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## Clandestine Communist Organization

## Part One

## The Communist Party Underground

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S E C R E TGENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

The international Communist movement has not merely survived, but has actually flourished, in the face of difficulties which have ruined political forces with less constancy of purpose and with less practical a technique. It has maintained itself as the "vanguard of the proletariat" through Tsarist and totalitarian suppression, armed intervention, two world wars, and a decade of general "bourgeois" prosperity. In large measure, Communist successes can be explained by the organizational adaptability of the Communist Party and its mastery over a mass of practical techniques. The Party knows what it must do and how to go about doing it, in any given circumstance. This competence was responsible in the first place for the success of the Bolshevik Revolution, and since then, for the endurance of the Party as a continuing threat to all "bourgeois" states. Whatever the political climate, the Party goes on, working openly and legally where it can, secretly and illegally where it must. It is this latter capability for "conspiratorial" work which largely accounts for the survival and success of the international Communist movement in the face of adverse conditions.

The scope of the "conspiratorial" activities of the Communist Party encompasses defensive and offensive purposes. As an organization of professional and practical revolutionaries bent upon the eventual achievement of revolution, the Communist Party is enveloped by an atmosphere of hostility. Realizing this, the international movement has naturally developed a system of defensive measures designed to protect the Party against the police, intelligence agencies, hostile groups and the hostile public, and has been normally organized so as to keep knowledge of the most significant aspects of Party activity restricted to a minimum of individuals. For similar reasons, the Party has made it a general practise to conceal as thoroughly as possible the mechanics of the political controls through which it extends its influence beyond Party confines. The Communist Party is generally designed

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and able to operate under any conditions of opposition, hostility and outright suppression. It is capable of going totally underground when outlawed, and it is sufficiently security-conscious, even under normal conditions, to conceal many of its "normal" activities. The "conspiratorial" practices of Communist Parties operating in hostile societies are largely defensive in nature. They are designed to preserve political and organizational gains made by the Party, rather than to advance the Party's aims further.

The defensive side of the Party's conspiratorial behavior can be extensively illustrated by its organizational and operational methods when proscribed. Part One of this study deals extensively with this subject -- the general patterns of underground organization are presented there, supplemented by descriptive analyses of the actual underground experience of several Communist Parties.

Defensive measures are normally adopted also by Parties which function more or less openly and legally. "Legal" Parties give their program a maximum publication and expose a great number of functionaries as well as parts of their organization to the public eye. However, even when admitted to the political scene, the Party usually acknowledges the hostility of the society it lives in, and attempts to submerge, automatically and by virtue of its organizational principles, the more significant areas of Party work.

Every Communist Party is a centralized and centrally-directed mechanism controlled by a comparatively small group of professional, paid and full-time functionaries -- the cadre. Within this cadre-hierarchy the functionaries at national headquarters occupy the central position and have a monopoly on policy-making and organizational direction. Accustomed to strict semi-military discipline, the lower Party cadre and the rank and file are mere instruments of the Party center. By virtue of its leadership function the Party center normally

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guards the professional secrets of the Party, not unlike the management of a business enterprise. The Party center, then, puts the stamp of secrecy on such matters as Party finances, particularly on the origin of funds not derived from normal sources; intra-Party communications of more than normal administrative significance; relations with other fraternal Parties exceeding the normal interchange of Party literature and other routine communications and relations with the Communist Party of the Soviet Union or representatives of the Soviet Government and the Cominform, which are likely to compromise the Party. Experience has further shown that Soviet intelligence agencies frequently channel their recruitment of Party members through individual functionaries in national Party headquarters -- operations which require secure and secret handling. Thus, even under normal conditions, highly significant aspects of Party work are managed by a small nucleus of trusted functionaries and are tightly sealed off from the rest of the Party and the outside world.

Further, Communist Parties generally maintain intra-Party police organs, frequently identical with the Cadre Department and the Control Commission. These agencies are organizational corollaries of the cadre principle. As the Party is built upon its cadre, it is essential for the center not only to train, protect and properly assign the professional personnel, but also to preserve constant ideological and security control. Thus, most Parties maintain a confidential corps of Party "detectives" who must often perform counter-espionage duties such as the identification of police agents infiltrated into the ranks of the Party, and "illegal" support functions such as the procurement of false papers and passports for the cadre. Clearly, the existence of such a Party police force must be concealed, not only for security reasons, but also for ideological reasons. The Party is supposed to be run according to the principle of "democratic centralism", and the centralism exercised through

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police control methods may be distasteful to the rank-and-file.

On the level of "normal" Party operations, secrecy is also unavoidable. Considering the smallest operative Party unit, the individual Party member, it is a well-known fact that many Communists operate without ostensible connection with the Party. This apparent lack of connection may be aimed at personal protection or at safeguarding a particular, often secret, mission. In any case, the secret Party member shows up in almost every Party -- one need only recall the case of the Indonesian Socialist leader and government official, Sjarifoeddin, who, at the time of the Moeso putsch in 1948 admitted that he had been a secret member of the Communist Party of Indonesia since 1935.

The Party, however, needs not only secret Party members -- it is bent upon the manipulation of non-Communist groups and organizations in order to establish "mass support" as a prerequisite for revolutionary action. The approaches to this organizational problem obviously vary from Party to Party, and the extent of secrecy with which they are handled is determined by the political climate prevailing in the particular country. In general, however, the Party will attempt to surround itself with a solar system of front organizations in order to attract accessible groups, and will further direct its fractions into non-Communist mass organizations -- for example, labor unions and political movements in colonial countries -- in order to expand Party control. In all these cases, it will be a problem of concealing Party control over fronts and fractions, a problem which becomes increasingly difficult to solve as the manipulative techniques of the Party are exposed in public.

Clearly, however, as a revolutionary organization, the Party cannot confine itself to defensive tactics alone. No matter what its status, whether legal or proscribed, the Party must at least plan such activities as will weaken the coercive power mechanism of the "capitalist" state, as well as hostile groups and political parties, in concrete operational, rather than in general

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political, terms. No matter what its tactical shifts, the Party can never neglect its fundamentally military-revolutionary character and it must attempt to organize support functions directly or indirectly related to future revolutionary action. This concept, which is by no means clear-cut and free from straight political considerations, involves what amounts to the setting up of intelligence and counter-intelligence organizations and/or operations, with all their operational ramifications. The general operational program of the Communist Party provides for the organization of secret Party nuclei in the armed forces, the police, the navy, the government, and occasionally also within opposition groups in order to specialize and concentrate upon

- a) the procurement of information which would clarify the organization and capabilities of the hostile power mechanism; b)
- clandestine subversion within "the citadel of the enemy," particularly in the armed forces. The program may also at times include the organization of clandestine nuclei operating in strategic plants and enterprises to provide industrial and economic information systematically -- the productive capabilities and facilities of the hostile society are clearly related to the problems of revolutionary action. Party security in its widest sense may also require a more aggressive approach, particularly when the physical liquidation of hostile individuals and traitorous or insecure Party members is concerned. Finally, when a revolutionary situation approaches, the Party must provide for a para-military organization to form the executive core of revolutionary action--action, however, which sets into coordinated motion the entire Party mechanism and the social forces allied with it.

Such and similar clandestine action auxiliaries of the Party have been occasionally observed in operation. Part Two of this paper includes a factual presentation, and a tentative analysis of their significance in detail. These offensive clandestine Party operations probably represent the most significant area of

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Party work. They perform functions which transgress the area of "normal" political action and they may constitute an acute threat to the existing social order. However, it is not yet possible to generalize on the subject. While the normal aspects of Party organization follow a pattern anywhere, it is by no means certain that every Party organizes clandestine action auxiliaries in the same fashion--if at all.

On the basis of evidence available at present, it appears that Leninist-Stalinist action theory applies practically to the organization of clandestine action auxiliaries as it applies to any other aspect of Party work. Thus, the actual organization of clandestine military auxiliaries prior to the all-out revolutionary effort depends not only upon such factors as availability of trained manpower, leaders and arms, but also upon the making of a clear-cut policy decision that a revolutionary situation, which may be successfully exploited by the Party, is at hand. While it may be expected that all Parties include individuals or even groups who are specialists in military matters, it would be futile to search for a facsimile of the Military Revolutionary Organization of the Bolshevik Party (1917) in the Communist Party of Great Britain at present. Incipient or underdeveloped Parties are more likely to concentrate upon political action in order to achieve mass influence. Parties which have reached a stage of relative mass proportions may find it practicable to organize secret military cadres and formations. Again, however, policy considerations and the degree of expectable opposition will affect planning, timing and organization.

Similar considerations apply to the organization of counter-intelligence, intelligence, sabotage, liquidation and other clandestine action agencies. Materials studied indicate that a stepping-up of such activity and its formalization in special auxiliaries occurs during critical periods considered by the Party favorable to aggressive, revolutionary action in general, such as the middle Twenties and the early Thirties when the "relative stabilization"

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of capitalism was estimated as coming to an end. It is considered, therefore, that a definite relation exists between the particular phase of the action-philosophy governing the Party at any given time and the incidence of well-defined clandestine action auxiliaries. Informally, however, and in a less pronounced fashion, the Party will naturally never pass up any chance for clandestine work in the power apparatus of the State or in hostile groups and organizations.

In focussing upon the organization of underground Parties as well as on the organization of clandestine action auxiliaries, this paper attempts to clarify the problem in terms of both past and current Party experiences. Again however, this paper must be examined against the totality of the Party's work in a given society -- overestimation, as well as underestimation, of clandestine Party operations may dangerously distort the terms on which each national Party must be appreciated.

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PART ONE

THE COMMUNIST PARTY  
UNDERGROUND

S E C R E TI. ORGANIZATIONAL AND OPERATIONAL PROBLEMSA. Police and Party

On general principles, the Party prefers to assume the form of a "legal" political party, in order to achieve more easily a mass basis. Under "legal" conditions, the entire propaganda and agitation apparatus can be employed overtly; front organizations can be set up at will; the Party's drawing power can be demonstrated at the polls; Communists can operate with greater ease in labor unions, and enter the government by way of "democratic" processes.

The Party will therefore fight desperately and until the last minute to maintain its legal status. It will marshal public opinion with the aid of liberal sympathizers and fellow-travellers. It will employ for its defense sympathetic or crypto-Communist lawyers, who are frequently pooled in international front organizations. It will receive the moral assistance of foreign Parties and the Soviet party-government, making an international propaganda issue of the Party's case.

In any case, the Party will seek to delay its transfer to illegality as long as possible, realizing that its organization and operations will be severely hampered by the loss of legal status. Once driven underground, it will make every effort to become "legal" again.

The Party knows that it can be paralyzed by an efficient police. The primary concern of the Party underground, therefore, is with the law enforcement agencies, for these can control the fate of the Party and its leaders. It is often extremely difficult for the Party to protect itself against police penetration, arrests, and searches. Even in areas where the police is not particularly efficient, the Party must spend considerable effort and time on defensive measures.

The over-all success of the police, however, is conditioned by several factors, some of which may work to the Party's advantage.

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1. Geographical Factors. In large countries and in countries with inaccessible territories (mountains, marshland, jungles, vast forests), the surveillance and border-control problems are difficult for the police. The experience of the Bolshevik Party before 1917 shows how great distances favor individual escapes and illegal border traffic. More recent events in Brazil, Greece, the Philippines, Malaya, et. al., illustrate the same point.

2. Population Density. Overcrowded metropolitan areas with vast slums, as well as port cities, also enhance chances for survival. It is comparatively easy for the underground Communist to shake off pursuit in highly populated street-mazes and among the wharves.

3. Political Factors. Police action against the Party may be hindered or encouraged by public opinion. Under a totalitarian anti-Communist government, police persecution of the Party will obviously be far more effective than under the relatively mild, legalistic approach of democratic governments. Mussolini, for example, took a great personal interest in police and intelligence operations against the Italian Party, and frequently directed them himself -- a factor which clearly increased the efficiency of the Italian security agencies.

On the other hand, a loosely controlled police force may grow lax and seek only to make occasional arrests for publicity purposes, without seriously affecting the Party's operations. A precariously balanced political situation, such as obtains particularly in countries near the Soviet borders, may also affect police operations. A shaky "liberal" government may be forced by increasing pressure from rightist parties to soften its attitude toward the Party, which might become an ally in case of need. The individual police official, too, fearful for the future of his position, may feel it unwise to be too strict and choose rather to straddle the fence.

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4. Mass Support for Police. If there is mass support for the regime and its punitive policy, as in Nazi Germany, police operations against the Party may prove extremely effective. Under such conditions, the police are able to procure a great number of informers and penetration agents, as well as disaffected Party members who remain in the Party as police agents. Large-scale cultivation of disaffected elements and the development of penetration opportunities have been favorite police tactics since the early days of the Bolshevik Party.

Whenever it has been feasible to put these methods into practice, they have produced astonishing results. The Tsarist police, for example, were able to recruit Malinovsky, who for a time was second in importance only to Lenin in the Bolshevik wing of the underground Russian Social Democratic Labor Party. In Germany, mass support for National Socialism provided the security authorities with a wealth of informers and penetration agents. The Italian OVRA (originally the CECA) is estimated to have controlled the greater part of the Italian underground Party, exploiting the breakdown in morale which follows vigorous punitive action. The Greek dictator Metaxas greatly complicated the operations of the underground Greek Party by setting up a parallel police-controlled underground Party. More recently, CP Malaya discovered that its Secretary General had been a police agent for many years.

The greatest danger which the Party underground must face is often not the police itself but the psychological impact of the anti-Communist movement upon the population and upon the morale of the Party members themselves. Nevertheless, various Parties which have undergone this persecution, such as the Bolshevik Party and the European Parties in the Fascist period, have managed, in one form or other, to survive. While the drawing-power of Communist ideology may partially account for the Party's durability, the adaptability of Party organization to illegal conditions is an important additional factor in the struggle between Party and police.

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S E C R E TB. Adaptability of Party Organization to Illegal Conditions

The model pattern of Party organization, developed by the Bolshevik Party during more than a decade of illegality, was grafted, through the Comintern, upon all foreign Parties. Thus, the basic forms of Party organization, as encountered today, have been pre-tested under illegal conditions. Consequently, when a Party is declared illegal, there is no need to alter its basic structure. All that is necessary is an adaptation of organization to illegal conditions. The specific advantages inherent in "normal" Communist Party organization, may be summed up as follows:

- (a) The Party preserves its continuity in terms of organization and personnel.
- (b) The Party emphasizes discipline and security even in legal periods.
- (c) Communist doctrine acts as a morale-builder in illegal periods, and may become attractive to the non-Communist leftist in times of general suppression of all "progressive" movements.
- (d) The basic cell organization of the Party, practiced at all times, facilitates underground operations.
- (e) More than any other "normal" political party, the Communist Party has acquired a backlog of "illegal" experience, even under legal conditions.

1. Organizational Continuity. By its nature as a revolutionary organization, the Communist Party will operate under any conditions, legal or illegal. On the basis of its theory, it considers the transition to illegality an extremely undesirable but otherwise "normal" consequence of the class struggle.

This advantage is not enjoyed by the evolutionary Marxist parties (Social Democrats) which operate strictly by legal, parliamentary-democratic methods. When ostracized and suppressed, such parties often undergo severe morale and organizational crises. Because of their fundamental inability (so often attacked by the Communists) to conceive of a revolutionary approach, they interpret their ostracism as "failure of the leadership", "failure of doctrine", and begin to disassociate themselves, psychologically and organizationally, from their past. "In all Fascist countries," states a leading Social Democrat, referring to events in the thirties, "there grows this idea within the illegal (Socialist) cadre: We are something new! We are not a mere continuation of the old party!... The old is dead -- something entirely new must develop now."

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Behind the security of its prefabricated doctrine, the Communist Party does not, as a rule, need to scrutinize its basic philosophy or raison d'être under illegal conditions. Party continuity is taken for granted by the Communists. When the Party is outlawed it does not waste precious time and energies wrangling over basic theory and metaphysical issues. It does not have one form of organization for legal and another for illegal conditions. The underground Party is the Party underground.

2. Cadre Continuity. A further guarantee of continuity is the fact that the Party is at all times a "cadre Party". As many executive and administrative positions as possible are occupied by trained, experienced, full-time and salaried functionaries or "professional revolutionaries". While the size, reliability and capabilities of the cadre obviously vary from country to country, the Party habitually, and as a matter of principle, creates a caste of functionaries who are entirely dependent upon the Party center in financial, personal and ideological terms, and who can therefore be depended upon to follow the center underground.

The extent to which the individual cadre-man is tied to the Party by personal interest is ably described by A. Rossi (Physiology of the French Communist Party, Paris, 1948).

"The role played by personal interest in this faithful adherence to the Party is greater than one might think... The Party functionary cannot become a functionary without quitting his factory, his office, his profession -- he takes on new habits and lives differently. He sheds his roots, he becomes a sort of outcast... He has entered a new social class, a class sui generis it is true, but still elevated as only the salaried class of industry and commerce... To quit (this class) means to be thrown back into the limbo from where he came."

As an added incentive for its cadre, the Party also dispenses power, which Rossi describes as frequently greater than that of high-level government officials. Having tasted this sense of power, the functionary is reluctant to give it up.

A party run both at the center and at the periphery by a well-trained and disciplined cadre-bureaucracy has the advantage of a concrete and specific approach to the problem of going underground. It

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can prepare and provide for the event in terms of cadre protection and replacement. Whatever action potential a Party may salvage in illegality depends less on the extent to which it can protect its rank and file from arrest, than on the success it achieves in salvaging or replacing its entire cadre. The disadvantage of the system, however, is that if the cadre fails, the Party fails. The Party underground is the cadre underground.

3. Discipline and Security. The stress on strict discipline which is required under illegal conditions constitutes no problem for the Party. The cadre will have been trained already and conditioned to depend on the instructions of the center in any circumstance. The center will therefore encounter little resistance in strengthening its control over the cadre, and will be able to dispense with those features of "democratic centralism" which permitted the rank and file to participate in the selection of the cadre during legal periods. Instructions issued by the illegal CP France of 1940, for example, stated specifically that the election of functionaries was out of the question, and that only Centralism was to be conserved. While this relationship has the definite operational advantage of permitting co-ordinated action even under hazardous conditions, the dependence of the cadre on the center can choke the initiative of the individual cadre-man and impede the efficiency of the Party.

Discipline under illegal conditions means not only strict adherence to the political and organizational direction of the center, but also rigorous conformity with underground security rules governing the conspiratorial behavior of cadre and militants. A functionary who has "betrayed" Party secrets under severe police pressure is punished by the competent organs of the Party for a "breach of discipline", with no regard for the circumstances in which the betrayal occurred.

The maintenance of discipline and security by special Party organs (Control Commission, Cadre Commission, and other specialized sections) is a traditional feature of Party organization which can

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be conveniently adapted to underground conditions. The main factor, however, which endangers the successful preservation of discipline and security in the Party underground is that, in the course of extremely severe police action, morale may disintegrate and result in factionalism, mass defections and penetrations.

4. Doctrine as Morale-Builder. Efficient underground organization and conspiratorial skill are, of course, the decisive elements in the Party's struggle to maintain itself when illegal. The demands of underground life on the underground Party worker, however, are frequently extremely taxing, and good morale becomes an operational necessity. No matter how much opportunism, adventurism, or lust for power go into the make-up of the individual functionary or activist, a willingness to sacrifice everything for the sake of the Party demands a stronger motive than these. This motivation is furnished by the Party, ready-made, in the form of its doctrine, the Marxist-Leninist-Stalinist ideology. As a morale-building element, doctrine stands in the first line of defense of the Party underground. Thorough indoctrination (which is, of course, a continuous and well-organized process in legal as well as illegal periods) appears to induce the following psychological habits in Communists:

a. Superiority Complex. The doctrine is dispensed as "absolute truth", providing the believer with a set of answers for every political, social and philosophical problem. The sincere individual Communist, in possession of "absolute truth", considers himself a crusader, a fighter for a "new world". The longer he stays in the Party, the less he is able to think in un-Communist terms. He feels eternally misunderstood by non-Communists and, when ostracized, feels victimized. In brief, his indoctrination produces the conviction that he is fighting for a just cause -- a definite morale asset.

b. Hostility. Based upon the idea of class struggle, the doctrine systematizes and cultivates hostility generated by social conflict, frustration and maladjustment. The doctrine is one of hatred directed at the "class enemy", the latter being anyone who does not share the Party's point of view. Such indoctrination, required by the revolutionary-military nature of the Party, pays off during periods of illegality. Hostility grows with the increasing pressure exerted by the "class enemy" and, added to the instinct for self-preservation, leads to vigorous resistance.

c. Optimism. Communist doctrine has a strong morale-building element in its "scientific" certainty of the inevitable doom of capitalist society. Defeat can be rationalized as a temporary setback, a deficiency in organization, or the result of the work of traitors. But it can never be accepted as definite

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and final. Optimism is prescribed as the Communist's basic attitude, and pessimism becomes a heresy. In this outlook there is a modicum of religious strength, an asset not to be underestimated during a period of underground activity.

5. Attraction of Doctrine. In situations where repressive measures are applied to the non-Communist evolutionary Marxist, liberal and progressive parties, as well as to the Communist Party, Communist doctrine may actually extend beyond its defensive function and further the growth of the illegal Party. When repression becomes total, as under the Fascist regimes, the peaceful evolutionists and liberal democrats may lose their faith in moderate tactics and join the Communists, who always maintain that socialism cannot be established by legal methods alone. Under Nazi control, the Austrian working class felt that the Socialists' democratic methods had brought about their defeat and began to place their hope in Communist objectives. CP Austria became a significant organization for the first time in its history during the term of Nazi suppression; it declined when suppression was lifted.

