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21 May 1982

Sub-Saharan Africa Report

FOUO No. 773

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SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA REPORT

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INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS

STUDENT UNREST REPORTED THROUGHOUT AFRICA

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 24 Feb 82 pp 16-18

[Article by Jean-Louis Buchet under the heading "Politics and Economics: In Africa and In the World": "Students in Opposition to Governments"; investigation by Sylviane Kamara, Mohamed Selhami and Francois Soudan]

[Text] Universities are astir almost everywhere in Africa. Do governments have reason to be worried?

"Abidjan--On 10 February the Political Bureau of the PDCI [Democratic Party of the Ivory Coast] decided on the immediate closing of the university and university-level professional schools in the capital, the vacating of all university residence halls and housing, and the suspension of student grants. The day before, a number of students had been arrested following a demonstration..."

"Rabat--On 11 and 12 February the science faculty observed a 48-hour strike. Students are protesting against the ban on the activity of the union of the UNEM [National Union of Moroccan Students]; three of the five members of the UNEM executive committee are in prison."

"Kinshasa--On Sunday, 31 January, the university and the National Teacher-Training Institute were closed until further notice by government order ratified by the chief of state. On 25 January students had begun a strike to support their demands."

"Libreville--On 11 December (1981) the campus was cleared out by the police force. The students and certain professors on strike were calling for the release of the recently arrested rector."

These are a few jumbled recent press agency dispatches. Others could be found. At any rate these are sufficient to give a picture of an academic year which at the start of 1982 looks troubled almost everywhere in Africa. There is no need to look for a hidden hand behind this outbreak, if it is indeed an outbreak. Remember 1968, famous for May in France, and also May in Senegal; a few months earlier the fever had taken hold of the universities in Berkeley (USA) and West Berlin. The universities in a number of Latin American countries were to follow, particularly in Mexico, where things were to turn out very badly.

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In the West at that time students wanted to "change the quality of life." In the Third World they had not yet reached that stage. But, going beyond the most assuredly different demands and concerns of both the one and the other groups of 1968 protesters--rich and poor, more privileged and less privileged--all evidenced the unrest of young people who were suffocating.

Is that the situation today in Africa? Surveys among students, university by university, could easily show that. But the unrest does not always emerge into open protest. If a half dozen African campuses are occupied or in turmoil at the same time, that is also in part a matter of chance. For the moment there does not seem to be more than a series of specific outbursts whose coming together is creating a stir. Hence, this is not a concerted movement, all the less so because there is no protest beacon to be found in it as there was in 1968 with the Parisian students.

Furthermore, although such a simultaneity of occurrences has rarely been observed, university disturbances are a constant element of the current African scene. As far as the last few years are concerned, let us recall the repeated brawls between fundamentalists and leftists in Tunis in 1979 and 1980, and, in Algeria, the Berber movement in Tizi-Ouzou and then the confrontations between Arabizers and "Frenchifiers" in Algiers in 1980 and 1981. In Cairo, in January 1980, clashes brought religious types into conflict with modernists. At the same time, Senegalese high school and college students were demonstrating; police intervention resulted in one death and several injuries.

That same year Malian college students and younger pupils went on strike because of a student grant issue and demanded the reestablishment of their association. In January and February 1981, Malagasy students protested against the reform introduced by President Ratsiraka's government. In Antananarivo, violently suppressed demonstrations ended in two deaths and dozens of injuries.

Each university has its own troubles, as this impressive series shows. Having said that, the diversity of the situations does not prevent one from grouping them into three broad categories. First, in the Arab world there is the appearance of a fundamentalist movement which, to be sure, is not peculiar to universities, and which intends to impose itself on factions which are dying out: the left, modernists, and so on. In this case internal confrontation overrides the struggle for power. Perhaps that latter struggle will be the order of the day if the "religious types" gain the upper hand.

Elsewhere, and for the most part, university grumbling is over matters of administration [prend une allure corporatiste], demands revolving mainly around material issues (lodging and working conditions, scholarships), studies guidance or the autonomy of student organizations. Since the authorities generally respond to this with repression, the slogans could of course take a more political turn afterward.

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Finally, in two of the most recent cases it seems that aspirations for more freedom played a main role. That is the way it was in December 1981 in Libreville where it all started with a demonstration hostile to President Bongo and the way it is in Abidjan these days. It is true that in Gabon as in Ivory Coast, the students are more fortunate than elsewhere in Africa, since they have modern buildings, ample financing and comfortable residences.

On the other hand, what does not change from one capital to another is the cycle: demands--demonstration--repression--strike--police occupation of university faculties. To the extent possible, governments do a great deal for their students, the future elite of their countries. But they distrust them. As soon as students have any intention of concerning themselves with their interests or, what is worse, with the country's affairs, instead of being content to study like good boys and girls, the stick appears.

Since farmers are kept out of the picture, and salaried workers are satisfied to be salaried, students, a favored lot receiving higher education, are feared all the more since they are almost the only ones who can think politics through. Of course this is not to the liking of the supporters of single parties. Students are capable of questioning the established order, and because they have knowledge they are able to propose solutions other than those which are being put into practice.

Let us not forget that in Latin America during the 1960's the universities provided massive numbers to the guerrillas. That stage has not been reached in Africa, but African governments would rather take precautions. So these idealists of today, who will be the technocrats of tomorrow, are isolated, and are occasionally reminded that they are better off than the majority of the population (anything to make students not very popular) and they are flatteringly soothed when possible, and the billy clubs are brought out for the slightest cause.

It is also true that while the involvement and participation of African students in political fighting has never been comparable to that of their Latin American colleagues, they have sometimes played an important role on that level. Remember May 1972 in Madagascar: The large demonstrations which started out from the university were decisive in the fall of Tsiranana's admittedly shaky regime. But the Malagasy students did not come to power; their victory was seized by the military.

Likewise, the French protesters 4 years earlier were quickly passed over. Nowhere in today's world, in fact, have students come into power. They are a protest force, and indeed a proposal-making force, but they cannot aspire to control--and for good reason. They can, on the other hand, be used by the government as a political base and a means of action. This has been seen in Mao's China and somewhat in Cuba. It is seen today even in Africa, in Rawlings' Ghana.

It is students who in fact make up the bulk of the shock brigades sent by Jerry Rawlings into the country's interior to repair roads and bring cocoa to Accra. Small mobile groups of them numbering 100 to 200 crisscross the

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country with their field rations (supplied by Libya). Furthermore, Rawlings' circle of intimates is made up of young professors and students, more often than not "Nkrumah-ists." Their influence is great: They are demanding a radical purge and reject any negotiations with the IMF. They are organized within a powerful association, the NUGS (National Union of Ghanaian Students), and they control in particular the Ghanaian people's tribunals.

