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8 July 1982

Sub-Saharan Africa Report

FOUO No. 780



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SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA REPORT

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CAPE VERDE

BRIEFS

EDF TEACHERS' TRAINING LOAN--An EDF [European Development Fund] training program (grant of [European Currency Units] 550,000 ECUs), for the period 1981-1985 envisages provision of grants for in country studies and for training courses for teachers and the supply of teaching equipment. The first facet involves elementary and secondary schoolteachers, while the second concerns materials for scientific and technical courses (physics, chemistry, biology, geology, drawing, laboratory equipment, scientific publications). [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1903, 30 Apr 82 p 1.138] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1982] 8796

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CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

INFORMATION MINISTER GIVES VIEWS ON ABORTIVE COUP

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French No 1113, 5 May 82 p 61

[Text] "There are some Frenchmen who wish us harm." Two months later, and for the first time, a member of the party in power in Bangui has commented on Ange Patasse's failed putsch. Lt Col Christophe Grelombe, the government's secretary general and minister of information, has the reputation--even if he denies it--of being the leader of the "hawks" on the military committee. Here are the main excerpts from what he told us.

The failed coup d'etat of 3 March: "It is to be explained by Patasse's devouring ambition, the multiple debts he had promised to repay once in power, and the well-known negligence of the generals who attempted to carry out the putsch for him. M'Baikoua was a retired military man and Bozize an obscure officer whom Bokassa had promoted because he carried his cane."

French "collusion": "We differentiate between the behavior of certain Frenchmen who wish us harm and the historical ties which join our two countries. Certainly, Minister for Cooperation Jean-Pierre Cot has never visited us. That is his affair. After all, he does not have exclusive responsibility for France's African policy." (Postponed several times, J-P Cot's visit is planned for July 1982. NLDR).

The risk of disturbances in the "Patassite" areas of the north: "There will be no destabilization. The army is ready to intervene energetically. That having been said, we are a united nation, and regionalism is a barbaric notion."

The Mobutu-Kolingba axis: "We have special relations with Zaire. But there is nothing extraordinary about that. We are neighbors, after all."

The return of civilians to power: "We will see in due time. For the time being, it is out of the question. Some people are putting pressure on us to go in this direction; they forget that harmony in a country is not achieved by political theory."

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CHAD

ROLE OF ALGERIANS ARRIVING IN CHAD DESCRIBED

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French No 1114, 12 May 82 pp 36, 37

[Article by Francois Soudan: "Can Allies From the North Save Goukouni a Second Time? The Algerians Arrive"]

[Text] Like the Moroccans before them in Shaba, the Tanzanians in Uganda, and the Libyans in Chad, the Algerian armed forces have thus "gone outside" their borders. For the first time in Africa, if one excludes their participation in the October 1973 Suez Canal war. Not to the same extent, of course, nor with the same tasks as their predecessors; there were about 200 of them, and their objective was not to become directly involved in the fighting. Where? In Ndjamen, Douguia, Atj--thus in Chad. In Chad, furthermore, which seems forever fated to suffer foreign intervention. Approximately half of these commissioned and noncommissioned officers, brought in over the last few weeks by regular Hercules C-130 flights to and from Douguia (80 km north of Ndjamen) are simply technical assistants: doctors for the armed forces or engineering specialists responsible for repairing the main roads which link the Chadian capital with the eastern front, and for ensuring--in collaboration with French technicians--the maintenance of the Ndjamen airport.

The others, some 150 men, are divided into three groups: "advisors" properly speaking, who are training Goukouni's troops in the handling of heavy and medium arms (machineguns, RPG-7 rocket launchers, Katyushas mounted on Toyota Land Cruisers); staff officers in charge of organizing the leadership staff of the Integrated National Army (as the Cubans did before them in Angola and the East Germans in Ethiopia); and finally personal security specialists, a sort of bodyguard-advisers assigned directly to Goukouni Weddeye.

This "intervention," discreet for the time being, is being added to that--official intervention--of the 16 army personnel sent by Algeria as observers of the OAU peacekeeping force and to the few civilians--much less conspicuous--given the task of transforming the FROLINAT (Chadian National Liberation Front) into a structured and centralized political party, along the lines of the Algerian FLN.

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No doubt the decision by the OAU's Standing Committee on Chad on 11 February in Nairobi, enjoining Goukouni to negotiate with his fraternal enemy Hissain Habre, had something to do with the haste in which the Chadian president went off in search of further outside assistance. But it is above all the failure of the counteroffensive, which he personally supervised, that was conducted by his troops against the FAN [Northern Armed Forces] in the Oum Hadjer area at the beginning of March, which seems to have convinced him of the impossibility of fighting alone against Habre's men, who are better organized and more motivated--particularly as the complete lack of cooperation by the "southerners" of Kamougue and the very considerable permeability of the security cordon thrown around Ndjamená by the OAU contingent left him hardly any choice other than to turn toward Tibesti or the help of a "brother country."

The Libyans having left, and the Ethiopians--hinted at since December--having other uprisings to fight in Eritrea, the hand that was stretched out was therefore Algerian. Or, more exactly, Franco-Algerian. Because Paris, since "the Cancun appeal" launched on 22 October 1981 by Francois Mitterrand, has not resigned itself to giving up the one to whom it had promised total support. A matter of honoring one's commitments, no doubt, but also a desire to maintain Goukouni in an honorable position in the event of a long war against Habre or of negotiations with him. After having supplied the GUNT [Transitional National Union Government] with about Fr 400 million in military materiel between October and February, Paris favored Algerian intervention. If Algiers, which in turn has resolved not to become mired down in the Chadian bog, appears anxious to obtain pledges in Ndjamená vis-a-vis Tripoli, there is no doubt that Chadli Bendjedid has no desire to see himself accused at the OAU of "outside interference."

