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USSR Report

MILITARY AFFAIRS

(FOUO 9/82)



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MILITARY SCIENCE, THEORY, STRATEGY

BOOK REVIEW: V. I. LENIN AND SOVIET MILITARY SCIENCE

Moscow VOPROSY FILOSOFII in Russian No 4, 1982 (signed to press 4 Apr 82)
pp 151-154

[Review by M. A. Gareyev of book "V. I. Lenin i sovetskaya voyennaya nauka" [V. I. Lenin and Soviet Military Science] by N. N. Azovtsev, 2d edition, revised and supplemented, "Nauka," Moscow, 1981, 352 pages]

[Text] The author of this book set for himself the goal of covering Lenin's contribution to creation of Soviet military science on the basis of a study and generalization of his theoretical and practical activities in the military field; to uncover the new elements Lenin introduced to the treasurehouse of Marxism on this matter; and to trace the subsequent development of Lenin's ideas.

The book makes an attempt to comprehend the problems posed as a complex, to understand Lenin's ideas as an integral system of views which reflected conditions of the first years of establishment and development of military science of the first socialist state in the world, and at the same time to demonstrate the close link of Lenin's ideas and military science of our days.

It should be emphasized in particular that in the course of his analysis of various problems of Soviet military science in all its stages of development, the author consistently identifies the current importance of Lenin's heritage and Lenin's approach to posing and resolving very complex issues of military organizational development and waging war in defense of the achievements of socialism, an approach necessarily assuming an organic connection of scientific objectivity and strictness with political realism and revolutionary principle, and consistent orientation on bold, imaginative search in the field of military theory and practice.

The book focuses primary attention on showing Lenin's imaginative development of the Marxist approach to an understanding of war as a sociopolitical phenomenon. The author reveals the fundamental difference between the Marxist-Leninist interpretation of the essence of war and bourgeois concepts. A proper understanding of the essence of war is impossible without Lenin's profoundly scientific, social-philosophical understanding of the essence of politics, without identifying its class nature and social-economic roots, and without a thorough analysis of the politics which preceded and gave rise to a particular war.

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On the basis of Leninist methodology the author also covers strictly military problems--the character of contemporary armed conflict. He examines the most important propositions, concepts and categories of military affairs in connection with their new qualitative definiteness generated by the entire course of social and scientific-technical progress. He covers the creative contribution of the 23d-25th CPSU congresses and Comrade L. I. Brezhnev personally to an evaluation of modern military phenomena, especially the military-political situation in the world under conditions of the opposition of two systems.

In conformity with Lenin's theses, the monograph notes that the Marxist-Leninist teaching on war and the army, based on a unity of the three components of Marxism-Leninism and directed toward an analysis of the origin, essence, social functioning and development of the army, is the immediate methodological basis of military science of the socialist state. It is also important to emphasize this aspect of the matter because the Marxist-Leninist teaching on war and the army sometimes is viewed only as a component part of historical materialism and no consideration is given to the fact that this teaching has both a social-political and political-economic content.

The monograph analyzes the laws of war. It points out in particular that one group comprises the most general laws reflecting the relationship of the course and outcome of war and armed conflict to the relative economic, moral-political, scientific-technical and military capabilities of the belligerents. Another group includes specific (special) laws reflecting essential inner relationships in the very phenomena of armed conflict as a uniform process of military operations on a strategic, operational and tactical scale. The distinction between general and specific laws of war and armed conflict have a relative, not absolute, character. They are interrelated and affect each other. It is correctly emphasized that both general laws (the laws of dialectics) as well as special laws reflecting the objective nature of military phenomena in the specific conditions of their appearance, change and development are manifested in armed conflict. An understanding of them provides a key to choosing the means and methods of controlling processes relating to the actions of armed forces in war. The book emphasizes that military science formulates the most important propositions and conclusions, which are a theoretical reflection of objective laws of the course and outcome of armed conflict.

Lenin's contribution to an elaboration of the principles of Soviet military art is shown convincingly. It is noted that he "revealed special qualities of military art of the socialist state as the art of a nationwide war against imperialist aggression, having emphasized its revolutionary, innovative character, purposefulness and decisiveness" (p 182).

On the basis of a study of Lenin's theoretical and practical endeavors in the military field and using literature published in recent years, it is shown that the Leninist methodology provides grounds for a correct understanding of specific features of laws of contemporary wars in which qualitatively new means of armed conflict may be employed.

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Lenin repeatedly emphasized the determining role of politics with respect to armed violence and noted that wars always have been and remain a continuation of the politics of states by means of armed violence. In Lenin's thinking this is "a theoretical basis of views on the significance of each given war."¹ He indicated that war is part of a whole and this whole is politics.

Of course the qualitative changes which are occurring in politics itself and the means of armed violence have complicated the interrelationship of politics and war. On the one hand the role and importance of politics increase and, on the other hand, nuclear missile weaponry exerts a considerably greater reverse influence on politics. The strategic character of war itself is changing radically. But for the main, in its social-political and class essence, war remains a continuation of politics by violent means.

Even today life indicates that any departure from these propositions and from class positions or the ignoring of this aspect of the matter leads to serious mistakes.

Graphic confirmation of this is the Maoist distortion of the Marxist-Leninist teaching on war and the army. Maoism absolutizes military violence and its means and identifies war exclusively with armed struggle apart from political and other forms of struggle. The left-opportunistic interpretation of the essence of war, especially in theses on the "omnipotence of war" and that "war can be destroyed only by means of war" has found its embodiment in the Maoist doctrine.

Also groundless are statements by some pseudorevolutionaries in the West to the effect that some provisions of Lenin's teaching on war and the army are inappropriate for analyzing present-day conditions. Many left-opportunistic ideologues exaggerate the specifics of war, absolutize its "bloody," violent element, and dissolve the essence of war in troop combat actions proper. Fawning on reactionary circles, they are attempting to justify the existence of the aggressive North Atlantic Alliance and their countries' participation in it. In so doing they even admit the possibility of remaining within this alliance if leftist forces should come to power in a particular country, i.e., remain part of a bloc aimed against the USSR and other socialist countries, part of an imperialist alliance of which one of the missions is to suppress the revolutionary movement, freedom and democracy.

The book devotes much attention to an analysis of the concrete use of Lenin's military-theoretical heritage in resolving certain problems of military science under new conditions of our party's struggle for peace, for strengthening national defense and improving the Army and Navy's combat readiness to repulse any aggression.

Issues such as the character and types of wars of the modern era, the essence and content of the revolution in military affairs and its influence on Armed Forces structure and their increased combat readiness, methodological problems of command and control, the scientific and moral-political potential, their role in reinforcing the military might of the socialist state, problems of moral-political and psychological preparation of Army and Navy troops and forces and a number of other problems also were developed.

1. V. I. Lenin, "Polnoye sobraniye sochineniy" [Complete Collected Works], XXVI, 316.

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The author systematizes Lenin's ideas on the structure of Soviet military science and notes that Soviet military science, in light of Lenin's military-theoretical heritage, represents a system of knowledge on the character and laws of war, on preparation of the Armed Forces and the country for war in order to defend socialism's achievements, and on methods of waging it. Jointly with other sciences, Soviet military science studies war as a complex socio-political phenomenon, but the primary subject of its study is armed conflict in war.

The most important components of Soviet military science, in addition to its general theory, are the theories of military art, organizational development of the Armed Forces, military training and indoctrination, military economics, and the rear. Military history plays an important role in understanding patterns of development of military art and the organizational development and training of the Armed Forces. It should be emphasized that a precise definition of the subject of military science contributes to an understanding of its interconnection and interrelationship with other sciences, to the identification of military problems in all other areas of scientific knowledge and, consequently, to a more qualitative, integrated and comprehensive study of war phenomena.

While setting forth these issues correctly on the whole, in our view the author also should have taken a critical look at certain views on the content and structure of military science in existence prior to the recent past and caused by an insufficiently deep understanding of the most important provisions of Lenin's theory of knowledge and fundamentals of the classification of sciences. This was reflected most often in a broadening interpretation of the subject of military science, in a mixing of its object and subject, and in lack of understanding that subjects of study of various sciences are determined not according to the factor of what departments they serve or what knowledge of related sciences they use, but above all in conformity with those principles which they directly understand to be categories and methods of research inherent to them. Attempts were made to include the entire system of knowledge on war and the army in military science based on these premises, but such issues as conditions of appearance, essence and origin of war and other issues cannot be understood using the methods of military science. This was done within the framework of historical materialism and political economy.

In the classification of military knowledge it was unfortunately not always taken into account that contemporary war, being a continuation of politics by violent means, is not only the clash of armed forces, but also a struggle in the field of politics, economics and ideology. Armed conflict comprises the deciding indication of war and its specific feature, but war is not limited to this. Other means, including economic, diplomatic and ideological means, also are employed to achieve the political goal set in war.

Clarification of the social essence of war and the army and the study of various forms of conflict involve a study of principles quite varied in nature--philosophical, social-political, economic, military and technical--and the elaboration of theoretical problems which are varied in their basis.

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And so an understanding of these principles as a whole, all together, is not within the capability of some one science. A study of all these complex, diverse phenomena can be made only through the joint efforts of a large number of sciences, including military science.

Three groups of objective processes and phenomena with their inherent principles requiring study stand out in all obviousness with an integral examination of war as a complex social-political phenomenon representing not only the clash of armed forces, but also a struggle of classes, states, coalitions and social systems.

The first group includes the most general laws of war, the sum total of the most fundamental, basic problems concerning the conditions for the appearance of war and the army, and their interrelationship with other social phenomena and with the philosophical-sociological, social-political and social-economic essence of war as a whole and of all forms of its conduct accomplished both by means of armed violence as well as other nonmilitary means. These issues are studied by all three components of Marxism-Leninism and by its teaching on war and the army.

The second group of objective phenomena and principles which are primary and deciding in war is connected with the specific features of a continuation of politics by means of armed violence in close connection with moral-political, economic and scientific-technical factors supporting the conduct of armed struggle. These problems serve as the subject of study for military science as well as special sectors of a number of social, natural and technical sciences which are contiguous with (border on) military science and which help prepare and conduct armed conflict.

The third group encompasses phenomena and principles stemming from features of struggling with an enemy by nonmilitary forms and means. During a war politics is implemented chiefly by means of armed violence, but armed conflict does not exhaust all means and forms of politics. Therefore other forms of struggle are necessary to conduct politics during a war: economic, scientific-technical, ideological, diplomatic and other means, with their subordination to the interests of waging armed conflict. The internal principles of these forms of conflict are studied by various social, natural and technical sciences in accordance with their subject matter.

Military science holds a special position within the overall system of knowledge on war and the army. Inasmuch as it is linked most of all with an understanding of armed conflict, it plays the chief role in elaborating methods for attaining political goals during a war. In our view, these and certain other issues were not properly substantiated in the book being reviewed.

A correct determination of the place of military science in the system of knowledge on war and the army and of its subject and structure has not only theoretical, but also great practical value. The classification of military science must ensure the scientifically grounded resolution of such matters as identifying those sectors of science where primary efforts must be concentrated for their development in accordance with practical needs; the

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organization and structure of scientific establishments; a systems approach to planning of scientific research projects; and the unification and coordination of efforts by scientific collectives for studying the most complex and inter-related current problems.

A scientifically grounded approach to the classification of a system of scientific knowledge on war and the army also is important from the standpoint of the orientation of all sectors of social, natural and technical sciences on the integrated study of problems of strengthening national defense and increasing the combat might of the Armed Forces.

The scientific-technical potential of developed socialism serves creative goals. But imperialist politics of the arms race forces the USSR and all countries of the socialist community to use the achievements of science to reinforce national defense and the country's Armed Forces.

The entire world knows that the Soviet Union is not striving for military-technical superiority, but the ever widening inclusion of scientific achievements in the sphere of military preparations by the imperialists and the keen rivalry in qualitative improvements in arms and combat equipment predetermine a shift in the center of gravity in organizational development and training of the Armed Forces to the field of a struggle of scientific and technical ideas.

We also have to reckon with the fact that scientific-technical progress is developing so swiftly that experience simply does not have time to accumulate in many fields of human endeavor. The need arises more and more in this regard to make decisions under conditions of a lack of experience. With regard to military affairs, their practice in peacetime always was relatively limited, since it is impossible to recreate many phenomena characteristic of a combat situation during combat training. The resolution of this problem becomes more and more difficult as the injurious effects of weapons increase, especially with the appearance of nuclear weapons.

Foresight, forecasting and simulation of the character of upcoming combat actions acquire especially great importance under these conditions. All this places higher demands on the organization, quality and effectiveness of scientific research.

The truth that the more complex military affairs become, the greater the theoretical training needed by military cadres becomes more and more obvious in our days. The ability to think broadly, deeply and quickly from the position of Marxism-Leninism, to see the relationship between the whole and the part, to set high goals for oneself and to find effective ways of achieving them all require constant improvement in cadres of various fields of knowledge in general and specialists of military science in particular. That is the objective necessity which confirms once again the truth of Lenin's thesis that the very best weapons produce no effect "in the absence of people capable of knowledgeably using the latest advancements of military technology."²

2. Lenin, IX, 156.

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The book also has shortcomings. Unfortunately the author did not provide a critical analysis of certain insolvent views distorting Lenin's genuine teaching on war and the army. It is impossible to agree with the author's statement that "military doctrine is formed with the help of military science and is based on its conclusions" (p 17). Military doctrine has its own military-political and military-technical aspects and so on a scientific plane is based on the entire system of knowledge on war and the army. Certain sectors of military science are covered too generally in the book.