Ghana is going through an extraordinary evolution and Rawlings' Red Guards remain the exception. They are far from foreshadowing the future of African students. Quite the contrary, what seems today to characterize African universities which date from when their countries became independent is their depoliticization. Let us be clearly understood: Students still for obvious reasons constitute one of the few social categories capable of reasoning in political terms. But they do not get together within political organizations any more as they did in the past. There were a great number of Marxist-Leninists in Dakar between 1968 and 1974. Today some of them are in the PS [Socialist Party] or the PDS [Senegalese Democratic Party]; most of them are in Cheikh Anta Diop's RND [Democratic National Rally]. But their successors have not picked up the torch; they are not very politicized and have mostly materialist [corporatiste] demands.

While there are still organized leftwing groups in Morocco they represent a minority. And the UNEM of 1982 is nothing like the UNEM in its heyday, when it was a force that mattered.

It must also be pointed out that African universities have reached new dimensions: 50,000 students in Morocco, 15,000 in Ivory Coast, 10,000 in Gabon, and so on. These dimensions are not yet comparable to those in Europe or Latin America but are no longer the small circles of former times. Added to the effect of numbers is the force of the economic slump which results in governments being less concerned about their students, on the one hand, and in the fact that a number of those students are going to become unemployed, on the other hand. This new phenomenon in Africa, which makes the situation of African universities more like that of those in the West, is a basic factor in current student crises.

The (new) concern over the future is clearly discernible in Abidjan. It will be so elsewhere, and to an increasing extent. This allows one to say that the restlessness of universities in Africa will, far from abating, probably be growing.

African universities are in some ways beginning a second stage of life in which the fairly great number of students' material concerns will predominate. So is there anything for governments in office to fear? No, not for the time being. But if student demands are not met, a new radicalization could start up. After all, student unrest reveals the broader unrest of an entire society. And if that society is frozen...

One begins to feel this, moreover. And if Ivorians and Gabonese are calling for more freedom it is not accidental. They can allow themselves to do so

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inasmuch as their countries are rich--relatively speaking--on an African scale. That is also the reason why changes are expected, and not only by students.

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INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS

AFRICA'S NEW HOME-GROWN JOURNALISTS

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 13 Jan 82 pp 66-67

[Article by Momar Kebe Ndiaye: "The New Bards--African Journalists Torn Between the Desire for Objectivity and the Required Allegiance to Authority"]

[Text] In African dailies, the activities of the head of state appear on page one day-in day-out, unless the space is given to those involving other government officials. A minor rally led by a minister is covered in great detail. Official government communiques are reprinted in their entirety and without comment. Wire service dispatches are either simply reproduced or dealt with as if they were intended for a European or American audience. News which touches close to home (shortages of consumer goods, increases in the cost of living, unemployment, health problems...) is tucked away in the back pages. The same holds true for radio and television.

There is, however, no shortage of journalists in Black Africa. They are now being trained as fast as possible, like administrative clerks. On December 12 in Dakar, CESTI (Center for the Study of Information Sciences and Techniques) placed at the disposal of the African media 34 new journalists--19 for the print media, 8 for radio, and 7 for television. Since 1972, 234 "modern-day bards" have graduated from this institution, bringing to nearly 500 the number of journalists trained for West Africa by CESTI and for Central Africa by ESIJY (International Higher School of Journalism of Yaounde). Why then do the news services provide such poor service to the public?

The former British colonies were the first black African countries to show an interest in training journalists "on the spot." It was a question of demanding the "made in Africa" label. As early as 1957, the Journalism Institute of Accra was founded. Two years later, the African Literature Center of Kitwe (Zambia) organized regional journalism courses. At the end of the Biafran War (1970), Jackson College of Journalism, which had opened in Nigeria in 1961, became the Communications Institute of the University of Lagos. Today, it trains more than 60 journalists each year. From 1963 to 1968, introductory courses in the techniques of journalism were given in Nairobi for the English-speaking countries of eastern and central Africa, and in Lagos for those of western Africa. These two experiments

resulted in the creation of the Journalism School of the University of Nairobi (1970) and the Nigerian Journalism Institute (1971).

The fever hit French-speaking Africa at the very end of the 1960's, when training possibilities were extremely limited. It marked the end of sending journalists to American and European (French, West German and Soviet) schools. Since 1970, one produces and consumes African: CESTI students come mostly from the seven countries of western Africa, while those at ESIJY are from the six countries of central Africa. The two schools, whose formation, operation, and programs are nearly identical, also have common goals: "The training of multipurpose journalists and development agents capable of answering the needs of the media and the expectations of public opinion." The bet is far from being won. Today, although provided with 20 journalism institutes, Africa still lacks appropriate training means. Teaching is too academic and tries to adapt foreign theories and models above all else. Yet, the role of the media in Africa is not the same as in the developed countries; they address themselves to a limited public because of illiteracy and the isolation of certain rural areas.

Even a journalist leaves the African schools with certain professional reflexes, he remains handicapped by a general lack of education. The School of Journalism and Communications of the University of Ghana is the only institution in Black Africa to offer training resulting in a doctorate (third cycle). In creating their own journalism schools, the African countries wanted to adapt training to the sociocultural context and make journalists the advocates of political power. Once they are members of the profession, journalists are torn between the demands of objectivity and the servitude of complying with existing authorities. That type of journalism can lead to everything... provided one cooperates with the government.

Table 1. Number of Journalists Trained Between 1970 and 1981

By Country

<u>CESTI</u>		<u>ESIJY</u>	
Benin	29	Cameroon	130
Ivory Coast	53	Central African Republic	13
Gabon	2	Gabon	24
Upper Volta	24	Rwanda	3
Mali	44	Chad	33
Morocco	1	Togo	42
Mauritania	6		
Niger	9		
Senegal	66		

By Specialty

<u>CESTI</u>		<u>ESIJY</u>	
Print media	133	Print media	107
Radio	28	Radio	76
Television	73	Television	40

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CHAD

GOUKOUNI-KAMOUGUE SPLIT, FAN TAKES TOWN

AB191536 London REUTER in English 1446 GMT 19 Apr 82

[By Abacar Aswvo]

[Text] Ndjamea, 19 Apr (REUTER)--Chad's interior minister has said the government will never negotiate with the rebels who now control over half the country, but an envoy sent by France spoke of a deep split between the president and vice-president.

Interior Minister Mahamat Abba told Ndjamea traders yesterday that President Goukouni's provisional government "will never agree to negotiate with the enemy...we want peace, but not at any price."

Mr Abba, who is close to the Chad leader, said the rebels, led by former Defence Minister Hissene Habre, "are backed by a lobby made up of African countries, behind which hides international imperialism to dictate our policies to us." He did not identify the countries.

French President Francois Mitterrand's African adviser, Guy Penne, who met President Goukouni here twice over the weekend, said he discussed what appeared from Paris as differences between the provisional government's various members.

The government split became public last week when President Goukouni's FROLINAT, one of the provisional government's 10 rival armed factions, accused Vice-President Abdel Kader Kamougue of wanting to negotiate with the rebels.