France--which is the petitioner in this affair--probably promised him that it would do everything necessary to allay the fears aroused in its moderate continental friends, even if this entails emphasizing the assistance--much more modest so far: a few Land Rovers--supplied by Morocco to Hissain Habre. Convinced of the reliability of the French "coverage"--Paris ambassador to Algiers, Guy Ceorgy, thoroughly familiar with the Chadian dossier, for which he was responsible at the Quaid'Orsay, no doubt spared no effort to this end--the Algerians consequently organized, as of mid-March, the first C-130 flights to Douguia (as many as three a day).

On 16 March, Adoum Togoi, GUNT minister of defense, and Ngollobaye Allafi, commander in chief of the Integrated National Army, traveled to Algiers to refine the technical details of this assistance. On 25 March, an FAN spokesman in Europe announced that a force equivalent to two Algerian battalions, that is to say 1,500 men, was sent by truck from Douguia to the Ati front. Algiers denied it. Not without reason, moreover, since the number was grossly exaggerated, including at that time one zero too many. All the same, the Algerians are there, and Goukouni himself does not deny the fact. He stated that in mid-April: "We believe that the Algerian Government and the Algerian people will continue to exert themselves to assist the Chadian people in freeing themselves of the war imposed upon them by international imperialism."

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We are firmly counting on this support, and we hope that it will become increasingly substantial." One could hardly be clearer.

On Sunday 2 May it was learned from official sources in Ndjamena that a segment of the Nigerian contingent of the OAU force had withdrawn. It is possible that the Zairians and Senegalese will follow suit before the wet season (i.e., before July), which makes all ground evacuation impossible. Goukouni has therefore lost, unless the Chadian president is saved for a second time by a friend from the north: a colonel, like the one before him. Even if the former has neither Green Book nor Islamic Legion, he has an army with a different sort of effectiveness.

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COMORO ISLANDS

BRIEFS

FINANCIAL SITUATION STUDIED--From 13 to 17 March, at the request of President of the Republic Ahmed Abdallah, a delegation led by Bernard Vinay, inspector general of overseas affairs, assisted by Miss Chantal Vie, conducted a study of the financial situation of the Comoro Islands. They reviewed all elements of financial activity with officials of the Comoran Government and administrations: federation, governorates, public establishments, state corporations and mixed economy entities. This assistance which the French Government has given the Comoran Government in gaining a detailed understanding of all aspects of the domestic financial situation reflects the desire to reexamine the conditions of financial aid to improve its effectiveness. The Comoran Government had recently announced (see MARCHES TROPICAUX No 1897 of 19 March 1982) a number of corrective financial measures whose effectiveness will be enhanced by this latest detailed study. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 30 Apr 82 p 1165] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1982] 9920

DOLLAR FLUCTUATION EFFECTS--Electricity supply in Moroni was seriously affected in March by a decline in petroleum stocks. This was caused in part by the changes in the dollar exchange rate. The rise in the dollar has had unanticipated effects on regularity in the fulfillment of delivery contracts from the Arab Gulf. Between the time the funds transfer order is prepared and the transfer is actually carried out the dollar rate has made the funds insufficient to cover the supply ordered. The delay involved in obtaining a supplementary transfer also holds up the departure of the tanker. This variation in the dollar rate also affects execution of the loan contracts subscribed by the Comoran Government in order to carry out its program of major infrastructure projects to give the country modern equipment. The settlement of interlocking interests is also affected, and the additional delay in arriving at an overall settlement correspondingly delays the issuance of later installments of the loans. Business finances suffer, as well as the work completion schedules. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 30 Apr 82 p 1165] 9920

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GUINEA

ATTEMPT ON PRESIDENT'S LIFE SAID TO HAVE BEEN INSIDE JOB

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French No 1113, 5 May 82 pp 22-24

[Article by Sennen Andriamirado: "Sekou Toure Abandoned by His Family"]

[Excerpts] The master of Conakry has escaped a new assassination attempt. This time the crime seems to have been instigated by those in his immediate entourage.

"We congratulate the comrade who renovated the premises of the future embassy of the Popular Revolutionary Republic of Guinea in France. We solemnly and warmly invite him to Conakry for the installation ceremonies on 14 May for the supreme guide of the revolution, Ahmed Sekou Toure, after his reelection." An outcry is heard in the room. Hubbub; then a voice calls out: "But comrade, Sekou has not even been reelected yet, and you are already announcing his installation?"

It was Sunday 18 April, in an assembly room on Censier Street in Paris, 3 weeks before the elections on 9 May which were to confirm Ahmed Sekou Toure at the head of Guinea. The Association of Guineans in France, in favor of the regime, was giving a reception that day for a craftsman who had completely redecorated a certain hotel on Faisanderie Street--the Guinean Embassy until November 1965 (the time of the breaking of diplomatic relations with France), since occupied by Cuba, and today once more taken over to house the Conakry delegation. The meeting that night turned rowdy; even among Sekou Toure's unwavering supporters there is a sensitivity to protocol and, by definition, a future election is not yet won.

