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CIRCA FEB 1956

**MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director (Plans)**

**SUBJECT: Comments re Draft Letter, OSD to DD/P**  
**SEATO Committee to Combat Communist Subversion (CCCS)**

1. The following comments on the attached draft letter are for your guidance, in the event that Mr. Godel contacts you prior to formal despatch of the letter.

2. Re paragraph 1:

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a. [ ] dated 16 February 1956, states "Personal report of senior military delegate seen and concurred in by adm stump has following para: 'The clash of military and civilian interests within the U. S. delegation which marred the manila meeting was conspicuously absent. The U. S. delegation worked amicably and in complete harmony. The senior U.S. delegate did nothing without consulting me. All messages sent from the meet were sent with my knowledge and concurrence. I feel that [ ] turned in an able performance as senior delegate. His attitude and cooperation were superior.'"

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b. [ ] dated 24 January 1956, from [ ], states: "3. Two Senior Observers (Godel and Layton) never observed and [ ] did not meet. Third Observer (Smith) attended one morning. Sent substitute by same name next day who attended morning session. He requested briefing on 21 January, [ ] complied."

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- 2 -

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c. There have been indications that [ ] was somewhat unhappy with the lack of positive programs advanced by the U. S. Among the reasons for this were the delays caused by the rather extended period of discussion resulting from the Manila meetings last September, and uncertainty as to the UK intentions in pushing their training program. [ ] of the [ ] has attended the Karachi meeting, with instructions to brief [ ] fully on the events in Washington during the past few months, and to bring back with him [ ] suggestions for the future.

3. Re paragraph 2 a and 2c:

a. Some criticism is justified. The fault lies in the failure of the Manila meetings to set up adequate machinery for preparation and review of papers in adequate time prior to the Manila meetings, and in the rather cautious and slow handling of all SEATO matters in Washington because of the internal discussion and the uncertainty as to the future of the CCCS.

b. Remedial steps were taken at the January meeting to prevent this weakness in the future. Each paper called for by the May Agenda was assigned to a specific country for the production of an initial draft. These drafts are to be circulated to the other countries for review and comment at least one month prior to the meeting.

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c. The U. S. has primary responsibility for developing a paper on: "Consideration of a programme of debriefing by member nations of their nationals leaving Communist areas including the exchange of information through agreed channels." Primary responsibility rests with Mr. Yeager of State, with [ ] designated to assist. CIA has requested [ ] to attempt to have the first draft ready by 15 March, so that all U. S. Agencies will have ample opportunity to comment.

**SECRET**

- 3 -

d. In addition to the agenda item for which the U. S. has primary responsibility, it was felt prudent to prepare a coordinated U. S. position on all other agenda items with particular attention being paid to that item concerning changes in the frame of reference of the CCCS. To this end, a consolidated CIA position on all agenda items is in preparation. The deadline for completion is 15 March. This early date will allow CIA to stimulate the Interdepartmental Committee to firm up a coordinated U. S. position well prior to the May meeting of the CCCS committee. We can expect that Defense is going through some such similar internal process which will be all to the good. Any possible disputes may then be settled amicably here in Washington.

4. Re paragraph 2b.

a. You are aware of the considerable effort made to gain the support of other nations, particularly the UK, for an expanded Center. I believe that the decision to settle for the small starting group, with provision for expansion was a proper one, and that further efforts would have served only to provide excuses for further delay.

b. The DOD representatives on the Interdepartmental Committee concurred in the decision.

c. We do not agree that prior arrangements with other Asian nations would have been effective.

5. Re paragraph 3.

a. DOD "heartily endorsed" their version of the DCI letter.

b. CIA concurred with State and Defense in the concept of the permanent working group at the Council Rep level, stating at the time that doing so would necessarily put the DCI proposal at least temporarily in abeyance. (See Memo for the Record, dated 17 January 1956.)

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- 4 -

(Note: During your absence, General Cabell queried as to the status of a reply to the DOD letter of 27 December 1955, signed by Godel. I would like to discuss this with you.)

6. Re paragraph 4a. See paragraph 3 above.

7. Re paragraph 4b.

a. CIA has furnished state with a bibliography of suitable material for purchase and a listing of publications for subscription.

b. Mr. Spaeth contacted various U. S. installations in the FE during his survey trip, and made arrangements for flow of suitable material to the Center.

c. CIA and State have held informal talks with a possible nominee for the position of Director or Deputy Director [redacted] Defense is knowledgeable.

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8. Re paragraph 4c. Concur.

[redacted]

10. Re paragraph 5. I would like to discuss the nature of our reply, if any, with you.

11. Re paragraph 6. A meeting of the Interdepartmental Committee is planned for shortly after return of various members from the Karschi meeting.

12. Summary.

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a. The letter is not unduly critical of CIA, unless implied criticism of [redacted] of the CCCS can be read into it.

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- 5 -

b. The letter appears to accept leaving the CCCS as is, a highly technical group [redacted]

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[redacted]  
This should help to remove previous sources of friction.

c. The letter calls for increased efforts, including those in the field of counter-subversion in the broad sense, in areas of responsibility other than the CCCS. This should be acceptable providing such efforts do not enter our area of responsibility without our participation.

SIGNED

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**FP NOTICES**

(Weekly Report - 25 January 1956)

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The Guerrilla Warfare Conference held at Fort Bragg, N.C. from 9-13 January 1956 was attended by approximately 100 officers and civilian personnel, including representatives from JCS, OCPW, Department of Army, Department of Navy, USAF, the Special Forces, all the Theaters, and CIA. [redacted] made the presentation for CIA on the role of the Agency in support of Special Forces. This talk and subsequent panel discussions and seminars, served to answer many questions in the minds of the officers attending as to CIA capability and responsibility. Considerable progress was made on the revision of drafts of concept and delineation of responsibility papers. Specific problems raised at the Conference are being studied internally for solution. All CIA reps agree that the Conference was highly successful in establishing a better understanding and relationship between the Agency and the Military.

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The Committee for Countering Communist Subversion of SEATO met in Bangkok from 17-19 January 1956. The U. S. representation was headed by [redacted] CINCPAC and the JCS sent military representatives to act as advisors to [redacted] All guidance for the meeting was carefully and fully coordinated in Washington and transmitted to the field through State channels. Reports, thus far, indicate that the U. S. representatives presented a unified position on all matters. The Ad Hoc Committee report recommending the establishment of a Research & Analysis Center was approved by the full Committee with recommendation for speedy implementation.

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