6. Cell System. Under illegal conditions, when security considerations demand the atomization of Party organization, the Party need only adjust its cell system, through which basic operations are effected. The grouping of the rank and file into small nuclei at the place of work, at the place of residence, and in non-Communist parties and organizations ensures the systematic exploitation of the cell member's normal outside contacts for propaganda and recruitment purposes. This is an all-important task in the underground when other Party activities may be curtailed. The importance of illegal cell activity is intensified by the fact that intermediate echelons are usually reduced to skeletons; hence, for practical purposes the Party underground often consists only of the center and the numerous "front line" cell organizations. There is inherent in this system, however advantageous, a considerable risk of isolation. When communications break down, as they frequently do, the basic Party organizations become ineffective or detached from the Party line. If the breakdown is prolonged, as it was in Germany under Hitler, the Party

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is reduced to a multitude of isolated nuclei, which can do little more than maintain their clandestine existence for the day when the Party may be revived. It is at this point that the extent to which the Party has accumulated and transmitted lessons learned from conspiratorial experience becomes effective.

7. Backlog of Conspiratorial Experience. Through the Comintern, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union has shaped the organizational policy of all foreign Parties, and has passed on its own considerable experience in underground work. Throughout the years of its existence, the Comintern exhorted and obliged its sections to prepare adequately for periods of illegality. By means of its Organization Bureau, headed until about 1936 by Piatnitzky, a leading organizer of the Russian underground, the Comintern furnished specific advice on underground operations and problems. Terms used in the Russian underground, such as "technical apparatus" for illegal printing and distribution facilities, have consistently found their way into the nomenclature of foreign Parties. The Greek Party, for example, currently uses a Russian word, "Yavka", meaning a clandestine reporting center. The "groups of three" upon which illegal Party organization appears to be based so frequently, have their equivalent in the Russian underground term, "troika" (team of three).

The fundamental problems of illegal activity are now widely understood by the various Parties. The practical experiences of many Parties, accumulated during underground periods and pooled by the Comintern prior to 1943, have increased the conspiratorial competence of the movement. There is hardly a significant Party which has not gone through illegal or semi-legal phases. While first-hand experience probably remains the best task-master, it is evident that a pattern at least exists in general outlines, and that a Party faced with illegality acts on it. To what degree this pattern has been created by a centralized effort, or by the appearance of identical problems treated in a similar fashion by different Parties, is a minor point. It is more important to recognize and understand the

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basic Communist approach to the organizational and operational problems of the Party underground.

C. Organizational Problems: Adjustment to Illegal Conditions

The fundamental organizational problem faced by the Party going underground is this: How to combine maximal security with maximal activity -- how to expose its agencies and functionaries to the police as little as possible. Therefore, the primary concern is with a realistic and practicable streamlining of the bureaucratic apparatus.

1. Reduction of Party Apparatus. The extent of the streamlining process is determined by the size of the legal Party, the severity of repressive action upon it, and general policy considerations. A small or underdeveloped Party apparatus cannot be drastically reduced; a mass Party may find it necessary to run the risk of preserving an extensive organization. Within the limits of such considerations, action may be taken along the following lines:

a. Consolidation of territorial organizations. The territorial organization of the Party, particularly in a large country, can be conveniently consolidated and reduced. This makes it possible to utilize staff personnel with greater economy, and to concentrate communications with the Party center. All levels of territorial organization (region, district, subdistrict and section) may be reduced simply by unifying the various staff commands, and combining their original areas of jurisdiction. The twenty-eight regional organizations (Bezirke) of the German Communist Party before 1933, for example, were consolidated after the advent of Nazi suppression into eight inter-regional organizations (Oberbezirke); other territorial organizations were apparently also reduced in number while their jurisdiction was extended.

The Party center itself may be less affected by the process of consolidation: a large Party may need a large central organization. On the cell level, however, consolidation is not practical. For security reasons, cells must be broken up into small units if they are to escape police attention. Hence, at the same time that territorial organizations may decrease in number or disappear altogether, the cell organizations in the Party underground may be atomized and grow in number.

b. Reduction of staffs. In addition to the consolidation of territorial organizations, the number of staff positions throughout the Party is normally reduced in the underground. The territorial Party committees are apparently strongly affected in this respect. According to a Comintern instruction, the committees of illegal Parties should, as a rule, consist of no more than five people, and a secretary should take the place of the executive bureau. In practise, the composition of illegal Party committees appears to be more elastic, depending on prevailing conditions. The extent to which the membership of the Central Committee may be reduced is also determined by the actual situation. Members of the Central Committee are elected at the national Party Congress or Party Conference, and their tenure of office is valid for both


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legal and illegal periods. Over and above the losses sustained by a Central Committee through arrests and other operational mishaps, there is, however, no general indication of how numerical composition is affected by illegal conditions. It may be as large or as small as conditions warrant.

There seems to be a general tendency to eliminate Party Committees during illegal periods, and to assign actual organizational and political work to the executive-administrative apparatus of the Party. CP Chile, for example, simply eliminated all Committees and transferred the direction of the Party to its executive agencies, as follows:



Insofar as the executive-administrative apparatus of a Central Committee is concerned, practical security reasons obviously recommend the paring down of staff personnel. If the actual workload is too heavy to permit reduction, the Secretariat and the various Departments or Commissions of the Central Committee (such as Cadre, Organization, Youth, Agit-Prop, etc.) may continue, while new commissions may be created for technical services, relief for interned comrades, and the like. In some Parties, the personnel of these Departments may be reduced. In others, the staff may continue or be replaced. One Central Committee may dissolve its Politburo and transfer its functions to the National Secretariat. Another may enlarge its membership in order to make up for expected losses in executive positions. There is no general rule except adaptability to the situation at hand.

2. The Command Function: The Triad System. Consolidation of territorial organizations and reduction of staff personnel can, in some cases, be combined with a special organization of the command function observable only in underground Parties. According to this

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system, at all echelons, from the national down to the cell level, groups of three functionaries may be established with two-fold responsibilities: the over-all direction and supervision of Party work at their level, and maintenance of vertical liaison with each other. In the latter capacity these triads represent the live chain of command in the illegal Party. Whenever observed, these triads have consisted of a) a specialist for political work, b) a specialist for organizational problems, and c) a specialist for agitation and propaganda, or for labor union work.

The triads, however, do not necessarily replace whatever other Party organizations may remain effective. They are sometimes merely superimposed on the illegal Party machinery in order to monopolize direction. Triads at national and territorial levels have been known to direct the work of the various administrative and executive departments and commissions of the Party. However, it cannot be clearly determined at present to what extent the national triad may combine executive command with policy-making functions. Theoretically it remains responsible to the Politburo, but in fact it may well become the actual leadership of the Party. The triad principle may even be applied to cell organization. Cells can be constituted as three-man groups, each member recruiting and directing another group of three who are not cell members and who comprise sub-cell basic units.

The triad represents an effective concentration of the command function in the hands of a comparatively few individuals. It permits greater centralization and compartmentalization.

3. Compartmentalization. Tight compartmentalization is an organization and security problem of the first order, since it is necessary to prevent the police from learning too much when Party members or functionaries are arrested. Compartmentalization is applied to Party operations as follows:

a. Party and military branch. Whenever an underground Party is in the position to create a military organization, the latter's staff composition is kept distinct from the Party's political mechanism. The two structures merely coordinate on policy and recruitment problems at their highest echelons.

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b. Party and auxiliary (front) organizations. As in legal periods, various Party auxiliaries (youth organizations, women's organizations, sport clubs, etc.,) remain connected with the Party through interlocking staff personnel only. They function on their own, as independently as possible.

c. Party and auxiliary illegal organizations. Party organizations, or teams for the performance of such specialized tasks as espionage, sabotage, clandestine penetration of police and other government agencies, liquidation and terror groups, etc., are established as largely independent and self-contained groups even in legal periods. They are maintained on this basis in times of illegality.

d. Internal Party compartmentalization. Within the political mechanism of the Party proper, the desired effect can be ideally achieved by the following measures:

1) Elimination of horizontal liaison. No cell and no territorial organization is permitted to maintain contact with any other Party organ operating on the same level. Liaison may only be conducted vertically with the designated functionary of the superior Party organization, whose task it is to direct the lower organizations under his jurisdiction.

2) Restriction of contacts. The fewer comrades a functionary or activist knows and meets in the course of his work, the better. This principle is sound if applied realistically. It can, however, be formalized to an extreme degree. CP France in 1941, for example, applied the triad system not only to the organization of the command function, but apparently also, as a security measure, to all Party activities. No comrade was to know more than two other Party workers. It is questionable whether the French principle can be put into practice rigidly. Even CP France frequently had to threaten disciplinary action in order to push its compartmentalization program to the extreme.

3) Functional restrictions. "The comrades of a group of three must not know anything but (what refers to) their work proper," states an instruction of CP France (1941). More than ever, it is incumbent upon the directors of illegal Party work to define the job of each functionary and activist clearly, so that he may not stray beyond security limits. It is not always possible, however, for the individual functionary to "stick to his guns". Nothing is less permanent than an underground organization, and shifts from one job to another occur often. As a result, a functionary may learn more than is good for the Party.

4. Election of Party Committees. The streamlining process applied to the illegal Party organization may not always be extensive, and the direction of the Party may actually lie in the hands of the national and territorial committees and their administrative organs. When this is the case, the illegal election of Party committees represents an organizational problem. The Comintern advised its member Parties that in an underground situation illegal Party elections were possible, though they must take place in restricted conferences and the elections themselves handled in such a way that even the conference members would not know who was elected. It is not certain whether

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this advice has been generally heeded, as the problems of illegal Parties are never identical.

a. Election of Central Committees. Electing a Central Committee at a conference abroad is one way of circumventing security restrictions at home when the Party is underground. In this way, the Bolshevik underground elected its Central Committee at conferences abroad, attended by delegates who travelled illegally from the interior of Russia. Currently, the Party conferences of CP Greece are held abroad for practical purposes (in the rebel area). This is also true of CP Spain at present. On the other hand, conditions prevailing in a particular country may permit the holding of large illegal meetings at home. For example, the illegal Central Committee (38 members) of CP Yugoslavia was elected in that country at a national conference of more than 100 delegates in October 1940.

The Party may not be able to hold a national Party Congress for the election of the Central Committee, but may be able to convoke the smaller national conference. Again in the case of CP Yugoslavia, special dispensation was granted by the Comintern in 1940 to allow the election of a Central Committee at a national conference instead of a congress.

b. Territorial Party committees and electoral commissions. Special electoral commissions have sometimes been created for the purpose of electing members of territorial Party Committees. A Comintern document refers to two types of such commissions:

1) An electoral commission chosen by the Party conference for the counting of secret votes cast. The commission checks the votes but does not announce election results to the conference.

2) A small electoral commission, elected by a Party conference, together with a representative of the next higher Party committee, actually "elects" (i.e. appoints) the new Party committee. In this case, the Party conference does not cast votes for candidates. It merely elects the commission.

c. Co-optation. Elections of Party committees at all levels can be replaced by or combined with "co-optation" -- i.e., appointment to its membership by a specific Party committee. This practice, however, appears to be regarded as an interim solution. Under normal conditions, all members of Party committees are supposed to be elected. One of the most severe of the criticisms directed by the CP Soviet Union against CP Yugoslavia in 1948 was that the latter had carried over a disproportionate number of co-opted Central Committee members into the legal post-war period. Administrative-executive positions may also be filled by co-opting responsible functionaries.

5. Party Organizations Abroad. When repressive measures become severe, the central Party organs, as well as special support centers, often have to be established abroad, working from the outside into "illegal" territory. This method of salvaging and maintaining centralized leadership abroad has been traditional with the movement since the days when Marx and Engels wrote in exile, and when Lenin and his staff abroad laid the foundation for the CP of the Soviet Union. The types of central organizations commonly transferred to, or created upon, foreign soil are the following:

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a. Central Committee and Central Departments. The Central Committee and its administrative-executive apparatus (Politburo, Secretariat, Departments, Control Commission) may be transferred, either in their entirety or in their salvageable components. Such was the case with CP Germany under the Hitler regime. At present, the central organs of CP Spain and CP Greece are functioning in the same manner. The freedom of action enjoyed by centers outside the home country obviously varies with the attitudes of the government and police of the host country. Party centers abroad are often forced to operate illegally or semi-illegally and are therefore not always effective. The current solution to this problem lies, when practical, in transferring the center to the Soviet Union or to satellite areas. The central organs of CP Spain, for example, are apparently at present being moved from Paris to Prague.

The central organs abroad, as well as performing a command assignment, must also provide the Party at home with propaganda and indoctrination material, printing equipment, funds, specialists in underground work, a central repository for files and archives, training facilities for the illegal cadre, communication services, arms and ammunition, safe haven, and financial support for exiled Party workers. In short, the central Party organization abroad becomes the chief operational support center for the home Party. It must therefore frequently create new types of auxiliary and administrative organizations.

b. Foreign Bureau. The Bolshevik Party abroad and the Italian Party during the Mussolini era (the Ufficio Estero in Paris) are known to have established Foreign Bureaus. This organization represents a central administrative-executive agency charged with the direction of support functions, such as communications, production and distribution of press and propaganda, etc. Theoretically, the supervision of the Foreign Bureau rests with the Central Committee, but in the cases at hand, the Bureaus have been the real directing centers.

c. Regional support centers. The apparatus of the Central Committee abroad may prove unable to handle all its workload, particularly when it must operate into a country with long frontiers. Consequently, the command and support function may have to be decentralized, and several support centers, operating from various countries into sectors of the homeland, may be created. The central organization of CP Germany, established abroad in the thirties, created such regional support centers in the form of regional command posts (Abschnittsleitungen), which operated out of several countries bordering on Germany. Coordination with the Central Committee was effected through the assignment of Central Committee members to the regional centers.

d. Party organizations for emigrants. Special Party organizations for exiled Communists, such as the "Emigrantenleitungen" of the German Party organization abroad, may be created. They do relief work and carry out the indoctrination and training functions of basic Party organizations. They also furnish personnel for special underground assignments (couriers, border guides, etc.).

Party organizations for emigrants should not be confused with front organizations created by the Party abroad. The latter, sometimes set up instead of special Party organizations for emigrants, serve political propaganda purposes from which the home Party may benefit. They are convenient money-raising instruments for the Party under the pretext furnished by the front's ostensible purpose. The far-flung organization of the Free German Movement during the war was such a front constituted abroad. The German Central Committee in Moscow practically merged with the Free Germany center in the USSR; other Party nuclei abroad, particularly in Latin America, Great Britain and the United States, followed suit.

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c. Special service organizations. The Party Center abroad usually has to create special organs to facilitate communications with the homeland. Communications may be expedited through a border-crossing mechanism, either under direct control of the center or manipulated by a regional support station. The production of printed materials and their distribution via special communications routes may have to be entrusted to a separate organization, usually referred to as a Technical Service or Apparatus. These groups, indispensable for the effective functioning of the illegal Party, will be discussed in greater detail below, as they are characteristic not only of Party organizations abroad, but appear in the home country as well.

Party organizations abroad fulfill extremely necessary and sensitive support functions. Their efficiency is frequently raised by the assistance obtained from the CP of the host country in the shape of funds, living space, safe houses, courier personnel, etc. Their operational problems, however, merge with those of the Party at home. Failure to solve these problems may spell the death of the Party.

D. Operational Problems of the Party Underground.

While the Party is legal, it normally exposes most of its cadre to the public eye. Once it is outlawed, therefore, a certain number of functionaries and activists have to be withdrawn from active duty. Those ranking functionaries who are indispensable must be safely housed or otherwise protected from the police. The compromised cadre must be replaced, and new personnel has to be trained for the various new functions which are characteristic of underground work. In view of the hazardous conditions which prevail in the underground, a special type of cadre must be developed: self-controlled, self-sacrificing and intrepid. More than ever, able cadre selection and supervision become the problems of the Party's personnel agencies (cadre departments and commissions). Numerically, a balance must be struck between a cadre which is too large -- and therefore in danger of exposure -- and a cadre which is too small -- and therefore incapable of mass work, shrinking into insignificant study and discussion circles.

1. The Cadre Problem.

a. Replacement of the cadre must be undertaken as a preparatory measure before the Party is actually outlawed. Sensitive functions may be secretly transferred to an "invisible cadre" of comparatively unknown individuals. The Comintern strongly advised the creation of an invisible cadre, an "illegally directing core", which must be kept distinct and separate from the Party Committee's legal apparatus, and thus ready to take over numerous supervisory functions when the Party goes underground. This cadre, according to the Comintern, was to be formed from those Communist leaders who were comparatively unknown to the police and the rank and file of the Party, but who

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were well trained in practical Party work.

According to the Comintern, the process of developing and bringing into play an invisible cadre should be applied to the entire Party structure and its auxiliaries, within trade unions and other legal "revolutionary" organizations. If, by the time the Party is outlawed, these invisible cadres have been strategically placed and properly trained, the most sensitive functions of the Party apparatus, as well as Party documents, can be handed over to them. Hence, when the police seize Party premises, very little of the Party's activities and few of its personnel will be revealed to them.

It also becomes necessary to deceive the police further by divesting ostensibly important functions of their significance. The Secretary of a Party committee, normally the most important functionary, may, in the underground, be degraded from political leader to administrative officer. The Comintern instructs on this point as follows:

"Not only is it not necessary for the secretary of the Committee of a Communist Party to be the political leader of the Committee, but as a rule he should not be its political leader.... Why is such a rule essential? It is important because the secretary of the Party Committee in illegal or semi-legal conditions is the person upon whom, above all, the blow of action will fall. If that person is the political leader of the Party Committee, his arrest will affect the work of the entire Committee.... The political leader of the Party Committee should not be connected with the technical functions of the Party apparatus."

Whether or not this principle has become general practise is not known; it would certainly need revision in the case of small Parties with insufficient cadre material. There are, however, past and recent indications that Parties expecting to go underground do prepare invisible cadres for underground work. In 1927, for example, when central records of the illegal CP Italy were seized in Genoa, none of the regional leaders whose names were revealed had previous records as Communists or Party members. In January 1949, Togliatti, Secretary General of CP Italy, reportedly instructed a leading functionary to make a tour of the regional organizations in Northern Italy and to nominate new regional secretaries, who would operate under illegal conditions if the Party should be outlawed.

The extent to which an invisible cadre may be created appears in practise to depend largely upon the availability of a reserve of trained but unknown Party workers and crypto-Communists.

b. An adequate cadre reserve must be maintained by the Party underground in order to have the means for re-constituting the Party. It is not always possible, however, to defer good workers from active duty, especially as the Party becomes progressively decentralized. Larger numbers of active functionaries are required in an illegal than in a legal situation. "The cadre requirements of our Party are unlimited," the CP France organ Vie du Parti stated in late 1941. The discovery of new cadre material, so necessary for replacement purposes, is no bureaucratic affair in the underground. This responsibility does not rest exclusively with the personnel (cadre) officers. A. Rossi (op. cit.) points out that the CP France in 1941 recognized the fact that the recruitment of cadre personnel must preoccupy the entire Party and could not be left, as in legal times, to individual (cadre) functionaries. The French Communist functionaries were instructed, at that period, to give up bureaucratic methods applicable to legal activity; only through an over-all Party effort could a new and capable cadre be developed.

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c. Ideological and practical training of the new cadre must also be de-bureaucratized in the underground. This is necessary for the simple reason that it becomes extremely hazardous to run Party schools, and not very practical to send large numbers of militants out of the country to attend courses arranged by Party organizations abroad. Only specialized technical training, such as radio operation, is occasionally conducted abroad. Ideological training may be acquired in the course of cell work, simply by reading and discussing the illegal press, and the standard works of Communist literature. Functionaries, who are well-versed in theoretical matters, may merely pass on their knowledge to small groups of other comrades (sometimes no more than two), and create "within the Party a multitude of small schools whose students may, in their time, become teachers of other Communists." (Rossi, op. cit.)

On the whole, however, ideological training is likely to be pushed into the background by more pressing operational problems. The current emphasis of the Cominform on the ideological re-training of the Eastern European Parties is based, at least partially, upon the neglect of ideological matters during the illegal war years.

The Party underground does afford considerable opportunity for practical, on-the-job training. In the course of its decentralization (for example, CP France with its multitude of basic three-man units), the Party may require more low and medium level functionaries than usual. It may be forced, as a result, to assign Party workers to responsible positions without regard to bureaucratic considerations. Although admittedly low in the hierarchy, this new cadre may in the long run receive better and more valuable practical training than it could obtain in formal Party schools. Similarly, the Party's special underground services (communications, housing, production and distribution of printed matter, etc.) must be established ad hoc and require new personnel who must receive their training en marchant. Thus, an illegal period, if it can be successfully weathered, may prove beneficial for the Party. Upon emergence from the underground, the Party may have a cadre larger than in the normal legal period and possessed of practical experience not previously available.

d. The protection of the illegal cadre must be given top priority. Defensively, the cadre (and with it the entire Party) must be protected against infiltration by police agents and unreliable elements into Party positions. Obviously, this is not a special problem of the underground, and it may be effectively handled by the national and territorial cadre departments (commissions) which are normally charged with the investigation and loyalty program of the Party. In Communist terms, however, loyalty is an elastic word. Deviations from the Party line, factionalism, lack of discipline, foolhardiness, breach of security rules, and lack of initiative constitute acts of disloyalty as reprehensible to the Party as the actual work of a police agent. Consequently, the cadre department may also be charged with the political supervision of the Party functionaries. During the war years, when CP France was illegal, the "Cadre Responsible" of the Paris Inter-region attended certain meetings of the responsible regional triad, and reported to the political "responsible" at national headquarters on the political conduct of the regional functionaries. Disciplinary action, including expulsion, based on the investigation of the Cadre Commission, rests with the National Control Commission in legal as in illegal periods. In operational terms, however, cadre protection in the underground requires the provision of false papers, as well as the maintenance of an adequate number of safe houses and apartments where the functionary may live or hide out from the police, and make his professional contacts securely. This is an

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elementary underground requirement, especially since functionaries and militants must frequently change their domicile.