He had time to shout: "I've come to avenge Kabassan!"

Moreover, Sekou Toure very nearly did not show up at all. A few days earlier-- 8 or 15 May, according to the sources, but "a Thursday"--he had once again escaped an assassination attempt. As usual, the fact was not given official confirmation. It is nonetheless undeniable. That morning, as the guide of the revolution was preparing to leave the presidential palace (where he resides) for the People's Palace (where he works), a young man jumped over the surrounding wall and ran toward the private apartments. Intercepted by the guards, he killed one outright--cutting his throat, according to some sources;

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with an automatic pistol, according to others--and wounded several, one of whom died during the day. He was overpowered but had time to shout: "I've come to avenge Kabassan," before he was sent off to an unknown destination.

Kabassan? The person in question is Abraham Kabassan Keita, dismissed in March from his duties as minister of public works, marine commander, and head of the "special departments" (one of the political police forces). Reason: diverting public funds, with the complicity, it seems, of the minister of banks. The dismissal of the two men was effective as of 18 March, but the decision was not "legalized" until 2 April. That Friday morning, President Ahmed Sekou Toure called a joint meeting at the People's Palace of the Central Committee of the PDG (Democratic Party of Guinea) and of the Council of Ministers.

The walls of "OAU City" have been built. Inside, nothing.

As minister of public works, Abraham Kabassan Keita coordinated the first operations preparatory to the holding of the 20th OAU summit in Conakry (provisionally in May 1983). With material aid from the North Koreans, the walls of "OAU City" have been put up. Inside, there is nothing. The supply of cement has been exhausted. Furthermore, by order of Kabassan, 5,572 drums of bitumen were removed without explanation from the storage warehouses, and 1,187 others are simply missing from the inventory. On the other hand, the minister of public works, on his own authority, had a superb villa built at Conakry, and three others at Pita, Kankan, and Kissidougou, respectively. Besides the supplies are the funds; the interior modeling of these personal residences cost several million, and credit for 800,000 leones (1 Sierra Leone leone = approximately CFR Fr 300), entrusted to Kabassan's management, was spent without vouchers. Altogether, combining goods and funds, the amount diverted would amount to 20 million silyls (1 silyl is the theoretical equivalent of CFR Fr 10).

No sooner had the indictment of [Interior Minister] Sekou Cherif been completed when Abraham Kabassan Keita, who had "betrayed the confidence of the people and of the Supreme Guide of the Revolution," was unaimously condemned. The verdict fell: "By decision of the Central Committee and of the Council of Ministers, Comrade Abraham Kabassan Keita is expelled from the Central Committee of the PDG and relieved of his duties as minister of public works. Commander Abraham Kabassan Keita is dismissed and removed from the ranks of the officers of the Popular Armed Forces." An additional inquiry was ordered.

The condemnation smacks of a settling of scores.

While awaiting the findings, Kabassan was arrested and committed to the custody of the Conakry police force. An ordinary procedure, indeed a legal one, were it not that another incident which arose at the beginning of the year gave this condemnation the appearance of a settling of scores.

At the time, Kabassan, still the minister of public works, was receiving representatives of international financial backers who had come to make

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inquiries about the utilization of their finances. In substance he said to them: "You ask me for an evaluation of the work! But nothing has been done! For my part, I have seen precious little of your aid."

Paradoxically, the "easing up" has strengthened the opposition.

Contrary to the advice of those close to him, he maintained the same position before President Sekou Toure and--more seriously--in the presence of foreign experts! At the time he indicated that other ministers--in this case, the minister of urban affairs and housing and the minister of economic and financial affairs--were "perhaps" better informed than he concerning the use of this foreign aid. It was that day, no doubt, that Kabassan sealed his own fate. For he broke the truce between Sekou Toure's two family groups: "the clan of brothers" and that of "brothers-in-law."

The driving force in the first group is the president's half brothers, Ismael Toure (minister of mines) and Siaka Toure (transport); one of the most loyal of them is this very Abraham Kabassan Keita. The second clan joins together the close members of his wife's family: Sekou Cherif (minister of internal affairs), Moussa Diakite (urban affairs and housing), and Seydou Keita (youth). Sekou has always governed (and eliminated) by gaining the support now of one, now of the other clan. He had already tried to oust Ismael Toure in April 1979, but had had to give up the attempt under family pressure. Nevertheless, Sekou succeeded in relieving his other brother, Siakou Toure, of the command of the sinister Camp Boiro by appointing him minister of telegraph and communications, then of transport. This time, after having dismissed Kabassan, he tried the same tactic by proposing to the same Siaka Toure at the beginning of April 1982 a post as regional governor. The "clan of brothers" reacted violently and called on some aunts to arbitrate.

The "family"--brothers and brothers-in-law, with Sekou at their head--was summoned to Faranah, the original fief. The verdict of the elders, both male and female: Siaka was to stay in his job. A slight success, since Kabassan had been not only dismissed but arrested, while his supporters' desire for vengeance found expression in the ridiculous attempt to assassinate Sekou Toure, caught in a vice between the two clans of his family whom he had set one against the other for too long.

The opposition's part in all this? It denies any involvement in the attempt, either direct or indirect--without hiding the fact, on the other hand, that it has not disarmed. It was thought that the "easing up" proposed by Sekou Toure in March 1978 would weaken the opposition. The result has been the opposite. On 14 May 1980, Sekou escaped a grenade attack. Responsibility for the attempt was claimed by a mysterious Patriotic Front, of whose existence the external opposition denied any knowledge. But from Brussels, the opposition, as a group, had been publishing a communique proclaiming: "This act of great political import must occur again as soon as possible."

