Turkey: A Troubled Future

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TURKEY: A TROUBLED FUTURE

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SUMMARY AND INTRODUCTION

The Turkish experiment with democratic rule has never been an easy one, given the weakness of some of the essential cultural, social, and economic underpinnings. Nevertheless, Turkish democracy has worked well in many important ways. Since 1950, when a truly free election first took place, Turkey has had frequent elections and democratic changes of government; a vibrant and broadly based multiparty system has developed; numerous organizations representative of competing interests have emerged; and a freewheeling press has adopted the role of protector of Turkey’s democratic achievements.

At the same time, the strains of modernization, often muted in more authoritarian systems, have been magnified in Turkey by the pluralism that the democratic process both fosters and reflects. The Turkish polity has experienced intense systemic stress as disparate groups have pressed conflicting demands on Turkish governments that have at times been incapable of meeting them. The extreme partisanship of Turkish governments, moreover, and the virulent competition among political parties and other groups have tended to compromise the working of the system.

The growing polarization encouraged by these factors has culminated in three major economic and internal security crises in the last two decades. The first ended in the 1960 military intervention and the second in the 1971 “coup by memorandum.” The present—and most serious—crisis, which began in the mid-1970s, has left the country nearly bankrupt and torn by spiraling political violence that claims more than a thousand lives a year. It has caused the downfall of two governments within two years—Suleyman Demirel’s coalition in December 1977 and Bulent Ecevit’s in October 1979—and it may bring down Demirel’s new minority government and several others before it abates.

Turkey has been variously described as the least developed West European country or as one of the more advanced of developing states. It is in fact a transitional society combining some features of both. Cultural norms and cleavages characteristic of traditional societies—such as an authoritarian value system and intensely felt sectarian, ethnic, and urban-rural rivalries—are still prevalent. Even though the modernizers are clearly ascendant and are likely to remain so, the struggle between them and the traditionalists that began with the Atatürk revolution some 60 years ago persists. At the same time, economic development has produced new economic groups with
clashing interests and political ideologies, introducing a new and deep cleavage along socioeconomic lines.

Turkey's democratic institutions have been a source of strength even as they have given free play to such clashing views. Together with the opportunities provided by economic development, they have channeled much discontent into constructive give and take.

Nonetheless, prospects are that Turkey will continue to suffer the growing pains of modernization. These are likely to be accompanied by a high level of social unrest and acrimonious politics, especially if, as seems likely, the current economic difficulties and slow rate of growth continue. And so long as no one party or coalition of like-minded parties becomes ascendant, weak and ineffective (and profligate) governments, such as those of the last five years, are certain to be the rule.

Such a prospect could again tempt those in the military and elsewhere who value efficiency and order over freewheeling politics to intervene openly in the governing process. But such political intervention by the military would most likely be temporary and relatively limited in nature, given both the residual strength of the democratic ethos and Turkey's participation in Western defense and economic systems.

No matter what government is in power, Turkey is likely to pursue a more assertive and independent foreign policy. Turkish leaders will see this as the most effective tactic for securing the desperately needed military, economic, and political support from a West that is perceived to be increasingly parsimonious and more inclined to attach unacceptable conditions to all three. They will also see it as facilitating the improvement of relations with Communist and Third World states that has been made necessary by political realignments in Turkey or which has been encouraged by hopes for greater economic and political aid from these quarters.

In sum, Turkey will be faced with serious and growing social, political, and economic problems during the time frame of this Estimate—that is, well into the 1980s. These problems will sorely test Turkey's democratic institutions and perhaps temporarily compromise them. Another military intervention could occur. These problems will also make Turkey a difficult, demanding, and, to some degree, unpredictable ally. Some of the advantages still enjoyed by the West in Turkey may be lost—to the residual benefit of the USSR. The US arms embargo, in particular, so impaired the close relationship between the United States and Turkey that Washington can no longer count on support from Ankara on international issues unless Turkey's own national interests are directly involved.
The uncertainties of Turkey's social dynamics and its exaggerated expectations of and need for Western support could produce an even more troublesome outcome. They could conceivably lead to a social upheaval, followed by a prolonged period of radical civilian or military rule. They could lead to a degree of alienation that might trigger a fundamental reorientation of Ankara's foreign policy away from the West. We believe, however, that chances for this are a good deal less likely than the prospect of a troubled but still basically democratic and pro-Western Turkey.
DISCUSSION

THE ATATURK LEGACY

1. Modern Turkey's major characteristics derive from Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, who sought to forge a Western-style nation state out of the wreckage of the Ottoman Empire after World War I. His greater emphasis on cultural and institutional modernization rather than on wholesale social revolution created gaps in Turkey's development that are a main cause of its instability today.

2. As conceived in Ataturk's "six principles," republicanism would provide a new legitimacy in place of Ottoman dynasticism; nationalism would reflect an ethnic Turkish identity and assertiveness in lieu of the Ottoman multietnic character and servile foreign policy; populism would ensure class harmony and cooperation in pursuit of national goals; secularism would separate the country from its traditional Islamic institutions and values; etatism (state capitalism) would provide the rapid development that the private sector could not sustain; and reformism would embody a commitment to change.

3. Ataturk and his colleagues were elitist, tutelary, and autocratic. The regime found support primarily among the bureaucracy, the intelligentsia, and the military in tacit alliance with the landed gentry. All these groups were represented in the Republican People's Party, whose function was to organize the elite and mobilize the masses.

4. Implemented in a gradualist and pragmatic manner, Kemalism was effective in establishing the basis for a modern nation-state. Traditional institutions and values were curbed, Western models were grafted onto society, and the country moved more rapidly toward industrialization, particularly in the latter part of the Kemalist period.

5. Kemalist precepts, however, have served much less well the later integrative and distributive phase of modernization as the masses have come to demand full share in and benefits from the political system. Nor has Kemalism been entirely congenial with multiparty democratic politics or the more advanced stages of economic development.

