consciousness of the Socialist Party, and it remains for the party's leadership elements to conceive how to build this axis in the context of everyday reality.

From Change to Expectation

The socialist activists have for years labored for political change. Without believing in an overnight utopia, they have hoped that victory at the polls would bring extensive and immediate social and cultural change. Standing before that everyday symbol--the small screen of a television set--we can understand their annoyance when they realize how little change has taken place in respect to human beings, and even less in respect to methods and content. We also calculate the risk, however, that injustice and arbitrary action would ensue if the activists were heeded fully in their personalized list of grievances.

We can therefore understand why many socialist experts have recourse to sectorial management practices--practices that are new for them and are, moreover, very time-consuming. One can also understand the discomfort of intellectuals who are deeply involved in the party, who are basically less at their ease than they were under Giscard d'Estaing, because in those days the compromises necessary for the operation of the government did not concern them.

Its victory in May-June brought French socialism face to face with responsibilities that are assuredly historic in nature. In the preceding pages we have above all raised questions--and called attention to certain contradictions--that are not easy to resolve. It seemed useful to state these questions and contradictions in these pages and to do so without any reservations, in consideration of the fact that political change has created too many--and too profound--expectations not to attempt a continuing analysis of the ways and means that have been put in place to respond to them. The victory of the Left (and first and foremost the victory of the PS) in May-June was a response to a present-day need for political change in a situation of social and economic crisis. It was also the result of a structural change in French society that has developed from the combined effects of urbanization; the increasing transformation of the middle class into salaried employees and wage earners; de-Christianization; the increasing youthfulness of the population; and the "shock wave" of May 1968. The new government and the Socialist Party are expected to respond to this structural challenge while at the same time responding to the immediate challenge of the present situation--the challenge to resolve the crisis.

Under these conditions, it would appear essential to question the PS on a continuing basis with respect to its contradictions and its limitations, and in this way to participate in the indispensable debate concerning the political options of French society.

COPYRIGHT: by CERAS, 15, rue R.-Marcheron, 92170 Vanves. 1981

10992

CSO: 3100/332

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

POLITICAL

FRANCE

PCF DECLINE, RESOURCES FOR RECOVERY VIEWED

Paris POUVOIRS in French No 20, 1982 pp 45-53

[Article by Jean Baudouin, professor of political science at the University of Poitiers, and author of "Le PCF et 'le socialisme aux couleurs de la France' - 1968-1978," thesis, 1978, Rennes: "The June 1981 Communist Failure: Electoral Retreat or Hegemonic Crisis?"]

[Text] One can readily imagine the trauma suffered by the communists on hearing the results of the June 1981 legislative election. Forced back to a level of electoral influence comparable to that in 1936, it may have seemed to them that within a span of two successive balloting sessions, the efforts of two militant generations to guarantee the unchallenged hegemony of the party over the French left wing had been brutally reduced to nothing. Prior to examining the political processes which led to this situation and the various responses the leaders of the party are attempting to implement, it would perhaps be well to clarify further this notion of failure which is at the heart of all the analyses.

1. The Problem of the Failure

No one disputes the June 1981 communist failure--neither the commentators on political life who undertake to draft an exhaustive inventory of its immediate evidences--electoral retreat, loss of membership, strategic chaos, identity crisis, nor the leadership of the communist party which acknowledges the "serious reverses" suffered and is trying to clarify the short and long-run reasons for the phenomenon. There are however two ways of interpreting this setback:

Either one can presume that it is a question of a temporary retreat, substantial indeed but not at all permanent and susceptible to being overcome eventually, comparable to that in June of 1958, with the socialist thrust serving in a reactive capacity in this connection analogous to the Gaullist wave at that time, or

One can on the other hand presume that it is a matter of structural decline which could be discerned as early as the preceding electoral consultations, confirming the increasing failure of the organizational forms and systems of thought inherited from Stalinism to adapt to a national situation which had changed profoundly in political decor and sociological profile.

The "lower" hypothesis of retreat is, naturally, that chosen by the PCF leadership. If in fact one examines the main exegetic texts drafted since the elections,

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

in particular the report by Georges Marchais to the Central Committee on 28 and 29 June and the draft resolution approved by the Central Committee on 12 and 13 October, three kinds of explanations are provided:

The first is of an institutional nature. The aggressive trend toward presidentializing the regime resulting from the 1958 constitution, paralleled by the bipolarizing dynamics of elections by majority balloting in two rounds (advantage to the dominant party, incentive for useful votes), gave an unrealistic advantage to the socialist party, while at the same time penalizing the communist party. The decline in the communist vote would therefore be more the product of a particularly perverse electoral "technology" than a cutting rejection of a political line. "We underestimated the serious threat which the new institutional mechanism posed for our party."

The second paints a more traditional picture and derives more from "demonology" than reason. The party was the victim of a "atmosphere of merciless ideological warfare," cleverly orchestrated by the dominant powers, massively passed along by the mass media, and subtly endorsed by the socialist leaders. The breaking wave of anticommunism deflected thousands of potential voters from the party.

Finally, the third explanation is the most innovative to the extent that it directly challenges the history of French communism: the party bears the cost of the "strategic delay" accumulated following the 20th CPSU Congress. If the august names of Maurice Thorez and Waldeck-Rochet are never mentioned, they are implicitly reproached for "having reacted the traditional form of unity of which the Popular Front remains the prestigious model, that is to say the search for a basic overall political agreement with the socialist party."

It would be unreasonable to deny the import of this last argument. It is not in fact usual for a party in the Stalinist tradition to cast a critical look at its own history and to excise from it, in abrupt fashion, a manifestation as decisive as the strategy of a single front at the summit with the socialists. The party interpretation does not however deviate significantly from the grand apologetic and legitimizing tradition of its hagiologies. In fact it offers the advantage of excusing the current leaders of the party and absolving the founding norms of the system (authoritarian stateism, ideocratic temptation, internationalist solidarity). A spotlight focused on the "individual errors" of the preceding leadership groups is also an artifice making it possible to isolate a moment in the "process," the better to preserve the inalterable validity of the "project."

In truth, whichever hypothesis is adopted, a politician cannot save time with an overall interpretation of the contemporary development of the party. It is high time to discard all of these "existentialist" concepts which have so thoroughly muddled our understanding of the communist party in the course of these recent decades. Just as it was absurd to pose the question "Has the communist party changed" unceasingly, without previously establishing the elements in the communist system which must in fact be altered before one can conclude that there has been a real change, it would also be extremely sterile to adhere to a situational concept of the failure, to add together and assign a hierarchy to its immediate evidences, for example, without integrating it in a general "pathology" of the

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

communist system which alone can make it possible to clarify its significance and to measure its efficiency.

In this connection, it seems that the June 1981 electoral retreat provides spectacular confirmation of a process which is certainly older but whose intensity was modified by the exalting prospect of the joint program: the gradual transition of French communism from an "organic epoch" characterized by the institutionalization of a certain number of privileges within French society (in particular, a quasi-monopoly on the representation of the least favored strata) toward a "critical epoch," characterized precisely by the gradual dismantling of these privileges. The communist institution is tending to move from the powerful and stable "countersociety" it was toward a peripheral and marginal society. There is hardly any need to add that within the framework of a necessarily limited study, we will limit ourselves to describing the strategic processes which led to this deterioration and the responses which the communist leaders are planning to cope with this hegemonic crisis.

2. The Development of the Crisis

If one studies the development of communist strategy between 1965 and 1981, one can see that the leaders of the party tested the joint practices at the "summit" and then "at the base," in both cases leading to failure, but constituting nonetheless a traditional parallel to the history of the party. Hasn't its rhythm since its origins been characterized by the alternation of so-called periods of overture characterized by an effort to reach agreement with the socialists and so-called periods of withdrawal, under the sign of denunciation of the social democratic betrayals? In truth, there are two factors which are inconsistent with this description. On the one hand, the goal of a joint government program is something unprecedented. On the other, the reestablishment of a powerful socialist party finally rooted in the left emerged as the element which, at every stage in the union, served as a catalyst for and deepened the retreat of the PCF.

The launching of a joint dynamics just after the death of Maurice Thorez seems consistent at first glance with classic objectives. The issue was indeed to develop new prospects for change by updating the alliance with the socialist party at the summit again. It was a question above all of establishing political and electoral hegemony in this alliance with a view to winning power under the most favorable conditions. The long-term prospect called for making a decisive breakthrough on the level of state power by winning the support of a vast public and nationalized sector. However, when the party debits this joint research to a model introduced in the era of the Popular Front, it erases the strictly heterodox aspect of the joint program strategy. For the first time in its history, in fact, the PCF is contemplating the long-term sharing of state power between the socialists alone and the communists with a view to advancing toward socialism, whereas in 1936 it rallied to the formula of "support without participation," and between 1945 and 1947 it participated in a reconstruction government which included representatives of the "national bourgeoisie." Above all, at a time when nowhere else in Europe would a communist party condescend to establish such favorable and such rich links with those hereditary enemies of communism, the social democrats. The unprecedented scope of the joint program aims explain the two great imperatives which the communists adopted for themselves as of 1972. On the one

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

hand there was a "sociological" imperative designed to extend the traditional audience of the party into the new wage-earning strata created by the "scientific and technical revolution," and on the other hand, a "political" imperative seeking to design the contours of a "socialism of a French hue" and to modify its identity on major points. Unlike the situation in 1936 and 1945, the party leadership is willing to wager its candidacy for power on significant reforms: a loosening of its links with the Soviet Union,⁴ abandonment of the concept of the dictatorship of the proletariat, recognition of pluralistic socialism, reestablishment of a climate of discussion within the party--partial, awkward and more or less sincere reforms which would despite everything involve it in a process of moving away from the Soviet Union, involving it almost despite itself in a Eurocommunist approach.

"Bad luck" would have it that this move was paralleled in time by a spectacular recovery for the socialist party, while the dynamics of unity benefitted more from the modern and sincere "reformism" of the socialist party than from the stiff and ambiguous "reformism" of the communist party. The contradiction which was already visible at the conclusion of the June 1974 presidential election became fully obvious during the negotiations in the summer of 1977 about the updating of the joint program. The socialist party veto both of its institutional demands (not to the "republican monarchy") and its economic conditions (more nationalizations and more self-management by the rank and file) stripped it of the last "resources" it could have hoped to mobilize in order to control the direction of the future regime. Ill adapted to the presidential function, excluded from the key ministries, ignored within the great technocratic structures of the state, the party is very concretely faced with the scenario it fears the most: serving as the workers' guarantee in a simple social democratic handling of the crisis. This is the reason for the decision to abandon the union of the left. And it is as of this moment that another great disappointment for the PCF takes shape. The return to a strategy of isolation and insults toward the socialists (the thesis of the "swing to the right"), the purpose of which was not only to reestablish party unity on the classic foundations (allegiance to the Soviet Union, priority for the poor and the oppressed, exaltation of the revolutionary party), but above all to destroy the roots of socialist renewal and the various legitimacies it claimed--this frenetic isolationism turned against it again, nourishing a broad and enduring dispute within the party, and outside it, further strengthening the reformist credibility of the socialist party. The "perverse effects" of unity appeared in all their "hideousness" in May and June of 1981. Not only did the communist party suffer unprecedented electoral reverses, but a powerful and triumphant social democratic sector lurked within the state mechanisms conceived by General de Gaulle.

Thus not everything in this communist exegesis linking the retreat of the party with the culmination of a wrongful logic of unity with the socialist party at the summit is necessarily false--with the basic reservation that one cannot draw justification from such a modern development to explain the profound reasons for the communist decline. The seriousness of the failure of the joint strategy (the party's loss of stability in its traditional monopoly on the representation of the workers class) enabled the communist leaders to invert the responsibility issue and to blame rash "Eurocommunization" for a decline which was above all due to the continuation within the party of systems of thought, organization and action inherited from the Stalinist period.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

3. A Shift in the Stakes

The communist failure in June of 1981 was a sudden consolidation of the gradual shift of the stakes involved in the socialist-communist rivalry since the signing of the joint program:

Between 1972 and 1981, the primacy the PCF had enjoyed in the electoral field, which enabled it to appear to be the "first party of the left," slipped away from it, little by little;

In 1977 and in 1981, the disruption in the union of the left and the symbolic participation in the regime illustrated, on obviously different levels, the same incapacity to establish a dominant influence on the level of the centers of power; and

After the formation of the new government, the competition between the socialist party and the PCF developed in a final sector--political and ideological control of the workers class, the exercise of the "tribunical function."

Control of the Tribunical Function

The PCF today has only two "resources" capable of contributing to a resumption of its influence left--the solidity of its institutions, on the one hand, and the density of its popular roots, on the other. The second factor is moreover the preponderant one insofar that it is true that an organization which is not implanted in mass practice is in the medium time range doomed to schism. Now the triumph of the socialist party, if it shatters the mythology of the "party of the workers class," does not destroy the old exchange system linking the PCF with the "least favored strata" society and in part explaining its enduring prosperity from top to bottom.

On the one hand, it remains the only national party which has incorporated in its organic "genes" the messianic postulate of the primacy of the proletariat and which vigorously stimulates the advancement of cadres of worker origin on all levels of the organization.

On the other hand, it continues on a permanent basis to structure the demands and the expectations of major sectors of the workers class thanks to its dense and extensive network of "links" made up of the cells in enterprises and neighborhoods, the municipalities controlled by the party, the popular and family associations and the local sections of the CGT [General Confederation of Labor].

Finally, one should not regard the enduring similarity between the daily administration of the party and the opinions characteristic of the social strata they claim to represent as a minor matter. Support of national values, the cult of athletics and virility, a tendency toward "machismo" or racism (Vitry), an inflexible campaign against immorality and pornography--the party, except for temporary concessions to "fashion" ("we are the party of women's liberation"), carefully cultivates this "traditionalism" which is inherent in a certain popular ethos.

