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# Sub-Saharan Africa Report

FOUO No. 783

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## SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA REPORT

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CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

BRIEFS

OPPOSITION MEMBERS IN FRANCE--The presence in France of two members of the opposition sought by the Central African police has angered the authorities in Bangui. One of the coauthors of the pro-Patasse coup d'etat attempt on 3 March, General Bozize, is reported to have been living in a southern suburb of Paris for 3 months. As to Lt Col Kaso-Ngo, former leader of the MLPC [Central African People's Liberation Movement] headed by Ange Patasse, he arrived in the French capital at the beginning of May after being expelled from the Congo. French Ministerial Delegate to the Ministry of External Relations for Cooperation Jean-Pierre Cot will doubtless, during his first trip to Bangui, which is scheduled for 9 July, make an effort to alleviate the concerns of his interlocutors on the subject of the activities of these two men. [Text][Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French No 1119, 16 Jun 82 p 38][COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique GRUPJIA 1982.] 5157

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CHAD

REASONS FOR VICTORY OF HISSEIN HABRE NOTED

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French No 1119, 16 Jun 82 pp 26-27

[Article by Siradiou Diallo: "Chad--End of a Long March"]

[Text] Never two without the third. After having occupied Ndjamena twice (in 1978 and 1979) on a trial basis, Hisssein Habre has just pulled off a veritable master coup with his third entry into the city. The leader of the Northern Armed Forces (FAN) took over the capital of Chad at dawn on 7 June, without encountering any real resistance there. Accompanied by the last group of faithful followers, President Goukouni Oueddei had crossed the Chari River a short time previously, seeking refuge in Cameroon, just as Hisssein Habre had done in 1980, when he was forced to leave Ndjamena when it was occupied by the forces of the Transitional National Union Government (GUNT), which were supported by Libyan air power and armored units.

The chief of the FAN chose to live in Maroua, 275 km to the south of Kousseri. But since he planned to continue the war, the Cameroonian authorities notified him that he would have to leave the country. There is good reason to presume that Goukouni Oueddei will soon be the recipient of the same injunction: either to bury the war hatchet for good and remain in Cameroon, or to go elsewhere. Perhaps to Algeria, whose ambassador in Yaounde is reported to have been sounded out already in this connection by representatives of the vanquished chief of state. Faced with the same alternative, Hisssein Habre, for his part, chose Sudan as the host nation--a choice which paid off.

Established on the frontier between Sudan and Chad, in the little village of Djenena, it did not take the chief of the FAN very long to reorganize his troops, which included some 2,000 men at that time. Some were survivors from Ndjamena, while others had come from other parts of Chad which the GUNT forces had subsequently occupied. The common denominator for all these men was the high level of their morale. And that was despite the crushing defeat suffered some days earlier in Ndjamena. All the foreign commentators were struck by the confidence of Hisssein Habre's supporters. Confidence first of all in themselves, but also in their leader, for whom they were all ready to fight and even make the supreme sacrifice. United Nations experts, representatives of humanitarian organizations, doctors and journalists, without distinction, were keenly impressed by the determination of these guerrilla fighters, the frugality of their lives and the iron discipline which prevailed in their ranks.

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Quartered for the most part within their own country, their main leaders included, the FAN benefited from firm support from abroad, beginning with neighboring Sudan. As a rear base, this country provided Hissein Habre with valuable logistic aid, despite the open hostility of the people who, in the frontier region, are profoundly Mahdist and more or less sympathetic to Qadhafi. Setting aside the other obstacles, including those having to do with language, President Nimeiri gave massive and unfailing support to the FAN. The retreat of the Libyan troops from Chad at the end of 1981, followed shortly afterward by the visit paid by Goukouni Oueddei to Khartoum, changed nothing of this. The protests by the chief of state in Sudan concerning non-intervention were nothing but a wartime ruse. He continued to aid the nationalist chief of the north well and truly.

Foodstuffs, weapons, ammunition and fuel bound for the zones controlled by the FAN continued to pass through Sudan. From Egypt there came not only weapons and ammunition taken from the arsenals established in earlier times by the Soviets, but military advisers responsible for training recruits as well. Communications were organized with the aid of Egyptian technicians and the transmissions themselves were relayed by communications centers in Cairo. As to the nerve center of the war, the money needed to buy foodstuffs, to pay the soldiers and to finance the many missions abroad, it was mainly Saudi Arabia which took charge.

Riyadh also provided Hissein Habre with considerable diplomatic support, not only through its dense network of relations in the Arab world and in Africa, but in the West as well. The fact that certain leaders turned such a deaf ear to the repeated appeals for aid from the president of the GUNT cannot be explained otherwise. Finally, behind this curtain of inextricably involved complicity and more or less indirect support was the United States. Determined to oppose Qadhafi everywhere and by every means, the Americans had to support the leader of the FAN. Hadn't Hissein Habre provided indications enough of his hostility toward the turbulent Libyan leader?

Since the outcome of the Claustre affair, that French ethnologist he was forced to release under a double injunction from Goukouni and Qadhafi, he professed a fierce hatred of the latter. Since the enemy of its enemy was necessarily its friend, the United States had hardly any problem in aiding Hissein Habre. Strengthened by such solid diplomatic support and served by a well-organized and perfectly disciplined army, the chief of the FAN was bound to triumph.

Particularly when he was opposed only by an eclectic coalition representing ill-restrained ambitions. The factions making up the GUNT had neither cohesion nor a plan nor a true leader. "The only real force in this country is Hissein Habre and him alone," we were told with a touch of bitterness in December of 1981 by Ahmat Acyl, the GUNT minister of foreign affairs and leader of the Revolutionary Democratic Council. "If the inter-African force for maintaining peace remains neutral and does not help us, he will make short work of us." Now the OAU contingent made of Nigerian, Senegalese and Zairean troops (3,000 men in all) has remained with weapons at the order.

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After harassing the Libyan troops stationed in the eastern part of Chad, the FAN followed in pursuit as soon as they began their retreat in November 1981. Immediately taking Abeche, and then Biltine and Faya-Largeau, Hissein Habre's men made a lengthy stay in Oum Adjer. And after waging a harsh battle against the government troops, they then took all the time they needed to reestablish their ranks and their liaison and supply lines before launching a pincer operation against Ndjamen. After the fall of Ati, the stronghold of Ahmat Acyl's Revolutionary Democratic Council, as well as Mongo and Moussoro, nothing further stood in the way of their entry into Ndjamen.

The only key position remaining along the route to the capital was Massaguet, 80 km to the north of the capital. Now after 5 hours of violent battle between the FAN and Goukouni's People's Armed Forces, Massaguet, in turn, fell on the evening of 5 June. Two days later, the FAN, commanded by Idriss Deby, the deputy chief of the general staff, took Ndjamen.

This victory was the culmination of a long march undertaken 10 years ago by Hissein Habre. His stubbornness proved strategically successful, even if, tactically speaking, it sometimes played him dirty tricks. This was the case in 1980, when having refused to negotiate a cease-fire with Goukouni he provided the president of the GUNT with a golden pretext for appealing to the Libyans to drive him out of Ndjamen. At the present time, it is Goukouni Goukouni's turn to meditate on his stubbornness. For in the end it was his categorical refusal to agree to any negotiations with his brother enemy (as urged by the OAU) which led to his defeat. The fact remains that the resort to arms has finally determined the outcome of the long civil war in Chad, and has brought forth a leader--Hissein Habre, whose victory is now total and unchallenged.

Provided the redoubtable faction leader is able to prove himself a skillful statesman. And can promote a policy of reconciliation, unity and national understanding involving all the forces and all the individuals useful to peace. And that he erases the errors of French diplomacy, which were after all only the result of a misunderstanding. In order to bind up the wounds of Chad and relaunch the train of its development, which has been standing, disabled, in the station in Ndjamen for 15 years.