6. The elitist and exclusionary nature of Kemalism, compounded by the societal differentiation brought on by economic development, produced an alienated counterelite that undermined the consensus necessary for political stability and compromise. Kemalism's emphasis on urban areas and neglect of the countryside initially accelerated the evolution of "two Turkeys," a developing and modernizing one in the cities, and a still traditional and backward one in the countryside, particularly in the east. High-growth statist and autarkic policies, effective so long as Turkey had an undeveloped and controlled economy, became irrational and inefficient strategies as the economy developed and became more open and interdependent.

7. Although Kemalism formally separated the military from politics, its mandating of the officer corps as guardian of the nation has inclined the military to act as a state within a state. Similarly the pervasive nationalism that sometimes makes Turkey a prickly associate in the Western community has often competed with the Kemalist emulation of Western cultural and institutional features. Finally, while Kemalist classless reformism provided Turkey a philosophy of change to compete with Marxist models, Marxism can seem to some Turks an extension of Ataturk's ideals.

8. So long as Turkey remained an authoritarian, one-party state, the paradoxes of Kemalism seemed unimportant. Once internal pressures and its desire for Western defense support against the Soviet threat had transformed Turkey into a multiparty democracy, however, these paradoxes intruded into the political system. They now are major causes of the recurring malaise that has become characteristic of contemporary Turkey.

POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC MODERNIZATION: A BALANCE SHEET

9. Turkey's democratic credentials are substantial, especially under the more liberal Second Republic of 1961. The Constitution guarantees freedom of thought and expression, and obligates the state to advance
social and economic rights. The system of checks and balances includes a bicameral legislature and an autonomous judiciary. Turkish democracy overall provides substantial outlets for criticism and dissent.

10. Encouraged by the proportional representation system introduced in 1961, political parties have grown from three to eight since 1950 and offer the electorate clear choices. The two major parties are durable and broadly based. The Republican People’s Party has currents running from left of center to the left, while the Justice Party is moderately conservative. Among the minor parties on the right, the National Salvation Party combines a religious orientation with a forward-looking, quasi-socialist economic program, while the Nationalist Action Party is essentially neofascist. On the left, the Marxist Turkish Labor Party and a myriad of smaller parties have had greater impact—especially in the labor movement—than their meager electoral showing would suggest. Avowedly religious and Communist parties are proscribed.

11. The Turks consider the selection of their leaders a right. There have been eight national elections since 1950, and, except for occasional irregularities, they have been conducted honestly. Elections have been followed by changes of governments, and still other transfers of power have followed from shifts in parliamentary alignments.

12. In the past three decades, voluntary associations that support and amplify the link between state and masses provided by the political parties have proliferated. Representing business, professional, labor, trade, agricultural, and religious interests, these groupings reinforce diversity. They have a vested interest in the safeguards that democracy provides.

13. Just as Turkey’s democratic institutions stand up well by some measures, so too do its social and economic achievements. High-growth and industrialization strategies, supported by massive foreign assistance from East and West alike, have given Turkey one of the highest growth rates among the countries of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, even though it is still the least industrialized member and its per capita annual income ($1,000) is the lowest. Turkey led all OECD countries in real growth rate during the last five years and ranked second over the last 10.

14. Development has changed the face of cities and countryside alike. City and village have been brought closer together by transportation and communications and the agricultural sector has become more mechanized. Improvements in health care have increased life expectancy. In a country where education is the principal entree to the elite, the educationally qualified have overtaken the placement opportunities. Overall there has been an absolute improvement in the standard of living for most Turks.

15. The forward thrust of Turkey’s democratic and economic development, however, has frequently been interrupted by interludes of political and economic retreat. The “miracles” of the early 1950s that transformed Turkey into a vibrant and prospering democracy gave way in the latter part of the decade to growing polarization, student unrest, economic crisis, and, ultimately, the military intervention of 1960, which put a damper on politics and brought a degree of economic retrenchment.

16. The military’s nearly complete withdrawal from open involvement in politics in 1961 and the accession of the moderately conservative Demirel government in 1965 began another period of more normal political and economic activity. But by the late 1960s politics had degenerated once more into confrontation and the economy again went into decline. Prompted in particular by a more ideological and systematic violence between leftists and rightists that seemed to challenge the state, the military intervened in 1971 for the second time. For two years thereafter they monitored politics from behind the scenes and imposed a harsh—but only temporarily effective—martial law regime against the battling extremists.

17. Although a third period of relatively open politics began in 1973, the trends—both political and economic—have remained sharply negative. None of Turkey’s six governments since 1973 has been strong and cohesive enough to deal imaginatively with pressing problems or to rise above partisan concerns. The rhetoric has grown increasingly shrill, and political immobilism has been accompanied by a gradual resurgence of political violence that took more than 1,000 lives in 1978 and an even greater number this year.

18. While most such violence has been urban gang-like warfare between left and right extremists, the Turkish elite and Americans have also become targets. Unrest in the less developed eastern provinces has led to clashes between Sunnis and Alevis Muslims and between Kurds and ethnic Turks. The martial law now in effect in 19 of the 67 provinces has failed in its relatively benign implementation to intimidate the terrorists, and has led to frictions between military and
political leaders and to further politicization of the police. Thus, it is not surprising that the number of incidents has actually surpassed pre-martial-law levels or that most of them are occurring in martial law provinces.

19. On the economic side, the third expansionary cycle has likewise again slid into crisis. After 1973, successive Turkish governments—committed to the goal of an industrialized economy—continued to pursue rapid economic growth despite the oil crisis and world recession. The resulting inflation, however, combined with unrealistic exchange rates, made imports more attractive, stifled exports, and discouraged private investment. The balance of payments deteriorated sharply as imports outstripped receipts from exports and worker remittances.

20. Turkey’s high growth rate has been financed by massive, mostly short-term borrowing and by drastic drawdowns of foreign exchange reserves. Foreign debt jumped from $3.3 billion in 1973 to $13 billion in 1978. Yet, for want of foreign exchange, industries have been operating at less than half capacity. And—given the huge oil and debt service costs—the debt rescheduling, standby loans from the International Monetary Fund, and new credits provided this year by private institutions and friendly governments in response to a major Turkish devaluation of the lira and other austerity measures seem likely to provide at best a brief respite.

