

Secret
No Foreign Dissem

DIRECTOR of CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

Key Intelligence Questions
For
Fiscal Year 1974

Secret
4 January 1974
DCI/IC 74-1215

Warning Notice
Sensitive Intelligence Sources and Methods Involved

Additional Warning
NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions

Classified by 365211
Exempt from general
declassification schedule of E.O. 11652
exemption category 5B(2)
Automatically declassified on
impossible to determine
(unless impossible, insert date or event)

Key Intelligence Questions for FY 1974

Table of Contents

	<u>Page</u>
Introduction.....	1
Soviet Union/Eastern Europe.....	3
Sino-Soviet Relations.....	7
The People's Republic of China.....	8
Middle East and Moslem World.....	10
Western Europe/NATO.....	11
Southeast Asia.....	12
East Asia/Western Pacific.....	13
Latin America.....	14
Economics.....	15
General, Worldwide.....	18

SECRET

KEY INTELLIGENCE QUESTIONS
FOR FY 1974

INTRODUCTION

1. The attached compilation of Key Intelligence Questions for Fiscal Year 1974 is issued as guidance to the Intelligence Community for the collection and production of intelligence on subjects of major importance to national-level intelligence consumers.

2. Two additional categories of intelligence collection and production, not included in this priority national intelligence guidance, are:

a. Lower priority national intelligence subjects: These are deliberately omitted in order to highlight the priority which attaches to the Key Intelligence Questions. It is recognized that some attention must be devoted to lower priority subjects (e.g., developments in Africa), although such subjects should, to the extent possible, require less expensive and less difficult collection techniques. The relative priorities of the broad spectrum of intelligence topics are reflected in the comprehensive listing of U.S. foreign intelligence topics in the Attachment to DCID 1/2 currently being considered by the USIB.

b. Departmental and tactical intelligence (including the intelligence requirements of the operational commanders, certain warning and surveillance activities, etc.): It is clear that some appropriate portion of the national intelligence effort must be devoted to meeting these needs, and the National Foreign Intelligence Budget Recommendations take account of this fact. Continuing efforts will be made to improve the interaction and mutual support of national and tactical programs so that each may be served by the same activities to the maximum extent possible.

3. The attached Key Intelligence Questions are circulated for the following purposes:

First, to insure that these subjects are given priority in the regular collection and production activities of appropriate elements of the Intelligence Community.

Second, to enable preparation of a baseline review (as soon as feasible for FY 1974, but normally at the beginning of the fiscal year). This review will, in summary form, identify the

SECRET

SECRET

status of current knowledge on the subject of each Key Intelligence Question, identify the important gaps, and the collection and production activities needed to fill the gaps. Its principal feature will be the acceptance of responsibility by appropriate individual intelligence agencies of the obligation to collect or produce on individual Key Intelligence Questions.

Third, to provide the basis for a recapitulation and evaluation, after the close of the fiscal year, of the performance of the Intelligence Community and of individual agencies on each of the Key Intelligence Questions.

Fourth, to enable experience with the Key Intelligence Questions process in the balance of FY 1974 to be used in preparation of questions for Community use in FY 1975.

And fifth, to permit the use of conclusions drawn from the recapitulation and evaluation of the FY 1974 effort as factors in Community resource allocations, specifically including the preparation of the DCI's National Foreign Intelligence Budget Recommendations to the President in November 1974.

4. While the attached Key Intelligence Questions are issued for guidance during the balance of FY 1974, it is clear that a full response to some of the questions cannot be expected within this time frame. It should be possible, however, to measure and evaluate to a degree the extent of progress within the period remaining in the current fiscal year.

5. The considerations cited in the introductions to the individual geographic and topical sets of Key Intelligence Questions provide guidance for longer-term forward planning for collection and production, particularly for subjects involving RDT&E and associated long lead times.

6. No priority is implied by the order of listing of the various Key Intelligence Questions. Difference in priorities exists, but it is not considered that refinements in levels of priority are necessary for the Key Intelligence Questions effort.