Colonel Kamougue, from the predominantly Christian south, replied that FROLINAT was attempting to foment trouble in the south. At a meeting in the northern city of Benouy he said: FROLINAT has pledged to square accounts with the south."

The vice-president, who has previously called for a ceasefire, told the meeting that Habre's forces now held the central town of Mao, hitherto believed to have remained under government control.

He also quoted Hissene Habre as having said his troops would be in Ndjamea within a month.

"Everybody is sick and tired of the war, and I shall work for peace," Colonel Kamougue added.

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Speaking to reporters before returning to Paris, Mr Penne said he discussed with President Goukouni the role of the African peacekeeping force comprising 3,800 troops from Nigeria, Senegal and Zaire in Chad since November last year.

According to informed sources, several African heads of state will meet in Lagos later this week to discuss the financing of the force, which the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) cannot meet for lack of funds.

So far the force has been financed by aid from France, the United States and Gabon, they said, adding that it was costing some eight million dollars a month.

According to unofficial reports, some contingents are not receiving their pay because of the force's financial crisis.

Meeting last February in Nairobi, the OAU called on President Goukouni to begin peace talks with the rebels to end the war. It threatened to withdraw the force by the end of June if no progress was made.

Military sources said the peacekeeping force was the only buffer protecting Ndjamena from attack by the rebels.

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EQUATORIAL GUINEA

LEADER PROMISES NEW CONSTITUTION

AB191724 London REUTER in French 1557 GMT 19 Apr 82

[Text] Geneva, 19 Apr (REUTER)--Equatorial Guinea head of state Obiang Nguema Mbasogo stated in Geneva on Monday that his government will promulgate a new constitution as promised by next summer. The constitution will provide for free elections.

President Obiang Nguema Mbasogo, who was addressing a conference sponsored by the United Nations and aimed at raising funds for his country, told newsmen that the new constitution would be promulgated by 3 August, the third anniversary day of his accession to power after ousting Francisco Macias N'guema.

After being promulgated, the constitution will be submitted to a referendum followed by elections. No timetable was announced.

The Malabo government, he said, has decreed general amnesty and hopes for the return of all Equatorial Guineans who went in exile during the previous dictatorship, in order to participate in the reconstruction.

He denied allegations made by the National Alliance for Democratic Restoration --an opposition movement--in a communique issued in Geneva charging the present government with suppressing the opposition and detaining 340 opposition members.

Some 20 countries have so far promised financial assistance. UN estimates report that \$141 million will be necessary for the reconstruction of the economy disrupted by long years of dictatorship.

The traditional cash crop of this former Spanish colony, which became independent in 1968, is cocoa which used to earn the country up to 80 percent of its foreign currency.

The sales of the commodity have gone down from 40,000 tons in 1969 to 4,000 tons only 10 years later.

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GABON

STATISTICS RELATING TO 1981 BUDGET SET FORTH

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1893 19 Feb 82 p 567

[Article: "The 1982 Budget in Its Economic Context"]

[TExt] In our 18 December 1981 issue, p 3375, we gave a general outline of the Gabonese budget for 1982 which amounts to CFA 453.5 billion. In a recent study devoted to this budget, and one which very probably uses official Gabonese statistics, the newspaper L'UNION of Libreville placed the budget in its economic context. The newspaper gave the following "provisional" figures for 1981 in Gabon:

Consumption rose by a total of 15.2 percent from CFA 361 billion in 1980 to CFA 416 billion in 1981, with a more sustained rate in the public sector (+25.3 percent) than in the private (+11.1 percent).

Investments progressed strongly to reach close to CFA 303 billion, or a 43 percent increase compared to 1980. They are distributed as follows: CFA 166 billion (of +35 percent compared to 1980) for private investment and CFA 136.6 billion for public investment, the net amount of subsidies, loans and capital interests. The proportion of productive investment to total investments improved by 57 percent in 1981 versus 54 percent in 1980.

The foreign trade balance dropped by 18 percent, from CFA 227.4 billion in 1980 to CFA 185.9 billion in 1981. This drop is principally explained by imports of goods (+24 percent) and purchases of services (42 percent).

The main economic indicators showed sustained activity in 1981, since prices and salaries remained stable to all intents and purposes with a slight improvement in the level of employment. The number of job offers increased appreciably.

These different trends confirm the consolidation of a recovery which started in 1980 but in an unbalanced manner since it primarily affects the petroleum sector. This amelioration made it possible for the Gross National Product (GNP) to improve by close to 12 percent, from 831.5 billion in 1980 to 928 billion in 1981. On the other hand, one could see the real timidity of the recovery in other sectors, including public works and buildings.

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In the monetary field, "the Gabonese economic situation was characterized by unmistakable and quite distinct signs of improvement" writes L'UNION, which states that credit to the economy has gone from CFA 125.9 billion to 153.7 billion, or an improvement of 27 percent. Likewise, one sees an improvement of the situation of the Treasury with regard to the Central Bank: credit to the state decreased from CFA 38.4 billion in December 1980 to 29.4 billion in December 1981.

The restoration of Gabonese foreign credits accelerated, reaching CFA 48.5 billion in June 1981 against 26 billion in December 1980. "On the other hand, the development of long-term savings remained a dismal point. It was impeded by considerations of repayment, since the quasi-money/credit marginal rates fluctuated too greatly," our fellow journal emphasized.

Public finances continued their recovery in an appreciable manner, thanks to the desire to maintain State expenditures within the limits planned in the budget, but also because of the unforeseen improvement in state petroleum receipts (CFA +12.3 billion), the result of appreciation of the exchange rate of the dollar.

The outstanding public debt was further reduced in comparison with 1980; however the burden of servicing the debt is still high, since it represented 36.3 percent of state expenditures in 1981 against 38.3 percent in 1980.

The balance of payments, which showed a deficit of close to CFA 45 billion in 1977, has begun to show a surplus again since 1979, with a maximum of CFA +20.3 billion reached in 1980. In 1981 the anticipated balance was +16.3 billion; however, one should stress one point of uneasiness: the permanent deficit in the balance of short-term capital, which seeks better prospects of repayment outside Gabon.

Budgetary Choices

From this point of view, the increase in the general budget in 1982 compared to the initial 1981 budget (the appropriations bill) is 12 percent; it improves more slowly if the budget is considered to have been effectively implemented in 1981, the fiscal year having ended at CFA 427.1 billion.

Receipts should increase by 12 percent in 1982 compared to 1981, thanks especially to receipts from petroleum (+16.2 percent).

Because of the uncertain nature of Gabon's medium-term petroleum receipts, the 1982 appropriations bill was paired with a series of provisions, respect of which, their originators stress, is basic to balancing the budget. The bill covers personnel expenditures (manner of recruitment, nomination and promotion) and common expenses (housing for officials, administrative leases, mission expenses, discontinued residential charges for water, electricity and telephone).