21. For good reason, growing numbers of Turks have begun to wonder whether there is not something fundamentally amiss in the country. Specifically, they are questioning whether Turkey’s very liberal brand of democratic forms and institutions is not a serious obstacle to its continued development as a stable and progressive society, given that there have not been matched by as rapid and thorough a transformation of antiquated economic and social structures.

DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY FLAWS

22. Turkey’s recurring economic difficulties do in fact arise in good measure from anarchistic development strategies and economic policies. The traditional emphasis on rapid industrialization under state ownership and control—even by governments claiming to oppose such policies— stems from the Kemalist conviction that economic sovereignty is prerequisite to political sovereignty. So long as Turkey remained a one-party state with a rudimentary economy, that strategy was efficacious. The state could marshal the scant personnel and material resources then available to create an infrastructure while forgoing gratification of immediate needs.

23. More recently, however, the autarkic approach has seemed increasingly at odds with the growing complexity of Turkey’s economy and its open political system. Arbitrarily selected import substitution industries intended to increase self-reliance themselves require substantial imports of machinery and raw materials. Yet adequate foreign exchange to pay for such imports cannot be generated from agricultural exports because of government underinvestment in the agricultural sector. Manufacturers for their part have had few incentives to develop markets for exports. Turkish industry, moreover, being capital intensive, produces few jobs, despite the need to absorb a fast-growing labor force. Government policies, financial difficulties, fuel shortages, and poor planning have led to power and transportation bottlenecks.

24. Turkey’s import dependence has been aggravated by a historically overvalued lira that keeps import prices low and discourages export-led growth and tourism. High tariff barriers protect industries well beyond the infant stage, delaying competition and modernization, and sustaining firms that cannot export. In addition, Turkey’s negative attitude toward foreign investment has deprived the country of the management and marketing expertise needed to realize a program of rapid export expansion.

25. The prime beneficiary of Turkey’s economic policies is the state sector, which accounts for about half of fixed investment and industrial production. State enterprises enjoy privileged tax treatment, easy access to credit, and price subsidies that provide few incentives to operate efficiently or profitably. Their number, manning levels, location, and pricing policies are determined as much by social welfare, political, and ideological considerations as by economic imperatives—for good reason they are known as “election factories.”

26. As part of the drive for a strong and independent state, Turkish governments until recently sought to foster population growth. With a population of 44.2 million and a 2.5-percent yearly increase—the highest in Europe—the surge in population has been a major cause of Turkey’s problems. Population pressures in the countryside and the attractions of city life have led to rapid urbanization, overcrowded cities surrounded by squatter settlements, and emigration
abroad. Population growth has partly neutralized economic advances.

27. Despite recent emphasis on rural development, the socioeconomic disparities between town and countryside and between west and east—sharply aggravated by the Kemalist emphasis on creating a Westernized urban elite—are still great. Composite indexes of development, using such measures as literacy, income and urbanization levels, and number of persons employed in industry, all show that the most developed western provinces outrank the least developed areas in the east by ratios of 2 and 3 to 1.

**MUTUALLY REINFORCING CLEAVAGES**

28. The negative impact of some of Turkey's development policies has been compounded by the persistence of several mutually reinforcing social and cultural cleavages in Turkish society.

Modernizing Center and Traditionalist Periphery

29. A cleavage between the elite and the masses, between the ruling center and the periphery, has been a traditional feature of Turkish society. The centralizing policies of the Kemalist regime, together with economic neglect of the periphery, initially widened that gap. Although the growing political power of the peasantry has made politicians more responsive and bureaucrats less haughty, the animosities persist.

30. Reinforcing the division between center and periphery is the cultural cleavage between modernizers and traditionalists that runs along the same divide. The Westernizing and secularizing policies of the Kemalists had their greatest impact in the urban areas while large parts of rural Turkey remained less affected by either. Turks in the cities have donned Western-style garb and mores, but the peasantry has remained tradition bound and heavily influenced by Islam. This fissure too has tended to close somewhat. For the modernizers, rejection of Islam has become a less important litmus test of Western identity, while modernizing influences have gradually penetrated the countryside.

Sunnis and Alevi

31. The cleavage between the Sunni Muslim majority and the Alevi minority also lingers. The Sunnis represent Islamic orthodoxy and tradition. The Alevi, comprising perhaps a fourth of the population, subscribe to more heterodox religious practices and to mysticism.

32. Sectarian differences have been reinforced by the Alevi's enthusiastic response to Kemalist reforms, particularly secularization, which they saw as an escape from Sunni repression and domination. Most Alevi still support the Republican People's Party, within which they form a cohesive and influential minority. Their relative poverty has also inclined them toward the left of the political spectrum. The more prosperous Sunnis have gravitated toward the right and provide the core of support for the Justice Party and the more conservative minor parties.

33. Urbanization and industrialization have brought the traditionally rural Alevi into the cities where they come into close contact with the Sunnis and compete for jobs. The frictions this caused were no doubt a factor in the mass outbreak of sectarian violence in the southeastern city of Maras last year, which resulted in more than a hundred deaths and prompted the imposition of martial law. Sectarian violence, reinforced by economic and political factors, continues on the upswing.

**Ethnic Turks and Kurds**

34. The Kemalist emphasis on nationalism and Turkishness, along with its centralizing and secularizing features, widened the fissure between ethnic Turks and the large Kurdish minority of 4-6 million and sparked several Kurdish uprisings. Turkish authorities have since sought unsuccessfully to eliminate all manifestations of Kurdish culture and national identity, including the Kurdish language.

35. With the advent of Tufan democracy, government policy has favored co-optation over suppression, but this has been slow to evolve and has produced only limited successes. A portion of the Kurdish elite has been accepted into the ruling class, and most political party delegations in parliament include at least some Kurds, with the largest number lined up behind the Republican People's Party. The Kurds, relatively impoverished like the Alevi sect to which a third of them belong, are attracted to that party's social democratic programs and are repelled by the more communally based appeal of the far-rightist parties.