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CHAD

BRIEFS

GOUKOUNI'S ACTIONS AGAINST GUNT MEMBERS--Former president Goukouni Oueddei sought to clear the space around him in the months which preceded his fall (7 June) by eliminating all the lukewarm elements in the GUNT [Transitional National Union Government] suspected of wanting to deal with Hissein Habre. The first target was Col Kamougue, for whose arrest for "treason" Goukouni has signed an order as of the end of January, with the agreement of certain officials of the southern forces and a number of officers in the Chadian Armed Forces (FAT) hostile to the colonel, whose military strength lies above all with Felix Malloum's former gendarmes. The Zairean chief of state, Mobutu Sese Seko, was temporarily successful in suspending the implementation of that order. Goukouni then blamed Ahmat Acyl in this connection. This time, he was to come up against the Libyan veto. [Text][Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French No 1119, 16 Jun 82 p 38][COPYRIGHT: Jeune AFrique GRUPJIA 1981.] 5157

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CONGO

BRIEFS

COC TEMPORARY EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE DISBANDED--The executive Committee of the Brazzaville Chamber of Commerce has disbanded on 22 May after a general meeting held under the chairmanship of the Congolese Minister of Commerce, Elanga Ngaporo. According to the minister, the chamber's situation is "disastrous" and marked by a "disgraceful apathy." He also declared that "things have not been clear" during the two inspections which took place recently, in particular as regards management. The temporary executive committee elected on government initiative is headed by Agathon Note, OFNACOM [National Marketing Office] general manager. The first vice president is Marcel Castanou, SIAT [expansion unknown], the second, Maurice Ognamy (press staff), the third, Prosper Gandzien. The treasurer is Andre Batanga, BNDC [National Development Bank of the Congo]. Certain persons, without being members of the Congolese government, have observed at times some shortcomings in the operation of the Brazzaville Chamber of Commerce, but the decision to set up a temporary executive committee, at the very moment when the Chamber of Commerce was engaged as the headquarters of the federation of commercial companies in Central Africa, and especially the charges made against the management, have aroused anxiety among the companies which operate in the Congo. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1909, 11 Jun 82 p 1517, 1518] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1982] 8490

STRENGTHENED ITALIAN COOPERATION--President Sassou Nguesso received Roberto Palleschi, Italian secretary of state for development cooperation on 2 June in Brazzaville. At the conclusion of this session, the Italian secretary of state and the minister delegate to the president of the Congo, in charge of cooperation, especially in the fields of public works, fishing, mining, energy and finance. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1909, 11 Jun 82 p 1518] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1982] 8490

PCT CENTRAL COMMITTEE MEETING--The Central Committee of the Congolese Labor Party (PCT), the country's single party, held a regular meeting at the beginning of May, in Brazzaville, to study the situation in Africa (Namibia, Western Sahara, Chad). Among other things, the Central Committee called on the OAU to become united again on the matter of admitting the SDAR (Saharan Democratic Arab Republic) in its ranks. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1905, 14 May 82 p 1286] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1982] 8796

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SPECIAL ASSEMBLY SESSION--The People's National Assembly of the Congo has been convened on special session to study supporting measures for the 1982-1986 Five-Year Plan. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1905, 14 May 82 p 1286] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1982] 8796

FRENCH AID, ROMANIAN DELEGATION--Two financing agreements involving a total of 200 million CFA francs (4 million French francs) were recently signed in Brazzaville between Congo and France. The two agreements deal with the agricultural sector and more specifically, with agronomical research and small-scale motorization. Also, a Romanian delegation headed by Marin Capisizu, secretary of state for agriculture and food industry, has just paid an official visit to the Congo. Among other things, the delegation had talks with Henri Djombo, minister of water and forestry, and was received by Aime Emmanuel Yoka, minister delegate to the president's office in charge of cooperation. The delegation also toured several agribusiness plants in the outskirts of Brazzaville. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1905, 14 May 82 p 1286] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1982] 8796

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DJIBOUTI

## AFAR ETHNICITY LINKED TO CREATION OF PPD

London AFRICA in English Feb 82 pp 33-34

[Text]

IN October, Djibouti officially became a one-party state, under President Hassan Gouled's ruling Rassemblement Populaire pour Progres (RPP). It hardly seemed a necessary move — the country had no other recognized parties anyway. In fact, the President's decision to set up a one-party state, passed unopposed by the National Assembly, was sparked off by an effort to get an opposition party off the ground a couple of months earlier.

This was the Partie Populaire de Djibouti (PPD), promptly dubbed 'anti-nationalistic and subversive' by the Government when it went public in mid-August. Within a month, the entire 12-man executive committee of the proposed new party had been rounded up (though half of them were released in the new year), and dozens more of their supporters were briefly detained. And with the National Assembly's legal ban on any other parties, the PPD lost any hope of being registered, and any chance therefore of putting up candidates for the assembly elections which are due to be held in a couple of months.

The Government's criticisms of the PPD were extensive. President Gouled, who was out of the country when the PPD's leaders were arrested, said on his return, that they had been trying to encourage ethnicism, and ethnic superiority, and they had distributed pamphlets, in itself illegal, and even, he alleged, tried to embezzle state funds. Another accusation was

that they were in the pay of a foreign power. The country concerned was not specified, and the evidence for this allegation, as for the others, has not been forthcoming.

**Ethnicism**

In fact it is certainly true that the creation of the PPD was an attempt to represent, essentially though not apparently exclusively, one of Djibouti's two main ethnic groups, the Afars. The majority of the Somali-speaking Issas, the other main group, do support President Hassan Gouled and his RPP, though the Prime Minister, Barkat Gourad is an Afar himself.

Similarly one of the leading members of the proposed new party was the secretary general, Moussa Ahmed Idris, a former MP in the French National Assembly in the mid-1960s and an Issa. Most of the other members of the PPD council were however Afars, and they included two former Prime Ministers, Ahmed Dini, and Abdullah Khamil as well as three former Ministers, Hussein Jabah, Mohammed Issa Dit Sheiko and Mohammed Siad Arabe and other MPs. Ahmed Dini had resigned four years ago from his position as Prime Minister specifically alleging anti-Afar activity by the RPP.

In fact the Afars have been restive since independence in 1977. Under the French, the Afars were the ruling

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group and the Issas who made up an estimated 40 per cent of the country's population, were the critics. The Afars comprise some 35 per cent of the population, and the remaining 25 per cent are Arabs from North or South Yemen, and Somalis from Somalia, who, not surprisingly tend to align with the RPP.

In claiming that the RPP and the Government is unjust ethnically and that it is partial, the Afars point, for example to the amnesty announced for five of Djibouti's 11 political prisoners in July. This left six still held — all Afars (all convicted of bomb attacks).

Dini has also argued that Afars are denied jobs, that French co-operants are normally sent to non-Afar areas while Afar areas are generally neglected, that the Government has failed in its development promises and it has also failed to carry out such matters as removing the fences and check points around Djibouti town. Ironically, it was Dini himself who was responsible for keeping these operation immediately after independence.

The appearance of the PPD, despite the Government's immediate dismissal of it as a tiny group and purely ethnic, shook the administration badly. A number of the RPP's own

Afar MPs swiftly changed parties, losing rent free Government houses in the process. The whole episode made it clear that President Gouled's theory of consensus politics is even more fragile than had appeared on the surface.

Equally, worrying for the Government were the links that the PPD might have been forging with neighbouring Ethiopia. The PPD even claimed to be socialist, and Dini, on a recent visit to Addis Ababa, got a very warm reception. Since independence, President Gouled has been watchful of both his neighbours and equally distrustful of both. The President is concerned that neither should have too much to do with Djibouti.

The Government has reason to be wary. In December, for example there was the fatal shooting of a doctor Osman in the centre of the capital. There has been no proof of who was responsible, but Osman was a member

of the Majerteen clan of Somalia, and he has been living in exile for some years. While apparently uninvolved in the opposition politics of the Somali National Movement, or similar organizations, two of his brothers inside Somalia were arrested by President Siad Barre's regime and

held for some months recently. There was some reason therefore to believe Osman's death could have been political. Whether or not he was a victim, as opposition sources allege, of Somali hit squads, cannot be confirmed; and no evidence has been produced that the Somali regime is even prepared to deal with its enemies in this way. Nevertheless, the Djibouti Government certainly believes that the roots of Osman's murder lie in Somalia itself.

