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
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A SURVEY OF ALBANIA

Attention is invited to Par. 87, TM 80 - 288 dated 20 October 1947, which prescribes that the disclosure of the nature, sources or even the existence of Counter Intelligence information, to persons mentioned in Counter Intelligence Reports, or to other persons not normally entitled to such information may be made only when clearly authorized by the Director of Intelligence General Staff, United States Army or higher authority. Unauthorized disclosure of such information will be considered a violation of AR 380-4.

FOREWORD

In presenting the following material on ALBANIA, three principal objectives were kept in mind; (1) to give the reader a simple and concise account of the historical background; (2) to present a cross-sectional analysis of the Communist Party governmental pattern; and (3) to submit added and timely information to those groups primarily interested in this field.

In various instances, extracts were made from filed reports since this information appeared best suited to illustrate particular points throughout the survey. Although far from presenting a comprehensive summation of the subject, the practical utility of this report lies in the coverage of the most important aspects of modern ALBANIA.

An effort has been made to demonstrate the development of ALBANIA by the USSR for political and military reasons. Inasmuch as the Soviet foreign policy has incorporated ALBANIA for the ultimate purpose of providing the USSR with an outlet to the Mediterranean, it is reasonable to assume that eventually Yugoslav Macedonia will have to be sacrificed to realize this undertaking. In view of the international situation today, and of the aggressive attitude assumed by the U.N., it may be some time before this Russian ambition in the Balkans can achieve fruition. The possibility that YUGOSLAVIA will do an about face and return to the Cominform fold cannot be discounted.

ALBANIA's importance stems from the geographical factor rather than any national accomplishments or contributions. Her strategic importance weighs heavily in the balance of power in the Mediterranean and the Near East.

For collateral reading which coincides in part with this report, it is recommended that the 17th CIC Detachment TRUST Bi-Weekly Intelligence Summary, 1-17 Feb 50, page 5, Macedonia, be consulted.

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History, Sociology and Geography

1. Early History

STRABO, the Roman historian, mentioned that the Albanians as a people settled in the trans-Caucasus flatland in the era before Christ. The Romans had established contact with these people during the century preceding the birth of Christ. The Albanians, meanwhile, had obtained possession of the fertile valley of the Cyrus River (at present known as the Kura, in Azerbaijan). By means of a military agreement concluded with the Albanians, the Romans used Albanian contingents during their wars against MITHRIDATUS, King of PONTUS.

According to STRABO, at that time the Albanians were already an important ethnic group, since they were able to form an army of approximately 80,000 men. An excellent cavalry formed the strongest component of this army. The people lived dispersed throughout the Cyrus River Valley, and also occupied territory in sections of the mountains north of the river. Various tribes had a similar language, but there were considerable differences in dialects. These tribes were ruled by chieftans whom STRABO called "kings", however, it is difficult to compare this term with its contemporary meaning.

The Albanians were heathens, like the nomadic peoples who invaded their territory, and they differed from these nomads by race rather than language. No historic documents remain from that time, therefore, it cannot be determined at exactly what period Albanian defense of their own country became possible. It is certain, however, that pressure from the south and east became so strong that further defense of their territory could not be carried on by the Albanians.

In conjunction with other racial groups from the East, the Albanians began to migrate toward the Mediterranean area. By one route they travelled across Asia Minor (Cappadocia, Galatea, etc.) and the Sea of Marmara, reaching Thracia (Thrace), south of the Rhodope Mountains; and by another route the Albanians crossed the Aegean Islands and reached Euboea, Attica, and Boetia. Until this day, strong Albanian racial characteristics are perfectly preserved in the islands which are now part of GREECE. However, the northern wing of this migration, not having found conditions suitable in Thracia, first turned to the north toward Macedonia where part of this original group has remained to the present time. The remainder of the group gradually spread until later it had reached the coasts of the Ionic and Adriatic Seas. The unsuitable conditions pointed out above concerned the inadaptability of these people in cultural and social fields rather than in any dislike of the climate or environment.

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A Survey of ALBANIA (cont'd.)

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In their new country, the Albanians were mixed with other racial groups and elements which had attached themselves to the main body of Albanians during the process of migration, either by means of protective arrangements or social contact. Upon their arrival in what is now known as ALBANIA, the Albanians found Pelasgic remnants of a superior culture and civilization, which influenced their own evolution considerably. Whether or not these Pelasgic peoples who had preceded the Albanians in their migration to the Mediterranean had originally belonged to the same racial groups is a problem which has never been solved.

While the ancient history of the Albanians cannot be established with certainty, ethnographers believe that they were part of the large Indo-European group which had migrated from ASIA arriving in Thracia and then settling during the following centuries in the impenetrable gorges of contemporary ALBANIA. In an ethnic sense, ALBANIA occupies nearly all of the territory surrounded by the borders of the country and also the areas which extend into the littoral of Crna Gora (Montenegro) (Rumija Mountain, Point 1593, YUGOSLAVIA, 1:250,000, Sheet Y-46, 090933), and from there across the Ibar River into the Sandjak Region near Novi Pazar (YUGOSLAVIA, 1:250,000, Sheet Y-37, 810331), then to the flatland of Kosovo Polje, well to the other side of Pristina (YUGOSLAVIA, 1:250,000, Sheet Y-38, 858273).

The ethnic border then follows the Vardar River, grazing Skoplje (YUGOSLAVIA, 1:250,000, Sheet Y-48, 873903) until it reaches Titov Veles (YUGOSLAVIA, 1:250,000, Sheet Y-48, 300870), from where it turns to the southwest toward Struga (GREECE, 1:250,000, Sheet G-1, 203518) on the northern shore of Lake Ohrid. The ethnic border then crosses the political boundary of GREECE and ALBANIA, following a line between Struga, Grammos Mountain (Point 2192, GREECE, 1:250,000, Sheet G-4, 212721), the vicinity of Jamiza (GREECE, 1:250,000, Sheet G-4, 202650), and the Greek coast at Parga (map not available).

Albanians living in the Albanian-Greek territory between Gjinkastre (GREECE, 1:250,000, Sheet G-4, 146701), and Parga are mixed with Greek ethnic stock. Actually, it cannot be stated with certainty that these are ethnic Greeks, but the cultural contacts these people have had during the last ten centuries with purely Greek elements have left their mark, since there is a great resemblance to the Hellenic civilization. The Orthodox religion has also exercised a profound influence, while the people in some of the valleys have assumed the Greek language as their own.

Southern Albanians also live in contact with ethnic groups of "Kucio-Vlachs" (Roumanians) residing in the Pindus Mountains of GREECE, while there are ten of these ethnic groups living within the borders of ALBANIA itself.

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A Survey of ALBANIA (cont'd)

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The Albanian language of today preserves some phonetic forms belonging to these nomadic peoples who had come from Thracia.

This shows the connection with the ancient inhabitants of Thracia while enroute during the migration toward the Adriatic.

The Roman Empire had subjugated ALBANIA, but had never succeeded in assimilating her population. The conquered Albanian territory was organically detached from the rest of the Roman Empire. It is a very significant fact that the Albanians were the only barbarous people along the Mediterranean coastline who had the strength to resist national and cultural consolidation by the Romans.

Albanians lived in the mountains and Roman civilization could penetrate only with the utmost difficulty, since it followed only the roads. Roman culture ceased in influence where the roads ended. Therefore, the Albanians remained in their primitive state due to the lack of roads. In the main, Roman culture was established along a narrow coastal strip and along the valleys of the main rivers.

Since the Albanians had chosen mountainous areas in which to live (possibly due to a healthier climate) their main national characteristics remained intact. It is known that the Romans selected the easiest routes of penetration for their political and commercial activities. These routes did not cross broken ground, as a rule, except in cases where there were no better passages available.

Therefore, the Albanians had practically no relations with the Romans. Roman culture, which had left indestructible monuments in the form of public works in some valley areas of ALBANIA, had never succeeded in impressing its mark on the Albanian spirit, language, and traditions. Due to this zealous nurture of tradition, the Albanians have remained somewhat primitive since the days of the Romans.

Judging from the nature and character of these people, it requires but elementary deduction to discover that they have not been very progressive in advancing toward what is the modern concept of civilization. Undoubtedly there has been a process of evolution, but it has been quite independent, taking its particular place within this molecular cell of universal culture, and devoid of any foreign influence.

In approximately the year 395, which was the year of the division of the Roman Empire into the Oriental and Occidental Empires, ALBANIA was assigned to the Oriental Empire. However, this relegation took place on paper and did not represent anything more, since ALBANIA at that time was nothing more than a series of small, feudal domains which were more or less tributary dependents of larger domains which were then being formed in other parts of the Balkans and in ITALY.

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A Survey of ALBANIA (cont'd)

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This situation was a result of the fact that both the Balkan and Western states aspired to the possession of the Albanian coastline and the Straits of Otranto, either to establish protection for their commerce or to penetrate further into the Mediterranean. The first large-scale barbarian invasions of ALBANIA took place in the 5th century, when the Goths invaded the country in 493. However, in 535 the Goths were driven out by JUSTINIANUS. Various invasions of ALBANIA by Slav tribes took place immediately after their arrival in the Balkan Peninsula. During the latter part of the 7th century there were several small Serbian principalities in ALBANIA, subjects of the Byzantine Empire, but independent to a certain degree. The Byzantines, who controlled but a narrow coastal strip, could only exercise a very limited influence and their power in the central parts of the country was of a purely fictitious nature. The Albanian coast was also divided into two areas at that time; the coast of Epirus in the south, and the zone in the north extending as far as Boka Kotorska (YUGOSLAVIA, 1:250,000, Sheet Y-35, 080930).

The 9th century brought an event of great historical importance in regard to ALBANIA. It was during this period that first approach to the country was made by any of the Italian states. This marked the beginning of commercial traffic between ALBANIA and the Republics of Venice and Amalfi. The Republic of Amalfi established a small domain at Durres, while the Venetian Republic established a hold over Shkoder and Lezh (YUGOSLAVIA, 1:250,000, Sheet Y-46, 123894). The Normans, who had consolidated the southern part of the Italian Peninsula under their rule, also intervened as a consequence of family ties which connected them with the Emperor of the Byzantine Empire, Michael DUCA. In turn, DUCA was succeeded by Alexis COMENOS, who came to the assistance of the Republic of Venice and who was successful in eliminating the Normans from ALBANIA. Although the Norman attempt to settle in ALBANIA had failed, it signified the beginning of their hegemony through the establishment of the Kingdom of Naples.

Along the coast, the influence of the Venetian Republic was apparent, since the Venetians wanted to safeguard their sea routes. The Albanians who were settled along the coast came into contact with various institutions which the Venetians had imposed upon those people, but the greater portion of the population continued to live in the mountains, defending themselves from invasions by either the Turks or the Slavs. The people in the lowlands derived some benefit from contact with the western world, but continued to remain quite immune from continental influences.

The Venetian Republic continued its penetration of ALBANIA from the north, using the Republic of Dubrovnik (YUGOSLAVIA, 1:250,000, Sheet Y-35, 035957) which was the strongest force of the Balkan coastline, and which remained in contact with western republics through commercial and cultural exchanges. Venice obtained nominal possession of all of ALBANIA and Epirus during the Fourth Crusade, but at the time, Venetian influence was limited to the coastline.

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A Survey of ALBANIA (cont'd)

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During the 18th Century, the Napoleonic Imperial Invasion occurred in ALBANIA. However, this expedition was unsuccessful, as were a number of revolts within the Albanian forces of the Turkish Army. These revolts were organized by tribal chieftains who were desirous of expanding personal power. The most important of these insurrections was that led by Ali PASHE TEPELENA, Lord of Janina.

After the end of the Napoleonic Wars, during which the Turkish Government remained extremely alert, Mehmed II decided that once and for always, the rebelling generals of the Albanian forces would be forced into submission. He managed to win the support of the Christians and Greeks, then began a long and bitter campaign which terminated in 1820, when Ali PASHE TEPELENA was killed at Janina.

Although Ali PASHE cannot be compared to SKENDERBEG in regard to military and glory and noble aims, he is undoubtedly one of the most remarkable personalities in Albanian history. After his death, many Albanians migrated into GREECE and valiantly fought against the Turks during the Greek insurrections in 1821 and 1827.

The movement for the liberation of the small nations which composed the European part of the Ottoman Empire had started under the leadership of RUSSIA, which already at that time claimed to be the "Protector of the Slav Nations of the Balkans" and placed the Albanians in a very precarious position. This was due to the fact that the Albanian population was made up of Moslem, Catholic, and Orthodox elements. Furthermore, the convenient location of ALBANIA excited the imperialistic aims of the small Balkan states seeking an outlet to the Adriatic, and simultaneously expanding their zones of influence. The Albanian struggle always had an anti-Slav character, since Slavism represented an eternal menace. This is the main reason why the Albanians, who had fought heroically against the Turks in a number of insurrections and revolts, fought under the Turkish flag against the Russian armies in the Crimean War. Later they fought against the united Russian and Bulgarian forces.

In 1877, Prenk BIB DODA, Prince of the Mirdita Tribe, who had been defeated a year previously by the Turks against whom he had led an armed revolt, refused all offers by Russian agents and fought with his followers (all Catholics) in the ranks of the Turkish Army, both at Fleven and at Sipka Pass. Facts like these present ample evidence that the national spirit of ALBANIA has demonstrated exhibitions of vitality and of unity. She has recognized the route toward her own interests independent of religion, whenever such dualism was allowed by prevailing conditions, since the religious factor had, as it still has, a great importance in all of the Balkans.

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A Survey of ALBANIA (cont'd)

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A source of this report is not of the same opinion. He claims with some certainty, since he has lived with these people and knows them well, that the idea of nationalism has been fully preserved, although restricted, during the course of the country's political strife, to areas where invaders never were able to maintain themselves for long periods of time. However, the particularism of individual groups is still very much alive.

A combined survey of the medieval and modern history of ALBANIA reveals that while the country was always divided by conditions imposed from abroad, it was also divided by disagreements between individual chieftans. In spite of the factors, ALBANIA has always been extremely jealous of her independence. The survey also reveals that requests for assistance addressed to the small states of the Italian Peninsula were always favorably received, particularly in Naples and Venice.