36. Regardless of Turkish attempts to assimilate them, however, most Kurds still remain outside the mainstream of Turkish society and pose a potentially serious internal security threat. Kurdish aspirations for
autonomy and independence still persist and are growing in intensity. They have been spearheaded by leftist youth organizations and fueled by the separatist activities of Kurds in neighboring Iraq and Iran. Although efforts to mobilize the Kurdish masses are hampered by tribalism and lack of organization and leadership, acts of violence against Turkish officials are likely to continue to test government authority in the Kurdish regions. These could lead to full-scale clashes between Turkish troops and Kurdish bands that would almost certainly evoke a strong reaction from the Turkish military to forestall any incipient uprising.

Class Cleavages

37. The newest and perhaps most consequential cleavage for Turkey, however, is that along class lines. A formidable business and commercial class of ethnic Turks emerged in the 1940s and 1950s, challenging the Kemalist soldier-bureaucrats and their statist policies. They were followed in the 1950s and especially in the 1960s by the rise of a potent labor movement, with interests antithetical to both business and the state, neither of which had been particularly generous to workers.

38. The intelligentsia also expanded during this period and turned to Marxism in reaction to the social injustices they perceived, and because of the exalted status it promised them. Efforts by labor in league with the leftist intelligentsia to get a larger slice of the national economic pie evoked the alarm and resistance of business.

39. Meanwhile, the propertied middle class of small businessmen, merchants, and artisans—seeing itself squeezed between big business on the one hand and the growing labor movement on the other—developed a greater class consciousness and set the stage for the emergence of a violent right-wing reaction.

40. While political life has thus become increasingly dominated by ideological and socioeconomic issues, there is much about the Turkish character itself that coexists uneasily with open and competitive politics. Turks have an in group/out group orientation that inclines them to look upon others as friend or foe. This leads to strong commitments to one’s own group and intolerance toward others; politics is a zero-sum game. The notions of moderation in the exercise of power, of loyal opposition, and of merit in compromise are foreign.

41. Turkey remains instead a “courage culture,” which places premium on strength and daring and provokes outbursts in the streets and chambers of parliament alike. Thus, attempts at free and open competition frequently degenerate into polarization and violence. And even though these attitudes and behavioral patterns are being diluted by modernization, they still help account for Turkey’s difficulty in mastering the finer points of Western democratic practice.

GROWING POLITICAL POLARIZATION

42. The struggle between center and periphery, between modernizers and traditionalists, will remain a significant element in Turkish politics. Nonetheless, as the transformation of Turkey has proceeded, the influence of the newer socioeconomic cleavage has been increasingly felt. As new economic groups have congregated, political parties have become realigned along a conservative-liberal continuum and political ideologies have come to the fore. New, ideologically oriented parties have emerged on the political extremes—others have been given new life. And the gap between the two major parties that was reflective of the older cleavages has widened somewhat as they have sought to hold on to their more radical followers and to co-opt the emergent forces in the periphery.

43. The rise of ideological and class-oriented politics in Turkey dates back to the turbulent 1960s, when labor and leftist political forces took advantage of the liberal features of the new constitution to organize themselves. An avowedly Marxist party, the Turkish Labor Party, appeared on the scene simultaneously with the revival of the labor movement after workers were given the right to strike. The Labor Party was attractive to students and to the intelligentsia, who thought the Republican People’s Party too ossified. The trade union movement, assertive in securing benefits for its members, now represents about one-third of the labor force in the two confederations, Türk-Is and the smaller, Marxist-oriented DISK. Neither political nor labor left has hesitated to resort to demonstrations and violence to achieve its goals.

44. The left’s rising fortunes set the stage for the rightist reaction that was organized primarily by Alpaslan Türkes. An authoritarian-inclined personality who helped mastermind the 1960 coup, Türkes transformed a small conservative party that he joined in 1965 into a highly dedicated, well-disciplined political force with its own paramilitary youth group and
renamed it the Nationalist Action Party. Drawing support primarily from the small shopkeeper and artisan class and to some extent from the youth, but financed in part by big businessmen alarmed at the growing influence of the left, the party combined antedeluvian nationalism and anti-Communism with corporatist economic policies. Its youthful followers have been the principal source of violence from the right.

13. The emergence of these forces on the political fringes has had its impact on the two major parties. Alarmed by the defection of its prized intelligentsia to the Labor Party, the Republican People's Party proclaimed itself in 1965 a "left-of-center" party and adopted a more progressive posture. The party went a step further in 1966 by electing Suleyman Demirel, the head of its "progressive group," as general secretary. That prompted the more conservative wing of the party to bolt, eventually to form the Republican Reliance Party. But the schism also freed the RPP to pursue a more social democratic program, to appeal to the working class and other disadvantaged groups it had formerly shunned, and to win back the support of the intelligentsia.

46. Similar ferment likewise produced schisms in the Justice Party. In reaction to Suleyman Demirel's moderate conservatism and its loss of a power struggle, the party's right wing defected and formed the Democratic Party, modeled after its 1950s namesake. Justice's growing ties with big business, moreover, prompted many small businessmen to shift to the Nationalist Action Party and to the National Salvationists, whose anti-big-business rhetoric accounts for as much of their support as their Islamic fundamentalism. To recoup some of these losses the Justice Party itself expanded further to the right, both in leadership and in program.

47. Turkey is still feeling the effects of this ongoing realignment at the electoral bases of the political parties. Under Ecevit's leadership the Republican People's Party, with its new social democratic platform, made a comeback from the dark days of the 1950s and the even darker 1960s, when, save for 1961, it never won a plurality. By contrast, the party won pluralities in both 1973 and 1977. Over the long term, its appeal to those groups, such as labor and the salaried middle class, that are on the increase could portend the possibility of eventual RPP dominance.

48. In the short term, however, the sharp setback the Republican People's Party suffered in the partial Assembly and Senate elections in October 1979 sug-

49. After two decades of political dominance in the 1950s and 1960s the political forces on the right of the political spectrum remained divided throughout the 1970s. To be sure, the Justice Party is a formidable political machine with broadly based electoral support. It bounced back from its low 29.8 percent showing in the 1973 election to a respectable 36.9 percent in 1977, and its sweep of the partial elections of October 1979 has returned it to power.