In conclusion, evaluating the work as a whole, it has to be said that the readers received a useful book which continues the work of many military scholars, philosophers, economists and historians engaged in the study and propaganda of Lenin's military heritage.

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NAVAL FORCES

BOOK EXCERPTS: ON PSYCHOLOGICAL TRAINING OF NAVAL PERSONNEL

Moscow VOYNA, OKEAN, CHELOVEK in Russian 1980 (signed to press 31 Aug 79) pp 2-5, 182-204, 228-247

[Annotation, author collective, table of contents, introduction and chapters 6 and 8 from book "War, Ocean, Man", edited by Admiral V. M. Grishanov, 2d edition, supplemented, Voenizdat, 20,000 copies, 247 pages]

[Text] Annotation

In this edition, as in the first, the authors reveal the features of the moral, political and psychological training of Soviet naval seamen, and the basic forms and methods of efforts to improve the political and military knowledge of seamen, petty officers, seagoing and shore-based warrant officers and officers of the navy.

The book is intended for naval commanders and political workers, party and Komsomol activists, and teachers and students at naval schools.

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Introduction

The Soviet Union is persistently pursuing Lenin's policy of peace and supporting greater security of nations and broad international cooperation.

Article 28 of the new USSR Constitution reads: "The foreign policy of the USSR is directed at ensuring international conditions favoring development of communism in the USSR, at protecting the state interests of the Soviet Union, at supporting the struggle of peoples for national liberation and social progress, at preventing aggressive wars, at achieving universal and total disarmament and at consistently implementing the principle of peaceful coexistence among states with different social structures."

Implementing its policy of peace, the Soviet state is waging a persistent and consistent struggle to deepen detente, to implement the Concluding Act of the All-Europe Conference, to prohibit the use of force in international relations and to eliminate centers of war danger. "Mankind's most urgent, most pressing task," L. I. Brezhnev said during his meeting with voters of Moscow's Baumanskiy election district on 2 March 1979, "has now become cessation of the arms race and prevention of the threat of world nuclear war. As with other socialist countries, the Soviet Union is sparing no efforts in the struggle for these goals."*

*Brezhnev, L. I., "Vo imya schast'ya sovetskikh lyudey" [In Behalf of the Well-Being of the Soviet People], Moscow, 1979, p 19.

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However, reactionary forces in imperialist states are offering resistance to detente, increasing their military preparations, inflating military budgets, intensifying the strategic arms race and creating new, more destructive weapons of mass annihilation. Hiding behind the false assertion of a Soviet military threat, militaristic circles are making material and psychological preparations for a new world war. They are strengthening aggressive military blocs, widening their military presence in all regions of the world and fanning military psychosis.

The adventuristic course of the present leadership of China also represents a great danger to peace. The Chinese leadership has elevated, to the rank of state policy, the scuttling of detente and provocation of military conflicts. This policy is to the liking of the most reactionary forces that are staking their future on aggression and war.

The difficulties in the way of disarmament, the provocations by reactionary forces and their efforts to increase military psychosis demand all-out enhancement of alertness, growth of the struggle for peace and unification of all of its proponents. The Soviet Union is resolutely fighting in the international arena to eliminate the possibilities reactionary forces have for unleashing a new war. At the same time concern is being shown for strengthening the country's defense capabilities and improving the Soviet Armed Forces. Defense of the liberty and independence of the socialist fatherland and the security of the peoples of the USSR, and protection of the great achievements of socialism together with the fraternal armies of other countries of the socialist fraternity are a basic element in the overall efforts of the peoples to ensure a sound peace on our planet. "The Soviet Union is effectively caring for its defense," notes Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, "But it is not striving and it will not strive for military superiority over the other side. We do not want to disturb the approximate equality of military forces that has now evolved, for example, between the East and the West in Central Europe, or between the USSR and the USA."*

The Soviet Army and Navy possess the most sophisticated weapons and combat equipment. But their fighting power is based on more than just this alone. The Soviet soldier, with his deep ideological conviction, his high political maturity, his limitless devotion to the Communist Party, his faithfulness to his military duty before the people and his awareness of personal responsibility for the motherland's protection, is that decisive force which ensures our superiority over any aggressor.

The Communist Party constantly devotes considerable attention to indoctrination of Soviet soldiers. The CPSU Central Committee decree "On Further Improvement of Ideological Work and Political Indoctrination" notes that we need to implement measures aimed at intensifying the educational role of the Soviet Armed Forces.

Soviet military science is founded upon Lenin's interpretation of the relationships between man and equipment in war, upon constant growth of the role of the moral factor in modern conditions. Research conducted by scientists in this area finds practical applications in the moral, political and psychological training of Soviet soldiers. This is why the press's regular illumination of the recommendations made

*Brezhnev, L. I., "Leninskim kursom. Rechi i stat'i" [Following Lenin's Course. Speeches and Articles], Moscow, Vol 6, 1968, p 596.

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by research scientists--recommendations tested in the course of troop combat and political training--has important significance to improving this work.

As was true with the first edition of the book "War, Ocean, Man", the second edition examines the problems of moral, political and psychological training of naval personnel. The book does not claim to offer an exhaustive treatment of the problems it poses. Each of them may serve as a topic of special study. The goal of the book is to help commanders, political workers and party and Komsomol organizations solve problems associated with moral, political and psychological training of naval personnel.

The authors express their gratefulness to all commanders and political workers who had submitted their remarks and advice on the book's first edition, and thus rendered practical assistance in work on this edition.

Chapter 6. Special Features of Psychological Training of Naval Airmen, Marine Infantry, Coastal Missile and Artillery Troops and Some Rear Services

The Soviet Navy possesses harmoniously developed branches of forces--submarines, surface ships, marine aviation, marine infantry and coastal missile and artillery troops. The moral, political and psychological training afforded to personnel serving aboard submarines and surface ships was discussed above. The moral, political and psychological training afforded to personnel in the other branches of naval forces is structured on the same basis as the training provided on ships. It is the same in content and directions, and to a significant degree in forms and methods. But in relation to personnel of marine aviation, coastal missile and artillery troops and marine infantry, this training also has its unique features, ones stemming from the fact that these are naval branches of forces. The greatest uniqueness can be found in this case in the psychological training provided in conjunction with combat training.

1. In Marine Aviation

One of the main attack forces of the navy is marine aviation. Naval pilots must know how to fly confidently, perform missions above the ocean, land their craft on ships and on water and so on. Recalling the psychological difficulties of flying above the sea, three-time Hero of the Soviet Union A. I. Pokryshkin wrote: "Each time I looked out of the cockpit and saw the dark stormy sea, the raging water so absorbed my attention that for a few seconds I even ceased to perceive the roar of the engine. It was only by strength of will that I could surmount this sensation and return to the accustomed little world of my cockpit and the pointers of the instruments.

"But even then, it seemed at first to me that the engine was not roaring as it should and the pointers were threateningly rising to the critical limits.... It took some time for me to fully regain my senses...."*

There are doubtlessly certain difficulties in flying above the sea. It is harder, than over land, to visually determine flying altitude, the sensation of speed is

*Pokryshkin, A. I., "Nebo voyny" [The Sky of War], Moscow, 1966, pp 306-307.

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less, and sometimes the pilot may even experience the illusion of hovering flight. When the sky is clear and the water is still, an inexperienced pilot may mistake the water for the sky, and the sky for water. The shimmering reflections of sunlight and moonlight on water have a certain influence on visual perception. When a helicopter flies over water at low altitude, wave motion distorts the pilot's perception of the craft's actual motion, and it may cause pilot error.

Flying at night is even more complex. A bright star could easily be mistaken for a light on the surface of the sea, while the lights of ships may be mistaken for stars. When a pilot turns his aircraft southward in the Arctic, he may experience illusions due to the sharp contrast between the brightness of the northern and southern halves of the sky. Sometimes the illusion of banking flight or counter-rotation is created. Experienced pilots recommend looking at the bright side of the horizon at such moments. When a thin film of clouds is present and light shines from ice crystals in such clouds, pilots flying at low altitude sometimes see stars above and beneath them. Sometimes under these conditions a refraction effect occurs: Lights on the coast appear not in the horizontal but in the vertical plane.

When flying in northern regions, airmen must also get used to the northern lights. They are an unusually brilliant phenomenon, and their swift motion sometimes elicits the illusion of banking. Other unique features of flying at polar latitudes include sharp changes in weather, the enormous size of ice fields and the difficulties of using radiotechnical and other navigation resources.

There are unique features to taking off and landing on the water and on a landing pad on the deck of a ship. They require high skill and high moral and psychological preparedness from the airmen. At night, because the horizon is hard to see and because there are no flat illuminated surfaces to serve as reference points, it is harder to visually determine the craft's attitude above the sea than it is over land. The distance to a ship is harder to reckon, and its outlines are distorted. Development of confidence in the craft's dependability and of the ability to make the fullest possible use of the craft's potentials in all situations has great significance to airman training. These goals are served by deep study of the equipment, demonstration flights, critiques, the personal example of experienced pilots, the sharing of experience, encouragement of greater friendship between pilots, engineers, technicians and ship specialists, and mutual trust and respect.

Psychological preparation for the conditions of long cruises is important to personnel associated with carrier aviation. This training is similar to the psychological training afforded to personnel aboard surface ships in this regard.

All marine airmen must be made comfortable with the sea, they must know how to swim, and they must acquire certain naval skills. As with any seaman, the marine pilot must not fear water.

Special attention is required by young pilots. In the best military collectives they are acquainted with the combat history and traditions of the unit, their individual qualities are studied attentively, and novices are given jobs which fit most closely with each of their capabilities. Young airmen are included in the most experienced crews. An effort is always made to see that their first flights would be invariably successful.

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It is important to make note of even the minor first successes of young airmen. The first solo flights are celebrated as memorable and triumphant dates in their development as air warriors. At such times, combat leaflets and flash bulletins are published, photographs are taken as keepsakes, and certificates are awarded to the young pilots, with all the personnel formed up for the occasion.

It should be considered that sometimes, after their first introduction to flying, young pilots gain an incessant desire to fly, and they tend to overstate their possibilities. It is important to help them deeply recognize the requirements of flight discipline. As they learn to fly above the sea, the particular features of such flight must be brought to their attention most carefully by way of explanations and visual acquaintance.

Firm assimilation of what to do in emergency situations plays a major psychological role in the development of marine pilots. Effective results can be achieved by practicing, in trainers and in the air until they become automatic, the things to do when the engine stalls and when other malfunctions occur. Also effective are parachute jumps into water while wearing individual rescue resources, and catapult chair training.

Constant attention is devoted in naval aviation to preparing pilots for flight and for combat missions in adverse weather. This type of flying requires faultless work habits with instruments, a firm knowledge of sensations and perceptions, and the ability to control illusions that arise especially frequently in adverse weather. Here is how one marine pilot described a typical incident in the air: "During one of my flights I was led into the clouds. I was young at that time, and I was not sufficiently prepared for solo flying in clouds, not to mention with a wingmate. After hopelessly losing my leader, I peered out of the cockpit, and immediately the illusions arose. It seemed to me that I was rotating and that the airplane was flying straight upward. Moreover a loud roar suddenly filled my ears (it had to be in my imagination, because the engine was working normally). Soon after, my conception of what was up and what was down vanished. I could not have extricated myself from this difficult position without the help of my flight leader."

Psychological preparation of the marine pilot for flight in adverse weather necessarily presupposes his familiarization with all forms of illusions, their causes and the ways of preventing and surmounting them. Thus the pilot works on achieving a correct posture, he changes the positions of his hands, legs and body, he relaxes excessively tensed muscles, he learns to keep his eyes on the instrument panel (especially on the gyrohorizon, the vertical speed indicator and the turn-and-bank indicator), he learns to turn his head to the left and right, and he learns how to make painful sensations work for him.

Training in instrument piloting acquires certain psychological significance. It not only develops a capability for correctly evaluating instrument readings and reacting to them in the required fashion, but it also develops the pilot's habit of flying with instruments. Inasmuch as illusions often arise when the pilot shifts his glance from instruments to the world outside and back, he is taught to observe the instruments and to correctly distribute his attention between observing a target and controlling the airplane. This is achieved through constant training in the airplane cockpit, in training apparatus and in check-out and ferry flights.

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It is very important to teach the airman to trust the instrument readings more than his own sensations. This is a difficult task, one associated with the development of volitional qualities, and primarily self-control, as well as with developing the means of self-control and the techniques of self-inducement and volitional effort.