7. The attached Key Intelligence Questions are subject to additions or modifications during FY 1974 if such are required by major changes in the international situation or in the foreign intelligence environment.

SECRET

SOVIET UNION/EASTERN EUROPE

The Soviet Union is the primary target of US intelligence efforts and can be expected to remain so because Soviet intentions and actions can so directly relate to the basic elements of US national security and to achievement of US foreign and economic policy objectives. With or without a viable detente, intelligence on the USSR will remain of continuing highest priority in the coming years.

In both the near and long term, improvement in the capabilities of Soviet strategic and conventional forces is a matter of major concern to the United States. Inherent in this problem is the monitoring of Soviet compliance with SAL and MBFR agreements. This involves detailed coverage of weapons systems capabilities and close attention to the early phases of Soviet military RDT&E relating to strategic offensive and defensive weapons systems.

Soviet political, economic and military contacts with the rest of the world are increasing the variety of topics on which high quality US intelligence is required. This puts a continuing priority on the need for intelligence, not only on Soviet military capabilities, but also on the dynamics of the Soviet political power structure, on factors influencing the Soviet leadership, on Soviet perceptions of the United States, and on the basic objectives of the USSR both at home and abroad.

1. Soviet political dynamics

a. Basic Soviet policies and objectives with respect to detente.

b. The principal influences operating within Soviet decisionmaking circles -- including competitive factions, policy disagreements and differing conceptions of US objectives in detente -- which importantly shape Soviet foreign and strategic policy planning and actions.

c. Soviet and Warsaw Pact strategic plans, doctrine and vulnerabilities for political, economic and military contest with the United States and Europe.

d. Soviet strategic planning, objectives, and activities re the Middle East and South Asia.

SECRET

2. Soviet objectives in arms agreement negotiations
 - a. Soviet objectives and negotiating positions in the SALT Phase II negotiations.
 - b. Soviet objectives and negotiating positions for MBFR discussions.
 - c. Soviet intentions and actions with respect to adherence to the ABM Treaty and the SAL Interim Agreement.
3. Soviet ICBM systems
 - a. Soviet progress and objectives re increasing the counterforce capability and survivability of its deployed ICBM forces.
 - b. Soviet progress in development of improved MIRV capabilities for ICBMs and SLBMs, including types, characteristics and operational objectives.
 - c. Soviet progress and objectives in development of a mobile ICBM.
4. Soviet nuclear weapons
 - a. Soviet doctrine for deployment and use of nuclear weapons in land, sea and air forces.
 - b. Soviet objectives and progress in underground nuclear testing, and Soviet policies with respect to a comprehensive test ban.
5. Soviet long range aviation
 - a. The intended size, role and armament of the Backfire force.
 - b. Soviet progress in development of improved tankers, a follow-on heavy bomber and air-launched stand-off weapons.
6. Soviet naval systems
 - a. The extent to which Soviet SLBM capabilities against the United States are increasing -- with particular attention to progress toward deployment of a full inventory of DELTA/SS-N-8 submarines, their patrol program and patrol areas, and command and control capabilities.

b. Soviet RDT&E and deployment of follow-on SSBN/SLBM and other naval ballistic and cruise missile systems, particularly follow-on submarine-launched systems.

c. Soviet progress toward acquisition of advanced ASW detection capabilities and improvement of present ASW detection systems.

d. Soviet plans for the role of their aircraft carrier, force goals and the rate of construction.

7. Soviet strategic defensive systems

a. Soviet progress in ABM development and plans for further ABM deployment.

b. Soviet development of a look down/shoot down capability for interceptor aircraft and associated warning and control systems.

c. Soviet progress in the development of advanced technology weapons systems and components, with particular attention to beam weapons.

8. Warsaw Pact-NATO balance

a. Strengths and weaknesses of the Warsaw Pact forces, including combat effectiveness of the ground forces and the Pact capabilities to sustain forces in non-nuclear combat.

b. Soviet views of Warsaw Pact-NATO military asymmetries, particularly as these relate to MBFR and to Soviet criteria for establishing adequacy of forces for military and political security.

c. Warsaw Pact tactical nuclear doctrine and capabilities, including availability of storage depots in Eastern Europe.

d. Soviet capabilities for rapid deployment of forces from the USSR to Central Europe.

