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The Situation in Cambodia, January 1974

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THE SITUATION IN CAMBODIA JANUARY 1974

INTRODUCTION

1. This report is the seventh in a series of quarterly reports prepared at the request of the Vietnam Special Studies Group. Its purpose is to review military, political, and economic developments in Cambodia during the fourth quarter of 1973.

2. Care has been taken in the selection and processing of the data used in this report, but even the most authoritative information from Cambodia frequently is unreliable. For example, military statistics covering FANK strength, casualties, and other factors are based on largely unconfirmed field reports. Likewise, the significance of economic data is clouded by uncertainty over the methods used by the Cambodians to calculate their statistics.

3. Because of the method of disseminating field reports, some of the military data for December were not received in time to be included in this report.

DISCUSSION

The Military Situation

Developments

4. Combat activity during the fourth quarter of 1973 started at a high level but decreased sharply in November as the Khmer Communists (KC) disengaged to prepare for their dry season campaign, which started slowly in December. Communist pressure was concentrated on Phnom Penh -- their principal objective -- and the main lines of communication (LOCs) leading into the capital. KC initiatives elsewhere in the country were aimed both at tying down FANK units in outlying areas -- to prevent reinforcement of the capital -- and securing part of the 1973/74 rice harvest. Illustrative of the intensity of KC activity, the number of combat incidents

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
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continued the upward trend which started early in the year and reached the highest level of the war in September (see Figure 1). Activity in the capital area also reached a new high in September (see Table 3, in the Appendix), and about 60% of all combat occurred within 5 kilometers (km) of major LOCs.

Figure 1

CAMBODIA: Combat Incidents

Data from OSD/DDPAE Khmer computer file.

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5. Early in the quarter, KC pressure in the Phnom Penh area was concentrated against the isolated garrison at Vihear Suor, east of the capital. FANK relief operations were generally unsuccessful, and on 30 November the garrison fell. This facilitated KC access to the east bank of the Mekong and allowed them to move a small number of rockets and artillery pieces into positions opposite the capital. As a result, indirect fire attacks became an almost daily occurrence in late December and early January. The range from which the attacks were being mounted -- at least 10 km -- and the FANK response to this threat limited the military, but not the psychological, impact of this shelling.

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6. To the south of the capital, KC units pulled back to rest and refit, leaving a two-division FANK force in firm control of defenses south of the Prek Thnot River and along Route 1. The situation remained stable until late January, when KC attacks forced FANK north of the Prek Thnot and KC artillery shelled Phnom Penh from a distance of about 10 km for several days.

7. Northwest of the capital, the KC mounted a major threat in December with the objective of destroying FANK's 7th Division and bringing Pochentong Airport and the petroleum storage facility at Prek Phnou under fire. Although the 7th Division was under heavy pressure, the defense line generally held, and only limited harassment of the airport has been achieved to date.

8. KC initiatives against Phnom Penh's vital LOCs met with mixed success. The KC undertook no major efforts against the most crucial LOC -- the Mekong. Only 10 of 35 northbound and southbound convoys were attacked during the quarter (compared with 17 of 39 in the third quarter), and no major damage was caused. (Mekong convoys and the status of Cambodia's three principal highways -- Routes 1, 4, and 5 -- during 1973 are shown in Figure 2.)

9. The KC, however, maintained the interdictions of Route 1, which was closed throughout the year, and Route 5, which has been closed since early September. A previous interdiction on Route 5 in Kompong Chhnang Province was expanded, and in October and December the KC accomplished interdictions less than 15 km from Phnom Penh. The success of this effort allowed the KC to assign responsibility for the more distant interdiction effort to local force elements, freeing a number of main force units for deployment closer to Phnom Penh.

10. Through October and early November, the KC achieved only intermittent interdiction of Route 4, and eight supply convoys reached Phnom Penh. However, with the commitment of a multi-regimental force in mid-November -- most of which later deployed to the Phnom Penh area -- the KC managed to close and hold sections of the road through the end of the year. A cautious FANK attempt to reopen the road with a reinforced division finally succeeded in early January, but the highway was quickly interdicted again.