There are typical errors associated with flying in adverse weather. Pilots make them most frequently during the landing approach, attitude correction and landing, inasmuch as descending flight, penetration of clouds and approach of the landing strip make up a complex and critical phase of flight. The pilot's attention is taxed to the maximum at this time, and if the pilot is insufficiently prepared or if it had been a long time since he had done any hard flying, especially in adverse weather, the airman sometimes descends below safe altitude prematurely. This error is often observed in night flying, after penetrating the cloud cover during an approach assisted by long-range precision approach radar. On seeing the lights of the system, the pilot sometimes becomes absorbed by the airfield, his attention to instrument piloting weakens or disappears completely, and he fails to notice his drop in altitude. Also typical is the pilot's desire to see the airfield as soon as possible, and therefore he prematurely switches his attention to visual piloting, while the airplane is still in the clouds. This error can cause a loss of spatial orientation, which is hazardous at low altitude. By studying the typical errors and their psychological causes, crews become better prepared for flying in adverse weather.

Purposeful development of psychological and psychophysiological qualities important to the pilot acquire great significance in marine aviation. I am referring to visual, vestibular, organic and other sensations, powers of observation, attention, thinking in three dimensions, and the rate of thinking and reactions. A pilot possessing such qualities in a sense becomes a part of the airplane. He begins to imagine the airplane engine to be his heart, and its parts his organs. These psychological and psychophysiological qualities must be developed in airmen on the basis of a strictly individual approach.

There are many complex elements in the actions of aviation in adverse weather: flying in clouds, penetration of cloud cover, performance of various maneuvers in clouds, resumption of normal flight following such maneuvers, change in speed during instrument piloting (which elicits a sensation of pitching or diving), take-off and landing at minimum and below minimum weather, flight in rain, when a film of water forming on the cockpit glazing can distort perception of reference points or make them completely indistinguishable, and team flight.

A highly strict sequence must be followed in psychological preparation for flying in adverse weather. Psychological training is first provided in the course of ferry flights under the guidance of experienced pilots. Gradually, after the student masters the next level of difficulty in team flying, he progresses to solo control. After he gains confidence in his actions, the level of difficulty is raised, and once again the training begins with team piloting. In the first phase, the pilot may fly in clear weather with a hooded canopy. Then follow penetration of clouds at high altitude, relatively lengthy straight and even flight through clouds, performance of maneuvers in clouds, take-off and landing requiring penetration of a low cloud ceiling, target search and attack in adverse weather, team flight and performance of combat training missions.

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Many air unit commanders and political workers validly view the flight critique as one of the effective resources of airman psychological training. The pilot's confidence in himself in subsequent flights, his initiative, boldness and the creativeness of his approach to problem solving depend in many ways on how these critiques are conducted.

Airmen receive special training in aerial combat over the sea as well as in combat activities against marine targets. Engagement of enemy carrier task forces, surface ships and submarines has no comparisons. It is harder to approach a target covertly at sea than on land. Marine targets are highly maneuverable, they are small in size, and they possess high-power antiaircraft resources. This is why combat activities at sea require exceptional boldness, daring, resourcefulness, swiftness and cunning of airmen.

A certain amount of attention is devoted in the psychological training of marine airmen to their confident use of target search resources, to unmistakable and swift recognition of friendly and enemy ships, and to artful use of missiles, torpedoes and bombs in the face of artillery and electronic countermeasures in complex weather conditions. Ways are sought to acquaint the personnel of naval air forces with elements of combat such as antiaircraft fire, countermeasures by "enemy" fighter cover, dummy targets and the bursts of bombs, missiles and artillery shells.

Lengthy flying over the sea is typical of the combat activities of naval airmen. In this form of flying, owing to prolonged tension, motionlessness and constant observation of the instruments and the outside situation, the pilot may tire faster than usual, his lower back may begin to hurt, and he may start getting hungry, all of which would distract the pilot from his main task. Because of the long time monotonous stimuli act, he may begin to experience illusions, banking for example. A pilot must have great endurance, stability of attention and discipline. It is even harder to fly at high altitude: Pressure suits, oxygen breathing apparatus and excessive cockpit pressure impose additional loads. There is also a complete range of psychological difficulties unique to flying during air-to-air refueling.

All of this requires special training and moral and psychological preparation of airmen, based on formation of sound knowledge and habits, clear ideas, confidence, decisiveness, carefulness, powers of observation and self-control. Trainers have proven themselves well for such purposes.

Flying in combat at low altitude is also difficult. A higher, emotional reaction to danger is typical of such flying. This reaction is generated by the closeness of the water surface combined with the high flying speed. The pilot experiences greater internal activity and stress, and even his body temperature rises. Performance of missions in this form of flying is also made difficult by the complexities of using radiotechnical resources, by the swift movement of objects within the pilot's field of vision, by arisal of interference taking the form of a low cloud ceiling, fog and smoke, by refraction phenomena and by constraints on banking and on vertical maneuver. At low altitude, errors are made more frequently in determining distance to reference points and to targets, the distances between them and their shape and dimensions, and in estimating the situation. Sometimes the illusion is created that the water surface is rising ahead. Interception of targets flying at low altitude becomes more difficult.

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This is far from a complete list of the particular features of the work of marine pilots requiring mental, volitional and emotional training and development of the necessary qualities: sensations, perceptions, attention and ideas. Airmen are taught to make special preparations on the ground. One useful way to train the pilot's depth perception and develop stable habits in estimating distances is for pilots to memorize the dimensions of objects most frequently encountered at sea. Pilots should also be trained to orient themselves quickly, to study and create an image of the route ahead, and to develop powers of observation. Simulation of situations at sea with models and use of documentary films are useful in such training as well. Pilots should undergo systematic training in distributing their attention on piloting techniques, in maintaining visual observation of the situation and in working with a sight.

Airman tactical training is conducted strictly in keeping with the uses for which units and airplanes are intended in combat. Some airmen are trained to make missile, torpedo and bomb strikes against various targets, while others focus their attention on engaging enemy bombers, missile carriers and fighters in aerial combat, annihilating airborne weapons and supporting combat activities. The tactical training of antisubmarine air units focuses mainly on hunting for and tracking atomic missile and torpedo submarines, on practicing the means of reconnoitering attack resources and on other problems. In each case the tactical conditions corresponding to the particular missions are selected for the purposes of moral and psychological training.

Many measures implemented by political organs and party organizations also promote improvement of tactical training. Discussions and briefings given with the purpose of assisting the fastest possible assimilation of a new airplane are offered as an aid to pilots and navigators. During such functions the air crews are acquainted with the kind of training required in modern missile aviation, with the ways the missiles can be launched, with the fundamentals of using radar bomb sites and radio-technical bombing aids in the presence of radar interference, and with the safety measures associated with preparing for and performing missile and bomb strikes.

Marine airmen must be ready to act in response to the enemy's use of mass destruction weapons. With this purpose pilots learn the destructive action of such weapons and the particular ways they influence the combat activities of aviation, and they acquire the habits of protection against such weapons. They learn to respond to the consequences of the use of a mass destruction weapon, to correctly evaluate the radiation situation and to select the most effective ways of surmounting zones of radioactive contamination.

There is no place in combat training for simplifications. We cannot condone the fact that the crews of certain units practice few missile launches at unfamiliar training grounds, that radar sites and communication resources are not subjected to jamming, that pilots are allowed to reduce their speed when making torpedo and bombing runs, that the target situation is rarely changed at some training grounds and that the complexity of the maneuvers made by marine targets is insufficient.

Systematic participation in long flights over seas and oceans and participation in naval maneuvers are a powerful means of psychological preparation of marine airmen.

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The conditions afforded by long flights over the ocean and by maneuvers improve and temper the steadfastness, endurance, will and persistence of the airmen. Their habits of piloting in conditions close to those of real combat develop quickly and grow strong, and the airmen gain the mental stability they need in the struggle against the difficulties of long flights. Personnel of naval aviation are visually persuaded of the merits of domestic aviation technology, and they gain firm confidence in its strengths and possibilities.

2. In Marine Infantry

The marine assault landing has proven itself in the history of naval art of war as one of the effective and widespread means of combat of naval forces on their own and interaction with ground troops. During the Great Patriotic War our navy made four assault landing operations, and it landed 110 tactical assault forces. Soviet marines struck the enemy in the rear and in the flanks, they diverted sizeable enemy forces onto themselves, they foiled the enemy's offensive operations and they helped Soviet Army units win time to regroup forces and organize for an offensive. Because of their fearlessness, their daring in combat and their capability for fighting to the last breath and acting swiftly and decisively, enemies have referred to Soviet marines as "the black cloud" and "black devils." Here is what Leonid Sobolev wrote about seamen who fought on shore: "They are recognized at the front by the blue-and-white stripes that cover their broad chests, in which the seaman's spirit burns with rage and hatred for the enemy and pride for the fleet--a happy and valorous Red Navy spirit, one prepared for occasionally desperate acts of heroism, one ignorant of panic and despondency, the honest and faithful spirit of the Bolshevik, the Komsomol member, the devoted son of the motherland.

"The marine spirit is decisiveness, resourcefulness, stubborn valor and unshakeable steadfastness. It is joyful boldness, contempt of death, long-traditional seaman's violence and fierce hatred of the enemy. The marine spirit is straightforward combat friendship, a preparedness to support a comrade in combat, to rescue a casualty and to protect a commander and commissar with one's chest.

"The marine spirit is the great self-pride of people striving to be the first and best in everything. It is the amazing charm of a joyful, self-confident and lucky person, one who might be a little smug, a little partial to showiness, to the spotlight, to eloquence. There is nothing bad about these 'littles.' There is but one reason behind this elation, this somewhat deliberate pursuit of the spotlight, one reason, simple and pure: pride in one's colors, in the name of one's ship, pride in the term 'Red seaman,' graced by the glory of of the legendary deeds of Civil War seamen.

"The marine spirit is an enormous love of life....

"The marine spirit is a desire to win. The power of seamen is unrestrainable, persistent and purposeful....

"When they attack, they do so with the purpose of dislodging the enemy at all costs.

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"When they defend, they do so to the last, astounding the enemy with a steadfastness he cannot imagine or understand.

"And when seamen die in combat, they die in a way which strikes terror in the enemy: A seaman takes with him as many of the enemy as he sees before him.

"It is in it, in a valorous, courageous and proud marine spirit, that one of the sources of victory lies."*

Modern marines are the worthy successors to the glory of the seamen of the Great Patriotic War. Their possibilities have now expanded significantly. They are outfitted with amphibious tanks, armored transporters, powerful weapons, various landing resources and landing ships of various capacities. The marine infantry of the Soviet Navy is a highly mobile branch of forces intended for combat activities in marine assault landings and in defense of naval bases and other naval objectives. It is manned by ideologically mature, morally steadfast and excellently trained soldiers. These soldiers are persistently studying the ways of war in complex conditions and they are assimilating the specialties of marine assault troops, tank crews, gunners, scouts, combat engineers, divers and many others.

The unique features of the psychological training afforded to marines and to personnel aboard assault landing ships in preparation for combat missions are a product of the nature of these missions. They must be constantly ready to set out to sea, sometimes for long periods of time in severe weather; they must be ready to land on shore, to fight for a beachhead on shore and to hold and widen it, and they must be prepared to defend naval bases and other objectives from land.

Marines who must sail on ships and participate in sea crossings must become habituated to the sea. They must build up a resistance to seasickness, and they must become accustomed to life and activities aboard ships and other floating craft--that is, they must acquire the same qualities needed by all seamen. This is why the same forms and methods of training applied to ship personnel in general are also applicable to marines at sea.

After coming aboard ship, marines are usually introduced to the crews, and they attend conferences and meetings. Such meetings and this form of acquainting the assault landing troops with the ship's equipment and with the work and life of the crew improve their psychological preparedness.

Joint training and political indoctrination measures are a regular occurrence throughout the entire cruising time. Damage control, landing preparation, overboard rescue, boat lowering, boat manning and other exercises are conducted. Joint wall and radio newspapers, combat leaflets and flash bulletins are published, and socialist competition is encouraged, for which purpose common pledges are adopted.

During a cruise and just prior to it, party-political measures that nurture a pride for one's branch of troops and a love for one's regiment and subunit in the marines are conducted. Ceremonies commemorating heroes of the assault landing forces who

*Sobolev, L., "Morskaya dusha. Zelenyy luch. Dorogami pobed" [The Marine Spirit. The Green Ray. The Roads of Victory], Moscow, 1956, pp 402-403.

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died in the war and ceremonies initiating young soldiers into the assault forces are regularly held.

Every seaman knows that it is often easier to stay at sea than to land on an unprepared shore. Special difficulties arise in stormy weather, when rocks, reefs, cliffs and ice are present, and all the more so when there is enemy resistance. The experience of combat teaches us that sooner or later, troops will have to land even in icy water, often without adequate rations and gear, but loaded to the fullest with weapons and ammunition. Assault troops land with the internal awareness that it would be much more difficult to return or to retreat for one reason or another than it would be to land, and that for practical purposes retreat is impossible. To them, every landing is a decisive one.

Assault troops landing on shore must have a good knowledge of the conditions awaiting them, and they must be totally comfortable in the water. It is for these purposes that marines get together with experienced soldiers and with the ship's personnel, that the actions they are to take after landing are visually demonstrated, that the landing resources to be used are thoroughly studied and that confidence in these resources is built up. Getting assault troops to know the territory in which they are to engage in combat better produces useful results. They study the bottom relief near the shore, and that of land adjacent to the water line.

Young assault troops are "broken in" aboard small boats. They are taught to navigate boats with oars and sails, to ride the waves to shore and to take off from shore, to jump into the water fully clothed from a rocking boat and to swim comfortably. They learn rigging, knot-tying and mooring line throwing. Diver training in the entire range of accessible depths and in calm and stormy seas is useful.