2. The "Housing" Problem and Communications. The provision of safe shelter for illegal Party functionaries and fugitives constitutes merely one aspect of a much larger problem. The Party underground requires numbers of safe houses or apartments for a variety of administration and operational purposes. Archives, files and Party correspondence can no longer be kept at "legal" premises, and bank deposits cannot be maintained in the Party's name. In fact, the entire process of "going underground" and of sustaining an illegal Party machine can be reduced to the prosaic but intricate search for safe space: homes of unsuspected sympathizers, shops and offices of crypto-Communists, houses and farms in the country, and the like. Particularly important is the safe housing of communications.

a. Internal communications. Liaison between the illegal national and territorial organization -- whether constituted on a "normal" basis or reorganized as triads -- requires safe meeting and contact places for representatives of the higher and lower echelons.

Reporting points. The Comintern advised Parties underground to establish special addresses or flats where at appointed times representatives of the cells and fractions of the mass organizations could meet representatives of the Party committee for consultation and instruction. Such reporting points may be established at all echelons of the Party underground. Even a legal Party may find it useful to create clandestine reporting points whenever the legal Party premises become insecure. Protective measures include the establishment of safety signals and special passwords for verification purposes. At the central reporting point of the Bolshevik underground Party, for example, different passwords were used for rank and file workers, for district functionaries, and for functionaries of the central apparatus.

Letter drops and contact points for couriers. Written communications between higher and lower echelons presuppose the existence of safe addresses where "mail" can be delivered and picked up. The Comintern's instructions specify that such safe addresses must not coincide with those of reporting points. By the same token, special addresses may be established for the use of intra-Party couriers carrying verbal messages.

b. External communications. Communications with the Party organizations abroad pose special "housing" problems.

Border-crossing mechanisms. There must be established on the borders special conduct points and safe houses (such as overnight stations) for the use of couriers, instructors, and the various special services of the Party, as well as for fugitives. In practical terms, the Party must either use the homes of "safe" Party members or sympathizers in the border regions, or buy the services of non-Party individuals who may be helpful by virtue of their experience. In the Bolshevik underground it

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was common practise to hire smugglers operating in border areas. Recruitment or bribery of individuals employed by border-control authorities may also be attempted. Fishermen, barge-owners, and maritime workers may be utilized when the crossing of waterways and maritime frontiers is required. The connections of Danish fishermen with their German friends in the Hamburg area were exploited in the thirties by the regional support station of the German Party in Denmark for the infiltration of liaison personnel.

Security considerations demand that border-crossing mechanisms remain specialized and compartmentalized. The Party must create as many of these as possible: special border-crossing points for couriers, for Party emissaries from abroad, for the transportation of propaganda material, and for escapees. They may exist side by side. So long as they are separate, if one mechanism is discovered, the others will not be endangered.

c. Reporting points for liaison personnel from abroad. The success of liaison personnel sent by the foreign support station into the homeland hinges upon a very simple requirement: the man must know where and to whom to report securely. In the CP Germany underground during the Hitler regime, such liaison personnel (referred to at that time as "instructors") were assigned the addresses of trusted Party workers (Vertrauenspersonen) inside Germany. The provision of adequate shelter for such liaison officers from abroad adds to the numerous housing difficulties of the underground.

3. Technical Apparatus. Maintaining and distributing illegal Party newspapers, information sheets and propaganda material necessitates the establishment of additional safe space for production, storage and distribution. Since considerable security risks are involved in the running of an illegal production and distribution machine ( or "technical apparatus"), the importance which the Party attaches to this work merits attention.

The function of the Party press in the underground is, in Lenin's words, that of a "collective organizer". As such, it not only organizes the mind of the reader along Party lines, but also groups the readers around the distribution personnel in loose, but nevertheless important, nuclei. In some cases, the Party may be reduced to just this level of operations: an illegal newspaper and several circles of readers connected with the center through the workers who bring the sheet to the house or factory. Further, the Party press tangibly demonstrates the strength of the suppressed Party. In highly organized Parties, the press serves the center as a vehicle for political direction on a mass basis. The abilities of Parties to maintain illegal publications vary. On the one hand, the illegal CP France was able to produce large numbers and many editions of national and regional newspapers, leaflets, factory

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papers and reviews within France. On the other hand, CP Germany under Gestapo suppression had to rely almost exclusively on the production of its foreign support centers. In general, however, an attempt will be made by the Party to follow Comintern instructions:

"All Communist Parties must without fail have an extensive apparatus for the publication of illegal Party literature, printing plants, various kinds of rotary machines, copying machines, mimeographs and simple hectographs in order to publish illegal literature, newspapers, leaflets, etc. In particular it is absolutely essential that the local Party Committee guarantee the publication of the factory paper for the factory cell...."

In addition to the production apparatus a special distribution mechanism must be set up. For security reasons, the technical apparatus of the illegal Party must be divorced from the center and compartmentalized on all levels; it may assume the character of a semi-independent Party section. According to Comintern instructions, special personnel must be brought in for this purpose; special addresses are needed for the safekeeping of literature from the press and for passing it along to all levels of the underground; and only one member of the Party Committee should be made responsible for publication and distribution.

The production process itself is dependent on the availability of paper, equipment and trained personnel. The acquisition of paper is often a troublesome problem. At times it must be stolen or pilfered by a Communist employee from his place of work. Equipment must frequently be improvised. However, when production is on a professional scale, as it was in France, the process may be broken up into as many component parts as possible; decentralization of the production of a leaflet provides better security. Depending on the scale of production and its decentralization, the number of persons engaged in technical work may vary. Three types of personnel, however, can be distinguished: 1) the responsible functionaries who supervise and direct production and distribution, 2) the skilled technicians (typesetters, printers, etc.), and 3) liaison and distribution personnel. The function of the supervisors appears to be restricted to technical problems; the writing and editing rest with the political functionaries. Liaison personnel may be needed in increasing numbers

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when the production process is decentralized. Six liaison agents, for example, were reportedly involved in the production of an illegal French leaflet, taking the text from the editor to the typesetter, and so on, down to the central storage place and distribution point.

Final distribution of the product apparently is undertaken by the political organization (local Party committee, etc.). The technical apparatus merely brings the product to the political section. If the center of the technical apparatus is abroad (as in the case of the German "Reichstechnikum"), it must provide its own courier and border-crossing service. As a rule, the jurisdiction of the technical apparatus ends when the product is delivered. Special functionalities of the local Party organization may be in charge of the ultimate storage places and distribution to the rank and file. The distribution process itself, according to the capabilities of the technical apparatus, may be put on a mass or on a selective basis. If there are only a few copies of a paper available it is obviously essential to distribute them among persons with good contacts, capable of passing on the information to wider circles. In any case, it can readily be seen that the housing of the technical apparatus constitutes a major problem. Homes must be rented for the keeping of equipment (even if only a handpress and a typewriter). Paper must be stored. Central and local distribution points must be established. Couriers must be sheltered. The component operations of the production process must be safely installed.

There has not so far been any evidence to indicate that there is a pattern which various Parties follow in treating the housing problem. Each Party organization, whether political or special, national or regional, appears to handle the problem according to its needs.

4. The Security Problem. The severe impact of security considerations on the organization and operations of the outlawed Party has been amply demonstrated in the preceding sections. Two special aspects arise to be treated: personal and administrative security.

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a. Personal security. Functionaries and members alike must adhere to certain "conspiratorial rules" if their security is to be protected. All Parties evolve a set of practical regulations affecting the member's entire way of life under illegal conditions. These cover such details as alcohol consumption; behavior in case of arrest, threatened or actual; private correspondence; selection and change of apartments; storage of letters, notes, newspapers clippings and literature in general; attitudes towards wife, girl friend, children, unreliable comrades, etc. Provision is also usually made for the use of fictitious (Party) names. In the CP Portugal, for example, members in close contact over a long period knew each other only by such pseudonyms. Some Parties advocate the creation of a "Party language", prohibit the use of telephone or mail for Party communications, advise the frequent changing of clothes and coiffure, and even of posture and gait. Particular attention is paid to security at meetings which should, as a rule, be attended by small numbers and should not last long. Playing cards may be displayed on the table to give the meetings a social appearance. Resolutions taken at meetings should be as succinct as possible.

A breach of security constitutes not only a breach of discipline but also a major political crime: "To be a good Communist under the present circumstances means above all to apply strictly the rules of illegal work, it means to understand that each failure in this respect represents a danger for the Party and a veritable crime against the working class." (*Vie du Parti*, 1941)

b. Administrative security. Over and above the need for safe storage space, special security measures may be introduced to protect Party records. Paper work is necessary even in the underground, although its reduction to minimal proportions is a constant prescription.

Membership records. Preparatory to going underground, functionaries will usually destroy membership lists and records indicating the affiliation of individuals with the Party. Some Parties may stop their recruitment program altogether, or for a certain period of time. During illegal periods, the issuance of membership cards or books and dues stamps is often discontinued. In some cases, the responsible personnel officer may simply rely on his memory to keep track of the members. The consequences of failing to carry out such an elementary security measure are illustrated in the case of CT Germany. The Gestapo was able to seize voluminous central records, which had been allowed to remain stored at Berlin headquarters.

Intra-Party communications. Written reports from lower to higher echelons and instructions from above, when permitted at all, will be as brief as possible. They should not contain any specific details of police interest, such as names of functionaries, cities, villages, and addresses. Confidential communications may be composed in code or ciphers, and written in invisible ink. Documents will generally be forwarded by a trusted courier, and delivered at special reporting points. In case of arrest, the courier must attempt to destroy the communication by all possible means. In the underground, Party functionaries will not, as a rule, sign with their names: they may use their initials or assigned numbers.

Biographical documentation. The Cadre Commissions (or Departments) may find it necessary to increase their bureaucratic activities. Cadre control in the underground is essential, and detailed biographical statements may be requested of each functionary and militant, particularly replacements. Such biographical reports may be transmitted by special couriers of the Cadre Commission, which may be in charge of safe-guarding these records.

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The actual volume of administrative paper work will depend chiefly on the size of the Party. A mass Party will not be able to function effectively without substantial administrative records.

5. The Financial Problem. Operating underground is much more expensive than operating legally. What is more, the "normal" sources of income dry up. On the one hand, illegal conditions impose a new and often heavy financial burden on the Party. As a consequence of the atomization of Party organizations and the specialization of personnel, cadres must be increased -- and payrolls with them. Functionaries and militants must be constantly on the move, either to escape the police or to minimize the risks of their work. They may have to change their domicile, sometimes at the slightest alert, and must not be handicapped by a lack of money. Rentals of safe houses and apartments, storage places, etc., may be considerable; one individual may frequently have to rent several apartments, each under a separate false identity. Printing and distribution costs rise; equipment is constantly being seized by the police and must be replaced. Further, the Party must aid the families of arrested functionaries and members, an expense which may be extremely heavy in the event of mass arrests.

On the other hand, the collection of dues is hampered. Contributions from sympathizers dwindle; front organizations, through which fund-collecting campaigns are channeled, may wither; the sale of Party literature decreases; and commercial ventures of the Party may fail.

Thus, Party finances frequently become a priority operational problem. Preoccupation with financial questions is shown in the instructions of the (illegal) CP France, calling for a discussion of finances at the beginning of every cell meeting. Tight budgeting can partially solve the dilemma, but essential costs cannot be eliminated. CP France in 1941 considered the following categories as essential:

- a) propaganda material -- paper, equipment; b) travel expenses; and
- c) couriers. The same Party further advised all echelons to budget as follows: 50% for propaganda costs (paper, machinery, etc.) and 50% for organizational expenses (salaries, indemnities, travel expenses, rents, etc.).

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In view of the scarcity of funds in the underground, the Party must frequently look for support from abroad. Party centers in foreign countries, or Party auxiliaries with foreign connections, such as maritime Party units, are particularly suited to collecting funds with the help of fraternal Parties and their front organizations. Prior to the dissolution of the Comintern, underground Parties could also present their case to the Budget Commission of the Communist International. While it is difficult to estimate the current financial policy of the CP Soviet Union towards foreign underground Parties, it is probable that if a significant Party should be forced underground in the near future (CP Italy or CP France, for example), direct or indirect financial support from the Soviet and satellite Parties would be forthcoming.

Whatever the origin of underground funds, their administration poses a critical security problem. Party funds, in possession of the national and territorial finance departments or finance officers, can in some cases simply be placed with trusted Party workers. Again, security considerations recommend decentralization of hiding places. When practical, dummy accounts and dummy corporations can be created. The administration of funds may also be taken out of the hands of territorial organizations and centered upon the national Party treasury, when the latter operates in safe territory -- a procedure recently reported to be followed by CP Greece.

6. Mass Support: the Crucial Political Problem. The Party's financial difficulties may be overcome, and the Party machine may be salvaged to a certain extent. Even so, deprived of its legal outlets, the Party's basic strategy of developing into the directing force of the entire working class and other susceptible strata, will be severely hindered under illegal conditions. Fronts and auxiliaries fall by the wayside in a state of political suppression, and the entire propaganda and agitation apparatus must restrict its operations. The strength of the Party as a political force is based upon free access for its propagandizers and organizers to wide masses of workers, farmers, intellectuals, minority groups, etc. The legal Party can

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obtain a maximum of mass support; the illegal Party may fall far short of this basic objective. "The fundamental deficiency of every illegal Party," in words of the Comintern, "(is) that an illegal Party apparatus makes contacts with the masses difficult - and yet the fundamental task of the Communist Party is to have close contact with the masses." There are several methods by which the Party may attempt to surmount these obstacles.

a. Penetration and control of legal non-Communist parties representing workers and related class elements. This approach has only limited possibilities. In the first place, during severe repression all "progressive" or "liberal" parties may be outlawed, and another illegal party is not worth penetrating because it is itself restricted. In the second place, Communist efforts to take over a non-Communist "Workers' Party" will meet with considerable resistance wherever these parties are controlled by Socialists. The attempt made by CP Austria to take over the Austrian Social Democratic Party as a whole, through a tactical alliance made by the two parties during the middle thirties, met with failure in this way.

b. Penetration and control of legal trade unions. This is a tactic recommended by the Comintern. Even if control cannot be achieved, Party fractions working in legal trade unions can exert a certain degree of political influence. Illegal trade unions are clearly less valuable than legal outlets. The penetration process of the trade union movement is a permanent requirement, no matter what the political status of the Party may be.

c. Creation of dummy front organizations or parties. As a rule, this method has little chance of success because it is usually too transparent. Exceptions may occur when suppression is not severe (such as currently in Brazil) or when the Party is in a position to exploit a national emergency (such as foreign occupation or colonial unrest) and to marshal national or colonial "liberation" movements.

The fact remains that no matter what political alliances the Party underground may conclude, or what additional strength it may gain in illegal membership, it still is not a legal Party and cannot fully develop its potential strength. The "combination of legal and illegal methods" is never adequate; ultimately the illegal Party must attempt to become legal. The passing from illegality into legality, however, may only be possible in acutely revolutionary situations. The Party may have to organize military-revolutionary action (as in Russia, China and Greece), or it may have to wait for such an international crisis as World War II, during which the regime suppressing the Party is destroyed.

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
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## II. CASES OF COMMUNIST PARTIES UNDERGROUND

This section contains analyses of six Communist Parties during periods of illegality, showing the particular organizational and operational problems which each of them faced and how they tried to solve them.

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
## ORGANIZATION OF THE BOLSHEVIK PARTY



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
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# THE ODESSA BOLSHEVIK ORGANIZATION (1905)




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## THE BOLSHEVIK TECHNICAL MECHANISM



### PUBLISHING AND DISTRIBUTION MECHANISMS



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S E C R E TA. THE BOLSHEVIK PARTY UNDERGROUND

In setting up the basis of the Bolshevik Party, it was Lenin's view that its organization must be stable, solid and continuous, and that the personnel engaged to take part in the enterprise must be professionally experienced in revolutionary activity -- so well trained in subterfuge and conspiratorial devices that the police would not be able to undermine their organization. From 1900 to 1917, Lenin never swerved from this concept of the Party; and in 1917, when the big chance came, only the Bolsheviks among the several opposition factions possessed the necessary self-confidence and organizational efficiency to enable them to take power and to hold it.

The development of factions within the original Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party (RSDLP), which was comprised of a large number of local Marxist organizations arose over organizational differences in 1903. Lenin insisted on restricting Party membership to a relatively small group of devoted, single-minded, well-disciplined militants, leaving sympathizers and revisionists to the Party's auxiliaries and mass organizations. He wanted a "monolithic and militant party with a clearly defined organization." Following the split, Bolsheviks and Mensheviks constituted two separate parties in fact, if not in name. They vied with each other for control over leading organs and over local organizations in Russia. They held separate congresses in 1905; and finally in 1912, the schism, which had continued to widen during the 1905 Revolution and the reaction which followed, was made permanent.

Until Stolypin's death in 1911 all opposition parties were severely repressed except for a brief period in 1905. Against the Bolsheviks, the Government was, if anything, inclined to be less severe, because it underestimated the capabilities and staying powers of the Party and because it correctly believed that Lenin's splitting would weaken the other revolutionary parties. These others, along with the bourgeois reformist parties, were considered by the Government to be much more dangerous than the Bolsheviks. The Tsarist police made mass arrests and kept the Bolshevik Party under close surveillance, of course, and police agents penetrated all major Party organizations. Trade unions,

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the proper subject for Party work, were tolerated only when organized on a local basis. Among those measures of the Government which hindered Bolshevik activity were internal passport requirements and the registration laws. Travellers and people changing residence were required to sign the register at new lodgings. However, lower police functionaries, when they were not ignorant, were likely to be corruptible. It was often no great task to bribe a prison guard, frontier patrol, or local police chief, or to "talk" oneself out of a tight situation.

Other difficulties faced by Lenin in the building of the Party along the highly centralized lines he had laid down, were imposed by the long distances over which command channels were stretched, both from abroad and within Russia itself. Transport networks set up by the Party's technical services, the employment of couriers, and the use of special communications devices overcame such troubles in some measure. Considerable aid was rendered local Russian organizations from abroad, not only by the Party's Foreign Centers, with their propagandizing-indoctrinating-money-raising auxiliaries, but also by foreign Social-Democratic Parties (particularly the German) and by the International Socialist Bureau. Within Russia, bandit gangs ("Expropriators") operated for Lenin's benefit, sending him funds with which he could construct his system of organizers, couriers, and agents, who succeeded in taking over the control of many previously non-Bolshevik Marxist groups in Russia.

Stolypin's death brought some relief from repression. Pravda, a general propaganda paper, and Zvezda, a weekly political journal, both Bolshevik organs, began to appear legally, along with several others. These were tolerated as long as they veiled their revolutionary intent, subject to a relatively liberal censorship. Violating these conditions, Pravda was repeatedly suppressed, but each time reappeared with only small changes in name, none in content. The Bolsheviks elected six members to the Duma in 1913. They formed a coalition with Menshevik deputies at first; but they soon broke away to form their own fraction. With its legal press and its Duma fraction, and with some influence on

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a number of labor, social, and welfare organizations, the Party pursued legal activities. It continued its illegal work at the same time, building up its Party organizations, issuing illegal, inflammatory leaflets, carrying on secret revolutionary work among the masses.

The Party was again forced wholly underground with the outbreak of the War in 1914. It devoted its energies to preserving what remained of its own strength and to sabotaging the Russian war effort, to which end it formed cells and committees in the armed forces for agitation, encouraged insubordination and fraternization among the troops, etc.

When the March 1917 ("bourgeois") Revolution overthrew the Tsar, the Bolshevik Party emerged into full legal status and resumed publication of its various periodicals. In April, Lenin hastened to Russia from Switzerland, through the charity of the German Government. By November, what with the incompetence of the Provisional (Kerensky) Government, the chaos brought about by Russian military defeats, and general economic and social debilitation within Russia, the Bolsheviks found their small, well-disciplined machine able to achieve a new Revolution, from which the Party emerged victorious.

1. Organization. (See Chart, "Organization of the Bolshevik Party.")

The Bolshevik apparatus was marked by a high degree of centralization of command and decentralization of structure. It consisted of those organs of the RSDLP which the Bolsheviks controlled at any given time. During most of the period to 1912, and from then until 1917, these were the Central Committee, the Foreign Bureau of the Central Committee, and the Editorial Board of the successive central newspapers of the Bolshevik faction. After 1911, the Bolsheviks were able to centralize their machinery inside Russia through a Russian Bureau of the Central Committee, and were able to develop command channels running down from the Russian Bureau through territorial echelons -- Provincial, Regional, City, City District, and Cell organizations. The Latvian and one section of the Polish Social-Democratic Parties supported the Russian Bolshevik Party. Some of the other independent Communist groups in the Empire sided with the Mensheviks, whose leading organ was an Organization Commission.

