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MILITARY ATTACHE TRAVEL WITHIN THE  
UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION

*Prepared By The*  
*Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference*  
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DIA AND FBI  
review(s) completed.

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SECRET

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	<u>Page</u>
I. INTRODUCTION.....	1
II. UNITED STATES POLICY.....	2
III. SUMMARY.....	4
IV. INCIDENTS.....	7

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EXHIBIT A - TRAVEL PERFORMED WITHIN THE USSR BY  
U. S. MILITARY ATTACHE PERSONNEL BETWEEN  
APRIL 1, 1958, AND MARCH 31, 1959

EXHIBIT B - TRAVEL WITHIN THE USSR REQUESTED BY  
U. S. MILITARY ATTACHE PERSONNEL BETWEEN  
APRIL 1, 1958, AND MARCH 31, 1959,  
BUT DENIED BY THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT

EXHIBIT C - TRAVEL WITHIN THE UNITED STATES BY  
REPRESENTATIVES OF THE OFFICE OF SOVIET  
MILITARY, NAVAL, AND AIR ATTACHES,  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

EXHIBIT D - INCIDENTS SURROUNDING TRIP WITHIN USSR,  
JANUARY 24 TO 31, 1959

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MILITARY ATTACHE TRAVEL WITHIN THE  
UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION

I. INTRODUCTION

Several recent incidents have served to focus the attention of the members of the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference upon the circumstances surrounding the travel of United States Military Attaches within the Soviet Union as compared with the manner in which Soviet Military Attaches are permitted to travel within the United States. This review of Military Attache travel has, therefore, been prepared for the use of the IIC members and presents a compilation of the facts concerning the travel in question as reported by representatives of the three military services and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. No effort has been made to assess the intelligence value of U.S. Military Attache travel in the USSR or of the Soviet Military Attache travel in the United States.

On June 22, 1959, the United States Army Attache at Moscow was called, as the senior United States Attache, to the Office of the Chief of the Otdel Vneshnikh Snoshenii, the Soviet office which handles liaison between foreign military representatives and Soviet ministries, and informed that the Soviet Union was contemplating action to place Attache travel within the USSR on a trip-for-trip basis under which the Soviets would approve a trip for United States Attaches only after a trip had been approved for Soviet Attaches within the United States. He was informed that this action was contemplated because of changes which had been made by the United States in two trips which had been requested by Soviet Attaches. (Details concerning these changes appear hereunder in paragraph two, page seven.) The Military Attache was told that he would be advised when and how this "reciprocity" would be established.

While at first glance it might appear that reciprocity would be achieved by establishment of a "trip-for-trip" requirement, the facts developed by the IIC members demonstrate that a vast difference exists between Attache travel in the Soviet Union and that in the United States. The Soviet police state not only permits but appears to encourage rough treatment of United States personnel by the Russian "militia," including physical detention, "strip searches," confiscation of cameras, film and personal possessions, and local, last-minute changes in itinerary forced by denial of hotel and travel accommodations or of access to nominally open areas.

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II. UNITED STATES POLICY

Currently applicable policy was established by the National Security Council and approved by the President on July 19, 1954. This requires:

"Restrictions should be placed upon diplomatic and official representatives of Soviet bloc countries in the United States on the basis of strict reciprocity for restrictions placed upon U. S. representatives in each Soviet bloc country; as determined to be feasible by a group composed of representatives of the Departments of State, Defense, Justice, and of ODM and CIA." (The Office of Defense Mobilization has been replaced by the Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization.)

The group established under this policy has designated certain areas of the United States as closed to travel by all Soviet citizens except Soviet employees of the United Nations Secretariat. These areas are not closed to travel by representatives of other Soviet bloc countries. (An approximately equal area of the Soviet Union is closed to travel by all foreigners.) It is thus apparent that Soviet Military Attaches can use representatives of the cooperative Soviet bloc governments to travel within United States closed areas for the purpose of intelligence collection, although no similar opportunity is afforded United States Attaches within the Soviet Union. The IIC members have received information from an unimpeachable source that the Soviet Union is utilizing the services of the Military Attaches of other Soviet bloc countries in connection with its intelligence collection effort in the United States.

In addition to the geographical restrictions imposed as a result of the policy quoted above, Military Attache personnel of both the United States and the USSR are required to file an itinerary concerning any proposed travel outside the Metropolitan Washington or Moscow areas. United States Attaches in Moscow must inform the Soviet Government by letter concerning proposed travel 48 hours in advance of departure. (The period from noon, Saturday, to 8:00 a.m., Monday, is not included.) The letter must include the names of the travelers, an exact itinerary including the cities and specific points outside city limits to be visited, the dates of the visits, and the mode of travel. If an

- 2 -  
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automobile is to be used, the license number must be furnished.

The Soviet Foreign Liaison Office has frequently denied proposed travel in whole or in part as late as one hour before departure. On occasion, changes have been received after departure of the travelers.

In contrast, Soviet Attaches in the United States have, until very recently, been permitted to indicate that their travel would include a certain period of time and to then list the cities to be visited and the routes to be utilized without designating the dates on which individual cities would be visited or the means of transportation to be used. The Soviet travelers are further accustomed to tour freely within a twenty-five mile radius of the cities on their itinerary. The freedom with which Soviet Attaches travel in the United States is indicated in the details of the Soviet visit to Texas during April, 1958, set forth within Exhibit C.

Restrictions and harassments in force by the Soviet Government which have no counterpart in the United States include the following:

- (1) All tickets for distant travel must be purchased from a central point. (Trips may be unofficially denied by refusal to sell tickets or by statement that transportation is not available.)
- (2) Travelers are normally restricted to "city limits." These are flexible and imposed by local "militia" who, on occasion, have established limits within one block of the hotel at which U.S. Attaches were stopping. Local authorities will refuse to define restricted areas or to provide maps, and travelers find "city limits" by encountering militia roadblocks. Brief visits to areas of interest along the route of travel are often denied by militia who force the travelers to detour around points of interest or to use alternate travel routes.

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III. SUMMARY

Between April 1, 1958, and March 31, 1959, United States military attaches in Russia requested permission to make 140 trips outside the Metropolitan Moscow area. Twenty-nine requests were made by Army Attache personnel, 48 by Navy, and 40 by Air Force. An additional 23 requests were made jointly by a combination of the military services. The Soviet OVS (Foreign Liaison Office) denied permission for 43 of these trips or 30.7 per cent. The details concerning the requests which were denied and the reasons which were furnished for the denials are set forth in Exhibit B.

A review of Exhibit B will reflect the frequency with which cities are "temporarily closed." It is noted that the city of Vorkuta, reportedly an administrative center for labor camps, was thus five times refused although located within territory nominally open to foreign travel.

United States Attache personnel actually made 97 trips during the period in question. Twenty-two of these were made by Army personnel, 36 by Navy, 32 by Air Force, and 7 by a combination of two or three of the services. Details concerning United States travel in Russia are set forth in Exhibit A.

Exhibit A reflects not only the dates and places of U.S. travel within Russia but also, in abbreviated form, comments by the travelers concerning unusual harassment or, in some instances, actual physical violence, encountered during the trips. These comments reflect such matters as the deliberate icing of train windows to prevent observation; the denial of hotel accommodations; detention by the "militia" and the deliberate obstruction or restriction of movement by the Soviet surveilling officers.

In contrast, Soviet Attache personnel in the United States requested, during the period in question, permission to make 33 trips outside the Metropolitan Washington area. All of these were granted. Nineteen of these involved travel to New York and four others to Philadelphia or Baltimore. The Soviet Attaches asked to make 10 extended trips, averaging two weeks in duration, and details concerning these are set forth in Exhibit C. Soviet Attache travel frequently involved personnel from

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more than one military service. Red Army personnel participated in 23 trips, Navy in 6, and Air Force in 17. In connection with travel by the Soviet Air Attache accompanied by an Adjutant to the Soviet Military Attache in October, 1958, permission to enter two counties in Nebraska and two counties in Iowa was denied by the Air Force in reciprocity for a similar denial of travel on the part of the Air Force Attache in the Soviet Union. The balance of the trip was taken by the Soviets.