It did happen again. On 21 February 1981, when Sekou Toure was to go by plane for an official visit to Central Africa, "bombs" exploded at Conakry

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international airport. No one claimed responsibility for the attack. But the Patriotic Front was once again suspected.

The "armed wing of the interior."

A year later, the notorious Front is less mysterious. Since the end of March 1982, Conakry has been inundated with tracts this time recognizing the ties between the external opposition as a whole and "its armed wing of the interior, the Patriotic Front." They call plainly for a popular uprising and the "liquidation of the PDG-Sekou Toure." Even if the initials PDG are those of the party alone, one cannot help thinking that the liquidation in question also concerns the head of state physically. The call has been heard: Perhaps not by those whom the opposition was addressing.

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GUINEA BISSAU

EEC APPROVES LOANS FOR FISHING, PROJECTS, HEALTH SERVICES

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1903, 30 Apr 82 pp 1137, 1138

[Text] On 20 April, the European Development Fund's Committee gave a favorable ruling on new projects which will benefit ACP [African, Caribbean and Pacific] countries. These projects are as follows for Guinea Bissau (amounts given in ECUs [European Currency Units]; 1 ECU = around 6.2 French francs):

--Development of traditional fishing industry in Cacheu (a grant of 1.5 million ECUs and a special loan of 470,000 ECUs).

The purpose of this project is to develop traditional fishing in the region of Cacheu, located in the furthestmost northwest part of the country, by means of several operations intended to increase the amount of fish caught for domestic consumption, to improve the fishermen's earning capacity and their living conditions, to create new jobs in that sector and to expand the distribution network for fishing products. To achieve this goal, there is a program to introduce power-driven boats and to increase the number of fishing vessels; a program to improve traditional fishing methods and to provide fishing equipment, and plans to improve the infrastructures for storage and marketing and to give technical assistance in the execution of the project and in the training of national cadres.

The transition to power-driven boats will be done through a credit system in conjunction with training on maintenance and repair work. A supply cooperative will provide the fishing equipment. The project includes a technical support facility which will have a small ice factory with silos, a cold storage room, a washing and processing room and so on. This facility will be built after a speeded-up call for bids; there will be an international call for bids for the generators and the outboard motors; the boats and fishing tackle will be purchased after restricted consultations. Some 20 fishing boats will be equipped each year for a period of 5 years and on a normal year their output is expected to be 2,500 tons of dried fish.

Medical facilities and supply of equipment (grant of 1.9 million ECUs). The purpose of this project is to increase the medical infrastructure of Guinea Bissau by building two local hospitals, each with 34 beds, and four health centers in localities of the center and east of the country (local hospitals

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in Quebo and Cosse and health centers in Xitole, Pontaingles, Bambadinea and Banta). The aim of this project is similar to that of the previous Fourth EDF Project, namely, to improve health services--to prevent as well as to cure illness--in rural areas which so far have been very neglected. To attract the interest of health personnel, housing will be provided for doctors and for other medical staff. Each hospital will have a pavillion for tuberculosis patients (10 beds), two hospital wards for general patients (18 beds), a maternity ward (6 beds), a section for doctors' offices and treatment clinics, a laboratory, a pharmacy and annex sections. All these facilities will be equipped in a simple but functional way. They will be built after a speeded up call for bids is issued and, for the equipment, there will be an international call for bids.

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MADAGASCAR

SECRET REPORT BY MONJA JAONA RECOUNTS REPRESSION OF STUDENTS

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 28 Apr 82 p 76

[Article by Senne Andriamirado: "Confidential Report to President Ratsiraka"]

[Text] The document of which we are publishing a part was to be classified "state secret" in 2 weeks by the Malagasy Government (along with other material on the same subject). It will not be so classified, because we are publishing it--in advance.

What is it about? It is a two-and-a-half page letter (in Malagasy) dated 17 March 1982 to President Didier Ratsiraka from the senior member of the Supreme Revolutionary Council and, by virtue of this position, the second ranking state official, Monja Jaona. In the letter, the elderly leader of the Monima Party--who, among other things, organized the peasant revolt in 1971--reports on the fatal clashes at the beginning of March in the town of Sambava (northeast coast), clashes of which the Madagascar public is not aware. The following, summarized in French, covers the essentials in the history of these riots protesting corruption and the black market as reported by the second highest official in the Democratic Republic of Madagascar.

For several weeks (in February), the students of Sambava General College had been demanding an explanation from the local authorities: Their families had contributed for construction of a new classroom, but construction had never started and the money had...disappeared. No official explanation, from either the college or the town officials. Instead, promises of a meeting which were never kept by the chairman of the People's Executive Committee (an elected "prefect"). One day (the document does not say which day), after having waited for 2 hours for this fine chairman who had again promised to come to the General College to explain, the angry students decided to march on the town. They seized and wrecked the People's Committee offices. The next day, the money was "found" in the committee's treasury: 5,978,422 Malagasy francs (the equivalent in francs CFA) borrowed by a merchant. The students stopped their strike and demonstration. A few days later, students of the town's high school in turn demonstrated also demanding an explanation of the use of their school's funds. They also complained of shortages, convinced that some town merchants, protected by the officials, were holding back products in order to sell them on the black market, naturally at a higher price. On 5 March these young people forced their way into shops and found large stocks of items which could not be found on the shelves. On 6 March, the merchants and businessmen persuaded

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the authorities to impose a curfew. On Sunday, 7 March, police and soldiers were stationed around the town.