It is precisely this tribunicial singularity, the main if not the exclusive source of its spread, which is today becoming the nodal point in the competition between the communists and the socialists.

This is because, first of all, of "situational logic" almost impossible to change. The coexistence within a given field of a powerful social democratic party and a powerful communist party is not viable. The natural logic of the former leads to seeking among the popular strata the support needed to expand its social base and to justify its demands for reformist administration of the system. The profound logic of the latter leads to extension of its influence beyond the popular categories which it "staffs," with a view to supporting its proposed penetration of state powers. Both sectors seek to harvest the same ground. In France at present the socialist party cannot consolidate its position as a dominant party unless it succeeds in guaranteeing itself majority control of the workers class, and thus reducing the influence the communist party exercises over it through the CGT in significant fashion.

This is because, secondly, of "situational benefits" recently acquired by the socialist party. The lasting conquest of state power finally provides it with an opportunity to overcome its original handicaps and to correct its unfortunate lack of presence in the enterprises. It is now in fact well situated to mobilize a whole complex of "resources" (mastery of economic and social policy, initiative in structural reforms, launching of an "anticapitalist" discourse) which will allow it precisely to achieve from "above" what it has never been able to accomplish from "below"--imposing itself as the privileged translator of the demands of the productive workers, confiscating for its own exclusive benefit a "tribunicial function" of which it was constantly deprived in the past, whether it be by anarchosyndicalism at the beginning of this century or by the communism of a Leninist hue beginning in 1936.

There can be no doubt that the communist leaders are more than acutely aware of the major danger which threatens them. What in fact will remain of their old proletarian legitimacy if the dominant sectors of the workers class move toward the "reformist" parties and unions? What credibility would a party incapable of representing the workers effectively with the public authorities have with those voters? It is in order to block a process which in the end would lead to a marginal position of the Scandinavian type that the communist leaders are undertaking, within the difficult post-May 1981 context, to set up a system of backfires.

The System of Backfires

Safeguarding the tribunicial privileges of a party threatened by social democratic hegemony at all costs--that is the guideline making it possible to organize the sometimes disparate segments of the communist strategy.

First of all, it clarifies the seeming paradox inherent in the decision to participate in power. Is it not remarkable, in fact, that the PCF leadership renounced leftist unity in August 1977 with the justification that it would no longer control the anticapitalist dynamics of the experiment? And that in June of 1981, that same leadership engaged in feverish competition as a candidate for power when it no longer had any guarantee at all of controlling its direction? In truth, even a symbolic participation in the state regime was the only means available to the party for conjuring the mortal threat that public opinion in the workers sector

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

would identify the socialist state with change, social democracy with social reform. The participation of four communist ministers at least gives credibility to this idea that the party is also playing its part in the effort toward social renewal which Francois Mitterrand cannot set aside without reversing himself.

Furthermore, it explains the subtle dialectics of unity and autonomy which governs the relations between the PCF and the state regime. On the governmental and parliamentary levels the party manifests great loyalty, asserting its solidarity with the advances made and maintaining a cautious silence when it comes to the measures in contradiction with the communist program. On the tactical and propaganda level, on the other hand, the party engages in discrete but firm one-upmanship with a view to pointing out the temporarizing of the socialists and identifying the thresholds which must be crossed in order to move forward. The measures initiated by the socialist regime both in the realm of taxing capital and financing social security have also been the subject of "unfavorable commentaries" by the communist leaders. Finally, on the trade union and worker demand levels, the CGT does not hesitate to place itself in the vanguard of a number of battles and to radicalize certain demands. The existence of a government dominated by the socialists is not of a sort as to hinder its activity, unlike the period immediately after the war in which it represented strikes as the "weapon of the trusts" and urged the workers to "roll up their sleeves." In the final analysis, the harsh self-restraint which the communists impose upon themselves on the ministerial level in no way prevents them from seizing every opportunity to appear as the natural defenders of the poor and the oppressed.

This is not unrelated, finally, to this whole process of internal party consolidation underway since the electoral "trauma" of June. The very limited maneuvering room which the party has henceforth precludes any fantastic innovations in the organizational realm. As a result, the current leadership is very faithfully adhering to the organicist tradition inherited from the Thorez era, consistent with which the unflagging unity of all the party institutions rallying around the leading strata constitutes not only the key to future developments but also the prerequisite for political renaissance. The party has been adamant with regard to the critical movement with its nucleus within RENCONTRES COMMUNISTES and symbolized by the former federal secretary for the Paris region, Henri Fiszbin. It has taken care to isolate and exclude the opposition elements in the various CGT structures, so that this great central workers organization will remain the privileged spokesman for the party among the workers. Finally, during the Central Committee meeting held on 8 and 9 October, it noted the disappearance of "hundreds of enterprise cells" and decided to reactivate the party presence in the trade union and associational movement as a whole.

FOOTNOTES

1. Draft Resolution, L'HUMANITE, 13 October 1981.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

4. Concerning the limits of this relaxation, see our article "The PCF--A Return to Archaism," REVUE POLITIQUE ET PARLEMENTAIRE, December 1980.
5. This expression was "immortalized" by Georges Lavau, "Communism in France," CAHIERS OF THE SNSP, 1968.
6. It was the Central Committee which had the duty of stating at the 8 and 9 October 1981 session that "The founders of RENCONTRES COMMUNISTES are no longer members of the party."

COPYRIGHT: Presses Universitaires de France, 1982

5157

CSO: 3100/345

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

POLITICAL

FRANCE

KRASUCKI PURPOSE: REINFORCE CGT, WAGE PCF ATTACK

Paris LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR in French 6 Feb 82 pp 22-23

[Article by Franz-Olivier Giesbert & Claude-Francois Jullien: "The Krasucki Offensive"]

[Text] The PCF is seriously ill? Then it is up to the CGT to take over. And the future secretary general shrinks from nothing in order to restore combativeness to the old house.

Every day, the dispatches that fall onto the desk of Jean Auroux, minister of labor, announce new social conflicts: "Strike Hardens at Renault-Maubeuge," Occupation of Motta Ice Cream Factory in the Orne," "Customs-Officer conflict still at Impasse," etc. The 39-hour matter has thus, in a few days, set on fire the France of the factories--a matter that came just in time for the CGT.

A CGT man himself, Jean Auroux is not taken in by the game in the rue La Fayette central organization. Henri Krasucki, who suspects him of primary anti-CGT-ism, even asked Pierre Mauroy for Auroux's head one day. Like the experts of Matignon or elsewhere, the minister of labor has understood that the CGT is henceforth making use of the discontent in order to strengthen its positions. On Thursday, Krasucki again lit into him by name.

Is the CGT, for all that, in the process of going into dissent against the government? Not really. Not yet. For the time being, Henri Krasucki, a brooding threat to the new regime, is content to issue a lot of "warnings." When he writes to the prime minister, it is to tell him that the workers of Renault "have been deceived." One day, he vituperates "the leftist forces that want to manage the crisis." The next day, he lights into the "bad ordinance" on reduction of work time. Andre Sainjon, the young boss of the metallurgical workers of the CGT, throws the ball farther: "The government's decisions are too limited, indeed sometimes contrary to change."

It is obviously not by chance that it is a man like Henri Krasucki who is taking the reins of the No 1 workers' central organization today. It is being attacked on all fronts. Within itself, first of all, by its dissidents who are challenging the watchwords inspired directly by the PCF. Before the first round of the presidential election, the Confederation's anti-Mitterrand campaign had scandalized the partisans of unity. The support for the Warsaw putschists only aggravated the malaise. Federations and departmental unions are on the verge of going over to inter-

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

nal opposition: thus it is in Seine-Maritime, or in the Pays de la Loire. The future secretary general is trying to root out the movement by refusing, for example, to renew the bad CGT members' cards for 1982. This amounts to de-facto expulsion.

Locking Up the Machine

On the outside, things are going no better for the CGT leadership. In several occupational test-elections, it has lost points to the advantage of the CFDT, and sometimes, the FO [Workers Force]. Thus, the drop was 7 percent at the Brest naval yard and in the SNIAS [National Industrial Aerospace Co] of Toulouse, and 12 percent at Renault-Billancourt. According to certain internal estimates, the CGT lost between 10 and 20 percent of its members last year. The organization's finances are feeling the effect of this.

What can Krasucki do under these conditions? His mission is not to be agreeable but rather to keep the house in blind obedience. For this purpose, he would have to lock up the machine, of course, while at the same time making his organization the most combative on the front of the struggles. The future of communism in France is at stake. The leadership of the PCF is well aware of the fact that its party has been sick for a long time. Thus it is up to the CGT to take over, to "become the spearhead of the working class," as the hallowed expression puts it.

Georges Seguy, the trade-unionist of the PCF's political bureau, was naturally not the man for the situation. A good soul, he had long dreamed of a more open and more democratic union, encompassing more than 3 million members. Henri Krasucki, who is the party's man in the CGT, will for his part know how to take drastic measures. He has already begun to do so, for that matter--all the more easily in that he is the true boss of the central organization. At the last executive-committee meeting, Rene Buhl, the "unity critic," declared that he is ready to sign the leadership's motion. But on one condition: that it call for the freeing of the trade-unionists imprisoned in Poland. Seguy, who was chairing, seemed ready to accept this. He turned toward Krasucki--and the answer was no.

It was not entirely of his own volition that Seguy quits the leadership of the CGT. What is involved was, of course, an eviction. It was the friends of "Krasu" who spread the reports about the "health problems" of the secretary general in office. Georges Seguy, for his part, does not explain his departure in terms of any fatigue. To the leaders of the executive committee he explained last year, half-heartedly, that it was necessary to "make room for the young." Smiles in the ranks. Everyone in the trade union knows that Henri is 3 years older than Georges. In his reply that day, Krasucki declared that Seguy had definitely "really deserved to leave."

The two men have several points in common. For example, it was in the middle of their adolescent years that they went into the Resistance, before being deported. But they do not have the same style. Georges Seguy, ruddy and lively, readily serves whiskey on the rocks to his visitors. Krasucki, pale and austere, ruminates day and night through his files, which he knows like a book. "He is the best negotiator," says Yvon Chotard, the No 2 of the CNPF [National Council of French Employers].

Seguy and Krasucki are not on the same wavelength politically either. It is traditional in any communist organization, of course, for roles to be divided and for

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

the boss to appear to be an open person, at odds with the "hardliners." But this time, the legend was true: Seguy, who urged unity of action with the CFDT, was certainly less firm than his "right-hand man." He is one of those communists who are not very infatuated with the "Soviet model." At the congress of the World Trade-Union Federation in Prague in 1978, Seguy was often caught in a clearly bad mood in the corridors. "Someone read a message from Brezhnev," he laughed in a small, fiendly group; "Interesting. Why not a message from Bokassa?" A quip--but it says a lot. Later, he did not hesitate to meet with the Czech "charter 77" dissidents. This is the kind of "provocation" that Krasucki has never relished.

"Sounding the Alarm with a Sleigh-Bell"

"Krasu," for his part, remains an unconditional supporter of the October Revolution. He has not understood the PCF's critical phase vis-a-vis the Soviet model. In a recent book, "Synidcat et Unite" [Trade Union and Unity] (published by Editions Sociales), he warmly hails the "immense role" that the Eastern countries "are playing for the maintenance of peace, the support that they are giving to the workers' movement." When you talk to him about the Polish tragedy, he shrugs his shoulders: "Without the USSR, Poland would be nothing at all."

A "retro" communist is what Henri Krasucki is. More political than Georges Seguy, he has also failed to make a career in the party. Thorez took note of him in the 1950's. He was made a political-bureau alternate in 1964. And since he thrives on theory, he worked in the key sector of the intellectuals. But it was necessary to prepare for someone to take over from Benoit Frachon, the trade-union patriarch. At the time, it was inconceivable that a Polish immigrant, and a Jew to boot, could become the boss of the No 1 French central workers organization. But he was the ideal factotum to back up the exuberant Seguy. And so he became.

His headquarters is a "worker's life" center, full of souvenirs of his trips to the Eastern countries. He entrenches himself in it. The journalists of "the VO [Vie Ouvriere (Worker's Life)]" never see him up close--except in the cafeteria, where he often eats, apart, with members of the confederation bureau. He does not get into "the VO" because he shuttles between the headquarters of the CGT, in rue La Fayette, and that of the PCF, in place du Colonel-Fabien. Little by little, he has taken control of all sectors of the central organization: the confederation press, the federations, beginning with the biggest of them--metallurgy.

If this model apparatchik has been able to impose himself, it is doubtlessly also because of his innate sense of formula. He loves to be striking: "One cannot sound the alarm with a sleigh-bell." And he does not hesitate to speak gruffly. Last year, to explain his central organization's reception of that Walesa whom he spurns, he went so far as to say to the executive committee: "In France, Solidarity is us, the CGT."

The government, in any case, does not take lightly the fine formulas or great diatribes of "Krasu." The fact is that all of his words have been weighed. But there is no need to read between the lines to understand the real reasons for the Krasucki affair. The French Communists know that they will have to break with the Socialist group sooner or later if they want to exist. Since the PCF is paralyzed by the governmental solidarity, the future secretary general of the CGT gives himself the responsibility of preparing the ground, with reliable people. In carrying on

ICIAL USE ONLY

the battle for "profound change," he is taking account of the impatience of the working class and clamping down on the internal challenges. Three birds with one stone.

The 39-hour matter is a windfall. "The government," says Krasucki, "is finding a way to bring about a reduction of the work week under such conditions that the workers are discontent." That is because everyone is finding some advantage in it: The customs workers are angry: their supervisory authority has jumped at the opportunity of the 39-hour work week to cut down on the advantages they have already acquired. One officer or another could include his travel time in the 40-hour work week; but that is no longer the case with the 39-hour week. At Kodak, in Vincennes, the "continuous process" workers were working 38 hours a week. Henceforth they will work only 37, but the management is taking advantage of this to reduce their night-work allowances. Elsewhere, workers are feeling themselves robbed of the 5th week of paid holidays. An employee of the Galeries Lafayette who worked underground enjoyed 2 days of vacation time because of his seniority and 3 extra days for "fatigue." His bosses decided that the 5th week should cancel these small favors.