11. Action elsewhere in the country was generally light. However, two large FANK outposts at Srang and Tram Khnar (about 40 km southwest of Phnom Penh) fell to the KC in the first week of November, with a substantial loss of men and materiel. Later in the month, the KC increased the pressure against the provincial capitals of Takeo and Kampot.

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Neither city appeared to be in imminent danger of collapse at the end of the year, however. The KC also initiated scattered "rice grab" operations in Battambang and Pursat Provinces, but because of the poor state of readiness of the KC units involved, they accomplished little.

Disposition of Forces

12. Countrywide, FANK has an estimated combat strength of 110,000 to 130,000 men, compared with a KC combat strength estimated at 50,000 to 60,000. (Comparative combat strengths, by military region, are shown in Figure 3.)

13. The largest concentration of combat forces currently is in the Phnom Penh area. By gathering forces from many areas of the country, the KC have increased their manpower commitment to the capital area to the highest level of the war. About 12,000 to 15,000 KC are targeted against the city's defenses -- roughly equivalent to the force committed last summer -- with a total of 20,000 to 26,000 KC within 25 km of Phnom Penh. In opposition, FANK has a combat force of 27,000 to 29,000 in and around the city, but they are nearly all committed, leaving little reserve for dispatch to trouble spots.

14. In the rest of the country, FANK holds a more decided manpower edge, but the KC retain the initiative and could easily achieve localized manpower parity or superiority. With both sides heavily committed in the Phnom Penh area, the KC probably are unable to redeploy sufficient units quickly to alter radically the situation in the countryside. However, some important changes in the status quo could occur as the result of the gradual erosion of FANK defenses around towns such as Takeo.

Status of the Government of the Khmer Republic

Military

Manpower


15. There were a few bright spots in FANK's manpower picture in the fourth quarter, but a substantial shortfall in recruitment left many units still understrength. At the end of the year, the Army conscription/recruitment drive, which began on 10 October, had garnered slightly more than 13,000 new troops, well below the target of 25,000. An additional 3,000 personnel enlisted in the Navy and Air Force, probably hoping to avoid the more distasteful and dangerous Army service. As a result of the influx of new troops, FANK's training capacity was strained during the period, but it nonetheless produced more than 15,000 trained

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Status of Government Supply Routes, 1973


Figure 2



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Figure 3

FANK and Khmer Communist Combat Strength, by FANK Military Region thousands



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personnel, compared with 9,500 during the previous quarter. Partially offsetting these accessions, however, were FANK losses (killed, wounded, missing, and deserted), which totaled almost 4,000 for the quarter. FANK's total trained strength at the end of the year was about 150,000, roughly 75% of total strength, which was estimated to be about 205,000 as of 1 December (see Table 1).

Table 1

**Estimated FANK Strength
as of 1 December 1973¹**

	<u>Number of Personnel</u>
Total	205,000
General Staff/Ministry of Defense	24,400
Army	159,900
Deployed in-country	159,200
MR I	7,800
MR II	36,400
MR III	25,700
MR IV	20,000
MR V	0
MR VI	16,400
MR VIII	4,100
Special Military Region	48,800
Out-of-country training	700
Thailand	600
Other	100
Navy (including Marines)	13,200
Air Force	7,500

1. Data are from the CIA FANK Computer File.

inflated by as much as 10%.


The estimate may still be

Army

16. Cambodian Army operations in the fourth quarter remained defensive and reactive. As shown by the disposition of FANK battalions (see Figure 4), most of FANK's combat strength remains concentrated around Phnom Penh and provincial capitals or along major lines of communication, thus giving the KC control over wide expanses of the countryside. In fact, the FANK effort to maintain control in the countryside dropped precipitously as units were pulled back to defend threatened urban areas. Both the absolute level of Army presence in the countryside and the level relative to earlier periods (both expressed in battalion-days of

Disposition of FANK Battalions, 1 December 1973

Figure 4



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presence) are at the lowest points on record (see Table 4, in the Appendix). Recognizing the need to increase its capabilities in the countryside (as well as around the cities), FANK has reversed an earlier program of reforming battalions into company-size units (primarily used to guard fixed positions) and has begun to reconstitute battalions from the manpower in those companies.