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Table. Gabonese Budget (In Billions CFA)

	1981		1982
	Planned	Realized	Planned
Receipts			
Totals	404.5	427.1	453.5
Petroleum	258.0	270.0	283.0
Nonpetroleum	131.5	138.9	152.8
Loans	15.0	18.2	17.7
Expenditures			
Total	404.5	427.1	453.5
Investment	135.0	137.5	182.8
Operation	134.8	134.4	150.7
Public debt	134.7	155.2	120.0

As far as investment expenses in 1982 are concerned, their exceptionally high level (CFA 183 billion including 24 billion carried over) should be emphasized and particularly the improvement in their sectorial orientation:

The productive sectors are receiving more than 20 percent of resources against 13 percent in 1980 and 19 percent in 1981. Of these, the share of agriculture is improving (+8 percent), as well as the amount of investment in water and electricity supplies which increases by 9 percent.

The infrastructures are consuming close to half of investment expenditures--43 percent for the Trans-Gabonese Railroad and 19 percent for roads. It will also be noted that sociocollective investments receive 16 percent, especially national education and public housing.

On the other hand, the relative weight of administrative equipment investments has been reduced by close to 10 percent after the considerable effort made in 1980-1981 (+18 percent).

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GABON

BRITISH RAILROAD CONTRACTS

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1893 19 Feb 83 p 568

[Article: "British Contracts for the Trans-Gabonese Railroad"]

[Text] AFP announced in London on 16 February that efforts made by the British Ministry of Trade to encourage sales by Great Britain to French-speaking Africa had born fruit for Gabon, where a major breakthrough has just been accomplished by several manufacturers of railroad equipment as well as by Transmark, the consultant service of the British railways.

Different contracts with a total value of some 12 million pounds (FR 135 million) have in fact been, or are on the point of being, concluded, and others for a total of 60 to 70 billion pounds (Fr 660 to 770 million) are expected by the end of 1982. All concern the Trans-Gabonese Railroad. The first orders were facilitated by a 10 million-pound (Fr 110 million) loan which three of the principle British banks (Midland, Barclays and Lloyds) have just granted to the Gabonese railway organization, CETRA. The loan is guaranteed by the Export Credit Guarantee Department (ECGD), the department of the British Ministry of Trade which insures credit for exports, with a relatively low interest rate of 8.5 percent.

Apart from the technical experience which Transmark will provide for operation of the first segment of the railroad and development of the second, the contracts deal chiefly with rolling stock, cranes, sections of track and rail plates.

Future orders are expected within the framework of the construction of the second Booue-Franceville section. Its construction will probably be entrusted to Eurotrag, a consortium of 18 European firms in which the British enterprises Wimpey and Taylor Woodrow, which specialize in large-scale projects, now hold a 22-percent interest. As of this writing, the British banks have promised a supplementary line of credit to cover this British interest.

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GABON

BRIEFS

PRESIDENT TOURS INTERIOR--President Bongo and his wife, accompanied by a ministerial delegation, began a series of tours in the Gabonese provinces planned for 11-14 and 21-28 February, as well as 1-2 March. These tours are significant in that the head of state is displaying his desire to regain control of the country after his having crushed the movement in favor of a multiparty system which emerged last December. That is why in Tchibanga on 12 February President Bongo promised increased efforts for the economic development of Nyanga Province (reopening of the marble plant, opening of a barytine mine, the first group of bridge works on Banio Lagoon in Mayumba, and so on) while blasting "the ingratitude of certain sons of the province who were implicated in the recent events in Libreville" wanting to create a "stillborn" political party. The head of state denounced the "leanings" within the government with divisions between "progressives", "moderates" and "convervatives." [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1893 19 Feb 82 p 567] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1982] 9380

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GHANA

TROUBLED ECONOMY REVIEWED; STRONG MANAGEMENT URGED

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1895, 5 Mar 82
pp 657-660

[Article by Jacques Latremoliere: "The Fall of the Ghanaian Economy: Jerry Rawlings' Choices"]

[Text] Two months after Ghana's coup, normalization of relations with neighboring countries has been attained, and Accra's mass psychosis of the besieged has abated. So the often excessive accounts heard in Abidjan, Lome, and Lagos from political refugees can now be sorted out. These people are terrified when they recall Captain Rawlings' earlier purges, but they also more or less nurture the vain intention of bringing about a reaction against him from the countries where they have found refuge.

For that matter, has it indeed been established that Jerry Rawlings is the real author of the coup? People wished to see proof of this, as well as of his collusion with Colonel Qadhdhafi, in the short visit he made to Tripoli in 1980. However, testimonies in Accra since 1979 have agreed on how Dr Limann's government succeeded in keeping him in isolation after a declaration was made forbidding him to leave. As in Liberia in 1980 and Togo in 1963, the coup was actually carried out by a small group of noncommissioned officers. These people might have received some Libyan support, as has been claimed; however, the simplicity of such intervention would have made it of no use whatsoever. What most likely happened is that once their feat was accomplished, their inexperience caused them to seek out a label to rally popular support in their favor. Thus the recourse to Rawlings.

They tried in the same way to assemble authorities to pull the state out of its economic morass. The truth is that volunteers have not come running, and the Provisional National Defense Committee, which is acting as the government, has only a modest honors list to offer in this area: noncommissioned officers, students, and a Catholic priest. Its only known members are Rawlings himself and Brig Gen Nunoo Mensah, who until that time held the position of chief of staff. It is he who today handles the delicate missions, such as reassuring neighboring governments and Ghanaian businessmen and industrialists about the true nature of the official ideology. At their request he stopped the limitation of bank withdrawals, at 1,500 cedis for individuals and 5,000 for corporations, which had completely blocked all activity.

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Of course the Libyan diplomatic service is ready and eager to seize the opportunity for revenge and the possibility for creating a political bridgehead in this region. Revenge, because in November 1980, Dr Limann, following the example of several other states in the region, expelled Qadhdhafi's representatives, who were accused of having supported an antigovernment movement. Nor is the idea of a "destabilizing" bridgehead foreign to him, but the timing would be poor if the OAU is taken into consideration. However, a step in this direction might be interpreted from the fact that since 10 January a delegation has been flying in to prepare shipments of food and probably of weapons, and to reestablish an embassy for the Jamahiriya as well. It is to be hoped that a responsible government, and Gen Nunoo Mensah in particular, will have the good sense not to alienate itself either from the moderate states in whose midst Ghana must live, or from Western aid because of acceptance of Libyan assistance; the possibilities of the latter, despite its immediate and spectacular nature, remain meager. Although the Ghanaians cannot be very choosy about the origin of the aid they receive, the state of Libyan finances does not permit great generosity, either.

