

MAR 16 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

FROM:

[REDACTED]
Deputy to the DCI for Collection Tasking

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SUBJECT:

SR-71 Reconnaissance Overflight of Cuba

1. This memorandum discusses factors affecting SR-71 reconnaissance overflight of Cuba. It follows up a request by David Aaron at an SCC working group meeting on 14 March that a study be prepared on the question of what would be needed to resume aircraft reconnaissance flights over Cuba. The question was brought up in the context of making it more "expensive" for the Cubans to maintain their presence in Ethiopia.

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2. The last SR-71 mission over Cuba was flown on 11 January 1977. The overflight program [REDACTED] itself, was terminated at the direction of the President following a 24 February 1977 Special Coordination Committee review. A brief summary of the previous overflight program is attached (Tab A).

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3. From an operational standpoint there are no major problems with the resumption of either a special SR-71 flight or a series of flights. The SR-71 can perform an overflight of Cuba from its home base, Beale AFB, California. Tankers are needed to support such missions. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
of such missions is offset because minimum SR-71 flight activity and tanker support must be maintained from Beale for training even in the absence of operational missions. The DoD performs a current vulnerability analysis in connection with all such missions to determine whether there have been any changes in the Cuban Air Defense posture which could affect SR-71 operations. The designation of specific collection objectives for such missions are developed through COMIREX.

DIA, JCS and USAF review(s) completed.

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NGA Review Completed.

[REDACTED]
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4. SR-71 overflight of Cuba is not required at this time for intelligence purposes. While periodic SR-71 flights would contribute additional intelligence, the bulk of the intelligence requirements on Cuba which depend on overhead imagery will continue to be satisfied by the [redacted] Tab B is a summary of our current all-source collection capability relating to Cuban involvement in Africa.

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5. Overflight of Cuba by U-2 and SR-71 aircraft in the past was a source of continuing political irritation to Cuba. The SR-71 missions in 1974-1977 were flown primarily for political purposes and to maintain a continuing reconnaissance presence over the island in case special needs arose. Resumption of SR-71 flights at this time should be recognized as possibly having a higher political reaction potential than the individual flights previously, which were a direct continuation of past practices:

8. Recommendation: It is recommended that if the SCC determines that an SR-71 overflight be considered for political reasons:

- The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, should be tasked to prepare a formal proposal for such missions through normal procedures.
- The State Department should be tasked to prepare a special political evaluation which would include an NFAC intelligence appraisal of estimated Cuban reaction.

The JCS proposal and State evaluation should be processed to the SCC for action and Presidential decision, if a positive recommendation is made by the SCC.

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Attachments:

Tab A - Brief Summary Overflight Program

Tab B - Summary of Cuban Activity in Africa

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DCI/IC/OPEI/CT/[REDACTED] (16 March 1978) [REDACTED]

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US Aircraft Reconnaissance Over Cuba

US overflight to Cuba was instituted in October 1960, with CIA U-2 aircraft. The requirements related to Cuban military activity on the Island and Soviet assistance. In October 1962, at the time of the Cuban missile crisis U-2 overflight operations were transferred to the Strategic Air Command. Following the crisis U-2 overflights continued at varying levels of intensity from several missions daily during the missile crisis to one mission during any three to four months period in mid-1974. In 1974 Dr. Kissinger approved use of the SR-71 as the vehicle for reconnaissance over Cuba in place of the U-2. The SR-71 missions were flown primarily for political purposes and to maintain a continuing reconnaissance presence over the Island in case special needs arose. SR-71 flights were set initially

[redacted]
days. A total of 16 SR-71 missions were flown between September 1974 and January 1977. (A typical track is attached.)

During the period 1960-1974, overflights were justified primarily on intelligence requirements for overhead imagery and, to a lesser extent, the political requirement to maintain an overflight "presence" over Cuba. By the early 1970's [redacted] imagery satellite systems were beginning to satisfy the bulk of the intelligence requirements. Also at this time, there was increasing concern over the possibility of the loss of a U-2 over Cuba and a Air Force desire to substitute the SR-71 for the U-2 on Cuban overflight missions. All of these factors bore on the substitution of the SR-71 for the U-2 in 1974. The continued success of the

[redacted]
to early consideration by the incoming administration in January 1977 of the justification for continued US reconnaissance overflight of Cuba.

Assessments at that time concluded there was no longer any need for overflight of Cuba in response to national intelligence requirements. This assessment pointed out that overflights did, however, serve several purposes: a constant reminder of US concern over Cuban activities; and, the maintenance of an overflight program which could be increased when needed without introducing an entirely new irritant to the Cubans. The new administration, at that point, terminated the program.