17. As has been true throughout the war, the great majority of Army units still rely on fixed, defensive positions -- frequently ill-prepared -- and rarely conduct extensive patrols or shift deployments to meet changed situations. This lack of mobility was particularly apparent throughout 1972-73, and in November 1973 the index of FANK mobility (expressed as the percent of FANK battalions moving more than 20 km per month -- see Table 5, in the Appendix) fell to the third lowest level on record.

Air Force

18. In contrast, Cambodian Air Force capabilities expanded and improved during the fourth quarter. The Air Force for the first time showed an ability to sustain heavy, well-coordinated support of ground operations with the launching of Operation Thunderstrike in late October. The eight-day operation, designed to provide direct support to units holding Phnom Penh's southern perimeter, apparently was effective in discouraging KC initiatives. During the operation the Air Force launched about 60 strike sorties per day, well above the average of 45 per day for the quarter. (Monthly strike figures are shown in Table 6, in the Appendix, and the locations of air strikes for the quarter in Figure 5.) Three subsequent Thunderstrike operations in November and early December were more limited in scope and less successful.

19. The 19 November bombing of the Presidential Palace by a disaffected Air Force pilot, however, has led to the placing of severe limitations on the ordnance carried by T-28 strike formations. Flight leaders are prohibited from carrying bombs and are required to monitor the activities of the others in the flight during strikes, thus reducing the impact of Air Force attacks on KC units. It is unclear when or if these restrictions will be lifted.

Navy

20. Improved leadership and morale continue to characterize naval operations. During the quarter, the Navy continued its resupply of Kompong Cham, initiated a series of resupply convoys to four other isolated cities, and provided effective support for Mekong convoys. In addition, the Navy provided vital transport and fire support for ground operations on the east bank of the Mekong near Phnom Penh and for an unsuccessful attempt to recapture the seacoast town of Kep.

Figure 5



21. The most significant aspect of naval operations, however, has been the formation and deployment of additional Marine battalions. With a total complement of more than 3,500 men, and further expansion under way, the Marine battalions have provided badly needed support along the Mekong and, in part, can be credited with the failure of the KC, to date, to mount a serious threat against Mekong convoys. Deployed in numerous small positions along the riverbank (other Marine units are stationed along the seacoast and near Kompong Chhnang), the Marines have patrolled aggressively and, with naval fire support readily available, have acquitted themselves well in engagements with the KC.

Auto Defense

22. Another bright spot on the government side has been the expansion of the Auto Defense Program. At the end of October, Auto Defense strength was more than 65,000, an increase of 8,000 since August. Despite the lack of support or recognition from central authorities, an additional 2,500 troops have been enrolled in two autonomous provincial programs.

23. Auto Defense performance has been uneven and the units are no match for regular KC forces, but they have proved a valuable adjunct to the Army. In areas around Phnom Penh, for example, Auto Defense personnel occupy exposed forward positions, and at the Port of Kompong Som they are an integral part of the overall defense plan. In Siem Reap Province, task forces composed of Auto Defense and Army personnel have occasionally undertaken limited offensives against relatively weak KC units.

24. The most important role played by Auto Defense forces, however, has been protection of the rice crop in Battambang Province. With a strength of more than 10,000, Auto Defense forces have been given primary responsibility for security in rice-growing areas. Dispersed in small units and conducting sweeps in conjunction with Army units, Auto Defense forces have had at least limited success against the weak KC units in the area, and they now are the principal target of KC propaganda broadcasts.

25. In Battambang, as in most areas, the major shortcoming of the Auto Defense Program is the Army's inability to provide adequate backup. Battambang, for example, has only one Army battalion available for intervention, and one isolated 100-man Auto Defense force has to rely on a force of only 30 Army troops 11 km away for support.