In addition to participating in the measures listed above, tankmen preparing for sea crossings and for disembarkation from assault landing ships study the rescue resources and the rules of using them. They practice dives in rescue gear, they exercise in tank damage control, they acquaint themselves with the seagoing qualities of the combat vehicles, and they train in special basins and in flooding chambers. In their training, the tankmen practice the actions they would take in shallow water and when traveling over the surface of the sea for short distances. The crews acquire confidence in driving the combat vehicles over water, in surmounting narrow passages, in dropping and weighing anchor and in damage control. Gradually the distance to the shore and the travel time are increased, poorer weather is selected for training, the damage control scenario is made more complex, and amphibious travel is practiced by groups of several crews in good and bad visibility.

The personnel of assault landing ships experience certain psychological difficulties associated with approaching the shore, shallow water, especially in stormy weather and at night, in the presence of mines, during total radio silence and darkness, and when shore targets are fired upon over the heads of assault forces en route and already ashore. Special training and exercises help to prepare the troops to surmount these difficulties, and to teach them to act confidently and competently.

Inevitably in a modern war, a marine assault landing force will be met by strong defenses and enemy opposition. If they are to surmount this opposition, the soldiers will have to display high proficiency, great inner strength, fearlessness and

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decisiveness. A member of an assault landing force must be ready to surmount minefields, wire entanglements and other engineer fortifications, artillery barrages, enemy aviation, hand-to-hand combat and tanks. In this training we use the techniques and resources of psychological training employed in the ground troops.

The fear of mines is surmounted by studying mine-type weapons and learning how to handle them, disarm them and clear passages through minefields. Experience has demonstrated the effectiveness of practical work with explosives and with training mines containing low-power simulating charges which ignite if the student acts incorrectly.

Interchangeability of crewmembers, which must be practically complete, has especially high significance in marine subunits. All actions by assault landing forces at night must be just as confident as in daylight, and this requires regular night-times exercises and training of continually growing complexity.

Simplifications such as, for example, regular training and exercises in the same well-studied places of embarkation and disembarkation are detrimental to psychological training. Ships are allowed to approach the shore at high speed, without even making depth checks, and no resistance or losses are simulated as the assault force lands. On shore the latter finds familiar targets that had been used many times before. The "enemy" shore is well equipped with navigation markers, and so on. In such an approach the people never experience psychological difficulties that would toughen them for future combat.

Marine subunits often conduct exercises in areas where marine assault landing forces had fought during the war. Commanders and political workers capitalize upon this to acquaint the personnel with combat traditions. Meetings with participants of assault landing operations in the Great Patriotic War and analysis of their combat experience make a deep impression on the soldiers.

Booklets, information files and wall posters prepared by political sections have a positive moral and psychological influence upon assault force troops. Examples of some booklet titles are "Preparing for an Assault Landing Operation," "The First Wave of a Marine Assault Force," "Read and Remember, Tankman!" and others.

The training marines receive in defending naval bases and other naval objectives and in capturing enemy bases and objectives is basically the same as the training received by ground troops in terms of purpose, forms and methods. Assault troops must be morally and psychologically prepared to act primarily in the face of the enemy's conventional weapons. They must be prepared to fight the enemy's aviation and tanks, to deal with radioactive, chemical and bacteriological contamination and to fight in the city.

Simulation of the typical background of combat--explosions, fires, interference--is a valuable way to psychologically toughen the personnel during field exercises. Soldiers become psychologically resistant to the whistle of bullets and nearby explosions of artillery shells and bombs by participating in gunnery practices, using smoke-puff charges, and experiencing the explosions of training charges and of overhead fire. Stability in the face of gunfire and fire grows as the student learns the properties of incendiary resources, as he practices firefighting techniques and burn care, and as he develops the habits of surmounting fire barrages.

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Assault troops benefit from exposure to airplanes flying over them at low altitude, to diving aircraft and to tanks and combat vehicles overrunning their positions. Exercise in jumping off and on moving tanks and throwing grenades at moving targets is a commonly encountered practice.

Assault troops gain some idea about the actions they would take in response to the enemy's use of mass destruction weapons by studying special literature, by acquainting themselves with visual aids, by participating in training in which fires are simulated and in which mock-ups of houses and defensive structures are demolished, by performing exercises in smoke chambers and on terrain contaminated by training war gases and so on.

The physical training of assault troops is organized with a consideration for the high requirements imposed on their physical qualities, and with an eye on their psychological training. They practice and take the tests of the Military-Sports Complex fully clothed, since this is the way they would have to act in a combat situation. The pentathlon includes a 100-meter dash, a 3-km cross-country run, diving from a tower and swimming, and a forced march of 6 km. Moreover assault troops run an obstacle course, row a six-oared boat for a distance of 2 km and throw grenades for distance and accuracy. They also practice the techniques of close combat: self-defense, hand-to-hand fighting with an automatic weapon, spade and bayonet.

Marine units are actively seeking new possibilities for using physical training and sports creatively to prepare the personnel psychologically. For example an obstacle course can be improved with deep, wide pits filled with water or burning materials, high obstacles, narrow and rocking bridges, burning beams and so on. Sometimes such a course is referred to as a "fire trail." The psychological load experienced by soldiers running an obstacle course can be intensified by including noise and light effects (explosions, gunfire, flashes of light, sirens, and so on). Certain elements of special tactical training are practiced on such courses as well: contending with tanks, surmounting minefields and wire entanglements and laying mines.

Special equipment is also used for psychological training. Thus one of the units has set up a "tower of bravery." This is a securely built structure about 15 meters tall. Soldiers climb up it on a rope ladder and descend grasping metal tubes 35 cm long sliding on cables tilted at various angles. This structure helps to develop strength, agility, fast reactions, boldness and decisiveness.

It is important in such creative efforts to simulate as accurately as possible the situations and obstacles which assault troops would encounter when landing on a shore. These exercises must also be diversified.

Sports such as rugby, free-style wrestling, diving into water from a trampoline and so on are broadly employed in the psychological training of marine infantry. The physical training of marine assault troops includes daily physical exercises, planned lessons in physical education and 10-15 minute exercise sessions before assuming watch. Assault troops compete in strength, agility and endurance during time off from study and work.

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3. In Coastal Missile and Artillery Forces

Soldiers of the navy's missile and artillery troops are outfitted with the most up-to-date weapons and combat equipment. This includes sophisticated guided missiles, automatic control systems, long-range artillery, radar and much else. The firepower of the troops, their range of action and the accuracy of their strikes make for dependable defense of a coastline and of important military-industrial objectives in the country's maritime regions against attacks from the sea, and ensure annihilation of enemy forces far away from shore.

Soldiers of many specialties serve in the coastal missile and artillery troops. They include missilemen, gunners, radiometric specialists, signalmen, drivers and so on. Their psychological training falls into three categories associated with the particular missions and conditions of fighting the enemy on land, in the air and at sea. These categories are similar, and therefore we will examine them together.

Training for combat against the marine and airborne enemy has much in common in content and methods with the training afforded to all missilemen, antiaircraft missilemen, gunners and antiaircraft gunners. The great importance of their missions presupposes, first of all, constant readiness to perform one's military duty at all costs, at any time and to the last breath. Soldiers in these specialties are taught to act boldly, decisively and effectively in response to surprise attacks and massed attacks by the enemy. The methods of this training include such elements as abrupt transitions from a ready state or simple activity to maximally complex conditions (surprise alerts in which maximally complex conditions are immediately created, abrupt and frequent transitions from inactivity to a maximum load and back, practice with the large number of targets that could realistically be expected in a massed raid and so on).

Steps taken to dispel the personnel's fear of airplanes can be useful: overflights at low altitude by diving aircraft, attacks on combat positions by aircraft firing dummy rounds, and simultaneous simulation of the explosions of artillery shells and bombs near the personnel.

Simulation of the complex and tense conditions of combat against the marine and airborne enemy has a toughening action upon the personnel. In addition to the usual procedures, the following special ones can be employed:

simulation of targets coming in from different directions, performing all possible maneuvers in course and speed and flying at speeds which would actually be encountered in combat;

a significant increase in the number of targets;

interruptions in target indication, in transmission of information on the enemy from radar stations and significant errors in the information;

sharp reduction of work station lighting;

loss (disruption) of external or internal communication through oral scenario inputs, disconnection (breakage) of circuits, grounding of conductors, placement of hoods over microphones;

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simulation of the enemy's use of dummy targets and antiradar homing projectiles;

practice of all forms of fire;

abrupt change in the number of targets, disappearance of targets being tracked and enlargement of returns from local features.

Missilemen must display special endurance in the presence of intense interference and after suffering combat-related damage.

In modern warfare, the soldier must be prepared to act confidently and calmly in the presence of electronic countermeasures, he must become accustomed to jamming, and he should learn to treat it as something normal.

Equipment damage and malfunctions should not cause confusion in the specialist either. For this purpose he studies and practices the methods of finding and eliminating faults. But to toughen the soldier it would be important to simulate the most diverse problems in the work of equipment during simulated combat; moreover the simulation should be unexpected, it should occur when the situation is at its most critical point, and in conjunction with other exercise inputs. Special attention is turned to preparing the operator to work with partially malfunctioning apparatus. Although they might make the work more difficult, many malfunctions and combat-related damage arising in auxiliary circuits need not cause a mission to fail. The soldier must know how to act creatively in such situations.

Inasmuch as combat activities proceed in constant coordination with different naval branches of forces, coastal missile and artillery troops train for such activities. Training in recognition of friendly ships and airplanes and development of powers of observation and professional memory are effective. During practical lessons, training sessions and exercises it would be suitable to broadly simulate situations in which a certain number of maneuvering targets are mixed in with friendly ships and airplanes. Moreover the number of both the former and the latter should be constantly increased. Systematic lessons in a real situation, where some of the forces act as the enemy, should be given proper attention. Moreover, targets may be simulated on display screens on the background of a real situation, and malfunctions can be simulated in target identification equipment.

Special training measures are implemented to prepare missilemen, gunners, radar operators and signalmen for action in the face of the enemy's use of mass destruction weapons. They include notification of the "enemy's" use of such weapons and simulation of the consequences: interruption of communication, power and water supply, jamming of doors, fires, lengthy, hard work by the soldiers for 2-5 hours while wearing personal protective resources, in the presence of high temperatures at the work stations, manpower losses and so on. The general training procedures discussed earlier are used as well.

In addition, attention is turned in the psychological training of coastal missile and artillery troops to their readiness to repel acts of sabotage, to which the enemy will doubtlessly resort. Transmitting false instructions, commands and information is recommended during training for this purpose. At certain times the soldiers may find themselves fighting on land together with a landed force.

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Therefore their moral-psychological training should include land combat in which the enemy uses infantry, artillery and mortar weapons, incendiary resources and even tanks. The soldiers must be ready for close combat as well. The procedures and methods of such training are much the same as those employed with Soviet Army ground troops and marines.

4. In Some Rear Services

Timely and fully adequate rear support has always played a significant role in the success of the navy's combat activities. Today the navy's rear services are a complex combat organism consisting of numerous services performing different functions aimed at providing comprehensive support to the fleet both in a coastal zone and in remote regions of the seas and oceans. The rear services possess modern auxiliary vessels of various types, high-power and complex equipment and shore bases. The personnel of the rear services are more than just quartermasters today--specialists in food, clothing and boatswain's supply; they are also engineers, technicians and experienced seamen.

Inasmuch as the navy's combat activities may proceed over vast expanses of the seas and oceans, completely new requirements are imposed on rear services personnel. Supporting naval forces operating at sea or on the ocean, the crews of auxiliary vessels have the job of promptly ferrying all of the stores needed by the fleet from the rear bases to the regions of combat activities, and rendering assistance in restoring the fleet's battleworthiness. The seamen of auxiliary vessels must also sometimes spend as much time at sea as warship crews. In modern warfare, they will operate in a situation of great danger and relatively less protection than that afforded to warships. The personnel of such vessels will need bravery, steadfastness, selflessness and resourcefulness. The psychological training afforded to seamen of the auxiliary fleet must be aimed at nurturing the moral and combat qualities they need.

There is much in common in the methods used in psychological training afforded to seamen aboard auxiliary vessels and those used in the training of warship personnel. Practical participation in rear support to long naval cruises today arms the seamen of auxiliary vessels with rich professional experience and teaches them to think broadly and act confidently on the ocean expanses. This experience also develops seagoing qualities, imparts naval skills and adapts the personnel to the difficult conditions of long cruises.

If the moral-combat qualities of auxiliary vessel seamen are to be improved, they must undergo special training in conditions as close as possible to those of real combat, and they must be acquainted in greater detail with what to expect in a combat situation. This category of soldiers must be adapted to surprise raids by airplanes flying at maximum speed, to the means of combatting them, to encounters with enemy submarines, to the danger of minefields, and to sailing as part of a large convoy; they must learn to act in all combat situations, and they must be prepared for the most complex damage control situations.