50. Working against the Justice Party's longer term recuperation is the difficulty its leadership will have in convincing voters that it has any solutions. The party took a buffeting in the 1973 and 1977 national elections from the Republican People's Party on the left and from the more strident minor parties to its right. By playing down its elitist image and turning toward socialism, the Republican People's Party has won over much of labor and the salaried middle class, which had previously supported the Justice Party. On the right, the Nationalist Action Party and the National Salvation Party, whose support is crucial for the survival of the Demirel government, feed on the resentment of those who either oppose modernization or are suffering from it.

51. The Nationalist Action Party in particular is enjoying a surge in popularity in central Anatolia and in such developed provinces as Izmir by appealing to those who see a strongman and greater authoritarianism as the answer to Turkey's problems. It doubled its share of the vote between 1973 and 1977—from 3.4 percent to 6.4 percent—and may do substantially better in the next general elections, which must take place no later than mid-1981.

52. The National Salvation Party has captured the hardcore anti-secular and pro-Islamic vote, and its performance in 1973 and 1977 made it Turkey's third largest party. Its success, however, is less indicative of an Islamic resurgence than of the persistence of a sentiment that could not be articulated so long as parties were prohibited from making openly religious appeals. The party's xenophobic nationalism and anti-
big-business and antilabor rhetoric, moreover, attract the same groups from which the NAP draws support, and this too accounts for some of its showing.

53. Both parties are likely to remain on the scene for some time although the Nationalist Action Party may well replace the National Salvationists in the third-place slot. Neither is likely to replace Justice as the principal conservative party, but the latest Justice government may be hostage to their whims; they may prevent it from recouping its former majority. Nor is it likely that the three former coalition partners could achieve such a majority by merging, given the sharp personality and ideological differences that separate them. A prolonged period of Republican People’s Party rule might have that effect, but such a conglomerate would suffer the same divisive tendencies now present in the RPP.

FOREIGN POLICY IN TRANSITION

54. Like its domestic politics, Turkey’s foreign policy has undergone important transformations over time and is not without paradox. Atatürk’s drive for Westernization was aimed at creating a state strong enough to defend itself against further encroachments from any quarter—including the West. He did in fact find a way to coexist with the new Soviet regime to the north, and his successors would probably have been content to pursue a nonaligned foreign policy following World War II, but for the Cold War and Moscow’s territorial ambitions against Turkey.

55. In turning to the United States and NATO for protection and accepting huge amounts of military and economic assistance, Turkey focused its foreign policy on the requirements of collective security and gave the Alliance virtual carte blanche use of Turkish territory. Moreover, military cooperation spilled over into greater interaction in political, economic, and cultural fields, transforming what began as an instrumental relationship into a socioemotional one, particularly for the Turks. It became more important to them to be “Western” even if they continued to feel apart and uncertain of their acceptance.

Domestic Determinants

56. Domestic developments as well as the changing international environment since the mid-1960s have both impinged on this commitment made 30 years ago.

57. The greater social and political differentiation among elite and masses alike has, for example, produced a diversity of views on what Turkey’s foreign policy ought to be—even within the major parties. The emergence of a political left, mainly the left wing of the Republican People’s Party, has created pressures to loosen ties with the West and improve those with the East. At the same time, the growth of Turkish social democracy, whose adherents make up a majority of the Republican People’s Party, has led to calls for closer ties to West European socialists or Third World states. On the right, parochial and Islamic-oriented forces in the two minor parties have pressed for a more chauvinistic foreign policy and for a turn toward the Islamic world. These pressures to some degree have been transmitted to the right wing of the Justice Party even though the thrust of that party’s foreign policy remains pro-Western. Because recent Turkish governments have been so weak politically, they have felt compelled to be responsive to such sentiments.

International Factors

58. Ankara has likewise found it necessary to adjust to substantial changes in the international environment. Faced with growing parsimony on the part of its traditional aid donors at a time when its requirements for economic and military aid and energy are still growing, Turkey has had to look for alternative sources of help. The switch from threats to blandishments in Soviet policy, along with the general easing of Cold War tensions, has tended to diminish the importance of NATO in the eyes of the Turks. Cyprus and Aegean disputes with Greece, moreover, have created a direct conflict of interest with the Alliance as well, inasmuch as NATO is interested in compromise solutions while the Turks (and the Greeks) seek maximum advantage. But Turkey has been angered both by the perceived absence of Alliance support and by its perception that its allies—the United States in particular—are being manipulated by Greece.

59. The Turks resented and were deeply scarred by the US stand against them during the 1964 Cyprus crisis and were initially highly suspicious of the US mediation effort during the crisis that followed three years later. And, while they took some comfort from the tacit Western acquiescence in their initial intervention during the 1974 Cyprus crisis, the condemnation of the second phase of that operation reinforced their feeling of isolation.

60. The greatest shock to Turkey’s sensibilities, however, was the Congressionally imposed US arms embargo and Western Europe’s inability or unwilling-
new to respond adequately to Turkish needs while the embargo was in force. The effect of the embargo was to convince the Turks that they could no longer be sure of US or NATO support for Turkey's vital interests, nor could they afford to continue such total dependence on US military aid. The legacy of that experience is that the once close US-Turkish relationship has been so impaired that Washington can no longer count on Ankara's support on international issues unless Turkey's own national interests are directly involved.

61. Nor have the Turks been pleased with the return from their associate status in the European Community, which they envisaged as preparation for full membership by the 1990s. They also hoped for preferential access to a major export market, large credits, and a permanent source of employment for Turkish workers. Instead, a negative trade balance has developed, worker migration has been curbed, and financial assistance has seemed grudging to Turkish eyes. The EC's Mediterranean policy and its agreements with other countries have watered down the significance of Turkey's associate status, while Greece's approaching full membership raises the specter of Turkey's isolation from Europe. Should Ankara soon bid for equivalent status, the Community's inevitable hesitation would only deepen Turkish frustration.