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PHOTO

TRACK NUMBER — SAMPLE
AIRCRAFT TYPE — SR-71
TAKE OFF BASE — BEALE AFB
LANDING BASE — BEALE AFB
MISSION ASSMT. — 6Z3

NATIONAL TASKING

SAMPLE SR-71 TRACK FROM
PREVIOUS OVERFLIGHT PROGRAM

CUBA

NAS Guantanamo Bay

JAMAICA

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SUMMARY ASSESSMENT OF COLLECTION CAPABILITY: ACTIVITY


IN CUBA Related TO CUBAN INVOLVEMENT IN AFRICA

Intentions of GOC to alter
posture/current policies

Transfer of military forces
to/from Africa

Impact of Cuba's African
involvement within Cuba


Soviet compensatory support
to Cuba



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Excellent
Good
Fair
Poor
Not Applicable

Discipline specific assessments obtained from
cognizant collection organizations. All-source
composite assessments obtained from cognizant
National Foreign Assessment Center analyst.




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Attachment B

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NPIC/R-1129/63

March 1963

PHOTOGRAPHIC INTERPRETATION REPORT

SOVIET MILITARY PERSONNEL IN CUBA



ARMY



NAVY




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W A R N I N G

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PHOTOGRAPHIC INTERPRETATION REPORT

SOVIET MILITARY PERSONNEL IN CUBA

NPIC/R-1129/63

March 1963

NATIONAL PHOTOGRAPHIC INTERPRETATION CENTER

INTRODUCTION

Soviet troops in Cuba are stationed at various military installations, including military camps, airfields, SA-2 SAM sites, and cruise-missile sites. The purpose of this report is to determine from aerial photography the peak Soviet troop strength at four armored military camps -- Artemisa, Holguin, Remedios, and Santiago de las Vegas -- and five other confirmed or suspect Soviet military camps -- Camaguey, Mayari Arriba, Pinar del Rio, Playa Baracoa, and Torrens (Figure 1).

As of [] a total of 10,946 Soviet personnel were estimated to be present at the above nine military camps. Of this total, 4,924 were found at the four armored camps, with the remaining 6,022 personnel* at the other five camps (Table 1). This estimate is based on a detailed analysis of both high- and low-level aerial photography.

*The majority of the estimated 3,238 personnel billeted at Torrens are believed to be Soviet; however, the percentage of non-Soviet personnel cannot be determined.

Determination of troop strength was based primarily on the extent of billeting facilities observed. Soviet facilities can be identified by

[] (Figure 2). In several camps, permanent barracks are being constructed to replace the tents, indicating a degree of permanency at these installations. Estimated troop capacity of the tents and barracks is based on an allocation of 40 square feet of floor space per man. Low-level photography aided greatly in determining tents and structures not used for billeting purposes.

A detailed study was also made of Soviet equipment present at the camps to determine if military units of specific size could be identified (Table 2). At each of the four armored camps, a medium tank battalion and an assault gun company were identified by the type and number of tanks and self-propelled guns observed. Support and other equipment and weapons identified at these camps do not correspond to the established TO & E of known units, how-




FIGURE 1. LOCATION OF SOVIET MILITARY CAMPS IN CUBA.

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
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ever. Therefore, troop strength could not be determined on this basis. No determination of the size of military units could be established at the other five camps.

Other methods of determining troop strength from aerial photography were also explored, in-



No consistent correlation factors could be determined.

A detailed list of all weapons and equipment observed in [redacted] at each of the nine military camps follows. (Small quantities of equipment and some billeting facilities may not have been observed because of dense foliage, protective canvas coverings, or camouflage.)

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ARTEMISA MILITARY CAMP

Artemisa Military Camp is located 3.3 nautical miles (nm) northwest of Artemisa at 22-50-54N 82-48-30W (UTM 17QLR144278 on AMS Series E 723, Sheet 3684 IV). The camp consists of a billeting area, a motor park, a secured FROG (free-rocket-over-ground) park,

a 57 mm antiaircraft artillery battery, a 14.5 mm antiaircraft artillery battery, and a permanent barracks area under construction (Figure 3).

The following is a complete list of weapons and equipment identified at the camp:

- 30 T-54 tanks
- 9 SU-100 self-propelled guns
- 8 SNAPPER antitank (at) rocket launchers
- 2 FROG rocket launchers
- 6 57mm antiaircraft artillery guns
- 9 14.5mm antiaircraft artillery guns
- 4 57mm antitank guns
- 3 120mm mortars
- 51 eight-wheeled APCs
- 2 BRDM APCs
- 5 FROG missile transporters
- 8 motorcycles with sidecars

- 94 cargo trucks
- 10 utility trucks
- 1 van
- 5 truck-mounted treadway bridges
- 1 AT-T prime mover with dozer blade
- 1 T-54 tank chassis with mounted crane
- 1 motorized grader
- 1 rotary trench digger on AT-T
- 1 FIRE CAN radar
- 12 field kitchens
- 2 tank transporters
- 1 wheeled backhoe

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FIGURE 3. ARTEMISA MILITARY CAMP

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HOLGUIN MILITARY CAMP

Holguin Military Camp is located 1.6 nm east-northeast of Holguin at 20-53-48N 76-14-00W (UTM 18QUU718111 on AMS Series E 723, Sheet 4978 I). The camp consists of a billeting area, a motor park, a secured storage

area, a 57 mm antiaircraft artillery battery, a 30 mm antiaircraft artillery battery, and numerous scattered personnel trenches (Figure 4).