Another interpretation which has run its course in Lome can henceforth be discounted: that of an Ewe coup. This interpretation purposes to be based on the bloody incidents which occurred in 1981 between Konkomba and Namumba. Some people would have seen in these a symptom of the state's imminent breakdown, deemed favorable by the Ewe Union for an attempt to reunify its ethnic group. In this plot, or ostensible plot, were mentioned the names of Gilchrist Olympio, a son of the former Togolese president, Captain Rawlings himself, who is Ewe on his mother's side, and such notables as Dr Owusu Ansah, General Kattah, and John Tetegah. The explanation smacks of a detective story, and Gen Nunoo Mensah's recent visit to General Eyadema would have done it justice. Indeed, it is not difficult to detect the motives of the refugees who have made themselves its propagators, knowing to what extent the Togolese head of state is sensitive to the problems of North-South rivalry.

It is true that there doubtless were many attacks against human rights at the time of the recent events in Accra. Dr Limann was arrested 4 January at Koforidoua, 60 km north of the capital. At present he is in a guarded house, as is former vice president Graft-Johnson. One of the top leaders of the PNP (People's National Party), the government party, Addai Amoaku, was executed. The same party's former president, Nana Okutwer Bekoue, is at the present time the subject of a particularly nasty charge of embezzlement. On the other hand, several ministers close to Dr Limann were released after being held for several days. Such was the case with George Benneh (finance), Mr Jantuah (interior), Joe Rendor (justice) and Francis Acquah (youth and rural development).

It is much harder to derive an idea of the true number of dead, wounded, or executed. According to news from Accra, the coup was probably responsible for about 50 dead, as many seriously wounded, and 200 slightly wounded. Probably about 50 people were executed for political motives. However, we cannot let pass in silence the horrifying tales, fortunately of questionable origin, circulating in Lagos, according to which the number of executions exceeded 700, of whom 100 were police and a dozen were women. According to the same source, these massacres took place in secret at Camp Burma.

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Fortunately, out of fear of international reaction, the most well-known personalities were spared.

The Coup's Socioeconomic Context

All there is to say about the permanent bankruptcy in which the country is struggling has already been said. The exchange value of the currency at the borders is only 20 percent of its official value (1 cedi=Fr 2.16). The inflation rate is 180 percent. The collapse of agricultural and mining production is attributable to lack of motivation and means. As for industry, the equipment cannot be maintained, can be developed even less, and runs at 30 percent capacity. All this in an environment of government-owned businesses, some having economic worth, such as those dependent upon Akosombo for the extraction and treatment of bauxite, but others (Ghana Airways, Black Star Line, an oil refinery, etc.) operating outside any criterion of profitability, outside any standard of wages, and in perpetuation of exorbitant privileges profiting their directors.

However, significant correctives must be applied to this apocalyptic picture. If the problem's specifics could be reduced to what has just been stated, it is clear that Ghana's population would have been wiped off the map. No worker could feed himself in a country where the minimum guaranteed wage is 12 cedis a day, or approximately the price of a loaf of bread or a liter of milk, a seventh of a chicken, or a hundredth of a mediocre restaurant meal. Although Ghana's 12 million inhabitants in reality suffer numerous constraints, they fortunately are not aware of the scarcity. A visit to Mkola, Accra's principal market, gives the appearance of an adequate supply not only of food and beverages but of all ingredients--household products, clothing, transistors, batteries, cycles, etc--which go to make up current consumption. The price of these objects represents, in the best cases, a considerable portion of a worker's wages; in the worst cases, a more or less high multiple of them. This does not prevent their finding buyers.

Despite the drop in the price of a barrel of Nigerian crude from \$40 to \$36, which represents for Ghana a weekly savings of \$780,000, the state announced at the end of 1981 a reduction in fuel imports of over 10 percent. This official limitation did not prevent the reappearance, less than 2 weeks after the coup, of a large number of cars on the road, many of them having large engines. In Accra, gas and "super" are rationed only at service stations.

The phenomenon has a simple explanation: the existence of a parallel economy, from which the official cedi is excluded. Agricultural production, especially cocoa, the source of 80 percent of foreign exchange income, sells in Togo and Ivory Coast, to the extent that that is not prevented by border surveillance. In 1981, as far as can be known, these countries absorbed more than 50,000 tons of beans; this explains the fact that the officially exported tonnage, which was 450,000 tons in 1973, fell to 250,000 tons in 1980-81. The difference between the amount of the decrease and that of the smuggling corresponds in the first place to the aging of the plants, and then to the consequences of customs control. The same thing applies to gold production, which fell from 900,000 ounces in 1965 to 372,000 in 1979. To explain the reduction in

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this case, management errors and wear and tear on equipment can be added to customs regulations. Smuggling itself is based on endemic stealing observed in the mines (40 percent). The product is sold across the land borders, but also in London, which has become the international market for Ghanaian gold. It arrives there in the form of jewels and necklaces worn around the necks of rich female second-hand dealers traveling as tourists.

Ghana's successive governments, trained in the British school, have above all else been sensitive to a commercial development stereotype. They have preferred to accommodate themselves to this economic duality rather than implement structural reforms which would permit them to avoid this impoverishment by putting production back in its place in the circulation of wealth. Indeed, in order to succeed, the reforms called for a temporary but radical lowering in the standard of living. The elite are less prepared for this than in other places because of their culture and Westernism. Many Ghanaians have spent several years of their lives in Britain, practicing the most varied professions there, and sometimes staying for good (the brain drain is one of the country's scourges).

These habits are well enough ingrained for Dr Limann, whose government nonetheless came indirectly from a revolutionary movement, to have turned down the proposals of the International Monetary Fund, subordinating the granting of \$800 million of financial aid to a devaluation which could have reached 700 percent. By rectifying the state's credit, this probably would have brought about, to Ghana's profit, a change in direction in the parallel currency market. But it would have clashed with the opposition of second-hand commerce, which by definition is hostile to the control measures for domestic prices which would be its necessary corollary. It is also tempting, for a government subject to popular pressure, to seek a solution instead in resources such as gold, oil, or diamonds. Unfortunately there is cause to believe that even if these [resources] were double their present level, they would still be insufficient.

Not only did Dr Limann's government not consent to the reforms, but 18 months ago it appeared to legitimize smuggling by authorizing imports without a preliminary allocation of foreign exchange. The unfortunate thing is that this flight forward imposed a purely consumer economy, as it was accompanied by a slackening of border controls that no one dared to implement until they were suppressed--indeed until the incitement to smuggling which would have been in the logic of the system. This [smuggling] goes on, on the other hand, at the expense of industry, whose needs cannot be adapted to semibarbar formulas; it is only with great difficulty that a scraper or an alternator can be exchanged at the Aflao border station for a few trucks of kola nuts. Industry must, in addition, struggle against foreign competition which is free from all taxes.