A careful review of United States and Soviet Military Attache travel reflects the following:

- (1) During the 12-month period under review, Soviet Attaches asked to make 33 trips and all were granted with a minor change in the itinerary of one. U.S. Attaches asked to make 140 trips of which 43 were denied and alterations were made in many of the remainder.
- (2) U.S. Attaches are subject to harassment, including physical violence, detention, and confiscation of effects. No Soviet Attache has been subjected to any obstruction in his travel by physical or other means. Soviet Attaches have, on occasion, been stopped by local or state police for speeding or other traffic violation but have been permitted to continue immediately upon demonstration of identity.
- (3) U.S. Attaches are normally not permitted to explore beyond "city limits" which are flexible and established by local "militia" to suit the circumstances. These limits are learned by U.S. travelers when they encounter roadblocks set up especially for them. No Soviet Attache has, within the knowledge of the IIC members, been impeded in any way in his travel other than by the geographical restrictions which exist in both countries.
- (4) U.S. travelers cannot obtain maps of the cities which they visit. Soviet travelers pick up maps at every stop, visiting Chambers of Commerce, bookstores, libraries, and newsstands in this connection.

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- (5) *U.S. Attaches must file precise itineraries with exact dates and details concerning method of travel, and travel tickets must be secured from a central point. Soviet Attaches have been permitted to file more general itineraries and are free to secure travel accommodations in the same manner as the general public.*
- (6) *U.S. travelers frequently are unable to secure even a taxi for limited local travel. Soviet travelers rent automobiles frequently and use them to drive around military and air bases and to permit observation of activities of intelligence interest.*

- 6 -

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IV. INCIDENTS

Although no Soviet travel request was denied during the 12-month period studied, two recent efforts by United States Armed Forces to achieve a closer approach to reciprocity have apparently resulted in the Soviet threat to establish a "trip-for-trip" standard:

On May 20, 1959, Soviet Attache personnel informed United States Foreign Liaison Offices that representatives of each of the three services planned to travel in California and Nevada between May 25 and June 15, 1959. In concerted action, the military services informed the Soviet Attache Office that the travel would be permitted but that it must be accomplished in commercial transportation media. This restriction was designed to prevent the use of rented automobiles and the observation of the numerous military facilities located on the route which the Soviets proposed to take. The Soviet Attache Office was also asked to furnish the exact dates on which they would visit the various points listed in their proposed itinerary and to follow this practice in the future. The Russians did not make this trip. On June 11, 1959, the United States Army Foreign Liaison Office was advised that an Assistant Soviet Military Attache, his wife, and an aide proposed to travel between June 15 and June 27, 1959, in Virginia, North Carolina, Tennessee, Kentucky, Indiana, Illinois, Ohio, and West Virginia. The proposed itinerary indicated that the travel route had been chosen so as to permit observation of Fort Bragg and Fort Knox. The Soviet Attache Office was advised that the itinerary should be amended so as to detour around both of these installations. The trip was not made.

It will be noted that in neither of these instances was the Soviet travel denied and in the second instance only a minor change in itinerary was required. The Russian threat of retaliation for these two changes was made in the face of the fact that during the preceding 12-month period 43 American requests for travel had been flatly denied while during the same period no Soviet request had been denied.

Soviet harassment of United States travelers is not limited to military personnel. During latter May, 1959, Richard H. Davis, Minister-Counsellor of the American Embassy at Moscow, reported that during April and May there had been 9 instances in which Embassy civilian personnel had been refused permission to visit nominally open areas. One of these involved the city of Vorkuta. Mr. Davis, in his report to the Department of State, after furnishing details concerning

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these instances, stated that they did not include military travel, where refusals, alterations, and harassments have all been even more onerous. He recommended that consideration be given by the Department of State to specific retaliation and that this be as nearly as reciprocal as possible. The IIC has not been informed regarding the action, if any, taken by the Department of State in response to this recommendation.

Soviet harassment has been applied apparently impartially to Attache personnel of each of the three military services. This is evidenced by a review of the travel comments set forth in Exhibit A. An unusual situation arose during travel by Army personnel between August 11 and 20, 1958, when Captain Ulatoski, after eating a meal aboard an airplane en route from Omsk to Khabarovsk became violently ill. Upon arrival at Khabarovsk, an attempt was made by Soviet personnel to evacuate Ulatoski to a hospital, preventing his superior, Colonel McBride, from accompanying him. When Colonel McBride insisted that he accompany the patient, he was told this would be permitted if he would leave the rear of the ambulance and sit in the front seat. Colonel McBride agreed and got out of the rear. No sooner had he done so than the attendants attempted to lock the doors and drive away. Departure of the ambulance was prevented only by Colonel McBride placing himself in the right of way where the driver would have had to run him down. After an additional 20 minutes of argument, Colonel McBride was permitted to accompany Captain Ulatoski to the hospital.

During the argument, Mrs. McBride and Mrs. Ulatoski were escorted by a courteous militia man to a taxi which took them to a hotel where an extremely hostile attendant, after a half-hour discussion, finally assigned them a room.

After thorough examination, the Soviet physicians admitted that they were unable to find any cause for the attack. The United States Embassy doctor concurs in the theory that Captain Ulatoski was deliberately poisoned in an attempt to separate him from fellow travelers in order to administer a truth serum while he was in extreme pain or, at least, to bring the trip to a close. It is noted that Colonel McBride did not leave Captain Ulatoski until the latter had recovered sufficiently to be fully in possession of his faculties.

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The trip was continued but, in spite of prior reservations for a separate compartment on the train from Chita to Irkutsk, the travelers were forced to accept other space and were separated, with Captain and Mrs. Ulatoski sharing a compartment with two other persons and Colonel and Mrs. McBride sharing another compartment with two persons. The actions of these persons indicate that they were "planted."

On arrival at the hotel in Irkutsk, the travelers were told that no space was available and they were given the same story at the airport hotel although this was obviously untrue.

The group thereupon decided to continue on to Yakutsk. At this point they attempted to secure a taxi to travel around the city but waited one hour without receiving one although it had been promised.

Return travel to Moscow had been scheduled to enable the travelers to pass a number of targets during daylight hours and the trip was purposely scheduled on a "puddle jumper" airplane to obtain maximum intelligence value by frequent stops. On arrival at Omsk, the travelers were informed that their plane would not continue due to bad weather but that there was a TU 104 which would take them directly to Moscow and that seats had been reserved for the group on this plane.

Although the travelers indicated that they were willing to wait for better weather, they were informed that their plane would be delayed indefinitely. Recognizing that further resistance would be useless, the travelers returned to Moscow on the TU 104.

A fully detailed account of travel performed by Naval personnel is set forth in Exhibit D. This recounts a number of efforts to involve the travelers in an "incident" and insistence that the travelers sign a statement containing fabricated charges.

**TRAVEL PERFORMED WITHIN THE USSR BY U. S. MILITARY  
ATTACHE PERSONNEL BETWEEN APRIL 1, 1958, AND  
MARCH 31, 1959**

<u>Dates of Travel</u>	<u>Service Participating</u>	<u>Places Visited</u>	<u>Comments</u>
March 18 - April 5, 1958	AF	Tashkent - Termez Kabul	Surveillance constant. Train windows deliberately iced. Train attendant entered locked compartment with pass key during time of airfield observation.
April 1-12, 1958	N	Kharbarousk, Irkutsk	Surveillance normal
April 4-7, 1958	AF	Leningrad	Surveillance constant but discreet
April 8-10, 1958	N	Yaroslau <sup>#1</sup> , Rybinsk, Uglich, Rostou	Surveillance normal
April 13, 1958	AF	Zagorsk	Denied exploring north outskirts of town by civilians, later by militia.
April 15-20, 1958	A	Stalingrad	Confined to city limits. Surveillance close but indiscreet.
April 20, 1958	AF	Klin	Denied visit museum on north side of town by militiaman dropped off by surveillant car.
April 20 - May 2, 1958	N	Oslo, Leningrad	Permission to travel Leningrad to Moscow by auto denied.
April 29 - May 2, 1958	N	Baku	Limits of Baku very narrow.
April 29 - May 2, 1958	N	Sukhumi, Poti	Only center of Poti open to observers. Surveillance complete.