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Most important of the Bolshevik organizations inside Russia were those of St. Petersburg, Moscow, Odessa, and a few other large cities. These received some direction, when communications permitted, from the Russian Bureau of the Central Committee. However, the Foreign Bureau and the Editorial Board, headed by Lenin, carried the decisive weight with the local organizations inside Russia.

The Central Committee was elected by occasional Party Congresses, most of which were held abroad and to which delegates were sent by local organizations according to their numerical strength. The Central Committee elected at the Prague Conference in 1912 consisted of six members and five alternates. Stalin was co-opted into membership after the Conference. Membership of the Editorial Board varied between three and seven, but the Board was always headed by Lenin. All Bolshevik organizations enjoyed the right to co-opt new members into their committees.

The following analyses of the Moscow and Odessa Bolshevik organizations show the structural principles followed by the Party during these years.

a. The Moscow Organization. In Moscow, three Party units worked practically independently of each other, although their activities sometimes overlapped. The Moscow City Committee worked exclusively within the city; the Moscow Regional Committee administered the Province of Moscow; and the Provincial Bureau of the Central Industrial Region comprised several Provincial organizations.

The Moscow City Committee, consisting of a Secretary and several District organizers and one trade union organizer, administered the work of several city Districts, which, in turn, were divided into Sub-Districts and factory cells. Auxiliaries and Party organizations attached to the City Committee included:

- 1) Moscow Central Trade Union Bureau, a Bolshevik organization with some strength in many of the illegal labor unions;
- 2) Central Social-Democratic Students' Organization;
- 3) Lecturing and Literary Board;
- 4) Finance Commission;
- 5) Central Technical Organization for production of passports and production and distribution of literature;

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6) Military Organization, actually independent of the City Committee, but with interlocking membership with the latter.

7) Military Technical Bureau, also independent of the City Committee except through liaison with the Secretary: responsible for the procurement and preparation of arms and other weapons.

b. The Odessa Organization (See Chart.) Osip Piatnitsky, the veteran organizer, has described the organization of the Odessa Party for the benefit of post-Revolutionary comrades and for foreign Parties who were, at the time of writing, "in great straits because they cannot find a suitable guise in which to clothe their local organizations under illegal conditions...."

"The organization of that time, in Odessa as well as in the rest of Russia, was built from top to bottom on the principle of co-optation; in the plants and factories and in the workshops, the Bolsheviks who worked there invited (co-opted) workers whom they considered to be class-conscious and who were devoted to the cause. The regional committees of the large towns had divided among its members the work of uniting all the Party cells of a given district (or sub-district), and of organizing new cells where there were none. The organizers of the sub-districts invited the best elements of the cells to the sub-district committees. When a member of the sub-district committee dropped out (if he had been arrested or had gone away), the remaining members co-opted another with the consent of the district committee. The district committees in turn were composed of the best elements of the sub-district committees. The city committees were formed by the union of the various groups and cells of a given city and were subject to the approval of the Central Committee. City committees had the right to co-opt new members. When a city committee was arrested as a body, the Central Committee of the Party designated one or more members to form a new committee and those appointed co-opted suitable comrades from the workers of that region to complete the new committee."

Piatnitsky was himself co-opted into the Odessa Party Committee. The Central Committee had notified the Odessa organization of his arrival from Germany, and the co-optation had been effected even before he reached the city. He was appointed organizer of the city District.

The Odessa Committee possessed a large illegal printing plant in the city, and was able to publish numerous leaflets on political events. The Committee also distributed literature received from the Central Committee and Technical Apparatus abroad, sent speakers to factories and meetings, and chose leaders for advanced circles in the districts.

Piatnitsky gives the following description of the way in which the Odessa organization functioned:

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"Each member of the District Committee was connected with the groups and cells of the trade in which he worked at the time; and through the groups and cells he got in touch with the workers of that same trade. Thus there was direct contact between the Odessa Committee and the workers of the plants, factories and workshops at Odessa; the district organizer connected the city committee with the district committee, the members of the district committee in their turn were connected with the groups and cells, the members of which carried out the instructions of the Odessa committee and the district committee among the workers; they in their turn informed the Odessa committee and the district committee of the mood of the Odessa workers.

The district committee met at least once a week; often more frequently. The members of the district committee were sufficiently well qualified. All questions were discussed fully and in detail."

## 2. Operational Problems.

Security measures and communications techniques for cutting across the difficulties imposed on the Party by the Government developed slowly, through painful experience. Some of them were taken over from the practice of older revolutionary groups, such as the Narodnaya Volya, which had been crushed in the 1880's.

a. Security Measures. Security precautions were directed to two chief ends: to prevent exposure and imprisonment of cadres, and to prevent exposure of plans and police interference with Party activities. Some of the devices used in maintaining security were:

- 1) Codes, cyphers, and other communications techniques;
- 2) Assumption and frequent changing of false identities;
- 3) Secrecy of meeting places and lodgings, which were changed frequently to avoid registration with police;
- 4) Restriction of contacts among members (letters of introduction, intermediaries, restriction of plans to minimum circulation);
- 5) Techniques of avoiding police surveillance (wearing of inconspicuous clothing, dodging police shadows, etc);
- 6) Careful disposition of records (encoding, safekeeping, committing facts to memory, provisions for quick destruction, etc);
- 7) Use of contacts within police as counter-intelligence producers, (ineffectual and very limited, as it turned out).
- 8) Compartmentalization: especially applicable to comrades engaged in "conspirative" work (as in the technical organizations), who left "day-to-day" work severely alone.

Meeting places and safehouses. Large meetings were held with a minimum of publicized preparation, usually in the woods several miles from town:

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"When it was necessary to call more or less general meetings they were arranged under the guise of excursions to the country in the name of some educational society. After leaving St. Petersburg a couple of dozen versts behind, we would go 'for a walk' into the depth of the forest. We would then place patrols who would direct the way only by a previously arranged password and then we would hold our meeting."

(Krupskaya, Memoirs of Lenin, II, 129)

Measures taken by functionaries in the carrying out of organizational business were more strict. Piatnitsky (Memoirs of a Bolshevik) describes those adopted in Odessa:

"Comrades arriving in the city used to report to the secretary of the Odessa Committee, Comrade Gusev. He himself, except on days when the committee itself met, had a different meeting place every day where we, the members of the committee, could find him. These meetings were in cafes, restaurants, private dwellings, etc. Committee meetings were very frequent, at least once a week. They took place at the private houses of sympathizing intellectuals. At these meetings the instructions of the Central Committee, the political situation, and the progress of political campaigns, were discussed.... Decisions passed by the committee were communicated to the district meetings by district organizers. The Odessa organization maintained several safe meeting places where members of the Central Committee, of the central organ of the RSDLP, and of Party organizations in neighboring towns could stay and meet."

Police restrictions on travel called for the expenditure of considerable energy and ingenuity. Piatnitsky emphasizes the time and effort wasted in changing lodgings every night to avoid being discovered through the regular police inspections of residential registers. Fake and doctored passports were prepared by technical units serving Party organizations in most of the large cities.

Communications. Codes and cyphers, some of them quite complicated, were employed for written communications. Piatnitsky recounts a two-day struggle to decypher addresses sent to him in one letter by the Secretary of the Foreign Bureau of the Central Committee. Other techniques included the use of invisible ink (cobalt and sulphuric acid solutions, milk, lemon juice) written in the margins and between the lines of innocent books, letters, bills, etc.; the marking of words and letters in innocuous literature; hiding of letters in picture frames, in the spines of books, etc.

Written communications were carried safehand by couriers or sent through the posts addressed to reliable sympathizers or to general delivery. More important communications were transmitted orally.

Penetration by Police. Extensive penetration of the Party by police agents did much to destroy the effectiveness of the most

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careful observance of security measures:

".... there was not a single local organization into which some provocateur had not crept. Every man regarded his comrade with suspicion, was on his guard against those nearest to him, did not trust his neighbor."

(Zinoviev, History of the Communist Party of Russia)

While recognition of the danger of police penetration undoubtedly helped to keep Party members security-conscious, the suspiciousness engendered must certainly have impeded efficient operation. There is little doubt that the Tsarist police knew practically all important details of Party business, and it was only because of their incidental belief that the Bolsheviks were not nearly so dangerous as the other revolutionary parties that even more severely repressive measures were not taken.

Roman Malinovsky, Lenin's trusted intimate, member of the Central Committee, and Vice-Chairman of the Social-Democratic Duma Fraction, was a police agent for years, and caused the arrest of innumerable Party members. So well did he conceal his purposes that Lenin refused to believe charges levelled against him. Even Burtsev, who had several good police contacts and who acted as a one-man counter-espionage service for the various revolutionary parties, failed to find him out, and a special Party commission created to investigate rumors against Malinovsky could not uncover any real evidence. Malinovsky was only the most prominent of many police agents within the Bolshevik Party.

b. Technical Services. As noted above, the Moscow City Committee maintained a Central Technical Organization for the procurement and preparation of false passports, and for the production and distribution of illegal literature, including the regular Party press and occasional pieces. Similar technical mechanisms were supported by other city committees and by the Foreign and Russian Bureaus of the Central Committee. The Central Committee operated border-crossing systems as part of their technical services (See Chart, "The Bolshevik Technical Mechanism").

Passports. The procurement of passports was a continuing problem. The following were the types of passports used by the Party members with police records:

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- 1) False passports with forged seals, in which all details were fictitious;
- 2) Copies of genuine passports of persons without police records;
- 3) Genuine passports belonging to persons without police records.

The third type, called "Iron," was considered the most reliable, but was the most difficult to obtain with descriptive data appropriate to the illegal bearer. Another important function of the technical organization was to exchange passports and copies with other centers.

Production and distribution of Party literature. In 1906 Piatnitsky was put in charge of the central technical organization of the Moscow Committee. The printing establishment produced about 40,000 copies each of various leaflets, broadsides, posters, and, at the time of a Duma election, a list of candidates for the voters. Located in the basement of "The Caucasian Fruitshop," the printing plant was equipped with an American press. A bell was rigged to give warning of the entrance of customers to the fruitshop, which was licensed fictitiously. The operators of the fruitshop were registered under false passports.

Procurement of newsprint and distribution of the literature produced were serious problems. Piatnitsky was given a letter of introduction to the manager of a papermill, from which he received credit and large quantities of paper. A recommended book-binder cut the paper, which was stored in an intermediate warehouse, then taken to a second storehouse (a "depository"), from which it was taken as needed to the printing plant. Printed matter was carried from the shop disguised as fruit in wicker baskets, and was taken to a bakery operated by a sympathizer; there it was called for by a functionary responsible for distribution, who took it to a house where distribution couriers from all the Moscow Districts picked it up.

The Moscow Committee, through Party members in various factories, was able to supply the technical organization with needed production materials. After the Caucasian Shop had been raided by police, a make-shift establishment was set up with type and other accessories supplied by members working in commercial printshops.

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Piatnitsky recounts techniques of distribution of printed matter received by the Moscow organization from St. Petersburg:

"We asked.... the St. Petersburg comrades to pack the literature in boxes and send it as merchandise, and to send us only the receipts. As soon as we received the receipts we picked out two comrades to get the boxes. One of them would hire a carter, to whom he gave the receipts for getting the merchandise out of the station. The carter was given a fictitious address to which he was to deliver the boxes. Another comrade would keep an eye on the driver, following him about wherever he went with the receipts. If everything looked safe, the second comrade would inform the first comrade of this, and then the latter would meet the carter on the road and direct him to the right address. If we suspected that the comrades were being watched, three comrades were selected: one hired the carter; the second followed him all the way to the station, in the station itself, and on the way back; the third acted as a courier for the second comrade. He informed the first comrade whether it was safe for him to meet the carter. The following precautions were also taken: even if the two comrades discovered nothing suspicious at the station, they nevertheless changed the address given at first for another fictitious address. (In such cases we used to give the address of some acquaintance.... The driver was dismissed, and later, if there was no hitch, the literature was sent to the depository and from there to the various districts.)

It sometimes happened that the carter would be called to the gendarme office at the station after he had produced the luggage receipt. In such cases the comrade who was watching him warned the other comrade not to meet the carter on the road; and he himself stayed to find out what would happen. Occasionally the gendarmes let the driver pass with the merchandise but send a detachment of spies and gendarmes at his heels. However, in view of the fictitious address given the carter, their labours were in vain. Several consignments of literature fell into the hands of the authorities, but nobody was ever arrested."

The printing plant operated by the Tiflis organization was even more elaborate, eventually becoming the largest underground plant in Russia. It served both Menshevik and Bolshevik factions of the RSDLP. It was set up by Leonid Krassin, manager of the Government power station in Baku, who served as a member of the Central Committee of the RSDLP and who carried on illegal activities so successfully that for four years neither the management of the power company, nor the police, nor the workers suspected his real role. He arranged for the smuggling of literature, forging of passports, raising of funds, and the setting up of the clandestine printing shop. Krassin was able to find reliable printers who would not only work long hours, but live in the plant as well, despite its discomforts. Through an arrangement with Krupskaya, who was Secretary of the Foreign Bureau, he received each issue of the RSDLP organ, Iskra, from abroad, and managed to publish 10,000 copies of it in Russia. The secret plant also

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produced the Communist Manifesto, Kautsky's Erfurt Program, and over a million copies in all of leaflets, pamphlets and periodicals. A deluxe edition of one hundred copies of the Erfurt Program was made up for sale to wealthy sympathizers at a high price.

Illegal literature was also produced by more primitive means by individuals and small organizations -- handwritten tracts circulated a few copies at a time, and, on a slightly larger scale, those run off home-made hectographs. After 1912 the Parties were permitted legal organs, subject to a partial censorship.

Revolutionary literature presented transportation problems because of its bulk. When the censorship was partially lifted, printed material could sometimes be sent through the mails, disguised as innocent material. During most of the pre-revolutionary period, however, it was customary to smuggle literature in false-bottomed suitcases, in "breastplates" (false bosoms), or sewed into skirts. All travelling members and sympathizers were pressed into the service of this "express transport."

The problem of bulk was later resolved by printing on onion skin paper with narrow margins. As the underground organization developed, Russian editions of papers printed abroad were run off from imported copies or matrices.

Border-Crossing. Communications with foreign centers necessitated elaborate border-crossing establishments. In preparation for the establishment of a transport service operating out of Berlin, Piatnitsky made arrangements for the lodging of visiting Russian functionaries with German Social-Democratic elements, for the storing and processing of smuggled literature, and for the creation of border-crossing stations. The transport service in Germany had its counterpart on the Russian side of the frontier. A second such system, operating out of Leipzig in 1910 and also set up by Piatnitsky, illustrates the methods employed.

The Leipzig Social-Democratic organization supplied him with several addresses to which communications could be safely sent and where visiting Russians could meet and find lodging. He was given the use of the attic in the building of the Leipzig Social-Democratic newspaper

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for storing and packing literature. Two reliable comrades living near the frontier were hired to do the actual smuggling. Both systems worked with a very small staff. This organization, as well as the persons who acted as connecting links, remained unchanged until 1913, although the legal daily, Pravda, was already being published in Russia.


c. Finances. Funds for both legal and illegal Party activities were secured by conventional means: donations by well-to-do Party members and sympathizers, and contributions by foreign Social-Democratic parties and the International Socialist Bureau. Support auxiliaries, such as Committees of Aid for Iskra, were set up abroad. Lenin's benefits from organized banditry ("expropriations") and counterfeiting also gave him access to large amounts of money which enabled him to build up and strengthen Party organizations under his own authority.

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
## ORGANIZATION OF THE PCF



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# TECHNICAL SERVICES OF THE PCF



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S E C R E TB. CP FRANCE UNDERGROUND

CP France (PCF), supporting the Soviet-German non-aggression pact of 24 August 1939 and pursuing an anti-war policy, was legally dissolved by decree of the French Government in September 1939. With the Armistice of 22 June 1940, the Party entered a brief period of "semi-legality," during which it collaborated to some extent with the Germans and was tacitly permitted a limited activity, including the regular publication of Party literature. It was again suppressed when Hitler invaded the USSR in June 1941.

The ambiguity in its policy removed, the Party hastened to take the lead in the resistance movement. Marxist demands were soft-pedalled in favor of "National Liberation" -- harassing the German occupation forces, discrediting Vichy, and cooperating with the British and the Free French of General De Gaulle. Large numbers of enthusiastic patriots were drawn into the movement through such auxiliaries as the guerrilla Francs-Tireurs, The Comites Populaires, and the Secours Populaire. Party propaganda called for a new National Front and for sabotage of the sections of French economy which supported the Germans. During the years of active resistance the Party completely rehabilitated itself, strengthening its cadres, perfecting its organization and tactics finding wide mass support. It emerged from the period of illegality stronger than ever before.

1. Organization. (See Chart, "Organization of the PCF")

In the spring of 1939, the Party's Central Committee decided to take precautionary measures against the inevitable period of illegality. Felix Cadras, head of the Organization Section, was instructed to group the seventy Regions under a number of Inter-Regional organizations. For some reason, the work was not completed until the Party had already been declared illegal, a failure which contributed to the general demoralization of the ranks which the flagrantly anti-nationalistic policy of the Party had already begun. Given a second chance during the period of semi-legality, the reorganization was apparently carried through.

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a. The Party Center. The Central Committee was reduced to a small illegal Center that moved from one city to another. Directing authority, in the hands of a "Directorate of Three" (Triangle Directeur), consisting of chiefs for Policy, Organization, and Agitprop, administered Party affairs through the following National Responsibles (see Chart):

- 1) Political Responsible and Assistant (Felix Cadras and Andre Pican in 1942): charged with over-all supervision, and, in particular, with the political education of cadres.
- 2) Responsible for Cadres and Assistant (Pierre Brossard and Gilbert Delhaye at the end of 1942): charged with supervision and protection of cadres (frustration of police actions and penetration, disciplinary measures, etc.). The Assistant was, in particular, charged with furnishing ration cards, false identity papers and other documents to Party militants.
- 3) Technical Responsible and Assistant (Roger Payen and Leon Kammeney in 1942): charged with all questions of printing materials and equipment. The Assistant was, in particular, responsible for purchasing supplies and for paying salaries.
- 4) Responsible for Youth (Danielo Casanova at the beginning of 1942).
- 5) Propaganda Responsible and Assistant (Georges Politzer and Daniel Decourte Manche at the beginning of 1942): responsible for the editing of literature at the national level.
- 6) Responsible for clandestine action in the public services (Marcel Paul, and later, Emile Pasquier).
- 7) Responsible for "Solidarite" (Marie-Claude Vaillant Couturier at the beginning of 1942): supervised the technique and activities of the regional Responsibles for "Secours Populaire."
- 8) Responsible for Internees (Depollier in 1942): concerned with all questions relating to PCF internees and, in particular, with the preparation of escapes.

In addition, the following functionaries have been identified at the Inter-Region level: Responsibles for Women, Immigrant Laborers, Peasants, and Enterprises. It is not known whether their counterparts operated at the national level, or whether the functions were directed by the eight Responsibles already enumerated.

The majority of the old, well-known leaders of the PCF, unlike their opposite numbers in Germany, did not flee the country. Instead, they apparently retired from active leadership in the illegal Party. Real Party work was delegated to less well-known figures -- an invisible cadre. For example, Jacques Duclos delegated political responsibility to Marceau until 1941; later to Cathelas, then to Felix Cadras.

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Benoit Frachon, Organization Chief, turned this work over to Carre, and then to Desire. Administration of Cadres devolved upon Maurice Treand, Leon Dallidet, and Pierre Brossard. Pierre Villon, Responsible for the Northern Zone, gave this work to Maucherat. Georges Cogniot, Cadre Responsible for the Southern Zone, delegated his functions to Gerard Beslay.

b. Territorial Levels. The territorial echelons of the Party were ranged by Inter-Regions, Regions, Sectors, Sections, Sub-sections (in some cases), and Cells.

Paris was divided into two Inter-Regions (designated "PR 6" and "PR 6 bis"), each comprising four Regions, each of which was designated by a letter. Outside Paris, a Region corresponded to a Department of the Civil Government. A Region comprised five or six Sectors, each of which was further divided into three or four Sections. (In Paris a Section corresponded to an arrondissement).

Sub-sections were sometimes intercalated between Cell and Section. During the legal, pre-war period, cells normally numbered from twenty to thirty members. From September 1939 until the 1940 Armistice, they were reduced to Three-Man Groups. During the period of semi-legality the cell size was again expanded to eight or ten members, except in Algeria, where unrelieved suppression forced the continuance of Three-Man Groups. In the fall of 1940, with increasing pressure being brought to bear on Party activities, size was again reduced -- to six members in September, and to five in October. Finally, in January 1941, the three-man cell was reinstated.

In the PCF pamphlet, Comment se defendre, circulated at the beginning of 1941, the following instructions were set out for the organizational basis of the Party:

"We must decentralize our cells with method and intelligence, in such a way as to facilitate the work of the masses of our adherents. Specifically, this means that, in the factory, decentralization should proceed by way of the shop, part of the shop, or even by bench. It means that, in the neighborhoods, decentralization should be by groups of streets, by street, by groups of households, and even by apartment. With such decentralization, the organizations at the base of the Party, small in membership, and immersed in the masses, are able to influence them, to gauge their temper, and to enable the Party to understand their thoughts and feelings."