An extremely important form of support is provided to the actions of the fleets by personnel of the emergency rescue service. There is much in common their training with that provided to seamen aboard warships and auxiliary vessels. But special

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emphasis is validly laid upon psychological preparation for actions in the most complex weather conditions, since it is precisely in such conditions that ships and vessels in distress require assistance as a rule. Personnel of the emergency rescue service learn swiftness of action, decisiveness, aggressiveness, self-control, endurance, agility, skill, resourcefulness and boldness. Excellence of naval skills is a priority quality of rescue specialists.

It is especially useful to study the experience of former emergency and emergency rescue operations, especially with officers of the emergency rescue service--not only from a naval and technical point of view but also from a moral-psychological standpoint. After all, the condition and behavior of people in emergency situations are unique, requiring an understanding and the ability to control them. The preparedness of emergency rescue service officers is improved by comprehensively and intensively developing their volitional qualities and their ability to control people, to lead them in critical moments, to inspire trust, to make psychologically competent decisions and to efficiently organize rescue operations.

Rescue vessels must be in a high state of readiness to set out for sea for the purposes of aiding ships in distress; this means that seamen must develop swiftness of action, efficiency and an ability to shift quickly from a state of prolonged anticipation to actions at maximum effort, and they must develop resistance to monotonous factors that may weaken their alertness. Special work is done to keep the personnel in a high state of readiness for these purposes.

Conventional and deep-sea divers occupy a special place among specialists of the naval rear services. During the Great Patriotic War they rescued personnel from sunken submarines and surface ships and from damaged ships, they made ship repairs under water, often under savage enemy fire, they assisted in the landing of marine assault forces, they erected bridges, cleared mines and damaged hydraulic engineering structures from harbors, restored moorings and laid cables and pipelines beneath the water.

The conditions under which the navy serves today have raised the requirements on divers even higher. Only he who is well prepared not only in physical and occupational respects but also from a moral-political and psychological standpoint can quickly find a puncture, orient himself easily within a sunken ship, place explosives correctly or weld a seam in deep water.

Ideological maturity is nurtured and high proficiency, courage and a preparedness for self-sacrifice in behalf of the rescue of others are formed in seamen of the diving service. Their indoctrination takes various forms, to include meetings of deep-sea divers with submarine personnel and navy veterans.

The political directorate of the twice-awarded Red Banner Baltic Fleet once published a special collection of stories about the heroic deeds of naval divers in peacetime. It also provides biographical information on divers who have earned orders and medals of the Soviet Union. Displays describing the bravery of divers have been organized at many bases and in many rooms of combat glory and museums.

Divers must be ultimately confident in the dependability of their equipment. This confidence is developed through the witnessing of the actions of experienced specialists, during dives, in damage control exercises and through mutual aid

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training. Naturally, if the seaman has an excellent knowledge of his diving equipment, all of this training will be effective.

The mental stability of divers depends in many ways on their individual features and on development of their powers of observation and of underwater work habits. The aquatic environment is qualitatively different from the aerial environment, and it imposes serious requirements upon the individual. It has a physiological influence upon the body, which by itself alters the course of mental processes. But the aquatic environment can also influence these processes directly. Thus objects look larger and seem closer in water. Color sensation is altered. As an example a red object may appear black or green. As depth increases the lighting conditions change significantly. Sound perception significantly loses its directionality, and so on. These and many other features require purposeful development of the psychological qualities needed by divers.

The training of shore-based rear services also has unique features. This category of personnel, diverse in its specialties, performs important functions associated with preparing and supporting ships, vessels, airplanes, missile and artillery troops and marine units in their combat missions.

The methods used in the psychological training provided to personnel of shore-based rear services are basically the same as the methods existing in the ground troops and marines. Drivers, supply personnel, engineers, repairmen, technicians, gunsmiths, medical workers and other specialists must be thoroughly prepared to perform their missions in the face of air strikes and actions by sabotage groups and assault forces, and they must be especially prepared to act following the enemy's use of mass destruction weapons.

Ideological and Psychological Brainwashing of Personnel in the Navies of Imperialist States*

The constantly increasing power of the Soviet Union and countries of the socialist fraternity and growth in the popularity of the ideals of socialism and in the successes of the national liberation movement have altered the balance of forces in the international arena.

Due to their continual economic growth, which is predetermined by the very nature of socialist society--a society that serves the interests of the laboring masses, and owing to a foreign policy aimed at confirming peaceful coexistence and exerting an increasingly greater influence on international relations, the fraternal socialist countries are now playing a major role in averting a new world war, reinforcing international security and developing the process of detente.

Suffering failure in its policy of dealing "from a position of strength," under the pressure of a powerful movement of all democratic forces imperialism has been compelled to recognize the need for detente. But naturally this does not mean that the nature and reactionary essence of imperialism has changed. Aggressive circles

*Information contained in this chapter on the navies of imperialist states was obtained from foreign publications.

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in the imperialist states, and mainly in the United States of America, refuse to recognize the positive changes that have occurred in the international situation. As in the cold war years, they continue to profess a supposed "Soviet threat," they support racist and other reactionary regimes, and they commit open acts of aggression against liberated countries and movements of national liberation. The arms race which imperialism began is continuing.

Sizeable armed forces are being maintained with arms at ready by the principal imperialist countries. Numerous military bases are being maintained at the borders of peaceful states, and they are constantly being reinforced with more and more new arms and combat equipment.

Presence of mass armies in which most of the personnel are from the laboring classes places a heavy burden upon the ruling circles of imperialist countries: They must achieve complete subordination of the privates and seamen to the interests of the imperialist bourgeoisie, and their unquestioning participation in military adventures. Military circles are attempting various ways to solve the problems of ideological brainwashing of the public and of the personnel of their armed forces. They spend huge sums not only to furnish the armies and navies with modern arms and combat equipment. Huge amounts are spent on brainwashing the personnel in the spirit of devotion to the bourgeois structure and hatred of communism. Reactionary forces are doing everything they can to shield the minds of their privates and seamen from progressive ideas.

Imperialism cannot hope for success if it openly declares its real goals. It is compelled to create an entire system of ideological myths which cloud over the true meaning behind its intentions. For this purpose it has created a gigantic propaganda machine, capitalizing on all modern resources of ideological influence.

The apologists of the capitalist structure have had rich experience in deceiving the popular masses. They have at their disposal a vast and well-tested propaganda system, a carefully tuned machine for political brainwashing. In the armed forces of capitalist states there is a broad network of personnel organs and scientific research organizations with which to do this work. The responsibility for the morale of the personnel and their combat readiness is imposed upon the commanders of the ships, units and formations. There is additionally a professional official system of propagandists. In the U.S. Armed Forces this system consists of an information directorate and the appropriate sections and departments in the formations. Concerned for maintaining the moral and combat spirit required of the personnel today, the Pentagon continues to increase the size of its staff of ideological personnel in the navy. Moreover a number of scientific research institutions are involved in efforts to solve moral-combat problems, to include the navy's institute of human resources, its center for training equipment, its institute of aerospace medicine and a naval scientific research laboratory of undersea medicine. The recommendations and proposals of these institutions are used aboard the fleet's ships.

Naval and marine corps associations also deal with the propaganda of militarism and brainwashing of personnel in the U.S. Navy. These are professional associations of naval personnel. Many other groups, including the American Legion, veterans' organizations and war industry associations serve the same purposes.

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Other imperialist states also possess a sizeable brainwashing system. In Great Britain it consists of four departments contained within the naval staff and subordinated to the navy's second minister, who is responsible for personnel affairs. The principal executive organ is the department of general education. It does intensive work with naval personnel through a broad network of specialized officers. In addition to monitoring general education and vocational-technical training, this department publishes various handbooks, textbooks and programs, and it prints propaganda literature, informative materials and teaching instructions. It also trains officer instructors for ideological stupefaction of naval seamen. A department responsible for organizing leisure time and services manages this process in off-duty time.

The process of religious befuddlement of the personnel is under the guidance of the navy's chaplains' department. Chaplains are present aboard all large ships and in all formations. They are the "spiritual assistants" of the commanders, and they have the right to interfere in all aspects of the service and life of the seamen, and keep their behavior and political moods under surveillance, keeping the command informed about everything.

Propaganda of militaristic naval conceptions among the civilian public is the responsibility of the department of naval information. Books, pamphlets and other printed matter are published under its guidance with the purpose of exalting the actions of the navy in colonial and predatory wars and publicizing reactionary naval traditions, militarism and chauvinism.

Besides this official brainwashing system, militaristic circles are creating various public organizations in order to encourage the participation of the broad sailor masses in the process of ideological stupefaction. The purpose for this is to make the activity appear to be of objective necessity, to be in keeping with the interests of each seaman. In its time, the main headquarters of the U.S. Navy adopted a decision creating so-called "general education centers" in all units and aboard large ships. These were specially equipped rooms and compartments "for self-education and information for servicemen of all categories, including officers." According to the newspaper THE NAVY TIMES, creation of such centers attests to the command's aspiration for shifting the main efforts in personnel training directly to the ships and units. It is with this same purpose in mind that military religious propaganda has been maximized aboard ships and in the units of the American navy. The staff of priests and chaplains in the navy totals about 1,000 officers of the military clerical service, to include up to 800 protestants and about 200 representatives of the Catholic and Jewish faiths.

The system itself of selecting persons to serve aboard the navy's ships creates favorable conditions for the personnel's brainwashing. The navies of the principal imperialist states are manned by mercenaries. Such a system can be explained by profound sociopolitical reasons. In order to be able to rely on those whom they arm with modern menacing weapons, the ruling circles of imperialist states want to have certain guarantees. Direct bribery is one way that this guarantee is reached. Because the navy is manned by mercenaries, it is possible to subject the seamen and especially the junior officers to careful political selection, and to demand a zealous attitude toward service and unquestioning subordination. Under capitalist conditions, typified by a perpetual army of unemployed, there is even a possibility for selecting those desiring to join the navy competitively.

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In sum total, the ships of the American, English, West German, Belgian and Canadian naval forces are almost 100 percent manned by mercenaries.

The selection system adopted by the naval forces of imperialist states has a dual purpose. One, its overt purpose, is to select a professionally and physically suitable contingent for the navy. The other, a covert class purpose, is to weed out political undesirables. These same purposes are served by carefully developed psychological methods. After all, it is possible to weed out any undesirable candidate on the excuse of psychological deficiency.

The mercenary manning system, especially when coupled with the use of long-term contracts, means that the bulk of the personnel in imperialist navies look at service as a well-paying job. Divorced from society, they gradually lose their sense of class solidarity, and under the influence of the brainwashing system they transform into the faithful servants of imperialism. The bulk of the mercenaries have been infused with anticommunism and anti-Sovietism, with blind hatred of progressive forces. They are opposed to detente as well.

The personnel of American and English atomic submarines, naval aviation and marine infantry are especially reactionary. According to assertions in the English and American military press, atomic submarines are manned by personnel "with a higher level of intellectual development than the average man," and they represent the "naval elite." In the words of the U.S. Navy's journal OUR NAVY, 75 percent of the personnel aboard American atomic submarines "are professionals."

Noncommissioned officers are the backbone of the submarine crews. They are selected from among the best trained specialists, ones who have demonstrated their political reliability and manifested a passion for their work. During selection, each candidate undergoes careful preliminary testing from the standpoint of political loyalty. Their backgrounds, ties and acquaintances are clarified. Promotion to this level requires not only the voluntary consent of the individual but also a certain amount of technical training. As a rule the crews of submarines consist of seamen who had served some time aboard conventional submarines and who had been recommended by commanders in their former places of service. Material advantages such as high pay, various allowances and special privileges are created to make service aboard submarines more desirable.

But the direct material benefits of naval service cannot form the required moral and combat qualities in the personnel on their own. This is true today especially, when the armament and combat equipment of the ships require a high level of general education and technical training. It is by necessity that ships are manned by the competent and qualified segment of the population of capitalist countries. As an example the bulk of mercenaries hired by the American navy and marines are recruited from the industrial northwestern states and California. As a rule these are representatives of the working and technical intelligentsia. Today's soldier, emphasizes MILITARY POLICE JOURNAL, "possesses an amazing sense of what is true and what is false.... He cannot be led about by the nose. He is intelligent and curious, and he is better educated than his predecessors. Delicate issues cannot be concealed from him, and it is impossible to impart blind loyalty."

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In his article "The Lessons of the American Defeat in Vietnam," D. Watt, an English professor, admits that one of the reasons for the "demoralization of the American army in Vietnam" was the weakness of the ideological principles upon which the discipline and morale of the soldiers rested. American soldiers, he writes, could not "swallow" the endless diet of a "civilizing mission and humanitarianism" served up to them, and the officers, their leaders, found themselves unprepared to keep the soldiers under their ideological influence.

Bourgeois military ideologists arrive at the conclusion that the shaken morale of the personnel must be shored up. The military press of the NATO countries emphasizes that new forms and methods of influence on people must be developed so that the morale of the armed forces could be kept at a high level today. Many of the old arguments and theses, ones which in the not-so-distant past were able to form an obedient and, to a certain extent, a dependable executor of the will of the ruling classes, are now either hopelessly obsolete in the opinion of many bourgeois military ideologists, or they cannot produce the expected results. In this connection the imperialist press is advertising proposals for reexamining some of the issues of personnel management and for developing new, more flexible forms and methods of ideological influence accounting for the social changes that have occurred and for the unique features of young people today. More-sophisticated resources and methods of influence upon people are needed if today's technically competent and educated servicemen are to be kept in the prison of bourgeois ideology.