The following is a complete list of weapons and equipment identified at the camp:

- 31 T-54 tanks
- 3 PT-76 tanks
- 9 SU-100 self-propelled guns
- 1 BTR-50p APC
- 5 57mm antitank guns
- 7 120mm mortars
- 9 twin-30mm Czech antiaircraft artillery guns
- 6 57mm antiaircraft artillery guns
- 1 FIRE CAN radar
- 1 height rangefinder
- 5 generators
- 1 AT-T tracked prime mover
- 2 AT-S tracked prime movers

- 8 AT-L tracked prime movers
- 3 tank retrievers
- 269 cargo trucks
- 18 utility trucks
- 4 vans
- 16 POL trucks
- 14 cargo trailers
- 5 truck-mounted treadway bridges
- 1 AT-L with dozer blade
- 1 rotary trench digger on AT-T
- 12 field kitchens
- 13 motorcycles with sidecars



FIGURE 4. HOLGUIN MILITARY CAMP

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REMEDIOS MILITARY CAMP

Remedios Military Camp is located 3.7 nm southwest of Remedios at 22-27-12N 79-34-57W (UTM 17QPQ459835 on AMS Series E 723, Sheet 4283 II). The camp consists of a billeting area, a motor park with a double-fenced parking

area, a secured POL storage area, a secured storage area, a 57 mm antiaircraft battery, and 12 barracks under construction (Figure 5).

The following is a complete list of weapons and equipment identified at the camp:

- | | |
|-------------------------------------|-----------------------------------|
| 32 T-54 tanks | 9 AT-L tracked prime movers |
| 9 SU-100 self-propelled guns | 6 tank retrievers |
| 9 SNAPPER AT rocket launchers | 202 cargo trucks |
| 2 FROG rocket launchers | 26 utility trucks |
| 8 field artillery pieces | 7 POL trucks |
| 6 120mm mortars | 26 vans |
| 6 57mm antiaircraft artillery guns | 17 cargo trailers |
| 8 light antiaircraft artillery guns | 5 truck-mounted treadway bridges |
| 2 FIRE CAN radars | 2 T-54 chassis with mounted crane |
| 1 height rangefinder | 1 motorized grader |
| 1 generator | 1 rotary trench digger on AT-T |
| 4 eight-wheeled APCs | 3 unidentified vehicles |
| 7 BRDM APCs | 12 field kitchens |
| 8 FROG missile transporters | 17 motorcycles with sidecars |
| 1 AT-S tracked prime mover | |




FIGURE 5. REMEDIOS MILITARY CAMP

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SANTIAGO DE LAS VEGAS MILITARY CAMP

Santiago de las Vegas Military Camp is located 2.8 nm east of Santiago de las Vegas at 22-58-00N 82-20-25W (UTM 17QLR626403 on AMS Series E 723, Sheet 3784 IV). The camp, located in a heavily wooded area, consists of a billeting area, a motor park, a 57 mm anti-

aircraft artillery battery, and a 14.5 mm anti-aircraft artillery battery. Infantry, armor, and probable elite badges and other minor insignia were observed at the camp (Figure 6).

The following is a complete list of weapons and equipment identified at the camp:

- 32 T-54 tanks
- 9 SU-100 self-propelled guns
- 3 57mm antitank guns
- 9 ZPU-4 antiaircraft artillery guns
- 6 57mm antiaircraft artillery guns
- 1 FIRE CAN radar
- 1 height rangefinder
- 5 BRDM APCs

- 4 FROG missile transporters
- 8 missile transporters
- 8 AT-S tracked prime movers
- 43 cargo trucks
- 11 utility trucks
- 34 unidentified wheeled vehicles
- 3 unidentified tracked vehicles
- 4 field kitchens



FIGURE 6. SANTIAGO DE LAS VEGAS MILITARY CAMP

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CAMAGUEY MILITARY CAMP

Camaguey Military Camp is located 4 nm southeast of Camaguey at 21-21-11N 77-51-24W (UTM 18QTU037637 on AMS Series E 723, Sheet 4680 III). The camp consists of a

billeting area, a motor park, and electronics areas (Figure 7).