62. The psychological fallout from Turkey's perceptions of the international environment could over time become a still larger factor in its policy positions. It can contribute a lack of realism to the pursuit of alternative sources of support—such as exaggerated expectations of financial assistance from Arab states, or the notion advanced by National Salvation Party leader Erbakan that Ankara could get along quite well without the EC if Turkey were to become the industrial heartland of some Islamic grouping. Turkish negotiators often convey an egocentric impression of the place Turkey occupies in Western preoccupations. They are frequently reluctant to accept the implications of Turkey's need to be economically more self-reliant, and they show a well-known disposition to blame others if Turkey, by "holding its breath," should go blue in the face.

**New Departures**

63. In responding to these domestic and international developments, Turkish leaders have pursued increasingly nationalistic foreign and defense policies, especially since 1974-75. On balance, these trends have been detrimental to US and NATO interests.

64. The essence of this "new look" in Turkish foreign policy is that Turkey, while remaining within the Western defense and economic systems, will pursue independent policies within them and closer relations toward other states:

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- Turkish national interests must not as a matter of principle be subordinated to Alliance interests. In practical terms, this means that Turkey will give greater priority to its own concerns over US and NATO interests.

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- Turkey will seek to enhance its arms production capability to avoid reliance on a single source. To this end the Turks have been particularly insistent on Alliance support for coproduction of certain categories of NATO arms.

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- Turkey's contribution to Western defense must be commensurate with the economic and military assistance it receives from the Alliance. The closing of US bases while the arms embargo was in force and their reopening on only a provisional basis pending a new defense cooperation agreement is a case in point, as is Turkey's refusal to go along with the Alliance's long-term defense program.

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- Turkey will qualify its role as an outpost of the West in the region. The implications of this are evident in the recent expansion of political and economic ties with the Soviet Union—highlighted by the signing in June 1978 of a political document and significant new economic accords—and the Turks' more recent unwillingness to permit SALT II verification overflights by the United States without Moscow's consent.

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- Turkey will seek to strengthen political and economic relations with Third World states, particularly the Arab oil producers. Signs of this are the greater support for the Palestinian cause and
closer economic ties and limited military cooperation with Libya.

TURKEY’S FUTURE

65. Prospects that Turkey will overcome its protracted and worsening malaise are not promising. Nor will Turkey’s formerly harmonious relations with its allies, the United States in particular, be fully restored. The outlook thus is one of continued domestic instability and uncertainty in foreign policy.

Growing Social Strains

66. Social and economic tensions are bound to remain high. The modernization process, marked by rapid urbanization, growing industrialization, and rising levels of education, has broken down many old social values and evoked demands for a better life. The Turks look increasingly—and enviously—to Western Europe as a reference point. Yet the prospect is that public expectations will outpace the country’s ability to meet them. Indeed, growing domestic and international constraints portend an actual reduction in state resources.

67. With population increasing by more than a million a year, and an age structure pointing to a further surge in population pressure, Turkey will have to run hard just to stand still throughout the 1980s. The economy must grow 3 percentage points annually just to provide for the additional population. Yet by limiting savings and strain resources to meet expanding social needs, population growth will slow economic development.

68. Prospects therefore are that the proportion of job opportunities relative to labor force growth is likely to continue to diminish. And the trend toward rising unemployment at home will occur at a time when continued slow growth in Western Europe means that migration is unlikely to provide the relief it did in the 1960s and early 1970s—even allowing for expanding work opportunities in the Arab world.

69. Population growth and the appeal of urban life are also likely to keep high the rate of urbanization that has already outrun the capacity of cities to absorb the newcomers and to provide them with adequate social services or employment. The effect will be to further concentrate a potentially volatile mixture of different religious, ethnic, and regional groupings that manifest longstanding animosities and that are also competing with one another in a tightening job market.

Slow Economic Recovery

70. These structural problems and basic social tensions are likely to be exacerbated by a slow and erratic recovery from the present crisis. For Turkey to escape from the cycle of supply shortages, burgeoning unemployment, accelerating inflation, rising energy costs, and slow economic growth, substantial assistance from abroad will not be enough. Indeed, it is the perennial dilemma of foreign lenders to ensure that aid provided makes it easier for Turkey to take the tough measures required without at the same time making it easier for Turkey to avoid them.

71. Among the needed changes are greater inducements for exports of goods and services. Exchange rates should be geared to the creation and maintenance of conditions in which Turkish industry can compete with imports without perpetual protection and also sell profitably abroad. This would ensure that foreign exchange receipts would rise sufficiently to sustain an expansion of economic activity and service a growing foreign debt. But, at present, imports are severely restricted by nonprice mechanisms, and Turkish producers find domestic sales much more profitable than exports.

72. Demand restraint is also a must. Public revenues will have to be raised substantially through a combination of higher taxes and higher prices for goods and services produced by public sector enterprises. Otherwise, Turkey will go on having the excessive monetary expansion that in recent years has fueled inflation and contributed to the deterioration in the balance of payments. Public investment projects need to be chosen in a more selective manner and financed without undue recourse to the central bank. Ideally, the public sector should be reduced, but at a minimum it must be more efficient.

73. Though a good beginning, the recent economic reforms will have to be supplemented by additional austerity measures over the next few years. Turkey’s foreign debt burden is now so large—on the order of $15 billion, as compared with the 1979 current account receipts of roughly $3 billion—that the country seems destined to suffer at least several more years of payments difficulties. To be sure, there are leaders in both major parties who privately accept the necessity of some pause in the headlong pace of Turkey’s
development that these difficulties imply. But every government faces a web of conflicting vested interests within the bureaucracy, the private business community, and the agricultural sector. And since each of these interest groups has a voice in parliament, every government is hard put to meet Turkey’s immediate international commitments or to undertake long-term economic reforms.

Continuing Violence

74. Political violence is likely to grow in scope and intensity, with growing numbers of the Turkish elite and Americans as targets. The extremist groups are well organized, their members are highly committed, and they are intent on destroying the country’s institutions as well as each other. Such groups—on the left and right—have a ready source of new recruits in the universities, where antiquated methods and poor employment prospects have a radicalizing effect; in the shantytowns dwelling the major urban areas, where second-generation youths see the good life of wealthy urbanites but cannot break into it; and in the impoverished east, where overlapping ideological, sectarian, and ethnic rivalries produce a steady flow of converts to radical views.