- 1 -

SECRET

EXHIBIT A

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<u>Dates of Travel</u>	<u>Service Participating</u>	<u>Places Visited</u>	<u>Comments</u>
May 8-14, 1958	AF	Rostou- Simferopol Dnepropetrovsk Zaporozhye Kharkou	Travellers held 1 hour by surveillants near Rostou Aircraft Plant, charged with violation of forbidden zone. Travellers delayed 1 day on flight Rostou-Simferopol. Denied hotel accommodation Simferopol, Zaporozhye, Dnepropetrovsk, Kharkou-Tula. Required to drive 25 hours without sleep. Surveillance extreme.
May 11, 1958	AF	Kalinin	Surveillance discreet.
May 18-21, 1958	N	Leningrad	Additional portion of trip by boat to Belomorsk, Onega, Archangelsk, Vytogra, denied.
May 20 - June 10, 1958	A	Kharkou Rostou Tbilisi Lake Sevan Sukhumi Sochi Yalta Simferopol	Delayed 2 days, failure to provide license number of Embassy auto and failure to specify points to be visited within 40 km radius Sochi and Yalta. Return via Lake Sevan, Tbilisi denied; forced return via Kazakh. Authority to travel by auto Simferopol-Kharkou rescinded.
May 25-28, 1958	AF	Leningrad - Helsinki	Trip requested by air. Tickets sold for non-existent flight. Travellers were required to go by train.
May 26-30, 1958	N	Dnepropetrovsk, Kherson, Odessa	Surveillance obvious on boats, discreet in Odessa.

- 2 -

SECRET

EXHIBIT A

**SECRET**

<u>Dates of Travel</u>	<u>Service Participating</u>	<u>Places Visited</u>	<u>Comments</u>
June 1-13, 1958	A	Adler Sochi Yalta Simferopol	None indicated.
June 7-12, 1958	AF	Kiev - Odessa - Kherson - Dnepropetrovsk	Surveillance severe in Dnepropetrovsk. Travellers not permitted to exploit city.
June 9-11, 1958	N	Archangelsk, Nargan-Mar, Kandalaksha, Murmansk	Only trip from Moscow to Archangelsk permitted. Ship travel refused.
June 13-16, 1958	AF	Leningrad	Surveillance discreet.
June 14-19, 1958	N	Stalingrad, Rostov, Voronezh	Surveillance normal.
June 25-30, 1958	AF	Tula, Stalinogorsk, Ryazan, Penza, Kuybyshev, Kazan	Travellers misrouted by militia on several occasions. Police escort through Kuznetsk, and across dam at Stavropol. Detained by Soviet Army Troops at Kuybyshev, charged with transgressing closed area. Detained 3 times in city of Kazan, manhandled and threatened with shooting.
June 27-28, 1958	N	Leningrad	Surveillance normal.
June 28-29, 1958	AF	Yaroslavl	Road blocks and detours to prevent observation of airfield.
June 29 - July 2, 1958	N	Gorkiy	Surveillance normal.

- 3 -

**SECRET**

EXHIBIT A

<u>Dates of Travel</u>	<u>Service Participating</u>	<u>Places Visited</u>	<u>Comments</u>
July 5 - August 5, 1958	A	Vyazma Smolensk Minsk Brest Warsaw Germany	Routine surveillance.
July 9-23, 1958	N	Stalingrad, Astrakhan, Baku, Pahlevi (Iran)	Discreet surveillance. Some foot travel prevented in Baku.
July 12-14, 1958	AF	Uglich - Kimoy	Surveillance discreet
July 14-18, 1958	N-A	Makhachkala, Baku, Tbilisi, Odessa	Trip completed as far as Tbilisi when travel- ers were informed they had to return to Moscow from Tbilisi on the first flight on July 18. Surveillance close but not unduly troublesome.
July 20-29, 1958	AF	Tashkent, Samarkand, Tbilisi, Sukhumi, Adler	Surveillance discreet.
July 21 - August 2, 1958	AF	Kharkov - Kiev - Vinnitsa - Minsk - Vitebsk - Pskov - Leningrad - Vyazma	No harassments.
July 23-24, 1958	N	Odessa	Travel shortened because air tickets not available for scheduled return. Sur- veillance believed almost nonexistent first day but corrected next day.
July 23-27, 1958	AF	Riga	No harassments.

**SECRET**

<u>Dates of Travel</u>	<u>Service Participating</u>	<u>Places Visited</u>	<u>Comments</u>
July 25-27, 1958	A	Stalingrad Rostou-on-Don	Surveillance discreet; no incidents
July 25-29, 1958	N	Rostou, Novorossiysk, Tuapse, Sochi	Discreet surveillance.
July 27-28, 1958	A	Kalinin	Surveillance continuous but discreet; no incidents.
July 29 - August 1, 1958	A	Minsk	Surveillance discreet; no incidents. Trip delayed one day due to inability to get tickets.
August 3-4, 1958	A-AF	Hunting Lodge for Diplomatic Corps	No harassments.
August 11-21, 1958	A	Khabarousk Chita Irkutsk Yakutz	Very severe - Possible deliberate food poisoning in meal served to Capt. Ulatoski. Attempts to prevent McBride from accompanying Ulatoski to hospital and from visiting him while in hospital. Crude and rude overt surveillance; delays in providing hotel and travel accommodations.
August 12-14, 1958	AF	Tashkent	Trip requested by rail but denied. Accom- plished by air. One traveller separated from others, hands tied and taken to "sobering- up" station, was stripped, placed in cold shower, held several hours prior to release.

- 5 -  
**SECRET**

EXHIBIT A



**SECRET**

<u>Dates of Travel</u>	<u>Service Participating</u>	<u>Places Visited</u>	<u>Comments</u>
August 13-17, 1958	N	Astrakhan, Baku	Discreet surveillance. Baku naval harbor closed by shore patrols.
August 12-17, 1958	A	Tashkent, Samarkand, Bukhara, Mari	After dinner on Aug. 12 a group of ostensibly friendly Soviet citizens attached themselves to the travellers. Portaluppi, who was accompanying Captain Dahlquist, became separated and was seized by two policemen who tied his hand and foot, searched him, photographed him, and held him for approximately 4 hours. He refused to sign a statement that he had been found drunk on the street by a cleaning woman who allegedly summoned police, and he refused to state that he had physically resisted the police, and declined to identify himself. All charges except that of resistance were false. His camera, notebook, and personal effects were confiscated but returned the following day. The travellers were unable to obtain tickets to Bukhara and returned to Moscow on August 14.
August 13-19, 1958	N	Sukhumi, Poti, Odessa	Surveillance constant but discreet.
August 17, 1958	A	Zuenigorod	Obvious surveillance.

- 6 -

**SECRET**

EXHIBIT A

*SECRET*

<u>Dates of Travel</u>	<u>Service Participating</u>	<u>Places Visited</u>	<u>Comments</u>
August 18-24, 1958	AF	Leningrad - Kharkou - Odessa	Travellers denied to exploit areas of Kharkou. Were turned back several times. No incident.
August 21-24, 1958	N	Nougorod, Leningrad	Return travel via Pushkin not permitted by "tail" car. Constant surveillance.
August 22-29, 1958	AF	Kirou - Kazan	Trip postponed due to non-availability of tickets. Air travel Kazan-Moscow denied. Kazan city bus rerouted. Train attendants attempted to enter locked compartment while passing aircraft plant. Aircraft plant obscured from view by smoke generators.
August 28 - September 1, 1958	A	Murmansk	Surveillance was discreet throughout entire trip.
August 28 - September 1, 1958	AF	Murmansk, Leningrad	Train attendants attempted to enter locked compartment. Travellers placed in aisle seats on aircraft to prevent observation.
Sept. 3-6, 1958	N	Murmansk, Archangel'sk	Surveillance normal.
September 6 - Sept. 13, 1958	A	Orel, Kharkou, Dnepropetrousk, Yalta	Difficulty with car, possibly due to deliberate tampering. The route from Alushta to Sudak was blocked by a militiaman who claimed the road was under repair.

- 7 -  
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EXHIBIT A

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<u>Dates of Travel</u>	<u>Service Participating</u>	<u>Places Visited</u>	<u>Comments</u>
Sept. 10-12, 1958	AF	Orel, Bryansk, Smolens, Vyazma	Travellers detained near Orel, cameras taken, film processed. Travellers were separated. Surveillance severe.
Sept. 10-15, 1958	A-AF	Kursk, Kharkou, Kremenchug, Kiev	Surveillance close throughout the trip. Militia & Army personnel blocked travellers in eastern part of Kursk.
Sept. 13-14, 1958	N	Leningrad	Surveillance normal.
Sept. 11-20, 1958	N	Sukhumi, Poti, Tskhaya, Tblisi, Baku, Astrakhan	Rail rather than taxi travel required Poti to Tskhaya. Movement or observation restricted eleven times.
Sept. 14 - October 2, 1958	N	Odessa, Istanbul	Very light surveillance.
Sept. 22 - October 6, 1958	A	Kharkou, Rostou-on-Don, Krasnedar, Sukhumi, Tbilisi, Ordzhonikidze, Makhachkala, Baku	
Sept. 26 - October 3, 1958	AF	Tashkent, Samarkand	Observation of airfields hampered by train attendants checking tickets, etc.
Sept. 28 - October 6, 1958	A	Kalinin, Leningrad, Nougorod	
October 7-8, 1958	N	Leningrad	Militia kept travellers moving along Embankment. Close surveillance.