9. Geographic expansion of Soviet naval and air activities

Demonstration of capabilities and intentions to expand Soviet military presence, and resultant influence, in strategic areas distant from the USSR (e.g., in and around Cuba, the waters and littoral of the Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean, and selected areas of Africa), and the reaction to such presence of the countries involved.

SECRET

10. Eastern Europe

a. Centrifugal and centripetal forces and tendencies importantly affecting current Soviet/East European relationships.

b. The leadership succession problem in Yugoslavia after Tito's death or retirement; in particular, indications that Tito's successors will remain strongly committed to independence, and any evidence the USSR is moving to exploit the post-Tito situation to bring Belgrade back into the Bloc.

SECRET

SECRET

SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS

Actions and reactions between the USSR and the PRC could have such an important impact on US interests worldwide that particular intelligence effort needs to be directed to obtaining an awareness and understanding of what is going on between these two countries. The serious border dispute is long-standing and still seems far from solution, with a resultant threat of hostilities which calls for continuing intelligence attention.

11. Status of Sino-Soviet relations

a. Plans, intentions and objectives of the USSR and the PRC with respect to Sino-Soviet confrontation or reconciliation.

b. Quantitative and qualitative ways in which the military balance between the Soviet Union and the PRC in the border regions is changing, and any modification of Sino-Soviet tensions, particularly as regards the likelihood of hostilities, which these changes portend.

SECRET

SECRET

THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA

Recent improvements in the military capabilities of the PRC and the country's more outward-looking political stance have markedly increased the extent to which China's policies and actions can affect US security and policy interests. Both Mao's age and indications of considerable in-fighting among members of the governing elite make the character of the post-Mao leadership a matter of considerable importance.

The Chinese may already have achieved an effective nuclear deterrent against the USSR and they are working toward a nuclear capability against the United States. The evolving PRC nuclear forces could result in major qualitative changes in China's strategic relationship with the Third World as well as with the two superpowers. The situation calls for close and continuing attention to PRC military capabilities, particularly its nuclear delivery systems.

12. PRC relations with the "outside" world

a. PRC attitudes and objectives regarding the US role in Asia.

b. China's intentions and progress toward attainment of a role as leader and spokesman of the Third World and the degree these tend to dampen or stimulate PRC sponsorship and support of revolutionary movements in the less developed countries (LDCs).

c. Identification of the leading candidates to succeed the present leadership and their foreign policy/economic/military views.

13. The military import of expanding PRC nuclear capabilities

a. The present status of PRC nuclear capabilities in terms of the availability and location of delivery vehicles, targeting sectors, the numbers and types of weapons in stockpile, and the warhead production rate.

b. Status of production and deployment of the Chinese SSBN.

c. PRC strategic concepts for the use of its missiles and bombers, with particular attention to Chinese doctrine for the utilization of nuclear weapons, command and control capabilities, and force goals for nuclear delivery forces.

SECRET

SECRET

14. PRC RDT&E efforts which could affect the future strategic balance

Characteristics of PRC offensive missile systems, with special reference to ranges, vulnerability, reliability, accuracy, and reaction times.

SECRET

SECRET

MIDDLE EAST AND MOSLEM WORLD

Current US interest in the Middle East and Moslem world focuses on obtaining an Arab-Israeli peace and restoring the flow of oil to non-communist countries. For both the short and longer term, achievement of political and military stability in the area is of high priority importance to the United States. This means there must be continuing attention by US intelligence to information needed to support US efforts to assure continuing access to oil supplies, to increase US influence with the Arab states and to reduce vulnerabilities of the Moslem countries to Soviet and other anti-US influences. (See Economic Section for questions related to oil.)