Equally, the episode underlines the vulnerability of the state, and it demonstrates exactly why the Government is so keen that the substantial French presence in Djibouti remains unchanged. At the moment there are some 12,000 Frenchmen in Djibouti, as well as around 4,000 troops (including a demi-brigade of the Foreign Legion), a squadron of Mirages 3s, and a substantial naval task force, in the territory of 300,000 people. France of course also provides aid of some 20 million dollars a year as well as pays around 200 million a year for its troops, co-operants and other personnel. France's interest is strategic, as Djibouti commands the narrow Bab el Mandeb straight on the Red Sea where so much oil still passes.

And, the US, similarly appreciates the strategic importance of the port of Djibouti; for the first time in 1979, US warships paid more visits to Djibouti than French ones did. That is in fact a connection that President Gouled remains cautious about. He strongly condemned the US/Egypt, Sudan, Somalia and Oman military manouvers last year, Bright Star 82. Indeed he even postponed the annual Franco-Djibouti military manouvers to avoid any suggestion of possible involvement in Bright Star, which was also bitterly criticised by two of his neighbours, Ethiopia and South Yemen.

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Many in Djibouti do resent the French, and claim with reason that their attitudes are colonial. They say that almost all of the 200 million dollars a year spent on the troops and advisers goes straight back to France, that the French wages are too high, that the French really run everything and so on. There is more than a grain of truth in all this. But still France is needed by everybody. Ethiopia and Somalia can't trust each other.

As the episode of the PPD emphasizes, Afars and Issas remain more than partially unreconciled, and the French do still hold the ring to some degree. So even the bitterest critics of French policy in Africa mute their criticism of Djibouti.

President Gouled has been surprisingly successful in getting aid from Arab states — 60 million dollars from Saudi Arabia since 1977, as much promised by Iraq, as well as sums from Kuwait, the Emirates and Libya. But it's not enough. With virtually no resources (though there is now a real possibility that there is deep level water to be found with all that this would mean for agriculture) and thousands of refugees still in the country, who fled from the fighting in Ethiopia four years ago, Djibouti needs all the help it can get. ■

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ETHIOPIA

## TRIPARTITE ALLIANCE SEEKS TO CURB 'U. S. IMPERIALISM'

London AFRICA in English Feb 82 pp 44-45

[Text]

IN response to joint military manoeuvres, code-named Bright Star 82, involving Egypt, Sudan, Somalia, and Oman, organised and financed by the United States of America, the foreign ministers of Ethiopia, Libya, and South Yemen recently held an emergency meeting in Addis Ababa at which they analyzed, and ultimately criticized, operation Bright Star.

Many diplomats in Addis Ababa, both Ethiopia's allies and others, say little else could have been done. The harshest, and most extreme, methods of retaliation would have been the closure of, or further demand of personnel cut-backs at, the American embassy; an Iranian-style anti-American demonstration outside the embassy, which was rumoured to have been planned; or an unlikely call for joint manoeuvres with the USSR in response.

None of these acts of vengeance was suggested, let alone carried out. Observers in Addis Ababa say probably because such a reaction would have played right into Reagan's hands. Ethiopia also remains able to protest, along with its allies, that it has never gone so far as to practise joint war operations with the Soviets. Such joint manoeuvres, outside of being farfetched, would not go down very well inside Ethiopia.

**Warning**

Instead of anything drastic, some pretty vehement words flowed from

Ethiopia's Foreign Minister, Col. Feleke Gedle-Giorgis, in a note to US Secretary of State, Alexander Haig. Feleke warned that Ethiopia will be forced to re-examine the premises of its entire policy towards the US *should* the manoeuvres involve actions detrimental to Ethiopia's national interests. No details on what this reassessment could entail were given but the fact that it was still a question of 'should' the operation prove detrimental, led some observers to believe that Ethiopia was still leaving its door to the US slightly ajar.

Feleke regards operation Bright Star as a 'war rehearsal', and believes the American RDF (Rapid Deployment Force) deserves another acronym, the QIF, or Quick Interventionist Force. One of the stated results of the emergency meeting was Ethiopia's deeper integration into the socialist camp. But, how much deeper it can go is a common riposte.

Ethiopia already considers its national and international interests as part and parcel of those of the socialist camp. An even more profound fusion with Libya, Washington's pet hate these days, is definitely an offshoot of operation Bright Star and the emergency get-together. Not only because of Ethiopia's will, but Libya's belief that the Bright Star manoeuvres were above all aimed at its Jamahiriyah. Therefore, this time around, regardless of domestic oil revenue ailments at home, promised Libyan

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aid to Ethiopia is, and will continue, coming through.

While fusion characterizes Libyan — Ethiopian relations, a widening fissure permeates those with Sudan. If any novel item emerged from the

emergency session in Addis Ababa, it was Ethiopia's unleashed and unrestrained diatribe against Sudan, along with Ethiopia's regular opponents. Since Gaddafi's denunciation of Sudanese President Nimeiri at Addis Ababa's Revolution Square last August, Feleke has managed to walk a narrow diplomatic line, with a degree of equilibrium, concerning Sudan. All efforts were geared to salvaging the hard-won but sinking rapprochement. Operation Bright Star has ended all the neighbourly pretence.

**Intervention**

Feleke spoke of retardation of the achievements of cooperation in the region, and particularly with Sudan, because of 'American intervention.' It is probably no coincidence that a reported upsurge in the Eritrean war practically accompanied this deterioration in Sudanese — Ethiopian relations. Although the Sudan has clipped the wings of the Eritrea Liberation Front (ELF) by disarming and confining many of its members, the Eritrea People's Liberation Front (EPLF) is apparently enjoying renewed Sudanese collaboration. It is now wondered if Sudanese-Ethiopian relations have reached a point of no return.

Sudan's cooperation in containing Eritrean secession is still a priority in Ethiopia's foreign policy. However, it now appears that, in a quid pro quo situation, the carrot is being replaced by the stick. In the foreign policy opinion of Ethiopia, although Gaddafi is not entirely trusted by all as an ally, he is considered irreversibly anti-imperialist. Nimeiri on the other hand, especially after Bright Star, is

openly termed a 'surrogate' that has 'succumbed to US imperialism. It is perhaps telling the Ethiopian Foreign Minister that spoke of the three allies' right to stand 'steadfast' against provocations.

Official US — Ethiopian relations are in a state of constant decline. The tendency is for both countries to entrench into politically opposite corners, with a welcoming glove only occasionally extended for economic aid agreements. The gap between the two, far from narrowing, is widening to a seemingly unbridgeable gulf.

During the same week of operation Bright Star in Egypt, the central committee of the Commission to Organize the Party of the Working People of Ethiopia (COPWE) held its Third Regular Plenary Session. Although many other issues demanded discussion, including the what, when, where and how of organizing the party, a conclusive statement of priorities was that Ethiopia should strengthen its defence capability in the face of the 'serious imperialist threat' that Ethiopia and its allies obviously perceive. ■

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GABON

NATION'S ECONOMIC SITUATION IN 1981 ANALYZED

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1905, 14 May 82 pp 1284-1285

Excerpts In 1981, Gabon, like the rest of the developing countries, suffered the repercussions of the economic crisis experienced by the industrialized countries. All its main export commodities (timber, manganese, uranium and even petroleum) were affected. But while the price of timber and uranium remained stagnant and even dropped at times, the recovery of the American currency had a favorable effect on the prices of manganese ore and petroleum in terms of their value in CFA francs.

It is therefore likely that total earnings from Gabonese exports increased again in 1981. Yet, a rather exceptional increase in the country's imports caused a certain slippage in the usual surplus of its balance of payments.

In any case, judging by the growth of its external net assets, the balance of payments of Gabon was in good shape in 1981. The same can be said regarding the position of the Gabonese treasury in relation to the banking system.

On the other hand, the final months of the year were marked by an inflationary pressure which created some social problems and which, in January 1982, led the government to grant a wage increase for the first time in 2 years.