Political

26. The long-anticipated resignation of Prime Minister In Tam and the subsequent formation of a new government headed by Long Boret,

In Tam's former foreign minister, highlighted political developments in Phnom Penh during the past few months. In Tam stepped down on 7 December and Long Boret assumed office within three weeks. Boret, however, did not take In Tam's seat on the ruling High Political Council -- which now consists of Lon Nol, Sirik Matak, and Cheng Heng. The new 16-man cabinet is smaller than its predecessor and appears to be relatively well qualified to tackle the country's increasingly severe economic problems. Moreover, Boret's recognized political skills should help him to move toward these objectives, as should his solid standing with President Lon Nol, who has claimed that he will give Boret considerable authority.

27. Internationally, the UN General Assembly voted on 5 December to defer action on an Algerian resolution to seat representatives of Sihanouk's "government" until next fall, thereby assuring government representation in the UN for at least another year. Despite the slim three-vote margin, the postponement represented an important victory for Phnom Penh and its supporters. The Sihanouk challenge was endorsed by the Algiers non-aligned conference in September and had the backing of China and a substantial number of the non-aligned states at the UN. Later in the session Phnom Penh also survived a parliamentary maneuver by Sihanouk's supporters to challenge the government's credentials.

28. Meanwhile, no discernible movement on either side occurred toward a cease-fire and a negotiated settlement of the Cambodian conflict. The newly installed government quickly affirmed its desire for peace and reissued the peace proposal of 6 July calling for an immediate cease-fire and talks. Sihanouk and the KC again quickly rejected the proposal and reiterated their opposition to negotiations with the government on anything short of its total capitulation. A poorly conceived and ill-timed peace plan proposed by former prime minister and would-be "third force" leader Sonn Sann in early January drew heavy criticism from both sides.

Economic


29. The most significant economic problems with which the government had to deal toward the end of 1973 were tight supplies of key commodity stocks and accelerated price increases that pointed toward an annual inflation on the order of 275% to 300%. Because the preponderant role in commodity production and supply belongs to the private sector, the effectiveness of particular government policies is necessarily limited. Notwithstanding this fact, the government -- with ample US assistance -- performed reasonably well in preventing runaway inflation, meeting key commodity requirements, and providing some support for the heavy flow of refugees.

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30. Considering the hyperinflation with which it must deal, the government showed remarkable restraint in fiscal and monetary policies during the last quarter of 1973. Despite pressures to grant additional salary increases as an offset to continued sharp price increases, expenditures did not increase above earlier projections. Nevertheless, efforts to reduce expenditures have been difficult because the military situation remains precarious and military expenditures continue to take up some 60% of all public spending. Thus the 1973 budget may be in deficit by as much as 16 billion riels, 60% more than originally planned. The rate of growth of the money supply was remarkably modest in the last quarter and for the year. Between the end of 1972 and October it increased by only 32% and was up only an estimated 40% during the year (see Figure 6).

CAMBODIA: Indexes of Money Supply and Prices

Figure 6



*Excluding cash in the bank and small sums on the current account of the general treasury.

**As reported by the Cambodian National Institute of Statistics.

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31. The final quarter also saw a continuation of fairly effective efforts to keep import demand within Cambodia's limited foreign exchange availabilities. Total foreign exchange sales were just under the \$36 million allocated for the Exchange Support Fund (ESF). Import demand was quite heavy during most of October, threatening exhaustion of ESF funds before the end of the year. The reimposition of advance import deposits, equal to 300% of the amount of exchange requested, helped reduce import demand considerably for the rest of the quarter.¹

1. Reimposition of advance import deposits, while reducing import demand, also reduced the flow of goods into the country, thereby adding to inflationary pressures.


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32. Exchange rate policy was also used more aggressively during the final quarter. In particular, during the period of heavy import demand in October, the riel was devalued twice from 250 riels per dollar to 302 riels per dollar (see Figure 7).² Earlier, the value of the riel had not been changed during February-August, despite strong demand for foreign exchange and a black market rate some 75% greater than the official rate.