Anticommunism and anti-Sovietism are the main directions of brainwashing of the public at large and military servicemen in imperialist countries, including naval seamen. The shopworn bugbear of anticommunism, which has been condemned by history, is consistent with the orientation of modern bourgeois ideology and propaganda activity. And even in an environment of lower international tension, reactionary circles, rather than weakening their anti-Soviet propaganda, are on the contrary doing everything they can to intensify it and to arouse anticommunist psychosis. Adapting to a changing situation in the world, they are attempting to alter only certain obsolete forms and methods and the tactics of their influence upon the minds and hearts of people, without changing the essence of their policy. Thus brazen, open anticommunism aimed at the illiterate and politically backward individual has been replaced by a sophisticated quasiscientific method with the same old anticommunism at its foundation. It serves as the "theoretical basis" of imperialism's military preparations, and as a barrier to the penetration of progressive ideas and viewpoints aboard the navy's ships and in its units. Under its cover, reactionary circles are attempting to justify, to world public opinion, their numerous military actions against peaceful nations. By creating the myth of a "Soviet military threat," of the "dangerous activity" of the USSR Navy in the World Ocean, the military circles of a number of imperialist states are trying to justify their actions aimed at increasing tension in some regions of our planet.

False information on the true state of affairs in countries of the socialist fraternity and in the world communist and workers' movement has the purpose of forming anticommunist and anti-Soviet viewpoints in the seamen of imperialist navies. The idea that they must prepare for war and defend Western "democracy" is perpetually suggested to naval seamen. Attempts are made to persuade them that they have to take up arms because "the Russians possess modern combat resources, an enormous army and a growing navy." They must also become qualified specialists in order to suppress

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internal unrest "organized by communists and their accomplices." The policy of anticommunism is aimed at persuading each sailor of the "Red danger" threatening him personally. "When the drill instructor at the training center conducted our lessons," described one American marine in an interview in the book "Talks With Americans" published in the USA, "he constantly repeated: 'I am teaching you to kill communists not just because I'm being paid to do so. I want you to understand how terrible a threat communists are to each of you personally. And if we don't kill the Reds in Vietnam now, tomorrow they'll be here in America, and they'll slaughter all of our people, you yourselves, your mothers, wives and children. Is this what you want?' And then we were all supposed to shout with all of our hearts: 'No!'."

Indoctrination of the personnel in the spirit of bourgeois morality is a typical direction in ideological and psychological brainwashing of the personnel of imperialist navies. As we know, bourgeois morality shapes the moral countenance of the individual in accordance with its main principle, "it's a dog-eat-dog world." Every commandment of this morality is permeated by a spirit of cruelty, misanthropism, hypocrisy and bigotry. It preaches extreme individualism, a passion for personal gain at all costs and a cult of physical violence, and it incites lowly instincts. The nature itself of life in the navy, in which each views his service as nothing more than a means of providing himself with material security, facilitates indoctrination of ship personnel in the spirit of bourgeois morality. Service and acts motivated by the notion of "money before everything" are given full approval. Zealous service is rewarded by high pay, bonuses and material benefits, while punishment takes the form of fines. Combat training also foresees encouragement of competition, individual initiative and private enterprise.

The cult of violence is typical of bourgeois morality. All means are justified in achieving a goal. Whatever produces success is right. Those who become successful and strong are also worthy of power. He who is selective about the resources he uses is fated to remain poor. These rules are justified by the philosophy of pragmatism, of "real life."

The cult of violence is especially popular in American society. Americans have 90 million pistols, rifles and other weapons for their personal use. Using a gun is the easiest way to achieve a goal. The moral side of it all has no meaning to most Americans. Nurtured on this morality, young Americans hired for service in the navy agree to fulfill the orders of their masters to kill peaceful inhabitants of freedom-loving countries, and they do so deliberately, with an eye on personal gain. The moral aspect takes a secondary position here. Young people coming to the navy have already absorbed some of the principles of bourgeois morality, and they are internally ready to commit all war crimes. The entire moral atmosphere of bourgeois society stimulates aggressiveness, cruelty and base plans and goals.

The dominance of the cult of violence also makes people ready to go along with all of its forms without a second thought. Drill is used in the system of moral indoctrination on this basis and in the interests of transforming the young man into an "unthinking machine." Drill takes especially vivid forms in the marines. Here the individual is forced to forget his name, and to remember only his number. Special marine training is a preplanned system of cruelty called upon to break the individual's will and to make him as similar to the next man as two peas in a pod. When violence and terror penetrate into all aspects of the work and life of

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a unit, each begins to realize that his sole salvation is to become just as cruel as everyone else. Psychological pressure that cultivates thoughtlessness, blind hatred, cruelty and a lust for blood is continually intensifying aboard the ships and in the units of the American navy.

The personnel of imperialist navies are indoctrinated in the spirit of chauvinism continuously and in sophisticated ways. Militarists competently speculate with the patriotic feelings of the people. Special steps are taken in the American navy to shape the seaman's belief in the superiority of the American way of life. "Teach our young," Admiral Burke instructs his officers, "to believe that our way of life is the greatest blessing of the people and of all mankind." And the officers devote much attention to "explaining" the principles and practice of American "democracy" to the seamen. Personnel in the British navy are brainwashed in the spirit of devotion to the existing structure. The queen is always represented as the embodiment of good and justice, as a person caring for the welfare of all strata of the public. Visits to the ships by persons of the royal family are widely used for ideological brainwashing purposes. Seamen who have had an audience with the queen are asked to speak to the personnel with the purpose of inspiring their sense of faithfulness to the monarch.

Much room is devoted in brainwashing to propagandizing faithfulness to military traditions. From the first days of service, the English seaman is persuaded that the British navy is one of the most powerful and invincible. Former Defense Minister Healy wrote: "Because of the concern of the government and the attention it devotes to the navy, Great Britain has the world's third most powerful fleet, capable of annihilatory attacks against any enemy." In order to demonstrate the power of the navy in England, exhibitions of armament and combat equipment are often organized, and "navy days" in which the latest ships participate are held annually.

The so-called system of military morals and ethics plays an important role in the brainwashing of personnel in imperialist navies. In the American navy it is spelled out in the "Handbook of Building Character," in which certain supraclass norms of behavior, supposedly common to all members of bourgeois society, are declared. The modern codes of military morals and ethics are not at all something new. Their roots lie in the abstract codes of honor and duty of the war machine of the past. Military ethics are an inherent element of the ideology of militarism, and they are used in attempts to create some sort of moral justification for aggressive actions and plans. In this connection the military actions of the armed forces are served up and lauded as manifestations of duty and honor, and the actions of the probable enemy are labeled as unworthy. The notion that physical annihilation of the enemy's peaceful population is a normal condition of any war is constantly inculcated in the personnel.

The system of morals and ethics in the English navy makes broad use of reactionary customs and traditions. Practically every ship and unit possesses its own array of traditions. Every seaman must adhere to them without fail. In order to inspire the personnel's faithfulness to the regime and their aspiration for zealous service, they are constantly reminded of the glory of their ancestors and of their victories in numerous wars fought by English colonists over the centuries. The names of ships that distinguished themselves the most in these wars are given to new ones that are built. Traditions are maintained by preserving the cut of the uniform

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and keeping lucky charms (mascots) that stay with each ship in all of its cruises and, as the story goes, bring luck. Observance of customs and traditions, in the opinion of brainwashing specialists, helps to create a "spirit of comradeship" aboard ship, to inspire obedience in the seamen to officers and consequently to the ruling classes.

The system of morals and ethics in the American navy foresees special lessons and exercises in subjects such as: "The Sense of Duty," "The Home of the American," "Integrity of Character" and "One Nation Under God." The purpose of such training is to shape, in each seaman, the traits and properties of the typical "well-meaning average man"--the dependable supporter of the ruling classes and a "dedicated" defender of the capitalist structure. As representatives of the naval department responsible for personnel brainwashing see it, such a seaman must structure his entire life according to the program suggested to him in the course of his service, and to blindly fulfill all orders of the command.

The brainwashing of personnel in the navies of imperialist states assumes various forms. The principal form is mandatory weekly group lessons with the personnel. Bourgeois propaganda tries to represent this system of knowledge as a manifestation of the "principle of democracy," and it refers to these lessons as "debates," "commander briefings" and "current events lessons." In fact, however, their real purpose is to introduce certain stereotypes of bourgeois morality into the consciousness of the personnel. Using a procedure developed by experienced specialists, psychologists as a rule, lesson leaders direct the outwardly noncoercive and voluntary change of opinions into the political channels required by the command.

Ideological influence upon personnel in the naval forces of West Germany is achieved during work time allocated to a special course developed by the ideological brainwashing division of the Department of Defense.

But ideological brainwashing of the personnel is not limited in the imperialist navies to just on-duty time. The command strives to encourage the participation of "representatives of the masses" in addition to officers in this work, and to make use of leisure time for these purposes. Groups of so-called "senior privates" and "senior NCOs" are specially selected from among seamen and junior commanders for these purposes in the U.S. Navy. "Training and indoctrination councils" and "leadership councils" are also created aboard ships. Council members are elected at meetings of the personnel, and the councils act as advisory bodies before the commander. This creates not only an appropriate social soil for better indoctrination and broader dissemination of bourgeois morality and the viewpoints of reactionary militaristic circles among the personnel, but it also creates the illusion of a common interest in solving all of the problems facing a ship. The effectiveness of brainwashing rises as well in this veiled form.

Besides various groups created by the command for purposeful moral and ideological influence, the sports, literary, artistic, musical, choral and other similar associations are created for this purpose.

Through them, a certain influence is exerted upon the seamen and upon their philosophy. At the same time, personnel encouraged to join such organizations are used for ideological influence upon the local public in foreign ports.

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Other resources are also used to brainwash the personnel of ships and units. They include meetings of the seamen with representatives of the most reactionary organizations of the USA and other NATO countries, encouragement of seamen to join political organizations such as "Aid to Refugees From Behind the Iron Curtain," instituting special prizes and other measures of materially rewarding ideological activity.

Officers involved in the activities of the ultraright "John Birch Society," the racist Ku Klux Klan, the openly fascist "American Nazi Party of White Citizens" and other reactionary organizations display special activity in the American navy. The American press has reported, for example, the "broad initiative" of the command of the naval school in Annapolis, which regularly sends dozens of "groups of speakers on anticommunism," formed out of the most reactionary instructors and students, to the bases and ships. Such measures are organized by the staff of the marine training center at Parris Island. Propaganda groups formed by this staff undergo special training and are sent to other garrisons. They broadly employ fabricated propagandistic data and prejudiciously collected facts.

A typical feature of the brainwashing to which personnel of the U.S. Navy are subjected is the broad participation by leading political and military officials, by representatives of the higher command and by senior officers. These set the tone in anticommunist and anti-Soviet propaganda. The secretary of defense, the chairman of the Committee of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and other highly placed military leaders regularly speak to the personnel.

The commands of the armed forces of the principal imperialist states are now devoting persistent attention to improving mutual relationships between officers and enlisted men. Leadership and mutual relationships in the navy are becoming significant problems because the class antagonisms inherent to any bourgeois army grow to extreme limits in the difficult conditions of lengthy oceanic cruises and especially in a combat situation. Such antagonisms manifest themselves in various forms of protest, which sometimes acquire a clearly political hue. The American press has reported cases of the participation of individual servicemen and small groups of seamen in antiwar demonstrations, refusal to participate in military actions in Vietnam for political reasons, and publication of underground antiwar newspapers aboard some ships and in some units and bases. In particular, according to press reports a newspaper entitled "Potemkin" appeared aboard ships of the Sixth Fleet. For the first time in the history of the U.S. Armed Forces the antiwar movement has begun assuming more or less organized forms. Cases of desertion for political reasons attest to growth in the class contradictions in the American armed forces.

Moral degradation of a significant proportion of the personnel of the U.S. Navy is also manifested by growth in the number of drug addicts, alcoholics and patients with venereal diseases.

The military press of imperialist states writes that often in a combat situation, "officers have lost the reins of control," they have been unable to understand their soldiers, they have been unable to find a common language with them, and sometimes they have even simply feared them. Some military scientists even come to the conclusion that the command has become "estranged" in a number of subunits and units, causing deterioration of the personnel's morale. "The low morale of the troops,"

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declared the organ of the American military police, MILITARY POLICE JOURNAL, "is to a great extent the result of poor leadership, and not a consequence of the influence of external factors."

The military leadership of the NATO countries is trying to improve officer and junior officer training as a means to surmount these difficulties more efficiently. It is with this purpose that the "scientific principles of leadership in the armed forces" and the so-called "leadership courses," which are being introduced into the practical training of the command, are being developed. In England, for example, officers and NCOs are promoted only after completing a course of instruction in "leadership schools."

John (Edair), a consultant at the English war college in Sandhurst, explains in his book "The Training of Leaders" that the "leadership course" has the purpose of teaching commanders "to lead people"--not simply to command and administer, but to be real leaders, capable of exercising effective leadership over their subordinates in all situations. The course particularly foresees the study of modern requirements on military leaders, the fundamentals of military discipline, the problems of personnel loyalty, the factors determining morale aboard ships and in units, and other issues.