The tragedy, the killing, came on the following day, 8 March. Soldiers in combat uniform, but armed only with clubs, arrived at the General College at 0700 to disperse students arriving normally for their classes. Exchange of insults. Stoning. Outnumbered, the soldiers retreat, but one of them has been killed and another seriously injured. A half-hour later, several trucks pull up in front of the school carrying police and soldiers, this time well armed. They open fire. The unequal battle lasts from 0800 to 1100 hours. Four students are killed, others seriously wounded. Some are drowned in trying to escape across the nearby river, still others reach the forest, where they are tracked by the special commandoes. Order reigns again in Sambava. The merchants are satisfied with the performance of the forces of order which call themselves socialist and revolutionary.

Monja Jaona's report concludes with a general view of the economic and political situation in Madagascar: Shortages prevail, the Malagasy people are in despair, and they are not informed about riots and repression. This is no doubt why Didier Ratsiraka wanted to stamp this document "state secret," since it raises too many questions about the government's readiness to open fire on the students, and also to protect the champions of the black market who are making their fortunes in the name of a socialist revolution, which is in fact a revolution never begun.

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MALAWI

BRIEFS

NEW RAILROAD LINE--The rail line recently built in Malawi with Canadian financing, linking Lilongwe with Mchinji near the Zambian border, opened to passenger and freight traffic on 1 February. Freight traffic has been running on a trial basis since last July. Elsewhere, traffic should be reduced by close to a third during the next few months on the Beira-Blantyre line, due to repair work on part of the track. It has been recommended that, as far as possible, freight forwarders direct to Nacala some traffic which generally passes through Beira. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1900, 9 Apr 82 p 97] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1982.] 9693

PETROLEUM PROSPECTING--During its visit to Malawi in June 1981, an American scientific expedition from Duke University (North Carolina) identified areas in Lake Malawi which might hold petroleum. This is why the Government of Malawi has signed an exploration contract with Shell which should enable the country's petroleum potential to be accurately defined. Three-quarters (30,000 square kilometers) of the lake belongs to Malawi, while the remaining quarter is in Mozambique. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1900, 9 Apr 82 p 97] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1982.] 9693

SALARIES INCREASED--Minimum wages in the public and private sectors in Malawi were increased by 15 percent as of 1 February 1982. The respective increases are: from 70 to 81 tambalas (1 Kwacha = 100 tambalas = 6.6 French francs) per day in the cities of Blantyre and Lilongwe; from 60 to 69 tambalas per day in the other cities; and from 50 to 58 tambalas per day outside the urban regions. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1900, 9 Apr 82 p 97] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1982.] 9693

PRESS HOLDINGS GROUP--The Press Holdings Group, which until now has been privately owned by President Banda, has been made a statutory body. You will recall that through its subsidiaries (about 20) and related companies (about 30), the group controls the key sectors of Malawi's economy. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1900, 9 Apr 82 p 97] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1982.] 9693

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MOZAMBIQUE

DETAILS OF COOPERATION WITH FRANCE REVIEWED

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1903, 30 Apr 82 p 1170

[Text] A general cooperation agreement between France and Mozambique--the first of its kind to be concluded with an African country since President Francois Mitterrand took office--was signed in Maputo, in mid-December, by Jean-Pierre Cot, minister for cooperation, and by Mario Machungo, his Mozambique counterpart (see MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS No 1885 of 25 December 1981, page 3449). By this agreement, it was decided, among other things, to set up a joint commission which will meet every 2 years and hold its first meeting in 1982.

This first meeting, which we announced in our last issue, page 1112, was held in Paris on 19 and 20 April. Eagerly awaited by both sides, the purpose of this meeting was, in the words of Jean-Pierre Cot, to enable this bilateral cooperation "to gain momentum" while in Maputo it was thought that it would contribute to "establish French-Mozambican relations for future years," relations which have already made new progress since the socialist government came to power in France last year.

On a more pedestrian level, the purpose of the meeting was, as is known, to decide how to use the credit of 700 million francs allocated for the import to Mozambique of French goods and services which represent the "second stage" of bilateral economic cooperation providing for higher volume of loans alongside easier terms for these loans, some of which are spread over a 7-year period. A first line of credit was used to finance a high-voltage power line going from the Cabora-Bassa Dam to the north of Mozambique and built by CGE-Alsthom.

On the eve of the meeting, a member of Mr Machungo's delegation noted that Mozambique wanted to apply the bulk of these credits to large agricultural and industrial projects and to infrastructure projects particularly in the spheres of railroad transportation and telecommunications.

The French proposals were for the Central Fund for Economic Cooperation to double its financial commitments to Mozambique in 1982-1983 and for the French Ministry of External Relations [for Cooperation] to treble its credits to that country.

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A significant event in the meeting of the joint commission was the signing of agreements for the execution of five projects:

--Modernization of the railroad line linking the port of Nacala with Entrelagos, on the Malawi border.

--Establishment of a training school for railroad personnel.

--Creation of an agricultural mechanization center in Milalene, 75 kms from Maputo.

--Building of an agro-industrial development complex on the middle course of the Incomati.