- 8 -

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EXHIBIT A

**SECRET**

<u>Dates of Travel</u>	<u>Service Participating</u>	<u>Places Visited</u>	<u>Comments</u>
October 12, 1958	AF	Zuenigorod	Travellers denied access to normally "open" tourist attractions.
October 17-21, 1958	N	Gorkiy	Travellers separated on train and forced to share compartments with police representatives.
October 25-31, 1958	N	Riga, Leningrad, Helsinki	Efforts to create incident foiled.
Nou. 6-8, 1958	N	Leningrad	Entire trip planned by auto but trip to Leningrad had to be by rail because highway "temporarily closed."
Nou. 6-8, 1958	N	Odessa	Normal discreet surveillance except at all water front vantage points when shore patrol intervened.
Nou. 12-17, 1958	AF	Vitebsk, Gomel	Rescheduling required by Soviets which prohibited views of installations during daylight.
Nou. 16, 1959	N	Zuenigorod	Surveillance normal.
Nou. 20-24, 1958	AF	L'vov, Uzhgorod, Baronouchi, Minsk	Travellers accused of violating frontier zone, though trip approved by Soviet Foreign Liaison Office. Travellers later awakened and ordered to leave town on next train (35 minutes).

- 9 -  
**SECRET**

EXHIBIT A

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<u>Dates of Travel</u>	<u>Service Participating</u>	<u>Places Visited</u>	<u>Comments</u>
Dec. 2-10, 1958	AF	Voronezh, Rostov, Tbilisi, Baku, Stalingrad	Travellers removed from city bus in Tbilisi, accused of photography and taken to militia headquarters where it was necessary to surrender film. Denied visit civil airport, Baku. Surveillance severe throughout trip.
Dec. 9-25, 1958	N	Khaborouk, Nakhodka, Japan, Stockholm	Surveillance in Khaborouk-Nakhodka close and constant.
Dec. 11-18, 1958	A	Odessa, Kishinev, Kiev	Train travel held to hours of darkness. In all tours travel was restricted to city limits. Overt surveillance; possible attempt to provoke an incident.
Dec. 14-16, 1958	N	Leningrad	Surveillance varied from discreet to close.
Dec. 15-20, 1958	A-AF	Kiev, Vinnitza, L'vou, Baranovichi, Minsk	Militiaman entered traveller's taxi at Minsk, and accompanied them throughout sightseeing trip. At L'vou, denied observation of rail yards. At Baranovichi military troops were used throughout city to deny travellers to proceed. On train, windows intentionally blocked to deny views at defense installations.

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<u>Dates of Travel</u>	<u>Service Participating</u>	<u>Places Visited</u>	<u>Comments</u>
January 2-8, 1959	A	Leningrad, Catchina, Petrodvorets, Zelenogorsk, Paulouak	Trip performed without incident.
January 7-11, 1959	AF-A	Yaroslavl, Kostrama, Ivanovo, Rostov	Surveillance discreet.
January 7 - February 13, 1959	A	Vyaina, Minsk, Warsaw, Brest	Surveillance and obstructions. Tails on several occasions tried to surprise travelers photographing targets, but were not successful.
January 8-10, 1959	N	Leningrad	Surveillance unusually close and in greater strength than usual.
January 14-16, 1959	N	Leningrad	Constant surveillance. Travellers stopped by militia at Zhdanov Shipyard.
January 16-19, 1959	A	Riga	Surveillance was close but not obstructive.
Jan. 24-31, 1959 (See Exhibit D for details of this trip)	N	Odessa, Yeupatoriya, Yalta, Novorossisk, Krasnodar	Surveillance close and constant. Series of events, apparently intended to compromise travelers, of such consistent pattern that they could not be coincidences; an act alleging "hooliganism" drawn up against two travellers in Odessa based upon a poorly manufactured incident.

- 11 -  
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EXHIBIT A

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<u>Dates of Travel</u>	<u>Service Participating</u>	<u>Places Visited</u>	<u>Comments</u>
Jan. 25-29, 1959	AF	Gorkiy, Kirou, Kazan	Travellers denied exploit Gorkiy to city limits. Trip modified to eliminate Kuybyshev by Soviet Foreign Liaison Office.
Jan. 27-29, 1959	N	Leningrad	Surveillance normal.
February 3, 1959	A	Zuenigorod	In Zuenigorod the travellers went to the Monastery Hill but were stopped by the tail car and told it was a closed area and had to turn around.
February 5-8, 1959	A	Leningrad	Trip was made as scheduled. No incidents indicated.
Feb. 16-18, 1959	A-N	Vladimir, Suzdal, Vyazniki	Trip was approved for Vladimir & Suzdal only. Vyazniki was closed for reasons of a temporary nature. Trip to Vladimir and Suzdal made as scheduled.
Feb. 22-25, 1959	A-AF	Pskou	Restricted travellers to the city limits of Pskou. Clumsy attempt was made by an individual en route to examine Zenith Portable Radio and to determine contents of travellers pockets.
Feb. 25-26, 1959	N	Leningrad	Return by air prevented by "unavailability of tickets."
March 3, 1959	AF	Zuenigoird	Surveillance discreet.
March 4-6, 1959	A	Kaluga, Vyazma	Routine surveillance; no incidents.

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<u>Dates of Travel</u>	<u>Service Participating</u>	<u>Places Visited</u>	<u>Comments</u>
March 7-10, 1959	AF	Kharkov, Kiev	Surveillance discreet.
March 9-11, 1959	AF	Kharkov, Dnepropetrovsk	Surveillance constant.
March 9-13, 1959	A	Minsk, Zhitomir, Kiev	Routine surveillance; no incidents.
March 15-18, 1959	AF	Leningrad	Attempts to visit normal tourist attractions on outskirts of Leningrad (Gatchina and Krasnoye Selo) were thwarted by Armed military man at 8 km marker from Leningrad.
March 18-20, 1959	N	Leningrad	Very close surveillance.
March 26-27, 1959	AF	Kalinin	Surveillance discreet.
March 26-28, 1959	AF	Kalinin	Trip requested also to Rzhev which was denied. Surveillance discreet.
March 26-28, 1959	N	Leningrad	Surveillance normal.



TRAVEL WITHIN THE USSR REQUESTED BY U.S. MILITARY ATTACHE  
PERSONNEL BETWEEN APRIL 1, 1958, AND MARCH 31, 1959,  
BUT DENIED BY THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT

<u>Dates of Proposed Travel</u>	<u>Service Requesting</u>	<u>Places To Be Visited</u>	<u>Reasons for Denial</u>
April 1-3, 1958	N.	Kharkov Stalingrad	"Temporarily closed."
April 3-7, 1958	A.	Tbilisi	Temporarily impossible; no reason given.
April 3-9, 1958	A.-N.	Vorkuta Gorki	Temporarily impossible; no reason given. Alternate trip was suggested, but was not acceptable to travelers.
May 11-14, 1958	N.	Leningrad	Not possible for several days.
May 1-19, 1958	N.	Rostov Simferopol Yalta	Boat travel not allowed on ground Soviet Attache in Washington not allowed to travel on Southern Coast, USA.
May 23-27, 1958	N.	Kirov Kazon	Air tickets reported not available.
June 20, 1958	A.-N.	Rybinsk Cherepovets Vytegra Leningrad	Travel by boat to Leningrad denied. Could go by air or rail. Remainder of itinerary not authorized. Trip cancelled because of these restrictions.
June 24-27, 1958	N.	Gorki	Denied at time requested.
July 10-15, 1958	N.	Archangelsk Mezen	Tickets reported unavailable.
July 11, 1958	A.-N.	Yakutsk Tiksi	The only portion of the trip which could be made was by air from Moscow to Yakutsk and return. No reason given for not allowing remainder of trip. Trip cancelled.