75. Because Turkish violence springs from fundamental social and economic conflicts, it admits of no easy solution, even with establishment of a garrison state. While the military might eventually curb political violence, they would not be able to tackle its underlying causes.

Can the Politicians Cope?

76. Such massive social, political, and economic problems would be a formidable challenge for any national leadership and polity. They are especially so in Turkey, where political competition is ferocious, political forces fragmented and increasingly polarized, and the economy distorted by structural flaws and ideological sacred cows.

77. Neither Ecevit nor the Demirel coalition that preceded him had the strength to tackle Turkey’s many problems head-on, and Demirel’s present reincarnation may prove even shakier. At the same time, political leaders have been quick to exploit them for political profit. Risky decisions, even when made, have been grudging, piecemeal, and often taken in response only to external pressures. Had Ecevit implemented his austerity measures during the early part of his stint in office, for example, they might have contained the slide and offered a greater prospect of recovery.

78. Political leaders have also approached the question of political violence cautiously, fearing that too heavy a reliance on the military would erode their own authority or alienate some of their followers. Ecevit, who was forced to declare martial law only when violence was out of hand, held back for ideological reasons as well. Only Nationalist Action Party leader Turkes, who would actually prefer a more authoritarian state, and the conservative wing of the Justice Party seem indifferent to such concerns.

79. Perhaps most revealing of Turkish political leaders’ ingrained attitudes and intentions are the goals of Turkey’s fourth five-year development plan (1979-83). Essentially it calls for continuation and acceleration of the traditional policy of high growth and industrialization by means of a constantly expanding state economic sector, the main cause of Turkey’s recurring cycles of boom and bust.

80. Overall, the animosities among Turkish political leaders—arising from personal and historical differences, intense ideological commitments, and the desire to retain the spoils of office—portend the continued primacy of politics over good government. The chances are not good that political leaders will rise to the level of statesmanship that would permit, for example, the once-vaunted “grand coalition” in which the major parties would come together to solve the country’s problems.

81. The outlook, rather, is that Turkey will continue to be governed by weak and ineffective governments—if politics is allowed to run its present course. And should the parties agree to—or events necessitate—a new national election before 1981, we see little reason to expect in either case a new constellation of power that would provide a government substantially more effective than those Turkey has endured for nearly a decade.

Toward a More Authoritarian System?

82. The prospect of continuing immobilism amid growing social tensions, economic hardship, and political violence will inevitably reinforce the desire for fundamental changes. These could include: an above-party government backed by centrist and moderate forces in both major parties with some kind of tran-
date to try to lift Turkey out of its malaise, further modification of the 1961 constitution to stress community rights and order over individual rights and liberty on grounds that the present charter is too liberal for a transitional and troubled society; abandonment of proportional representation and return to a single-member majority system; and/or an even larger governmental role in the economy to allocate resources.

83. Pressures to move in such directions will pose serious dilemmas for Turkey's political leaders. An above-parties government and curbs on civil liberties would signal an end to the freewheeling politics to which they have become accustomed. It would also mean an end to the spoils of power for those in charge. A switch to a majority system would be opposed by all parties except Justice. The Republican People's Party, already dominant in the left-of-center spectrum, could not expect to gain substantially, and the rightists and minor parties would be badly hurt by losses to the Justice Party. On the other hand, Justice—the home of most businessmen—would be leery of greater economic controls.

84. Yet the degree to which political leaders can somehow co-opt these pressures and sentiments and reconcile them with their own values and political imperatives in the next few years may well determine the fate of Turkish democracy as well as their own. Unwillingness or inability to respond may imperil the military reluctantly to consider expanding further its political role.

What Role the Military?

85. Present conditions in Turkey are similar in many ways to earlier crises that brought on military interventions. Although the military has in general worked with civilian leaders in the enforcement of martial law, there have also been signs of discontent. The economic squeeze, the persistent violence, the political constraints under which the military must operate in dealing with violence, and the politicizing of civilian leaders seem to the military a threat to the strength and unity of the state toward which it has a guardian role; they offend the military's law-and-order values; and they are also beginning to threaten the military's corporate material concerns as well as those of individual officers.

86. There are also some differences with earlier periods. The 1960 and 1971 praetorian experiments showed the difficulty of governing the country; they politicized the officer corps and undermined its professionalism; they damaged the military's standing among certain parts of the elite and electorate, and exacerbated political polarization when the military returned to the barracks. Since then, political leaders have become more feisty, while their present-day military counterparts are less politically minded. And the military establishment—perhaps mindful of the ambiguous experience of the Greek junta—must wonder whether Turkey's Western allies would be more or less inclined to lend security, economic, and diplomatic support to a junta in Ankara.

87. Nonetheless, the country is in such bad shape and political leaders so uncertain of how to cope that the military may take on a larger role during the period through the mid-1980s. This has already transpired with respect to internal security policy. The military's greater involvement would most likely be of the behind-the-scenes variety. Military leaders will be frequently exposed to temptations to exceed the spirit and letter of their constitutionally mandated advisory role on security issues, to proffer 'advice' on broader policy matters, and perhaps ultimately to suggest who should govern.

88. If a more openly political intervention should occur—and we consider that there is an even chance that this will happen if civilian leaders are perceived unable or unwilling to cope—-it would likely follow the pattern of 1971, when moderate senior military leaders forced the government to resign and replaced it with a military-backed, above-parties government. A direct military takeover, similar to that of 1960, would probably take place only after a prolonged period of anarchy and economic crisis or in the event of another Kurdish insurrection which the politicians seemed unable or unwilling to contain. While direct intervention would probably also be led by the senior military leadership, it might be instigated by more radical elements from below.

89. Given the law-and-order values and basically conservative orientation of the officer corps, its enhanced political involvement would push Turkey toward a politically less liberal society and a more controlled economy. The military would likely insist on some of the changes currently gaining public support, such as a more authoritarian constitution and a modification of the electoral system. It would also compel adoption of more stringent economic austerity measures, although it would still try to satisfy its own corporate requirements. A military or military-backed government would continue Turkey's current policy of
pursuing essentially a ratification of the new status quo in Cyprus and a substantial revision of the status quo in the Aegean. It would, however, be more responsive to broader Western defense interests if sufficient military and economic assistance were offered as quid.