**CAMBODIA: Weekly Foreign Exchange Sales by the Banque Nationale
Du Cambodge and Effective Exchange Rate**

Figure 7



33. Delivery and distribution of US-supplied goods were relatively effective, as attested by the 25% decrease in the free market price of rice in late December and resultant slowdown in the rise of the consumer price index. Prices of non-rice foods, however, did not show a comparable decline, but here it should be noted that the government has little control over the flow or distribution of most such items, which reach Phnom Penh from outlying domestic areas.

34. Despite some progress in framing counterinflationary policies, the government has done little toward developing a comprehensive approach to income distribution problems. With the large numbers of people arriving

2. An additional 20% devaluation -- to 377 riels per dollar -- was announced in early January 1974, indicating continuing awareness of the importance of maintaining some purchasing-power alignment.

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daily in a capital city that already has an army of unemployed, the prospects for civil disorder have become progressively stronger. The average refugee, lacking skills or training, has been forced to accept employment that provides him barely enough for survival. Available statistics indicate that in the past three years minimum real wages have fallen by 20%, and working classes have been forced to increase the share of incomes spent on foodstuffs. Government wage increases have several times been awarded to civilian and military personnel, but increases for non-government workers have probably not been equivalent. In contrast, the incomes of middle- and upper-echelon workers probably kept pace with the cost of living, while some businessmen were able to take advantage of commodity shortages and a glutted labor market. Although upgrading of the military personnel system has reduced the formerly high level of "phantom" troops, many military officers still reap some benefit from manipulating payrolls.

35. As the year ended, and with prodding from US advisers, the Prime Minister announced a new program to counter economic disruption caused by the war. Although few details are available, the program is known to include cost-of-living allowances for civilian and military employees, improved rice distribution, increased agricultural output, refugee relief, limitations on the budget, and tax reforms. Given the present military environment, the need to maintain heavy defense spending, and constraints on domestic resources as well as foreign assistance, it is highly unlikely that such a program can do more than bring about a modest slowdown in the recent rate of inflation.

Critical Stocks


Military Equipment

36. During the fourth quarter, a major effort was undertaken to increase FANK's supply availability through the delivery of MAP-funded weapons, ammunition, and equipment. More than 30,000 M-16 rifles and substantial numbers of crew-served weapons and artillery were delivered, as well as more than 700 trucks and nearly 80 armored vehicles. (For data on the delivery of selected items, see Table 7, in the Appendix.)

37. Although FANK ammunition consumption rose during the quarter, to the highest level of the war in early January, enough ammunition was delivered to increase FANK stocks by about 50%. (For a comparison of ammunition deliveries, consumption, and stocks, see Figure 8). At the end of the year, FANK had a 42-day supply of small arms ammunition and enough mortar and artillery rounds and bombs to last between 23 and 30 days. The only ammunition type in short supply was aircraft rockets, with only a 10-day supply on hand. The current goal is to have a 30-day stock of all ammunition types.

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Figure 8

FANK Air and Ground Ammunition Status

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Petroleum

38. Petroleum stocks threatened to diminish seriously during the quarter as a result of the Arab oil cutback, but, by the end of the period, at least 30 days' stocks were on hand for most civilian product categories, and about 60 days' supply for military categories (see Table 2).

Table 2**Stocks of Petroleum Products in Phnom Penh**

	Days of Supply			
	29 Sep	13 Oct	13 Nov	20 Dec
Gasoline	15	16	13 (58) ¹	22 (58)
Kerosene	24	21	2	6
Automotive diesel	12	8	12 (34)	28 (61)
Industrial diesel	41	28	29	46
Fuel oil	22	16	23	19
Jet fuel	49	62	56 (70)	42 (56)
Aviation gasoline	85	59	68 (55)	101 (54)

1. Data in parentheses are military stocks for a comparable period.

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Government discussions with Cambodia's three suppliers -- Shell, Caltex, and Summit -- led to a reversal of announced delivery cutbacks, which could have created a year-end shortage of numerous oil products. Shell and Caltex, suppliers of about 70% of petroleum imports in 1973, agreed to continue petroleum deliveries at significantly higher prices through May 1974, when current contracts expire. Summit, on the other hand, defaulted on its scheduled deliveries for the first half of 1974 because of a shortage of supplies.