Bourgeois military scientists are now directing their research efforts toward smoothing out class contradictions among the personnel through a certain "liberalization" of mutual relations and through devotion of greater attention to their daily needs. The journal MILITARY REVIEW even advises sending students at military schools to the ships and units as common soldiers for a period of several months. This, the journal writes, "would help the future young officers understand the soldiers, to become familiar with their ways of thinking, problems and moods," it would teach officers to "speak in the language of the soldiers." The desire to bridge the gap that separates enlisted men and officers is obvious in all of these investigations. One of the possible ways for doing so is to acquire the ability to persuade and inspire subordinates, to win their obedience by appealing to their "inner feelings and convictions."

Improvements in leadership and mutual relations in imperialist navies also pursue the goal of substituting solution of political problems arising in the course of service by psychological solutions. The English military press warns directly that political enlightenment of the modern army requires the highest art and the ability to strike a balance between two hazards. On one hand it may undermine the faith and loyalty of servicemen, while on the other hand it may steer them toward the influence of communist propaganda. Both outcomes are thought to be dangerous. The authors recommend that officers conduct the brainwashing of their subordinates in such a way as "not to elicit questions and doubts"; otherwise they might "reject the very system which they are called upon to defend."

Imperialists turn special attention in the brainwashing of naval personnel to raising its effectiveness. Although they spare no efforts for such purposes, here as in all other areas of bourgeois reality, a desire to obtain the highest dividends from invested capital manifests itself. But they are unable to achieve high effectiveness just on the basis of ideological influence alone. The reason for this lies in the poverty of bourgeois philosophy. Attempting to correct this significant

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deficiency, reactionary imperialist circles use the latest technical resources of the mass media and propaganda with the goal of not only imposing their own way of thinking but also silencing moral ideas hostile to them, of suppressing the possibility of internal resistance. All of these resources are broadly employed aboard the ships and in the units of the navy. Primary among them are motion pictures, radio and television.

In accordance with the "commander briefing" program, in the course of the last few years the American navy has been outfitting all first- and second-ranked ships with onboard automated broadcasting centers. The American radio and television network covers all theaters in which the U.S. Armed Forces are deployed. It was reported in the ARMED FORCES JOURNAL that the formerly separate propaganda radio and television networks of the armed forces in America, West Europe, the Near East, Southeast Asia, the Western Pacific and other regions have been united into a single global system. It includes more than 200 radio and 11 television stations located aboard ships.

The press plays a significant role in the brainwashing of personnel in the armed forces of the imperialist countries.

Every branch of the armed forces possesses its own journals intended for enlisted men and NCOs. Moreover the Pentagon employs a large gang of so-called "literary agents" who supply, on its orders, special reading matter propagandizing war, aggression, cruelty and violence to the book market.

Just in the USA alone there are a total of about 1,400 military periodicals. According to data in the ARMED FORCES JOURNAL the American navy and marines publish 333 newspapers, journals and bulletins. The main naval newspaper is the NAVY TIMES. Ships and units also receive all-army newspapers such as STARS AND STRIPES, OVERSEAS WEEKLY and others. All large warships, marine formations, bases and naval schools have their own newspapers. This whole flood of printed matter is filled with anti-Soviet and anticommunist fabrications, calls to militancy and the basest materials of detective and pornographic content.

Movie propaganda is given a large role in the brainwashing of servicemen in the NATO countries. The cinematographic service of the U.S. Armed Forces spends millions of dollars on movie production each year. No cabinet department of the USA must possess more than one studio, according to orders from the White House. However, as we can see from official statistics, in 1976 the Pentagon possessed 69 movie studios. Moreover orders for making movies with a military theme are also placed with other movie companies. The movie and television programs of many capitalist countries offer so-called "horror films" obtained in this way--"The Exorcist," "Jaws," "King Kong" and so on.

* * *

Reactionary circles of imperialist states are using all resources and methods to strengthen the political dependability of naval personnel. They are intensifying control over the thoughts and moods of the seamen and their behavior, they are subjecting political unreliaables to cleansing, they are engaging in stronger and

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harsher repressions against undesirables, and they are resorting to bribery of their followers more and more. But they lay their main hopes on intensifying ideological brainwashing of the personnel. All of these measures are promoting consolidation of reactionary and militant forces, ones controlling the situation in the navies of the imperialist states.

At the same time a significant part of their personnel are attempting to argue the positions of realism and to arrive at their own evaluations of current events and facts. Refusing to become transformed into the blind executors of the will of the ruling classes, into mute robots, into racists and assassins, many naval seamen of the imperialist navies are resisting the influence of official propaganda and rising in protest. These phenomena are having an influence on the combat readiness of the imperialist navies. However, this should not provide the grounds for understating their combat possibilities. Experience shows that although in view of the fundamental contradiction between the interests of the ruling monopolistic circles and the broad popular masses the possibilities enjoyed by imperialism for ideological stupefaction of the laborers are limited, they are finding the necessary ways and means of preparing the personnel for war. Their efforts in this direction are especially effective in privileged branches of the armed forces, such as the navy in general and its basic attack formations in particular.

Consideration of these possibilities of imperialism is an inherent part of the moral, political and psychological training of Soviet naval seamen preparing to fight an experienced, strong and well trained aggressor.

The combat potential of the formation, the unit and the ship could be fully realized only when the personnel are capable of applying new tactics and surpassing the enemy in the art of combat. And this would require not only military proficiency but also a knowledge of the enemy's tactics and combat capabilities. Without a knowledge of the enemy, all of the efforts taken in troop training may turn out to be useless. This pertains not to individual aspects but rather to the sum total of the elements defining the strength of the probable enemy: military, economic, political and ideological. It is in our interests to objectively evaluate the forces and possibilities of the probable enemy because, as military history teaches us, both understatement and overstatement of these possibilities threaten negative consequences.

Performing their missions, our naval seamen are thoroughly studying the probable enemies, and they are maintaining a constant combat readiness guaranteeing an immediate repulse to any aggressor, as required by the USSR Constitution.

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NAVAL FORCES

EXCERPTS FROM BOOK ON SOVIET NAVAL VESSELS IN WORLD WAR II

Moscow SOVETSKIYE NADVODNYYE KORABLI V VELIKOY OTECHESTVENNOY VOYNE in Russian 1981 (signed to press 29 Jun 81) pp 1-2, 3-7, 251-257, 271-272

[Title page, annotation, table of contents, introduction and conclusion from book "Soviet Surface Vessels in the Great Patriotic War" by Geliy Ivanovich Khor'kov, Vo-yenizdat, 20,000 copies, 272 pages]

[Text] Annotation

Taking the most characteristic and instructive examples from actual combat operations, the author looks at typical tactical methods of operation employed by Soviet naval surface vessels during the Great Patriotic War in accomplishment of a variety of tactical-operational missions. He illustrates the art commanders displayed in exercising control of their forces [soyendineniye], ships and weapons as well as the selfless heroism naval personnel demonstrated in battles for the motherland.

This book is intended for naval officers and students and cadets of naval educational institutions.

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Introduction

Surface tactics encompass questions concerning the preparation and conduct of combat operations involving individual ships or groups or forces of ships operating independently or in cooperation with other naval forces. The preparation of and then the conduct of a combat operation constitute a single, integrated process, the product of which is the execution of the combat mission. The individual components of this process are the following: the training and preparation of the forces to be involved, planning the necessary support, elaborating the concept of the combat operations, organizing tactical cooperation between forces participating in these operations, controlling them over the course of the sea passage and during combat and then achieving the assigned objective.

Soviet naval surface tactics underwent further evolution in the course of the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945. Study of the materials from this period allows us to follow the practical application of provisions of guiding tactical documents in actual combat operations as well as trends and directions in the development of surface tactics.

Specific examples drawn from actual combat situations illustrate the dependence of success in combat upon the organization and then provision of combat and special support, effective cooperation in the course of operations and the relationship between the level of ship crew training and morale and the tactical methods employed by their commanders in battle. In these examples we can look as well at the relationship between the tactical methods and procedures employed to accomplish an assigned mission and the ideological temper and communist conviction of ship commanders; aggressiveness, courage, steadfastness and selflessness in battle and the quality of party political work and the level of political consciousness and understanding of his responsibility to the socialist fatherland on the part of each member of a ship's crew. In looking at this aspect of experience accumulated in the course of the Great Patriotic War, L. I. Brezhnev has declared that "party political work with personnel and their ideological temper has always been and remains a powerful weapon for our army. The force of this weapon has been tested in the fire of battle. And it strikes terror in our enemies even today."¹

During the war, Soviet naval surface vessels destroyed 7 submarines (damaged more than 10), 10 destroyers and destroyer escorts (7 damaged), 8 landing ships (11 damaged), 12 mineweebers and minelayers (2 damaged), 5 boats of different kinds (23 damaged)

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the fact that beginning in 1942 small ships and boats from bases located near the front line were the only active components of these fleets. Ships of the Northern Fleet guarding our external and internal sea lanes and operating in enemy sea lanes in Vangeranger Fjord constituted an exception throughout the entire war. Forces of small ships and boats redeployed in the wake of the advancing troops alone participated in combat operations during the Soviet Army's strategic offensive of 1944-1945. As a rule, they operated in tactical cooperation with fleet aviation, which had now been reinforced and assigned missions in the naval sector. The tasks of our surface ships in this period of the war consisted primarily in clearing mines from areas in which our ships were operating, landing amphibious assault forces in support of offensive ground operations, providing direct fire support to ground units and operating in sea lanes with the objective of disrupting the evacuation by sea of retreating enemy forces.

Also playing an important role in the war were the vessels of our river flotillas, which provided support for ground forces in crossing water obstacles and water transport, landed assault forces in the enemy rear and provided fire support to forces operating in riverine sectors.

In discussing and analyzing the combat experience of the Great Patriotic War, we entirely justified in asking ourselves the question: after the passage of so many years, should we really be looking so closely at the actions of one particular commander or another who was leading his military unit not infrequently in the contradictory, conflicting and confused conditions of actual combat, when he would have been intensely hard-pressed for time and acting under the threat of enemy action? From the point of view of the study of military affairs I think this is necessary. In analyzing one military action or another we are not diminishing the role of any of its participants. In combat there is no one who would not realize at least a fraction of his combat potential. In all combat operations everyone did everything he could, but the results of an operation depend upon many factors: the state of training of the ship commanders and crews involved, the correlation and type of forces taking part in an engagement, knowledge of the situation, the state of a ship's weapons and equipment, the morale-building preparation and psychological state prevailing prior to an engagement etc. If there was any component upon which depended the outcome of an engagement which was not fully realized, we must find the reason so as to make the most effective use of a specific combat experience to improve the combat skills of our commanders.

In discussing the specific nature of a commander's actions under battlefield conditions, M. V. Frunze stressed the following: "The Red commander must learn as completely as possible to master the method of thinking, the art of phenomenal analysis to be drawn from Marxist doctrine. This method reduces essentially to the fact that, for us, there can be nothing absolute and ossified; everything is in a state of flux, everything is continuously changing; and any means, any method can find application in a given situation. The commander demonstrates his art in being able to choose from among the various means at his disposal those which will yield the best results in a given situation at a given time."⁴

Illustrations drawn from actual combat situations permit us to discover what constituted the basis for a commander's selection of one solution as opposed to another.

Conclusion

The illustrations we have been looking at show that, depending upon tactical-operational conditions and the physical-geographical factors involved, naval surface vessels would carry out either the basic mission involved in given combat operation or

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and 11 auxiliary vessels (5 damaged) and sank 24 enemy transport ships with a total displacement of 45,197 t.² However, in evaluating the role our surface vessels played in the war we cannot restrict ourselves to looking only at the magnitude of the losses they inflicted upon enemy ships. We have also to give attention to the specific nature of the conditions taking shape in the course of the war which dictated the use of main naval forces in support of ground forces, which bore the brunt of the task of defending the country against the aggressor.

Over the course of the war the navy executed more than 110 amphibious landings on enemy shores, successfully repelled enemy attempts to land forces on Soviet shores, defended internal and external sea lanes and riverine routes, over which was transported more than 117 million tons of military and civilian cargo, provided reliable seaward cover for the flanks of ground forces against attack by enemy ships, gave systematic fire support to forces of coastal fronts engaged in both offensive and defensive operations and accomplished a number of other missions. Beneath the surface of these facts lie thousands of combat runs, numerous encounters with fascist surface ships, submarines and aircraft, engagements with shore batteries and minefield breakthroughs. During and after the war navy minesweepers had the task of eliminating the mine hazard from the Baltic, Barents and Black Seas as well as from the Volga and the Danube, which required enormous expenditures of manpower and resources and a demonstration of mass-scale heroism and courage on the part of our navy mine specialists.

For exemplary performance in execution of military missions as well as for the courage and steadfastness of their crews, many ships and forces were awarded military orders, redesignated as Guards and given other honorary designations. For personal bravery and skillful leadership in combat operations, some 100 surface-vessel personnel were awarded the highest award the motherland can bestow--the title of Hero of the Soviet Union, 37 of them from torpedo boats, 13 from destroyers and destroyer escorts and 48 from other types of ship, the valiant North Sea boat crewman A. O. Shabalin being awarded this high title twice.