15. Political and military stability in the Middle East

25X6

a. [REDACTED] (especially Egyptian, Syrian, Jordanian, Saudi and Palestinian) views on and strategies toward the major issues of a peace settlement.

b. The Soviet role in the Middle East as it affects prospects for and against US peace efforts, i.e., in what ways and on what issues is the USSR exerting its political, economic and military influence on the Arab states.

c. Actions which the USSR and industrialized non-communist nations, especially France, are taking to supply arms and/or technology to Arab countries, thereby contributing to the Arab-Israeli arms race and conflicting with US objectives.

d. Identification of threats to the political stability of major Moslem countries, and of increasing tensions between these countries (e.g., between Saudi Arabia and Iran).

SECRET

WESTERN EUROPE/NATO

US interests are deeply involved in the ongoing efforts of European leaders to redefine the political and economic involvement of Europe in the world, to identify their own national roles in today's Europe, and, on both national and supra-national levels, to clarify their relations with the United States and the USSR. The Middle East problem and the energy crisis have intensified some long-standing problems, introduced some new ones, and accelerated de facto decisionmaking of profound consequences for the future of the alliance, both in its NATO manifestation and in other political and economic aspects. Strains in the close ties which have long existed between Western Europe and the United States call for continuing priority attention to this area by US intelligence. (See Economic Section for questions in that category.)

16. The US role in Europe and the cohesiveness of NATO

- a. The assessments of important political leaders in Western Europe (and their principal oppositions) as to the US role in Europe.
- b. The likelihood of major near-term leadership changes in important West European countries.
- c. Centrifugal and centripetal forces and tensions upon NATO and the EC.

SECRET

SOUTHEAST ASIA

Ongoing or threatened insurgencies adverse to US interests in all Southeast Asia countries are, and probably will continue to be, the major focus of US intelligence in this area of the world. The situation is in flux throughout Southeast Asia and some level of armed hostilities with anti-US overtones can be expected to continue throughout at least the next several years.

17. Political and military stability in Southeast Asia

a. The objectives, intentions and capabilities of North Vietnamese and other communist forces to launch and sustain major military actions in Indochina during FY 1974; any limitations on weapons, ammunition and food stuffs which could constrain such actions, and the likelihood and effect of support or restraint from Moscow and Peking.

b. Evidence of any significant erosion in the position and stability of the Saigon government.


c. Foreign policy or other internal developments in Southeast Asian countries -- particularly any indication of significant change in basically pro-US policies -- which could affect the short-term or long-term prospects for retention of US military bases in countries such as Thailand and the Philippines.

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

25X6

EAST ASIA/WESTERN PACIFIC



19. The military situation in Korea

Objectives, capabilities and intentions of North Korea for launching and sustaining major military action against South Korea in FY 1974 and the likelihood and effect of support from Moscow and Peking.

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

LATIN AMERICA

Improvement of US understanding of Latin American political dynamics and their impact on US objectives in the Western Hemisphere is of sufficient importance at policy levels of the US Government to call for careful intelligence attention. The emergence of increasingly nationalistic, highly personal governments which exhibit anti-US tendencies is the primary force working against US interests. Obtaining and analyzing the information needed to cope with this situation will require a continuing intelligence effort.

20. Political and economic relationships with the United States

25X6

a. Policies and attitudes of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, [REDACTED] Panama, Peru and Venezuela (including the motivations, objectives and personal strengths and weaknesses of the leaders and leadership elites) which have a direct influence on United States interests in Latin America.

b. Developing intra-Latin American alignments, within or outside the OAS, on regional or global issues of interest to the United States.

21. Panama Canal negotiations

Panama's intentions and bargaining vulnerabilities in negotiations for a new Canal Treaty or related agreements, and the willingness and ability of the Torrijos government to make concessions.

22. Cuban policies and programs

a. Cuban relations with and/or subversion in Central and South American countries, and Cuban relations with the USSR and the US which affect US interests in Latin America.

b. Cuban internal weaknesses.

SECRET

SECRET

ECONOMICS

Intelligence on economic developments affecting US national security and on the plans, policies and economic performance of major US economic competitors is rapidly increasing in importance to government policy makers. The acquisition and analysis of foreign economic information has become, and is expected to remain, a high priority task of US intelligence.