**Whither Turkish Foreign Policy?**

90. Regardless of which of the preceding domestic political scenarios is played out, Turkey’s political, economic, and security ties with the West are likely to remain the focus of its foreign policy over the next several years. Nonetheless it is unlikely ever again to be the accommodating and even submissive partner it once was, neither domestic nor international trends are working in that direction.

91. The fragmentation of political forces suggests that the foreign policy debate, in the absence of renewed East-West tension, will broaden rather than narrow; the former consensus on the “primacy of collective security” is unlikely to reemerge. The prospect of continued political and economic malaise, moreover, will incline Turkish governments, whether weak or strong, civilian or military, to be importunate in their insistence on support. In short, Turkey’s domestic political environment will put a premium on “standing up” to the West.

92. Nor is it likely that the West will be able to entice the Turks into being more cooperative. The prospect of growing political and economic constraints is apt to make Alliance and EC members more cautious in providing military and economic assistance to the Turks. And the likely persistence of the emotion-laden Greek-Turkish quarrels, with their economic and security implications, will continue to make the West’s honest-broker role suspect in Ankara. All of these factors will incline the Turks to try to parlay their strategic assets into more generous help from the West.

93. Turkey will also continue to see advantages in trying to use those same strategic assets to finagle economic and political support from the Soviet Union. Because Turkey is such an important country, Moscow’s interest will likely remain high. Yet there are limits beyond which the emerging Soviet-Turkish rapprochement is not likely to go. Even if Moscow were able and willing to provide Turkey with the hard currency and credits its economy will need, the Turks would be well aware of the political strings associated with such assistance. Most members of the Turkish political, economic, and military elite would be highly sensitive to the risks of permitting Turkey to become a Soviet client.

94. The prospect of a nonaligned Turkey—which, in light of its geography, would be open to more direct Soviet pressures—is almost as remote. Nonalignment appeals to only a small minority on both sides of the political spectrum, and it is doubtful that any future Turkish government will see much of a payoff in casting its lot with the Arab or other nonaligned states, other than to ensure Turkey’s energy supplies and whatever diplomatic support can be elicited on its quarrels with the Greeks. On neither of those issues have such states been particularly forthcoming, given Turkey’s own history as a colonial power and its more recent association with the West—factors that still grate on Arab and other nonaligned states.

95. Turkish foreign policy will in fact almost certainly operate within some broadly definable parameters. Turkey will likely remain within the Western defense and economic systems, staying within the military wing of NATO, retaining the bilateral defense tie with the United States, keeping its ties with the EC, and possibly applying for full membership. Only the West can provide Turkey with credits and hard currency in amounts anywhere near what the Turks will require to finance their development plans, and to find an effective and politically acceptable alternative to Western, particularly US, arms would be difficult. But Turkey will pursue its national interests more actively both within and outside those systems, by, for example, placing further restrictions on its participation in NATO activities and on the use of US bases.

96. Turkey’s poor economic prospects into the 1980s and its woefully obsolescent military establishment suggest that its dependence on the West in those areas is likely to increase rather than lessen. And though Turkey’s quarrels with the Greeks have loosened its ties to the West, those quarrels also ensure that Turkey would be reluctant to loosen them further lest it concede Western support to the Greeks.

97. Turkey’s foreign policy parameters, moreover, are not set only by instrumental factors. Most Turks still place a high value on their Western identity and on the cultural and institutional credentials that flow from it; geography and history have instilled deep distrust of the Russians; and beyond very vague feelings of Islamic brotherhood they feel they have very little in common with their Middle East neighbors. However fractional the Turks may be, and however hard they work their link with the West for what they
can get out of it, that link reflects a commitment that is not likely to be abandoned.

Conclusions and Uncertainties

98. The thrust of our prognosis, therefore, is that Turkey will face extraordinarily difficult challenges in the 1980s, but that moderate political forces will likely retain the upper hand; that its democratic institutions are likely to provide a safety valve for the growing discontent that in more authoritarian societies might already have led to a social upheaval; that, if the military does intervene, its goals will be limited and its tenure brief; and that Turkey’s instrumental, organizational, and emotional ties to the West are likely to keep Turkey on an essentially Western course.

99. While this is the shape of the Turkey that we are most likely to face over the next several years, there are circumstances that could produce a more troublesome outcome. One element of uncertainty is the difficulty of fully comprehending the longer term consequences of the dynamic social change so characteristic of Turkey today, the impact it will have on mass psychology, and the resulting possibility of social upheaval. Combined with the activities of violence-prone elements and perhaps stimulated by developments in neighboring countries, mass discontent could conceivably reach a critical level of unrest either in the urban areas or in the eastern provinces. Should such an outbreak occur, or seem imminent, the military intervention that would almost certainly follow could usher in a longer lasting period of military rule—a period, moreover, involving more radical domestic changes in the direction of authoritarianism.

100. Also critical to Turkey’s domestic tranquility, as well as to its foreign orientation, is the quality of its overall relationship with the West. Regardless of who holds the reins of power, any solution to the economic problems compounding Turkey’s social and political turmoil is difficult to imagine without substantial economic assistance from the West. Without the provision of substantial military assistance, the West is not likely to retain the influence it has had with the Turkish military. To an important degree, moreover, the basic psychology of the country is and will remain dependent on how the West seems to come down on the issues involved in Turkey’s continued rivalry with the Greeks.

101. Yet Turkey’s demands will nearly always exceed what the West is apt to provide. International financial assistance is increasingly constrained—not only by the real shortage of funds but by the growing skepticism that Turkey will meet the performance standards attached to it. The needs of the Alliance and the underlying uncertainties in Greece’s situation have likewise set limits to how far the West can go in tilting toward Turkey. The upshot is that an element of uncertainty in the situation will continue to be Western policy toward Turkey and Turkish perceptions of how well the West is measuring up to Turkey’s performance standards. If Turkish leaders perceive their political, economic, and military support from the United States and the West as increasingly inadequate, their estrangement from the West may grow. In that case, effective Turkish membership in NATO could not be taken for granted.
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