The scales and the nature of surface-vessel combat operations, as well as, to a certain extent, the tactics employed in these operations, were governed by the strategic and operational situation in a given theater of military operations and by the composition of our naval forces and those of the enemy.

In the situations prevailing in 1941-1942, surface vessels participated actively together with ground forces in the defense of our naval bases at Liyepaya (Libava)³, Tallinn, Khanko [Hangö], Kronshtadt, Leningrad, Odessa, Sevastopol' and Murmansk. The tasks of our surface vessels during this period consisted primarily in providing artillery support to ground forces, landing tactical assault forces on the flank of an attacking fascist German army and providing operational transport and seaward defense of the flanks of our ground forces. Our naval aviation was at that time being extensively employed in ground-force sectors. In these situations our ships had frequently to carry out their missions without air cover and in the face of intensive operations undertaken by Hitlerite aircraft. Our ships therefore undertook their operations primarily at night. All types of ships participated in these battles. After losing their bases in the Baltic in 1941 and at Sevastopol' in 1942, ships of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet concentrated in the vicinity of Leningrad, ships of the Black Sea Fleet in ports along the Caspian coast. This virtually excluded any possibility of deploying surface vessels of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet into the Baltic Sea and ships of the Black Sea Fleet into western part of the Black Sea. This accounts for

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missions in support of other forces. In cooperation with naval aviation and coastal artillery they destroyed combat and convoy transport ships, carried out artillery and torpedo attacks upon enemy ships and vessels in ports and bases, served as landing craft in landing amphibious assault forces, operated as submarine hunter-killer ships, carried troops and cargo when these missions could not be carried out by transport ships and performed a wide range of tasks in a mine-clearing role.

In carrying out their supporting missions, surface vessels provided antisubmarine, antiaircraft, antiboat and antimine defense in escorting submarines, convoying transport ships, screened them in coastal waters against attack by shore artillery and conducted reconnaissance at sea to provide defense against amphibious assault landings and reconnaissance of enemy-held coasts in support of assault landings by our own navy.

In cooperating with ground forces, surface ships carried out, independently or jointly with other naval forces, attacks on airfields, artillery batteries, control centers and communications facilities protected by heavy and field fortifications and concentrations of enemy men and equipment. They also provided protection and defense of seaplanes and river routes used for operational transport and transport ship crossings.

From analysis of examples characterizing joint operations involving surface ships and ground forces we can draw the conclusion that in coastal sectors of a front and in a naval base and port defense system, active combat operations on the part of surface ships constituted an indispensable condition of successful ground-force operations.

In supporting the operations of other naval forces (submarines, naval infantry, shore units (chast')), surface ships themselves required a full range of combat and special support: reconnaissance, camouflage and deception measures, antiaircraft, antisubmarine and antimine defense and navigational safety measures. Examples demonstrate that the effectiveness of surface operations depended to a considerable degree upon the quality and completeness of the support they received. Throughout the entire war, the most important kind of ship support proved to be defense against air attack, which ships could not always provide for themselves.

The experience accumulated during the Great Patriotic War confirmed the correctness of the basic principles governing the conduct of combat operations by surface ships contained in documents on tactics prepared prior to the war, primarily in the 1937 Field Manual for the Naval Forces of the RKKA [Workers' and Peasants' Red Army]. According to the requirements contained in this manual, the basic characteristics of surface-ship tactics were as follows:

- decisiveness in operations to accomplish missions assigned in combat;
- thorough situational analysis and mission concepts based upon a solid foundation of calculations;
- concealment of preparations for execution of mission and the achievement of surprise during execution;
- rapid execution in all phases of a mission;
- careful organization of cooperation between the different types of forces involved in the interest of the grouping carrying out the main mission;
- thorough preparation for execution of a combat mission.

The basic directions in the development of surface tactics over the course of the war included a gradually growing trend toward the use of massed forces, systematic increases in all forms of operational support for forces performing the main mission, improved

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cooperation between ships of different types of naval forces, with aviation primarily, and the development of means and tactical methods of employing new types and models of weapons in combat operations.

Maintenance of reliable and continuous control of ships at sea on the basis of continuous contact between ships and the control stations of force and strike and tactical group commanders was an indispensable condition for the achievement of victory and the successful accomplishment of a combat mission.

The experience of the Great Patriotic War demonstrated that the selection of means of conducting combat operations and the tactical methods employed in an operation is governed by not only tactical calculations, but also by the high level of ideological conviction of our commanders, their selfless devotion to the cause of the Communist Party and our socialist motherland and by their desire to accomplish their assigned mission under any conditions.

The Communist Party of the Soviet Union was the main organizing and directing force in the Great Patriotic War. It inspired the Soviet people to the struggle with fascism and provided the country with wise and unfailing leadership in this critical period of its life. Communists were to be found in the front ranks of its fighting men. They spared neither their blood nor their very lives for its victory.

In carrying out their combat missions, our naval commanders, most of whom were communists or Komsomol members, as a rule employed active, offensive tactical methods. The best results were achieved by those commanders and crews to whom was alien any mindless adoption of stereotypical operational decisions or an inclination to temporize, to take a wait-and-see position in the course of an operation. The victors proved to be those commanders who acted resolutely, demonstrated initiative, boldly forced the enemy to bow to their will, to their conception of how the battle involved should be fought, who tried to prevent the enemy from being able to execute a timely maneuver and to employ his weapons, exhibited creativity, innovativeness, artfulness and keen judgement and who maintained an unshakeable confidence in the power and strength of their ships' weapons and crews.

The achievement of surprise in launching an attack played an important role in winning victory in combat. Surprise was achieved by depriving the enemy of warning, executing deception measures, taking account of psychological factors and employing new tactical methods and types of weapons possessing tactical characteristics previously unknown to the enemy. A number of examples show that surprise in launching an attack was achieved by undertaking a combat mission under adverse weather or navigational-hydrographical conditions, conditions in which the enemy believed naval operations to be impossible or at least highly improbable. This confirms the view that has it that at the basis of successful naval combat operations together with good fire and tactical training lay a high state of naval training on the part of both ship crews and ship commanders and an ability to navigate and employ weapons effectively under conditions in which the enemy would consider this unrealistic. Also playing an important role in operations against enemy ships and aircraft were skillful combination of fire and maneuver and an ability on the part of commanders to exploit to the full the maneuver capabilities of their ships, which was demonstrated most clearly in combat boat operations along patrol lines, in attacks on convoys by torpedo boats and in landing amphibious assault forces. Exploitation of the maneuver capabilities of a ship is inseparably associated with a category of naval art such as swiftness of action. This made it possible to achieve

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an advantage over the enemy in the process of deploying ships prior to an engagement, take up a more favorable position from which to employ weapons, seize the initiative in the course of an operation and then to impose one's will upon the enemy. Rapid execution of a planned maneuver played a decisive role in achieving success in torpedo boat attacks, landing the early waves of an assault force, attacking enemy installations along his coasts and boats in his ports and bases and in evading attack by enemy weapons.

Analysis of the actions commanders took shows that the decisions they made in combat were governed not only by the level of their tactical training, but also by their ideological maturity and their readiness under the conditions of actual combat to be independent, to demonstrate personal heroism and courage in making decisions, frequently entailing risk but dictated by circumstances, and to assume full responsibility for the results of the implementation of those decisions in combat.

Experience associated with the execution of force-level combat missions testifies to the enormous role the staffs of these forces played in preparing for combat operations and assisting force commanders with control of subordinate elements during an operation. During the phase of preparations for combat operations, staff personnel performed a great many tasks in the way of collecting intelligence information and undertaking situational analyses, conclusions drawn from which formed the basis upon which the force commander then developed his concept of the operation. There are a number of examples which demonstrate that errors in evaluating the enemy had serious consequences and caused unjustified losses. It was to a substantial degree upon the experience a force commander and his staff officers had had in determining the true capabilities of subordinate elements under specific conditions, assigning them their missions and in preparing battle-related documents that depended the effectiveness and realization of cooperation, the reliability of their control in the course of an operation and, in the final analysis, the execution of the combat mission itself. Of utmost importance in the ship or force commander's work in preparing for execution of an assigned combat mission was foresight [predvideniye] and, on the basis of this foresight, forecasting [prognozirovaniye] of the situation and enemy tactics to be anticipated.

In situations involving active enemy resistance it was of great importance to insure the combat survivability of ships executing the primary mission. Combat survivability (the capability of a group or grouping of ships of withstanding enemy attack, maintaining fighting efficiency and accomplishing their assigned mission) was achieved primarily by allocating the full range of supporting forces required by the situation involved and by organizing the cooperation among these forces and between them and ships executing the primary mission dictated by the situation. The organization of these combat operations was most effective in the case of Northern Fleet torpedo boat attacks on convoys in support of fleet aviation, in minesweeping operations undertaken by Red Banner Baltic Fleet minesweepers in the fall of 1943 and during the campaign of 1944 and in landing amphibious assault forces during the strategic offensive carried through by Soviet forces over the period 1943-1945.

The war years saw combat training continue aboard ships and within units (chast'). It was oriented toward the execution of an assigned combat mission and so made it possible to focus trainees' attention even more closely upon the special characteristics of the situation in which the mission was to be carried out and to work out the most probable variants of operations to be undertaken under one or another set of combat conditions. In the case of the nonrated and rated personnel, as well as of warrant

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officers, this training was conducted in the form of drills, with the officers in the form of group exercises and staff drills with the participation of cooperating ships and units. In individual cases requiring especially close operational cooperation between ships, aircraft and shore units and subunits (podrazdeleniye), tactical exercises were conducted in which the ships involved would actually put to sea and engage in combat firing. Experience accumulated during the war demonstrates that, even under combat operational conditions, properly organized combat training was a most important precondition of successful accomplishment of assigned combat missions.

There is no place in tactics for any stagnation in thinking, in the general tactical means and methods of operation applicable in all situations. Experience gained during the Great Patriotic War confirmed this repeatedly. The appearance among enemy forces of new weapons or his employment of new tactical methods required an immediate reaction, the development of new models of shipboard armament, a change in the way we organized the use of our own forces and immediate improvement in the tactical skills of our ship and force commanders and staff and directorate [upravleniye] officers. The war confirmed one of the most important principles of Soviet military science, namely, that no types of weaponry, not even the most advanced or sophisticated, will by themselves bring victory. That required the development and continuous improvement of the modes and methods by which these weapons were employed. But victory in combat in all cases went to the man who had mastered his weapon and the tactics involved in its employment in the given situation and who was at the same time wholeheartedly convinced of the rightness of the cause he was defending.

Thanks to the CPSU's unflagging concern for strengthening our country's defense, the revolution in science and technology has generated rapid developments affecting both the men and the weapons and equipment employed in battle at sea. This has led to fundamental changes in the tactics used in conducting today's naval warfare. We have seen sharp increases in the spatial scales on which it is waged, the requirements imposed upon both the combat and special support forces involved in an engagement and in the complexity and importance of control in all phases of the execution of a combat mission. The appearance of missiles on surface ships has expanded the range of tasks they have traditionally performed.

Increases in the effective range and power of shipboard weapons have sharply increased the degree to which the successful accomplishment of a combat mission depends upon the speed and accuracy with which data on the enemy are transmitted, the organization of communications between cooperating forces and the quality of control. We have also seen substantial changes in the methods commanders and staff personnel employ in planning and organizing for an engagement. Present-day conditions require that we take a substantially larger number of factors into account than we had to in the last war.

Despite the fact that present-day ship and force commanders and staff officers dispose of a variety of electronic equipment capable of modeling a situation, analyzing the information generated, synthesizing a range of operational variants upon the basis of this information and then selecting the optimum from among them, this equipment cannot supplant the living thought, will, intelligence and creativity of the human commander or take into account and consider many of the factors discussed in connection with the decisions and actions commanders took in specific combat situations.

It would be virtually impossible to model all possible variants of situations a ship commander might encounter in the course of an engagement or a force commander in controlling his forces from his control station and then to incorporate these variants in

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the logic of a machine. Equipment will not replace the thinking of the commander as the author and organizer of battle. The formula "tactics are the commander's weapon" thus remains as valid as it ever was. The commander has been and remains the link in the chain of control without which victory is impossible. A naval engagement today will still consist essentially in a fight between two opposing groupings. Tactical principles such as massing of forces, anticipating the enemy, surprise in attack, swiftness of execution and tactical cooperation between a variety of forces thus remain their importance. To apply these principles in combat is the task of the commander. While with the appearance of new types of weapons and equipment in the naval inventory the content of these principles has changed, it is still of practical value to look at them in the context of wartime experience, since that permits us to follow the process of applying theoretical principles and the requirements of tactical documents under the conditions of actual combat.

FOOTNOTES

1. L. I. Brezhnev, "Leninskim kursom. Rechi i stat'i" [On a Leninist Course. Speeches and Articles], Vol 2, Moscow, Politizdat, 1970, p 51.
2. A number of ships and transport ships are listed here, the definite sinking of which was confirmed by data of both sides.
3. The names of geographical places and population points are given in contemporary spelling, their old names are given in parentheses. In examples where the same name comes up several times, the old name is cited only the first time.
4. M. V. Frunze, "Izbrannyye proizvedeniya" [Selected Works], Moscow, Voenizdat, 1950, p 190.

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