The CFDT is not at rest. After a meeting, described as "courteous," with Yvon Gattaz, the boss of the bosses, Edmond Maire denounced the "legalism" of certain company chiefs who strive to apply the law to the letter, all the better to betray its spirit. But for his part, he refuses to challenge the government in the matter of the 39-hour week: if anyone is guilty, it is the employers, and they alone.

Should one be afraid of Krasucki? His wheezy old machine should not be underestimated. The CGT still holds EDF [French Electric Power Company], the SNCF [French National Railroads] and the RATP [Independent Parisian Transport System]--a number of strategic points, in other words. In the nationalized sector, in which the trade unions are destined to exert more and more influence, it gets 53 percent of the votes, on the average. In the private sector, only 38 percent. But it is clear that the CGT hegemony is no longer what it was--far from it. "The future of our central organization is not very rosy," says Pierre Feuilly, 34, leader of the Socialist dissidents. "Its threats are only blusters."

Perhaps. But it would be risky not to take Krasucki seriously.

COPYRIGHT: 1982 "le Nouvel Observateur"

11267

CSO: 3100/374

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

POLITICAL

FRANCE

PSF DEPUTIES' FACTIONS, GEOGRAPHIC DISTRIBUTION SURVEYED

Paris POUVOIRS in French No 20, 1982 pp 55-66

[Article by David Hanley]

[Text] The parliamentary faction produced by the election comprises 269 deputies. An attempt will be made here to make a closer study of those elected on 14 and 21 June 1981 (thus we will not concern ourselves with the alternates for those elected who have become ministers. All this will perhaps change little as to the basic data, it may perhaps do so on the level of factions, since these alternates are not always of the same persuasion as these ministers). Despite these limitations, we have chosen to undertake² an analysis based on factions, for the analyses of the deputies published to date² have devoted little concern to this dimension of the PS [Socialist Party], which is however essential if we are to understand its internal functioning, and which confers upon this party a large part of its uniqueness. If everyone knows that the PS representation has more than doubled, and that its deputies are now and henceforth active more or less everywhere in France, with spectacular penetration in the east, west and center, and that the bulk of the new parliamentarians are men in their forties, wage earners in general in the intellectual professions in the broader sense (see the innumerable commentaries on the "professors' Republic), it appears that an analysis based on this key factor might possibly contribute some modifications to this very roughly sketched image, casting a little light in the process on the internal mechanisms of this party which now, as Harold Wilson puts it, appears to be "the natural party of the government."

The Factions⁴

The deputies have been classified on the basis of the motions they supported during the indicative vote for the Metz Congress in 1979, and we have not excluded any motions. For if category D reflects above all the existence of a serious crisis within the Bouches-du-Rhone federation, and if category F did not achieve the necessary five percent, both reflected a certain sensitivity. Of course, we have been unable to take into account the factional changes which have occurred in the meantime (this is the case for a certain number in the F category, in particular). It is also difficult to assess all of the nuances ("A certain individual voted for C but feels close links with A"--or the reverse). Tactical rallies, wherein a deputy approved one motion out of a sense of duty or concern for the future, are inevitably excluded as well. Thus our classifications reflect the Metz

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

choice in all its harsh reality, but perhaps this will give them a certain indicative value.

Table 1--PS Deputies by Faction, 1981

Faction	Absolute Number of 1981 Deputies	% of 1981 PS Group	% of 1978 PS Group	% of Metz Seats (1980)
A (Mitterrand)	129	48	52.8	40.1
B (Mauroy)	42	15.6	20.7	13.6
C (Rocard)	45	16.7	16	20.4
D (Defferre)	5	1.9	1.9	7.8
E (CERES [Center for Socialist Studies, Research and Educa- tion	36	13.4	6.6	14.4
F (Pierret)	11	4.1	1.9	3.2
Unclassifiable	1	0.4		
Total	269	100	100	99.5

In comparing the percentage of deputies elected by each faction with its score in the indicative vote for Metz, we see that the Mitterrand faction benefitted the most, with a gain of some eight percent. If the Mauroy faction also showed a little gain, one might perhaps see therein the effect of a certain presidential dynamics.⁵ The Rocard faction, in the minority at Metz, showed a loss, while the CERES faction succeeded for the first time in obtaining more or less the number of deputies it merits.⁶ One is also struck by the persistence of the category F differentiation (CERES dissidents, for the most part), despite the fact that this faction does not officially exist. This doubtless reflects not only the weight of certain strong personalities within their federation, but also real autonomy in the choice of candidates by the section members. Without a doubt Mitterrand was well aware of the persistence of the category F preference when he appointed Edmond Herve to his cabinet.

The Routes Followed

Within the parliamentary group, one can distinguish several directions.⁷ Let us take first of all the sudden "dropout" in the districts which, according to every expectation, should have come back into the PS fold. There do not appear to be too many such cases: we are thinking of the old battle comrades of the chief of state such as R. Dumas (Dordogne 1) or G. Halimi (Isere 4). In cases such as those of V. Neiertz (Seine-Saint-Denis 5) or A. Bellon (Alpes de Haute-Provence 2) are in all probability less a matter of reward for services rendered in the past than an investment in the future, with the obvious desire to put potential stars in place. All of these examples, it should be mentioned, fall within category A.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

In the old party bastions where a renewal is in progress, the "cursus" of the new group often seems to resemble that of its predecessor. For example in Ariege or Haute-Garonne, the new deputies are men of a certain age with experience in executing municipal or departmental responsibilities. Even when a younger man with a Paris degree takes over (J. P. Balligand in Aisne, or A. Rodet in Limoges) they have usually been well broken in previously in departmental life. If these comments are valid above all for categories A and B, it is nonetheless possible to say that the typical deputy has had extensive experience in municipal or county government dating back to 1977 at least, and has made himself a reputation as a capable and industrious administrator. Many of these deputies were candidates in the 1978 legislative elections, and they are now harvesting the fruits of their local labors and the effects of the change in opinion on the national level. This is valid for all of the factions taken together: the success of the likes of R. Carraz in Cote-d'Or or K. Haye in Gironde, both of them CERES mayors in working class suburbs, is indeed very similar to that of men with the most classic of profiles, such as Mitterrand supporter L. Robin in Ain or G. Bonnemaizon, of faction B, in Epinay.

Within this category of local elected officials, it is possible to distinguish various shadings. One can separate those who are truly native sons (for example in the CERES, M.-J. Sublet in Rhone, or G. Benedetti in Gard) from those who, despite their local popularity, remain both in terms of their roots and their professional activities Parisians, working from a distance. We are thinking of the likes of J.-M. Belorgey in Allier or C. Goux in Var. It seems to us that this phenomenon pertains above all to the Mitterrand faction.

There is also a certain polarity between the party and the locally elected officials. If at least 25 of the new deputies were the "federal leaders" in their department, and if the intraparty responsibilities are often interlinked with the mayors' mandates, there is another profile which seems to be less directed towards public life. This seems to us to be particularly true of the CERES, which has among its deputies a number of individuals without other electoral mandates (G. Toutain and J.-P. Planchou in Paris, J. Natiez in Nantes, A. Chepy in Marne). These members are committed to making of the PS a serious political tool, consistent with the CERES line, but in so doing, they have bypassed local mandates.

One can also distinguish a certain number of elected officials who, although not natives of their districts, settled there some years ago in order to establish (or revive) the party and their faction there. At present they are seeing their years of effort well rewarded, and one might note among them in particular such CERES figures as J.-P. Michel in Haute-Saone, J. Gatel in Orange or M. Suchod in Dordogne (the latter was, it is true, elected to office during a partial election at the end of 1980).

Refining the analysis of elected posts held by deputies according to faction somewhat, we see first of all that there are many deputies who do not seem to hold any office. That having been said, the percentage of local elected officials appears very high for category B, and very low for the CERES. Among the officials in category B, moreover, half serve as mayors or county original councilors--an indication of really remarkable local ties, and proof, if such be needed, of the

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

persistence of a type of municipal socialism which must indeed be associated with the SFIO [French Section of the Workers International]. The CERES obviously prefers a party with local responsibilities, since it is underrepresented in all the categories in Table 2. Faction A is strong in all categories, and the Rocard supporters are difficult to classify. There is a goodly number of deputies who hold no elective posts and relatively few who are both mayors and county councilors. On the other hand, there is a goodly number of county councilors pure and simple. Should we see therein a certain difficulty in gaining local power, or a more deliberate rejection of the responsibilities of multiple posts? The same question can be asked for those in category F, few though they be.

Geographic Distribution

The regional distribution of the deputies is also a rich source of information (see Map 1). Letting faction D aside as a purely regional phenomenon, we are struck by the extreme splintering of faction F (except perhaps in Vosges, where C. Pierret himself is an elected official). This suggests members holding solid local elected offices (B. Vennin in Saint-Etienne, J. Osselin in the Lille suburbs). In greater depth, this means that these deputies have had a certain autonomy in relation to the Paris CERES even before their affiliation with it, which enabled them to survive the breach in 1978-1979 better than was possible elsewhere. This was certainly the case for the two elected officials mentioned, since J. Osselin is a member of M. Wolf's group, and B. Vennin headed an important group of former PSU [Unified Socialist Party] members who joined the PS during the Socialist Assises (1974).

As to the CERES, it is harvesting the fruits of a decade of patient waiting and effort. In the "missionary territory" in the east and west, where the PS has finally broken through, it is in many cases the CERES which has headed the federation for a long time. If ever a national movement were to occur, this faction would profit from it. Now that this has happened, the CERES is electing officials in Marne, Haute-Marne, Moselle, Meurthe-et-Moselle, Haute-Saone and--most creditably--Haut-Rhin. The same observation could be made for Paris, long the pride of the faction, where there has been a gain of from one to seven deputies. If the triumphant CERES are often party cadres in the east, it is on the contrary local and departmental elected officials which carry it forward in the west, in particular in Loire-Atlantique and Ile-et-Vilaine. Elsewhere and above all to the south of the Loire, it is a matter of isolated successes (A. Lejeune in Gueret), often due also to previously established municipal influence. Generally speaking, the CERES fits in much more comfortably in the "new" federations in the east and the west. But it has left its mark more or less everywhere, and, by way of interesting evidence of the spread of its influence, there are at least 18 deputies in the other categories, including F, who were members of the CERES in the past.

The Rocard faction is strong in the west, particularly in Bretagne, where it benefits from a whole CDT and leftist Catholic tradition of which a certain PSU group has long been the embodiment. In the east, on the other hand, where it should a priori have advanced, it finds itself limited by the other factions, except in Moselle and Meurthe-et-Moselle. Without a doubt this reflects the influence of the likes of Y. Tondon and also the weight of a CDT rank and file, in many cases characterized by anticommunism. One can also find representation of the Rocard

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Table 2--PS Deputies by Elected Post in 1981

Position	FACTION										Total office holders	Total as a % of the PS Groups		
	A		B		C		D		E				F	
	(i)	(ii)	(i)	(ii)	(i)	(ii)	(i)	(ii)	(i)	(ii)	(i)	(ii)		
Town council member or deputy mayor	12	9.3	7	17	4	8.9			5	13.9	1	9.1	29	10.8
Mayor or equivalent	29	22.5	6	14.6	8	17.8			5	13.9	1	9.1	49	18.2
County council member	28	21.7	2	4.8	14	31.1	2	40	6	16.7	4	36.4	56	20.8
Mayor plus county or regional council member	31	24	21	50	4	8.9	2	40	4	11.1	2	18.2	64	23.8
Regional council member	2	1.6	1	2.4									3	1.1
Deputy mayor or municipal council member and county council member	2	1.6			2	4.4			2	5.5	1	9.1	7	2.6
No elected office	25	19.4	5	12.2	13	28.9	1	20	14	38.9	2	18.2	50	22.3
Total	129	100	42	100	45	100	5	100	36	100	11	100	268*	99.6*

Note: (i) = absolute number; (ii) = percentage of deputies in this faction.

* M. J. Beaufort (Finistere 6), since according to our information he was "unclassified," was not included in the faction estimates for this or other tables.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

faction all along the eastern frontier, ranging from Doubs to the Hautes-Alpes. Here again, it is a question of areas with a Catholic tradition in which the left wing has had difficulty progressing. In the Paris area, there are strong sectors in the west and south suburbs, that is to say in the relatively prosperous quarters: is it that the Rocard line is mainly attractive to "white collar groups?" Thus far, then, there is nothing very surprising where the modernist trend is concerned, but what is more surprising is the rather good representation, all in all, for the Rocard faction in the southwest, in the old SFIO federations such as Ariège, Tarn, Lot-et-Garonne. Should we interpret this as a sign of a temporary rally in connection with Metz or the dawning of a more profound renewal? Time alone will tell.

The category B deputies are recruited above all in Nord-Pas-de-Calais. They account for 15 out of 42, with four others in the neighboring departments. What we are seeing here is the whole legacy of a traditional municipal socialism. This is equally true for the area south of the Loire, where the deputies in category B, above all from Limousin, Puy-de-Dôme and the coastal departments. On the other hand, there are hardly any in the east or the west (except for Nantes). There is a whole socialist sensitivity which doubtless cannot be transferred to the new terrain. One cannot fail to stress the close links between the B category deputies and the mayors of the large cities, particularly since it is known that the motive forces of the B faction on the national level are none other than such deputies serving as mayors as A. Chenard, J.-M. Boucheron, M. Sainte-Marie, etc. (and, naturally, P. Mauroy).