In 1230, ALBANIA was conquered by the Bulgarian Czar, Ivan Arsen II, who extended the Bulgarian Empire to the coast of the Adriatic. But this invasion was of very short duration. The Bulgarians were forced to withdraw because of an alliance formed between the Serbians, Byzantines, Hungarians, and Tatars. With the departure of the Bulgarians there followed a short period of Serbian domination. But this too, was short since the ANJOU Dynasty in expanding its power, invaded ALBANIA during the years between 1272 and 1279. In 1279 all of ALBANIA was firmly held by the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies. The Serbians fought for years against the ANJOU without achieving any success. Venice, however, succeeded in recovering the city of Skoder.

During the latter part of the 14th Century, ALBANIA was divided into a large number of minor feudal domains. These waged permanent wars against one another and they would not be reconciled, even by the Turkish menace, which was growing increasingly imminent. Some territories, like the city of Janina, became subjects of the Ottoman Empire of their own accord. However, Venice was anxious to save its territorial possessions in ALBANIA.

George CASTRIOTA, better known as "SKENDERBERG", became the national hero of ALBANIA when he succeeded in uniting his compatriots in the common war against the Turkish invader and defeating the Turks on several occasions. In 1443, exploiting the victory of Janos HUNYADI over the Turkish Army in the vicinity of Nis (YUGOSLAVIA, 1:250,000, Sheet Y-39, 923340), SKENDERBERG had himself nominated Governor of Kruja (YUGOSLAVIA, 1:250,000, Sheet Y-46, 133862). In the spring of 1444 he formed the "League of the Albanian Peoples" at Lezh, which was supported by the principal chieftans and the Venetian governors of Lezh, Skoder, and Durres. SKENDERBERG then began a series of brilliant campaigns against the Turks.

SKENDERBERG first defeated greatly superior Turkish forces on 29 June 1444. The fighting then ceased for a period of three years when it resumed in 1447, and lasted until 1453. SKENDERBERG received a

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A Survey of ALBANIA (cont'd)

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After the political events of 1878, ALBANIA demonstrated other proofs of an admirable national conscience. The Berlin Treaty (June 1878), in appeasing Russian demands, assigned the Albanian territories of Vranja (YUGOSLAVIA, 1:250,000, Sheet Y-39, 317255) and Kursumlija (YUGOSLAVIA, 1:250,000, Sheet Y-38, 872325) to SERBIA; Bar (YUGOSLAVIA, 1:250,000, Sheet Y-46, 981932) and the districts of Plav (YUGOSLAVIA, 1:250,000, Sheet Y-37), Trepca (YUGOSLAVIA, 1:250,000, Sheet Y-36, 747296) and Gusinje (YUGOSLAVIA, 1:250,000, Sheet Y-37, 749274) were assigned to CRNA GORA (MONTENEGRO), while a part of the Epirus was given to GREECE. The "Albanian League" was formed in protest against this division of Albanian territory. This organization was both political and military in nature. The "League" decided to resist the occupation of these territories with arms, and was supported by Albanians of all three religious creeds who were without any differences on this occasion.

The Turks, recognizing the Treaty, withdrew their forces, then these were immediately replaced by forces of the "League" and who were ready to resist occupation of these areas. However, the powers which had signed the Berlin Treaty, led by GREAT BRITAIN, were anxious to conclude the political contest with RUSSIA, therefore, they sent an ultimatum to the Turkish Court. In response, the Turks sent a force of 30,000 men, led by Dervish PASHA, against the insurgents. The forces of the "League" were defeated and its leaders killed or exiled. The Mirdita Prince, Prenk BIB DODA, was retained as a hostage.

At that time, Albanian patriotic publications began to appear all over the world. Arberi i Ri (Free Country), the first newspaper in the Albanian language, was printed under the direction of De RADA, the Italo-Albanian poet; Calendar, published in Sofia under the direction of Kristo LAURASI (a member of an old Albanian family from Tirane); the magazine Albania, published in Brussels; Bel I (The Sun), at Boston; and Shklopitari (The Albanian) published in Constantinople.

The "Albanian League" appeared again in 1863 led by the tribes of Hoti, Gestrati, and Skrelli who revolted against the Montenegrin occupation of the territory of Podgorica (YUGOSLAVIA, 1:250,000, Sheet Y-46, 700265). On this occasion, Catholics and Moslems fought side by side in defense of their territory. Movements of a similar character emerged during the events of the Greco-Turkish War (1897). The FRASHERI Brothers, Abdyl and Sami, gathered Albanians in a patriotic movement based on a federal program.

In 1908, the revolution of the "Young Turks" took place. The Turkish Government at Constantinople again sent an expeditionary force headed by Shefket TURGUD PASHA to pacify ALBANIA. The Albanians could have utilized the unstable situation during the revolution of the "Young Turks". Paradoxically enough, the moment demanded that the Turkish Empire be preserved rather than destroyed, since other Balkan states, in attacking the Empire, would have divided up ALBANIA as a Turkish province, with SERBIA, MONTENEGRO, and GREECE benefiting.

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In an effort to establish claims to areas of Southern ALBANIA, GREECE used deliberate methods in confusing the issue. The Greeks claimed that there were many people living in those areas who were of Greek nationality or of the Orthodox religion.

The Balkan War presented a great danger, since the Albanians resented the treatment given them by the Turks, and were still perturbed by the memories of the acts committed by the Turkish expeditionary forces under Sheiket PASHA and Dervish PASHA. Simultaneously, the collapse of the Ottoman Empire would cause ALBANIA torn to pieces. The Catholic elements of northern ALBANIA, formerly the vanguard of the "Albanian League" and, as such, suffered most of the inhuman methods of Turkish oppression and reprisal, deserted the Turkish forces during the Battle of Kumanovo (YUGOSLAVIA, 1:250,000, Sheet Y-48, 298917) and joined the opposing Serbian forces. Skoplje (YUGOSLAVIA, 1:250,000, Sheet Y-48, 274907) and Monastir (Bitolj) (GREECE, 1:250,000, Sheet G-1, 255797) were taken by the Serbian Army, which also invaded Albanian territory and reached the Adriatic Sea at Durres (GREECE, 1:250,000, Sheet G-1, 103844) and Shen Gjin (YUGOSLAVIA, 1:250,000, Sheet Y-48, 106873) by means of a rapid maneuver. At the same time, Montenegrin forces besieged Shkoder (YUGOSLAVIA, 1:250,000, Sheet Y-46) which, at that time, was the main city of ALBANIA.

Albanians of Catholic, Moslem and Orthodox creeds then arrayed themselves against the Serbs and Montenegrins during the second phase of the Balkan War. In 1912, an uprising took place in the Kossovo under the leadership of politicians and militarymen, such as: Hasan DRAGA; ~~Nerhin DRAGA~~ and Colonel Rejvan CURPI. ~~The Serbians were~~ Isa BOLETINI conquered Skoplje and Prishtina, and national independence was gained on 28 November 1912. Although the Ottoman Empire was approaching its end, ALBANIA was still in danger of the Slavs.

Even though sovereignty was recognized in ALBANIA, her ethnic territory was cut nearly in half. The tribes of Hoti, Gruda, and part of the Clementi were completely cut off Albanian territory. The flatland of Podgorica (Titograd), and the ports of Bar and Ulcinj were in MONTENEGRO. The fertile flatlands of Pec (Peja) (YUGOSLAVIA, 1:250,000, Sheet Y-37, 787280) and Djakovica (YUGOSLAVIA, 1:250,000, Sheet Y-47, 195553) had also been given to MONTENEGRO to enable her to maintain an independent economy, and in doing so, the ethnic and national factors of the Albanians living in these regions were completely disregarded.

The flatland of Kossovo, with its cities of Prizren (YUGOSLAVIA, 1:250,000, Sheet Y-47, 218532) and Prishtina (YUGOSLAVIA, 1:250,000, Sheet Y-38, 859273) were assigned to SERBIA for sentimental reasons since those cities were reminders of the Battle of Kossovo, which had cost the Serbians their independence. The right bank of the Black Drin River up to and across the city of Debar (Dibra) (YUGOSLAVIA, 1:250,000, Sheet Y-48, 4152 1948) was given to SERBIA, while all of the Epirus with the cities of Janina and Ciamurija, became part of GREECE.

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Three Albanian provisional governments were formed in order to prevent more harm. One was located in Vlone and headed by the prominent Ismail Qemal VLORA; the second was located in Mirdita, and was headed by Prenk (Prince) BIB DODA; while the third was in Tirane, and headed by Esad PASHA TOPTANI, the Defender of Shkoder.

During the course of the same year (1913), the Ambassador's Conference was held in London under the chairmanship of Sir GREY, with the participation of several powers: ITALY, ENGLAND, AUSTRIA, FRANCE, RUSSIA and GERMANY. The purpose of the conference concerned reaching an agreement on the Albanian problem. By January 1914, a commission was established for the delimitation of the Albanian borders. In March 1914, William WIED, a German prince, was sent to ALBANIA as its sovereign. However Prince WIED was forced to abandon Durres in September 1914 aboard an Italian vessel in order to escape an insurrection provoked by Esad PASHA, an Albanian general who was assassinated in Paris a few years later.

2. Sociological Survey

As mentioned in the preceding section, the Albanians have preserved almost intact certain social institutions which have become quite uncommon and virtually non-existent in other European countries. While fighting for their independence, the Albanians maintained themselves in their inaccessible mountains. There they preserved certain traditions and characteristics which may be primitive and anachronistic; institutions which might be unacceptable in other countries; but which prove that the Albanians have remained genuine and that their race has remained pure.

It is well known that the family is the basis of society, and when the family ceases to exist, the nation itself is subject to collapse. In the specific instance of ALBANIA, which was so hard pressed from all sides, the state had to retreat leaving the defense of individuals to small, collective groups. Although in feudal form, which corresponded to the time, these groups managed to solve the problem by retreating into the mountains, organizing small groups, and subjecting them to a severe moral and military discipline. The aim of this policy was to protect the primitive cell, the family. If the family had been allowed to disintegrate and disappear, the Albanians as a nation would be non-existent today. For example, the Etruscans disappeared leaving no descendants, only a few remnants and monuments of their civilization.

The Berlin Treaty appeared to have been largely affected by the general belief that the disintegration of ALBANIA was already a completed fact, and that a division of her territories could be made without causing any difficulties. However, as events proved, just the opposite transpired. Mainly, this was due to the extraordinary vitality of the Albanians, who, while giving ground to the secular rule progressing in the valleys, preserved intact their ethnic structure in the mountains. There the secular power had been unable to penetrate. There was probably 5 centers of Albanian

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resistance, which corresponded to 65 tribes. At present, the most important of these are; the Mati (25,000), and the Kirdita (18,000).

Tribes are ruled by an "assembly of fathers" (family chiefs) in which a particularly few chiefs who merit the honor, hold places of predominance. In the areas under Moslem influence, the chiefs are called "Bey" or "Beg", while the foremost carry the title of "Bajraktar". These titles are a carryover from the days of SKENDERBEG, when the titled were called "Dukes", "Counts", and "Captains". "Bajraktar" became a hereditary title, and is still in use today in central and northern ALBANIA.

The authority of the chieftan, or Bajraktar, has remained untouched in the northern areas, particularly among the Catholics, in spite of the fact that the Communists have tried to diminish or completely abolish their personal and historic prestige. However, there is reason to believe that resistance to the authorities today has not yet ceased in the northern mountain areas, since the government has not as yet been able to penetrate the territory. It cannot be determined as to how popular a successful resistance will be, since the Communist regime uses deception to a great extent, which is a weapon never employed against these people, even by the most violent of oppressors.

The "Canon of the Mountain" (Kanun' i Leko DUKAGJINIT) which was coded during the 12th Century by an obscure member of the great family of the DUKAGJINI, and widely spread during the time of SKENDERBEG by another member of this family, Lek (Alexander) DUKAGJINI, constitutes the codification of the mores. During that period, all ALBANIA was under the influence of the law. It has been altered slightly by Turkish and Slav influences, but basically remains the same.

The basis of the Kanun' i Leko DUKAGJINIT is the law of "Blood Revenge", which imposes upon the next of kin of an assassinated person, a "duty" or "task of honor" to redeem the dead relative by killing the assassin, or one of his family who is "able to carry arms". Excluded from this law of revenge are women, children, and priests, since they are considered unable to carry arms. The redemption of a human life by payment of a sum of money is considered unmanly and is allowed only in unusual circumstances, and then only by tribes considered as unimportant. The Luria and Mati Tribes exclude this practice altogether, although they maintain the institution of "spontaneous pardon". This allows blood revenge to be suspended by mutual accord, but not abandoned.

It may be suspended in every instance whereby the assassin is under the protection of "hospitality", which is a sacred institution in ALBANIA. Hospitality begins the moment the "Family Chief" allows a guest to pass the threshold of his home. The guest, no matter who he is, is given all possible care and attention, more so if he is a stranger. Any escorts of the guest are also immune from revenge or inhospitable treatment.

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The woman is shown absolute respect. No man would dare disturb a woman. Women may travel unharmed, even though they travel for several days, through various regions strange to them. It is an unwritten law which provides authorization for a woman to seek hospitality in any village through which she may be passing, and it is the duty of all concerned to accept her and give her the utmost attention and care.

Based upon the Kanun' i Leka DUKAGJINIT is another important institution, that of the oath given in the form of a word of honor. It is known as the "besa" ("besa" means word). By taking it, one assumes the duty to protect and to keep in safe custody a person, to defend a locality, or to fight in the national interest. To break one's "besa" would expose the offender to the unlimited contempt of his fellowmen.