Smuggling is by nature an underground operation, even when it is unofficially tolerated. The objects involved benefit from an exemption from taxes, but for the raw materials imported by industry, taxation is the rule. Taxes do not affect the sale of smuggled products. That of local industrial products is subject to the BIC, without loss of exit duties for exports. This aspect of things explains why industrial circles in Accra are far from hostile to the

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new regime; rightly or wrongly, they expect interventions from it that require courage, good sense, and equity. Europeans are still numerous here, although at times they must have recourse to the black market in a personal capacity. There is no love lost for leaders of past regimes either, be they living or dead.

Another major disadvantage to the system is that it establishes a completely unjust distribution of profits among the population. From the top to the bottom of the social scale, all those who can index their cedis expressed at the official rate, through bribes, commissions, tips or by holding more than one job--called "kalabul" in Accra--adjust to it rather well. This reinforces the privileged situation of smuggling's "great lords"--the carriers and the female second-hand dealers. The lot of the others is poverty; it is not without sociological interest to mention that prominent among them are subordinate officers, noncommissioned officers, and soldiers. General and high-ranking officers are more discreet; thus the decimation they underwent during the 1979 purge, and the popularity that leaves Jerry Rawlings his rank of "flight lieutenant."

Unfortunately, it is far from certain whether the new regime is resolved to carry out a devaluation whose long-term effectiveness, considering well-conditioned habits, will not prevent painful social consequences. Captain Rawlings has just come out against it, despite, or because of, a rise in the dollar, which is traded at the parallel price of 40 to 1, and at the official rate of 2.75. National pride, which is at the basis of this decision, is not necessarily the best counsel. Noble sentiments do not make a good economy, and this refusal, if it continues, bodes more turbulent days ahead for Ghana.

The Official Economy

The double-circuit system, as it operates in Ghana, obviously removes a lot of interest from the study of the official economy, such as it appears through the Central Bank statistics. Foreign debt has undergone several consolidations, the latest in 1979 involving 70 million French francs. Ghanaians repay at the rate of 2-3 million per year. Under these conditions it is hard to see how the "Paris Club" could grant them new terms, except by purely and simply erasing their debts. The current medium-term rate of COFACE (French Insurance Company for Foreign Trade) (around 91 million French francs, but 50 of them pertaining to accident insurance), although a modest sum, is sufficient to put a considerable limit on French-Ghanaian exchanges.

For a gold and currency reserve of 245 million cedis, the short-term public debt in July 1981 was 950 million cedis. Medium-term public debt, on the other hand, does not exceed 178 million (around 6 percent of export income). This figure is explained by the generalized block on international commercial credits, but also by the considerable amount of free aid received from Great Britain (50 million pounds sterling per year), from the Federal Republic of Germany (55 million Deutschmarks), and soft-condition credits opened by other countries, including Italy and Brazil (it seems that \$35 million was unblocked by this country in 1981). Several organizations, such as OPEC,

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USAID, the UNDP, the EDF (Economic Development Fund) and the ACDI (Canada) have also offered, as a reinforcement to the IMF proposals, advances totaling \$150 million under the same conditions.

At the end of 1979, the trade balance showed a surplus of \$262 million, and that of current payments \$133 million. Since then, these theoretical surpluses have decreased. In any case, they show only the tip of the iceberg. Only by comparing announced budgets and executed budgets can an idea be formed of the state's true operating conditions. It is eloquent. The predicted expenses of the 1980-81 budget were 6 billion cedis, of which 4.8 billion were for operations; predicted income was 4.4 billion, of which 3.1 were from indirect taxes. Thus the announced deficit was 1.6 billion. In reality, there were 8 billion cedis of expenditures, of which 6.3 were for operations, and 3.3 of income, of which 2 were from indirect taxes. The real deficit was 4.7 billion cedis. In 1981-82, the budget shows 10.4 billion in expenditures, of which 8.4 are for operations, and 6.2 in income, of which 4 are from indirect taxes, or a predicted deficit of 4.2 billion; without any trouble at all, it is easy to assure that it will be double this amount.

Tonnage produced is undergoing the same drop as trade surpluses. That for cocoa has been pointed out; smuggling is only partially responsible for the decrease. The same holds true for gold. There is no underground compensation to be sought out for tonnage reductions involving bauxite and manganese; respectively, these fell from 315,000 and 409,000 tons in 1975 to 181,000 and 252,000 tons in 1979, simply as a consequence of the deterioration of equipment and tools.

Industry's situation varies according to the sales facilities for its exported products and the greater or lesser accentuated liberalism of contracts negotiated with the government, as concerns the granting of import licenses. The new investment code now in preparation does not foresee any important changes in this area; it focuses especially on reducing the minimum shares held by the state in the various industrial and commercial branches: 45 percent for mines, 20 percent for oil, 40 percent for banks and 60 percent for insurance. Nationals should retain 50 percent of the shares in corporations with capital under \$500,000.

In this context, note should be taken of the efforts to interconnect the Ghanaian electrical network with that of Ivory Coast. This was financed, for a total of 6.8 billion CFA (African Financial Community) francs, with the participation of the BAD (African Development Bank), the BEI (European Investment Bank), Ghana, and Ivory Coast. An international group, with American leadership and the participation of two French banks, is to grant a \$28.6 million loan, guaranteed by the Italian Government, for the creation of an aluminum lamination unit under the trusteeship of Fata Industriale of Turin, a subsidiary of Babcock International. A cement plant to work on the local limestone deposits, and able to make use of the recently discovered gas at Half Hassini, would be studied at Nauli, for a sum of 680 million cedis financed by an international group. Finally, there are projects involving the manufacture of carbonic gas (Peabody Holmes), brickyards, in which Brazil has shown interest, and finally, together with Ivory Coast and Upper Volta, the Bul Dam, in the

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Brong Ahafo district, in the northern part of the country. The Kpong hydro-electric dam also remains in the files; it would involve an estimated cost of 600 million cedis, and the relocation of 65 villages, not to mention the building of new settlements.

Besides these projects or completed works which are deemed to have more or less of a priority, the majority of small and medium-size businesses struggle along under conditions which often are discouraging for their promoters. Automobile assembly plants in CKD have practically closed down, be they the West African Trading Company (SCOA) for Peugeot, the French Company of West Africa (CFAO) for Renault, or the UAC for Bedford; each is equipped to produce 1,500 to 2,000 vehicles per year and employed several hundred workers. Operations conceived at the suggestion of government authorities, which would have provided these corporations an outlet for their progressively devaluating nonrepatriable cedis, have gone under out of the general indifference. This was the case with the combined poultry farming unit, cofinanced by the Ghana Commercial Bank, Shell, and the French Company of West Africa (CFAO), which was designed to produce 1 million chickens for local consumption; efforts exerted over 18 months resulted only in the production of 700 tons of corn. It had to be terminated because of a lack of foreign exchange currency which would have provided for the importation of necessary tools.