Category A is found more or less everywhere, which gives it a certain strength which goes beyond the simple presidential phenomenon, or even the unconditional attitude where the former first secretary is concerned. If in Nord-Pas-de-Calais, it sometime harvests the fruits of a pro-Mollet line which P. Mauroy has not endorsed, it also shows real strength in Bretagne, so pro-Rocard by inclination. While it has been able to arouse party patriotism well rooted in the old leftist territories in the southwest, and its secularism is further echoed in the anti-clerical departments in the center (for example Allier, Saône-et-Loire), it is this faction too which predominates in the new departments won by the PS, often in brilliant fashion, in the heart of France, and above all along the Loire. Indre, Indre-et-Loire and Cher bear witness to this. A geographic treaty arranged with the CERES in Paris provides the Mitterrand supporters with three more seats in the northern part of the capital, since the CERES controls principally the sectors in the east. Here we see the reward for a number of years of patient but dedicated struggle to win the federation back for the CERES--a battle waged, as we know, by L. Jospin and B. Delanoë. In the suburbs, the Mitterrand faction is strong in the north and the east. The only corner of France where they are relatively weak is the east, and here again one must not forget either the two deputies elected from Meuse or the brilliant victory of J. Oehler in Strasbourg. Even in the alpine departments, a priori so unpromising, category A is very strong in Isère. The members of faction A will henceforth play a role in 68 of the 88 metropolitan departments in which there is PS representation, which gives them a substantial base for the future.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

The Classic Criteria--Occupation, Age and Sex

Within the factions, it seems difficult to establish differences very clearly within the large mass of those elected who come from the wage earning petit bourgeoisie, with that professorial preponderance which has so amazed the analysts. However, let us stress the fact that in category A, the liberal professions account for 15 percent, and in the CERES they account for more than 13 percent. If we take note of the weight of a certain "radical" tradition in the former, this rather high percentage is nonetheless somewhat surprising in the renewal trend. In categories B and C, as we can see, the liberal professions are substantially less well-represented. Where teachers are concerned, on the other hand, we see underrepresentation in the CERES in relation to the average for the group, offset by an excess of engineers and higher management cadres (since these two categories account for 39 percent of the CERES total). The base for the CERES group seems to be an alliance between technicians with practical knowledge and those with management expertise. There is a high percentage of teachers in the Rocard faction, on the other hand, with slightly fewer "Higher Technical Cadres" (only 22 percent). In category B, the seven percent figure for teachers bears witness to the continuity of a long republican tradition. But we should probably not give too much importance to these internal shadings in the group, for these are people all of whom have a certain cultural level. We can see that the two workers are distributed between categories A and C.

The Socialist Deputies

In terms of the age of the deputies, a glance at those newly elected¹⁰ shows hardly any significant differences (see Table 4), the great renewal being from every indication the achievement of those between 35 and 49 years of age. This is particularly true of the Rocard and Mitterrand factions, but category B seems to have more deputies in the age bracket above 50, which is quite consistent with the rather distinguished profile of the pro-Mauroy deputy mentioned above. If it is often suggested that the supporters of Rocard and the CERES are mainly younger than the supporters of other factions, this is only partially accurate, at least for the deputies, because categories A and E have a good proportion of men of a certain age. This phenomenon suggests that experience and local reputation may be assets as useful as ideological vigor or the level of militancy. Yet once again, the members of the Mitterrand faction seem rather typical of the average.

As to feminine representation, it must be said that equality remains in the future. If one deputy out of 14 is now a woman,¹¹ we can see that the factions differ rather substantially. If category A is again very typical, we note that there is only one woman in B and two in C (one of whom won an improbable victory in a suburb where the influence of the PS remains very limited). A disparity between word and deed, one might say. On the other hand, the CERES can hold its head relatively high, since one out of every six of its deputies is a woman. It is true that within the alternate mechanism it was possible to increase feminine representation, but this was done in a somewhat clandestine fashion, behind the backs of the members (in the voters) "who would not understand...." It is always the male star, a likely candidate to head a ministry, who has been put forward. Thus one can speak of an advance, but only a very small one, it seems to us.

Table 3--PS Deputies by Profession in 1981

Occupation	FACTION										Total in this occupation	Percentage of PS Deputies
	A	B	C	D	E	F	(i)	(ii)	(i)	(ii)		
Industrialists-- company managers	3	2.3	2	4.8							7	2.6
Tradesmen-- craftsmen	1	0.1									1	0.4
Farmers	15	11.6	2	4.8	2	4.4			2	5.5	21	7.8
Doctors	5	3.9	1	2.4	1	2.2			2	5.5	9	3.3
Lawyers												
Other liberal professions	1	0.8	1	2.4					1	2.8	3	1.1
Professors (higher education)	16	12.4	2	4.8	11	24.4			3	8.3	36	13.4
Teachers (secondary level)	42	32.6	18	42.9	14	31.1			8	22.2	84	31.2
Engineers	4	3.1	3	7.3	2	4.4			4	11.1	15	5.6
Higher Management Cadres	16	12.4	6	14.6	8	17.8			1	20	43	16
Journalists	4	3.1	2	4.4					1	2.8	9	3.3
Permanent Agents	6	4.7	1	2.4	1	2.2			2	18.2	8	3
Teachers	4	3.1	3	7.3	1	2.2			1	2.8	9	3.3
Technicians	1	0.8	1	2.4	1	2.2			1	2.8	4	1.5
Middle Management												
Cadres	2	1.6	2	4.8					2	5.5	6	2.2
Office employees	1	0.8			1	2.2			1	2.8	3	1.1
Blue collar workers	1	0.8									2	0.7
Officers												
"Pensioners"												
Other	3										3	1.1
No profession									1	9.1	1	0.4
Unknown	4	5.4									4	1.5
Total	125	100	42	100	45	100	5	100	36	100	268	99.6

Note: (i) = absolute number of deputies; (ii) = percentage of deputies in this faction.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Table 4--The PS Deputies by Age in 1961

Age group	FACTION												Total in age group	% of newly elected PS deputies
	A		B		C		D		E		F			
	(i)	(ii)	(i)	(ii)	(i)	(ii)	(i)	(ii)	(i)	(ii)	(i)	(ii)		
25-34	3	4	3	14	3	10			6	21	1	11	16	9
35-49	56	75	11	50	22	73	3	100	17	58	8	89	117	70
50-64	16	21	8	36	5	17			6	21			35	21
65 or older														
Total	75	100	22	100	30	100	3	100	29	100	9	100	168	100

Notes: (i) = absolute number of the newly elected deputies; (ii) = percentage of newly elected deputies in this faction.

This table covers only the newly elected deputies (including those replacing an outgoing PS deputy).

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

What can we conclude on completing this brief overview? Within category B, a certain SFIO trend still survives and is even spreading. Its profile of distinction should not be underestimated. The two renewal factions, modernist and Marxist, the Rocard and CERES groups, have indeed carried the party to new terrain, but on the level of political personnel there is less of a difference from the other factions than one would expect. The CERES for its part has a predelection for an orientation within the party rather than in public life. As to the supporters of F. Mitterrand, they remain--in terms of age as well as profession and geographic distribution--rather typical of the average for the socialist group. Could they then constitute a kind of lowest common denominator--those who, as has been said, detest Rocard and fear the CERES? Or would they be very simply typical of the mass of members and sympathizers, dedicated to bringing about pragmatic change in an atmosphere of calm and efficiency? A reexamination in five years, or after the next elections--and the party congress which will be held in the meantime--will perhaps give us the answer.

FOOTNOTES

1. This figure included 266 deputy officials installed by the PS (254 in metropolitan France, 1 in Reunion and 1 in Guadeloupe). We have seen fit to add to these the two "dissidents" J. Giovanelli (Morbihan 6, Rocard faction) and R. Patriat (Cote-d'Or 3, Mitterrand faction), as well as Gisele Halimi (Isere 4). All three are in our opinion a part of the rising socialist tide, despite some difficulties at present between their federation and the natural leadership of the PS. On the other hand, we have excluded 6 various leftists, too heterogeneous to be included in the framework of the analysis set forth here (these are Messrs Castor, Cesaire, Dabezies, Hory, Pen and Pidjot).
2. See for example Gilles Fabre-Rosane and Alain Guede, "The Bourbon Palace Swings Toward the Center," LE MATIN, 6 July, 1981, or the sociological analysis by Roland Cayrol in LE MONDE, "The June 1981 Legislative Elections," p 84.
3. For an excellent overview of the gains of the PS, see LE MONDE, op cit, pp 78-85.
4. We use this word rather than the better known but also more recent "trends." This latter term, less forceful, in our opinion ignores the elements of competition in many cases fierce, characteristic of these groups within the party, and which gives it much of its strength.
5. Curiously, the percentage of category A deputies in the group is slightly lower than that for the last legislature. The absolute number (up 74) is the important figure.
6. Prior to 14 June 1981, the CERES had only seven deputies. It had 14 percent of the seats at the Metz Congress, but only a quarter of those at Nantes.
7. The "dynastic" heritage situation (M. Masse took over his father's seat in Marseilles) appears unique in 1981, and doubtless has to do with the special conditions which make the socialist sector in Bouches-du-Rhone so rich.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

8. Our information is doubtless inadequate, because the majority of the elected officials must be municipal council members, at least. What is important here is that they have not chosen to make much of this responsibility (to the point that LE MONDE would mention it in its descriptions of the candidates, for example).
9. The other factions are represented in the departments as follows: B in 24, C in 32, E in 26 and F in 9.
10. We do not have sufficiently accurate data on the ages of the outgoing deputies to analyze the whole group, but we do not think this is likely to alter the value of this analysis much.
11. Prior to 14 June, the socialist group had two women (out of 106).

COPYRIGHT: Presses Universitaires de France, 1982

5157

CSO: 3100/346

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

POLITICAL

ITALY

DC'S PICCOLI ON PARTY CLASHES OVER EL SALVADOR

PM220943 Turin LA STAMPA in Italian 16 Feb 82 pp 1, 2

[Interview with DC Secretary Flaminio Piccoli in Rome by Luca Giurato: "Piccoli: They Are Asking for a Stocktaking? Right, It Must Be Done Immediately and Comprehensively"--date not given]

[Excerpt] Rome--[Question] You have always said that the stocktaking [of the government's record] should be carried out after the DC Congress in May. You now seem prepared for a rapid confrontation. Why?

[Answer] For the sake of truth, it should be said that everybody, even the prime minister, has been perplexed about the timing of the stocktaking. We are being accused of being responsible for the majority's difficulties, even in foreign policy, because we are not prepared to take stock. That suggestion is becoming a burden. Therefore let us say that we are not avoiding any discussion. It worries us that a majority could collapse on a foreign policy issue, with the risk of undermining an agreement [between government parties] which still strikes us as absolutely necessary. It is better to clarify the situation immediately rather than allowing it to deteriorate.

[Question] The government has been defeated in Parliament on articles of major legislation. The socialists have dissociated themselves from foreign policy lines. Can Spadolini still count on the five-party majority or not?

[Answer] I think so. He can certainly count on our desire to continue and to improve collaboration. We are aware of the difficulties but we think that this government has not completed its task. We are certain that a break would now be a defeat as regards steering the country out of the crisis, which we all want, and also a defeat in the sphere of the struggle against terrorism, which now requires unity of the democratic forces more than ever before. [answer ends]

As regards DC policy on El Salvador, Piccoli has some proposals which mark a significant step forward on the problem which is now plaguing his party most: "We agree with Spadolini on not sending government observers to the elections. However, we propose to entrust the job of monitoring the elections in El Salvador to the United Nations. The United Nations has significant impartiality and the strength to appoint a delegation which can express a clear and incontrovertible opinion. If that delegation decides that the elections are not honest then we will all have to accept its reply. And first of all we will have to accept it."

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

[Question] Many people are puzzled by the DC stance on El Salvador.

[Answer] In El Salvador an experiment is taking place under the guidance of Duarte, a man who was persecuted by the right in 1972. He is a democrat who, to break the spiral of the reactionary rightwing military, on the advice of political experts, joined forces with the democratic part of the army. We are on the eve of elections, which, with the reform, constitute Duarte's pledge. We--Piccoli explained--condemn all atrocities, whichever side they are committed by, particularly those committed by the army. However, we warn, and we realize this from our memory of history, that if this experiment fails (and at the present time there is clearly a concerted desire on the part of the communist parties and some socialist parties to define the elections as a "farce") and if these elections in El Salvador fail there will eventually be an intervention by an army which has entirely returned to the old colonialist, hegemonist and violent methods. We must remember that the United States is not prepared to tolerate another Cuba. Will it refuse to do so whatever the cost? We hope not, that would be regrettable, but U.S. policy has major and serious crude aspects.

[Question] Is there a change by the DC on this subject too?

[Answer] We just want to stress that anybody who hinders a final democratic attempt in a tense country, perhaps the tensest of all, opens up a future full of risks and dangers. We agree not to send a delegation of observers from our government. We are, however, now sending a party delegation which will inform us of how things are going.

[Question] The DC is isolated in that assessment. Does it realize that?

[Answer] Of course I realize it. Arousing popular feelings about things happening thousands of kilometers away from here is the easiest thing in the world. People have always painted one side all black and the other all white. We well remember the case of Vietnam, but we also remember that the invasion of Kampuchea has been forgotten or virtually ignored. Therefore I feel the strain of all this, even if I am convinced that the DC will not remain isolated. The Social Democrats have a different position--many aspects of the statement given by Spadolini on this subject were accurate, and even the liberals are very careful. In foreign policy the parties identify with their own respective positions and the way in which you react to that policy requires truth and consistency.

[Question] Do you fear a U.S. military intervention in El Salvador?

[Answer] I fear it if the hope that there is some possibility of a form of democracy in that country is destroyed. I fear it and I condemn it in advance. But I fear it. You have to be capable of political realism. If that intervention comes we will condemn it. We must also recognize that things have happened partly because an opportunity has been wasted to restore to a people like the Salvadoran people their capacity to express themselves in a free election. The danger lies precisely in this: To define these elections as a "farce" in advance strikes me as really arbitrary.