The judges or enforcers of such laws as these were the chieftains, to whom the collectives owed blind obedience, particularly in the case of a call to arms. Such tradition of command existed until the arrival of the Communists, although the authority of the individual Beys had previously degenerated somewhat since many of them had adopted the Western way of life, especially after 1913. In wanting to give their sons a more cultured background plus a formal education, they were sent to various European capitols. There the sons came into contact with mentalities quite different from those they were familiar with, and returned home with many new ideas. King ZOGU was a prime example of a dual education. He had spent some time as a youth at the Court of the Sultan in Constantinople, and later was attached to the Court of Emperor CARL in Vienna, thus providing him with the necessary experience to become a ruler. He had learned both Oriental and Occidental principles of government and mentalities.

It may be safely assumed that none of the Communist social institutions could penetrate the areas occupied by the Clementi, Kastrioti, Kraishniqi, Haba, Bityci, Dukagjini, Kruma, Luma, and Mirditi tribes.

Those tribes of northern ALBANIA, pressed between TITO on the north and the Tirano government on the south, find themselves in an identical situation as prevailed during medieval times. Their resistance, in addition to purely physical efforts, is maintained by a shrewd political sensibility, which is a result from the times when these tribes were forced to employ to the best of their knowledge, a sense of political and Military intelligence in order to continue their defenses.

In approaching the center of ALBANIA, the predominance of ruse over physical violence and overt defense becomes more noticeable. This is particular reference to the tribes of Malakastro and Musacia. This is true of the Malakastro tribe more so because of their poverty which forces them to bow to the Communist authority in order to physically survive. The Musacia tribe is the center of a Communist collectivization experiment (due to the wealth of this group), and is supervised quite rigidly by a large number of Communists.

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3. Geography (See Exhibits VII, VIII, IX, X, XI, XII, & XIII)

ALBANIA is an extremely mountainous country, averaging more than 3,000 feet above sea level. The Dinaric Alps in the north and northeast, and the Pindus Mountains in the south and southeast form the walls of a huge amphitheater which enclose a marshy plain along the Adriatic Sea. Several rivers cross the narrow coastal plain, flowing rapidly because of their relatively short courses, since they average 130 kilometers in length in their steep descent from the mountains. The most important rivers are: the Bojana (the only navigable river in the country), the White Drin; the Black Drin; the Mati; the Erzeni; the Vojusa; and the Shkumbin. The last named river separates ALBANIA into two separate regions, with the Ghegs living in the north, and the Tosks in the south. There are small, fertile valleys and basins, and toward the hinterland, there are wide valleys and plateaus which contain the centers of population. The Albanian climate is Mediterranean; summers are hot and dry, and winters are moderate. Coastal temperatures are higher than those inland. There are beech, pine, and fir in the highlands, and large areas of oak, walnut, chestnut, and elm in the coastal plains.

Mineral resources, although relatively unexploited, are believed to be considerable, and include aluminum, petroleum, lignite, iron, bitumen, asphalt, gypsum, and copper. Only a small part of the interior is arable, although nearly the entire population is engaged in a combination of farming and stock raising. Chief crops are: corn, rye, wheat, barley, tobacco, oats, spelt, olives, and citrus fruit.

PART II

Political

4. Three events have occurred which, although external to external to ALBANIA, are likely to have an important influence on her internal situation. Diplomatic relations have been re-opened with ITALY; the Greek Rebels have announced that for the present they have called off military operations; and YUGOSLAVIA has formally denounced her treaty of friendship with ALBANIA.

In more fortunate countries, the welfare of the people depends mainly upon the effectiveness of the government's internal policy and administration. In ALBANIA, to a quite unusual extent, the life of the people, even down to the adequacy or inadequacy of their rations, is affected by the actions of neighboring countries, by their relations with her, with each other, and with the Great Powers. Ever since the final departure of the Turks in 1913, ALBANIA has required the expenditure or investment of foreign money to keep her immediately supplied with consumer goods, and to carry through the long-term development of her resources which may one day make her economically independent.

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Therefore, ALBANIA's foreign policy consists primarily of the search for a patron and a "meal ticket". This is, in a most literal sense, the trade by which she earns her daily bread. In King ZOGU's time, ALBANIA was functioning on Italian loans. A beginning was made in the establishment of the state framework and in the development of her minerals. But the ITALY of MUSSOLINI wanted repayment in the form of strategic control, so the indigenous monarchy was expelled, and ALBANIA's precarious independence was extinguished. The new regime under ITALY was not more noticeably oppressive than its predecessor, its greatest handicap was that it was foreign. Economically, ALBANIA flourished as the favorite child of Fascism. Building and development were emphasized, the people were furnished adequate foodstuffs, and the shops were well stocked. As later developments revealed, the price of this investment and prosperity never had to be paid. ITALY lost the war before she could either colonize the land, or recruit Albanian conscripts for her garrisons or overseas armies.

ITALY had Vlone and Sazan Island (Sasono) under her domination from 1914 on. During the First World War, she extended her occupation over to Durres and central ALBANIA, where Esad PASHA had formed a temporary government with Italian aid. Apparently the Italian aim was to limit Austrian influence in the Mediterranean. In 1915 AUSTRIA occupied Kruja, Lesh, Shkoder, and Durres; while Bulgarian troops penetrated to Elbasan. On 17 December 1920, the Ambassador's Conference in Paris recognized the constitution of the Albanian government. In 1921, ZOGU made his entrance in Albanian politics as Minister of the Interior.

ZOGU was born at Burgnjet on 5 October 1895. He is a descendant of an old feudal family. He spent part of his youth at the court of William WIED, and during the First World War was appointed "colonel ad honorem" by the Austrian Emperor CARL. In 1922 ZOGU performed a coup d'etat, and brought order to the country. He then became Prime Minister. From 1922 to 1924 Albanian history depicts a chain of insurrections, with ZOGU having the chance to display the characteristics of an energetic statesman. In 1924 ZOGU failed to suppress the movement of the National Party led by Theofan S. NOLI. As a consequence, ZOGU was forced to escape to Belgrade. Theofan S. NOLI then became Prime Minister. ZOGU's unexpected visit in Belgrade was a favorable event in regard to YUGOSLAVIA's policy toward ALBANIA. Nikola PASIC, a very capable Yugoslav statesman, gave ZOGU arms and money and asked him to return to ALBANIA.

On 24 December 1924 ZOGU returned to ALBANIA and forced NOLI to escape to ITALY, from where he went to AUSTRIA, the USSR, and later to the UNITED STATES where he lives at present. On 31 December 1925, ZOGU announced the constitution of the Albanian republic. He was then elected president, and among the first laws he introduced was one which called for six months compulsory military service.

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When ZOGU came into power, he turned toward ITALY for assistance in solving his economic and political problems. An agreement to this effect was signed on 27 November 1926 at Tirane, by the Albanian Minister of the Interior, Hysen VRIONI and the Italian Minister Pompeo ALOISI. This agreement favored a political, judicial, and territorial "status quo" in ALBANIA. ZOGU knew that a reciprocal political interest could only be based upon a military alliance between ITALY and ALBANIA. On 22 November 1927, a military agreement was signed at Tirane. It is natural to consider that ZOGU's policy was not dictated by any love for ITALY, but more because he was only too well aware of YUGOSLAVIA's aspirations toward ALBANIA. On 1 December 1928, after having previously obtained the consent of the National Assembly, ZOGU was elected King of ALBANIA with the title of ZOG the First.

Financial support was necessary for the reconstruction of the country. YUGOSLAVIA and GREECE were in no position to grant the funds needed by ALBANIA. Therefore, King ZOG again turned to ITALY. In 1925 SVEA (Societa Sviluppo Economico ALBANIA, Association for the Economic Development of ALBANIA) granted a credit of 243 million lire to be reimbursed over a 40 year period. In 1931, although ALBANIA had not paid the interest on the first loan, ITALY granted another loan of 100 million lire under the condition that ITALY be permitted to supervise the finances of ALBANIA. It was then established that this new loan should be gradually settled each time the balance of the Albanian government exceeded 50 million lire. The Italian request sounded like an insult to King ZOG, who then endeavored to find new markets. The Italian government then wasted no time about the matter and promptly dispatched 14 navy ships to Durres (1931). King ZOG was then advised to settle the matter in a peaceful manner. It is quite possible the Italian move was initiated by the fear that King Zog might negotiate a secret agreement with YUGOSLAVIA. Loyal political and economic relations between ALBANIA and ITALY were virtually ended, and there began an atmosphere of "nerves" until April 1939.

It was then that the moment of great events began, and ITALY thought it necessary to invade ALBANIA. From 7 to 17 April 1939, Italian troops landed in ALBANIA while ZOGU fled to GREECE, taking with him the national treasury. YUGOSLAVIA remained silent about the proceedings mainly because of the agreement signed earlier in the year between MUSSOLINI and the Yugoslav Prime Minister Milan STOJADINOVIC.

The only resistance to the Italian invasion was conducted by Abas KUPI, who led the Albanians in a brief movement by utilizing the troops stationed at Durres and Vlone. ITALY soon consolidated her position in the country. It should be mentioned that the Italian action has been preceded by a systematic preparation. Francisco JACOMONI, Italian Ambassador to ALBANIA, very efficiently handled the diplomatic angles. He secretly contacted anti-ZOGU elements who agreed to collaborate with him, blinded by his promises (which, incidentally, were never kept), of sharing in the government.

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During the latter part of his reign, ZOGU indulged in a rather dangerous policy, since he had closed all Catholic schools, and failed to observe the formation of the first Communist cells in ALBANIA. In failing to see the infiltration of Communists into various governmental departments ZOGU allowed a situation to begin which would have ultimately cost him his throne had the Italians not beaten the Communists in expelling him. ZOGU appeared to be more interested in creating an antagonism between the Christian and Moslem tribes of the country, in view of the fact that the Italians were supporting the Catholics. He swung his support to the Moslems thereby creating a situation which undoubtedly would have registered sufficient repercussions had not political moves developed earlier.

5. How the Communists Achieved Hegemony in ALBANIA

The organization of the first Communist cells, known as "Communist groups", originated in 1931-32. There were three groups and their respective centers were in Shkoder, Tirane, and Korce. From these three centers, branches were organized in other towns and zones. Propaganda material (books about MARX, ENGELS, LENIN and STALIN) was brought into the country through various channels which included mysterious visitors who came every week from YUGOSLAVIA. Contacts were made with Albanian elements abroad. In 1934, ZOGU's administrative policy was shaken when he decided to close all Catholic schools. This move brought about disastrous psychological repercussions among the youth. A complete chaos reigned in the Albanian State School System, especially in Shkoder. The Minister of Public Education, Mirash IVANAJ, was the Number One enemy of all Catholic Schools.

Taking advantage of this "liberal policy", Albanian officials who up to this time were not known to be extremists, appeared on the political and administrative scene. Some examples are: Zef MIRDITA, a high official in the Ministry of the Interior; Ismet TOTO, former high official in Shkoder; Professor Skender LAURASI (at present a member of the Agit-Prop in Tirane) who used to deliver long speeches on social progressive theory to groups of his students after classes. The most fanatical Albanian Communists graduated from LAURASI's school, among them: Qemal STAJA, National Hero, killed on 5 May 1942 by the Italians; Gjovalin LUKA, at present a Deputy; Khamel BROJA, at present an official of the SIGURIMIT; Brok LEGI, at present in the Officers School in Moscow; Vasil LLAZANI, at present a member of the Albanian-Soviet Cultural Committee; Cin SUMA (killed in an automobile accident in the fall of 1949); Vojo KUSHI, National Hero, killed in combat at Tirane, 1944; Zija DIBRA, at present the Albanian Consul in Prague; Mark ULI, at present First Secretary of the Albanian Legation in Paris. The following is a list of those persons who collaborated during the first years of the formation of clandestine Communist groups at Shkoder and who have important positions in Tirane at present:

a. Tuk JAKOVA - a carpenter's apprentice in 1943; today he is a Vice Prime Minister, Major General in Albanian Army, and a member of the POLITBURO.

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b. Mark NJODA - Member of the Albanian-Soviet Cultural Committee, and member of the SHNUM (Shoqnija Per Ndihme Ushtrise e Mbrojtjes - Association for Aid, Army, and Defense).

c. Kolo JAKOVA - Tuk's brother, a member of the Albanian-Soviet Cultural Committee.

d. Arif GJYLI - Elementary School Teacher, at present a high Party official in Shkoder.

The group in Korce boasted such members as: Xoxo KOCI; Enver HOXHA; and Kristo PANDI. The groups from both Tirane and Korce had lesser ideological preparations, but had a more developed political adhesion among the followers due to these factors:

a. Southern ALBANIA was particularly hostile toward ZOGU, who had neglected their region, and had failed to include any southerners in his government.

b. A rather liberal, but not very religious character of the people

c. The war, which totally impoverished southern ALBANIA.

Although these Communist groups were in contact with each other, they were permeated with sectarian and opportunist feelings. The Party in ALBANIA is a Yugoslav product, and without the aid of the Yugoslavs, there would be no Communist Party in ALBANIA today. Before the arrival of Milan POPOVIC and Dusan HUGOSA, who went to ALBANIA to organize and guide Albanian Communism, the existent groups were rather insignificant.

There were discrepancies in their policies and they indulged in a continuous and bitter struggle.

The situation dominating these groups of Albanian Communists of the time was defined by Milan POPOVIC in 1949, as follows: "We had found a real chaos. Altogether there were eight groups of Trotskyists. Each of them struggled for supremacy over the others. Frequently they came to see us and accuse the others. Discussions with these groups lasted from ten to twenty days. We went from one illegal meeting to another. We discussed with the group in Korce in the houses of Enver HOXHA and Koco TASHKO. This group attempted a refusal in any admission of its errors. They claimed to be "the Party" and considered the others as groups, but we succeeded in persuading them that they should accept the Constitution of the Party. The highest contributions from the group in Korce were given by Koci XOXE and Kristo PANDI".

6. The Yugoslav Alliance

During his reign, ZOGU showed pronounced ability, and his greatest success was the organization of the police force whose commanding officer was a British officer, Colonel HILL.