The situation is worse yet for the national corporations, the creation of which was the work of Kwame Nkrumah. To the factors of nonprofitability and production slowdowns there is the disadvantage of extravagant management; in Ghana, as in many other countries in Africa, the benefits of these constitute a "nomenklatura" which comes in handy for defending its interests under the cover of political parties where one would not expect to find them. The two best examples of this are the Black Star Line, a national maritime shipping company, and Ghana Airways.

The former, having ceased its payments in September 1980, saw its ships seized in foreign ports by its creditors, while the 20 units remaining in Ghana, or three-quarters of the fleet, immobilized at Tema and Takoradi by striking crews who had not been paid for several months, had to be turned over to the navy. A technical assistance and management agreement was negotiated between the West German company Woerman Lines and Black Star. The Limann government's true objective was to succeed in selling it--a difficult goal, considering the advanced age of the equipment. Nonetheless, four ships were turned over to Greek shipowners, while replacements for them were ordered at a South Korean shipyard.

Despite the recent acquisition of a Fokker Fellowship by Ghana Airways, and a considerable increase in the company's fares, its situation is hardly less critical; a partner is being sought in Canada to share the financial burdens. It is the same tune and the same quests for the Ghana Railways Corporation, which has undertaken negotiations with Indian and Canadian firms, and for State Transport, where 120 buses out of a fleet of 250 remain in operating condition.

At the time when, as a consequence of this situation, the logical tendency to go into private hands becomes apparent, the state unfortunately is compelled

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to take over the wealth of private firms. Firestone, for instance, had been reduced to producing 300 tires per day out of a capacity of 4,000; since they had to pay 11 million cedis in taxes, they preferred to sell, at a miserably low price, their local facilities, including the hevea plantations of Ghana Rubber Estates Ltd. Their promissory notes still will not be paid for 5 years by the Central Bank; within the framework of a three-way agreement, the cedis obtained must be turned over for the expenses of the U.S. Embassy in Accra. The only condition imposed upon this arrangement by Firestone, which is leaving some technical advisers there, is the promise not to turn these facilities over to a rival firm. It is highly unlikely that any should appear on the scene.

This trend toward going into private hands, which is general throughout all Africa (it is especially evident in Ivory Coast, Mali, Zaire, and even in the Congo), clashes in Ghana, in the same way as monetary devaluation, with a popular sentiment of which Captain Rawlings is the expression. Thus, he would contemplate denouncing the agreement reached between Woerman Lines and Black Star, and he has decided to rehire the wage earners, laid off by the preceding regime, of the Ghana Industrial Corporation, a particularly inefficient and impecunious state holding company.

Oil and Mining Resources

French-Ghanaian Relations

This attitude on the part of the Provisional National Defense Committee corresponds both to the still prestigious memory of the Osagyee [Kwame Nkrumah], who died in exile in Guinea in 1972, and to the idea that the nonviability of his economic ideas was only illusory--that the implementation of national resources development, which would have assured a balance, was abandoned by the profiteers of the regimes that succeeded him, to the profit only of mercenary activities.

Great hopes were based on oil. Up to the present time, reality has not justified them. The Saltpond and Bonsu offshore deposits, being operated or readied for operation in shallow water off Accra by Agri-Petco International (USA), have limited reserves of 7 million tons. And extraction from these is undergoing technical difficulties. Total production capacity does not exceed 3,000 barrels per day. In 1980, Phillips Petroleum announced the discovery, at the boundary with Ivorian territorial waters, of the Half Hassini deposit, for which production is estimated at 1,500 barrels a day. This annual contribution of 250,000 to 300,000 tons of crude will be able to lessen the severity of the oil bill but not guarantee the stabilization of the economy, even when implemented by the gas reserves recently found 30 km from Half Hassini.

Ghana Consolidated Diamonds, a joint economy corporation, the majority of whose shares belong to the state, showed a drop in production of more than 100 percent between 1976 and 1980. More than 25 percent of its wage earners had to be laid off. It continues to operate only through the advances of one of its stockholders--Consolidated African Selection Trust, a subsidiary of British Petroleum.

Prospects for production of gold might be more encouraging. To stimulate this, Dr Limann's government sought investors (\$3 billion was deemed necessary), contemplated tax facilities which would profit development corporations, and with this in mind organized an international seminar in Accra. When it was still called the Gold Coast, Ghana, with 34 tons, held the rank of fifth largest world producer, following South Africa, the USSR, Canada, and the United States. Despite the existence of high-content ore in thick veins that often can be developed through surface mining, production, which had been 900,000 ounces in 1965, fell to 527,000 in 1970, 402,000 in 1978, and 362,000 in 1979. These figures are official, from the weight exchanged at the Bank of Ghana at the rates prevailing at the time. There are a few corrective factors: premiums allowed the price to be increased by 20 percent, but this was insufficient, despite the rise in gold prices, to offset thefts in production and smuggling, estimated at 40 percent; thus, real production in 1979 would be 13 tons.

This situation alone would be sufficient to explain the drop in production, without even taking into consideration the difficulties of maintenance; the lack of foreign exchange currency, facilities, and tools; or the defects in a state management which has affected most operations since 1969 except that of the Lonrho firm. In their case, the state has only 55-percent participation, and their technical training allows them to be able to guarantee two-thirds of national production. A state holding company, the State Gold Mining Corporation, whose position is not specifically indicated, groups together small mines which keep their financial individuality.

Gold is probably the only resource whose reasonable development could contribute to reestablishing confidence in Ghanaian currency and, by so doing, attenuate the other flaws in the economy. It was in this context that Jean-Pierre Cot, on his recent visit to Accra, looked into the possibility of French intervention in the Tarkwa mine. This would be financed by the Central Fund for Economic Cooperation; the position of COFACE (French Company for Foreign Trade) could be relaxed by the guarantee of commercial credits. Contacts were made but were not followed up; they have perhaps reawakened certain sensitivities dating from the colonial era. It would be quite surprising if Accra's young revolutionary government took them up again on its own.

Another project, involving the creation of oil stations in the port of Tema, was studied by the Central Fund, which operates in Ghana through the intermediary of its agency in Lome. Although such action falls more within the purview of export credits, it could be the opportunity for French cooperation to renew relations with Ghana; these are at a standstill, with the exception of a low-cost experimental study on joint financing to be carried out by the Institute for Rubber Research in Africa (IRCA). The question can be taken up again as soon as a partner able to negotiate for Ghana is named. It is plainly to be wished that Captain Rawlings' team, whose past excesses have been equal to the corruption of which this country has been the victim, not deceive itself about the real causes of the evil. In order to remedy it, they must demonstrate a rigorous management more effective than that of submachine guns.

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NIGER

OFEDES EXPERIENCING WELL DRILLING PROBLEMS

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1893 19 Feb 82 p 562

[Article: "OFEDES Board of Directors: Problems with Hydrology Projects"]

[Text] The board of directors of the Nigerien Office of subsoil Waters (OFEDES) met in Zinder on 27 January with Minister of Hydrology Yahaya Tounkara presiding.