The following is a complete list of weapons and equipment identified at the camp:

- 24 cargo trucks
- 18 utility trucks
- 7 POL trucks
- 32 vans
- 14 electronics vans
- 14 unidentified vehicles/pieces of equipment

- 2 TOKEN-type radars
- 1 ROCK CAKE/STONE CAKE radar
- 1 probable SPOON REST radar
- 1 probable FLAT FACE radar
- 1 microwave tower




FIGURE 7. CAMAGUEY MILITARY CAMP

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MAYARI ARRIBA MILITARY CAMP

Mayari Arriba Military Camp is located 2.6 nm north-northeast of Mayari Arriba at 20-27-14N 75-31-12W (UTM 18QVT457616 on AMS Series 15 723, Sheet 5077 II). The camp consists of a billeting area, a motor park, an

open storage area, and an area containing probable storage revetments (Figure 8).

The following is a complete list of weapons and equipment identified at the camp:

- 2 37mm antiaircraft artillery guns
- 51 cargo trucks
- 3 utility trucks
- 23 vans
- 13 unidentified vehicles/pieces of equipment
- 3 missile transporters
- 1 unidentified transporter
- 7 MAZ-529 B prime movers
- 3 S-80-type tractors
- 2 wireline service trucks

- 2 wheeled backhoes
- 1 AT-T with dozer blade
- 5 truck-mounted cranes
- 3 generators
- 44 crates (cruise-missile type)
- 4 POL tanks (horizontal)
- 10 (approximately) concrete arches
- 15 (approximately) concrete slabs
- 10 revetments (probable storage)




FIGURE 8. MAYARI ARRIBA MILITARY CAMP

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PINAR DEL RIO MILITARY CAMP

Pinar del Rio Military Camp is located 1.5 nm southwest of Pinar del Rio at 22-23-56N 83-42-48W (UTM 17QKQ206794 on AMS Series E 723, Sheet 3483 II). The camp consists of a billeting area located in and around an orchard, and a motor park to the north (Figure 9).

The following is a complete list of weapons and equipment identified at the camp:

- 34 cargo trucks
- 3 utility trucks
- 4 vans
- 37 unidentified vehicles, pieces of equipment
- 1 radio tower (R-400)




FIGURE 9. PINAR DEL RIO MILITARY CAMP

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PLAYA BARACOA MILITARY CAMP

Playa Baracoa Military Camp is located 1.4 nm south of Playa Baracoa at 23-01-40N 82-34-31W (UTM 17QLR386474 on AMS Series E 723, Sheet 3685 II). The camp, located at

Playa Baracoa Airfield, is associated with the assembly and maintenance of HOUND (MI-4) and HARE (MI-1) helicopters at the airfield. It consists of a billeting area, an assembly and




FIGURE 10. PLAYA BARACOA MILITARY CAMP

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maintenance area, a POL storage area, and three 3-gun 37 mm antiaircraft artillery batteries. Seventeen tents differing in size and shape from the typical Soviet tents (Figure 2) are located in the assembly and maintenance

area and probably billet Cuban personnel being trained at the airfield (Figure 10).

The following is a complete list of weapons and equipment identified at the camp:

9 37mm antiaircraft artillery guns
16 cargo trucks
3 utility trucks
30 POL trucks
6 electronics vans (net-covered)
47 HOUND (MI-4) helicopters

9 HARE (MI-1) helicopters
108 helicopter shipping crates
60 unidentified vehicles/pieces of equipment
1 motorized grader
36 POL tanks (horizontal)
numerous POL drums

TORRENS MILITARY CAMP

Torrens Military Camp is located 4.4 nm west-northwest of Santiago de las Vegas at 22-59-36N 82-28-00W (UTM 17QLR496434 on AMS Series E 723, Sheet 3784 IV). The camp consists of four billeting areas -- one of which formerly was a reformatory -- three motor parks, an electronics area, and a 57 mm anti-

aircraft artillery battery (Figure 11). The majority of the estimated 3,238 personnel billeted at Torrens are believed to be Soviet; however, the percentage of non-Soviet personnel cannot be determined.

The following is a complete list of weapons and equipment identified at the camp:

6 57mm antiaircraft artillery guns
3 SPONGE CAKE radars
2 height-finding radars
10 generators
4 AT-L tracked prime movers
16 AT-S tracked prime movers
151 cargo trucks
21 utility trucks
10 POL trucks
160 vans

2 van work-shop trucks
33 cargo trailers (two-axle)
7 van trailers (two-axle)
17 trailers (two-axle)
8 trailers (single-axle)
1 ADA shower
1 motorized grader
17 field kitchens
181 unidentified vehicles/pieces of equipment
numerous reels of wire

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FIGURE 11. TORRENS MILITARY CAMP

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REQUIREMENTS

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