The place of the US economy in the world has changed. This has resulted in high priorities being given to economic intelligence on

25X6



US dependence on the mineral resources of other countries, especially petroleum, is mounting. Incomes of oil-producing states are rising at an accelerated pace and some of these countries are exerting pressure on the United States and other countries by controlling oil supplies. The world demand for US grains and oilseeds has expanded. The Soviet Union is attempting to make up for deficiencies in its economy, and in so doing is seeking increased economic exchanges with the United States and other high-technology countries. Acquiring data on natural resource availability worldwide and on foreign technological developments of economic importance are expected to be tasks for the US intelligence community of increasing importance in the coming years.

23. The oil problem

- a. Policies, negotiating positions and vulnerabilities of the major foreign petroleum producers with respect to output, export and price of oil.
- b. Impact of oil crisis on the economies, commercial arrangements, and economic, political and military policies of Japan, Canada, and the European countries.
- c. New sources of energy and processing, including oil.
- d. The composition and location of monetary reserves of the major oil producing countries, and movements from one currency to another, particularly with respect to dollars.

SECRET

SECRET

24. Soviet economic capabilities and vulnerabilities

a. Soviet needs for imported technology to improve productivity growth and military capabilities, and successes in obtaining that technology.

b. The effect of the Soviet balance-of-payments position, including gold production and sales, on ability of the USSR to trade with non-communist countries and to undertake credit obligations arising out of major new US investments.

c. The interaction of Soviet economic policies and military expenditures, and its effect on Soviet economic, political and military strength.

25. Crop prospects, demand and stockpiling


Information required for forecasting the international market in 1974 for key cereal and vegetable proteins, especially as influenced by the needs of the USSR, PRC and Eastern Europe, and by national stockpiling policies.

26. Potential shortages

Identification of important natural resources or products (other than petroleum and food crops) which will be in limited or short supply in 1974, and any indications that resource-rich less developed countries (LDCs) are using or intend to use competition among the United States, [REDACTED] and Western European nations for such resources as a tool for influencing US economic or political policies.

25X6

27. International economic policies of major US competitors



SECRET

Approved For Release 2000/04/19 : CIA-RDP82M00311R000100070001-4
25X6

Approved For Release 2000/04/19 : CIA-RDP82M00311R000100070001-4

SECRET

GENERAL, WORLDWIDE

Some important problems for which intelligence inputs are required at policy levels of the government are either worldwide in scope or involve a number of countries in different areas of the world. Rather than repeat the Key Intelligence Questions for each country to which they apply, four questions of this nature are grouped in this section.

28. Nuclear proliferation

25X6 Objectives and actions toward nuclear weapons development, or the acquisition and deployment of such weapons, by countries other than the USSR, PRC, and the [REDACTED]

29. Law of the Sea

Negotiating positions and bargaining vulnerabilities of key countries on the form and content of a Law of the Sea treaty, with particular attention to issues on which the attitudes and intentions of these countries are likely to be so contentious as to put in jeopardy prospects for any treaty minimally acceptable to the United States.

30. Narcotics

a. Identification of the major producers and traffickers in illicit narcotics and their methods of operation (i.e., where are their production areas, laboratories and storage facilities, and how and by what routes and timing do they move illicit narcotics to the United States).

25X6

b. Effectiveness of the anti-narcotics programs of [REDACTED] France, Turkey, Thailand, Burma and Laos (including the willingness of these governments to cooperate with US efforts to expose and prosecute producers, traffickers and their collaborators).

31. Activities of terrorist/extremist groups

a. Advance information on overseas attacks against US citizens and property wherever terrorist or extremist groups plan such operations.

b. Identification of the composition, intentions and capabilities for foreign anti-US terrorist or extremist groups (including their sources of funds and weapons, the issues with which they identify, their relations with other like-minded groups, the extent of government support

SECRET

SECRET

or opposition, their impact on government policy and stability of the regime, and any evidence of influence from Moscow or Peking).

SECRET

Approved For Release 2000/04/19 : CIA-RDP82M00311R000100070001-4

Secret
No Foreign Dissem

Secret

Approved For Release 2000/04/19 : CIA-RDP82M00311R000100070001-4