<u>Dates of Proposed Travel</u>	<u>Service Requesting</u>	<u>Places To Be Visited</u>	<u>Reasons for Denial</u>
July 12-14, 1958	A.	Uglich Kimry Savyolovo	Travelers were informed that under no circumstances could they buy tickets at the ticket office. They should get them through Burobin or Intourist. There was no time to make the purchase so trip was cancelled.
July 21-August 2, 1958	A.	Kharkov Kiev Zhitomir Vinnitsa Gomel Minsk Pskov Leningrad	Trip could not be registered due to "conditions of a temporary nature." Would not state which portion of the trip would be permitted.
July 23-28, 1958	N.	Odessa Sukhumi Poti	Series of harassments regarding tickets and hotel reservations.
July 27-August 2, 1958	N.	Sukhumi Poti Odessa	Only air trip to Sukhumi and return permitted; remainder denied for "reasons of a temporary nature." Trip cancelled.
July 31-August 5, 1958	A.-N.	Odessa Ismael Yeopatosiya Simferopol	On July 30, the Soviet Foreign Liaison Office called to say that the Odessa-Ismael trip could not be made, because Ismael is "temporarily closed," however, the rest of the trip could be made provided the steamship "Lensovyet" departing Odessa on August 2 (in place of the "Rossiya" departing August 4) was utilized. An immediate telegram for reservations was sent to Odessa; the reply: No tickets. Since the purpose of the trip was to ply the Black Sea, the trip was not made.

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<u>Dates of Proposed Travel</u>	<u>Service Requesting</u>	<u>Places To Be Visited</u>	<u>Reasons for Denial</u>
August 5-7, 1958	N.	Tbilisi	No tickets before August 8. Press announced completion of maneuvers on August 7.
August 5-11, 1958	A.F.	Alma Ata	Denied due planned mode of travel.
August 14-19, 1958	A.-N.	Odessa Kishinev Karul	Trip denied for reasons of a temporary nature.
August, 1958 (No specific date)	N.	Arkhangelsk Dikson Tiksi	Steamship tickets reported sold.
September 20-30, 1958	A.F.	Tashkent Samarkand Bukhara Stalinabad	Denied "reasons of temporary nature."
October 15-22, 1958	A.-A.F.	Dzhankoy Kherson Dnepropetrovsk Khorkov Voronezh Karsk	The Soviet Foreign Liaison Office stated the route requested was temporarily closed but that travelers could make a trip to that general area as follows: Moscow-Simferopol-by rail, Simferopol-Zaporozhye-Dnepropetrovsk-Khorkov-Kurak-Tula-Moscow by auto. Itinerary not accepted and was mildly protested for not being allowed to travel in a supposedly open area.
October 20-22, 1958	A.-A.F.	Kalinin Rzhev Vyazma	Trip denied by automobile but allowed the trip by rail. Trip cancelled.
December 8-13, 1958	A.	Vorkuta	Denied for reasons of a temporary nature.
January 5-11, 1959	A.-N.	Vorkuta	Temporarily closed.

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EXHIBIT B

<u>Dates of Proposed Travel</u>	<u>Service Requesting</u>	<u>Places To Be Visited</u>	<u>Reasons for Denial</u>
January 13-17, 1959	A.F.	Riga Pakou	Trip as planned denied but permitted if itinerary reversed.
January 13-17, 1959	A.	Riga Pskov Bologoe	Soviet Foreign Liaison Office informed that trip was not registered but that the travelers could make the trip "in reverse." This was found impractical and the trip was called off.
January 18-24, 1959	A.-N., A.F.	Vorkuta Salekhard	Area temporarily closed.
January 21-25, 1959	A.F.	Rostov Tazavrog Dnepropetrovsk	Denied. No reason stated.
February 12-13, 1959	A.F.	Starista	Denied. No reason stated.
February 16-18, 1959	N.	Vyazniki Korou	Closed for temporary reasons.
February 16-20, 1959	A.-A.F.	Nougorod Pskov Opochka Vitel'sk Smolensk	The travelers were to go by train and were to confine their activities in Pskov to the city limits. The trip was not made due to the restrictions imposed.
February 19-23, 1959	A.-A.F.	Vyazma Minsk Baranovich Bobruyak	The trip was registered, it must be made by train, and travelers must stay within city limits of town. Trip was not made due to restrictions imposed.
March 3-6, 1959	A.-A.F.	Portaluppi Arkhangelsk Solombala	Reasons of a "temporary nature."
March 4-10, 1959	A.	Vorkuta Salekhard	Soviet Foreign Liaison Office telephoned on the afternoon of March 3, 1959, and informed that the trip was not registered.

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<u>Dates of Proposed Travel</u>	<u>Service Requesting</u>	<u>Places To Be Visited</u>	<u>Reasons for Denial</u>
March 8-16, 1959	N.-A.F.	Stalinabad Samarkand Bukhara Tashkent Alma Ata	"Temporarily closed."
March 13-17, 1959	N.-A.F.	Kazan Ust Kamenogorsk	"Temporarily closed."
March 20-23, 1959	A.F.	Samarkand Bukhara	Reasons of temporary nature.
March 24-27, 1959	A.-A.F.	Arkhangelsk Solombala	"Temporarily closed."
March 24-27, 1959	A.F.	Irkutsk Yakutsk	No reason.
March 26-28, 1959	A.F.	Rzhev	Trip permitted only to Kalinin. No reason for denial to Rzhev.
March 30 - April 7, 1959	N.	Murmansk Arkhangelsk Leningrad	"Reasons of a temporary nature."
March 31 - April 4, 1959	A.-A.F.	Leningrad Odessa	Only that portion of the trip from Moscow-Leningrad approved. Rest cancelled for reasons of a "temporary nature."
March 31 - April 5, 1959	A.	Kiev Riga Pskov	No reason.

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TRAVEL WITHIN THE UNITED STATES  
BY REPRESENTATIVES OF THE OFFICE OF  
SOVIET MILITARY, NAVAL, AND AIR ATTACHES  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

Between April 1, 1958, and March 31, 1959, persons attached to the Office of the Soviet Military, Naval, and Air Attaches, Washington, D. C., engaged in travel outside the metropolitan Washington area on thirty-three occasions. Nineteen of these involved trips to New York City, while four others were trips to Baltimore or Philadelphia. All of these were of one, two, or three days' duration. The remaining ten trips involved extended travel, usually including several states and lasting about two weeks. These were as follows:

1. SERGEI A. EDEMSKI, Assistant Military Attache  
IVAN V. IVANOV, Secretary to Naval Attache  
IVAN I. LESZHOV, Assistant Air Attache  
Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama, Florida  
March 24 - April 5, 1958
2. ALEKSEI F. ANTONOV, Assistant Air Attache  
GRIGORY I. GONCHAROV, Employee, Military Office  
Texas  
April 16 - April 29, 1958
3. FELIKS G. DEDKOV, Adjutant to Military Attache  
VALENTIN N. ELISTRATOV, Assistant Air Attache  
Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina  
May 18 - May 30, 1958
4. IVAN S. PIVKIN, Assistant Military Attache  
ANATOLI G. VASILEV, Employee, Military Office  
Iowa, Kansas, Missouri, Oklahoma,  
Arkansas, Tennessee  
June 9 - June 23, 1958
5. VIKTOR V. FOMIN, Assistant Military Attache  
VASILI E. RYBIN, Employee, Soviet Military Office  
Arizona, Colorado, Utah, Wyoming  
August 6 - August 19, 1958
6. IVAN I. LESZHOV, Assistant Air Attache  
VIKTOR F. LOBANOV, Assistant Military Attache  
Wisconsin, Minnesota, Illinois  
September 7 - September 20, 1958

- 1 -

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EXHIBIT C

7. *FELIKS G. DEDKOV, Adjutant to Military Attache*  
*MIKHAIL N. KOSTYUK, Air Attache*  
*Nebraska, Iowa, Oklahoma, Texas*  
*October 20 - November 1, 1958*
8. *ALEKSEI F. ANTONOV, Assistant Air Attache*  
*GRIGORY I. GONCHAROV, Employee, Military Office*  
*Tennessee, Georgia, Alabama, Mississippi*  
*January 7 - January 17, 1959*
9. *ALEKSEI F. ANTONOV, Assistant Air Attache*  
*DMITRI K. RYAZANTSEV, Assistant Naval Attache*  
*Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama,*  
*Georgia, Florida*  
*February 26 - March 11, 1959*
10. *IVAN V. IVANOV, Secretary to Naval Attache*  
*IVAN I. LESZHOV, Assistant Air Attache*  
*Missouri, Arkansas, Louisiana, Oklahoma*  
*March 18 - March 28, 1959*