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ZOGU knew his people better than any other Albanian. He was not loved, but accepted. His greatest criticism would lie in the fact that he did not express the peoples will through a more representative government. He held a virtual monopoly of governmental posts, and he failed in including representatives from all over the country in his cabinet. The fact that he developed the Mati area, his own birthplace and strictly Moslem, above all other areas in ALBANIA showed a favoritism which rankled in the South. For reasons such as these, the clandestine groups of Communists were making rapid headway. They had much to offer in the way of propoganda even beyond the ordinary Communist teachings.

The alliance with YUGOSLAVIA was made possible because Albanian Communism is a movement developed almost exclusively in the South. Had the northern Ghegs been in power, they would have undoubtedly looked askance at such an alliance. A few reasons why there would have been no such alliance are: YUGOSLAVIA is in possession of large tracts of land which are inhabited mainly by Albanians, both in the wheat lands of Metohija and Kossovo, and northwestern Macedonia; in 1912 the Serbs and Montenegrins endeavored to obtain possession of most of northern ALBANIA, including the city of Shkoder; and the way of life in the North did not lend itself to the Communist way of life.

However, the Communists were recruited from the Tosks, whose fear of foreign domination stemmed from the other direction, GREECE.

They turned to YUGOSLAVIA as the only available aid, since ITALY had been beaten and was discredited, and GREECE was too "reactionary". Even before the war, the Yugoslav Communist Party was the channel through which directives from the Kremlin were received, and the two or three sinister figures who briefed Enver HOXHA during the struggle for power were all Yugoslav Communists.

Milan POPOVIC, Dusan MUGOSA, and later on, Svetozar VUKMANOVIC, alias "Tempo", were the creators and the guides. They were in truth the real leaders of the Albanian Communist Party. They smoothed, as much as they could, the conflicts, brought discipline, organized districts, appointed leaders, and issued orders. They insisted that a National Liberation Army be formed. As soon as the 1st Brigade was assembled, Mehmet SHEHU was appointed Commanding Officer while his advisor was Dusan MUGOSA, the virtual dictator. SHEHU at present, is the Minister of the Interior, holds the rank of Major General, and is a member of the POLITBURO.

On a certain occasion, Milan POPOVIC made the following statement, "Before we left for YUGOSLAVIA, Dusan MUGOSA was invited to the Assembly of the Central Committee of the Albanian Communist Party, and it was at this time that he announced that General Spiro MOISIU was not adequate and that his place should be taken over by Enver HOXHA, Commissar of the Supreme Command. The Central Committee approved MUGOSA's suggestion, and during the course of the conference held in Permet during May 1944, HOXHA was appointed Supreme Commandant, with rank of Col-

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Yugoslav Communists completely dominated the Albanian Communists. When MUGOSA returned to YUGOSLAVIA, Albanian Communists corresponded with him. A paragraph from a letter written by the present Minister of Interior, Mehmet SHEHU reads as follows, "We did not have a party, but merely a confused state of things. With yours and POPOVIC' instructions we were able to form our party. You helped us; you taught us; and cured us as does a mother with her child. Major General Bedri SPAHIU, present Attorney General of the Albanian Peoples Republic, wrote, "We learned from you, "Sale" (alias of MUGOSA), what was indispensable for us. Therefore, I personally, with everyone else, feel something of you in ourselves.

Our lives as Communists are bound with yours". Expressions of servilism are contained in letters written from Enver HOXHA, Koci XOKI, and Ramadan CITALI, which reached their peak in the words pronounced by HOXHA at the Assembly of the Central Committee of the Albanian Communist Party held at Berat, in November 1944, "Comrade Blazo (Blazo JOVANOVIC, delegate of the Central Committee of the Yugoslav Communist Party for the Albanian Central Committee) contributed a great deal to the conference, Blazo was for us as GOD from heaven".

During the Italian occupation, Communist groups were passive and their only action was the publication of a manifest on 8 November 1941, issued on the initiative of POPOVIC and MUGOSA by the Communist Group of Shkoder, on the occasion when HITLER attacked the Soviet Union. The manifest read, "The chances to start an armed revolution against the Italian occupation increases with HITLER's aggression against the Soviet Union". However, due to lack of political activity and organization, the manifest went unheeded. During the course of the first conference for the formation of the Albanian Communist Party (8 November 1941), and in the resolution of the first conference of the Albanian Communist Party held at Labinot, in April 1943, the passive attitude of Communist Groups was severely admonished. During the conference at Labinot, it was mentioned that, "the struggle among the various groups of Albanian Communists impeded a favorable action during the following historical phases:

- a. Occupation of ALBANIA on 7 April 1939 by Italian troops.
- b. Other internal Albanian affairs.
- c. Second World War, and during the war declared by ITALY on YUGOSLAVIA and GREECE.

In 1939 "Balli Kombetar" (National Front) was founded on the basis of a revolutionary program which included: liberation of the country from the Italian Fascist Occupation; and the establishment of a democratic regime with applications of economic and social reforms which were to bring real liberation to the people. The formation of this organization was due mainly to British policy which was designed in ALBANIA to harry and obstruct the Italian occupation.

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In 1939-40, the British had daily contact with the exponents of "Balli Kombetar". During this period, Colonel HILL (organizer of ZOG's Gendarmerie) was living in Tirane where he had become very cognizant of the political problems, the people, and their language.

"Balli Kombetar" was responsible for propaganda which was efficacious in promising to struggle for the "Free and Independent ALBANIA", which was to have a republican government, with a social policy based on freedom for everyone under state control. The policy further included a "Greater ALBANIA", which meant the return of Metohija, Kossovo, and Ciamurija, the first two from YUGOSLAVIA, the latter from GREECE.

It is quite clear that the political program of "Balli Kombetar" had nothing in common with Communist aspirations. The following are some passages written by Milan POPOVIC, published in "Yugoslav-Albanian Relationship, page 78: "The leaders of the "Balli Kombetar" disregarded every other organization and considered the Central Committee of the National Liberation Resistance as a typical Communist organization. Several discussions took place with members of the "Balli" but these failed to produce any results. Some members of the Central Committee of the Albanian Communist Party, among whom were Enver HOXHA, attributed too great an importance to these discussions and neglected the activity which should have been performed among the masses of the "Balli" and aiming to disclose their reactionary leaders".

The Albanian Communist Party refused to apply the decisions taken at the General Conference in Labinot, regarding the organization of a Communist Army or a National Liberation Army, without first having reached an agreement with "Balli Kombetar". Svetozar VUKMANOVIC and Blazo JOVANOVIC exerted pressure on the Albanians along other lines, because a few days after the First General Conference, VUKMANOVIC arrived in Labinot, where part of the Central Committee was gathered, and in company with JOVANOVIC, they urged the Albanians to examine the military problem. VUKMANOVIC did his utmost to convince the Albanians of the necessity of forming a "Supreme Command of the National Liberation Army" without waiting for the conclusion of negotiations with "Balli Kombetar", which was organizing its own army and intentionally delaying the discussions with the National Liberation Movement.

"Unless a Supreme Command is formed immediately, it means that "Balli Kombetar" plans are being followed. Some of the members of the Albanian Central Committee of the Albanian Communist Party did not understand the situation, among them being Enver HOXHA and Br. Ymer DISENICA, which clearly shows their lack of political intuition. Because of the same reasons, some members of the Central Committee of the Albanian Communist Party were against the organization of mobile units. VUKMANOVIC suggested that field companies (which did not lead a military life) be converted into partisan detachments, with regular military discipline, in a continuous offensive status, and easily moved from one place to another. It was further suggested that larger units be formed without delay".

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A Survey of ALBANIA (cont'd)

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The Supreme Command was organized four months following the First General Conference, and the first brigades were mobilized five months later. Mobile and assault military units were formed after the intervention of Svotozar VUKMANOVIC, who in July 1943, while returning from GREECE stopped at the village of Kucake (in the vicinity of Korce) and submitted his opinion to the Central Committee of the Albanian Communist Party. "I repeatedly insisted on the fact that it was necessary to immediately convert field companies into partisan detachments, which could, in turn, be converted into larger and more mobile units. Due to the fact that the organization of forces in liberated territories was rather neglected, I urged them to form a military authority in the hinterland, before the end of the discussions with "Balli Kombetar".

After his suggestion was accepted by the Central Committee of the Albanian Communist Party, VUKMANOVIC left for Macedonia. On 1 - 2 August 1943, the exponents of "Balli Kombetar" gathered at Mukaj, where they met the leaders of the National Liberation Movement (Communists) to decide about the policy to follow in connection with future military operations against the Italians.

It was then that the "Committee for National Salvation" was formed and was given full power to wage war. Instead of the motto "Freedom to the People-Death to Fascism", the Committee chose the words "Death or Freedom". They drafted a program for the Committee which contemplated the organization of a Greater ALBANIA.

Following instruction from high and official sources in YUGOSLAVIA, VUKMANOVIC dissolved the agreement reached at Mukaj and created a strong antagonism within the Albanian forces, which at that time, were struggling among themselves. Subsequent to the breaking of the Mukaj Agreement, Mehmet SERHU and Dusan MUGOSA were leading a number of troops in the vicinity of Jushnja where they surrounded 168 soldiers belonging to "Balli Kombetar", and massacred all of them. By employing all sorts of ruses, deviations of policy, dishonest practices, and all other means to further the Party Line, the Albanian Communists with the aid of the Yugoslav Communists, achieved hegemony in the country.

Germany never administered the country. For a year, and for purely military reasons, she occupied ALBANIA with troops and held the ring while the Communists, who were pledged to fight the Germans, were liquidating anti-Communist forces against the day of liberation. The British were instrumental in aiding this practice since their interest was reflected only in the groups who were capable of killing the most Germans. The "Legalitoti" (Abas KUPI's Zogist Forces) and the "Balli Kombetar" were not as well organized or equipped as the Communists, therefore it was the better part of British discretion to support the group who produced the greatest results. To complicate matters a bit further, the Communists were recognized as allies, since RUSSIA was fighting with the United Nations as an ally.

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A Survey of ALBANIA (cont'd)

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A Survey of ALBANIA (cont'd)

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Had RUSSIA's policy demanded that ALBANIA should become one of the federal republics of YUGOSLAVIA, HOXHA and his associates would undoubtedly not have objected; but as it happened, RUSSIA was hoping that ALBANIA would be admitted to the United Nations where another vote would have been added to the Eastern "Bloc". To make quite certain the Yugoslav Alliance would be accepted by the Partisan soldiery and the enthusiastic Communist youth, an intense pro-Yugoslav propaganda was carried on, complete with fraternal visiting, presentation of bronze plaques of the Yugoslav dictator, and exuberant shouts of "Enver-Tito".

Economic cooperation with YUGOSLAVIA was not unfruitful for ALBANIA. Even if the former is backward by Western standards, she is richer than ALBANIA in technicians, and could help in exploiting the copper and chrome, and even send groups of youthful volunteers to work on ALBANIA's long-promised but never completed railway. Most important, YUGOSLAVIA sent wheat from the Kosovo so that the Albanians had enough bread. Some of the Albanians may have reflected that under the Axis yoke, that same wheat was coming from an Albanian province. But no one really worried about it just so long as the wheat continued to arrive.

The entire situation was altered by the Yugoslav breach with the Cominform during the summer of 1948. At the critical moment, ALBANIA did not align herself with her partner, but switched to a more distant relative, STALIN. From the standpoint of choice to the Albanians, the Russian appeared more attractive. At that time, TITO was not expected to make good his rebellion. It was generally accepted by everyone (Communists included) that either TITO would be forced to make his peace with RUSSIA, or he would be eliminated and YUGOSLAVIA would be brought back into the fold by a more obedient Communist leader. But even without this exception, any Albanian Communist politician would have been strongly tempted to seize the chance of freeing his country from a patronage that was beginning to become extremely irksome. Acceptance of outside influence inevitably brings with it a measure of foreign influence in the administration of a country, and this factor has always been resented by xenophobic Albanians. Thus, if the first constant element in Albanian foreign policy is securing foreign aid, the second is normally to rid the helper of any influence in her affairs.

7. The Conspiracy of General Koci XOKE

The most dramatic incident marking the decision to stand with RUSSIA, was the fall (sudden) of the Minister of the Interior, Commissar Lieutenant General Koci XOKE. In view of the assiduous pro-Yugoslav propaganda, it is not strange that some of the servants of the regime had adhered quite closely to a policy of cooperation with the Yugoslavs. As a consequence, when the Party Line changed, these people were considered as politically unreliable to carry on in their posts. The persons who were most irretrievably committed had to be liquidated. The switch-over was accompanied by crops of arrests, which were followed in due course by treason trials.

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A Survey of ALBANIA (cont'd)

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In all this, the principal casualty was the man who had been all-powerful as Minister of the Interior, and as Chief of "Mbrotje Popullore" (Political Police). The fall of XOXE is typical of political life in ALBANIA. His liquidation came as a result of outside intervention rather than any internal force. However, the conspiracy which led to his undoing was his own idea, and from an impartial viewpoint, he earned exactly what he had worked for.

In a Communist regime there is always an element of chance in the selection of a supreme leader from the list of Party bosses. In ALBANIA, Enver HOKHA was chosen. But he was not such a commanding personality as to rule out the possibility of a replacement by a favorably placed and determined man, especially when that man was already his Deputy. XOXE was the only Lieutenant General in ALBANIA, and as such, he was the highest ranking officer under Colonel General HOKHA. XOXE had presided over the first treason trial of importance when 60 "war criminal and enemies of the people" were tried in Tirane in April 1945 after the maximum amount of publicity. Seventeen of those tried were shot. A year later, XOXE succeeded in eliminating the veteran, Moscow-trained Communist Sejfullah MALESHOVA. During the first half of 1948, XOXE succeeded in surrounding HOKHA with his own spies and police, so that the nominal leader's real power was reduced to practically nothing, and HOKHA was under what amounted to house arrest. All that was necessary was more time and HOKHA could have been suppressed altogether, and with no difficulty, succeeded by XOXE.