COPYRIGHT: 1982 Editrice LA STAMPA S.p.A.

CSO: 3104/127

POLITICAL

SPAIN

MANEUVERINGS FOR POSSIBLE UCD-AP COALITION DESCRIBED

Madrid CAMBIO 16 in Spanish 8 Feb 82 pp 26-30

[Article by Antxon Sarasqueta: "UCD, Going After Fraga"]

[Text] The winter sun of the Costa del Sol and the calm horizon of the Mediterranean were the setting for the Center's awakening against its political adversaries. The nightmare of the defections was behind them; the most important of which, after Francisco Fernandez Ordonez going over to the social democrats, was the departure of Miguel Herrero, a "wrecker" who had worked within the UCD [Democratic Center Union] on behalf of Fraga. "Now Fraga must be confronted with his inconsistencies," the secretary general of the UCD, Inigo Caverro, declared to CAMBIO 16, while his "noisy" counterpart in the AP [Popular Alliance] was trying to minimize the matter, calling it "water over the dam," and offering "impartial support" to President Leopoldo Calvo Sotelo.

They were turning their minds toward the subject of agreements in the new session of parliament, the last one before the general elections, which will focus on the new electoral law. At least three reports concerning this project are on the respective desks of three ministers, according to information obtained by this magazine.

"We will have to go to confrontation with Fraga." That was how the secretary general of the UCD, Inigo Caverro, summed up the state of mind of the centrist leadership, which is convinced that the leader of Popular Alliance is undermining the stability of the party in power and of the government itself in his far-reaching operations. That is not all: a certain colleague of President Leopoldo Calvo Sotelo even told this magazine, in a sharp tone and with a determined attitude, that "as long as I'm around, there will be no agreement with Fraga."

The fact is that Calvo Sotelo has considered the leader of the most conservative faction of the Right to be more an adversary than a possible ally. Or a dangerous ally, as Calvo Sotelo himself once pointed out in private, when referring to Fraga's behavior in some agreement in parliament.

The reasons for this are complicated, and convincing.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

An alliance with Fraga would kindle a tremendous controversy between the Right and Left, destroying the Center, which today holds power and which manifests it in its highest representative: Leopoldo Calvo Sotelo.

On the government level, the "big Right" would abort the whole process of consolidating democracy, which is now in the midst of developing its basic standard, the Constitution (because the most progressive sector of the UCD, represented by Adolfo Suarez, the social democrats and some liberals would certainly abandon the ship.)

It is clear that the political and social stability which was retrieved after a critical situation at the time of the unsuccessful coup of a year ago, has been based on the autonomy agreements between the government and the majority opposition party and the National Agreement on Employment (ANE) between the administration, the managerial CEOE [Spanish Confederation of Business Organizations] and the socialist and communist unions around the table.

On the other hand, those who are interested in the elections appear to be advising the current president of the government and of the UCD to stand up to Fraga's sector firmly, which would allow them to regain lost ground and pick up votes. That strategy would help the president--when you think of it--in getting hold of the ballots of that progressive center.

A distinguished government minister added, "Calvo Sotelo, besides having his hands on the reins of power, is an undeniable liberal-conservative, who in a close alliance with Fraga would gain hardly any new adherents, but instead would have many desertions from his following."

Fraga's Contradictions

Perhaps it was all this that made Cavero declare to this magazine, after admitting that up until now the UCD had not tangled with Fraga because they needed his votes--helping to create the myth which surrounds the Villalba politician--: "Now Fraga must be confronted with his contradictions."

A Fraga who, after being crushed by outside campaigns, his own errors, and the ballot boxes came back as the great leader of the conservative Right, while at the same time his greatest political foe, the then president Adolfo Suarez, was beginning his decline.

The duke of today was then a president who was beginning to become estranged from powerful forces (Church, Army, capital), and was being hounded by the most conservative sectors of his party and the socialists; while Fraga was beginning to receive strong support from some sectors of the economy, mainly from business.

The Fraga "fever" reached its peak with his spectacular triumph in the Galicia regional elections.

It was Fraga himself who, days before that campaign began, made his first warning to Calvo Sotelo in an interview with CAMBIO 16 at his Perbes seaside estate, implying suspicion that the head of the government would make a far-reaching agreement with the socialists. "Calvo Sotelo has more resources than anyone to contribute to the natural majority (UCD-AP), and we will not pardon him if he doesn't do it," said Fraga to representatives of this magazine.

Alliance leader added: "As soon as that great moderate movement is formed--the Democratic Right, or whatever we may want to call it--those problems (of instability) will decrease. Everyone understands that."

These statements are taking on importance today. In analyzing the "why" of these Center-Alliance tensions and the defection of the centrist deputies to the parliamentary group headed by Fraga, the president of the AP is seeking to secure his objectives by means of various coalition agreements with Calvo Sotelo.

"The Wrecker"

"We have to know which way we're going," Fraga's voice almost thundered, "it must not be like what happened in that famous incident in the history of Spain where Admiral Aznar said on that election night of 13 April that he was going to go and read the 'Rocambole,' 'let it turn out as God wills'...look: it's not going to be that way."

Days later, in his Corunna country house with the "Fraga Wines" warehouse and office that once belonged to the film producer Samuel Bronson, he was visited by Miguel Herrero de Minon, still spokesman of the centrist parliamentary group, the moving spirit and one of the leaders of the "Moderate Platform," whose purpose was to defeat the Suarez apparatus of the UCD and Francisco Fernandez Ordóñez' social democrats.

Actually, the close political ties of Miguel Herrero and Fraga had begun some time ago. They both had already studied the political situation and the prospects for the future during a parliamentary visit to Japan in the spring of 1981.

In spite of these contacts, and his statement at the end of May 1981 at a lunch with a group of journalists, that he favored a legislative agreement with the Democratic Coalition--hinting moreover that a coalition with the Fraga group would be easier than one with the PSOE [Spanish Socialist Workers Party]--Miguel Herrero, after setting up the "Moderate Platform," asserted on 29 July just before the summer recess that that operation had nothing to do with Fraga. However, the whole course of events during the crisis of changing the presidency of the UCD and the working out of the change of government had a very negative effect on Herrero de Minon's confidence in his party and its future.

"Miguel does not believe in the UCD, and was wrecking the party," concludes a colleague of the president of the Cortes, Landelino Lavilla, who is in close touch with the "rebel" centrist within the Christian democratic family.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Miguel Herrero believes that the new centrist leadership, headed by Calvo Sotelo, is "sacrificing" him as president of the parliamentary group, and in exchange is offering him the Ministry of Culture. Sources from the "Moderate Platform" who have worked together closely with Miguel Herrero assured this magazine that Calvo Sotelo did not persuade him at the time they offered him the post, because they did not give him guarantees of autonomy or clear objectives. Moreover, the government was not about to come to an agreement on a parliamentary majority with Fraga; rather, the social democrats who were loyal to the president would strengthen their positions in spite of the departure of Ordonez.

The dissatisfaction of Miguel Herrero and the other UCD parliamentarians began to blossom last December. Miguel Herrero made the decision to go over to the Fraga group. And this idea was communicated--despite his denials--to another of the "moderate" leaders, the christian democrat Oscar Alzaga.

Miguel Herrero has adopted an overly belligerent position favoring a policy of understanding with Fraga and a conservative slant, and he fears he will be dumped by the centrist leadership in view of the coming general elections.

Sources close to Inigo Cavero assured this magazine that Miguel Herrero had, in a last-ditch attempt, asked the secretary general of the UCD and President Calvo Sotelo for sufficient guarantee of appearing in a favorable spot on the electoral slate, which would assure him a seat.

Alzaga Stopped It

That account had been passed on to the members of the centrist executive secretariat, with the addition that the leadership was prepared to offer him certain guarantees in writing of keeping the seat. This letter, it appears, did not satisfy Miguel Herrero as a definitive guarantee.

Miguel Herrero's negotiations with the AP were already too far advanced by then. More delegates were going to follow him in defecting to the Democratic Coalition group, as Jorge Vestring himself, the secretary general of the AP explained. The list included Jose Manuel Otero Hovas, Jose Luis Meilan, and others with christian democratic leanings. Some of them, like those mentioned, emphatically denied that they had anything to do with the operation. In the end there were only three defections: Miguel Herrero, Francisco Soler and Ricardo de la Cierva. The one who first gave impetus to the "critical" sector, and later to the "Moderate Platform" which neutralized the main part of the maneuver, according to very reliable sources, was none other than his old companion in the operation.

"It was Oscar Alzaga who played a decisive role in controlling the blood-letting," said a high official in the Moncloa who had followed the course of events step by step.

Vestring confirmed this when CAMBIO 16 asked him why the changes that had been announced by him had not taken place: "Because it appears that pressure has been put on those people, and they have reconsidered their position."

Fraga's moderate statements on his return from his trip through Latin America, and the abrupt halt in the campaign of statements by his secretary general were steps which involved a conciliatory turn toward Calvo Sotelo.

Although Vestringe admits in his statements to this magazine that Fraga's hopes that he had last summer regarding Calvo Sotelo have not been fulfilled, he affirms that "there is still probably time to turn the situation around." After calling the defection of deputies "water over the dam," Vestringe stated that as the Andalusia election begins, CD [Democratic Coalition] will continue to offer its "impartial assistance" to Calvo Sotelo in solving problems of national interest. In parliamentary terms they explain it this way: "David isn't playing David anymore, but is being a friend of Goliath," recalling that as far as numbers go, there are 13 CD deputies as opposed to the approximately 150 in the UCD.

Thus the new 1982 session of the Cortes is beginning with a relationship between the forces "supportive of" the Calvo Sotelo government, despite the political and tactical differences within the groups of the party in power and of the opposition themselves.

Coalition deputies Jose Maria de Areilza and Antonio de Senillosa had been on the point of going over to the UCD. The temptation to do so was great at first, because of strong pressures from the centrists, but the element of "responsibility" won out over other interests, and both deputies refused to make a spectacle of themselves in parliamentary switchovers which would have been unedifying to the democratic faithful. One thing is clear: there is guaranteed support for the Calvo Sotelo government.

This does not come as a surprise, because, as Areilza himself admitted to this magazine, he--together with Senillosa and also Pio Cabanillas--was in on the operation of the center at its beginning, and ever since Calvo Sotelo assumed power he has been closer to the chief executive than to Fraga. His formal incorporation into the election operation which Calvo Sotelo will head is only a question of time and of method. Cervero believes that all the problems resulting from the changes in the parliamentary group are caused "by something which is very difficult to put before the public": the problem of appearing on the ballot with any chance of being elected in the coming elections. To reaffirm his theory, the secretary general wondered: "If this is not the case, why are the conflicts mostly arising in the parliamentary group, and not in the infrastructure of the party or in the government? Be that as it may, in view of the many upsetting events during the final stretch of the legislature which will usher in the general elections, it is certain that reform of the electoral law has become one of the key issues which both the government and the opposition unquestionably must face.

The PSOE and the AP are calling for it, considering it a top priority constitutional necessity. The government and the UCD say yes, but...there is not enough time. And what time does remain is unfavorable, because it is so near the elections. On this Calvo Sotelo and Inigo Cervero agree.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Cavero insists that there has been some talk on the highest level with the socialists about setting up--as a provisional formula--a mandatory ruling obliging the new government which emerges from the elections to introduce a law of this type for approval within a period of 6 months after appointment of the new executive.

The centrists, like the rest of the majority parties, including the leader of Popular Alliance, Manuel Fraga, are in favor of eliminating the present system of closed slates, replacing it with another using open slates, and even direct election by electoral district, so as to achieve a more direct deputy-voter relationship.

However, there is some initial fear being felt--especially by the centrist forces, which also hides their own fears--that the Spanish voters would be confused by a more open election system, and that it is better to wait a longer time before proceeding on this course. In the middle of this week sources from the socialist executive board denied to this magazine that there was any agreement with the government to determine the date for and the general provisions of the new electoral law, although they asserted that contacts and negotiations on this subject were impending and inevitable.

Calvo Sotelo admitted in Torremolinos that his government already had a plan concerning a new electoral law, and CAMBIO 16 later confirmed that at least three ministers have drawn up their respective reports on the law: political Vice President Rodolfo Martin Villa, Minister of the Interior Juan Jose Roson, and Minister of Justice Pio Cabanillas.

With important debates in parliament approaching, with such decisive votes coming up as those on the new regulations for the Cortes, the LOAPA [Organic Law for Harmonization of the Autonomies Process] LAU [Law for University Autonomy] et cetera, and at the very time when the trials of the coupists of 23 February are going on, political matters are getting into complicated entanglements which are very complex and difficult to predict. Although at this late stage the government has its majority guaranteed for reasons of stability, and is ruling out prospective general elections.

COPYRIGHT: 1982, Informacion y Revistas, S.A.

8131

CSO: 3110/80

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

POLITICAL

SPAIN

PSOE BIDES ITS TIME IN MIDST OF UCD DEFECTIONS

Madrid CAMBIO 16 in Spanish 1 Feb 82 p 24

[Article by Antxon Sarasqueta: "Election Maneuvers"]

[Text] With the uproar of the Andalusia and Catalonia regional congresses, the ruling party is again having to contend with the "defection syndrome". This attrition is being engineered from the ranks of Manuel Fraga's Alliance, and is furthered by the wide-open race for seats which the insecure deputies of the UCD [Democratic Center Union] have thrown themselves into.

The example of the social democrats, who followed former Minister Francisco Fernandez Ordonez in departing from the UCD, was recurring now on the Right, with the announcement of a string of defections by the most staunch conservatives, beginning with Herrero de Minon.