*In connection with the travel of Dedkov and Kostyuk as indicated in trip number seven above, permission to enter two counties in Nebraska and two counties in Iowa was denied by the Air Force inasmuch as an Air Force attache in the Soviet Union had been similarly denied permission to visit certain areas there. This is the only instance, during the twelve-month period reviewed, in which a requested Soviet itinerary was altered.*

*A representative trip, wherein an Assistant Air Attache and an employee of the Military Attache traveled in Texas in April, 1958, has been described in detail in the accompanying material.*

- 2 -

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**EXHIBIT C**

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SOVIET VISIT TO TEXAS  
APRIL 16 TO 29, 1958

Lieutenant Colonel Aleksei Fedorovich Antonov, Assistant Soviet Air Attache, Washington, D. C., and Grigory Iosifovich Goncharov, employee, Office of the Soviet Military Attache, Washington, D. C., traveled in Texas in April, 1958. Their route is outlined in the attached map, and the points which they visited and their activities of specific interest are summarized under the following numerical headings, which refer to the points designated by similarly numbered arrows on the map. The shaded areas on the map indicate those areas from which Soviet nationals, with the exception of Soviet employees of the United Nations Secretariat, are barred.

1. Antonov and Goncharov arrived at Houston, Texas, by plane from Washington at 10:20 p.m., April 16, 1958. They immediately rented a 1958 Chevrolet from the Hertz Rent-A-Car Company and drove to a motel, where they registered, correctly identifying themselves, and spent the night. At 5:50 a.m., April 17, they left the motel, drove to downtown Houston, and walked around the downtown area. They visited the Houston Chamber of Commerce and were given several pamphlets concerning Houston, including a map of the city. They were also furnished a pamphlet which contained aerial photographs of downtown Houston, the Houston Medical Center, and the Turning Basin of the Houston Ship Channel.

They next toured the northeastern industrial area of Houston by automobile observing the Dixon Gun Plant, the Southern Pacific Freight Yard, and the Houston Ship Channel Turning Basin. They visited a bookstore and inquired concerning books regarding the Houston area but made no purchase.

2. They arrived at Corpus Christi by airplane from Houston at 5:05 p.m., on April 17, and rented an automobile, correctly identifying themselves. After driving around the city, they spent the night at a motel. On April 18, they toured the Ship Channel and viewed various industrial facilities, driving to the gates of the Naval Air Station and Cabiness Naval Auxiliary Air Station. They also viewed the Sinclair Oil Company Refinery, the Pontiac Refining Company,



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*the Portland Cement Company, the Great Southern Chemical Company, and other smaller industrial plants.*

*They visited the Corpus Christi Chamber of Commerce and secured literature concerning the area, following which they walked in a park near the Bay area and apparently took photographs of each other with a small camera.*

- 3. They arrived at Laredo at 7:00 p.m., April 18, and registered at a motel. On April 19, they visited the Information Bureau of the Texas Highway Department and received a Texas highway map. They purchased Mexican phonograph records and twice drove past the Laredo Air Force Base.*
- 4. They arrived at Hondo, Texas, at 4:15 p.m., April 19, stored their rented automobile, and inquired concerning train and bus transportation to San Antonio.*

*On April 21, after returning from San Antonio, they drove along the west and south sides of Hondo Air Base.*

- 5. They arrived at San Antonio via bus at 8:45 p.m., April 19, purchased a San Antonio map at a newsstand, and registered at a hotel. On April 20, they rented an automobile and drove to the main entrance of Kelly Air Force Base, proceeding to an overpass affording a good view of the southern part of the base. They then drove along two sides of Brooks Air Force Base, afterwards driving through part of Fort Sam Houston.*

*They visited the San Antonio International Airport and purchased newspapers and post cards. They observed the Longhorn Cement Plant and Electric Power Station and spent the night at a motel.*

*On April 21, they visited the Chamber of Commerce and took several pamphlets concerning the area. They next returned their rented automobile, purchased a street guide to San Antonio and three other San Antonio maps. At 1:00 p.m., on April 21, they left San Antonio by bus, returning to Hondo.*

- 6. At Burnet, Texas, they visited the Southern Pacific Railroad Station and the bus ticket office in an*

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*EXHIBIT C*

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*unsuccessful effort to obtain transportation to Austin.*

- 7. The itinerary originally filed by the two Soviets reflected travel from Burnet to Austin and back by train. The Bergstrom Strategic Air Command Base is located at Austin which is an "open" city within closed territory.*
- 8. At Waco, Texas, the Soviets visited the Chamber of Commerce on April 22 and secured a visitor's guide, a map of metropolitan Fort Worth, and a brochure concerning Waco. On the same date, they visited the Air Force Recruiting Office, and Antonov took one copy of the following publications:*

*"Horizons Unlimited - For Women in the Air Force"*

*"The Airman - Official Journal of the Air Force - February 1958"*

*"The Airman - Official Journal of the Air Force - March 1958"*

*They next drove to and completely around the James Connally Air Force Base, using the roads closest to the perimeter fence of the base, some of which are little used, unimproved roads. They then returned to Waco and drove past the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps Building, the Army Reserve Training Center, the Texas National Guard Armory, and the Twelfth Air Force Headquarters. At a newsstand they purchased a Waco City Street Map and various post cards.*

*They stored the car and departed from Waco by train en route to Fort Worth at 3:20 p.m. on April 22, returning at 12:40 p.m. on April 24.*

- 9. They arrived at Fort Worth, Texas, at 5:10 p.m. on April 22, purchased post cards, rented an automobile, and spent the night at a motel.*

*On April 23, they visited the Fort Worth Chamber of Commerce and secured maps. They then drove to the southern edge of the city within one block of the entrance of the Fort Worth Quartermaster Depot. They*

*- 5 -*

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*EXHIBIT C*

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*next drove to an elevated area overlooking Carswell Air Force Base and to Mosque Point which overlooks the Convair Plant.*

*They visited the Fort Worth Public Library, examining a file on Fort Worth industries from which Antonov took notes, while Goncharov read various magazines pertaining to oil, gas, and other industries in Texas.*

*They returned the rented automobile and left Fort Worth by train at 10:10 a.m., April 24, 1958, en route to Waco, Texas.*

- 10. Shortly before entering San Angelo, Texas, they observed Goodfellow Air Force Base from U.S. Highway 87. On April 25, they secured a map of San Angelo and city literature from the Chamber of Commerce, viewed the San Angelo Municipal Airport, and again drove twice past Goodfellow Air Force Base.*
- 11. They arrived at Abilene, Texas, at 12:50 p.m. on April 25 and immediately went to the Abilene Chamber of Commerce where they received a city map and literature concerning the city. They drove around Abilene, and thereafter drove to Dyess Air Force Base, a Strategic Air Command Base, where they drove along a road parallel with the boundary from which runaways and airplanes were visible. They then returned to Abilene, viewing the Abilene Municipal Airport.*
- 12. They arrived at Lubbock, Texas, at 7:48 p.m., on April 25, and secured a free city map from a drugstore and purchased an evening paper. They spent the night in a motel, and on April 26 visited the Chamber of Commerce where they secured literature concerning the Lubbock area. They toured the industrial section of Lubbock and visited the Lubbock Municipal Airport.*

*On the same morning, they drove to the bookstore on the campus of Texas Technological College and secured a "Director of Faculty, Students and Employees" for thirty-five cents.*

*They next drove twice past Reese Air Force Base.*

- 6 -

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*EXHIBIT C*

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13. They arrived at Odessa, Texas, at 3:25 p.m., on April 26, and drove past the General Tire and Rubber Company Plant and the Odessa Styrene and Butadiene Plants. They registered at a hotel where they secured a guide to the Odessa area, which includes photographs and details concerning Odessa and Midland, Texas.

On April 27, they departed from Odessa by train en route to El Paso at 7:16 a.m.

14. They arrived at El Paso at 12:56 p.m., on April 27, and rented an automobile. They drove by the Standard Oil Company and Texas Company Refineries and drove along Scenic Drive, observing Fort Bliss, William Beaumont Army Hospital, and Biggs Air Force Base, a Strategic Air Command Base. They visited Lookout Point from which Antonov used binoculars which are available for general public use.