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One Regional organization of the Party circulated the following instructions to its Sectors and Sections:

"In order to have strict control over the members, to avoid repression, and to achieve the greatest activity, it is necessary, in spite of resistance (on the part of militants unwilling to reverse their way of thinking), to organize the Party according to the principle of Groups of Three."

The Groups of Three were pyramided, doubtless in the same manner, as the following directive circulated in September 1941 for the formation of Women's Comites Populaires proscribes:

"The first task for the Responsible and Secretary of the Committee is to find two other comrades to help her; thus is the first triangle constituted. Each of the two comrades should find two other women for the propaganda of our committees; thus, two new triangles are constituted. These three triangles form the first link of the chain which should be extended throughout the city. Each new adherent should know only the two other members of her triangle and the two friends whom she leads. It is the Responsible of the triangle alone who receives the directives, the literature, the dues.... From triangle to triangle, the instructions circulate throughout the committee."

Centralization of command and compartmentalization of work was represented at all levels by the institution of the Triad, which comprised Responsibles for political, organization, and either trade union or agitprop work. The following scheme was set forth in Comment se defendre for the division of work in the Sections:

- 1) Political Responsible, charged with the application of the Party line by organizations and by the press. In addition, he concerns himself with matters relating to youth, to women, and to the fight against capitalist repression.
- 2) Organization Responsible, charged with Party organization at the factory and in the neighborhood. He has charge of preparation and distribution of propaganda, and is also concerned with various mass movements -- peasants, middle-classes, old workers, local Popular Committees.
- 3) Trade Union Responsible, charged with supervision of the work of Communists in the syndicates, and with factory and miners' Popular Committees.

As a further measure to centralize control over Party elements, "Democratic Centralism" gave way to "Centralism," with suspension of elections to Party organs. Functionaries were now appointed from above, and were co-opted into leading Party organs. Command channels operated in a strictly vertical direction, with instructions passing from a Responsible to his opposite number at the next lower level. Liaison between functionaries and between organizations at the same level was reduced to a minimum.

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Functionaries at the Party Center also directed the activities and organization of separate technical and military mechanisms. These were organized and operated independently of the PCF political apparatus, with which they had contact only at top levels.

2. Technical Services. (See Chart, "Technical Services of the PCF") Preparation and distribution of Party literature was effected by a special technical mechanism, which was kept entirely separate from the political apparatus except at those points where contact between them was indispensable. The political line of all literature was, of course, controlled by ranking functionaries in the political organization, and a Responsible for the technical apparatus served on the national PCF staff. The chart shows the points of contact between the two networks and the high degree of decentralization obtaining in the technical service.

The Party published L'Humanite, its central organ, regularly. L'Avant-garde, organ of the Young Communists, and the trade union publication, La Vie Ouvriere, appeared fairly regularly. In addition, no less than 38 local and regional publications were put out by lower Party echelons between June 1940 and December 1941. Many of these were ephemeral, in some cases appearing for only a single issue. With the reimposition of illegality, all but the central organs and those of the largest regional units were abandoned. Some of the latter appeared only in irregular "special editions." Energies, cadres, and materials were now too precious to be expended on any but the most important publications.

The importance of the central, official party publications as means of liaison and direction cannot be overemphasized. Every issue carried the "mots d'ordre" -- indications of the general political line of the Party Center -- down to the smallest compartmentalized unit.

The normal agitprop function was fulfilled as much by the enormous volume of pamphlets, broadsides, posters, and wall-writings as by the central press. Simplicity in preparation and distribution made the occasional piece much less hazardous a medium than the more elaborate

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periodical. The hectograph was a favorite for this reason. Vie du Parti printed detailed instructions on its manufacture. It made no noise, was easily concealed, and supply of ink and paper was a relatively simple matter. The mimeograph was somewhat less favored because of the difficulty in securing special paper. Presses necessitating elaborate installations and security measures were generally used only for the large editions of the central organs. It was occasionally possible to print pieces clandestinely on legal presses, sometimes with, sometimes without the cooperation of the owner.

The problem of getting paper in sufficient quantities was difficult. Small quantities could be pilfered by members at their offices or factories. But it eventually became necessary to organize burgling expeditions among the largest available stockpiles, local governmental offices being favorite targets.

Distribution of literature was somewhat simplified by the printing of small editions and by an increased use of the mails.

### 3. Security.

Police measures against the Party took two main directions:

(a) Systematic subversion of members and penetration of Party organizations, including the utilization of spies, provocateurs, and informers;

(b) Direct suppressive action, including mass arrests, assassination and other terroristic methods aimed at paralyzing Party activities and immobilizing cadres.

To counter these, the Party adapted its policies and structure and took steps to perfect its control of cadres and their activities, to maintain security, and to prevent provocation.

a. Modification of Structure. As noted above, the PFC reorganized itself on the basis of the Triad, or Group of Three. As further security, control passed in a vertical direction, and contact among functionaries and between organizations was reduced to a minimum. The following instructions for the implementation of these principles were published in Vie du Parti for the second quarter of 1941:

"All efforts of a group of three to establish contact with a similar group will be considered suspect and sanctions in consequence will be taken. Liaison between organizations of the same echelon is absolutely forbidden. (The groups of three should not know each other; cells should not know each other; there should be no horizontal liaison.)

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No meeting of more than three comrades should be held. The groups of three constitute the basis of organization of the Party cell, and all efforts to establish groups of more than three members should be treated as violating Party discipline.

This principle of compartmentalization should be applied to the Party in all instances. The group of three should be the basic compartment of the Party. The groups of three should be hermetically insulated, one from another. The comrades of one group of three should be familiar only with their own work. Groups comprising more than three adherents should be decentralized immediately."

When the PCF became wholly illegal, it even became necessary to divorce regular Party work from that carried out by the mass organizations. These served as excellent cover for members, and it was considered relatively safe for those who were known to the police as Communists to work within them. Employment of known comrades within the Party itself, however, carried hazards which the Party sought to minimize by a strict enforcement of security rules. Especially, participation of known members in the Party's technical apparatus was discouraged. In general, known members were to avoid contact with other comrades who had no police record, and the latter were to reciprocate, being especially careful not to be observed at or near the residence of a known member.

b. Compartmentalization. This has already been discussed in the section on organization. Briefly, it involved a prohibition of horizontal liaison between Party units at the same level, a reduction in the size of units, restriction of contacts among individuals, and various rules surrounding the security of meetings which are discussed below.

c. Security Rules. "To be a good Communist," declared Vie du Parti, "it is first of all necessary to apply scrupulously the rules of illegal work." Party publications reminded members periodically of the dangers of falling into "legal cretinism." Rules were laid down in various pamphlets and periodicals for personal conduct, for meetings, contacts, and other communications, and for the safeguarding of documents.

1) Restriction of Contacts. The separation of "legal" from "illegal" Party work, a standard practice for all Communist Parties, was complicated when the PCF was declared illegal in all respects. Comrades engaged in activities which would be illegal under any

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circumstance -- such as sabotage, espionage, strong-arm self-defense, etc. , -- continued to operate within organizations which were separate from the Party's political mechanism. They left political work severely alone; kept their identities and activities apart from all Party political units; did not engage in the work of the Party's mass organizations. The purpose of this separation was to preserve, not only their own security, but also that of any "legal" comrades with whom they might come in contact.

2) Security of Meetings. The following regulations governing clandestine meetings were posted in Vie du Parti and in the pamphlets Comment se defendre and Soyons hardis, soyons prudents early in 1941:

a) Never more than three comrades at a meeting (two, in the case of very important functionaries), which should never last more than an hour.

b) Be on time! To be ahead of time at a rendez-vous is to call attention to one's self. To be late is to call attention to the comrade who must wait for you. To arrive on time is the first condition for good clandestine work.

c) Never arrange meetings in cafes or at the residences of known comrades. Meet at the cinema; in the street, in the country, at the sea-shore, out fishing.

d) Do not use the same meeting-place repeatedly. Sooner or later it will become a trap. Rather, change the place as often as possible.

e) Beware the mails, beware the telephone! Never arrange a meeting by telephone, and, as a general rule, do not use the telephone at all. The telephone and the post should be banished as means of transmitting meeting arrangements.

f) A meeting should not take place in the presence of outsiders.

g) A militant Communist.... should never go to a rendez-vous without being certain that he is not being followed. Take little-frequented streets, in which a "shadow" must reveal himself. You cannot be sure that you are not being shadowed until you know that no one is behind you. Never go into the house of a comrade, never go to a meeting without being sure you are not being followed. The police do not always arrest immediately those comrades revealed by their spies; they orient themselves with the first information received, to discover and round up the whole organization.

3) Safeguarding Party Records and Materials. The location of Party records should be a closely guarded secret, restricted to the smallest possible number of persons, warned the tract,

Renforceons la surveillance: "Two comrades only should know where

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the materials and presses are kept." The keeping of records was discouraged, but when this was unavoidable, it was required that lists of names and locations of Party units and other details of organization should be encyphered: "The compiling of lists in free text is rigorously prohibited by the Party and should be considered an act of provocation." Material of this nature should never be kept in the regular residence of a Party member. Provision must be made for quick and easy destruction of all records.

4) Personal Conduct. In addition to scrupulous observance of the rules which have already been outlined, the militant was constantly admonished to preserve the security of the Party organization by keeping himself inconspicuous and refusing to answer any questions which might compromise the Party or other comrades in any way, in case of arrest. Vie du Parti denounced those militants who,

"although little known before the war, instead of preserving a strict anonymity with persons with whom they came in contact, behaved like pretentious, irresponsible bourgeois."

Other publications carried these instructions:

"An illegal militant should never describe his work, either to his wife, or his friends, or to anyone. Still less should he make known his meeting places or where he works. Never tell anyone any more than he must know to carry out his work."

"Militants have no choice between family and Party," one pamphlet declared. At the first sign of danger, he must change his residence and give up seeing his family, who are likely to be under police surveillance.

Inconspicuous disguises, such as modifying the style of one's dress or coiffure, affecting a different gait, etc., were recommended in case of necessity, and even more elaborate disguises in certain instances. "It is better to err by an excess of vigilance than by imprudence," militants were told. However, the best demeanor was to be natural, "to resemble the rest of the crowd." Communists were warned against drawing attention to themselves by too conspiratorial a manner: "Don't slink. Be natural."

The conduct which a militant should follow in case of arrest was described in detail in the Party press during 1941. The burden

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of these instructions was that nothing should be revealed which would lead to further arrests. First of all, the militant should keep his head:

"Don't be panicky. Every militant knows that he may some day be arrested. The event should not surprise him."

He must reveal nothing which could help the police in any way. Until brought before a court, he should preserve a strict silence. Like Georgi Dimitrov at Leipzig, the PCF member on trial should take advantage of the opportunity to turn the proceedings into a "veritable indictment of capitalist society." He should not attempt to defend himself against specific charges, leaving that "delicate" function to his lawyer. The lawyer should be chosen from among those recommended by the Party, and under no circumstances should he be permitted to argue the case in such a way as to throw discredit on the Party or to compromise any of its members.

d. Control of Cadres. New organizational forms imposed by illegality worked in the Party's favor in the development of new cadres and in their control. Decentralization of structure, based on the Triad system and correspondingly smaller superior units, stimulated the development of previously untrained militants who emerged to assume command of the many new units. Centralization of direction ensured rigorously close supervision of their work by experienced superiors, an immediately personal surveillance which entailed continuous investigation and verification of character and of qualifications. There was an endless search for talents and patient training; a constant reshuffling of functionaries and refinement of technique. Finally, illegality forced a close attention to detail and to planning, as well as a clear recognition of the necessity for strict discipline, for personal safety, as well as for Party security.

It is testimonial enough to the flexibility of structure, to the ability of individuals, and to the effectiveness of principles followed, that the Party was able, within a few months, to reconstitute a strong, disciplined cadre structure from what had been badly demoralized elements.

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The task of controlling the cadre and its activities fell immediately to the Cadre Section in the PCF Center, which exercised this control through the Cadre Responsibles at all Party levels. These were charged with the selection and supervision of functionaries, with checking their work, and with the vital task of verification. The constant threat of police infiltration was too great and the importance of the selection of cadres on Party morale too profound to trust to chance. The Cadre Responsibles themselves could not be expected to carry on the work alone. The Political Responsible at each level was specifically charged with double-checking his Responsible for Cadres:

"The problem of the cadres is infinitely large. It is the problem of the whole party. Each Responsible must know the comrades who work directly under his supervision.... A Regional Responsible should be acquainted with his co-workers in the Sectors and Sections, but with discretion. He should seek out the "reserve" who will replace him should he fall, or become sick. He must help the Responsibles who work under him to select their replacements. The Cadre Responsible seconds him in this task and accomplishes the myriad particular tasks of selection and verification."

Cahiers du bolchevisme, 1st Quarter 1941)

Cadre Responsibles also kept close tabs on the political apparatus. The Cadre Responsible for one of the Paris Inter-Regions attended some of the meetings of the "Triangle Directeur" of that Inter-Region, reporting on these to the National Political Responsible. Presumably, the reports dealt with the efficiency and ideological security of the leaders of the political mechanism. The Party Center was in this way given a double check on the caliber and integrity of its middle and lower cadres.

Of the devices at the command of the Cadre Responsibles in the execution of this work, not the least important were the card files and statistical surveys which they compiled from autobiographical reports and periodic organizational reports. From these, it was easy to determine the status and condition of the Party organization at any given time. It was also possible, by having on hand a militant's sworn statement as to his family and his personal and political background, to check these statements with confidential reports by other comrades and with facts of public record. Thus, the Cadre Commission and lower

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Cadre Responsibles came close to performing functions of counter espionage, such as were set aside by CP Germany during this period to its Abwehr Ressort of the illegal "Apparat."<sup>\*</sup>

Examples of the Autobiographical Report and periodic Organizational Report follow.

AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL SCHEMA

Family Status

1. Date (year only) and department of birth. Do not give name or address.
2. What education do you have? Where did you study?
3. What is your occupation? Where have you worked since leaving school?
4. What is the occupation of your parents, brothers, sisters, uncles? Have they engaged in political activities and do they belong to any organizations?
5. Are you married? What is the occupation and nationality of your wife? Of her parents? What are their opinions?
6. Have you any children? How many? Their ages? Do they belong to any organizations?
7. In your family or in that of your wife are there any Nazis, Socialists, or Trotskyites?
8. In your family or in that of your wife, are there any policemen, gendarmes, or police informants? Persons with questionable means of existence? If so, what are your relations with them?

Political Background

9. How did you become a Communist? At what date?
10. Have you been a member of any other party or organization?
11. Have you ever been a Free-Mason? How and when did you quit that organization?

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\* The Abwehr was reportedly transferred to the Control Commission after the disbanding of the "Apparat," which apparently took place in 1935. Thus came to an end a particular separation of a normal Party function under an independent Party mechanism. The KPD was the only CP in our knowledge to have made this precise separation. CP France, like other CP's in similar circumstances, delegated the normal, continuing work of verification, along with such counter-espionage pursuits as this involved, to its Cadre Commission. It is recognized that this account, containing references to the unique KPD organization is somewhat out of place here. However, it would seem worthwhile to clear up confusion which appears to exist in certain quarters over the problem of verification as a normal function of all CP's, whether legal or illegal.

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12. What have been your successive Party functions? What is the nature of your current Party work?

13. Did you militate actively during the war? Where?

14. Have there been any interruptions in your Party or syndical activity? When and why?

15. Have you attended Party schools? Which ones? What books have you read of Marx, Engels, Lenin, Stalin? Have you studied the History of the Bolshevik Party? Do you read the pamphlets and books of the Party?

16. Have you had contact with Trotskyites? With the Barbe-Celor group? Have you had any relations with Doriot, with Gitton, or any other excluded person? Have you any acquaintances in their camps? Of what kind?

17. What disciplinary measures have been taken against you in the Party or in other organizations? When and why?

18. Do you have a police record? Have you been sentenced under the common law? When and why?

19. Have you been subjected to political repression? Have you been arrested? Condemned? When? After how long and how were you liberated?

20. Have you ever been to the colonies or abroad? When and why?

21. Have you previously filled in a biography? Do not preserve the duplicate copy of this. Do not sign it.

A note accompanying the form forbade its reproduction or retention and warned that false answers to the questions would render the offender liable to action by the Control Commission.

Party organizations were required to return weekly reports on their activities and the general conditions under which they worked. A model report circulated in February 1941 suggested the following as worthy of filing:

Situation: current public temper; signs of unrest; demonstrations; movements, etc.;

Propaganda: literature received and produced; status of printing apparatus;

Organization: expansion or contraction of units and their constitution; collections, etc.;

Mass Work: progress in the struggle of the workingman, in the formation of women's and other auxiliary groups, and in penetration of bourgeois institutions;

Repression: arrests of members and functionaries; nature of charges and evidence; morale, etc.;

Solidarity: collections and methods for relief; liaison with prisoners and their families and with camps and prisons.

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Instructions for filing the report called for brevity, security in preparation (including the use of numerical designations for respondent organizations and preservation of anonymity of personnel) and transmission, and for quick destruction in the likelihood of police seizure:

"The weekly reports should be brief and concrete. It is useless to go into detail over steps taken or activities pursued in connection with a particular task of a temporary nature. Tell us only of actual facts and happenings of the week, along with results obtained. For greater clarity, classify the subjects. Avoid giving names and Party names in the clear or in full. Re-read your report always, checking it with this in mind: What would happen if it were exposed? Take the necessary steps to minimize dangers: put names and identifiable landmarks into cypher. Force yourself to reduce your text to the smallest possible volume. Never give any indication of your own name, nor of that of a town or Sector. Use the number assigned to you. Your number is \_\_\_\_\_. Keep in mind that, in case of necessity, the liaison agent should first of all try to save the report, to prevent its falling into the hands of the police, to destroy it, if necessary (usually, by eating it).

#### 4. Finances.

With the end of the period of semi-legality, the PCF underwent a financial crisis. Clandestine operation entailed difficulties in the way of collections, and abnormal expenditures. Large-scale money-raising drives were temporarily out of the question. Militant cadres, driven underground, could no longer be expected to earn their own living by normal pursuits and had to be put on the Party pay-roll. To maintain their morale, it was necessary to guarantee some financial support to their families in case of imprisonment or execution. Large sums were expended on organizing escapes from concentration camps. Maintenance of safe houses and a courier system were expensive. The police seized quantities of agitprop materiel, including expensive printing presses, which had to be replaced, with a corresponding drain on the Party treasury.

An economy drive was ordered. A circular at the beginning of 1941 had this to say:

"We must cut expenses. Economics must not fall on the propaganda apparatus (purchases of paper, equipment, etc.), or on travel or the courier system, which lie at the heart of the whole organization. They must, then, be imposed on salaries. Henceforth, the following rule should govern our budgets at all levels: half for propaganda expenses .... half for organizational expenses (salaries, indemnities, travel, rents, etc.) .... The question of

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mutual aid (solidarite) is independent of the others. Although restrictions here are painful, they must be made in order to secure maximum efficiency: for example, by placing militants so that they can earn part of their living while continuing to work for the Party. We can furnish them with supplementary aid. Register with us your proposed budget, bearing in mind the above considerations. We will settle upon whatever subsidy is possible to give you, and let you know by the next courier."

It is interesting to note that such subsidies from the Center amounted to two-thirds of the income of the local organization hypothetically stipulated in a model monthly financial report published for the guidance of local secretaries.

Other receipts of local organizations were derived largely from dues, special assessments, contributions, etc. The Party Center received some aid from abroad, especially after the British began to subsidize the Free French and other resistance elements. What the extent of Soviet aid was is not known. The model report mentioned above is appended here in order to show how the Party imagined various sources of revenue and objects of expenditure.


## MODEL OF A MONTHLY FINANCIAL REPORT

On Hand as of 1 December 1940	5 000	
<u>Receipts</u>		
Dues, contributions, recovered losses, etc.	3 000	
Subsidy from X	6 000	
	<hr/>	
	14 000	14 000
<u>Expenditures</u>		
Salary for X..., secretary	2 000	
for X..., typist	1 500	
Aid for family, PX	500	
Lodgings. Clothing for security.		
Disguises, BX; rent, BX, etc.	1 000	
Travel and food, purchase or repair		
of bicycles, etc.	1 000	
Propaganda. Materials. Equipment.		
Establishing stock, purchase of press.	5 000	
Aid to prisoners and their families	1 000	
	<hr/>	
Total	12 000	12 000
On Hand as of 31 January 1941		2 000

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
## ORGANIZATION OF THE KPD UNDER CENTRALIZED CONTROL



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
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# THE KPD FOREIGN DIRECTORATE NETWORK



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# OPERATIONS OF A KPD FOREIGN DIRECTORATE (AUSLANDSLEITUNG)



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S E C R E TC. CP GERMANY UNDERGROUND

The case of CP Germany (KPD) is of special interest because it illustrates the various ways in which a highly-centralized, supposedly "mature" Party may attempt to adapt its structure to illegal conditions. The fact that, of the attempts of the KPD to maintain its organization under Hitler, none succeeded is testimony, both to the effective repressive measures which a police state can command, and to the debilitating effect which a long period of bureaucratic comfort may produce on Party cadres. The failure of the KPD cannot be laid to a failure to explore all possible devices. Centralized control exercised by a central authority inside Germany failed; centralized control exercised by a Party Center abroad was no more successful. Decentralized direction through a number of foreign support centers was somewhat more rewarding, but was spiked by the Nazi advance into countries from which such centers could operate. The failure lay less in the principles which the Party projected, than in its inability, from both internal and external causes, to carry the projects through.