And, as if to prove that anything is still possible in the UCD, the centrist deputy from Almeria, Francisco Soler Valero, who was aligned with Fernandez Ordonez and the social democrats throughout almost the whole legislative session, was also negotiating his going over to the Democratic Coalition, on the condition that they guarantee him the seat and autonomy like that enjoyed by Antonio de Senillosa and Jose Maria de Areilza.

In the context of this surrealist comedy, where what is really at stake behind the scenes is the guarantee of a seat in the next legislature, it was still surprising that men like Jose Luis Meilan and Jose Manuel Otero Novas, who had stayed in the UCD as long as they held powerful positions (the presidency of a bank or the head of a ministry)--even if it was at the side of the Adolfo Suarez they reviled--should flee now that Leopoldo Calvo Sotelo occupies the Moncloa, just as Ricardo de la Cierva did previously.

These regrettable moves are only to be expected as the result of a party being created from power, and for it, and where the "sense of party" is unknown.

These destabilizing defections make us think about the possibility of future general elections, which the Calvo Sotelo government is opposed to, as is the main opposition party, which Felipe Gonzalez, secretary general of the PSOE [Spanish Socialist Workers Party], himself confirmed. The one who would

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

benefit most from any future elections produced by instability would be the Alliance man, Manuel Fraga. Both Felipe Gonzalez and Fraga are involved in weakening the Calvo Sotelo government in the context of the defections from the Center to the Left and Right; but the socialists see greater advantages in holding elections in a climate of stability, and there is not enough time to achieve this after the trials of the 23 February coupists. The reaffirmation of the autonomy agreements between the government and PSOE, which took place in the Moncloa at the highest level, tend toward achieving that stability until the end of the legislature.

Difficult Consensus

However, the fact that 1982 will be a year in which the parties and the government come face to face in a key election makes it unlikely that a line of general consensus will recur in the parliamentary session that begins in February.

The PSOE also needs time to reinforce its election front with a band of "independents," who come from the Center and from the renewers who are deserting the PCD. At the same time they are publicly distancing themselves from Santiago Carrillo's communists, despite the municipal agreements which formalized the unity of the Left on a national level. These initial breaking of these agreements in a place of such national importance as the capital of Spain and province, although in theory it came about for technical reasons, has helped to confirm the flight of the Carrillo followers.

Caught in the middle of the "sandwich" of Socialists and Alliance members, the government and the UCD were trying to establish their strategy regarding, first, the Andalusian elections slated for 23 May, and more importantly, the general elections.

Thus it was that Calvo Sotelo, after lashing out at the irresponsible deserters, was singing the praises of moderation and liberalism, and announcing his candidacy for leading the Center in the coming general elections.

In the UCD's "renewal from within" operation, the president of the Congress of Deputies, deputy from Jaen and leader with presidential aspirations, Landelino Lavilla, was under strong pressure this week to decide to try for the regional presidency of the Andalusia UCD before the name of Soledad Becerril came up.

"There come times in politics when a leader has to get down into the arena and be knocked over, and this is the role that Landelino has to play now in Andalusia," a minister who is politically close to the president of the Cortes told CAMBIO 16.

It was Marcelino Oreja who first played that role; and the next step, motivated by the "critics," was to put up Lavilla and the minister of education, Federico Mayor Zaragoza, for the presidency of the Catalonia centrists.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

"The spirit of defeatism which has spread throughout the UCD must be overcome," a close colleague of Calvo Sotelo told this magazine. He cited as an example the case of Marcelino Oreja, who heads an election platform in the Basque Country, with support that goes beyond the strict orbit of the UCD. Calvo Sotelo himself, and the new leaders of the UCD, intend to apply this alternative to the rest of Spain. In view of the low level of acceptance which UCD is encountering in society--according to polls which are being carried out, and which in the case of Andalusia have caused "alarm" on the highest levels of the party and the financial sectors which support it--the centrist leaders are looking for solutions which will allow greater diffusion and differentiation of that political force.

COPYRIGHT: 1982, Informacion y Revistas, S.A.

8131

CSO: 3110/80

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

MILITARY

FRANCE

DEFENSE BUDGET FOR 1982 STRESSES EMPLOYMENT, EQUIPMENT

Paris ARMEES D'AUJOURD'HUI in French Jan-Feb 82 pp 8-9

[Article: "The Defense Budget for 1982"]

[Text] The 1982 budget for defense and the armed forces--presented to the National Assembly on 14 November 1981 and to the Senate on 4 December 1981--totals Fr 122.855 billion, up 17.63 percent over the 1981 budget.

A Growing Budget

The 1982 defense budget totals Fr 122.855 billion, not counting pensions, which before 1977 were put into the common-charges budget. This is a 17.63-percent increase over the 1981 budget, which was Fr 104.443 billion.

Since the programming law of 19 June 1976, relative to military expenditures and armed-forces equipment for the years 1977 to 1982, could not be totally implemented during its term, the government has decided to give itself an additional year for fulfilling the objectives set. This budget will not be separated from the one for 1983. The dates of these two fiscal years will align with those of the interim plan. They will be followed by a military planning law extending over the 5 years from 1984 to 1988.

In 1982, the defense budget will represent 3.895 percent of the gross domestic product minus services (PIBM).

Percentage of PIBM Devoted to Defense

3.39	3.55	3.63	3.62	3.67	3.85	3.895
1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982

Priority to Expenditures Having an Impact on Employment

This budget favors those expenditures that have an immediate impact on employment, with the equipment expenditures at the top of the list. They are going up faster than the operating expenditures, so as to make it possible to:

- maintain the priority assigned to the nuclear forces;
- continue to equip the armed forces with modern materiel;
- bolster the research effort.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

The equipment expenditures represent Fr 56.302 billion, or 45.8 percent of the budget, which corresponds to an 18.16-percent increase in payment credits over 1981. The program authorizations increase only 12.5 percent, with the major programs provided for by the programming law coming to a conclusion.

Operating Expenditures (Title III)

The Title III operating expenditures come to Fr 66.553 billion, or 54.1 percent of the defense budget. They are up 17.18 percent over 1981.

The pay and social-charges credits, which represent 66.48 percent of Title III and 36 percent of the defense budget, are up 16.66 percent.

In addition to the pay increases, they make it possible to finance certain measures in favor of the military and civilian personnel--in particular:

- increasing the enlisted man's pay to Fr 11.5 per day;
- scaling of enlisted men's pay in order to encourage draftees to take on responsibilities;
- the awarding of a field-service bonus to draftees: set at Fr 6.5 per day;
- for draftees serving the in FFA [French Forces in the FRG], some advantages intended to compensate for the effects of service far from home: free travel on the FRG railways, an allowance intended to alleviate the disadvantages connected with variation of the deutsche mark;
- creation of 16,81 active-army jobs, in addition to the 1,000 jobs created by the rectifying finance law of July 1981.

These 1,681 jobs break down as follows:

- 900 jobs for active-army personnel, including 225 women for the Gendarmerie;
- 408 jobs for the Navy, for preparing for the outfitting of the public-services ships and the launching of the sixth missile-launching nuclear submarine in 1986;
- 3 jobs for active-army physicians, in the industrial-medicine category, for the establishments of the General Delegation for Armament;
- 200 jobs for workers, for the Air Force, to enable it to free up the personnel needed for reinforcing protection of the air bases;
- 112 jobs for nurse's aides and head nurses for the Medical Corps;
- 10 social-assistant jobs for the Gendarmerie;
- 48 jobs in miscellaneous services.

As regards the staffing, the budget provides for assignment of state-worker status to 11,589 "temporary" or unaffiliated workers and integration of 496 ORI (indirect-management workers) with the state-worker personnel.

Along with these creations of jobs, the budget also includes some measures for specific categories, such as the 50-percent upgrading of the patrol allowance given to the crews of the missile-launching nuclear submarines and the increase in the amount of the qualification bonuses granted to qualified-specialist officers.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

The credits devoted to armed-forces activity, impeded by the price rises for petroleum products, will make it possible:

- for the Army, to do 100 days of field exercises away from quarters, including 47 days with limited-potential (armored) materiel for the combat units and 30 days' field exercises for the command and service units;
- for the Air Force, to reach total annual activity on the order of 420,000 hours;
- for the Navy, to ensure to all combat vessels activity close to 100 sea days and 15 hours of flying time per month for each pilot of the Naval Air Force.

A variation of the dollar exchange rate and the price of crude oil--estimated at Fr 5.5 and \$43 per barrel, respectively--will more or less influence the quantities of fuel allocated.

Finally, the appropriations of credits for operating purposes and the everyday life of the armed forces are going up at a rate equivalent to that of the defense budget. They will make it possible to continue with the renovation of the barracks, particularly those of the French Forces in the FRG.

The Equipment Expenditures (Title V)

They total Fr 56.302 in payment credits (up 17.72 percent over 1981) and Fr 72.298 billion in program authorizations (up 12.5 percent). These credits will make it possible to:

- maintain the priority assigned to the nuclear forces--30.04 percent of the Title V payment credits are devoted to them, as well as 20.6 percent of the program authorizations. They will make it possible to continue with development of the M-4 missile so that it will be operational in 1985 on board the sixth SNLE [missile-launching nuclear submarine], the "Inflexible"; the equipping of the second Albion Plateau launching unit with S-3 missiles; and continuation of the adaptation of the medium-range air-to-ground missile (ASMP) to the Mirage IV;
- bolster our research effort, to which defense will devote Fr 19.571 billion, including 4 billion for basic research, which grows by 18.8 percent over 1981.

The principal research programs for the Army will involve the main combat vehicle to succeed the AMX-30, the antitank helicopter, and the engineers' armored vehicle.

The Air Force will concentrate its efforts on development of the Mirage 2000, the armament for it, the laser-guided bombing systems, and the M-88 engine project.

As for the Navy, it will continue with development of the SNA's [nuclear attack submarines], the antiaircraft and antisubmarine corvettes and their weapons systems.

- continue the equipping of the armed forces with modern materiel.

The Army will receive credits that will enable it to ensure continuation of the major ordering programs provided for by the programming law. Thus, 50 AMX-B2 tanks, 47 AMX-10P's, 2,400 wheeled tactical vehicles, 270 VAB's [Forward-Area Armored Vehicles], 30 AU-F1 155-mm cannons (with high rate of fire), 6 tractor-drawn 155-mm cannons, 21 Roland antiaircraft batteries, 18 SA 341/43 helicopters, Hot antitank firing stations, 120-mm mortars, and 43,000 Famas rifles will be ordered.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

In 1982 the Air Force will order 25 Mirage 2000's, which will be added to the 48 ordered previously; 30 Epsilon training planes; 10 light helicopters; and for protection of its bases, 56 20-mm antiaircraft batteries. At the same time, 28 concrete airplane shelters and 11 underground PC's [Command Posts] will be built with infrastructure credits.

For the Navy, the emphasis is on the credits devoted to the modern combat and public-service ships. Nine ships will be ordered: two antisubmarine corvettes, one nuclear attack submarine, two antimine ships, two patrol boats, and two 300-ton public-service ships.

The Gendarmerie, in conclusion, will be able to continue its program of replacement of automotive and armored vehicles, development of its communications, purchase of four light helicopters, and construction of housing for its personnel. Finally, subsidies are provided for to aid the self-financing effort of the local collectivities building Gendarmerie barracks.

COPYRIGHT: 1982 Revue des forces armees francaises "Armees d'Aujourd'hui"

11267
CSO: 3100/366

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

MILITARY

FRANCE

GENERAL DESCRIBES AIR REGION'S LOGISTICAL, DEFENSE FUNCTIONS

Paris ARMEES D'AUJOURD'HUI in French Jan-Feb 82 pp 30-33

[Interview with Lt Gen Jean Rajau, French Air Force, Commanding General, 3d Air Region, by editorial staff; date and place not specified]

[Text] [Question] General, you are the commander of an air region (RA). Can you briefly describe for us this territorial organization you head?

[Answer] Quite obviously I can knowingly discuss only the 3d RA, the air region with which I am very familiar.

First of all, its geographical aspect. The 3d RA covers 20 departments spread over four administrative regions, Aquitaine, Southern Pyrenees, Poitou-Charentes, and Limousin. Within this territory, the air force has 13 bases, including five major air bases (Bordeaux, Cazaux, Mont-de-Marsan, Toulouse, and Cognac), two technical training and school bases (Rochefort and Saintes), four service and supply bases (Limoges, Rocamadour, Merignac-Beausejour, and Toulouse-l'Hers, an administrative base), one communications base (Cenon), and one support base (Bordeaux Faucher). A total, therefore, of 13 bases plus some shared installations, air force information offices, and the air force detachment supporting the Airborne Troops School at Pau.

As for the region's personnel and their distribution throughout the various bases and stations, a distinction should be made between those troops organic to the 3d RA and the other air force troops belonging to such specialized major commands as the Air Defense Command (DA), the Strategic Air Force (FAS), or the Military Air Transport Command (COTAM).

The 3d RA "is" southwest France, a southwest remote from the enemy which in the past has traditionally come from the north or east. These historical reasons are what prompted the concentration in the southwest of schools (mechanics and pilots), depots, firing ranges, and test centers. The region does, of course, have some operational units, but they are less numerous than in the northern and eastern regions. These units consist mainly of Jaguar aircraft based at Merignac, strategic bombers based at Mont-de-Marsan, Cazaux, and Bordeaux, plus transport aircraft at Toulouse.

Air force personnel stationed in the region total approximately 21,000 men, 9,000 of whom are organic to the region. From a manpower standpoint, this places the air region on a par with a major command like, for example, the Air Defense Command.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

The region's 9,000 men include about 500 officers, 3,000 noncommissioned officers, a little more than 5,000 draftees, plus 500 civilians. I should point out that there is a sharply higher percentage of draftees in the air regions than in the major commands because the regional protection, security, and transportation tasks require a great deal of manpower.

[Question] What is the air region's role?