--Setting up of a fund to conduct feasibility studies on the cooperation projects.

It must also be noted that an agreement on food aid to Mozambique is under study. This is something absolutely essential in view of the adverse weather conditions suffered by the country (a drought in the north and torrential rains in the south have destroyed part of this year's crops) and given its economic difficulties which, as Mario Machungo pointed out, "are compounded by the destructive activities of South African-trained gangs."

The expansion of French-Mozambican cooperation also requires that a solution be brought to a problem which was discussed by the joint commission: the imbalance of trade between the two countries. The table below, which gives a brief comparative picture of trade between France and Mozambique, is revealing in this respect. Figures are given in 1,000 francs; by "exports" one must understand F.O.B. exports from France to Mozambique; by "imports" one must understand C.A.F. imports to France from Mozambique.

	Exports		Imports	
	1980	1981	1980	1981
Agricultural and food products	58,055	103,309	23,459	16,898
Semimanufactured products & intermediary goods	38,825	217,727	283	1,660
Raw materials	1,097	6,413	1,588	8,645
Capital goods	99,391	86,206	72	24
Consumer goods	17,443	22,479	18,798	28,066
Total	214,811	432,134	44,200	55,293

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This table indicates two phenomena: on the one hand, a much faster rate of increase for exports (101.16 percent increase from 1980 to 1981) than for imports (25.09 percent increase from 1980 to 1981); on the other hand, and as a result of the preceding, an increase in the amount of cover rates (485.99 percent in 1980 and 781.53 percent in 1981). For agricultural products and foodstuffs, the cover rate jumped from 247.47 percent in 1980 to 611.36 percent in 1981; for raw materials, from 69.08 percent to 74.18 percent on the other hand, the cover rate for consumer goods declined from 92.79 percent to 80.09 percent from one year to the other; for semi-manufactured and intermediary products and for equipment goods, there is total imbalance of trade.

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SENEGAL

DIOUF 'SHOWS POLITICAL COURAGE' IN MAKING CHANGES IN PS

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French No 1114, 12 May 82 p 29

[Article by Sylviane Kamara: "The Moralization Measures Affecting the Country Should Not Spare the Socialist Party in Power; Abdou Diouf Sweeps in Front of His Door"]

[Excerpts] Nine months away from the presidential and legislative elections, the secretary general of the Socialist Party (in power), Abdou Diouf, is more than ever determined to introduce change into the ranks of his own group. Already, at the communal and regional level, administrators who thought they were firmly ensconced in their armchairs have had to give up their seats. "Renewal has begun, and it will continue," Abdou Diouf told us. "It is up to the people to decide. It is up to them to choose their men. Freely, but with discipline." This "grassroots democracy" spares no one. It was seen 18 April in the defeat of the minister of social action, Babacar Diagne, whom the activists of the National Confederation of the Workers of Senegal (CNTS), affiliated with the PS, did not reelect to his duties as secretary general, preferring to him the number two man, Madia Diop (J.A. No 1113). This phenomenon can be observed at different levels of the party. It is not to everyone's taste.

For two reasons: it is the party in power, and it is therefore through it that one can "arrive." On the other hand, unquestionable laxity had set in. People closed their eyes. But since the establishment of the court for the elimination of illegal enrichment and the arrests which followed the budgetary appropriations affair (J.A. No 1101), they opened them wide.

"As president," Abdou Diouf informed us, "I must fight against all injustices. Now it is unjust and shocking that in an underdeveloped country like ours, a privileged few maintain a lifestyle out of proportion to their merits or the services rendered to the nation. The fact that they are in the party does not change a thing; they should submit to the law. I know that the purification of our political morals will cause some anxiety and arouse reactions of fear. We will exercise restraint in carrying on the fight against corruption. But no one will be sheltered." Since the PS numbers several black sheep in its ranks, the purge should be of major concern to it. The comment is heard in those quarters which feel affected that it is "a smart way for the secretary general to get rid of any who are troublesome--to settle scores with the representatives of the other tendencies."

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Abdou Diouf's position is certainly an uncomfortable one. The Senegalese expect him, as head of state, to pursue the struggle against corruption to the end but, as secretary general of the party, he runs the risk of being accused of eliminating potential rivals. The advantages of the purification campaign are at the same time economic, moral, and political in the strongest sense of the word. Its disadvantages stem from the politicking of politicians. Abdou Diouf has a choice to make. "I will follow the noblest course," he affirmed, "and believe me, I have no scores to settle with anyone."

The mode of operation of the Socialist Party has always drawn ironic comments from the opposition. Bailing out, remote control, and favoritism are said to be the basic principles. People even go so far as to speak of "gangrene." The term offends Abdou Diouf, who prefers "unweildiness." "It is true that in the past, and we are all to blame, information on what ought to be done has been wrung from the PS leadership. Some activists expect me to make my wishes known, to impose men or ideas. That is not my style. In the same way that I have wanted openness so as to allow a larger number of people to rejoin our ranks, I want internal democracy. But it is difficult!"

Because of the existence of divergent opinions, the secretary general is taking a risk. Not a very big one, because his popularity is very great--he has many convinced around him--but enough to be put in an awkward situation from time to time. As an opposition activist admitted: "Taking place a few months from the elections, this push for democratization of the Socialist Party is a fine demonstration of political courage."