On this occasion the minister indicated that "with respect to the implementation of our planning set forth in the 1979-1983 5-year plan, it can be considered satisfactory despite numerous problems of an administrative nature and difficulties with materiel and manpower.

"With respect to the physical objectives set by the plan, from 1979 to 1 January 1982 we drilled 905 OFEDES-type wells, or 40 percent of those planned; 376 boreholes in the substratum, or 20 percent of those planned; and 30 deep boreholes, or 50 percent of those planned.

"During the first 2 years of the plan, performance was poor owing to the time required to set up funds and equipment. The annual rate of drilling for the first 3 years is, nonetheless, good. By the end of the plan this rate will guarantee us with certainty a minimum of 1,627 OFEDES-type wells, or 71 percent of those planned; 1,800 boreholes in the substratum, or 100 percent; 41 deep boreholes, or 205 percent."

With respect to the operations in progress, Dr. Tounkara pointed out that "by 5 January 1982 a total of 228 boreholes had been drilled; of these 144 were positive and 84 negative or an average failure rate of 36.84 percent within the framework of the drilling program. But Maradi and Zinder Departments in particular have experienced the greatest failures.

"Of the two, Zinder is the more disturbing since of 81 boreholes drilled 43 are positive and 38 negative, or a failure rate of 48.90 percent, while Maradi and Niamey Departments record 23.18 and 14.82 percent respectively. Such a result obliges us to revamp this program and prompts us to be careful with subsequent programs of this type so that the state will not pay for work that is largely unproductive."

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The ECOWAS program involving 1,500 sites, 100 boreholes and 400 village wells, the launching of which was planned for 1981 in Niamey, Zinder, Diffa and Maradi Departments, is marking time for lack of a firm and definitive commitment.

The 200-borehold program for Liptako (with WADB [West African Development Bank] and Nigerien financing) should begin shortly after several months' delay resulting from slowness in setting up financing and obtaining necessary equipment.

UNDR [United Nations' Development Program]-UNICEF program of drilling 250 boreholds in Zinder Department continues to suffer from administrative clumsiness relating to the recruitment of international experts. Operations listed in the second Danish loan, which involves 150 wells in Zinder Department and the drinking water supplies of the cities of Guidan-Roundji, Tibiri, Aguié and Gazoua in Maradi Department, will soon enter the phase of concrete accomplishments after having been the victims of administrative misadventures for months on end.

The drinking water supplies of five secondary centers--Madarounfa, Gotheye, Tera, Torodi and Gaya--and the determination of new collection zones for the water supply to the city of Zinder, which has FRG financing arranged by the GKW [expansion unknown], are nearing their end on a note that is not very reassuring for the city of Zinder, which is decidedly running the risk of remaining the city of thirst. In fact, the results obtained up to now do not presently indicate underground water levels capable of covering this city's needs.

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SENEGAL

NEW CONTROL SHOPS ESTABLISHED IN CAPE VERDE AREA

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1893, 19 Feb 82 p 557

[Article: "Trade: 50 New Control Shops"]

[Text] Some 50 new control shops will be established in the Cape Verde area, bringing to 76 the number of these shops run by young Senegalese. The Senegalese Government has just cleared a fr118 million support fund for the extension of the control shop operation which started in the Cape Verde area in 1975.

The operation was devised to make possible the creation of nonsalaried jobs. It was also a question of modernizing and expanding the retail distribution network by creating functional stores with all essential products at lawful prices. The third objective of the project was the Senegalization of the sector which is monopolized by non-Senegalese (especially Mauritians and Guineans).

In 1975 a first group of 15 stores was financed by SONAGA [National Company for Commercial Insurance and Assistance] and SONADIS [National Investment Company of Senegal]. The first company is handling planning and equipment and the second the financing of the initial stock. All this for a total of approximately 2 million, repayable in 6 years at a reasonable rate. In late 1980, 11 other stores were opened with the assistance of the 2 companies and of some local banks.

The office of domestic trade and prices is handling the hiring of the young managers who must first attend a 6-month training course at the Dakar professional center.

The control shops should not be confused with the frontier shops. The frontier shops operation has the object of making staple foodstuffs available to the residents of the frontier villages in order to prevent their crossing frontiers for provisions. In view of the difficulty of obtaining provisions, the Senegalese who live near the frontiers were exchanging products for goods. It was in order to discourage this practice that the now defunct ONCAS (National Officer of Cooperation and Assistance for Development) financed a certain number of shops, especially in West Senegal and Casamance.

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After ONCAD was disbanded, the regional cooperation associations took over. Some regional associations set up several shops without waiting for any financing. Soon 10 of these shops will open in West Senegal, and another 6 in Casamance and in Sine-Saloum. State financing is expected for the construction of 39 shops.

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SENEGAL

BRIEFS

OPPOSITION CRITIQUE PLANNED--Eight Senegalese opposition parties announced their intention to form a committee for critical study of the Senegalese Election Code, a revision of which is presently being worked out. In a press release dated 14 February the eight parties emphasized that they had not been consulted concerning the revision of the Senegalese Election Code. They say that they will submit their conclusions and proposals to the president of the republic, the government and public opinion. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1893 19 Feb 82 p 557] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1982] 9380

PARIS SENEGALESE DAYS--On Wednesday 28 and Thursday 29 April in Paris, the CNPF [National Council of French Employers] will organize 2 days--or, more precisely, 3 half-days--of information on Senegal. The Senegalese delegation which will come to Paris should be headed by Toure, the minister of the plan and cooperation. The objective of these Senegalese days will be threefold: presentation of the new Senegalese development plan, presentation of the new Senegalese Investment Code and, finally, presentation of the new formula for the Dakar Free Industrial Zone. Five committees--mines and energies, construction materials, metal and electrical engineering, fishing and fishing industries, free industrial zone--will bring together the Senegalese delegates and French businessmen interested in Senegalese projects. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1893 19 Feb 82 p 557] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1982] 9380

PEAT EXPLOITATION COMPANY--A Senegalese Peatery Company (CTS), a semipublic corporation with capital of CFA 100 million, has been created in Senegal with a view to exploiting the 50 million cubic meters of peat discovered in the country. The CTS should start production in 1986 with the construction of two 30-megawatt peat powered thermal power stations, which would represent 45 percent of Senegal's energy consumption. For the first year and a half, the company will function as a research corporation in order to complete the preliminary studies begun 2 years ago; the cost of these studies is estimated at CFA 1 billion. Financing for this research is being provided by France, the FRG, Canada, Finland and Ireland. The new company's capital, open exclusively to Senegalese during its first phase, is held by the state, SENELAC (Senegalese Electrical Energy Company) and SOFISEDIT (Senegalese Financial Company for the Development of Industry and Tourism). With the exploitation of peat, Senegal will be able to diversify its energy sources; up to the present all power stations built in Senegal have been powered by fuel oil. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1893 19 Feb 82 p 557] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1982] 9380

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