The year of 1982 looks less promising than the previous one. No big improvement is expected regarding the situation of timber, manganese and uranium. The upheavals experienced by the oil markets could also deprive the government in Libreville of part of its expected revenues and force it to cut some of the expenditures included in the 1982 budget.

Agricultural Production

Cocoa--In 1980-1981, just over 2,800 tons of cocoa were marketed, this amounts to 1,000 tons less than in 1979-1980 and 1,500 tons less than in 1978-1979. This significant drop was partly due to the fact that less cocoa was smuggled into the country. Other contributing factors were the old age of the cocoa plantations, the damage caused by brown rot, the shortage of manpower and the failure to increase the prices paid to farmers.

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Yet it should be noted that at the beginning of the 1981-1982 crop year, farm prices were renegotiated for the second consecutive time. It is true that these prices are still slightly higher than the prices paid in other African countries, particularly in Cameroon and in the Ivory Coast, at least as far as top-quality cocoa is concerned (320 CFA francs per kilo).

In any case, the 1981-1982 crop year seems to have started well since, at the end of its 3rd month, the harvest was more advanced than in the previous year.

Coffee--In contrast to what happened with the cocoa, more coffee was marketed in 1980-1981 than in 1979-1980 (around 1,700 tons compared to 1,300 tons). But it seems that the gains registered were the result of more coffee being smuggled from neighboring countries rather than an increase in the country's production.

As in the case of cocoa, the price paid for coffee remained unchanged for the second time around during the 1981-1982 farming year. But it must be pointed out that this price, which stands at 180 CFA francs for 1 kilo of coffee berries, is decidedly higher than the prices paid in other French-speaking African countries. In any case, prospects remain uncertain in the current farming year.

Other Crops--Very little information is available regarding agricultural products other than cocoa and coffee. However, it is known that in 1981 Gabon's sugar production was down compared to 1980 (14,000 tons instead of 17,200 tons) although it produced more than was needed to meet the country's needs.

#### Forestry Production

Until the end of the first half of 1981, Gabon had been relatively untouched by the prolonged crisis which affected the market of tropical woods and even the timber market in general. For instance, the National Timber Company of Gabon (SNBG) managed to export almost the same amount of okoume wood as in 1980 and its foreign sales of ozigo wood were even slightly up.

For the entire year of 1981, results were distinctly less satisfactory. The SNBG bought 17 percent less okoume wood and 29 percent less ozigo wood than in the previous year. This company's exports decreased to a much lesser extent (5 percent for okoume wood and 16 percent for ozigo wood). On the other hand, local sales of okoume wood plunged drastically (39 percent) while sales of ozigo--which had severely shrunk in 1980--recovered and almost went back to their 1979 level.

It should be pointed out that despite the economic crisis, France continued to be a good client for Gabon. In 1981, French imports of okoume and other Gabonese woods were slightly up.

#### Mining and Industrial Production

As in the case of forestry production, the mining sector of Gabon suffered the effects of the crisis in the industrialized countries.

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Manganese ore exports seem to have been most seriously affected: in 1981, the shipments made through the port of Pointe-Noire dropped by 28 percent: 1,543,000 tons in 1981 compared to 2,137,000 tons in 1980.

The COMUF [Franceville Uranium Mining Company] was apparently worse hit than the COMILOG [Ogooue Mining Company] since it seems that the amount of uranium mined in Gabon remained practically unchanged (1,033 tons in 1980, 1,024 tons in 1981) and that exports decreased just very slightly--999 tons in 1980, 946 tons in 1981.

But the volume of crude oil pumped continued to decline: according to specialized publications, only 7.65 million tons were pumped, compared to 8.9 million tons in 1980, which amounts to a 14-percent decline. All things considered, the best results appear to have been achieved in the production of natural gas where shipments (83.8 million cubic meters) went up by 17 percent compared to 1980 (71.9 million tons) and by 38 percent compared to 1979.

Gabon does not publish an industrial production index. Also, there are no figures for the consumption of high-voltage electricity in 1981, which had amounted to 309.5 million kilowatts per hour in 1980, a 10-percent increase. Under these circumstances, it is difficult to have an overall picture of the recent activity in the industrial enterprises of Gabon.

But we know that the refineries continued to operate at less than full capacity and that, in 1981, the two refineries put together processed slightly less crude oil than in 1980: 1.2 million tons compared to 1.28 million tons.

The timber industry was obviously affected by the repercussions of the crisis. For instance, French imports of wood sawings from Gabon dropped by more than half in 1981 (2,200 cubic meters compared to 5,100 cubic meters in 1980). Things were slightly better with veneer wood and plywood, mainly as a result of a marked increase of sales in the foreign market.

#### Prices and Wages

We know that after the first petroleum "boom," Gabon experienced a disturbing inflation. After that, prices settled down and for quite a while Gabon was one of the Black African countries with a slower rate of inflation. But towards the end of 1981 there was a recurrence of inflationary pressures.

It is true that despite a noticeable increase in the chapter of "building and public works" (21.2 percent), the wholesale price index rose by just 9.8 percent between November 1980 and November 1981. But retail prices rose more sharply, going up by 13.7 percent for high-income households and, more significantly, by 15.8 percent for low-income households between December 1980 and December 1981.

Consumers were badly affected by these increases because wages had not been raised since the beginning of 1980. As a result, there were strikes, particularly in Port-Gentil, and the government was forced to increase the monthly interoccupational guaranteed minimum salary from 30,000 to 35,000 CFA francs and the "minimum monthly income" from 40,000 to 50,000 CFA francs.

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**Foreign Trade**

**Export Prices**--The SNBG has not changed its buying and selling price lists since 15 April 1980, a fact which has created problems for the timber enterprises and for the SNBG itself since production costs have gone up.

In this respect, the COMILOG fared better because the dollar price of manganese ore was slightly up when the contracts for the 1980 shipments were concluded. Taking into account the recovery of the American currency, the increase in terms of CFA francs was obviously much higher: according to statistics issued by UNCTAD, this increase was in excess of 30 percent for the entire year of 1981.

During a certain period, Gabon, like most of the other oil-producing countries, had to lower its crude oil prices in dollars. But here again, the recovery of the American currency had a favorable effect in terms of the conversion into CFA francs: in 1981, the average CIF [cost, insurance, freight] price of Gabonese petroleum imported by France was 972.3 French francs a ton while in 1980 that price jumped to 1,470.31 French francs which represents an increase of 51 percent.

All things considered, uranium was the commodity most severely hit since, apparently, its average selling price went down by 10 percent.

**Volume Exported**--We reported earlier the changes which took place in the amounts of manganese shipped from Pointe-Noire. Not counting the shipments of petroleum, 1.1 million tons of goods were shipped to foreign destinations from Libreville and Port-Gentil during the first 9 months of 1981 compared to 1.5 million tons for the same period in 1980. This was a considerable drop and timber and petroleum products account for most of it.

During these first 9 months of the year, shipments of crude oil from Port-Gentil are reported to have decreased by 2 million tons or 33 percent. But such a drastic decline needs to be confirmed.

**Total Value of Exports**--Gabonese statistics concerning foreign trade in 1981 are still unavailable. Under these circumstances one has to turn to French statistics and to those compiled, although less frequently, by the OECD.

French imports from Gabon amounted to 2,279.6 million French francs in 1981 compared to 2,723.3 million in 1980. This 16 percent drop was mainly due to a decrease, in quantity as well as in value, of crude oil shipments. French purchases of Gabonese products other than petroleum also dropped by slightly more than 5 percent.

The statistics of the OECD reveal decidedly better results. In fact, during the first 11 months of the year, the dollar value of Gabonese exports to countries which are members of the OECD went down by just 3.8 percent, but taking into account the recovery of the American currency this meant an increase of about 24 percent in terms of CFA francs.

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Therefore it is reasonable to believe that unless Gabon's exports went into a sudden decline towards the end of the year, their value increased in 1981 even though their volume had dropped.