On April 28, they visited the El Paso Chamber of Commerce and secured copies of the following:

"Maps and Information - El Paso and the Southwest"

"El Paso - Sunshine Playground of the Border"

"Things To Do and See in El Paso and Juarez"

"Points of Interest in Austin 'The Friendly City'"

Carson Motor Trip Maps of Taos

"The Padre Beach and Magic Rio Grande Valley News"

During the late morning and early afternoon of April 28, they toured El Paso driving by the American Smelting and Refining Company, the Southwestern Portland Cement Company, and the El Paso Electric Company Power Plant. They visited the Public Library and Gencharov examined reference cards concerning industrial management, industry, military fireworks, and related subjects. Antonov examined and made notations from a folder or pamphlet,

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*"El Paso pamphlet number two containing a 'Report to the People From the City of El Paso - 1948.'"*

*At 12:55 p.m., on April 29, 1958, they left El Paso via airplane en route to Washington, D. C.*


*It is known that the two Soviets carried at least one camera with a telescopic lens.*

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**INCIDENTS SURROUNDING TRIP WITHIN USSR  
JANUARY 24 to 31, 1959**

*Soviet harassment appears to be applied to the attaches of each military service. The following incident, as reported by Navy, illustrates the manner in which the USSR occasionally goes beyond formal travel restrictions and normal surveillance in its effort to harass and embarrass U. S. Naval representatives in the USSR:*

*The incident occurred on a trip being taken by Lieutenant Colonel Leo J. Dulacki, U. S. Marine Corps, and Lieutenant Commander Oliver S. Hallett, U. S. Navy (both Assistant U. S. Naval Attaches); Commander Donald W. Knox, Royal Canadian Naval Attache; and Lieutenant Commander John Dauenport, United Kingdom Assistant Naval Attache.*

1. *The following itinerary of travel was completed by the groups:*

0050 24 January departed Moscow via rail  
1458 25 January arrived Odessa

1900 26 January departed Odessa via ship Piotr Veliki  
0730 27 January arrived Yeupatoria

0830 27 January departed Yeupatoria via taxi  
1400 27 January arrived Yalta

2400 27 January departed Yalta via ship Piotr Veliki  
1400 28 January arrived Novorosiisk

1000 29 January departed Novorosiisk via taxi  
1400 29 January arrived Krasnodar

1400 31 January departed Krasnodar via air  
1935 31 January arrived Moscow

*It was intended to depart Krasnodar on January 29 via air for Baku. Due to weather conditions, it was impossible to obtain flights to Baku. An attempt to travel to Mineralniye Vodi via taxi, in order to board another flight to Baku, was prohibited by local authorities. After two days delay in Krasnodar, with no immediate hope of the weather improving, the travelers boarded the only flight out of Krasnodar and returned to Moscow.*

2. *The following is a summary of surveillance encountered during the trip and a description of probable but unsuccessful Soviet attempts to create incidents:*

- 1 -  
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**EXHIBIT D**



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a. During the rail journey from Moscow to Odessa, a militia captain and sergeant traveled the entire route in the same car as the group. These two militiamen appeared to go out of their way to avoid any contact whatsoever with the group. On the afternoon of January 24 a passport belonging to a Soviet naval petty officer was found on the floor just outside the open door of the group's compartment. This passport was found just after three Soviet travelers stopped at the compartment and for a few moments observed a cribbage game which was in progress in the compartment. The passport contained previous duty stations, leave records, and a personal history of the petty officer. The passport was returned to the train conductor. The conductor was later asked if she had located the owner of the passport, to which she replied that it belonged to a "sailor in the next compartment traveling in civilian clothes."

COMMENT: The presence of the militiamen (who are usually present when an "akt" (indictment) is in the making) and a naval passport "lost" outside the compartment of four naval attaches, would appear to be more than just a coincidence. Similarly, it is extremely doubtful that a Soviet sailor would be traveling in civilian attire. It is quite probable that it was assumed that the passport would be retained by the group, thus giving the militiamen cause for search and an eventual "akt."

b. Surveillance in Odessa was close and continuous along the bluff overlooking the waterfront. Two "vigilant citizens" accused Commander Knox, who was then in the company of Lieutenant Commander Davenport, of covert and illegal photography with "a camera hidden under his coat." One of the citizens insisted on Knox's opening his coat and searched his person. Knox was not carrying a concealed camera. The incident was brought to a close when a well-dressed lady joined the group and verified the fact that photographs were not being taken and "what is more it was perfectly permissible" to photograph from this area. The three citizens were left arguing amongst themselves.

c. During the boat trip from Odessa to Yeupatoria and from Yalta to Novorosiisk, travelers were continually surveilled, while on deck, by three civilians. Use of binoculars caused one of the surveillers to summon a militiaman who instructed the travelers that binoculars could not be used on the ship. The same militiaman very openly pointed out the travelers to three new civilian surveillers who were waiting on the dock at Novorosiisk.

- 2 -

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EXHIBIT D

d. Travelers disembarked from the ship *Piotr Veliki* at Yeupatoria and traveled to Yalta via taxi in order to meet the same ship again, due to the fact that the ship schedule called for a stop in between these two cities at Sevastopol, a closed city. The captain of the ship informed the travelers that the ship would not stop at Sevastopol; the manager of the dining room insisted that Sevastopol was not a closed city and strongly urged the travelers to remain on the ship rather than take the taxi drive.

COMMENT: The ship did actually anchor in the stream at Sevastopol. It is possible that an effort was being made to induce the travelers to remain on the ship and thus accuse them of entering a "closed city."

e. During the taxi trip from Yeupatoria to Yalta, travelers were closely followed by a car containing six surveillers; on the taxi trip from Novorosiisk to Krasnodar, travelers were followed by a car containing four surveillers.

f. When checking into the hotel at Yalta, the travelers were preceded at the registration desk by a Soviet Army Air Force captain. Observing the travelers, he stepped aside and allowed the travelers to move up to the counter. A stack of approximately five letters were openly lying on the counter. The captain's attention was directed to the letters. He sheepishly stated that they did not belong to him.

COMMENT: Recalling the recent "watch your pockets" incident, it is possible that the letters were conveniently left in an exposed position hoping that the group would take the letters.

g. During the boat trip, the cabin maid seemed to be overly concerned for the welfare of the travelers, making frequent trips into the group's cabins and always attempting to engage the travelers in long conversations. Approximately three hours out of Novorosiisk, she came to the cabin in which Lieutenant Colonel Dulacki was alone at the time. This cabin was just off the "first class lobby." She again began a long conversation inquiring about the trip. Lieutenant Colonel Dulacki was standing in the doorway of the cabin, the maid was standing sideways half facing outward from the cabin door. A Soviet girl, about 25 years of age, was standing immediately next to the doorway with an elderly lady, the manager of the ship's lounge; both were facing outwards. A flash indicated that a photograph was taken; the two ladies at the side of the door immediately disappeared. When Dulacki asked the photographer why he

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had taken this photograph, the man stated that he was only taking a picture of his wife who was standing on the stairway. The discussion was dropped since the usual group of inquisitive Soviet citizens immediately gathered around.

COMMENT: The direction of the camera, the fact that the photographer was not seen to take any pictures later on the ship, the fact that the two ladies standing alongside the cabin left immediately after the photo was taken and the fact that the cabin maid suddenly did not seem to show any concern whatsoever for the comfort of the travelers, is an indication that an effort was being made to obtain a "compromising" photograph.

h. In Novorossiisk surveillance was not apparent, but a shore patrol directed the two United Kingdom travelers to "keep moving" when walking along the waterfront. In the hotel, the employees were overheard referring to the group as "those four spies."

i. Surveillance in Krasnodar was not apparent - it was not necessary since the travelers spent almost all of their time at the airport attempting to catch a flight to Baku. After picking up the group at the hotel for the taxi drive to Mineralniye Vodi, which trip was approved over the telephone by the taxi company dispatcher, the driver stated that he first had to check with his office. With the taxi parked on an unbelievably muddy intersection, the driver left the group in the taxi and walked two blocks down to his "office." He returned to inform the group that the trip was disapproved due to "fog and ice."

j. An elderly Soviet citizen approached Lieutenant Commander Davenport in front of the hotel in Krasnodar and attempted to hand him several sheets of paper, stating that he could not read and requested that Davenport read the papers for him. Davenport refused.

COMMENT: The gentleman appeared to be genuine, but if he were not, an embarrassing situation could have materialized.