1. Organization.

The KPD leadership passed through a period of confusion following the rise of Hitler to complete power in the Spring of 1933. Internal factionalism and a totally wrong estimate of the political situation played directly into the hands of Nazi security services. Though outlawed and suppressed, the Party could not believe that Hitler was in to stay. As late as May 1933, the Central Committee (ZK) passed a resolution reaffirming the interpretation which the Comintern had put upon the Nazi phenomenon, namely, that a revolutionary situation existed and that the new regime was purely transitory. The KPD would, as Pieck put it, ride to power on Hitler's shoulders: "Nach Hitler unsere Zeit!" The Social-Democrats remained the chief enemy, and the KPD actually abetted the Nazi rise to power on the strength of this notion.

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a. Initial Confusion. Prior to the Machtübernahme, the KPD presented features common to all "bolshevized" Parties. A thirty-man Central Committee (ZK), a ten-man Politburo, a Control Commission, Orgburo, and a Secretariat with elaborate departmentalization for Party affairs, all sat comfortably in Berlin. Work in the provinces was directed through familiar territorial echelons: 28 Regions (Bezirke), Districts (Unterbezirke), Sub-districts (Ortsgruppen and Stadtteile), and Cells. The structure was highly centralized in every respect. Direct Comintern supervision over the KPD was exercised through its Western European Bureau (WEB), with headquarters in Berlin.

Preliminary counter-measures. Although confident that the Nazi power was transitory, the KPD had addressed itself to the problems involved in a possible suppression, however temporary. In response to a report made by Hans Kippenberger in July 1932, the Central Committee instituted preliminary security measures. A courier system was organized; the mails were given up as a communications channel; the Party in Saxony ordered a house search of its members for the removal of all compromising material. The Berlin organization set up parallel dummy and secret offices in November.

Such plans proved quite inadequate. Continuing to make light of Nazis, the KPD was surprised by the violent suppression which followed the Reichstag fire of 27 February 1933. Indeed, the Central Committee met in Berlin the same night, and retired in ignorance of the disaster. The mass arrests which followed cut deep into Party cadres. Communications were disrupted. Party ranks were driven into confusion by fear and lack of leadership. The Center delayed moving its vital records out of the Karl Liebknecht Haus long enough for the police to seize them.

b. The Failure of Centralized Control. The first reaction to the suppression on the part of the KPD leadership was to attempt to perpetuate the highly centralized control of the past. Two Polish Communists were dispatched on Comintern orders to instruct the Party on underground work. One was an organizer, the other, a specialist

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in underground press work. They accomplished nothing. In May, John Schehr returned to Berlin from Moscow with Comintern instructions to set up a central directorate (Reichsleitung) in the form of a Triad (Dreierkopf), consisting of himself as Polleiter, and two others as Orgleiter and Agitpropleiter. This system was reproduced at all lower Party levels. (See Chart, "Organization of the KPD under Centralized Control.") Schehr was arrested in November, and a new Dreierkopf appointed. Several such triumvirates followed in rapid succession. Finally, with the arrest of the entire Reichsleitung in March 1935, the idea of a centralized leadership within Germany was given up as impractical.

The territorial organization of the KPD was decentralized by the intercalation of eight Inter-regional units (Oberbezirke) between Reichsleitung and Bezirke. The other levels were retained as they had been, except for reduction in size. In reality, as a result of Nazi suppression, local Party units functioned independently and often in ignorance of each other's existence. Gradually, whatever direction they received came largely from the foreign support centers set up in adjacent countries.

Meanwhile, the leading organs of the KPD (Central Committee, Politburo, and Secretariat) had been removed abroad for safety. The Central Committee and Secretariat met in Prague; the Politburo met occasionally in Paris. In 1936, headquarters were established in Paris. In 1937 the Central Committee dissolved the Politburo, concentrating authority in the Secretariat. The latter development represented a shift of emphasis from policy-making to organizational work, for by this time the foreign support centers had practically taken over control of KPD affairs within Germany.

Liaison between the Party Center at Prague and units within Germany was maintained through two separate courier systems: the Reichstechnikum and the Durchgangsstelle network.

The Reichstechnikum engaged in typically technical pursuits -- production and distribution of illegal literature -- and in the operation of a chain of couriers. Its Reichskuriere carried instructions

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back and forth between the Foreign Center and Berlin, as well as literature and copy for local reproduction by the Berlin Technikum. The German security services understood that the Reichskuriere smuggled instructions, materiel, and funds into Germany from neighboring Soviet diplomatic establishments.

The Durchgangsstelle (transit stations) offered an alternative courier system. Like the Reichstechnikum, Durchgangsstelle headquarters were originally in Saarbrücken; later they moved to Holland. The Durchgangsstelle operated its own couriers, one for each of the eight zones of Germany. Each reported weekly to the Oberbezirksleiter to whom he was assigned for materials and communications. Monthly reports were made to Durchgangsstelle headquarters.

Communications abroad were effected largely through the German branch of the International of Seamen and Harbor Workers (ISH) under Ernst Wollweber.

The degree to which centralized control disintegrated during the early years of illegality is illustrated by the case of Heinrich Wiatrek. Comrade Wiatrek, a KPD militant since 1922, trained at the Lenin School in Moscow, was dispatched to Berlin as an organizer by the head of the Foreign Directorate (Auslandsleitung) at Prague in 1934. At Berlin he met his contact, a Communist from Wupperthal who offered him the post of Bezirksleiter Niederrhein.

He met the two 'advisers' (Oberbärter) for Western Germany at Düsseldorf. One of these advisers was responsible for Party activities, and the other for trade unions. They came to the conclusion that Wiatrek was too inexperienced and placed him in the No. 2 position (Orgleiter) to a man from Hamburg known only as 'Fritz'. Wiatrek, however, became Bezirksleiter a month later when 'Fritz' was summoned to Prague.

According to Wiatrek, there was no clear-cut delineation of functions within the Bezirksleitung. In his position, he was responsible for Düsseldorf and Solingen. His Nos. 2 and 3 were assigned to other areas, and apparently acted very much on their own. Within his own area, Wiatrek took charge of all activities, producing a paper which he wrote largely himself, and even acting as cashier. A courier from Berlin visited him regularly up to February 1935, a fact which indicates that the Reichsleitung managed to keep contact with at least one Bezirk until within a few weeks of its extinction. After that, he received his instructions from Amsterdam, via a woman courier who left them with the Bezirksleiter of Mittelrhein, from whom Wiatrek picked them up every Monday. He also had a weekly meeting with his InstruktEUR from the Auslandsleitung.

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The Instrukteur showed him an illegal publication which originated from the region and established the existence of a Communist group with which Wiatrek should be in touch. When Wiatrek did succeed after some weeks in making contact with its leader, it proved to be the Leiter of the Unterbezirk Düsseldorf-Bilk -- one of his subordinates. This man, however, was extremely suspicious, and Wiatrek had great difficulty in establishing that he and the Instrukteur, who was also present, were not Gestapo agents. They succeeded in obtaining his cooperation only after Wiatrek had agreed to a number of conditions, whose substance was that he would leave the Düsseldorf-Bilk area completely to its own devices."

c. Decentralized Control. The failure to maintain a centralized direction of the KPD in Germany was recognized at the "Brussels" Conference, which was actually held in Moscow in October 1935. A new and enlarged Central Committee was elected, and it was decided to decentralize control by means of the Foreign Directorates, the Auslandsleitungen.

The Auslandsleitungen. (See Charts, "The KPD Foreign-Directorate Network," and "Operations of a KPD Foreign Directorate.") The AL's, which had been set up in various neighboring countries from the beginning of the illegal period to serve as intermediate supervisory-communications centers between the Central Committee and Party elements in Germany, had assumed increasing importance as the structure in Germany disintegrated. Central Committee supervision over the work of the AL's was assured by ZK-Vertreter (representatives) who sat on them until January 1937, at which time the Triad system was introduced. By 1934, each AL was responsible for a specific area of the Reich, to which it dispatched Instrukteure, each assigned to a particular district.

The following AL's have been described:

- 1) AL-Zentrum, located first at Prague, then in Göteborg, and in Stockholm from 1939. It covered Berlin, Saxony, Hanover, and Brunswick.
- 2) AL-West, Amsterdam. Covered Niederrhein, Aachen, Hagen, Siegen, Ruhrgebiet, and Bielefeld.
- 3) AL-Nord, Copenhagen. Covered Hamburg, Schleswig-Holstein, Bremen, and the Baltic coast. Was also responsible for Communist refugees in Denmark, Norway, Sweden, and Iceland.
- 4) AL-Süd. Covered South Germany.
- 5) AL-Saargebiet. Covered the Saar.
- 6) AL-Südwest, established at Brussels in 1936. Covered Mittelrhein.

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AL composition varied from place to place, but generally included the following personnel:

- ZK Representative, acting as chief
- Chief of the Technical Apparat
- Chief of the Border Station (Grenzstelle)
- Chief of the Emigrant Directorate (Emigrantenleitung)
- Representative of the German zone being serviced
- Representative of the Red Aid (Rote Hilfe)

In AL's Holland, Belgium, and Denmark, the International of Seamen and Harbor Workers (ISH) was also represented. Although under nominal Central Committee supervision, the AL's necessarily acted with a fair amount of independence.

As the AL's gained in importance after 1935, and especially, from 1937, they built up extensive organizations. AL-Nord, headed from 1937 by Wiatrek, consisted of the following functionaries:

- No. 1 (Folleiter) (Wiatrek)
- No. 2 (Orgleiter)
- No. 3 (Agitpropleiter)
- Transit Agent (Grenzmann), responsible for conducting Instrukture into the Reich and for the dispatching of illegal literature published by the AL.
- Technical man (Techniker), responsible for false papers.
- Editor, who published the AL's paper, Norddeutscher Tribune.
- Responsible for Youth and Abwehr (the latter, concerned with Party security)
- Responsible for Transport and Communications.
- Responsible for Finances.
- Responsible for trade union work.
- Three representatives of the Rote Hilfe (a welfare organization commonly used as cover for espionage activities).
- Three Responsibles (Zirkelleiter), each in charge of one of the three areas under the AL.
- Instrukture for each of the above areas.

The Instrukture were given their orders by the Zirkelleiter, who told them what places to visit and what instructions to give there. All of these functionaries lived illegally in Copenhagen. The AL was supported partly by local contributions, partly by subsidies from the Central Committee, partly by the sale of Party literature.

The work of the AL's was divided between organizing KPD and mass organizations among German emigres and supervising the work of KPD elements in the area of the Reich to which each AL was assigned. The organizing work was accomplished largely under cover of the Emigrant Directorates (Emigrantenleitungen: EL's) which were set up under AL supervision. For communications, the AL's operated their own courier system, which was apparently separate from those run by the Party Center.

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The Emigrantenleitungen. The EL's gave relief to German emigres and organized them into KPD and mass organizations. They maintained close contact with indigenous Communist elements and served as convenient cover for AL activities. They were fruitful sources of recruits for AL courier and other work. The EL Triad consisted of Polleiter, Orgleiter, and Agitpropleiter. The EL Polleiter sat on the AL, from which he received instructions.

The AL Communications system. The Border-crossing Stations (Grenzstelle) of the decentralized AL's consisted of a leader, a ZK-Vertreter, and representatives of the Border Sections (Grenzabschnitte) under the particular Grenzstelle. The lay-out of the Foreign Directorates, with their appendage Grenzstelle and Grenzabschnitte, as German security services believed them to exist in 1937-1938, is shown on the accompanying diagram, ("The KPD Foreign-Directorate Network").

It will be noted that, while most adjoining countries supported only two Border Sections, Czechoslovakia boasted no less than ten (one of these is not shown). The sections in Switzerland were based on Basel and St. Gallen; the Dutch sections, on Maastricht and Nijmegen. Locations of sections in Belgium and Denmark are unknown, while Stockholm is thought to have had a border section operating in the direction of Stettin and Königsberg.

The activities of Lothar Hoffmann, a Moscow-trained functionary of the Copenhagen EL from 1939 to 1941, illustrate the services performed by such foreign support centers:

Hoffmann secured the services of a member of CP Denmark, and of two fishermen, one Danish and the other German. The Danish Party member, serving as courier, went to Hamburg, where he established contact with the KPD Bezirksleiter. Hoffmann furnished the Dane with literature procured in Copenhagen. The Dane carried it to the Danish coast, where he turned it over to the Danish fisherman, who, in turn, delivered it to his German opposite number outside Danish waters. The Danish courier, going to Germany unencumbered, picked up the material again, this time from the German fisherman, and delivered it to the Bezirksleitung in Hamburg.

Hoffmann's duties also included work within the EL, instructing German emigrants. From 1940, there remained in Copenhagen besides the leaders of the EL and AL, only about twelve emigres. These were

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organized in four groups, each of which had street contacts and held secret meetings. The EL maintained some contacts with CP Denmark.

The work performed by Paul Helms, who was (presumably) Orgleiter of the Copenhagen AL, is also of interest.

In the Summer of 1937 he began to recruit reliable KPD militants (Vertrauensleute: trusted persons) still in Germany to carry on organizational and propaganda there in small groups. He maintained contact with these elements through Instrukteure.

One such Instrukteur, who had connections in Hamburg, made the trip from Copenhagen some ten times. He met with workers and small business men and received reports on public opinion and morale and furnished his contacts with illegal literature. Returning to Copenhagen, he would report to the AL to get new instructions. Once, he received a false passport. At first, literature was smuggled into Germany by the AL's "Grenzapparat," which employed Danes for the purpose. Later, the Instrukteur carried it himself. His reports were written up and evaluated by the AL, then forwarded to the Central Committee.

Another Instrukteur had contacts among Hamburg port workers which he was charged with exploiting. He attempted to organize them and carried into Germany illegal literature hidden in pocket mirrors and pieces of soap."

d. Attempt to Revive Centralized Control. As Georgi Dimitrow, Secretary General of the Comintern, pointed out to a KPD conference held at Moscow in January 1940, the Party in Germany had largely disintegrated. The German-Soviet non-aggression pact, which had been signed the preceding August, however, raised the illusion that the Party might begin to function more or less normally inside Germany. The "January platform," therefore, called for the reestablishment of a Reichsleitung at Berlin. It should consist of a more or less overt dummy Secretariat and a real, secret Secretariat. It was even thought possible that the latter might build up and direct an extensive military organization for espionage and sabotage work.

With this project in view, the AL's were officially dissolved. Actually, they continued to function as before, until forced to close down by Nazi military advances.

Knöchel, to whom the task of preparing the field for the Berlin center fell, dispatched three Instrukteure into the Reich. Early in 1942 he went in himself, setting up shop in a safe-house secured by one of the Instrukteure. Here he installed a duplicating machine from which he ran off a number of illegal papers. Liaison with some local

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KPD units was established and maintained for a time by the Instruktore, who reported regularly to Knöchel.

Instructions reached him through a post-box address in Dusseldorf, through a number of couriers, and by small boats plying on the Rhine. His own correspondence was received by his fiancée in Amsterdam, who gave it to a Dutch Communist known as "Der Grosse." The latter radioed these messages abroad. An attempt to set up a transmitter in Berlin came to nothing, but Knöchel was able to receive general instructions from Radio Moscow and from other stations.

This meager establishment was finally broken with Knöchel's arrest on 30 January 1943. Thereafter, whatever foreign direction was exercised over the small, disconnected KPD groups in the Reich seems to have come from Stockholm.

Establishment of the Free German Movement. Three methods of control over units in Germany having failed, KPD emphasis now shifted to the establishment of a mass organization abroad. The "Free German" Movement was begun at Moscow in July, 1943. It was composed of anti-Nazi prisoners of war and KPD emigrants. It published a weekly newspaper, Freies Deutschland, and beamed propaganda broadcasts to Germany over "Free German Radio." On July 1943, a separate organization, the "Union of German Officers" was affiliated with the Movement.

Free German Committees were established on a mass basis all over the world. Chief centers were New York, Mexico City, London, and Stockholm. In South America, a "Latin-America Committee of Free Germans" was formed by the amalgamation of various anti-Nazi organizations in 1942.

The chief value of these mass organizations to the KPD was in converting German prisoners of war to Marxist principles. The intensive propaganda carried on in prison camps in the USSR through the Antifa training courses won over recruits for the post-war Party and

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the administration in the Soviet Zone.\*

## 2. Security.

KPD unpreparedness made it vulnerable to police repression from the first. Seizures of complete membership lists and of elaborate central records led to decimation of lower cadres, while agents-provocateurs invaded Party organizations and even built up numbers of decoy organizations into which many comrades and sympathizers were enticed. When the trap became full, it would be sprung, and the gulled comrades thrown into concentration camps. The arrest, in October 1933, of the Agitpropleiter of the Bezirk Berlin-Brandenburg, for example, led to the exposure of the whole Unterbezirk network, and to the arrest of the Bezirksleitung and many members of the Unterbezirke. A courier was arrested and found to be carrying papers concealed beneath a knee-bandage and under the grips of the handle-bars of his bicycle. The latter contained roughly enciphered lists of the meetings which he was to hold during the week. The persons whom he had arranged to meet were nearly all rounded up while on their way to, or at, the designated meeting places.

As a counter-measure, the KPD adopted elaborate security regulations. "The party organization must be decentralized," a functionary declared rather belatedly in 1935:

"In place of the old centralized system there must grow up many independent little local organizations which must be capable

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\* Recent reorganizational steps taken by the SED (Socialist Unity Party: the amalgamated KPD -- SPD Party in the Soviet Zone) and the KPD may have produced a degree of confusion. They may have led some to conclude that the KPD is about to go underground and that these steps were taken in preparation for this. The KPD in the Western Zones has been officially separated from the SED and has set up a "West Zone Directorate" at Frankfurt. The Bezirk has been abolished as an intermediate echelon between Land and Kreis. Ten-man Groups have been prescribed as the basic KPD unit. These measures would be perfectly natural ones for the KPD to take in response to the crystallization of the East-West division within Germany. Streamlining the Party structure, as the KPD has done, should not be taken as prima facie evidence that it intends or expects to go underground. There is no evidence to show that the steps were taken with such a specific expectation in view. Whether or not the KPD intends to go underground is beside the point. The reorganization probably would have been made in any case.

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of carrying out the party line on their own and of leading the masses in their respective areas. "


Bearing cover names and changing residence frequently, militants maintained very limited party contacts to prevent such large-scale exposures as had overtaken the Party in 1933. Functionaries were appointed from above, rather than elected, and they habitually worked in areas where they were not previously known. To ensure secrecy of communications, instructions to lower units were relayed through intermediaries. Thus, an Unterbezirksleitung appointed a committee of three from among the leaders of its several Ortsgruppe. This committee represented the only contact between the Unterbezirksleitung and its subordinate groups.

All members known to the police were forbidden to take any part in underground work or to have any contact with functioning militants. Meeting places were changed often and their locations closely guarded. Signals discernible from a safe distance were used to indicate security, such as flower pots in (or missing from) a window, or the position of window shades, etc. It was forbidden to carry incriminating documents to meetings or to keep them at members' lodgings. Safe houses were established for hiding personnel and materials; letter-drops and cut-outs for communications. Party cards and dues receipts were no longer issued. Recruits were carefully screened and their records checked with the Central Committee, which had access to the blacklists of police agents and traitors compiled by the Party's illegal Apparat. Members who had ever given signs of defection, or who had been released too soon by the Gestapo, were treated with suspicion, and sometimes, with beatings or liquidation.

These security measures were all valid in themselves, and if they had been applied at the beginning of Nazi suppression might have foiled the Government's efforts to wipe out the Party. Coming as late as they did, it is doubtful whether they were effective in helping the Party to pick up many of the pieces.

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
## ORGANIZATION OF THE KKE (1946)



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
# ORGANIZATION OF EPON



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
# KKE CONTROL OF THE OENO



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# THE SALONIKA RECRUIT-FORWARDING SYSTEM



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S E C R E TD. CP GREECE UNDERGROUND

With the formation of the Markos rebel Junta in December 1947, and the resumption of serious guerrilla warfare, CP Greece (KKE) went wholly underground. Illegality was no novelty for the KKE. It had been suppressed during the dictatorships of Pangalos (1925-1926) and Metaxas (1936-1941). Many of the Party functionaries arrested then were released when the Germans occupied the country in 1941. A new Central Committee was formed and the Party bent its energies to the creation of a united front resistance movement, the EAM. The EAM's guerrilla force, ELAS, which was constituted in February 1942, cooperated with other resistance groups and the British to forward the fight for liberation. From the time of liberation, October 1944, until June 1946, when the Government promulgated a Law for Public Safety, providing for powers of search, abolishing the right to strike, and setting up special police tribunals, the KKE enjoyed practical freedom of action. During the months from June to December 1946, it prepared itself for illegality by strengthening discipline and reorganizing. So far as its political mechanism is concerned, the KKE effort has met with failure. While the rebel forces have had some notable successes, the political structure in all areas but those held by arms appears to have collapsed. During 1948, the Greek police uncovered many local Party organizations, and most of the leading cadres have either been arrested or have fled to the mountains.