Import Prices--Every 2 months, the Gabonese Statistics Service publishes a wholesale price index for imported goods but, from time to time, sharp variations appear in the annual rates of increase reflected by that index and these variations are hard to explain. We will only mention, without comment, that the rate of increase, which was less than 9 percent for March and July 1981, jumped to 17.9 percent in May and to 12.6 percent in November.

Volume of Imports--Judging from the traffic of merchandise through the ports of Libreville and Port-Gentil, the volume of goods imported by Gabon increased sharply in 1981. During the first 9 months of that year, 305,000 tons of goods were unloaded in these two ports compared to 258,000 tons in 1980. But it must be pointed out that far fewer goods were unloaded in 1980 than in 1979.

Total Value of Imports--In 1981, French exports to Gabon rose by 17 percent in terms of value (2,158.1 million French francs compared to 1,844.1 million in 1980) but the increase was relatively small in terms of volume. On the other hand, the sum of exports from all the OECD countries to Gabon during the first 11 months of the year rose by more than 7 percent in terms of dollars, which means around 38 percent in terms of CFA francs. So there is reason to believe that there was a particularly sharp increase of Gabonese imports in 1981.

Trade Balance--The deficit in France's balance of trade with Gabon was considerably reduced in 1981 due, as already pointed out, to a drop in the purchases of Gabonese crude oil. Also, the negative balance of trade between the OECD countries and Gabon was reduced by \$100 million during the first 11 months of the year. Although these are provisional and partial figures, one may well wonder if, under these conditions, the surplus usually registered by Gabon's balance of trade was not smaller than usual in 1981.

Balance of Payments and Monetary Situation--Without recent balance of payment figures, one must look at the changes registered in the net external assets to have an idea of Gabon's financial dealings with foreign countries. The net external assets, which had been in the red for a long time, moved back into the black column as of November 1980. On 31 October of last year, they amounted to almost 43 billion CFA francs, having increased by more than 47 billion in 1 year. It should be noted that during that period Gabon made repayments of \$6.6 million to the International Monetary Fund and that, by 31 October 1981, its standing debt to that institution was only \$13 million.

As for the money supply, it registered gains but the annual rate of increase (18 percent according to the latest available figures) remains within seemingly normal limits. On the other hand, credits to the economy, which for many months had increased at a relatively slow pace, rose appreciably up towards the end of the year (20 percent between 31 October 1980 and 31 October 1981).

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GABON

DOCUMENT DESCRIBES MINING ACTIVITIES IN 1981

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1909 11 Jun 82 p 1516

[Text] A document drawn up by Gabon's general Administration of Mining and Geology has just summarized mining operations in Gabon in 1981.

Production

The most striking event of the year is the net drop in export of manganese ore, whose tonnage decreased by 30 percent compared with the usual sales level in recent years.

Petroleum production also declined compared with 1980, 7,651,864 tons compared with 8,895,005 tons, or 14 percent, with recent discoveries not yet making up for the normal drop of the main production fields.

Petroleum prospecting is still very active, as in previous years, and is making progress in the number of wells bored (29 compared with 20 in 1980) and the length drilled (56,791 meters compared with 37,453 meters in 1980). Four new discoveries and two confirmations of workable deposits are reported. As regards development of the fields greater activity is also observed: 46 wells bored in 1981 compared with 24 in 1980. Two new fields have gone into production, Ayol and M'Polunie. The starting of operation of the new discoveries should stabilize production as early as 1982 and allow an increase beginning in 1983, the General Administration of Mining estimates.

The refineries of Port-Gentil, SOGARA [expansion unknown] and COGER [ELF Gabonese Refining Company] have together processed more than 1,193,635 tons of crude oil in 1981. Export of crude oil was 6,298,803 tons. It was distributed as follows: United States 23.4 percent, France 14 percent, Brazil 12.8 percent, Netherlands 9.3 percent and Chile 8 percent.

Production of manganese ore was only 1,481,538 tons compared with 2,163,380 tons in 1980. This sizeable decrease in production is explained by the drop in sales caused by the liquidation of stocks among producers of ferro-manganese which has caused a drop in demand. To that is added a considerable decrease of purchases by some Eastern European countries, especially Poland and Rumania which are badly hit by the economic crisis.

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However it is observed that as regards the value of the exports of manganese ore, the considerable rise in the exchange rate of the dollar has noticeably mitigated the effects of the reduction of the tonnage exported. These exports are distributed as follows: France 22.83 percent, Norway 15.27 percent, United States 12.72 percent, Canada 9.05 percent, Italy 7.80 percent, Asia 5.72 percent, Eastern European countries 4.86 percent, Belgium 4.86 percent, Mexico 4.54 percent, etc. The prospects for 1982 are uncertain, according to the document which we refer to.

As regards uranium, the market situation has shown little development and taking into account sales opportunities is close to that of the previous year: 1,360 tons of concentrate containing 1,022 tons of uranium metal compared with 1,381 tons of concentrate containing 1,033 tons of uranium metal in 1980. On the other hand, the sales price in current francs is considerably below that of the preceding year, about 14 percent.

In spite of economic and operational conditions which are much more difficult than in recent years, the development program of the means of production has continued. The Boyindzi mine has begun production since the beginning of the year and the units of the new processing plant have been completed on schedule, that is the beginning of 1982. Market development forecasts do not allow envisaging a much appreciably higher production in 1982. Tonnage should increase about 10 percent, with the average price being on the 1980 level.

**Mineral Prospecting, Cartography in 1981**

Prospecting concentrated on three substances in 1981: uranium, gold and barite.

Uranium is the "number one substance" because of the extent of the facilities used, the General Mining Administration points out. The Gabonese state association COGEMA [General Nuclear Materials Company, CFr.]-KEPCO [expansion unknown] has continued its program of evaluating the indications of the North Leyou sector in the Lastoursville area, it has done 13,500 meters of boring there. On the whole, the results of the work are not very encouraging. COGEMA has continued, on its own account, the geological prospecting of the South-Franceville area and made a dozen borings for this purpose amounting to 5,500 meters. COMUF [Franceville Uranium Mining Company] has done 1,175 meters of boring on its indications in Lekedi and Bagombe.

In the case of gold, the Eteke syndicate made up of the Gabonese state, BRGM [Geological and Mining Exploration Office] and COMUF has continued its prospecting in the Eteke-Ovala area. A number of extensive mineralized areas have been revealed at Ovala and Ndombo-Mobi. Proving these indications by bore-holing will be done in 1982.

As regards barite, after stopping prospecting for lead and zinc, the Kroussou syndicate concentrated exploration on barite, numerous indications of which had been observed along the socle-cretaceous contact. It made a certain number of tests of geochemical anomalies in the Mayombe mountain

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group as well as prospecting indications of already known mineralizations. Two indications on the axis of Mayumba-Tchibanga road seem interesting. They will be studied in detail in 1982.

The program of cartography at 1/200,000 and of a mining inventory of the area crossed by the Transgabon continued in 1981. A radar survey of all the territory financed by the development budget was made at the end of December 1981. It was made by the American company, Aero Service Corporation. On the other hand, the national geological service and the BRGM prospected and surveyed a section of about 6,500 square meters in the provinces of l'Estuaire (East-Cocobeach) and Woleu-Ntem (southern Mitzié).

In 1982, it is planned to make 130,000 square kilometers of aerogeophysical survey and 8,000 square kilometers of geological survey at 1/200,000 of these areas. Part of the geophysical survey will be financed by EDF [European Development Fund], with FAC [Aid and Cooperation Fund] contributing to the completion of the geological work of cartography.