39. In view of the uncertain supply situation, the government instituted several measures to conserve existing stocks. On 23 November, gas rationing went into effect for all vehicles except those used by the government and public transportation. Two weeks later, prices of all oil products were increased sharply. A National Petroleum Institute was set up to monitor fuel procurement and consumption, and the military was ordered to reduce consumption by 15%.

Rice

40. The extremely tight rice situation that prevailed in Phnom Penh during late summer continued into the fall. However, deliveries of US PL-480 rice from South Vietnam by the end of October eased the situation and prevented government stocks from slipping to dangerously low levels, such as had prompted the severe riots of September 1972. Later deliveries of Thai rice and PL-480 rice from South Korea helped the city support reasonable consumption rates, until the arrival of large PL-480 shipments from the United States in December.

41. Efforts to bolster rice stocks to a minimum of 45 days by the end of the year were successful, despite some disruptions in delivery schedules. By the end of the year, government supplies in Phnom Penh were sufficient for about three weeks' consumption, with an additional three weeks' supply waiting to be moved from Kompong Som to the capital.

Status of the Khmer/Vietnamese Communists

Military

42. Developments late in the fourth quarter greatly eased the logistic problems that hampered KC operations earlier in the year. Command and control shortcomings and recruiting difficulties, however, are still restricting KC capabilities and have adversely affected their early 1974 dry season operations. While the KC have been able more easily to mass forces around Phnom Penh from all parts of the country, they apparently still have not developed the capability to coordinate multi-regimental formations on several fronts, as demonstrated by their inability so far to launch simultaneous attacks on all sides of Phnom Penh.

43. Manpower also remains a cause of concern for the KC. Although they have largely replaced the heavy casualties suffered last summer (the government claims to have killed an additional 800 in the fourth quarter), the KC have been hit with widespread illness and have had to resort to forced conscription in some areas, thus decreasing the effectiveness and reliability of many of their units. In Kratie Province, for example, the KC have had great difficulty in recruiting troops, primarily because of the large numbers of ethnic Chams in the province. To overcome this problem the KC began to forcibly induct Cham youths into the military in October.

44. Currently, the Vietnamese presence in Cambodia consists primarily of administrative services troops -- about 20,000 -- most of whom are supporting operations in southern South Vietnam. During the past two years, the Vietnamese have substantially reduced their combat strength in Cambodia, and we now estimate that only a few thousand combat troops remain (including some personnel maintaining liaison with KC units). Although none of these are thought to be engaged in combat against FANK, occasional clashes between the Vietnamese and the KC in border areas are still being reported.

45. In the southern provinces of Kampot and Takeo, for example, the two sides continue to engage in scattered skirmishes. Both sides have chosen to ignore the agreement reached last August that provided for a formal delineation of zones of administrative control in the two provinces. Instead, each has tried to expand its control over territory, population, and economic resources controlled by the other. Local KC units have staged small-scale harassing attacks against Vietnamese units in an effort to push them across the border into South Vietnam, and Vietnamese troops have been instructed to enlarge their areas of control and have been ambushing KC troops. Despite these actions, casualties have been relatively light, and recently there have been tentative indications that KC and Vietnamese Communist officials have again been seeking to reach an accommodation in this area.

Political

46. Sihanouk's fragile relations with the KC took another turn in early November, when the Prince announced that all portfolios of his Peking-based Royal Government of National Union (RGNU) -- with the exception of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs -- would be transferred to KC leaders in Cambodia. The move was made in part to remove the "exile" stigma from the RGNU. All that apparently remains of Sihanouk's Peking operation is a small "mission" to receive foreign diplomats and dignitaries.