The fact that Koci XOXE failed, when success seemed within his grasp, was not that he was insufficiently clever or strong, but that he was pro-Yugoslav. The Russians decided that they needed a reliable man of their own choice to suit their own purposes, to be head of Albanian affairs. Unfortunately for XOXE, he wasn't selected since the Soviets preferred HOKHA. When the Russian Mission gave the word, XOXE was arrested, thus restoring HOKHA to his former power.

5. RUSSIA had never taken much interest in ALBANIA, except at certain, particular moments. It was XOXE's misfortune that his arrest was one of those moments. The Soviets attached considerable importance to the harrying of GREECE by rebel forces, then under the leadership of General MARKOS. For this activity, they required unimpeded use of Albanian soil. As the unreliability of YUGOSLAVIA became more apparent to RUSSIA, the importance of ALBANIA increased, and it was from the latter that the Greek operation was conducted. General MARKOS had his main base, headquarters, armies, and even his wireless station moved there. All this was too valuable to the Russians, since they could not afford to allow ALBANIA to parallel the Yugoslav action. This was the main reason for re-instating the docile HOKHA, eliminating the unreliable XOXE, and re-aligning ALBANIA with the Cominform countries. ALBANIA represented to STALIN exactly what she had represented to MUSSOLINI, a jumping-off point for attack upon GREECE. The Yugoslav Alliance, for all practical purposes, was ended. ALBANIA's new patron was RUSSIA.

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A Survey of ALBANIA (cont'd)

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Enver HOKHA was received with honor in RUSSIA, and most important of all, Russian advisers were sent to ALBANIA in ever larger numbers. Russian and Rumanian ships began to arrive with greater frequency at Durres and Vlone. Meanwhile, the Albanian and Greek rebel armies were kept mobilized and supplied, and at convenient moments, the latter was sent across the Greek frontier to bring war and desolation to the Greeks.

The Battle of the Grammos, 1948, came and went. The Greek Army, in an arduous campaign, drove the rebels from their positions and "pacified" northern GREECE. But the operation was not permanently successful since the rebels retired to their refuge, there to rest and re-equip for the next season's campaign. In 1949, they appeared once more in GREECE, in the region of Vitsi; and driven from there, they retired across the frontier, moved a few kilometers to the west, and again emerged upon the Grammos. This time, however, they had to contend with a fine soldier, Field Marshal PAPAGOS, who in 1940, had defeated another and larger invasion from the same direction. The Battle of the Grammos, 1949, was more decisive than its predecessor since fewer of the rebels escaped. The Greeks moreover, adopted a much more menacing attitude toward Albanian troops who used cover fire across the frontier, and for a time, it appeared that the Greeks might even pursue their enemies across the frontier into ALBANIA itself. Tirane Radio announced, as it had a year previously, and with equal truth, that armed Greeks arriving across the frontier were being interned.

The Battle of the Grammos, 1949, was decisive, not only for the Greeks, but also for ALBANIA. For the time being, at any rate, it led the Russians to write off the Greek rebels as ineffective, and the suspension of military efforts was announced by General MARKOS.

PART III

Government

9. Structure of the People's Republic of ALBANIA

a. The Albanian Government and the Albanian Workers' Party (Communist) are constructed on a pattern familiar in all Cominform countries. The structure may be described as vertical, with the Government and Party forming two parallel and nominally independent columns. Although unrelated in theory, the leading positions in both the Government and the Party are occupied by the same, small group of men, and the Party exercises a dominant influence over the Government. The various "Front Organizations" are independent in principle, but are in fact subsidiary to the Party and constitute instruments for the furthering of Party interests among specific elements of the population.

b. The Presidium (Presidium) is technically the highest governing body of the Albanian Republic, and its members are elected by the People's Assembly. The President (presidenti) of the Presidium,

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A Survey of ALBANIA (cont'd)

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c. The People's Assembly (Kuvendi Popullor) is composed of deputies (Deputet) from the ten Prefectures of ALBANIA. The President of the Assembly is ~~Enver~~ DRESHNICA.

d. The Cabinet (Gabinoti) consists of sixteen portfolios, currently held by thirteen ministers. These are:

HOXHA Enver	Premier (Kryeminister) Minister of National Defense (Minister i Mbrojtjes Kombetare) Minister of Foreign Affairs (Minister i Punetve Te Jashtme)
JAKOVA Tuk	Vice-Premier (Non-Kryeminister)
SHEHU Mehmet	Vice-Premier (Non-Kryeminister) Minister of Internal Affairs (Minister i Punetve Te Mbrendeshme)
NUSHI Gogo	Minister of Industry (Minister i Industrise)
KELLAZI Abdyl	Minister of Finance (Minister i Financave)
EQVELA Kico	Minister of Commerce (Minister i Tregetise)
KONOMI Manol	Minister of Justice (Minister i Drejtetise)
KOLEKA Spiro	Minister of Communications (Minister i Komunikacioneve)
TASHKO Gogo	Minister of Agriculture (Minister i Bujqetise)
SHEHU Abedin	Minister of Public Works (Minister i Punetve Botore)
YLLI Karaman	Minister of Education (Minister i Arsimte)
SPANIU Bedri	Minister of Social Welfare (Minister i Mirmeve Shqiptare)

e. Also on cabinet level are the Control Commission (Komisjoni i Kontrollit), under the Presidency of Enxhi LLESHI, and the Economic Planning Commission (Komisjoni i Planit Ekonomik), under the Presidency of Spiro KOLEKA.

f. Under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of National Defense is the Army (Ustria) under Chief of Staff (Kryetar i Shtabit Madhuer) Mehmet SHEHU.

g. Under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Internal Affairs are the political Security Police (Sigurimit), the Political Direction (Drejtoria Politike), and the following regional units: Prefectures (Prefekturat); Sub-Prefectures (Non-Prefekturat); Communes (Komunet); and Cities and Villages (Qytete dhe Fshate). There ten Prefectures, twenty-nine sub-Prefectures, and 151 Communes in ALBANIA.

h. The highest organ of the Workers' Party of ALBANIA (Partija e Punetveve Shqiptare), formerly the Albanian Communist Party (Partija Komuniste Shqiptare), is the Secretariat (Sekretarija), composed of the following members:

HOXHA Enver	Secretary General (Sekretar i Pergjithshem)
JAKOVA Tuk	Second Secretary (Non-Sekretar)
SHEHU Mehmet	Secretary (Sekretar)
SPANIU Bedri	Secretary (Sekretar)

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i. The policy-making body of the Central Committee is the Politburo (Politburo), or Executive Committee (Komiteti Ekzekutiv). It has nine members:

HOXHA Enver	KAPO Hysni
JAKOVA Tuk	BELISHOVA Liri
SHEHU Mehmet	BULLUKU Beqir
SPAHIU Bedri	NUSHI Gogo
KOLEKA Spiro	

j. The Orgburo (Orgburo), or Organisational Committee (Komiteti Organizativ), is the Central Committee body dealing with Party administrative problems.

k. The Central Committee (Komiteti Qendror) is the General Assembly or regional delegates of the Workers' Party. It consists of nineteen members today, the twentieth, ISLAMI Niazi, was killed three months ago:

HOXHA Enver	SHEHU Abodin
JAKOVA Tuk	BEKTESHI Sadik
SHEHU Mehmet	HEBA Teodor
SPAHIU Bedri	KONCANI Manol
KAPO Hysni	PERISTERI Pilo
BELISHOVA Liri	DUME Potrit
BALLUKU Beqir	ALIJA Rnisi
NUSHI Gogo	MYFTIU Manush
HOXHA Nexhmije	PRIFTI Mihal
KOLEKA Spiro	

There are also nine Candidate Members of the Central Committee:

NDOU Beqir	HAMITI Zejnel
LLËSHI Baxhi	SOCAJ Sedik
XHANGOLLI Ramadan	PANO Spiro
VINGANI Nexhip	KELLEZI Shqyri
ORMANI Sali	

l. The Control Commission (Komisjoni i Kontrollit) is the body of the Communist Party authorized to adjudge the correctness of measures taken by the Party - whether by the Secretariat, Politburo, Central Committee, or any other committee - and, where it sees fit, to condemn the decisions. In this sense, it constitutes a Party supreme tribunal, and stands apart from the direct chain of command.

m. A number of specialized committees exist within the Central Committee, including: The Women's Committee (Komiteti Femruer); the Youth Committee (Komiteti i Rinis); The Albanian Popular Cultural Committee (Komiteti Kultura Popullore Shqyptare); The Agit-Prop Committee, i.e. the Committee for Agitation and Propaganda (Agit-Prop, Komiteti Agitacion e Propagande); and the Press and Propaganda Committee (Komiteti i Shtypit dhe Propagandes).

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HOXHA Enver

Colonel General, General Secretary of the Albanian Workers Party since its foundation.

Born: 1908 at Gjinokastre

Education: Elementary School in Gjinokastre, and High School in Korca.

In 1931 he enrolled at the University of Montpellier (FRANCE) where he studied Natural Science for a period of a year. Was expelled from FRANCE because of immoral conduct.

Enrolled at the University of Brussels (BELGIUM) where he studied Law for one year.

Was appointed as Professor of French at the High School in Korce, where he remained from 1936 to 1939.

Became a member of the Communist Group at Korca in 1937 along with KOCI Xoxe and FANDI Kristo.

During the Italian Occupation of ALBANIA, HOXHA managed a cigarette store in Tirana.

Toward the end of 1942, he was in the zone around Labinot working with the Communist organizers from YUGOSLAVIA; POPOVIC Milan and MUGOSA Dusan.

In 1943, HOXHA was in contact with the exponents of "BALLI KOMBETAR" with a view toward bringing about an agreement concerning joint operations against the Germans.

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HOXHA Enver (continued)

During the same year, he had contacts with Julian AMERY of the British Secret Service. In the Fall of 1943, HOXHA met VUKMANOVIC Svetozar alias "TEMPO", and JCVANOVIC Blazo. These two were also Party organizers from JUGOSLAVIA, and they appointed HOXHA as Chief of Staff of the Albanian Army.

After the war, HOXHA became Chief of the Government and Foreign Minister in conjunction with being Chief of Staff.

In 1946, he went to Paris as leader of the Albanian Delegation which attended the Peace Conference.

He has received the following decorations: the Albanian order, "NATIONAL HERO"; the Soviet "ORDER OF SUVOROV (1st Class); and the highest Yugoslav order, "ZA HRABROST" (For Courage) as well as several other lesser decorations.

In 1947, he went to Moscow for the first time.

In December 1949, he again went to Moscow but this time with a request for a peace treaty and a mutual assistance pact. Up to the present, all negotiations based on HOXHA's requests of 1949 have remained wishful thinking on the part of the Albanian Government.

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JAKOVA Tuk

Major General, Secretary of the Albanian Workers Party

Born: 1914 at Scutari

Education: Five elementary grades

Profession: Carpenter. Was employed by the "Vllazen Daija", a carpenters enterprise, to December 1942.

Political and Military Careers:

1935 - Became a member of the Scutari Communist Group.

1941 - Member of the Central Committee of the Albanian Communist Party.

During the war, he was Brigade, Division, and Army Corps Political Commissar with rank of Colonel.

After the war, he held the following positions: Deputy at Scutari; President of the General Albanian Syndicate Union; Albanian Minister to Belgrade; and Minister of Industry.

1950 - President of the Albanian Workers Party, and also Vice Prime Minister.

Has been decorated with the Albanian order "NATIONAL HERO", and by YUGOSLAVIA and RUSSIA.

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SHEHU Mehmet

Major General, Secretary of the Albanian Workers Party.

Born: 1913 at Corrush (Mallakstra)

Education: Soviet Military Academy "VCROSHILOV"

Military and Political Careers:

1936 - A volunteer in SPAIN (International Brigade)


1943 - A candidate for the Central Committee of the Albanian Communist Party.

During the war, he became a Brigade Commandant and Division Commandant, with rank of Colonel.

1946 - Chief of Staff, and Deputy at Tropoja.

1948 - Minister of the Interior (holds same position at present.)

Has been decorated with the Albanian order "NATIONAL HERO", and several other lesser dec-



SPAHIU Bedri

Major General, Secretary of the Workers Party, ALBANIA.

Born: 1908 at Gjinokastre

Education: Military School (Artillery) in 1931 at Tirana

Military Career: 1935 - Appointed as a Warrant Officer

Political Career: 1941 - Secretary of the Communist Party,
Gjinokastre

1943 - Member of the Plenum of the Central
Committee, and Political Commissar
of the Headquarters for the Zones of
Valona and Gjinokastre.

1944 - Minister of Reconstruction, and elect-
to the POLITBURO of the Party Central
Committee.

1945 - Public Attorney, Special Tribunal in
Tirana.

1946 - Public Attorney, Albanian People's
Republic. (Holds same position at pre-
sent time.)

1949 - Minister for Social Assistance.

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KOLEKA Spiro

Member of the POLITBURO of the Central Committee
of the Workers Party, ALBANIA.

Born: 1908 at Vuno (Himara)

Education: Classical Gymnasium at San Demetrio Corona,
ITALY, and Civil Engineering Faculty, Pisa,
ITALY.

Political Career: (Date Unknown) - Deputy at Himara

1947 - 1948 - Minister of Public
Works and Scientific Institutes.

1949 - Minister of Communications

1950 - President of the State Econ-
omic Planning Commission.

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KAPO Hysni

Major General, member of the POLITBURO of the Central Committee of the Workers Party, ALBANIA.

Born: 1915 at Terbac (Valona)

Education: High School

Political Career: 1941 - Political Secretary of the Party Regional Committee, Valona.

1943 - Member of the Plenum of the Party Central Committee.

During the war he was a Brigade and Army Corps Commissar.

After the war he was appointed as Minister to Belgrade, and as Aide to the Minister of Foreign Affairs.

Became a member of the POLITBURO of the Central Committee of the Workers Party, and a Deputy in Valona.

1950 - President of Political Direction for the Army.

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BELISHOVA Liri

Member of the POLITBURO of the Central Committee of the Workers Party, ALBANIA.

Born: 1926 at Mallakashtra

Education: High School

Political Career: 1943 - Secretary of the Regional Committee, Albanian Communist Youth, Tirana.