[Answer] I think the simplest way of explaining the RA's role is to proceed by subtracting from everything the air force must do to accomplish its mission. Broadly speaking, the air force has to train its air crews, it has to have aircraft available and armed, it has to protect its bases, it has to feed, transport, clothe, house, pay, and care for its personnel, it has to instruct them, supervise them, supply them with necessary equipment, etc.

Briefly stated, a specialized major command with troops stationed in the region strives essentially to bring its units to the highest possible level of operational readiness. This entails the assignment of personnel with highly specialized skills, mainly pilots, engineers, mechanics, and controllers. This entails supplying units with equipment (aircraft, radars, airborne weapons, etc.) and providing adequately for its effective maintenance.

So what then is the region's role? Well it is everything else, in other words, an exceptionally varied spectrum of tasks ranging from public relations to defense of bases, and including communications, social welfare services, antiaircraft artillery, transportation, food, pay, etc.

That is, in my opinion, the most convenient way of defining the region's primary mission. Yet the air region also has an important operational role in connection with missions that may properly be called national. By decentralization, the region has been delegated certain responsibilities of specialized major commands whose jurisdiction covers the entire national territory.

[Question] Can you describe some of the fields in which this decentralization applies?

[Answer] The first field in which there has been such delegation is air defense. The CAFDA (Air Command [component] of the Air Defense Forces) has, in fact, delegated considerable authority to the air region commander. To exercise this authority, the region commander has a general officer assigned to him as his deputy for operations. It might seem that this officer's dual command authority greatly complicates his task. In practice, however, such is not the case, because the division of responsibilities is accomplished very logically.

Given the speed of attacking aircraft and the operating range of fighter-interceptors, it is evident that air defense can only be broadly national in scope. All information on the air enemy is immediately relayed via data transmission facilities from one region to another, but major decisions on the overall defensive courses of action are made by a single unified command.

At the same time, however, numerous measures are taken at regional level. Specifically, the air defense of bases is a decentralized responsibility as concerns the alerting of units and the engagement control of Crotale [surface-to-air] missiles, antiaircraft

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

guns, and soon, very-short-range surface-to-air missiles. The Commanding General, Air Defense Command at Taverny is responsible for overall air defense operations and does not handle local situations. Consequently, while the division and interpenetration of all these responsibilities may seem complicated, they can, in actual fact, function flexibly and effectively.

Things work about the same way between regional airfield air traffic control centers and the large surveillance and control radars. Air traffic control involves particularly air restricted areas, such as controlled firing areas or airborne training drop zones. These matters have a regional aspect that must take into account a large number of local or national factors, such as the overlapping of airways, population centers overflown, low-altitude flight paths, etc. Hence it has been left to the air regions to settle these questions themselves or recommend solutions thereto.

Of course, at the national level, the DIRCAM (Military Air Traffic Directorate) approves, negotiates, and coordinates solutions with the civil authorities, test centers, adjacent countries, etc.

The same process is followed in the very diffused field of communications. This is a difficult entity to grasp and direct instantaneously at national level, and for this purpose we have a major command, the CTAA (Air Force Communications Command). As is the case for air defense, the region commander is assigned a colonel who "wears two hats," one as regional communications officer, the other as CTAA representative. Communications personnel have difficult and complicated schedules. They are often stationed in isolated locations and operate highly specialized equipment. A well-devised and thoroughly understood decentralization enables action to be taken efficiently and rapidly, thereby ensuring reliable operation of a service of prime importance to the air force.

In an altogether different connection, the region commander may be called upon to use the troops stationed within his territory--whether they be his own organic personnel or those of the specialized major commands--in providing general assistance to public authorities. He does this by order of his higher headquarters or with their approval. In the event of a major disaster, it is obvious that for the public good we will assign personnel and equipment from certain units: schools, tests centers, etc. to relief work.

[Question] Isn't there also some delegation of authority within the air region itself?

[Answer] Certainly, and in this respect I must mention the air base commanders. They are the fabric, the web, the framework of the air force, the structure on which everything rests. I have 13 base commanders under my command, 12 colonels and one general. They are my most valuable subordinates on which everything hinges. They receive orders from both me and the specialized major commands having units stationed on their bases. The air force's organizational structure gives them considerable authority. I ask them to keep me informed about everything that happens in their area and field of activity, and to report any measures they take or request measures to be taken by me. The air force has assigned its most brilliant officers to these command positions. If I had to venture a comparison, I would say it has placed them in the position of "the captain of a ship at sea." In my view, this is an excellent thing. It constitutes that decentralization desired by the air force.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

[Question] What is the region's mission in matters of Territorial Operational Defense (DOT)?

[Answer] In DOT matters, the air region participates in the overall defensive action taken by the armed forces. First of all, by defending the air bases, particularly air force key points, and then other points whose protection a plan has assigned as an air region responsibility. Naturally, the air region maintains close liaison with army units participating in the DOT mission. It also participates in frequent DOT regional exercises.

[Question] Can you tell us about the decentralization measures taken in a crisis situation?

[Answer] That's an important point. In fact, regulations provide that the region commander is delegated all powers of the central authority over the territory he commands whenever communications with that authority are interrupted. This delegation does not include employment of nuclear forces. It is a very broad delegation of powers, however, and the air region commander, in close cooperation with army and naval commanders of the same area, will form an integrated force capable of continuing combat operations under the authority of the defense area commander, in spite of the outage of communications with the central authorities.

[Question] Will you please discuss general military discipline?

[Answer] The air region is charged with enforcing the rules of military discipline with regard to all personnel stationed within its territory. It handles sanctions, that is to say penalties as well as rewards, commendations, and decorations.

The region has its own air police--nearly 200 men in the 3d RA--organized into air base detachments. Commanded by a field grade officer of the National Gendarmerie, the air police are responsible for air base security, the prevention of violations or the apprehension of violators which, fortunately, are very few in number. In this respect, we realize that, compared with the army which does not have its own police force, we are lucky indeed to have an air police organization which renders us such yeoman service.

The region also has a defense protection and security section which is active not only in the region's own units but also participates in providing security for defense industries.

[Question] And what about the rest, general?

[Answer] There is a great deal more. The region furnishes short-haul transportation service for the air bases, and long-haul transportation by rail, truck, occasionally by boat, of materiel for the depots or personnel and equipment transiting our region. The region also operates air force firing or gunnery ranges with all their attendant safety problems.

It also manages the air force's real estate. This is "big business" when you consider the surface areas and number of buildings involved. An air base frequently covers 300 to 400 hectares and has many buildings and other structures. The region buys and sells real estate according to detailed procedures and with the approval of Air Force Headquarters. Lastly, it builds facilities required by the air forces.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

All medical services are a regional responsibility. They are handled by the region's Director of Medical Services. Numerous physicians, approximately five or six per base, dentists, veterinarians, and pharmacists look after the good health of the troops and the high quality of their food. All medical personnel belong to the Armed Forces Central Medical Service Directorate but are directly attached for duty to the air regions. Furthermore, inasmuch as these physicians specialize in aviation medicine [flight surgeons], they also serve in regional organizations known as CEMPN's (Medical Evaluation Center for Flight Personnel) where they determine whether civilian and military flight personnel are fit for duty.

The air force must be present everywhere. Hence it has to participate in various ceremonies, celebrations, and festivals. This participation may include delegations, the regional air force band which has great public appeal, parades and demonstrations. The air force must project the most favorable image possible so as to entrench itself in the nation's mind. This is done through multiple contacts with local political, professional, and religious leaders.

Lastly, there is recruitment and public information. In this field too, the main activity is directed by a central agency, the SIRPA-AIR [Armed Forces Information and Public Relations Service-Air Section]. This section attends to the air forces distinctive public image, and as a corollary, to the quality of its recruitment. This is an effort of great importance to the region commander because it demands extensive regionalization and excellent insertion into the national fabric. Recruiting is a matter that takes a long while to produce a favorable outcome. It demands constant work and one has to work a long time before obtaining results. Yet when a reputation is established when trust sets in, it lasts a long while. We traditionally recruit in certain regions for variable reasons that need to be understood and have to be cultivated.

Concurrently with the recruitment of volunteers there is the induction of draftees. Every 2 months, some 1,000 airmen are inducted at various bases in the region. They are processed, given aptitude tests, classified, divided into groups and given 5 weeks of instruction. They are then assigned to units on the basis of air force requirements and their individual qualifications.

[Question] Moreover, general, there are the reserves and mobilization.

[Answer] Yes indeed, mobilization is a vital matter in the air force. If we want to double our personnel strength, which is our goal, we must have a very sound and sustained reserve policy. This is another of the region's tasks. We need well-trained, highly motivated personnel that can be assigned to positions very, very rapidly. Manning combat stations round-the-clock requires a great deal of manpower. It is not easy to watch and remain alert in a gun site so as to be prepared for an engagement that will last but a few seconds. The gunner and the gun crew have to be constantly on the lookout, sharp-eyed at all times, never relaxing their vigilance.

There are also the ground observer teams along our borders. This likewise is a manpower-consuming mission. Thus protection of our bases, our antiaircraft defenses, and our border ground observer organization can be effective only with numerous and competent personnel which only a well-trained reserve air force can furnish.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

And besides, above and beyond the matter of immediate effectiveness, there is the tremendous fellowship of those who have served in the air force, fellowship that is strikingly demonstrated at all meetings and conventions of our reservists. All those who have served in our air force have remained extremely loyal to us and are often our ambassadors to the general public.

[Question] Today, supersonic aircraft can fly over France in 20 minutes. Today, "telematics" permits immediate centralization of data on events, stocks, and other information scattered throughout the territory. Under these conditions, is there still justification for having an air region?

[Answer] At a time when everyone is talking about decentralizing, should we question the validity of one decentralization effort which in my opinion, because I am one of its principal operators, is a total success? I think it would be a big mistake. I consider this decentralization to be successful because Air Force Headquarters allows its region commanders who, in turn, allow their base commanders, freedom of action commensurate with the field of activity they have to cover. My higher headquarters assigns me specific missions coupled with appropriate guidelines. It also gives me the means to carry out these missions: means in the form of personnel: officers, noncommissioned officers, and pilots with different military occupational specialties; means also in the form of equipment, aircraft, radars, weapons, a variety of vehicles--300 to 400 per base--, all sorts of accessories and instrumentation, plus countless shelters. Lastly, it gives me money in the form of fuel for aircraft and motor vehicles, and in the form of funds with which to feed, clothe, house, and pay troops, build and maintain our installations.

But once the framework is established, once the means have been supplied, it allows me the broadest initiative in actually carrying out its orders. Of course, what I do is carefully reviewed, inspected, and monitored ex post facto. Yet who can take umbrage at that? The quid pro quo for the freedom given me must inevitably be an ultimate rigorous review of my actions. In like manner, I review what the air bases do, but without thereby interfering with the way my orders are being carried out. I have tests and inspections made to evaluate each base's operational, technical, and administrative capabilities.

In short, I do try to behave toward my air force troops the same way Air Force Headquarters acts toward me. In other words, I avoid any meddlesome centralism and endeavor to make the best possible use of each individual's abilities.

Admittedly modern aircraft do fly extremely fast. We must, therefore, be fully cognizant of what is happening within a radius of 300-400 kilometers around us because we have very little reaction time. We must also be informed of what is happening near each "air" key point and these two interests are not compatible.

Telematics is, of course, a valuable tool. For personnel administration, the region has an inquiry station, i.e. data terminal equipment for inquiry into the air force's personnel data processing center. Regional stock control and movement of spare parts are handled by telematics. The region also receives air defense data by telematics and can take appropriate preparatory measures. Above all, however, there are the physical realities of men and equipment, realities that can truly be perceived only at the local level. An air region is a coherent unit to which present means of communication provide ready access. All installations in the region are within easy travel distance. No base is more than an hour away from my headquarters. Whenever a major problem develops, as soon as a base commander calls me and I have to determine

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

personally what must be done, I can be on site very quickly and give him important help by immediately ordering resources brought in from other installations. Then there is the life style, the geographical context, the military mission, all of which vary from one air region to another.

Hence the air region, with its mission or "calling" often dictated by history, with the style and temperament of the people assigned to it, is a coherent geographical and military unit. Within the flexible and trustful style developed by the air force in its chain of command, the air region concept is fully justifiable. Our decentralization is a success. We must be very careful not to change it in any way.

COPYRIGHT: 1982 Revue des forces armees francaises "Armees d'Aujourd'hui"

8041

CSO: 3100/370

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

MILITARY

FRANCE

AIR REGION'S ROLE IN AIR DEFENSE OPERATIONS DESCRIBED

Pairs ARMEES D'AUJOURD'HUI in French Jan-Feb 82 pp 34-35

[Article by Lt Col Michel Garrelis, French Air Force: "One Quarter of Blue Sky"]

[Text] Supervision and coordination of air defense operations and declaration of an air defense emergency demand centralized information. This is the mission of the Headquarters, Air Defense Command (DA) in Taverny north of Paris. But the French Air Force has chosen to decentralize at air region (RA) level responsibility for directing the air battle and managing air defense resources.

Pursuant to instructions issued in June 1970 by Air Force Headquarters, the Commanding General, Air Defense Command and the Commanding General, CAFDA (Air Command [Component] of the Air Defense Forces) have delegated to each air region commander the responsibility for operational readiness of flight units and control and reporting units stationed within each RA's territory, and likewise for control and coordination of Military Operational Traffic (COM) within each RA's area of jurisdiction. In addition, an RA commander's authority covers all military air traffic matters, whether it be traffic around the airfields (regional responsibility) or flights conducted under the control of air defense radar stations.

Moreover, an RA commander must ensure that these air defense units receive the logistic support needed to maintain their operational readiness.

Lastly, he is responsible for the training, control, operational readiness, and employment of the region's surface-to-air weapons defense units.

To enable each air region commander to discharge his assigned duties, metropolitan France is divided into four air defense areas (ZAD) whose boundaries were designed to correspond as closely as possible to boundaries of the [four] air regions. Each ZAD is commanded by a general officer who also serves as the air region commander's deputy for operations.