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GABON

## BRIEFS

INSECURITY IN LIBREVILLE--Since the middle of May, security checks have become more frequent in Libreville to combat increased banditry there. According to the government's daily L'UNION of 5 June 1982, about 500 persons, "mainly nonGabonese" have been caught breaking the law since the beginning of the checks. The Gabonese minister of external affairs, Martin Bongo, summoned on 4 June all the chiefs of diplomatic mission accredited in Gabon for a report regarding the security of residents in Libreville. Martin Bongo declared the capital is "unsafe, so the government has taken measures to protect the people. Consequently the security forces are going to proceed with fairly strict checks, especially of all automobiles moving about in the city." These checks, the minister emphasized, are not directed against definite persons. "It has been ascertained that criminals use cars with different license plates, so the police must check extensively," even when it involves vehicles belonging to foreign embassies. The security forces which were represented at this meeting by colonel major, Leon Osiali, director general of documentation, are obliged to "meet violence and shoot in their turn," the minister declared. A spokesman of the ministry, indicated at the end of the report to L'UNION that the nationals guilty of crimes on Gabonese territory would "be repatriated on the responsibility of their embassies" without prejudice to the punitive measures which could have been taken against them. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1909, 11 Jun 82 p 1517] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1982] 8490

AMOCO'S GABON ACTIVITIES--President Bongo granted an interview on 3 June in Libreville to George Trump, president and general manager of Amoco Gabon, an affiliate of Standard Oil of Indiana, the world's seventh oil company. The conversation, which took place with the United States Ambassador, Terry McNamara, present, involved this company's operations in Gabon, which began in May 1980. Since this date, it is reported by a source close to the Gabonese minister of petroleum, Amoco Gabon has made six operational borings in the area south of Port Gentil, of which four have shown definite commercial possibilities. These four bore holes are now producing 10,614 barrels of petroleum a day, it is reported from the same source. Amoco Gabon, which intends to increase this production to 33,000 barrels per day in 1984, has invested 20 billion CFA francs in Gabon until now and expects to invest 30 more billion between now and 1984. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1909, 11 Jun 82 p 1517] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1982] 8490  
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GAMBIA

BRIEFS

NATIONAL ASSEMBLY SESSION--The Gambian National Assembly, elected on last 5 May, met for the first time on 2 June at Banjul. The assembly is made up of 27 members of the PPP [People's Progressive Party] (the party of President Sir Dawda Jawara), five independent deputies (former PPP members, elected although they had not obtained the party's approval), three members of the National Convention Party, as well as five representatives of the traditional chiefs and eight deputies appointed by the chief of state. The deputies reelected as president Sir Aleieu Souleiman Jack, who has held this position for 15 years after having been the last governor of Gambia before its independence. In a statement, the vice president of the republic, Bakary Darbo, congratulated President Jawara for having "thwarted the attempted coup d'etat of 30 July 1981 and permitted the holding of free elections, which proved his popularity." He also emphasized the increased importance of the role of the Gambian deputies, a certain number of whom will become members of the Senegambia Confederated Assembly. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1909, 11 Jun 82 p 1508] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1982] 8490

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GUINEA

## BRIEFS

JOINT DANISH SHIPPING OPERATIONS--In October 1981, the Guinean Shipping Co, a national company of the Guinean Republic, signed in Conakry a cooperation agreement with the Danish shipping firm A/S Deep Sea Shipping Ltd (DSS) based in Copenhagen. The aim of the contract was to help the Guinean Shipping Co by training its seagoing and land personnel and chartering or buying ships which will be jointly operated. As part of the contract, the Danish ship Gudrum-Maersj has been chartered and will be operated jointly by the Guinean Shipping Co and the DSS. On 15 April, that ship was handed over to its operators in Hamburg where it took cargo, then proceeded to Ipswich, Antwerp and Rouen en route for Dakar, Conakry and Freetown. On its northbound voyage, it will unload in Nantes, Caen and probably Antwerp. It is a shelter-deck ship of 3,700 tpl [dead-weight tons] which was built in 1977 with two hatchways measuring 19.2 by 10.5 meters and its cargo handling equipment consists of two 10-ton and two 25-ton cranes. The DSS has already been operating four ships on regular service to the ports of Hamburg, Rotterdam, Antwerp, Ipswich and Rouen, and in Africa to the ports of Dakar, Kamsar and Conakry in Guinea, Freetown in Sierra Leone, Monrovia and Buchanan in Liberia. They call in Antwerp every 10 days and in the other ports every 2 weeks. Out of Europe, they carry miscellaneous cargo in conventional freight or in containers measuring 20 by 40 feet, motor vehicles and heavy parcels. They also carry goods from the United States or from the Far East, mostly from China, after transshipment in Antwerp. It must also be pointed out that the two shipping companies plan to purchase one or two ships in 1982 for their joint operations and these ships will sail under the Guinean flag with Guinean crews. Guinean land personnel will also be trained in the European offices of the DSS. In Rouen, the forwarding agent is the Agence Maritime de la Basse Seine [Basse Seine Maritime Agency]. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1905, 14 May 82 p 1271] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1982]8796

SPANISH RELATIONS--After having stopped for 12 hours in Rabat during which he met Moroccan prime minister, Maati Bouabid, and several members of the government, the Guinean chief of state, Ahmed Sekou Toure, paid a 3-day official visit to Spain from 25 to 27 May. The Guinean president had talks with King Juan Carlos, Leopaldo Calvo Sotelo, prime minister of the Spanish government, Jose Pedro Perez Llorca, minister of foreign affairs and lieutenant general Alvaro Lacalle, chairman of the council of the chiefs of the general staff. The Guinean delegation was made up namely of the ministers of external affairs, energy, agriculture, fisheries and livestock and finally education. The discussions involved improving bilateral cooperation

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in the field of fishing, the coming signing of a cultural cooperation agreement--which will allow Guinean students to study in Spain--increasing trade between the two countries and the means for Spain to reduce its deficit with Conakry. Now very slight, trade between the two countries shows, in fact, a strong imbalance in Guinea's favor. In 1981 Spain's purchases in the People's Revolutionary Republic of Guinea amounted to 6.2 billion pesetas (about 60 million dollars) while Spain's sales were just 920 million pesetas (some 9 million dollars. [Excerpts] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1909, 11 Jun 82 p 1509] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1982] 8490

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KENYA

## ANALYSIS OF LUHYA, NAUDI LAND BRAWL

London AFRICA in English Feb 82 p 42

[Text] **O**F all its multi-faceted political and economic problems, there is little doubt as to one of Kenya's prime and most sensitive tribulations. The problem of land ownership is a daily preoccupation of the vast majority of the country's populace. It has been debated privately and publicly, has dominated parliamentary sessions for years, but the solution still appears far beyond the horizon.

It is not a problem that just sprung up the other day. It is a problem rooted in the country's history. The same problem drove hundreds of thousands of Kenyan nationalists to rise up in arms against the colonial government, a bitter struggle culminating in the country's independence from Britain in 1964.

But even after the ousting of the colonial regime, there has been no end in sight for land ownership problems and, as in the past, there has always been the scent of violence in the air. No undertaking of Kenya's two independent administrations to solve the land problem has had any semblance of great success.

**Shock**

It was, therefore, in a sense, not much of a shock to many Kenyans last November when they learnt that a violent clash between the Luhya of Kenya's Western Province and the Nandi of the Rift Valley had left several people dead, many injured and about 100 houses burnt to the ground. The fight was over

land. Precisely who the aggrieved party were was not established. The two neighbouring groups are not known particularly to hate one another. But scarcely has it been known, until the November clashes, that there was a simmering land dispute between them.

Luhyas involved in the fighting told journalists that they had been subject to persistent Nandi attacks over what the Nandis said was an occupation of their land by the Luhyas. The Luhyas said that though living on intrinsically

Nandi land, they had legally acquired it and some said they had lived on it for ten years. They said they could not understand why the Nandis had decided to set upon them. Some said that if the Government was doing nothing about the problem, then they were left with no choice but to defend themselves, by force of arms.

The Nandis, mostly through their local leaders, blamed the clashes on Luhya provocation ignited by Luhya leaders. The verbal acrimony was small compared to the physical hostilities that seemed to escalate by the day. Many Luhya families fled their homes to the neighbouring Kakamega

district on the Kenya/Uganda border. The border between Nandi and Kakamega districts where most of the fighting took place, became a hotbed of fear and terror. Arms used in the fighting included poisoned arrows.

The Government stepped in, first with stern verbal warnings that any

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escalation of the fighting would lead to a tough response. Not much attention was paid to these warnings and the Government's next move was to step up police vigilance and border patrols.