47. Sihanouk's failure to attend farewell functions in Peking in November for Ieng Sary and his public cancellation of plans for a visit

to the "liberated zone" in 1974 made it clear that considerable ill will remains between the Prince and the KC leadership. Despite Communist efforts late in the year to smooth over their differences with Sihanouk, he has continued to annoy them by taking a pessimistic public line on the KC's chances for achieving a quick military victory in Cambodia.

Administrative Control

48. The past quarter was characterized by continued attempts by the KC to maintain strict control over the population. Recent information indicates that the KC have created covert "leagues" to oversee more closely the activities of particular segments of the population. In Svay Rieng Province, for example, at least four such leagues currently exist -- the Farmers' League, Youth League, Children's League, and Workers' League. Reportedly created in January 1973, they are administered at the district level and below directly by Khmer Communist Party members. Mass associations, such as the Farmers' and Patriotic Youth Associations, are organizationally subordinate to the various leagues and serve as the overt vehicles through which high-level KC policy is implemented. Although leagues have been reported only in Svay Rieng and Pursat, they probably exist in other parts of Cambodia as well.

49. Discrimination against particular segments of the population also persisted. In Kampot, for example, the KC have waged a campaign against Chinese merchants and farmers to prevent them from selling supplies to the North Vietnamese. In Kratie, Kompong Cham, and several other provinces, the KC have imposed a harsh rule on the ethnic Chams, including such measures as prohibiting or sabotaging religious ceremonies, forcing families to contribute to the KC organization, and communizing all property. In the case of the Chams, however, a number of villagers have organized armed resistance and, in at least one area, are seeking FANK's aid. Support by the local population for these anti-KC operations reportedly is running at a high level.

APPENDIX

STATISTICAL TABLES

Table 3

Combat Incidents within 20 Kilometers of Phnom Penh¹

1971²	38
1972²	
1st qtr	34
2nd qtr	48
3rd qtr	24
4th qtr	31
1973	
Jan	36
Feb	61
Mar	77
Apr	125
May	139
Jun	186
Jul	182
Aug	98
Sep	213
Oct	154
Nov	82

1. Data are from the OSD/DDPAE Khmer Computer File.

2. Monthly average.

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Table 4
FANK: Battalion-Days in the Countryside¹

	Index (December 1970 = 100)	Percent of Total Battalion-Days
1971²	139	49
1972²		
1st qtr	127	49
2nd qtr	115	44
3rd qtr	115	42
4th qtr	123	41
1973		
Jan	125	41
Feb	113	41
Mar	130	42
Apr	122	45
May	129	46
Jun	117	43
Jul	121	43
Aug	111	41
Sep	103	38
Oct	94	38
Nov	81	33

1. Data are from the CIA FANK Computer File.

2. Monthly average.

Table 5
Percent of FANK Battalions
Moving More than 20 Kilometers per Month¹

1971²	21
1972²	
1st qtr	12
2nd qtr	15
3rd qtr	16
4th qtr	15
1973	
Jan	15
Feb	8
Mar	7
Apr	22
May	14
Jun	17
Jul	13
Aug	16
Sep	17
Oct	15
Nov	10

-
1. Data are from the CIA FANK Computer File.
 2. Monthly average.

Table 6**Tactical Strike Sorties in Cambodia¹**

1971²	2,741
1972²	
1st qtr	1,902
2nd qtr	1,150
3rd qtr	1,336
4th qtr	948
1973	
Jan	1,378
Feb	773
Mar	4,024
Apr	5,010
May	5,719
Jun	6,002
Jul	6,744
Aug	4,124
Sep	1,326
Oct	1,327
Nov	1,187
Dec	1,806

1. Including Vietnamese Air Force sorties through January 1973 and US sorties through 15 August 1973.

2. Monthly average.

Table 7**MAP-Funded Deliveries to FANK, Fourth Quarter 1973
(Selected Items)**

M-16 rifles	30,586
Machineguns	569
Recoilless rifles	32
Mortars	284
105-mm howitzers	30
155-mm howitzers	12
Trucks	744
Armored vehicles	79
Naval craft	2

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