1944 - Member of the Central Committee, Albanian workers party.

1946 - Political Secretary of the Central Committee, Albanian Communist Youth.

1948 - President of the Albanian People's Republic Youth, and a candidate for the POLITBURO of the Central Committee of the Party.

1949 - Member of the POLITBURO of the Central Committee of the Party.

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BULLUKU Beqir

Major General, member of the POLITBURO of the Central Committee of the Workers Party, ALBANIA.

Born: 1917 at Tirana.

Education: High School

Military Career: 1943 - Brigade Commandant

1944 - Army Corps Commissar

1945 - Commissar at the Headquarters of Hinterland Units, Division Commandant and Deputy, Tirana

1948 - Chief of Staff



NUSHI Gogo

Member of the POLITBURO of the Central Committee of
the Workers Party, ALBANIA.

Born: 1915 at Vuno (Himara)

Education: High School

Political Career: 1943 - Political Secretary, Party
Regional Committee, Tirana,
and later, a member of the
Party Central Committee.

1945 - Deputy at Himara

1947 -- Minister of Commerce

1948 -- Minister of Industry

1949 -- Elected a member of the POL-
ITBURO of the Party Central
Committee.

NUSHI GOGO is reported to have been killed in April 1950 (P-6)

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A Survey of ALBANIA (cont'd)

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The structure of the Albanian Workers' Party below the directional level follows that of the Albanian Government. Prefectural Executive Committees (Komiteti Ekzekutiv i Prefektures) exist on the prefectural level, formed of representatives from the Sub-Prefectural Committees (Komiteti i Non-Prefektures), which in turn are elected by the Communal Offices (Zyrja e Komunevet). The Cell (Celula) constitutes the lowest level of the Party structure. Every Prefecture has in its Party organization an Economic Committee (Komiteti Ekonomik) which is composed of various sections (Seksjoni) dealing with Finances, Economics, Sanitation, etc.

n. The front organizations serve as instruments for Communist penetration and indoctrination of specific elements of the Albanian population. They are designed to gather into Party controlled organizations those persons who are not eligible for Party membership. The structure of these organs parallels that of the Workers' Party. They include: The Union of Albanian Women (Bashkimi i Graveve Shqiptare); The Committee of Albanian War Casualties and Partisans (Komiteti Invalidet Shqiptare dhe Partizanet); The Albanian Trade Union Association (Sindikatat); The Union of Working Youth of ALBANIA (Bashkimi i Rinise se Punes Shqiptare), formerly the Communist Youth of ALBANIA (Rinija Komuniste Shqiptare); subsidiary to the Union of Working Youth of ALBANIA is the Pioneers (Pioneri), an organization for children under twelve years of age; the Albanian Red Cross (Kryqi i Kuq Shqiptar); The Albanian-Soviet Union Cultural Association (Shoqnja Per Bashkopoliminin Kulturor Shqypni-JEES); The Association for Physical Education and Sport (Fisikultura e Sportit); The Union of Albanian Anti-Fascist Youth (Bashkimi i Rinise Anti-Fashiste Shqiptare), with a much broader membership than the elite Working Youth; The Professional Union (Bashkimi Profesional); and The Association for Assistance to the Army and Defense (Shoqnja per Ndhim Ushtrise dhe Mbrojtjes) or SHNUM, an organization designed to prepare Albanians for military service and for efficient national defense.

10. Statute of the Albanian Workers' Party

Following is the text of the "Statute of the Albanian Workers' Party", reportedly approved by the Albanian Communist Congress during the early part of 1949.

A. Statute of the Albanian Workers' Party:

1. The primary aim of the Statute is the establishment of a Socialist and Communist social order in ALBANIA.

2. The Albanian Workers' Party, with regard to its activities, is guided by the theories of the founders and masters of Leninism and Marxism, namely: MARX, ENGELS, LENIN, and STALIN. In the present state of development of ALBANIA, the Albanian Workers' Party mobilizes and directs the class of workers, peasants and other types of workers of

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the country in their struggle against the remnants of Fascism and Feudalism; against the mentality of the bourgeoisie and of the reactionaries; for the defense of national independence and territorial inviolability; for the consolidation of democracy and of the right of the people; for the edification of the country by means of its industrialization and electrification; and for the edification and development of the State's economy and of cooperatives. By working toward these aims, it will be possible to achieve higher economic, cultural and technical standards for the working class and for the whole nation.

3. The Party gives its full support to the development and education of the Proletariat and of the generation. It directs the democratic front (Fronti Demokratik) and all organizations of the workers and of the State's employees, also the efforts to improve living conditions of all the workers. It fights for the strengthening of the democratic cause, against warmongers, against racial discrimination, for a defense of the ethnic and democratic rights of the minorities, and for a consolidation of the international solidarity of the workers of all countries.

4. The Albanian Workers' Party concentrates all its efforts toward a close cooperation within the democratic anti-imperialist field and primarily toward a sincere friendship with the USSR, the guide in this field, and with the countries which have a Peoples' Democracy.

5. The Party demands from its members proof of their activity and self-denial in the performance of the work for the realization of the program and the observance of the Statute. This is necessary in order that the Party may effectively carry out the program and insure unity among the ranks of the Party.

B. Duties and Rights:

1. It is the duty of each member: (1) to fight for the program of the Party; (2) to become familiar with the basic doctrines of Marxism and Leninism; (3) to observe discipline, unity and vigilance; (4) to be an example of good conduct and morale; (5) to act in accordance with the norms of labor (planned according to the Russian brigades system) and of the State's laws; (6) to become perfect (to improve) in the skill of his profession; (7) to strengthen the ties with the masses and be sympathetic to their wishes and to guide them and to elucidate to them the Party line policy; and (8) to be a member of one of the mass organizations or a laborers' organization and to establish the organization where it does not exist.

2. The member has the right to participate in discussion, to attend meetings, and to take part in the activity of the Party press.

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In the course of Party meetings, he has the right to criticize the activity of any member. He has the right to elect or to be elected into any of the Party bodies. He has the right to refer any question to any Party body, including the Central Committee.

C. Admission to the Party:

1. A person can be admitted to the Party after he has been a candidate for one year. In the case of industrial workers and peasants, candidacy is only six months. The candidates attend the Party meetings and have a consulting vote. They are bound to respect the same rules as the Party members. Necessary age to be admitted to the Party (membership or candidacy) is eighteen years. Persons exploiting the labor of others are not eligible to become members.

2. Admission of workers as candidates must be accompanied by a recommendation on the part of two members who have to their credit at least one year of activity within the Party. Poor peasants need a recommendation by one Party member who has had one year of activity within the Party. Moderately wealthy peasants (small holders) and artisans (handicraftsmen) need a recommendation by two Party members with two years activity within the Party. Intellectuals need a recommendation by three Party members, each of whom must have had three years activity within the Party.

3. With regard to the first two categories, the members recommending the candidate must have known the person for at least six months. With regard to the last categories, this period must be at least one year.

4. The suggestion to admit a person to the Party is made by the basic organization of which the candidate is a member. His admission as a Party member must be approved by the nearest higher committee.

5. Expulsion from the Party is usually decided in the basic organization meeting and then approved by the nearest higher committee. The expelled members can submit an appeal against the expulsion decision to any Party body, including the Central Committee.

D. Structure and Democracy:

1. The structure and organization of the Party is based upon the principles of democratic centralization. The Party leaders who represent the various organs of the Party are elected by secret ballot and are obliged to render account to the masses by whom they have been elected. Decisions are discussed liberally; however, when adopted by the majority, they are to be adhered to by the minority without question. The decisions taken by the supreme organs are compulsory for all subordinate organs. Local problems are solved by the respective organizations, according to the principles of autonomy, without disturbing the general course of action of the Party.

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The supreme body of the Party is the Congress, which elects the Central Committee and the Committee on Revision. For the cities and their administrative sub-divisions, the supreme body is the corresponding Conference, which elects the Committee; while for the basic organization, it is the General Meeting, which elects the Secretary General or the Bureau. In cases where the majority demands, or where the Central Committee wishes to verify its policy, political issues of the Party can be submitted for discussion by all in the Party.

E. Superior Bodies (National):

1. The Congress of the Party generally meets every three years; the Central Committee may, however, convene the Congress for unusual cases or by a one-third vote of the participants of the last Congress. The Congress ratifies the work performed on the part of the Central Committee, it modifies the program of the Party and the Party Statute, it elects the Central Committee and the Committee on Revision, and it fixes the number of their components.

2. The candidates of the Central Committee attend all meetings, having the right to express their consultative opinion. The Central Committee elects the Politburo for the performance of the general work and it appoints a secretary for current affairs. The Central Committee meets every three months. Every year it calls a conference of the representatives elected at the plenary meetings of the Special Committee for the purpose of deciding on important questions of the Party and it may call an additional conference if one-fifth of its members were deprived of representing the Committee. The Commission on Revision checks on the speed and accuracy in which the Party affairs are being handled, as well as its financial situation.

F. Party Bodies within Cities, Districts, and City Districts:

1. In these Party organizations, the highest body is that of the Conference, which meets once a year. Special meetings are held following a decision of the corresponding (city, city district) Central Committee, or the Committee or the delegates to the Congress. The Committee elects a Politburo and two secretaries with at least three years' activity within the Party; their appointment to be approved by the Party Central Committee.

2. The basic organization of the Party is established in every working center, military unit, public institution (organization), or village where there are more than two members of the Party. The basic organization organizes the masses and conducts the agitation and propaganda activities according to the Party line policy. The cell educates the members and is responsible for the working plan being carried out according to the mission; it mobilizes the masses toward a realization of the working plan; it fights against deficiencies and works toward the improvement of the material and cultural standard of the masses.

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Each basic organization totalling less than 15 members elects only one secretary, while those totalling a higher membership elect their own Politburo. The Workers' Party directs the organization of the youth, and it provides for their education in conformity with the principles of Marxism and Leninism.

3. A member who fails to obey orders from superior bodies, or who commits actions considered as crimes in the opinion of the Party, can consequently be admonished, with the punishment entered in the offender's records, or he can be temporarily deprived of the right to occupy a leading position with the Party, or as a further punishment he can be expelled from the Party. The members of the Central Committee can be expelled from the Central Committee or from the Party itself by two-thirds vote of the plenary meeting.

4. The financial resources of the Party are constituted from contributions and income from Party enterprises. The contributions range from 5 lek to 3 per cent of the monthly income of the member.

PART IV

"Peace, Bread and Work"

11. The Communist Conception of the Four Freedoms

A. Following is a resume of a statement made in the Albanian Refugee Camp "Haxhi-Qirjako" in Piraeus, GREECE, by Mehdi EDHUSEA, an Albanian who escaped from his native country to GREECE in 1947:

1. "After almost insurmountable difficulties, I succeeded in shaking off the Communist yoke and finally reached Piraeus. It was no easy task to circumvent the Albanian Communist frontier guards. Now that I have regained liberty, I feel it incumbent upon me to reveal to the world what is going on in ALBANIA, and to disclose the hardships that a proud and distinguished nation like ALBANIA has to endure. Under pretense of democracy she has been deprived of her liberty by the barbarous supporters of the Bolshevik program.

By April 1947, the jails of Berat were overcrowded with political prisoners who were serving sentences at hard labor. Guarded by armed Red agents, any attempt to break away would have proved suicidal.

Those moral and material sufferings matured in us the determination either to regain liberty or die. It so happened that about forty of the internees had formed a group, and on 17 April 1947, when returning from their work, attacked their armed escorts in the vicinity of Berat. Defying machine pistols and hand grenades, these desperate men were soon engaged in an embittered hand-to-hand struggle with their guards. Only three of the prisoners survived and finally reached the Greek frontier. I was one of them.

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2. The First Days of the Red Regime After It Had Assumed Power

"It was common knowledge that Communist bands had been organized under the pseudonym "National Clirintar" (National Liberation) headed by two Slav agents from Belgrade, and known only by the names "MILADIN" and "DUSHAN". They were followed by fanatic Albanian Communists who blindly obeyed orders they received. After a complete victory over the Albanian democratic Nationalists, they entered Tirane and immediately commenced carrying out the program of the Russian Revolution of 1917. This event was marked by the mass executions of intellectuals, workers, merchants, proprietors, and ecclesiastics. Persecutions and arrests were a daily occurrence. The Red bandits justified their barbarous methods by placarding these crimes as a struggle against Nazi-Fascist collaborators and traitors. No time was wasted in establishing a Democratic Front by means of intimidation, such as tortures and arrests, thus separating the population from a regime which had fought for the liberty of ALBANIA with unflinching valor.

On 2 December 1946, an election day, I was jailed and deprived of all my civil rights. Today, I am in a position to testify to the many terroristic acts and measures that were resorted to on that specific date to ensure a majority of votes. It must be mentioned at this point that not even the slightest opportunity was offered to the population to express its own opinion or to vote against the solid electoral body of the Red Regime. But, in spite of all that, there were many who remained undauntedly true to their patriotic sentiments and either burned their ballot-papers or otherwise refrained from voting. The Red Government, in order to complete the number of votes, forced minors to the voting booths, with the result that on 2 December 1946, a regime was set up that bore the brand of a legal, self-nominated government, constituting the basis of the Peoples' Republic of ALBANIA, though practically built up on Soviet Republican principles. Thus, 2 December 1946 became the date that doomed the liberty and independence of the Albanian nation and actually was the date of issuance of a death warrant for the population.

Thus ALBANIA became part of the governmental machinery of TITO (STALIN) in a political, military, administrative and economic sense. All orders and directives emanated from the Kremlin via Belgrade.

3. The Disintegration of Albanian Culture and Traditions

"Under the new regime all existent laws were abolished and substituted by acts dictated from Moscow. This was followed by burning all private and public libraries and other books, which caused an irreparable loss to national culture. New books published were pervaded by Marxist-Leninist propaganda. Traditions that had been so jealously guarded by the Albanians and respected by previous occupation forces had to yield to a destructive opposition characterized by showy conferences and theatrical performances. Where legal measures failed to attain the desired effect, executions and arrests sealed the fate of "reactionary elements".