3. The following is a summary of the incident which occurred in the Odessa Hotel on January 25-26:

a. At approximately 1345 the Intourist manager came to Lieutenant Commander Davenport's room and invited him to come to the hotel director's office to discuss an incident which occurred

- 4 -

SECRET

EXHIBIT D

SECRET

in the hotel dining room on the previous evening. Davenport and Lieutenant Colonel Dulacki accompanied the Intourist manager to the office. In the room were seated a militia lieutenant, the hotel manager, the restaurant manager, a waiter, waitress, and a janitor. The group was later joined by the head waitress of the restaurant. The Intourist manager assisted, when necessary, as an interpreter.

b. The militiaman stated that during the previous evening a table knife was thrown to the floor in the hotel restaurant and the group was gathered to investigate this "violation of the law." In addition, several persons remained in the dining room beyond the closing hour and someone invited the waitress to a "reception the following day in rooms 12a and 14a." Since it was known that Dulacki and Davenport were in the restaurant during the course of the evening, they were invited for questioning. Both the waiter and waitress emphatically stated that neither Dulacki nor Davenport were the persons involved. The militiaman then requested that Commander Knox and Lieutenant Commander Hallett be invited to come to the hotel director's office.

c. Upon their arrival, the waiter and waitress identified Knox and Hallett as the two persons involved, stating that both were in the restaurant after closing time, Knox threw the knife and Hallett invited the waitress to a "reception" on the following day. After the "inquisition group" was certain that Hallett and Knox were the two persons involved, the travelers informed the militiaman that Hallett and Davenport had actually departed the restaurant prior to Dulacki and Knox and that the latter two were the last of the group to depart. At this time, the head waitress was called in for assistance in identification. She came in wearing a coat and the militiaman stated she was late in arriving since it was necessary for her to be brought in from her home. Actually, as pointed out in sub-paragraph f., this head waitress had but a short while previously delivered a kettle of hot water to room 14a. She confirmed the identifications.

d. A discussion then ensued for approximately one hour in regards to: who threw a knife; whether or not the signal for the closing of the restaurant was given on time; the fact that several Soviet citizens were in the restaurant at approximately the same time, one of whom was sitting at the table with Knox and Dulacki; and the time of departure of the Soviet citizens. The main issue at point seemed to be the fact that a knife was thrown and efforts were being made to prove that Knox threw it. Twice the

- 5 -  
SECRET

EXHIBIT D

SECRET

militiaman stated to Dulacki that it was apparent that he had not thrown the knife and asked him to agree that Knox threw it.

e. The militiaman telephoned his chief and stated that the two persons involved were identified but that there was some confusion as to the time, the person who threw the knife, and the presence of the Soviets in the restaurant at the same time. In addition, the schedule approved by the Foreign Liaison Section in Moscow called for the travelers to depart Odessa by ship that evening. The militiaman then hung up and indicated that his instructions were to write up an "akt." He requested Davenport and Hallett to leave the room since they were not involved. Davenport insisted upon remaining. The militiaman again phoned his chief after which he stated that he was told to order Davenport to leave the room. Davenport's insistence to the contrary was to no avail.

f. The militiaman then proceeded to question all of the Soviet "witnesses." The same story was repeated. The waitress stated that she was originally mistaken in the identity of Dulacki but was not certain of it because he was wearing a gray suit on the previous evening (not only was Dulacki wearing a brown suit on the previous evening - he did not have a gray suit with him on the trip). During previous discussions concerning the time, an attempt was made to set the time about 0130; because of the different stories of the witnesses the time settled for was "after 0100." The witnesses stated that although they did not see a knife thrown, one was thrown and that they believed Knox threw the knife. None of the witnesses denied the fact that Dulacki and Knox left as soon as they paid their bill when the signal for the closing of the restaurant was given by the switching of the lights on and off. The waitress, in answer to a question, stated that all four persons were very well behaved; quietly had dinner; she enjoyed serving the group; they engaged her in conversation throughout the meal and that a Soviet citizen sat at the table with them at about closing time. Nevertheless, she stated that at sometime in the conversation she was invited to "rooms 12a and 14a for a reception on the following day." Otherwise she would not have remembered the two room numbers. She did not know in which of the two rooms Dulacki lived. (Prior to the commencement of the proceedings that afternoon, this same waitress had come to one of the rooms purportedly for the purpose of bringing a glass to the room; the head waitress had come to the other room with a pot of hot water for coffee. These unusual trips were undoubtedly made for the purposes of identification. The fact that Dulacki was in

- 6 -  
SECRET

EXHIBIT D

SECRET

neither room at these times and the other three persons were moving between the two rooms, complicated the identification.) The Intourist manager, who seemed to be disgusted with the entire proceedings, admitted with a laugh that it was most unlikely that this waitress would be invited to a room by anyone of this group. (She appeared to be about 45 years of age, weighed some 160 pounds, and had her share of the usual Russian gold teeth.) His comments were to no avail. The militiaman stated that if it was necessary, the Soviet citizens who were in the dining room would be located later to find out when they left the room and whether or not they were guilty of violation of any laws.

g. The militiaman then proceeded to write up the "akt." Dulacki and Knox, insisting that they were completely innocent and the entire affair was an utter fabrication, stated that they would not remain while the "akt" was being drawn up. The militiaman permitted them to leave but stated that when the "akt" was written they would have to return and then decide whether or not they wanted to sign. About thirty-five minutes later, Dulacki and Knox were again called to the hotel director's office. The militiaman read the "akt" in the presence of all of the "witnesses."

h. The "akt," in brief, stated:

"(1) Dulacki and Knox were in the hotel restaurant on the evening of January 25.

"(2) Dulacki invited the waitress to a 'reception (priyom) in rooms 12a and 14a after 1:00 a.m.'; this was an insult to the waitress and a violation of the law.

"(3) Dulacki and Knox remained in the dining room after closing time; this was a violation of the law.

"(4) While Dulacki and Knox were in the restaurant, someone threw a knife.

"(5) All of these are acts of hooliganism. When faced with the facts, Dulacki and Knox stated that they did not consider these acts hooliganism."

i. Dulacki and Knox pointed out that the word hooliganism was not mentioned in the previous discussions, that the wording implied that they admitted committing the acts and

SECRET

and did not consider them "hooliganism." The Intourist manager interjected to agree. The militiaman said that this was unimportant and that the objection could be taken care of by his insertion of the phrase "and they do not admit to these facts."

j. Dulacki and Knox, before indicating whether or not they would sign the "akt," requested that the following be added to it:

That the waitress and waiter first stated that Dulacki was not involved; that the waitress stated that Dulacki was wearing a gray suit whereas he did not have a gray suit in his possession; that the waitress stated that Dulacki and Knox were extremely well behaved, and that she enjoyed her conversations with them; that an unknown Soviet citizen sat at the table with Dulacki and Knox at about closing time; that three Soviet citizens were at another table nearby during the so-called incident; and that no request was necessary for Dulacki and Knox to leave the restaurant - they voluntarily departed the restaurant as soon as they paid their bill.

k. The militiaman stated that these facts were not now important since he took all of them into consideration in arriving at his conclusions. Dulacki and Knox stated that they would under no circumstances sign the "akt" since they were innocent of all the charges. The militiaman then requested all of the Soviet witnesses to sign the "akt." They all signed a blank sheet of paper. The director of the hotel shook his head and appeared to renege at signing but was directed to do so by the militiaman.

l. The proceedings were completed at 1615. During the day unsuccessful attempts were made to obtain boat tickets previously reserved. At 1620, a telephone call was made to the travelers' room informing them that they could now pick up their boat tickets and depart Odessa that evening.

4. Lieutenant Colonel Dulacki and Commander Knox emphatically stated that neither threw a knife or any other item on the floor while in the restaurant; neither invited the waitress to their rooms or even vaguely suggested so; both were completely circumspect and correct in their actions in the restaurant; both left the restaurant together after one o'clock after paying their dinner bill.

5. Commander Knox is of the opinion that an effort was being made on this trip to compromise him because of pending "persona

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*non grata" action against a Soviet military attache accredited to Ottawa. The fact that the passport was dropped to the floor while Commander Knox was "standing the corridor watch," that he was accused of photography by a "vigilant citizen," and that the main effort in the initial proceedings appeared to be to prove that Commander Knox had thrown a knife to the floor, all would tend to confirm this opinion. Failing in these attempts, it was undoubtedly decided to come up with any sort of an "akt" in an effort to discredit as many of the group as possible.*

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*EXHIBIT D*