1. Organization (See Chart, "Organization of the KKE, 1946")

Except for having established, through its resistance period, a number of political, and clandestine action auxiliaries, the KKE was organized along familiar CP lines prior to its suppression in 1947. Centralized control was held by a seven-man Political Bureau, a four-man Secretariat, a Central Committee, and a Control Commission, extending successively down through Regional and City organizations, Districts, and Cells. Most recently, the Rebel Radio (DABS) announced that as a result of a decision of the Fifth Plenum of the Central Committee, held in the Grammos Mountains on 31 January 1949, Markos

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had been relieved of political responsibilities and has since been replaced as military commander by Ionnis Ioannides. A new Politburo, elected at the same time, is composed of five regular members and three alternates, headed by the long-time Secretary General, Zachariades. Chryssa Hadjivassiliou, once head of the KKE organization for penetration of the Armed Forces and State Security Service (KOSSA), was also relieved of her Politburo post.

The KKE organizations for the three major cities -- KOA, Athens; KOP, Piraeus; KOTh, Salonika -- have traditionally stood at the regional level. As police interference has tightened around Party communication channels, they have come generally to represent whatever organization coherency is left to the KKE outside Rebel territory. If the "normal" breakdown of KKE city administration by Districts, and Cells (KOB's) still obtains, it does so loosely. The average District (Achtis) comprises a small bureau, most of whose members have been co-opted rather than elected. It meets infrequently, and it administers very few KOB's. An attempt was made early in 1948 to sub-divide the KOB's into three-man groups (pyrines), but most recent reports indicate that the KOB's, comprising anywhere from four to twelve members, are themselves too small to admit of further purposeful division.

KKE auxiliaries such as the AKE (Agricultural Party), EAM (National Liberation Front), EPON (United Youth Organization), and EA (Mutual Aid), are theoretically organized along lines similar to those of the political mechanism, and have also suffered disruption. The underground organization of EPON is shown on the attached chart.

The organization of the military auxiliary, the "Democratic Army," and the clandestine action apparatus of KOSSA and MLA, will be discussed in Part Two of the present study.

In October 1948 the Central Committee of the KKE announced the dissolution and replacement of the Athens Committee (KOA) on the grounds that the latter had failed to execute properly the recruitment and sabotage program directed the previous March for support of the military action. The present constitution of the KOA, is not clear. A "Central Committee Delegation" reportedly coordinates and directs KKE

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affairs in the city. During the summer of 1946, as a counter-measure against the numerous arrests suffered then, the Central Committee of the KOA was enlarged from nine to fifteen members. Power was concentrated in a new, four-man Secretariat, consisting of the following:

- First Secretary
- Second Secretary (Organization)
- Responsible for Fractions
- Responsible for Women's Work

The Central Committee of the KOA in 1946 consisted of the following functionaries:

- First Secretary
- Second Secretary
- Responsible for EAM
- Responsible for Security
- Responsible for Clandestine Organization
- Responsible for Intellectuals
- Responsible for Trade Unions
- Responsible for Fractions
- Responsible for MLA's
- Responsible for EPON
- Responsible for AKE
- Treasurer
- Enlightener

The KOA administered several independent KOB's and sixteen Achtides, nine of which were organized on a neighborhood basis, and the remainder, according to occupation, as follows:

- Civil Servants
- Students
- Street Vendors, Bus and Taxi Operators
- Bank and Clerical Workers
- Intellectuals
- Transport Workers
- Hospital and Veterans Organizations Workers

Membership of KOB's was also reduced at this time.

The KOP of Piraeus and, probably, the KOTH of Salonika, were similarly organized, as were the following Regional organizations:

- Macedonia and Thrace
- Epirus and Ionian Islands
- Thessaly
- Sterea
- Crete
- Aegean Islands
- Dodecanese

The Achtis was abolished as an organizational unit in the countryside during the 1946 preparation, rural members being absorbed into local AKE organizations. The former Provincial Committees of the Regions were transformed into city committees, administering Achtides and KOB's within towns.

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The structural decentralization adopted by the KKE as a standard counter-measure against police action during 1946 proved ineffectual. As a result of many arrests during that year and the next, many local Party units were destroyed.

A recent interrogation throws interesting light on the state of disintegration into which the KKE political mechanism had fallen. In July 1947 the KOA sent Maria Manousaki to Chalkis as Responsible for the city organization there. On her arrival, she discovered that it consisted of a four-man bureau, administering three neighborhood KOB's and three factory KOB's, with a total membership of fifty. Each KOB was directed by a Bureau headed by the Responsible, who acted as First Secretary. In some cases, arrests had reduced the Bureau to the Responsible alone. Each KOB comprised from four to twelve members.

According to Manousaki's statement, the work of the Chalkis political organization consisted solely of the preparation and distribution of printed material. However, as Responsible, she worked closely with representatives of the KKE auxiliaries, EAM, EA, and EPON. The EPON had only fifteen members in the entire city.

The Responsible for "vigilance" (epagrypnisis: internal control, including aspects of Party intelligence work) in the Chalkis KKE organization had not been able to carry this function down to the KOB's, presumably because of a shortage of qualified cadre. He was also, however, Responsible for the technical mechanism, which consisted of himself, an assistant, one flat mimeograph machine, and a typewriter. As Responsible for the political organization, Manousaki dictated the policies of the technical mechanism. She also took charge of the central distribution of the printed matter which it produced.

Liaison with the KOA and with local KOB's was maintained by couriers. Contact with the KOA was interrupted during the winter of 1947, when the Bureau of the Regional Committee of Central Greece, in the competence of which the Chalkis organization technically lay, succeeded in establishing an irregular liaison with Manousaki through Andarte units in Evvia. It is interesting to note that, while recognizing the nominal authority of the Regional Bureau, the guerrilla headquarters tried to assume some direction over the Chalkis organization.

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The present composition of the KKE at the national level, and current territorial organization are not clear. In the face of trying communications difficulties, it seems likely that the rather elaborate picture which was drawn in 1946 would be meaningless today. The Politburo and Central Committee are stationed in the mountains. While many of the functionaries who in 1946 filled posts for myriad Party affairs may still maintain their positions, it is highly probable that their administrative activity is nominal.

## 2. Operational Problems.

a. Security. The KKE and its auxiliaries have adopted familiar security measures for the preservation of their cadres and for what limited action they can achieve against police interference. The actual practise of these measures is best demonstrated in the details given by interrogated KKE members.

Meetings. This is how meetings were arranged for Zoi Maniati, a fairly low-level courier working for Maria Manousaki:

In May 1947 Maniati was sent by the Responsible of the Chalkis organization to Athens to deliver a note. She was instructed as to her Athens contact and the proper password, and given money for expenses. Arriving at the Athens perfume shop to which she had been directed, she gave the sigh, "Is Mrs. Sami's perfume ready?" To this the owner of the shop gave the countersign, "It is ready and it costs 15,000." He told the courier Maniati to return the following day, when she would be given her contact. The next afternoon she returned to the shop, where the owner shortly indicated a man passing the shop as the contact. Maniati met the man in the street and delivered the message to him. He gave her 500,000 drachmae to take back to the Responsible of the Chalkis organization.

Manousaki has described several meetings with other Party functionaries, from which the following characteristics emerge:

1) Meetings were pre-arranged whenever possible. This included the furnishing of addresses where initial contacts could be made, such as the residence or business establishment of a sympathizer or secret KKE member. It also involved the use of such recognition devices as passwords.

2) When regular contact places had not been established or were not known, meetings were necessarily casual. Thus, Manousaki made contact with the KKE organization at Thebes through the mother of an old Party acquaintance.

It is interesting to note that the KKE term for safehouse is "yavka," an old Soviet intelligence word for a secure meeting place or reporting center.

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Meeting places were often fitted out with secret hiding places in case of police raids. One such was behind the false back of a wardrobe closet. It was large enough to accommodate four persons.

Sympathizers and their families frequently provided "yavka" for visiting functionaries, who sometimes were forced by police surveillance to "hole up" in these safe-houses for weeks at a time. Occasionally, having provided lodgings at the request of a friend or relative, the host might even be kept ignorant of the character of his guest.

Personal Conduct Upon Arrest. As a guide for conduct to be followed when arrested, the Central Committee allegedly issued the following (paraphrased) instructions:

1) Never admit your Party affiliation, or reveal any details of Party work, organization, or personnel, even under torture. Confine yourself to a denial of the charges made against you. Anything further gives the police a good check on previous information and on the work of their agents within the Party, and enables them to make further arrests. Do not associate with anyone connected in any way with the police.

2) Fear is your worst enemy. Signs of nervousness or cowardice encourage the police to torture you in the hope of getting detailed confessions.

3) Do not acknowledge even apparently insignificant points. Thus encouraged, the police will resort to torture, so that finally, you may confess to things you have never heard about. Do not forget that this is the first step towards treason. From the very moment you have acknowledged something which the Security asked you to acknowledge, however insignificant this information might appear to you, you have already confessed to treason, and nothing can save you.

4) Those arrested together must defend each other. If another comrade is being tortured, make noise and demonstrate so that you will be heard outside. A passive attitude, while a comrade of yours is being tortured, will not only not help you when your turn comes, but will facilitate the work of the torturers.

5) Do not avail yourself of the opportunity which the Security may offer you to contact anyone on the outside. You would only give away other comrades.

6) In case Party documents or other incriminating records are in your home, do not reveal your address, so that your family or organization will have time to destroy them.

7) Remember that police agents may be planted in your cell at prison as "convicts." Never talk to fellow prisoners about Party affairs.

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b. Communications. Liaison among KKE elements and between the KKE and foreign Communist centers has been maintained through couriers, Party press, and radio.

1) Couriers. The use of couriers has already been touched upon in the section on security. No material is available at this writing describing any systematic KKE courier network, except for that which operated out of Salonika. If a network covering the whole of Greece has ever existed (and the fact that Chryssa Hadjivassilion was reported in 1946 to be responsible for the transmission of Central Committee directives to all provincial organizations may indicate that it did), it has most probably disintegrated. Those courier operations outside of guerilla-held territory which have been described have all been informal affairs, with agents recruited and commissioned as the need arose.

It is otherwise with the courier system operating between Greece and foreign countries. This service was performed by KKE members of the Party-controlled Federation of Greek Maritime Unions, the OENO. (See Chart, "KKE Control of the OENO"). It was partially destroyed by police in September 1948.

In addition to its courier services, the OENO performed the following functions:

- a) Infiltration of Greek Maritime services, including the Navy, for intelligence-gathering, sabotage, and subversion purposes;
- b) Raising and transporting of funds from abroad;
- c) Recruitment for the Rebel Army;
- d) Supply of equipment for the Rebel Army;
- e) Publication and distribution of Communist literature.

The OENO operated out of Piraeus. It had offices or agents in Marseille, Genoa, Cardiff, Sydney, Antwerp, New York, and in Durban and Johannesburg, South Africa. In New York, the President of the Brotherhood of the EA of Seamen worked with the CPUSA-sponsored Committee of Aid for Democratic Greece for the collection and forwarding of funds and equipment to Piraeus and to Markos by way of Genoa.

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An examination of OENO records seized by Greek police reveals that, of the approximately 6,800 seamen members of the OENO (i.e., about one-third of the total Greek Merchant Marine ranks), 315 actively served KKE interests. These agents worked aboard ship as firemen, sailors, stewards. They were members of the following KKE cells under the Piraeus City Committee (KOP):

- KOB of tubercular seamen
- KOB of coastwise lines crews and lower crews of the Merchant Marine
- KOB of sailing vessels
- KOB of local lines
- KOB of lines abroad

These KOB's constituted the "5th Seamen's Sector" of the KOP. The KOB members were later incorporated into the "Seamen's Partisan Committee" (KEN). The KEN controlled the OENO through the latter's secretary. In March 1948, the KENL, a short-lived successor to the KEN, was in turn superseded by the "4th Sector for Transport and Communications" (AE 4: i.e., the 4th Achtis) of the KOP.

2) Press and Radio. Preparation and distribution of printed KKE material is the function of the Technical Mechanism which operates at all levels down to the Achtis. Party publications serve communications, as much as agitation purposes. With the breakdown of liaison channels, Party units have apparently come to rely upon instructions, relayed orally or through print, broadcast by the Central Committee over the Andarte Radio (DABS), which is now probably located in Bulgaria.

The way in which this radio channel has been used is illustrated in the following extract from an interrogation of an important KKE functionary, a secretary of the "Aftoamyna" (MLA: Mass Popular Self-defense) for Athens:

"Early in 1948.... the Markos radio station passed in a forceful broadcast the line that the armed movement must be intensified in the cities with sabotage and the execution of political personalities. In one broadcast a Politburo letter was read, the contents of which were later disseminated in writing and verbally to all party organizations of the cities. One letter came into my hands.... On the basis of this letter from the Politburo we tried to put into effect the orders but without results because of the repeated deteriorating blows suffered by the Aftoamyna."

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Two points are significant in this statement: the extent to which the communications system had broken down, that such important instructions had to pass by so public a channel; and the really great potential use to which radio can be put in Party work under illegality, without endangering the precious lives of militants.

No material is at hand to illustrate the workings of a technical mechanism of the KKE at a level higher than the Achtis. Those described by Manousaki are all of this caliber. The Mechanism of the Athens Fifth Achtis consisted in 1944 of a print shop utilizing two cylindrical and ten flat mimeograph machines. That of the Chalkis organization in 1947 consisted only of a flat machine and a typewriter, hidden in an attic over a bakery. A second flat machine, hidden in the base of a wardrobe closet, was not used because the house in which it was hidden was under police surveillance.

A recent description of the technical mechanism of a KKE auxiliary, EPON, (See Chart, "Organization of EPON"), is more interesting. Mechanisms operated at the national and city level, set up as follows:

Alexandros Thomiades was technical 'responsible' of the Central Council. Pantelis Divaris (a member of the EPON Central Council) had given him 80 gold sovereigns with which he rented a house in Old Faliron (in the outskirts of Athens). With the assistance of Theofanis Paspaliaris, he had installed in an underground crypt a new mimeograph machine and a large quantity of paper and ink. The crypt also contained the entire enlightenment archives of EPON and a considerable quantity of leftist books. This crypt had been constructed in such a fashion that it was impossible to discover it by a cursory search. Within this crypt were printed the illegal publication of EPON, Nea Genia, and proclamations of subversive content.

The technical mechanism of EPON in Piraeus was also housed in an underground crypt. It included a hand press, two cylindrical mimeograph machines and a considerable quantity of paper and ink. In addition, the Responsible for Labor in Piraeus EPON also operated a flat mimeograph machine in his house.

The shop of the Mourikis brothers had undertaken to provide the typographical installations for the Communist organizations. They not only sold printing presses, but also transported them on the firm's motorcycles. The press installed in the house of Thomiades was brought there by Konstatinos Mourikis. When the shop was seized by Piraeus police, it contained three presses intended for the KKE.

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c. Recruitment and Transport. A network for the channeling of recruits for the Rebel Army has been described by Manousaki. It was directed by Savvas Argyropoulos, who was, until Manousaki's arrival, Responsible for the Chalkis political organization.

Argyropoulos despatched couriers (the same persons employed by Manousaki in her political liaison with the KOA) to the same perfume shop that was used as a reporting center for Chalkis-KOA liaison. There the courier was put in contact with the prospective recruits and would arrange to meet them at the Chalkis railroad station. If a boat was available when the recruit arrived at Chalkis, he would be despatched immediately, hidden in a space constructed within a load of bricks, tiles, or other cargo. Sometimes, recruits had to be lodged in Chalkis for some time, until the next boat left. Presumably, they would be landed on the coast at a point from which they could easily join a guerilla unit.

During the winter of 1947-1948, Salonika police uncovered and destroyed a network for the channeling of recruits, refugees, and instructions from the Salonika area to Andarte elements in Pieria and the Chalcidice. One George Kazakis was in charge of the "entire illegal organization" in Salonika. Assisted by his wife, he kept liaison with Markos and with local guerilla organizations, and he operated at least two recruit-forwarding systems, one working by sea to Pieria and the other, overland to the Chalcidice. The Chart, "The Salonika Recruit-Forwarding System," shows the major links and directions taken by these systems.

The Kazakis organization maintained safe-houses in a shoe-repair shop, a provision shop, and in a sympathizer's apartment. During the period of its operation, it forwarded about 100 persons to the Audartes, 19 to Pieria and 81 to the Chalcidice.

d. Finances. Financial affairs of the KKE in 1946 were directed at the national level by a ten-man Central Finance Committee, which was divided into five functional sections, viz:

- (1) Income
- (2) Expenditures
- (3) Enterprises
- (4) Underground Mechanism
- (5) Enlightenment and Propaganda

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The Cashier of the Committee was also Secretary of the EA (Mutual Aid) and President of the KOA Executive Committee. Finance committees also operated on the Regional level.

In February 1948, it was reported that the Central Finance Committee would confine itself to the area accessible to KKE officials in Athens (that is, to the KOA, KOP, Aegean Islands, Crete). It was to consist of six members, three of whom, headed by Chryssa Hadjivasiliou, would direct all financial affairs. How finances in other areas would be administered was not covered in the report. Presumably, a finance office operates at Party Headquarters in the mountains under direct supervision of the Politburo.

1) Sources of Revenue. In addition to more prosaic sources of income, such as dues, membership fees, and the like, the KKE has received large amounts from abroad through the EA and the OENO. Between June 1945 and December 1946, the OENO brought in --

3,671,064	English Pounds
80	Gold Pounds
1,769,012	(Egyptian?) Pounds
2,060	American Dollars

These sums were transported by OENO agents. One member of the crew of the American SS SOUTH WESTERN VICTORY, for example, delivered to the OENO finance office in Piraeus \$4,200 collected in the United States. A second courier delivered 268 Pounds in British banknotes collected at the OENO Antwerp office.

Altogether, the Athens Finance Committee reported the following contributions from abroad in the period September-October 1948:

	<u>Drachmae</u>
Great Britain	19,200,000
Western Europe	12,500,000
OENO branches	18,750,000
United States (sent by the Editor of the New York <u>Greek-American Tribune</u> )	7,500,000
Cyprus (sent by AKEL)	5,000,000
Australia (sent by local EAM members)	1,800,000

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The above items represented about 13% of total revenues for the period.

Other revenues included contributions from the central treasury in the mountains, from local donors and organizations, and proceeds from Party subscriptions and dues and from the operations of various business enterprises in the Athens, Piraeus, and Attica area. Total receipts for the period were 502,900,000 Drachmas.

The following business enterprises were operated by the Kazakis organization in Salonika:

Cooperative for the manufacture and sale of shoes,

Dairy Products Business,

Automobile Cooperative: operated buses and trucks until end of 1947, when sold, proceeds going to Kazakis;

Printing shops,

Popular Book Store: sold Party literature and stolen stationery till end of 1948,

X-ray Laboratory,

Nail Factory,

Motorboats: two boats, presumably operating on a commercial basis;

Silk Business: 360 kilos of silk cloth bought in Albania for resale, but impounded by Salonika police;

Kotoula Machine shop: allegedly manufactured 11 printing presses which were sent to various KKE organizations;

Miscellaneous sales: of the rugs, foodstuffs, etc., appropriated during ELAS regime; proceeds from sale of three KKE and EAM newspapers after these were outlawed.

2) Expenditures. A detailed account for the area administered by the Athens Finance Committee during the period between 1 September and 10 November 1948 shows total expenditures of 1,038,150,000 Drachmas, principal items being the following:

Salaries, lodging, travelling expenses of KKE functionaries, including couriers;

Rents and other housekeeping expenses of KKE political organs;

Equipment for technical and military mechanisms;

Salaries, overhead and printing expenses for publication of Party literature;

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Financial support to auxiliary organizations;

Financial support to non-KKE functionaries and families of auxiliaries;

Financial support to KKE organizations (KOA, KOAtt, and the KKE Regional Committee of the Aegean Islands), including KOSS..

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S E C R E TE. CP SPAIN UNDERGROUND

CP Spain (PCE), along with the autonomous Catalan and Basque CP's, was driven deep underground with the victory of General Franco in the Spring of 1939. Party cadres scattered, some to Latin America, some to the USSR. With the liberation of France, a Center was established at Toulouse,\* close to the Spanish border. The official weekly publication, Mundo Obrero, soon began to appear clandestinely in Madrid. In March 1947, the third PCE Congress met at Paris. It elected a Central Committee, which set up headquarters in Paris under Dolores Ibarruri as Secretary General. For some time the PCE controlled the National Spanish Union (UNE), a resistance coalition which was dissolved in 1945. It held posts in the cabinets of Giral and Llopis in the Republican Government in Exile that was established in Mexico City. The Party has always worked closely with CP France, and has set up branches all over the world.

The PCE center is presently at Paris; latest reports indicate, however, that sections of it may have been already removed to Prague. A bewildering number of fronts, auxiliaries, and penetrated organizations under varying degrees of PCE control operate out of France and other countries, some of them maintaining underground organizations within Spain. The Spanish police have exerted so strong a pressure on these undergrounds as practically to nullify such small works as they may attempt. Numerous guerilla bands carry on desultory and largely uncoordinated operations in the mountains. Some of them are undoubtedly controlled by the CP's; many are auxiliaries of other outlawed parties; most are apparently simple banditti.

1. The Party Center Abroad.

Late in 1945, the Madrid police arrested a number of persons

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\* Recent reports alleging existence of a formal PCE training school at Toulouse seem to be without foundation. It is possible that a certain amount of informal cadre training is carried on in the Toulouse area, but present anti-PCE action by French police would seem to make operation of any sort of a centralized school impossible.