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4. The Elimination of National Emblems

"Changes in this direction were begun by adding spikes of grain to the right and left of the Albanian bicipetal (two-headed) eagle and adding a red star on top. The tombs of earlier martyrs that commemorated Albanian history were done away with. The Albanian nation had been spending a fortune on the maintenance of these sacred symbols of the past, but the iron heel of Communism, with merciless indifference, destroyed these shrines leaving no trace of monuments to those whose names appeared on the national roll of honor. All this happened in the wake of Communism in which the Albanian nation had placed its only hope for justice and liberty".

5. Destruction of the Traditional Honor of the Family

"One of the most virtuous features of Albanian tradition is the education of womanhood. These were customs anxiously guarded by parents during the past centuries in order to give to the nation mothers capable of begetting a sound generation. It was due to these mothers that the characteristics of the Albanian nation were preserved throughout the past, turbulent centuries. One of the salient traits was the practice of moral duties based on rigid patriarchal principles. It required all the cunning and intelligence of the Communist agents to undermine these traditions, and in part, they succeeded. Albanian women were drafted to serve in Partisan units; some were used in the espionage service; others, actuated by overindulgence in Communist doctrines even went to the extent of denouncing their own parents and causing their executions. Prostitution, which had been unknown in the past, became rampant, being promoted by Communist commissars. Brothels were later abolished, and in their places cultural centers were set up where conferences were supposed to be held. However, these centers served as meeting places of amusements. Drastic measures were in store for those parents who objected to their daughters frequenting these circles, for they were taken care of by the HOXHA police of both sexes. Marriage, a sacred matter in ALBANIA and celebrated in accordance with ancient traditions, became a thing of the past. Parents had no voice in planning the futures of their daughters.

In March 1945, on the occasion of the demobilization of Albanian women, Major General Bedri SPAHIU addressed his audience in a speech. After having eulogized the active part taken by the Albanian women during the war, and having stressed their loyal attitude in critical situations, SPAHIU bade farewell to the demobilized women, who, as he said, were returning to the domestic fireside. On this occasion, he promised every demobilized soldier or Communist civilian willing to contract marriage with a demobilized woman a premium of 6,000 francs, equal to 60,000 lek. The number of women was considerable; many of them, being conscious of the welcome they would be accorded due to their past conduct, refused to return home. The Red Government was forced to concentrate these homeless women at Durres, and later compelled them to get married. These conditions were a source of crime and suicides.

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In the village of Tatzat in the Delvina District, for instance, a father shot his partisan daughter to vindicate the disgrace brought upon the family. Similar occurrences took place in other parts of ALBANIA and serve to prove the corrupt methods practised by the Communists to destroy the traditional patriarchal ties".

6. Public Instruction

"Education as practised in the past has been abrogated. Schools and educational institutions that had been conducted on national principles and western methods were substituted by Communist schools, characterized by a revolutionary and political program of action aiming at the individual considering himself as a simple means and not as a factor of civilization. The Russian and Serbo-Croat languages have become obligatory in Albanian high schools. The educational program of politics, economics, history, and socialism has been adapted to that practised in the Soviet Union, with special regard to the biographies of Yugoslav and Soviet personalities who took leading parts in the revolutions. National songs or hymns have been prohibited and intonations on the Soviet Revolution have taken their place".

7. Agrarian Reform and Expropriation of Land

"The promises made to the Albanians as a means of satisfying the demands of the partisans were not kept. On the contrary, they were deprived of their principal rights. The Agrarian Reform was put into practice, thereby ignoring justice and the democratic spirit. The land was simply taken from owners who were suspected of reactionary sentiments and distributed among those who enjoyed the confidence of the government. This procedure had a killing effect on the bourgeoisie, and gave birth to a new ideological class. It was the mountain population that was primarily and most seriously affected by the new agrarian reforms.

They openly voice their discontent, especially of the fact that they were not accustomed to the change in climatic conditions; that they were not housed properly due to lack of housing facilities and suffered undue hardship; and that they had been deprived of their agricultural implements. The Albanian press did not fail to give the matter a twist, in that it prominently displayed these reforms as measures taken along lines of extreme justice. The objective was to gain the confidence of the population and to throw sand into the eyes of foreign observers.

But as with all other jugglery, these tricks performed by the government were soon unmasked. Later on, all farm products were declared as property of the state and had to be delivered to the authorities. The farmer, having been left with inadequate supplies to cover his own personal demands, was compelled to buy products at cooperative stores and at higher rates than those paid to him".

12. Suppression of Religion in ALBANIA

A. The following information was obtained from an Italian Catholic Sister who lived in Shkoder for over 20 years, and returned to ITALY in the fall of 1949.

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B. In 1944, after the Communists gained control in ALBANIA, persecution of the Catholic clergy commenced. The Communists, according to the abovementioned Source, have executed or imprisoned the following Catholic priests:

- 1) Franciscan Padre Anton HAPARI was given a trial in Tirane and charged with being a member of the National Regency during the German Occupation. In spite of the intervention of the Catholic Apostolic Delegate, S. NIGRIS, in the Autumn of 1945 Padre HAPARI was convicted and shot.
- 2) Padre Alfonso TRANCKI, of German extraction, was sentenced and shot to death at Shkoder in August 1946. The reason for his execution is unknown.
- 3) Don KURTI, of Tirane, was sentenced and shot after having been accused of collaboration with the German and Italian Occupation forces.
- 4) Monsignore Vincenzo PRENUSHI, Bishop of Durres, died in jail, February 1949, while serving a sentence for alleged subversive activities.
- 5) Monsignore VOLAJ, Bishop of Lesh, was shot by the Albanian Communist Government for reasons unknown.
- 6) Franciscan Padre Gjon SHLLAKU was shot in 1947 for having disobeyed government orders. (Type of orders unknown).
- 7) Padre Leke SIRDANI, of Boga, was slain in 1946 for having refused support to Communist Partisans.
- 8) Franciscan Padre Frano KIRI was shot in 1947 for having allegedly concealed firearms.
- 9) Padre Anton KIRI was shot in 1947 for reasons unknown.
- 10) Padre Toma LACAJ was sentenced to serve a prison term for having sympathized with anti-Communist movements.
- 11) Padre Mihel KOLIQI, of Shkoder, was sentenced to 30 years at hard labor after being tried for collaboration with the German and Italian Occupation forces. He is now in forced labor near Elbasan.
- 12) Franciscan Padre Agostin ASHIKU was sentenced to 20 years at hard labor for having possession of firearms.
- 13) Jesuit Padre Giacomo GARDINI was sentenced to 10 years at hard labor in the concentration camp at Puka.
- 14) Franciscan Padre Gasper SUMA, of Thethi, was sentenced to 10 years at hard labor for having opposed Communist government orders.

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15) Jesuit Padre HARAPI Mark was sentenced to 20 years in prison for reasons unknown.

16) Franciscan Padre Donat KIRRI is confined in prison for unknown reasons.

17) Jesuit Padre Gjon PANUELLA was sentenced to 30 years for collaboration with the Germans and Italians. This priest attempted an escape from prison, but was unsuccessful and died of the wounds received when apprehended.

18) Franciscan Padre Gesh ASHTA has been jailed for unknown reasons.

19) Franciscan Padre Injac BAQLI has been jailed for unknown reasons.

20) Luigi PICI was an Albanian priest who was known to have collaborated with a group of National Communists in 1947. However, he was tried and executed by a firing squad.

C. The Source of this report estimated that approximately forty priests have been executed since the end of the war.

D. In the Spring of 1946, the Apostolic Delegate S. NIGRIS was expelled from ALBANIA on a charge of having resisted government orders. This action was in accordance with an Albanian directive which grants the police a free hand in the removal of strong adversaries.

E. During the Autumn of 1946, the Albanian Government issued an order to close all Catholic convents and seminaries in the country.

On 20 December 1946, one group of nuns were told to vacate their convent on a half hour's notice, and were allowed to carry with them only a minimum amount of their belongings. This convent, on Via Shen Mehilli #3, Shkoder, was then occupied by the D.M.P. (uniformed police). In view of this action, the nuns had no alternative but to turn to the civilian population for hospitality. They were no longer allowed to wear the garb of their order. The Franciscans shared the same treatment in having to vacate their seminaries, monasteries, etc.

Their monastery on Via Washington, Shkoder (now called Corso HOKHA Enver), has been converted into a food rationing office.

The Bishop's residence at Shkoder has become a tobacco warehouse. The Shkoder parish house serves as a school for apprentice shoemakers, while the Jesuit Seminary has been converted into a medical clinic. The Salesian Sisters were also evicted and their convent in Shkoder, located at Via GJECOV Shtjefan #11, has become a physical training center for the "Pioneers" (Communist Childrens Organization). Im-movable assets of the Jesuit property at Bardhanjore have been requisitioned and are now state-owned lands.

F. Among the ecclesiastical properties which were confiscated by the state, were the libraries of the Franciscans and Jesuits, and which were removed for their value, were burned. The epic works of

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Padre FISHTA, such as the "Lahuta e Malcis" were also destroyed. These books were burned because there was no room in the Communist curriculum for such conservative teachings. The Museum of the Franciscan Padres at Shkoder and the Physical Institute of the Jesuits were also confiscated by the state and declared government property. In addition to the above-mentioned properties, the printing establishment of the cleric Ndoc NIKAJ, known as the "Tipografia Nikaj"; the "Tipografia Zoja e Paperlyeme" of the Jesuits, and the "Tipografia Francoskane" were all turned into state-owned enterprises.

G. Visits to hospitals and jails by priests are permitted only in case of death or during religious holidays. Sisters continue to perform their duties in hospitals but are compelled to wear street clothes.

The government has placed no restriction on attendance of the Catholic Church, although this practice of attending church is considered reactionary.

H. The Albanian Government favors the Orthodox Church but it is rumored that a purge of certain elements within this church is projected, in view of objections raised in regard to the state's interference in religious matters. The head of the church has been substituted for by another man whose name is unknown at the moment. The Orthodox Church in ALBANIA is a national institution and the government is expected to protect her since its followers are the most faithful in their attitude toward the state. Noteworthy to mention is the fact that members of the Orthodox Church simultaneously act as leading exponents of the Communist Party.

I. The Pope's ex-communication orders concerning Communists have produced sensible moral repercussions among the population. True to form, the Albanian press interpreted the decision taken by the Vatican as an indication of fear on the part of the Church, and the Albanian Communist Government has disregarded the ban imposed by the Vatican and will not permit any compliance with the clauses contained in the ex-communication order.

J. The following is a list of known Catholic clergymen who have been authorized by the Albanian Communist Government to pursue their ecclesiastic works in that country:

Padre Zef SARACI, a Jesuit
Padre Ernesto COBA, at Shkoder
Padre Marin SIRDANI, a Franciscan
Padre Ferdinand PALLI, a Franciscan

These priests receive identical treatment as the general public in regard to rationing of foodstuffs and clothing. It is interesting to note further that approximately three per cent of the Albanian Catholics hold government positions, and are members of the Communist Party. Other than Padre Luigj PIGI, who was executed, Source could name only Sister Margherita GJOKA as a known collaborator of the Albanian Communist Party.

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K. The Albanian Mohammedans have also been subjected to persecutions, but within certain limits. They form the backbone of the Albanian population (70%), therefore, the government is anxious to avoid reactionary currents among them. They have ignored the ordinance against the veil and fez, have continued to observe their Mohammedan festivals, such as the "Beiran i Vogël". The wealthy class of Moslems, the "Bek-tashi" have been affected most severely by the reforms of the new regime. They have had to pay heavy contributions to the state and have had to part with their movable assets, which were nationalized. The "Sheherlitos", who are the poorer class, and chiefly inhabit the north-western regions of ALBANIA, have given full support to the Communist Government.

13. Albanian Political Parties in Exile

A. In the "Free ALBANIA Committee" the following parties in exile are represented:

1. Balli Kombetar (National Front)
2. ALBANIA Agrarian Party
3. Legaliteti (Monarchist Party)

B. Other parties in exile, but not belonging to the above committee are; the Bloku Kombetar Independent (The Independent National Bloc); and The Prizren League. These latter groups are politically to the extreme right and philo-Italian, in accordance with the conception that history and geography tie ALBANIA to ITALY and that without ITALY, ALBANIA becomes a paralytic ethnic unit.

C. Chief exponents of the Independent National Bloc are:

1) Dr. Ismail VERLACI, son of Shouqet VERLACI, Prime Minister during the Italian Occupation of ALBANIA, presently residing in Rome. Ismail VERLACI is undoubtedly pro-Italian, and he advocates the formation of an anti-Communist front, regardless of the form of government, Republican or Monarchist. He has considerable authority and finds many followers, particularly among the younger elements with whom he is in constant contact. Consequently, he is much feared by the present regime in ALBANIA, as well as by the prospective candidates of a future democratic government. The policy adopted by VERLACI to justify his pro-Italian sympathies is in substance as follows: "One must seek support from ITALY because the Italians are the least interested in the de-nationalization of our people and the partition of our territory; the Italians have only economic interests in our country; and it is to their vital interest to advocate a united ALBANIA". For these principles, Ismail VERLACI has been made the object of attacks from the Communists. VERLACI has been and is still in touch with the former prefect of police in Tirane, PAPANILLO, an able politician, about sixty years old.

2) Marka Gjoni GJONI, spiritual head of the resistance movement in Mirdita (Northern ALBANIA) and prince of that zone. GJONI advocates the formation of an united anti-Communist front, and several

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times he has contacted Ali Bey KLISURA, the most prominent exponent of Balli Kombetar, in an effort to achieve this. According to GJONI, the Monarchist issue should be dealt with by means of a public referendum after the Communists have been driven from power. However, no positive results were reached on these problems, due to the uncompromising attitude of the Balli Kombetar, which refused to give up its republican principles, alleging that this would mean a weakening of the "national front" and place KLISURA in the background. KLISURA is at present allied with the British, while GJONI is entirely devoted to the national cause of ALBANIA and does not approve of British interference in Albanian affairs. GJONI is considered by many to be the most suitable personality to bring about the overthrow of the Communists in ALBANIA, both as a patriot, and a practical man. Several members of his family were killed during an uprising in ALBANIA. In regard to the Greek territorial claims on ALBANIA (which are supported by some powers), GJONI maintains an absolutely uncompromising attitude in not admitting any territorial concessions of any nature.