Each air region has a special staff section, the air defense section (DVDA). The DVDA is usually headed by a field-grade air force officer. For routine matters, it is under the operations division of the air region general staff, but on many matters it reports directly to the region's deputy for operations who is also the Commanding General, ZAD. The DVDA actually serves the latter as a sort of standing working group.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

The DVDA is generally organized into four branches whose titles clearly indicate their functions: control branch (handles radar stations), air traffic branch, surface-to-air weapons branch, and field exercises and maneuvers branch.

The chief of the DVDA is directly responsible for matters relating to the fighter wings.

The Commanding General, DA and the Commanding General, CAFDA issue operation plans and orders to RA commanders, as well as directives covering the employment of air defense units stationed within their area of responsibility.

RA commanders have these plans, orders, and directives executed by their deputy for operations, the Commanding General, ZAD, who is also chairman of the Joint Regional Military Air Traffic Committee: coordination of the activities of units responsible to the Ministry of Defense: DGA (General Directorate for Armament), Naval Aviation, ALAT (Army Light Aviation), and the Air Force. The ZAD commander is also co-chairman of the CRG (Regional Management Committee), a civilian-military body responsible for airspace organization and management at regional level.

From the foregoing remarks we can define the duties and functions of the RA deputy for operations and Commanding General, ZAD in peacetime and wartime.

Peacetime

In maintaining units operationally ready, the ZAD commander's main task is to ensure that instruction and training is conducted in compliance with standing instructional and training procedures (CPI) established by CAFDA.

In performing this task, the ZAD commander personally conducts frequent inspections or has them made by DVDA officers. He also periodically holds meetings with all unit commanders. He is authorized to take at his level all necessary measures to remedy deficiencies or correct mistakes, while reporting such deficiencies, mistakes, and corrective measures to CAFDA.

The ZAD commander appoints officers from the DVDA to assist CAFDA teams conducting operational readiness tests. He participates in these evaluations in the manner prescribed by standing field exercise procedures published by CAFDA.

He issues special orders for air defense exercises applicable solely to his area of responsibility, whether the exercise or maneuver is organized by CAFDA or the ZAD.

Pursuant to specific CAFDA orders and instructions, he participates at his level in the execution of the following tasks: military operational air traffic control, rescue operations, and providing minimum civil air traffic control service as required when so ordered by the government.

Lastly, he gives special attention to flight safety problems in combat units as well as control units. In this connection, all incidents are thoroughly investigated and analyzed, and all possible immediate-action measures are taken to improve equipment or procedures.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

The Commanding General, ZAD exercises authority over:

- a. Flight units (fighter wings);
- b. Surface-to-air (gun and missile) units;
- c. Control units and stations: control and reporting Centers (CDC), military coordination detachments (DMC), etc;
- d. Units of the other services (army or navy) when attached to his command.

To assist him in discharging his responsibilities, the air region commander's deputy for operations and ZAD commander has:

- a. A DVDA (described above);
- b. An area operations center (COZ) whose functions in the operational chain of command lies between the air defense control center at Taverny and the ZDA units;
- c. An air defense control center located with the COZ and activated and manned by DVDA personnel during exercises and maneuvers, in periods of crisis, and in wartime.

The ZAD commander also ensures that all logistic support measures are taken as required for effective performance of air defense missions.

Wartime

Pursuant to general orders and special directives issued by CAFDA, the ZAD commander conducts air defense operations within his area. In so doing, he directs the air defense battle and controls all air traffic.


The scope of the duties and functions of the commanding general of an air region and his deputy for operations, the ZAD commander, and the diversity of the forces under their command, are indicative of the importance of the air defense role assigned to each air region.

The volume of airspace allotted to each region and the presence of necessary logistic support facilities within its territory thus give the Air Defense Command a suitable, flexible, and efficient organizational structure.

AIR DEFENSE

<u>Echelon</u>	<u>Normal Chain of Command</u>	<u>Operational Chain of Command</u>
Air Force Hq	CG, CAFDA	High Air Defense Authority at air defense control center
Air Region	CG, ZAD	Area air controller
Air Base (fighters)	CO, Fighter Wing	Flight operations officer Fighter aircraft
Air Base (radars)	CO, Control and Reporting Center	Chief Controller Control consoles

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY



Author

Lieutenant Colonel Michel Garrelis, the author of the above article, entered the Air Force Academy in 1956. After graduation, he served as an air defense controller in different air force radar stations. After having commanded the control and reporting center at Cinq-Mars-la-Pile, he served on the 2d Air Region staff. He is currently assistant officer-in-charge of the Northern Air Defense Area's operations center.

COPYRIGHT: 1982 Revue des forces armees francaises "Armees d'aujourd'hui."

8041

CSO: 3100/369

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

MILITARY

FRANCE

TERRAIN-FOLLOWING RADAR TESTED FOR MIRAGE 2000N PROGRAM

Paris AIR ET COSMOS in French 13 Feb 82 p 17

[Article: "Tests of Antilope 5 Radar on Vautour Aircraft"]

[Text] The Flight Test Center (CEV) has begun testing the flight control system that will enable the Mirage 2000N--penetration version--to fly at extremely low level while avoiding terrain obstacles.

This system is based on the Antilope 5 radar developed jointly by Serge Dassault Electronics and Thomson-CSF. This terrain-following radar is designed to enable the aircraft to automatically follow the terrain at minimum safe altitude. Hence the requirement to obtain a good image of the terrain, analyze it, determine therefrom--consistent with the aircraft's dynamics--the ideal flight path, and generate flight path control signals to be transmitted to control surfaces via the aircraft's autopilot. This entire sequence obviously has to be performed in real time, thus requiring use of high-speed, high-capacity computers.

For its current tests of this system, the CEV is using the Vautour No 358, a utility twin-jet aircraft designed for the Mirage 2000N's Antilope radar development tests. Last year, this aircraft was modified at the Clermont-Ferrand Aeronautical Industrial Plant to permit installation of the entire terrain-following component of the Mirage 2000N navigation system. A very complete set of measuring instruments was also mounted in the Vautour. Lastly, the entirely new forward part of the fuselage was fitted with a cylindro-conical section ("detachable collar"), thus giving the Vautour's fuselage the shape of the forward nose section of the Mirage 2000N and providing space for the conditioning unit needed to cool the radar.

Evaluation of the Mirage 2000N's very low-altitude flight control system recently began at the Istres Flight Simulation Center. The system generates the radar image of the terrain, image on which flight control commands are based. In addition, a micro-video camera relays to the pilot inside the Mirage 2000N simulator cockpit the picture it obtains by "flying over" a terrain model board, the flight path flown by the micro-camera being similar to the one generated by the simulator.

Clermont Ferrand Aeronautical Industrial Plant

Since 1976, this facility has completed modifications and adaptations for the Mirage 2000N program on the following aircraft used as test beds: Mirage 3B No 202 for

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

autopilot tests; Vautour No 377 for tests of the RDM [Doppler multifunction] radar; Vautour No 307 for tests of the RDI [Doppler] radar and the mount for the Matra Super 530 missile; Mystere 20 No 79 for RDI radar tests; Mystere 3B No 235 for tests of the air data computer and the inertial platform; and Mystere 20 No 124 for tests of the electronic countermeasures system.

COPYRIGHT: A & C 1982.

8041

CSO: 3100/371

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

MILITARY

UNITED KINGDOM

HOME GUARD, EXPANDED TERRITORIAL ARMY ADVOCATED

PMO41513 London THE TIMES in English 4 Mar 82 p 1

[Report by Henry Stanhope: "Home Guard Is Revived: Forces To Train Teenagers"]

[Text] The government is to create a new home guard to protect some of Britain's more vital parts from crack Russian troops in wartime. A pilot scheme will start in four areas of the country next September.

Details were disclosed yesterday by Mr John Nott, secretary of state for defence, who also announced expansion plans for the territorial army, including 12 new TA centres, and an adventure training scheme that will be run for young people by the Ministry of Defence.

The new reserve, foreshadowed last year in THE TIMES, will be called the Home Service Force (HSF) and, if the pilot scheme is successful, will include about 4,500 volunteers.

The army is looking for people aged between 18 and 59 who will probably have to assemble for four or five weekends a year. Because the training periods will be few it is hoping to attract former servicemen, regulars or reserves, or policemen, who would already know something about "drill and teamwork."

Ideally the army would like young men in their twenties who might not be able to spare the time for the territorials. They will be paid and will wear a khaki uniform, but the details have yet to be decided.

A senior officer said last night: "We have not yet decided what weapons they will carry, but they will have something better than pitchforks."

The need for such a force was decided on after a survey which listed about 1,000 key points, such as telephone exchanges, power stations, electrical transmitters, or even railway stations, that would need to be guarded in wartime.

The threat comes from the large Soviet special purpose forces, many of whose troops would be expected to be deployed against Britain in a future war. They could be parachuted into Britain or landed by ship, charged with the task of sabotaging communications and power supplies.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

The new force would free regular and reserve troops for more mobile defence work. Sources said last night that the cost of the pilot scheme would be "peanuts."

The four pilot companies, each of which will have 95 members, will be centered on Perth, Birmingham, Bury St Edmunds, and on Reading, Portsmouth and Maidenhead in the south-east. They will use TA centres and facilities.

The TA expansion comes in the wake of last year's announcement of a phased increase in its strength from 70,000 to 86,000. Some units will be allowed to recruit above their establishments and the number of training days is being raised to 42.

New units will include the equivalent to two royal engineer regiments and one extra company for the Royal Irish Rangers, the 51st Highland Volunteers, and the Royal Regiment of Wales. The emphasis will be on home defence.

In some areas TA centres will be improved and new ones will be built at Bangor (Northern Ireland), Bedford, Sutton Coldfield, Telford, York, Colby, Newham, (South Teeside), Walsall, Colchester, Bath, Widnes, Aintree and Alnwich.

The adventure training scheme will provide outdoor courses of two or three weeks for young people with the services, starting next month. They will be available for up to 7,000 teenagers aged between 16 and 18 who can start applying to their local service career and information offices from March 29. The scheme will cost 1.5 m pounds, funded from the defence budget.

The ARY scheme will be run from Fort George in Scotland under Lieutenant-Colonel John Blashford-Snell; the navy will take boys to HMS Raleigh, the junior training establishment at Plymouth; and the RAF will organize its contribution at Cosford in the West Midlands and at Catterick, North Yorkshire.

Ministry of Defence officials said yesterday: "It is not backdoor conscription. We are not looking for recruits."

It will not be exclusively for the unemployed; priority will be given to applicants from cadet forces. Travelling expenses, food, and accommodation will be free.

The courses will offer training "outward bound" style under the care of some of the services' best instructors.

COPYRIGHT: Times Newspapers Limited, 1982

CSO: 3120/47

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

MILITARY

UNITED KINGDOM

NOTT'S ANNOUNCEMENT ON RESERVISTS WELCOME, BUT NOT ENOUGH

PM051413 London THE TIMES in English 5 Mar 82 p 13

[Editorial: "Swords and Ploughshares"]

[Text] Mr John Nott's announcement about increasing the reservists and providing adventure training for a few thousand unemployed youngsters is to be welcomed, as far as it goes; but it does not go very far. Last June he said that the government was determined to give greater emphasis to the reserve forces, and this has now resulted in an increase of 16,000 men in the territorial army. No increase, however small, should be decried, but Mr Nott has failed to go to the heart of the question of reserve military power, and he should try again.

Britain's strategic defence policy is based on the principle of nuclear deterrence. However, since the abolition of conscription, all governments have found it convenient to hide behind that policy we need, on the ground that the only danger we face is of a total breakdown of deterrence rather than a partial one. Hence we only need a nuclear bomb, with a small number of volunteer armed forces, backed up by even fewer reservists.

This goes against the whole principle of reserve power, which should be based on the view that--in peacetime, or relative peacetime such as we have--one's standing force should only be allowed to contract if the reserve forces correspondingly expand. In that way the nation preserves machinery for military expansion to meet a whole range of future emergencies, not just the too-narrowly defined contingency of a breakdown in nuclear deterrence. The bankruptcy of this policy was fully apparent only a few years ago when the strain of law enforcement in Northern Ireland virtually incapacitated the army for any other purpose, in spite of its continuing pretence to meet NATO and global commitments.

Mr Nott's new reservists, therefore, will provide some temporary palliative to the regular army. But, if even Northern Ireland can incapacitate us, any future emergency will reveal much more starkly how gravely the chiefs of staff have neglected their duty to provide Britain with appropriate machinery for expansion of the services to meet unexpected emergencies.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

The proposal for adventure training is also an attractive one, but incomplete. Mr Nott said that the very low numbers leaving the armed services, and the consequential reduction in recruitment, had produced some spare capacity in the training establishments of all three services. That training capacity should not be frittered away providing canoe trips and such like. It is the seed corn of the country's future military potential. But it is more than this, since military trade training improves the quality of those who pass through the machine in a social as well as a military sense. Social and military qualities are not necessarily incompatible. There is more to military training now than learning to [word indistinct]. There is more to it even than gunnery, tactics or fieldcraft. It is noticeable that four out of every five recruits enlist because they wish to learn a trade which would be valuable to them later as civilians.

The national value of this training machine is thus not only that it trains servicemen with technical skills. Most of those skills are as relevant to industry, as they are to the military. There is much exchange of information and experience between service training establishments and their counterparts in industry, particularly in junior management and trade training. When the economy picks up we will again need more skilled manpower than exists. We should harness the military training machine to this future industrial and economic requirement, by using its spare capacity now to turn out young men and women trained in modern techniques. In peacetime there is always pressure to turn swords into ploughshares. But we should not forget the service training machine's ability to turn out swordsmen who are ploughmen too; and the better for it.

COPYRIGHT: Times Newspapers Limited, 1982

CSO: 3120/47

END