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SENEGAL

SIGNIFICANCE OF ELECTION OF NEW CNTS SECRETARY NOTED

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French No 1113, 5 May 82 p 25

[Article by Sylviane Kamara: "The Trade Unions Are Moving"]

[Text] The winds of change are still blowing in Senegal. On 18 April, the National Confederation of Senegalese Workers (CNTS)--which is affiliated with the governing Socialist Party--elected a new secretary general: the 54-year old Madia Diop. Mr Diop replaces Minister of Social Welfare Babacar Diagne. The latter, furious, left the conference hall before the end of the meeting to demonstrate his dissent. The election is not without significance even apart from this incident. According to law, the secretary general of the CNTS automatically has a ministerial post, in the context of "responsible participation." Doudou Ngom, who headed the central organ of the CNTS until 1977, was minister of national education. But on 18 April, this provision was criticized for the first time, and the CNTS congress adopted a resolution--proposed by Madia Diop--specifying that the secretary general may no longer be a member of the government. The CNTS reserves the right for itself, on the other hand, to nominate members of the confederation's executive committee--there are eight of them, representing two different trends--for various ministerial posts related to the trade union movement: public offices, work and employment, etc. The secretary general, however, Madia Diop told us, should be at the Labor Exchange. "Experience has shown us how harmful this plurality of offices is. Doudou Ngom and Babacar Diagne both preferred their ministerial portfolios to the defense of the interests of the working classes. Furthermore, remote from the working world and without contact with the rank and file, they reigned over the CNTS like dictators."

Madia Diop, who does not mince words, is a veteran trade unionist. An accountant and the father of 14 children, he first took up the struggle at the age of 20 in the African Democratic Rally (RDA). A member of the Senegalese Progressive Union (which became the socialist party) from its inception, he joined the National Union of Senegalese Workers (the future CNTS) in 1967. His time with the railroads--whose workers are considered the best organized in the country--gave him a taste for tough trade union battles. He took over the Federation of Food Industries at the 1977 CNTS congress. This trade union is highly combative and--due to the number of its members--the most important. Madia Diop has been a radical trade unionist and deputy since 1978, but he was always kept out of the central leadership. "Although

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he was a member of the Socialist Party," they say in Dakar, "he was 'uncontrollable.' For him the interests of the workers came before everything else." This makes him very popular with the working class.

His recent election is no accident. Following the directives of the chief of state, who is also secretary general of the Socialist Party, the democratic game was played up to the hilt. President Abdou Diouf told JEUNE AFRIQUE: "I said it was the turn of the rank and file activists, whatever my own preference may be." Apart from Babacar Diagne and the group he represents, everyone has gained: not only--obviously--the workers, but also the government, which now has someone to deal with who is a member of the Socialist Party and enjoys wide support.

The secretary general of the Socialist Party--of whose executive committee Mr Diop is now an ipso facto member--believes changes will be made in the CNTS leadership. He also told us: "The styles and personalities of Mr Diop and Mr Diagne are different. So are their methods of performing their duties. Finally, and this is important, Mr Diop's election was based on a trade union renewal."

What is not likely to change, on the other hand, is "responsible participation"--in other words the ties between the CNTS leadership, the Socialist Party, and the government. Will Babacar Diagne, who was the symbol of these ties for 5 years and who has now turned over his position in the PS executive committee to Madia Diop, remain in the government? "I cannot answer that question," says President Abdou Diouf, "but I do not foresee any changes in ministerial posts for now."

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ZAIRE

NEW TERRITORIAL, POLITICAL, ADMINISTRATIVE ORGANIZATION

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1900, 9 Apr 82 p 973

[Text] The territorial, political, and administrative organization of Zaire, as well as methods for legislative, regional, and municipal elections and the status of the city of Kinshasa, were the subject of three important statutes signed by President Mobutu Sese Seko on 25 February 1982. Here are the basic points of these provisions, according to an analysis of the statutes by CEDIOM in Brussels.

Territorial, Political and Administrative Organization

The first statute, which defines the territorial, political, and administrative organization of the country, repeals legislation of 19 November 1977 and 20 January 1978 on the territorial and administrative organization of Zaire. It confirms the unitary democratic, social, and lay character of the republic and its division into eight regions plus the city of Kinshasa.

The Region

The region is a decentralized administrative unit with legal status and the following agencies: the Regional Committee of the Popular Movement of the Revolution (MPR); the Regional Assembly; the regional president of the MPR and governor of the region.

The Regional Committee of the MPR is composed of: the regional president of the MPR and the governor of the region designated by the president-founder of the MPR; the deputy governor of the region, designated by the president-founder of the MPR; the manager of the region; the urban commissioner; the regional secretary for mobilization, propaganda, and political animation; the regional secretary for the status of women; the regional secretary of the MPR Youth; the judge of the Court of Appeals; the commander of the military region; the regional administrator of the National Research and Investigation Center; the commander of the military district; the regional secretary of the National Union of Workers of Zaire (UNTZA); and the regional chairman of the National Association of Zairian Enterprises (ANZEA).

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The Regional Assembly is a deliberative assembly which rules by decision. It is composed of: one-third [are to be] persons from the region appointed by the president of the MPR, president of the Republic; representatives of the urban councils elected to the second level, with three members per Urban Council; representatives of the rural zone councils elected to the second level, with one representative per zone; representatives appointed by business and special interest groups, with one representative per group (UNTZA, ANEZA, ANAPEZA, and all of the recognized religious denominations). In general, the Regional Assembly has the authority to rule on anything involving the region. Its mandate is for 5 years.