When it seemed that police reinforcements were in peril of being overcome by the protagonists, Rift Valley provincial commissioner Hezekiah Oyugi threatened that the Government would deploy the crack para-military General Service Unit (GSU). As police contingents were reinforced, the GSU was put on alert.

Up until this time, high-level official pronouncements on the fighting had not been forthcoming. But suddenly, on the eve of his departure for Lusaka, to join eight Heads of State and Government in signing the Preferential Trade Area (PTA) of eastern and southern African states aimed at promoting regional economic cooperation, President Daniel arap Moi issued a terse warning to the two warring groups. The fighting had to end, he said. Moi, who is also the current Chairman of the OAU, said he would not hesitate to visit the troubled area to give the matter his personal attention.

**Unhappy**

This is precisely what he did shortly after returning from Zambia. Accompanied by key Ministers and officers of his Government, Moi travelled to the scene of bloody clashes and addressed a public meeting. He angrily declared: 'I am not happy to be here'. The President then proceeded to parade before the large gathering the leaders of the two groups who, he said, the Government held responsible for the troubles.

Moi said that there were no fundamental differences between the two peoples. It was a question, solely, of a few individuals fuelling ethnic animosity between them with a view to getting themselves elected to Parliament in the coming general elections

two years from now. 'Human life cannot be mortgaged for votes,' warned Moi. He then asked the paraded 'culprits' to swear never to repeat their 'criminal acts' and henceforth to work for peace.

After the clashes a local newspaper expressed the general feelings of Kenyans when it said: 'It is important that the problem is not blown out of proportion. It must be seen as what it is — an unfortunate incident provoked by some selfish individuals. Trying to read too much into the issue will lead nowhere. It is also futile to try to ascribe blame to either group wholesale, rather than to the few individuals responsible for the trouble. ■'

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LIBERIA

**BRIEFS**

IDA CREDIT--The International Development Association (IDA), an affiliate of the World Bank, approved on 6 May a credit of \$15.5 million in favor of Liberia intended to help that country carry out a project to develop food and cash crops in the county of Lofa. Some of the crops involved are rice, coffee, cocoa and cassava. Living conditions in the developed areas will be improved by building roads, sinking wells and creating better health facilities. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1905, 14 May 82 p 1280] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1982] 8796

MINING PROJECT--The National Iron Ore Co (NIOC) of Liberia recently started a program to overhaul its iron ore mines and has issued a call for bids for the supply of materials and equipment. Aid for this project has come from the World Bank, the African Development Bank, the OPEC Fund for International Development and from the Dutch FMO [expansion unknown]. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1905, 14 May 82 p 1280] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1982] 8796

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NIGER

BRIEFS

DESERTIFICATION ADVANCING--Col Seyni Kountche, head of state of Niger, has returned from a 6-day visit to the department of Maradi, in the central part of the country, and on 8 May he spoke in Niamey about the problem of the desertification experienced by that department. President Kountche said in particular: "If we want to keep the entire country from becoming just a desert, we are going to have to find a new strategy." In spite of carrying out vast operations to fight this desertification, such as the "Green Sahel" Operation and the campaign to plant trees in the villages, the desert continues its advance, Colonel Kountche said. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1905, 14 May 82 p 1273] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1982] 8796

BELGIAN COOPERATION--On 4 May, Jules Marchal, Belgian ambassador to Niamey, held a ceremony during which he officially turned over to the Nigerien Government a hydroagricultural complex financed by Belgium. This complex, built on the Niger River, 50 kms from Niamey, at an estimated cost of 2,600 million CFA francs, will serve to irrigate 300 hectares of land and to produce about 2,500 tons of paddy rice a year. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1903, 14 May 82 p 1273] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1982] 8796

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NIGERIA

PROBLEMS IN LABOR SITUATION REVIEWED

London AFRICA in English No 128, Apr 82 pp 33-35

[Article by Eddie Iroh: "Unions Flex Their Muscles"]

[Text]

**F**OR one week last month it seemed that the whole executive machinery of the Federal Republic of Nigeria had collapsed under the crushing weight of 'Union Power'. The country's entire electricity and power facilities were shut down as members of the Electricity and Gas Workers' Union downed tools in a sudden industrial show of anger that plunged all of Nigeria into darkness.

Five days into the power shut-off, the giant Civil Service Technical Workers' Union of Nigeria (CSTWUN) began its own strike action after the Government had ignored its 21-day ultimatum. Consequently the radio and signals technicians of the civil aviation service joined their 'comrades' in the CSTWUN and reduced Nigerian Airways domestic flights to 'skeletal services'.

Water supplies were shut off, too. And as if that was not enough, engineers and pilots of the state-owned Nigerian Airways went on work-to-rule (just short of all-out strike) to press their own claims. It was a week in which Nigeria's federal-authorities appeared confused and helpless as the whole country lay paralysed.

The Electricity and Gas Workers' Union had, as it were, embarked on its strike action without due declaration of a trade dispute, claiming that the management of the Nigerian Electric and Power Authority had refused to implement an earlier agreement on

Incomes Policy Guidelines and Christmas Bonus for workers which was due in December 1981.

While there was considerable public displeasure over the precipitate action of the striking workers, there was no applause for the manner in which the authorities seemed to have reneged on the incomes and bonus agreement, or for the Federal Government's lack of haste in tackling what is the most effective industrial action since the civilian administration came to power two and half years ago. Commented the *PUNCH* newspaper in a candid front-page editorial: 'The current industrial crisis is an expression of loss of faith by workers in the dispute-resolution machinery of the Government'.

### **Machinery**

Nor was the Nigerian media itself equal to its task of briefing itself, let alone informing the public on the scope and effects of a nation-wide electricity shut-down. Not until Monday morning, after three days of rumour and hearsay, ranging from the customary power failures to technical hitches at the giant Kainji hydro-electric dam, did Nigerians learn that a major national industrial crisis was afoot.

It took the Government an equal length of time to begin to attempt a solution. But even then, what the nation was given was a definition of

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what was going on, not a solution. Stating the obvious, Federal Minister of Mines and Power Mohammed Hassan, described the action of the workers as 'illegal,' and worsened the mood of the angry strikers by threatening them with mass dismissal.

### Intervention

As the nation headed for what one newspaper editorial called 'complete paralysis,' President Shehu Shagari, acting with the customary ease and caution which his critics insist is 'foot-dragging', moved to invoke limited executive powers to set up a 'task force' of engineers to reactivate power supply to essential services. But some cynics quipped that the last time most Nigerian engineers touched a screw-driver was during their practicals in college. Thus, eight days after the power strike was called off, most of Nigeria remained without electricity supply and the hardship continued.

That the striking workers agreed to return to work at all was not so much due to any action of the executive as the intervention of the legislature. After a day long session with the Labour Committee of the Federal House of Representatives, the leaders of the striking workers agreed to call off the strike. President Shagari followed by cancelling a hastily-scheduled radio and television address in which some observers speculated he might have made some drastic declarations, including perhaps a state of emergency.

But all these efforts and even the

agreement that was reached might appear to be too little too late. Experts are unable yet to calculate the damage done to hospital and health services, business in general and Nigeria's fledgling industrial establishments in particular, by the strike action. More important, labour leaders as well as industrial analysts insist that the crisis could have been avoided by the various managements as well as Government responding more rapidly to labour discontent.

Shagari's administration has faced more crises in the labour front than any other Nigerian government since 1960. In the past year alone, Nigerian university teachers went on a strike that lasted all of ten weeks (the longest in Nigerian history) before it was resolved. Before that a general strike by N.L.C. had embarrassed the government; doctors in the country had struck for two weeks during which enormous damage was done to the health care services. As we go to press all the Colleges of Technology in the country have been closed down as a technological students' strike goes into its seventh week. Last year, strikes involving a total of 366,323 workers cost Nigeria an estimated two million man-days.