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alleged to represent a Central Committee at Toulouse, and confiscated a printing press, 5,000 copies of Mundo Obrero, and two radio transmitters, but means of which contact with the Toulouse Center had been maintained.

The PCE Center established by the 1947 Congress at Paris consists of a Central Committee, Politburo, Control Commission, and Secretariat, supervising the work of several administrative departments. The principle of co-optation has applied throughout the Party since the Civil War. Whatever political apparatus functions within Spain is quite decentralized, reportedly ranging through the following eight echelons: Region, Province, Local, Comarcal, District, Sector, Radio, and Cell.

The Basque and Catalan CP's maintained separate Politburos, although both were represented on the Central Committee of the PCE until December 1948, when a unified Politburo was set up for all three Parties. This new Politburo reportedly consists of ten members (as compared to six members previously), headed by Secretary General Dolores Ibarruri ("La Pasionaria") and Political Secretary Vincente Uribe.. It is most recently reported that part of the Politburo is about to remove to Prague, where Ibarruri and Uribe have been for some months.

Comorera may stay on in Paris at the head of some sort of organization there. Whether this presages an eventual complete removal to the Czech capital, it is too early to judge. French police have lately begun to interfere with Spanish Communist activities. Nevertheless, it would seem unlikely that a complete transfer of operations will be effected. France is too convenient a base for the manipulation of such wires as the PCE still has into Spain.

In addition to those secretaries named above, Antonio Mije also sits on the Politburo as Organization Secretary. Both Mije and Uribe are aided by Politburo Assistant Secretaries. Administration below this top level is something of a mystery. Several reports of dubious merit list such unlikely administrative departments as "Jurisprudence" and "Commercial Relations." One enumerates no less than 26 separate working sections under the Central Committee. Another cites 18 subsections functioning under three major departments, viz., "Coordination

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and Information," "Political Affairs," "Military Affairs." From such descriptions, it is possible only to deduce that the PCE maintains a standard administrative set-up, with sections for Agitprop, Organizations, Cadres, Youth, Women, Finances, Labor, etc., to which there have possibly been added such departments as may reasonably be expected to function in an underground party -- Liaison, Military, Mutual Aid, Security.

Many of the departments allegedly working at the Party Center probably exist as paper entities. It is indeed doubtful that such appalling bureaucracy as has been set out in these reports would be countenanced by such well-schooled Communists as those who currently lead the PCE. It is significant in this connection that most of the members of the new Politburo have spent some time in Moscow and have had extensive training in practical underground work. Ibarri was a member of the Comintern's Executive Committee in 1935. Whatever the composition of the central organs, it is unlikely that top cadres expend serious energies in matters of such relative levity as "Economic Studies."

## 2. Organization within Spain.

Information concerning organization within Spain is even more nebulous. There is probably some sort of central headquarters for coordination of affairs in the peninsula. A "Central Executive Committee," "Executive Politburo," and a "Central Committee Delegation" have been reported at various times as fulfilling such a function. A central organ may have worked in or near Madrid in 1947 (see above). Thus, Agustin Zorua Sanchez, on trial in December 1947, admitted that, as Secretary for the Madrid area of the PCE, he had handled all incoming and outgoing communications between peninsular organizations and France; but that he had supervised propaganda work in the Madrid area only. (This latter included the preparation and distribution of Mundo Obrero and guerilla leaflets and the operation of a Party radio station). The State prosecutor charged Zorua with having been head of a central organization for all of Spain, an accusation which may very well have

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been true, but which the defendant persistently denied. In any case, he admitted having received several monthly shipments of 60,000 pesetas from France.

It is possible that a central organ may still function in Spain. It is also possible that it may operate from some place across the French border, Toulouse being the most likely location.

The nearest approach to a genuine territorial organizational breakdown at hand is a report on the Basque CP in the Province of Vizcaya in 1946. Here a Regional Responsible directed the work in three subordinate Provinces, including Vizcaya. The Provincial Responsible was assisted by Responsibles for Agitprop, Political Affairs, Organization, Syndical Work, and Finances. Couriers and cut-outs effected liaison between various Party units.

Trials of other Communists have revealed the following details of organization at lower levels:

Niceto Carcarmo Gonzales admitted having been Propaganda Secretary for an (unstated) organization. As such, he supervised the work of five "groups." A mimeograph machine was found in his possession at time of arrest. He received a regular salary of 1,900 pesetas per month from the "organization."

Francisco López Garcia, as Secretary for Propaganda, directed fifteen "groups."

Others directed one or two "groups" or acted as liaison agents.

The above were all under the direction of Antonio Villaseñor Gallego, who was Secretary General of (apparently) a Radio consisting of fourteen cells of five members each.

Luis Ferranes ( or Fernandez) Carrera was "Number Three" (i.e., Responsible for Propaganda) for either a Radio or a Sector. He was in contact with various Radios.

Antonio Ivias Paredas was "Number Two" (Organization? Political Affairs?) of "Sector II."

Eusebio Cabanillas Alfaro (?) was sent to Spain from France on instruction from the "Organization in Madrid."

Jesús Monzon Neparas, Governor of Alicante and Murcia during the Civil War, fled to France via Oran (the route taken by many of those tried). Was made a member of the CC/PCE. Charged with having preceded Zorua as head of the apparatus in Spain and with having sent the latter to take over in Madrid. Denied that the central organization at Paris directed work within Spain, claiming that it was responsible for affairs in France only. Claimed that an "entirely separate commission" functioned in Spain.

Others were charged with having transported arms from across the French frontier. Raquel Pelayo, for example, entered Spain clandestinely in 1944 and was sheltered by a certain Conchita in Barcelona.

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Conchita led her and three (?) other women to a place in the Pyrenees, where they picked up arms, which they carried to Conchita's house for safekeeping.

3. Other Party Organizations Abroad.

In addition to the Paris center and the local organizations in Spain, Communist exiles set up their own organizations in many other countries, chief centers being the USSR, Mexico, Uruguay and Argentina.

Some Spanish Communist refugees stayed on in the USSR. "Free Spain" radio broadcasts on a variable frequency around 11,620 kilocycles from some place near Moscow. Most of the leading Party cadres, however, have left the USSR for France.

In Mexico members of the Basque CP and of the PCE set up local branches. These work closely with CP Mexico, but receive direction from Paris, with which they are in regular communication.\* Principal front for Spanish Communists in Mexico is the CP Mexico-sponsored FOARE (Federation of Organizations for Aid to the Spanish Republic). Leaders of the Basque CP and the PCE serve in executive capacities in the FOARE.

Manuel Delicado reportedly supervises the work of Spanish Communists in Uruguay, Argentina, and Chile, making frequent trips around this circuit as newspaper correspondent for Ce Soir and Humanite. He receives regular contributions from CP Argentina for the financial support of the groups in the three countries. Spanish Communists in Uruguay work chiefly within such fronts as the Casa de España and the JHUPRE (Spanish Junta of Uruguay for Republican Spain).\*\* The Argentine branch of the PCE which has only about 100 members publishes a newspaper which has a reported circulation of about 1,500. Spanish Communists in Argentina utilize a number of fronts for their activities.

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\* Intercepted letters have been addressed to the Politburo of the PCE at Paris by the "Information Bureau of the PCE," Mexico City.

\*\* Until this year, Spanish Communists in Uruguay could belong to CP Uruguay. In February the CPU decided to cease issuing membership cards to the Spaniards because the latter had occupied themselves solely with collecting money for their own groups. They may continue to attend CPU meetings, however.

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F. CP PORTUGAL UNDERGROUND

CP Portugal (PCP) has been officially illegal since 1935. It has been suppressed since 1926. For all practical purposes destroyed during the extreme repression practised by the Salazar regime in its first few years, the Party was not able to reorganize until 1941. Two years later, the "First Illegal Congress" elected a Central Committee. In 1943, also, the National Movement for Anti-Fascist Unity (MUNAF) was established under PCP domination. It was soon outlawed. In 1945 the Movement of Democratic Unity (MUD), a formation of liberal opposition, was set up. The PCP soon gained control over it. The MUD was not denounced by the Government until April 1948, although the police closed its Lisbon headquarters in February 1947.

Meanwhile, the PCP underground spread out and strengthened its organization. In 1945 the police again clamped down on the Party, and during the succeeding years destroyed large segments of it. The PCP does not constitute a significant threat to the Salazar Government, and is a relatively insignificant Party. Nevertheless, certain aspects of underground organization are better illustrated from the activity of the PCP than from any other Party currently underground.

1. Organization. (See Chart, "General Organization of the PCP")

Little is known about the leading (national) organs of the PCP. So far as they are known they seem to fit into the standard pattern. Location of Party headquarters is not known; it undoubtedly moves around from one place to another to escape the police. Leading organs are the following:

(1) Secretariat: a Triad consisting of Alvaro Barreirinhas Cunha (recently arrested), Francisco Miguel Duarte, and Manuel Guedes.

(2) Politburo: 6 members, elected at the "Second Illegal Congress" September 1946.

(3) Central Committee: 9 members known. In this, each of the Regional or Provincial Committees is represented by one member; who controls work in his area.

Other functional organs which may possibly operate under the Secretariat's supervision are the following:

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- (1) Treasurer
- (2) Radio
- (3) Library (publications?)
- (4) Technical council (printing and distribution?)

An Agitprop section has quite reasonably and reliably been reported to function on the Regional level, and it is not unlikely that a corresponding section operates on the National level as well. A separate Military Committee has been described as operating at the top level. It is responsible for the penetration and supervision of Party fractions within the armed services and publishes several mimeographed sheets directed at these (A Voz do Soldado, Sargento, Official Miliciano for the Army; O Leme for the Navy). The following positions have been held in this Committee:

- (1) Responsible for the Committee to the CC/PCP; also in charge of passwords and identifications.
- (2) Responsible for fractions in the Navy.
- (3) Responsible for fractions in military units stationed West of Lisbon.
- (4) Responsible for fractions in military units stationed East of Lisbon.

Jose Soares was reportedly made Responsible for Party maritime work in 1946. He set up cells for stevedores, lightermen, warehousemen, and unloaders. He directed a "strike commission" and regularly distributed copies of the PCP organs Avante and O Militante among his cells.

PCP structure through the Provinces is decentralized through the following territorial echelons: Province, Region, Sub-region, Zone, Local, Cell. In some areas, there is apparently no Provincial organization, control being exercised directly by Regional Responsibles sitting on the Central Committee. Likewise, the Zone and Regional Sub-committees do not seem to be constant features in all regions. Two further subdivisions have been reported: District Committees between Regional Sub-committees and local committees; and below these, an "Advisory Commission", which seems to be merely an informal grouping of several local committee Responsibles for cooperative action. Party committees at all levels above the cell consist of from 3 to 5 "functionarios" (i.e., paid functionaries), one of whom is the Responsible, the others controlling one or more subordinate units. It appears that

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Responsibles for organizations on each level occupy seats on the next higher committee.

An account of organization and activities of units under the Provincial Committee for the Beiras may clarify the picture as shown on the chart.

The Provincial Committee was directed by J. P. Jorge (Central Committee and Politburo member). The Provincial Committee administered two Regions, "Y" (Coimbra and the Beira Litoral) and "R" (Upper Beira and Lower Beira). Region "Y" was directed by Agostinho da Conceicao Saboga. It comprised at least two local committees, "Y1" (Coimbra) and "Y2" (Figueira da Foz). The local Committee for Coimbra was set up at one time by V. A. de Andrade, Dr. A. R. de Cunha, and J. R. de Freitas, working under Saboga's orders. As an initial step in its organization, Saboga met Andrade secretly in the outskirts of Coimbra, giving the latter the following assignments:

- (1) To control PCP organization in the offices of Posts and Telegraph, in the shops of Auto Industrial Lda, and among chauffeurs.

- (2) To set up a cell in the printing trade.

Cunha, who was Responsible for work among intellectuals, put Andrade in touch with several persons who would take over the actual work of organizing the cells and with "Tom", who would carry on the work of distribution of Party publications to those cells. Later, when Andrade, still acting on Saboga's orders, severed his Party relations to devote himself to work on the MUD District Committee, he turned his cells over to "Tom".

The same Jorge, as Central Committee Responsible for the North, supervised PCP work at Oporto as well as Coimbra. He was PCP delegate of the Regional Committee of MUNAF at Oporto; later succeeded by F. S. Martins, who acted as liaison between Jorge and Dr. J. A. D. de Oliveira, Responsible for Party work among intellectuals in Oporto.

A safehouse in which Jorge was living in 1945 was raided, yielding Party records and a few arms. Jorge himself escaped arrest, being in the south at the time. Another safehouse was rented by Oliveira on Jorge's instructions. This house was used by one PCP member after his

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escape from prison and was later turned over to a Local Committee of the PCP for its use.

The connections noted above between the PCP and MUD and MUNAF recur in many cases. There can be no doubt that these organizations have served as Party auxiliaries. Key posts on all organizational levels are held by individuals who are either admitted Party members or who have technically severed connections with the Party. The usual line of control in cases of record, passed through a "Funcionario" sitting on both PCP and MUD (or MUNAF) committees. Sometimes, a member or members of local auxiliary committees have been nominated or appointed to these committees by a PCP functionary, who may thus exercise an indirect control over several subordinate auxiliary groups. MUD is organized along lines similar to those of the PCP; is divided between MUD Youth and MUD Adult organizations. It has had (at least in Oporto) Feminine Committees, whose place in the over-all structure is not quite clear.

To all intents, the above organizations operate as branches of the PCP, agitating, recruiting for eventual Party membership, raising money, printing and distributing propaganda.

Not the least important purpose served by such fronts has been their usefulness in shielding Party cadres. In a strike at Barreiro in April 1947, e.g., not a single member of the PCP factory cell was implicated, although the cell had initiated the strike and had given the orders for its termination. Responsibility could be fixed by the police only on non-Communists.

Other fronts and auxiliaries, such as the "Gloria Football Club" of Vila Real (an organization which reportedly has never held a sporting event of any kind), the "Circulo de Cinema", and various Party and auxiliary "Aid Committees", have served money-raising, recruiting, and propagandizing needs of the Party.

## 2. Security.

In September 1946, the Secretariat complained that the Party had suffered heavily from failure of individual members to practise elementary rules of security. The directive circulated recited several

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cases in which arrested members had given away organizational details by which the police were enabled to break up large sections of the Party structure. The Secretariat recognized its responsibility for having failed to put into effect adequate security measures and criticized many middle and lower cadre-men for corresponding errors. These may be reduced to the following:

- (1) Permitting unnecessary traffic into safehouses and permitting their locations to be too generally known among members.
- (2) Storing documents in residences of members; failing to make provision for quick destruction of records.
- (3) Using "a means of transportation (the boat between the Praco do Comercio in Lisbon, and Barreiro) expressly forbidden and condemned by the Secretariat".
- (4) Using a "condemned" and too "elementary code describing the site of a meeting".
- (5) Ignoring a warning signal that all was not secure in a house entered by a member engaged in illegal work -- such contact itself being especially prohibited.
- (6) Failing to take recommended precautions in changing from one safehouse to another.
- (7) Failure on the part of a Responsible to give adequate warning to other members of his organization when one of them had been arrested.
- (8) Giving, and inducing others to give, information concerning Party work to the police upon arrest. (This criticism was levelled against no less a person than a Candidate member of the Central Committee).
- (9) Giving information to a police agent who had been planted in the prisoner's cell.

Some additional information is available on safehouses and on techniques employed for meetings.

Meetings. The following instructions were given in a PCP document seized in the summer of 1947:

- (1) All leaders must be very careful about meetings with other members.
- (2) For every meeting the place and time must be previously thought out; all who are to attend should have advance knowledge of it and not make others wait.
- (3) The places for meetings should be secure, so that members can discuss all problems pertaining to the organization without having to worry about self-protection.
- (4) The place must be known only to those attending, even after the meeting has taken place.
- (5) It must never be communicated to anyone, not even to members in whom we have the greatest confidence.

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Meetings between individuals are prefaced by an exchange of identification tokens (most commonly, simply a card or piece of paper torn into two matching pieces, each scrap being given by the supervising functionary, who is the only one knowing both persons) and letters of introduction certifying one to be a "person of confidence."

Apparently, rather large meetings -- of whole committees and observers, e.g., -- are held with regularity, the members depending rather overmuch on a strict observance of pseudonyms. For example, so important a functionary as Jorge once visited the home of the Responsible for the Faro District Committee of the MUD Adult to reprimand him in person. There is little question, however, that most of the large number of militants so far arrested have been quite in the dark concerning the identities of their associates and superiors, knowing each other only by party names.

Safehouses. Important meetings take place in safehouses, of which the PCP has had a large number, both for this purpose, as well as for housing "funcionarios" in hiding and for the safeguarding of necessary records. Probably most of these houses are rented through intermediaries -- sympathizers, secret members, friends and relatives, and adherents of auxiliary groups. Such a house, at Praia de Granja (7 km. south of Vila Nova) was rented for a month's time by an intermediary employed by Jorge, Politburo member responsible for the area north of Lisbon. This house, which has not been further described, was used by the Central Committee for a week's meeting in which 16 persons participated.

A two and one-half weeks' course in organization, agitation, and strike preparation was given at a second safehouse near Lisbon. To preserve the secrecy of the location of the house, the following extraordinary precautions were taken: the car in which the students (cadre in PCP maritime work) were taken to the house followed a devious route, driving blackout as soon as the open country had been reached. The "funcionario" conducting the group instructed the members to close their eyes during the trip, keeping close watch on them the while. Even after leaving the car to walk the remaining distance to the house, the

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students were supposed to keep their eyes closed, joining hands to keep from stumbling.

3. Agitprop.

Publications. The PCP and its auxiliaries have published the following:

Avante: Official Party organ. Small, thin paper; minute type-set which is quite legible. General propaganda.

O Militante: Internal organizational bulletin.

O Campones: MUNAF peasants' publication.

Ressurgimento: MUNAF periodical.

Patria Livre: A new mimeographed publication intended for personnel of the armed forces. First issue, August 1948. Allegedly put out by the Military Committee of the PCP.

O Expresso: Intended for railroad workers.

Libertacao Nacional: Mimeographed sheet put out at Oporto by the PCP organization in the North.

UNIR: A pamphlet.

No material is at hand to illustrate techniques of printing such editions. No less than 10 central printing establishments have been discovered and confiscated by the police since 1941, but no descriptions of their physical setup or methods are available. It is likely that relatively small editions of such regularly published papers as Avante and O Militante are printed at several different locations.

A student at Coimbra University, resident in Oporto, was arrested for buying mimeograph paper in "large quantities" in Coimbra and transporting it to Oporto, where Libertacao Nacional and UNIR were published.

A second Coimbra student, member of the District Committee of the MUD, also had a mimeograph machine from which he used to run off MUD Youth circulars. He refused to say where he got the machine or other supplies.

Occasional pamphlets and flyers were also printed by a PCP member on the mimeograph machine of the import-export firm which employed him.

Distribution. Central distribution of PCP literature is effected through the regular Party machine, from a Responsible to his subordinates, on down the line. Couriers, intermediaries, and storage places

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are standard fixtures in the distribution system. Local distribution to individuals is managed by cell Responsibles and sympathizers, especially those having establishments (e.g., grocery stores, bakeries) in which secure storage is available and local traffic not likely to arouse police suspicion.

The case of da Luz Taqueliu will serve to illustrate the observance of security measures in the matter of distribution. Taqueliu, (member of the Regional Committee #1 under the Provincial Committee for the Algarve), was instructed by "Ricardo" to set up a distributing apparatus at Lagos, where he was Responsible for the Regional Sub-committee. Through an identification token given him by "Ricardo", Taqueliu contacted one Ribeiro to take up the actual work. Ribeiro used the token to establish contact with the person from whom he was to receive the literature to be distributed. Presumably, he also arranged for people to distribute the material to cells and other auxiliary groups around Lagos.

The PCP also has done its share of street-and-wall writing. In Lagos, the same Taqueliu prepared black paint from coal for walls, and white paint from lime for streets. He and the three members of the Local Committee proceeded to paint slogans around the town, possibly employing stencils, such as were commonly used for the purpose.

A certain amount of literature is imported from abroad, notably from Brazil. Brazilian and Portuguese ships with Communist crew members have brought in some publications, probably those of CP Brazil. Literature from Spain and France comes by way of Morocco and Tangier, carried by small boats plying between Portuguese and North African ports.

#### 4. Communications Abroad.

In addition to occasional contacts that may be established by Communist crew members, as described above, the PCP is believed to hold fairly regular communications with CP Spain. Refugees from both sides of the frontier are harbored by the co-operating CP's. Border-crossing stations have been operated at several points: Veiga Mea,

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Casas de Monforte, and Cambada. These three "support points" were at one time controlled by Fernando de Oliveira, at Chaves. J. P. Jorge made several trips to Chaves to meet Spanish refugees, many of whom stayed in Portugal only long enough to make arrangements to join Spanish guerrilla units. Other "support points" are believed to have operated near Bustelo and Smdarcos, in Spain.

Safe-conducts, issued by various Spanish authorities for travelers to the frontier and elsewhere, have been returned to PCE units for use and re-use by other refugee comrades.

Cyphered letters to persons abroad have been discovered among PCP and PCE documents seized at the frontier by police.

Small boats sometimes carry Portuguese and Spanish Communists between peninsular ports and Morocco and Tangier.

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