Other Units

The subregions, urban and rural zones, and collectives are also administrative districts, but without legal status. Their agencies are: a Subregional Committee and a subregional chairman of the MPR for each subregion; an Urban Committee and an urban MPR chairman for each city; a Popular Zone Committee, Zone Council and chairman of the Popular Zone Committee and zone commissioner for each zone; a Popular Committee of the Collective, Collective Council, president of the Popular Committee of the Collective, and head of the Collective for each collective.

The City of Kinshasa

Kinshasa, the capital of Zaire, is a decentralized administrative unit with legal status. It is subdivided into urban zones, which are subdivided into districts. The capital's agencies are: the Regional Committee of the MPR, the Regional Assembly; the regional chairman of the MPR and city governor, appointed by the president of the MPR, president of the Republic. The regional MPR chairman is assisted by two deputy governors appointed by the president of the MPR.

The city's Regional Assembly is a deliberative assembly which rules by decision. It is composed of: one-third [are to be] members appointed by the president of the MPR, president of the republic; representatives of the urban zone councils elected to the second level, with three members per zone; representatives appointed by business and special interest groups, with one representative per group (UNTZA, ANEZA, ANAPEZE, and all recognized religious denominations).

The Regional Assembly of the city of Kinshasa is elected for a term of 5 years; it meets twice a year.

The Urban Zone is a decentralized administrative unit with legal status. It is divided into districts and has the following agencies: a Popular Zone Committee; a Zone Council; a chairman of the Popular Zone Committee, and zone commissioner.

Districts are administrative districts composing the Urban Zone but have no legal status. They are headed by district heads assisted by deputy district heads.

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Division of Responsibilities

The statute defines the division of responsibilities between the Executive Council and the decentralized units. All questions dealing with the country's general policy and with national sovereignty are under the sole jurisdiction of the central authority. These include the following, in particular: justice; foreign relations; national defense; domestic and foreign state security; commercial policy; economic stability; currency; the state budget; the drafting of legislation; national equalizations; large national facilities, especially ports and airports; postal service and telecommunications; the major orientation of national development; overall planning; scientific and technological research policy; education policy; economic sectors felt to be strategic: mining, hydrocarbons, and energy; and national public enterprises.

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ZAIRE

NEW ADMINISTRATIVE STRUCTURE FOR GECAMINES, SOZACOM

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1900, 9 Apr 82 p 974

[Text] We know that, at the same time as some public enterprises are being made private, Zairian authorities have decided to place General Quarries and Mines Company (GECAMINES) and Zairian Company for the Marketing of Ores (SOZACOM) under the overall authority of the president of the republic. GECAMINES had previously been under the authority of the president, and SOZACOM [had been] under the departments of Commerce and of Government Investment Holdings.

The new authority will be exercised through a committee composed of: the state commissioner for finance and budget, the state commissioner for transport and communications, the president's chief of staff, and the director of the Bank of Zaire.

Unless otherwise expressly provided, authority will be exercised especially over: the conclusion of labor and supply contracts; the organizing of services, organizational structure, status of personnel, and pay scales, as well as any modifications to them; the annual report; the establishment of branches and offices inside or outside Zaire; sales and acquisition of real estate and stock; loans; investments or sales of financial holdings; the private accounting program; the budget or forecast of income and expenditures; closing statements; and the balance sheet.

The boards of directors of the two companies have also been changed. From now on they will be composed as follows:

GECAMINES: the president and chairman of the board of GECAMINES; the secretary of state for finance; Mr Nda-Ngye Mpia, staff adviser to the president of the republic; the 1st state commissioner's deputy chief of staff; the assistant director of the Bank of Zaire; the head of the Department of Mining; the president and chairman of the board of SNCZ [Zairian National Railroad Company] and the president and chairman of the board of ONATRA [National Transportation Office] as representatives of the Department of Transport and Communications; the president and chairman of the board of SOZACOM; the technical manager and the financial manager of GECAMINES.

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SOZACOM: the president and chairman of the board of SOZACOM; the secretary of state for finance; Mr Nda-Ngye Mpia, staff adviser to the president of the republic; the 1st state commissioner's deputy chief of staff; the assistant director of the Bank of Zaire; the head of the Department of Foreign Commerce; the president and chairman of the board of GECAMINES; the technical manager and the financial manager of SOZACOM.

These decisions were the subject of statutes No 82-011 and 82-013 of 27 January 1982 for GECAMINES, and No 82-012 and 82-014 of the same date for SOZACOM.

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ZAIRE

BRIEFS

PORT OF BANANA--The financing of additional studies on the port of Banana, estimated at 4 million European units of account, was the subject of a meeting in Brussels last February which brought Zaire together with potential providers of funds. France and Italy pledged to cofinance detailed port studies and city planning. Belgium will provide financing for studies of electrical supply, while after the meeting of the joint German-Zairian Commission, West Germany could pledge to finance the water supply project study. Upon the request of the Executive Council, the European Development Fund, for its part, could finance studies on setting electrical rates for the port and industrial plants. Zaire will assume the expenses for the study of the Boma-Muanda highway. Furthermore, France and Belgium have confirmed their agreement to grant technical assistance to OEBK (Organization for Equipping the Banana-Kinshasa), and Japan has confirmed its interest in the study and improvement of the Matadi-Boma railroad. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1900, 9 Apr 82 p 974] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1982.] 9693

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