But while there is no doubt that more strikes are likely to rock the country in the future (there are at least three ultimatums to the Government from various unions at the moment), one hopes that both management and Government will have learnt of the necessity not only to act or react, but sometimes to 'pro-act'. ■

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SENEGAL

PLANNED CUTBACK IN FRENCH COOPERATION MISSION REPORTED

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1905, 14 May 82 p 1269

[Text] On assignment to Senegal since 1978, Michel de Bonnecorse, who was the head of the French cooperation mission in Dakar and is now leaving for a new post in Madagascar, has summed up the situation of French-Senegalese cooperation.

During the years of 1980 and 1981, and within the framework of initiative adopted under the Plan for Economic and Financial Recovery, Senegal received from France not only the yearly programs but also several additional credit facilities amounting to some 40 billion CFA francs. De Bonnecorse also touched on the subject of the reduction in technical assistance, saying that the number of French overseas volunteers now standing at 1,230 will be cut down to 1,000 by 1985.

"It is not by accident that, among African countries, Senegal stands in first or second place as a recipient of grants from the FAC (Aid and Cooperation Fund), of overseas volunteers and of committed loans from the Central Fund for Economic Cooperation," de Bonnecorse said.

"Every year, since independence, France and Senegal have joined in drawing up an annual program of cooperation which, in recent years, has amounted to between 25 and 30 billion CFA francs.

"It so happens that during these last 2 years the economic crisis has forced Senegal to adopt a recovery plan requiring that we provide new funds. This was incorrectly called "exceptional aid." It would have been more suitable to call it "support aid" for the recovery plan.

"For this purpose, during the years 1980 and 1981, in addition to the annual programs France has granted to Senegal some additional credit facilities which amount to around 40 billion CFA francs. They formed an "assorted basket" which included grants, advances without interest, soft loans, rescheduling of debts. It is hard to figure out what all this represents in terms of money, (especially since some repayments are made within a few months but are a great help for the Senegalese Treasury.

"Talks are now underway to decide on the contents of a new basket, which means that we are working together to determine how much aid will be given to Senegal in the 1982-1983 financial year and to establish the terms and timetable for that aid."

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On the subject of the number of overseas cooperative volunteers, de Bonnecorse said: "The policy followed by the two governments is clear: the number of French cooperation volunteers must decrease as the Senegalese become capable of taking over. Therefore we have a progressive and harmonious cutback in personnel which is not motivated by financial considerations but simply by the realities of the 'training-job tandem.'"

"When I first came to Senegal in 1974, there were more than 1,600 cooperation volunteers here while, today, they number 1,230...The French-Senegalese Commission which met recently in Dakar has set the target of 1,000 French cooperation volunteers by 1985. This means that some 100 posts will be eliminated each year. Let us say that there will be a quantitative reduction and a qualitative progression," de Bonnecorse said in conclusion.

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**SENEGAL**

**BRIEFS**

**STOPOVER FOR BRITISH MILITARY AIRCRAFT--Senegal's minister of information, Djobo Ka, confirmed on 5 May that British military airplanes are stopping in Dakar on their way to the British Ascension Island. Many British military planes of various types, but mostly Hercules, were seen to be refueling at Dakar-Yoff International Airport. Official sources in the Senegalese capital report that since the onset of the Malvinas conflict, a real airlift has operated between Great Britain and Ascension Island with a stop in Dakar. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1905, 14 May 82 p 1269] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1982] 8796**

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ZAIRE

POLITICAL, ECONOMIC BACKGROUND REVIEWED

London AFRICA in English No 128, Apr 82 pp 30-32

[Article: "Mobutu Walks Measured Steps"]

[Text]

**G**ENERAL Mobutu's sixteen years of power have brought no respite for the Zairean regime. The country's economy is in bad shape. What has kept Mobutu at the top is his repressive rule, the tolerance of other countries and Western business circles, and the consistent exploitation of the threat of communist subversion. But for how long is the true state of affairs in Zaire going to remain behind this facade of stability?

In June last year, the permanent committee of Zairean bishops made public a pastoral letter denouncing 'a most disturbing situation' characterized by 'a serious disregard for man, his most fundamental and indefensible rights.' The letter instanced a number of 'cases of kidnapping, arbitrary arrests, the settling of accounts, and even torture, not to mention thefts and other troubles.'

Forty-five per cent of Zaire's population is Catholic, and the Church remains the most cohesive body in the country. Its stand is proof enough of the sad level to which the country has fallen. The political authorities could not ignore this. In fact it was no coincidence that in August 1981, one month after the publication of the Pastoral

letter, the National Council for Security and the Supreme Council for Defence met to discuss questions regarding the maintenance of order.

At that time, it is true, the Karl-I-Bond affair had hit the headlines in the Western press. An ex-Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs in Mobutu's Government, he had taken refuge in Belgium and had been talking about the alarming situation inside Zaire. He said at the time that the choice for Mobutu's Zaire was between a third war in Shaba Province and a civilian uprising in the capital, Kinshasa. He also declared his candidacy for Head of State in the next Presidential elections.

### Stripped

The attention Karl-I-Bond's pronouncements got in the Western capitals was not to the taste of President Mobutu. He acted immediately, and Karl-I-Bond was swiftly stripped of his political and civil rights for five years. Then, to make matters worse, there was the shock of Socialist Francois Mitterand's winning of power in France; little chance that France's new President would have any warm

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amounting to around five billion dollars all told, and from time to time putting the country's financial house in order. They know well enough that a real boost to the economy cannot be in sight — that would involve a significant rise in the prices of the raw materials that Zaire exports: copper, coffee, diamonds, cobalt. No one can see that happening soon.

Last year, on the order of the International Monetary Fund and the 'Club de Paris' (the 'Club de Paris' members are the main private creditors of Zaire), both of which sponsor the plan for the economic recovery of Zaire, the Zairean Government had to devalue its currency once again. On 12 February 1982, again under pressure from the IMF, Zaire had to take the significant step of allowing about forty state-controlled enterprises which were running at a loss to be privately administered. Among those enterprises were commercial farms, the Kisengue mining company in Shaba province, the commercial company FORESCOM, the Kinshasa transport company, the office of public transport in Zaire as well as the metallurgy company of Maluka. A mixed economic structure is to be set up with Zaireans and foreigners as partners. This move came six months after the Central Committee for the

feelings for President Mobutu.

It is not very surprising that on top of the real economic difficulties that the country faces, the Government in Kinshasa has tried to dramatize the situation in order to get new support, notably from the Americans.

### **Anti-communism**

In a clever manoeuvre Mobutu has succeeded in reversing the situation by obtaining the support of the West. After some hesitation, France agreed to view the Mobutu Government in a more kindly light. Belgium gave way to Mobutu's pressure and blackmail. The new Reagan administration with its instinctive anti-communism immediately became a friend of Zaire.

Most Western countries and business interests believe that — in spite of the chaos that exists — in present circumstances President Mobutu is a lesser evil. He is the only leader who can cope with Zaire's plight, at least in the short-term. As for Karl-I-Bond, he, they say, should be kept in reserve, for his popularity does not extend throughout Zaire, but only through his own province of Shaba.

Zaire's principal creditors have thus agreed to support the country and the regime by way of reprieve, allowing it to skim off debts at regular intervals. Popular Movement for Revolution (MPR), the sole party in the country, had taken the decision to allow certain firms in deficit to be taken over by private concerns.

The consequences of all these measures were soon felt — a rise in the cost of living, a rise in the cost of food and basic consumer goods. In spite of successive wage readjustments, there is an obvious and continuous decline in real terms in people's standard of living.

Added to this is the growing instability in this region of Africa. Broadly speaking, the Western powers had made their help to Zaire conditional on a reconciliation with her neighbours, namely Angola, Zambia and Congo. It was in this spirit that Kinshasa normalized relations with Luanda. And now, with help from South Africa, former elements of the National Front for the Liberation of Angola, Holden Roberto's party, have become active again on the frontier with Angola. There is also a build up of tension between Zaire and Zambia — through whose territory most of Zaire's copper is transported. There have even been clashes at the frontier. Relations with Uganda are also strained since Zaire had to deploy the 31st Brigade of Parachutists in an attempt to contain the influx of refugees. In spite of the Kinshasa Government's optimistic statements it is obvious that President Mobutu will be constrained to walk with measured steps. ■

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