3) Professor Ernest KOLIQUI, during the Italian Occupation was Minister of Public Education, President of the Chamber of Deputies, and currently is professor of Albanian Literature at the University of Rome.

KOLIQUI is the most educated and perhaps the most intelligent in the Albanian community in Rome. Politically, he is anti-Communist and pro-Italian; he has no preference between a monarchy and a republic; advocates only a free and independent ALBANIA. In this he is upheld by the Italian Foreign Office, which seems to give considerable moral support to the cause of an independent ALBANIA (without, however, any precise viewpoint on the question of Albanian frontiers). Because of his world-wide fame as a scholar, KOLIQUI has much influence, both in Rome and abroad.

D. The best known exponent of the Prizren League is Xhafer DEVA, who was Minister of the Interior during the German Occupation. DEVA is a violent character, urging military action against the Communists; it is rumored that he is presently organizing some guerrilla "legions" of Albanians and Macedonians. It is the general opinion that this is only a bluff, for he has little authority and cannot rely upon resolute individuals due to the vigilance of the Albanian Army along the Greek border, and also the activity of the Roje Popullore (Communist Popular Militia), which has many informants among the Albanian refugees. It is known that DEVA has made proposals to the British and Americans for obtaining a supply of arms. DEVA, who is now an Egyptian citizen, is not on good terms with KLISURA and the groups of VERLACI and KOLIQUI.

E. Objectively speaking, these Albanian parties were all created by political interests which seek control and hegemony over the Balkans. Thus, the nations taking active interest in the welfare of the various parties are as follows:

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- (1) Legaliteti (Monarchists): ENGLAND
- (2) Balli Kombetar (National Front): ENGLAND
- (3) Albanian Agrarian Party: YUGOSLAVIA
- (4) Independent National Bloc: ITALY (and indirectly the United States.)
- (5) The Prizren League: ITALY

The structure of the above parties varies as do the foreign interests in the Balkans, and it follows that instead of any collaboration among the parties, there is only suspicion, intrigue and rivalry.

F. The National Front (Balli Kombetar) managed to gain the upper hand in the "Committee for a Free ALBANIA" when this committee was formed in Paris in August 1949, after a quasi formal consultation among the various party representatives responsible for the policy of the committee. As the dominant party, the National Front has been mostly responsible for the policy of the committee. Within the ranks of this party it was believed that Colonel Fitzroy MACLEAN had reached some accord with TITO in regard to ALBANIA. A few considerations bore out this belief. For example, TITO had given some signs of a plan, the principal aim of which was to bring pressure to bear on Enver HOXHA's Cominformist government - probably by stirring up some activity on ALBANIA's northern border. Actually TITO delegated this task of harrassing the Albanian government to Serbophile Gani KRYEZIU, head of the Albanians in Kossovo and brother of Sait KRYEZIU, leader of the Albanian Agrarian Party. (The Kossovo, ethnically Albanian, was assigned to YUGOSLAVIA by the London Conference of 30 May 1913.) This MACLEAN accord and Kossovo plan were later substantiated sufficiently so that the National Front modified its policy within the "Committee" and in Albanian circles. Fearing possible developments of the TITO-MACLEAN accord, and fearing further isolation from the Prizren League, the National Front toned down its policy of domination and hesitated in making any clear decisions and in taking any definite action. This has naturally hampered the activities of the Committee.

G. Meanwhile, National Front exponents also fear that the British may bring pressure to bear on ALBANIA through GREECE, who claims a part of southern ALBANIA (Korce and Gjinokastre). TITO has had his own troubles and has not been able to do anything on the northern border - not even through the Albanian exiles. Thus, the Albanian government, fearing the threat from the south, has concentrated two divisions along the Greek border. In the meantime, the Soviet Union, seeing ALBANIA thus isolated and encircled, foments disorders in Macedonia, promising and intending to set up an independent Macedonian state.

H. In National Front circles, it is known that roads are being built in ALBANIA with the purpose of joining Elbasan with the Greek-Yugoslav border in the vicinity of Lake Ohrid. This might be the result of a plan

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made by the Soviets to join BULGARIA and ALBANIA through a corridor in Macedonia. Although this appears to be very difficult it would solve the problem of control of the lower Adriatic by the Soviet Union if it were to succeed. In National Front circles it is believed that in order to defeat this threat, the Greeks, urged on by the Allies, might break through the southeast border of ALBANIA and march on Tione, thus cutting the route of the Communists. (It will be remembered that a state of war still exists between ALBANIA and GREECE, since no peace treaty has as yet been signed.)

I. According to these same circles, the National Front is attempting to infiltrate Albanians into the fatherland through GREECE in order to spread propaganda within the ranks of the Albanian army in favor of a free ALBANIA. Other Albanian Parties, rivals of the Balli Kombetar, have not shown any enthusiasm over this venture. These latter parties believe that the hypothetical corridor of the Soviets in Macedonia is nothing but political pressure and an attempt to embarrass TITO. The same National Front sources reveal that some members of the National Front (about 25 persons) are presently in Malta waiting to be sent to ALBANIA. Although this type of expedition should first of all result in information of a military, political and economic nature, the members of this expedition will probably spread propaganda in favor of their own party, and nothing more. This is another example of the fact that an effective collaboration among the parties is impossible.

J. Members of the Balli Kombetar believe that a policy of patience should prevail, since the USSR is daily seen to be in more difficulty in furnishing supplies to ALBANIA. From information gathered in ALBANIA, these members have learned that morale in the Albanian Army is extremely low, and that of the civilian population even lower. The economic situation of the country is bad, inasmuch as the USSR, in exchange for raw materials, sends an infrequent shipment of cereals and arms.

K. The National Front, in Committee circles, shows itself willing to collaborate with the Monarchists, only for opportunistic reasons and in order not to be isolated. Ex-King ZOGU is perfectly aware of the intentions of the National Front and does not fear them. ZOGU is represented on the Committee by his trusted servant, Abas KUPI, who recently left Rome to join the King in EGYPT in order to discuss possible developments of the Albanian situation.

L. The National Front members believe in eventual victory of their own party in the Free ALBANIA movement, because of their social and revolutionary ideology. They believe that King ZOGU is an English pawn, to be used in case of failure of the Republicans (the National Front). Such a failure they exclude on the grounds that the Yugoslavs could not suffer the restoration of the monarchy in ALBANIA because the ideological differences would

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be dangerous to the countries of popular democracy. And when the time comes for the founding of a new Albanian government, the National Front leaders hope for foreign support (English and Yugoslav).

M. The most prominent exponent of Balli Kombetar is Ali Bey KLISURA, now in exile in Rome. During the constitution of ALBANIA, KLISURA was the closest collaborator of Nuredin Bey VLORA, and with him held a position of command within the provisional government of Vlone. Later, however, he tried to undermine the prestige of VLORA, turning first to ITALY and then to GERMANY. With the assistance of GERMANY, KLISURA managed to set up the cadres of the Balli Kombetar at the very beginning of World War II, organizing a small army (which assumed a definite anti-Italian attitude) In January 1943, KLISURA and other members of the Balli Kombetar were captured by General HOXHA's Communist Partisans. These partisans were organized with the assistance of the British (Major SEYMOUR). However, Britain was at that time still uncertain about the policy to adopt with the two Albanian factions; therefore, KLISURA was set free. After the war he went into exile, and is now the most influential representative of Balli Kombetar.

PART V

ALBANIAN MILITARY SITUATION

14. Natural Defenses (See Exhibit VII)

A. A rough topographic survey of ALBANIA might at first lead one to believe that the Albanian defense position is good, since mountains surround all of its continental borders. However, if examined in detail, the situation proves to be anything but favorable, since there are many possibilities of invasion which could all be fully exploited by enemies of ALBANIA.

It is assumed that both YUGOSLAVIA and GREECE must at present be considered enemies of ALBANIA. These two hostile countries cover the entire length of the Albanian continental borders and close ALBANIA entirely. If the military action of its enemies were to be conducted simultaneously, ALBANIA would be unable to put up a successful defense in the proper sense of the word. The Albanian territory in a very short time would be reduced to a few pockets, disorganized and divided, which could only continue to molest the enemy forces by a more or less successful guerrilla campaign.

By successfully performing the initial phase of their offensive and establishing a single break-through along the eastern border of ALBANIA, the Yugoslav and Greek armies could easily reach the coast in a relatively short time, not exceeding twelve days, and divide the country into two or more pockets, even if such a maneuver were not aided by a simultaneous amphibious operation along the coast. This would certainly break, or at least greatly weaken, the organized defense of the Albanian Army.

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The Albanian Army, even if it were equipped with up-to-date equipment and were well trained, which it is not, is numerically too weak to resist blows delivered at certain points where the enemy's reconnaissance would reveal a lesser resistance. In the case of ALBANIA, the probing of the resistance along the border and the following delivery of the main blow at exactly the right point, still assuming that the enemy had the initiative, does not constitute a too difficult tactical problem. This is particularly clear if one keeps in mind the fact that the numerical strength of the Albanian Army, without considering its fire power, is so small that it could not efficiently cover all of its long border line.

Boosting the Albanian Army to its maximum potential and reinforcing it with Cominform brigades, which would certainly aid Enver HOXHA's regime, a force not exceeding 200,000 men would be obtained. This small force would have to cover not less than 700 kilometers of borders. Even if not one man were assigned to the defense of the long coastline, this is an unsustainable proportion. No army in the world could defend so vast a territory with so small a force, from which a large number of rear personnel and reserve troops must be subtracted.

Besides this, guerrilla forces, composed of Albanian regulars and irregulars, would find in their enemies elements equally well suited for guerrilla warfare and able to counter their operations with a corresponding counter-guerrilla operation. Such movements would be conducted by light and mobile units, quite similar to the Albanian guerrilla forces, but better armed.

B. The survey of the continental borders should best start at the north (see Chart I). This part of the border line is extremely important, since the most important attempts to invade Albanian territory, since the beginning of modern warfare, took place in this area. This occurred during the First Balkan War and the attempted invasion of ALBANIA by the Yugoslav forces during World War II.

A chain of mountains, usually called the Albanian Alps, forms the border of YUGOSLAVIA (i.e., the Yugoslav National Republic of Crna Gora), starting from the flatland north of Shkoder, at the village of Hani Hotit (YUGOSLAVIA, 1:100,000, Sheet 138, 128526), and forming with its peaks both the hydrographic and the political boundary. The mountain chain rises steeply and reaches a height of 1228 meters only about 10 kilometers north of Lake Scutari. Towards the north it constantly rises, reaching the height of 2173 meters with the peak of Glieva Glava. It then crosses the Vile Mountain (Point 2093, YUGOSLAVIA, 1:100,000, Sheet 129, 303746) and maintaining its general north-south direction, leaves the locality of Gueinje in Crna Gora (Montenegro) reaching a height of 2580 meters about 15 kilometers north of Okol (YUGOSLAVIA, 1:250,000, Sheet Y-46, 741258).

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The mountain chain then follows the boundary, at heights varying from 2,500 to 2,600 metres, and ends in Djaravica (Point 2656, YUGOSLAVIA, 1:250,000, Y-37, 773268), abruptly falling into the flatland of Pec, in the Metohija region. This mountain chain, closing the north side of Lake Scutari along a length of not less than 130 kilometres, is without any roads or valleys, with the single exception of the valley at Vermoshe (YUGOSLAVIA, 1:250,000, Sheet Y-36, 742278), across the Lim River. Since this valley is enclosed in a circle of high mountains, it possesses no strategic value.

Another mountain chain, also following a north-south direction and forming an appendix to the abovementioned principal mountain chain of about 60 kilometers in length, starts with the Djaravica and ends in the 1,989 metres high Beshtrig (Point 1989, YUGOSLAVIA, 1:250,000, Sheet Y-38, 200934). This mountain chain leaves open a valley about 5 kilometres wide through which the White Drin River flows. A road runs along the river through this valley. Immediately to the south of this valley is another high mountain, the Koritnik, 2,394 metres, (Point 2394, YUGOSLAVIA, 1:250,000, Sheet Y-47, 202919). Koritnik is connected with the large chain of the Korab Mountains, but there is a passage for the small, but fast river Luma, which flows into the White Drin about 5 kilometres east of Kukes (YUGOSLAVIA, 1:250,000, Sheet Y-47, 189921), crossing the road between Prizren (YUGOSLAVIA, 1:250,000, Sheet Y-47, 189921) and Kukes, under the bridge of Ura Vezirit (YUGOSLAVIA, 1:250,000, Sheet Y-47, 191922).

The encirclement of this area of defense, composed of imposing mountain bulwarks connected by irregular heights, might be carried out easily by launching a bi-lateral maneuver, of which one arm would take Prizren, to be used as a jump-off point to follow the White Drin Valley, while the second would penetrate into the flatland of Shkoder from the Montenegrin isthmus. Both directions invite fast movements by means of excellent roads, of which the first connects Prizren, Kukes, Shenaric (YUGOSLAVIA, 1:250,000, Sheet Y-47, 176923), Leithiz (YUGOSLAVIA, 1:250,000, Sheet Y-47, 168924) and Puke (YUGOSLAVIA, 1:250,000, Sheet Y-47, 148920); while the second leads from Bar and Shkoder to Puke. Both roads were built by the Italians, are well suited for trucks and other heavy vehicles, and allow fast motorized columns to maneuver rapidly by means of which the Albanian forces, arrayed within the semi-circle of north and northeast ALBANIA, could be encircled.

The second natural defense system of ALBANIA, closing the eastern border towards YUGOSLAVIA (mainly the Republic of Macedonia) is constituted by the Korab Mountain chain. This imposing mountain has a length exceeding 70 kilometres and extends to the bay formed in the locality of Debar (Dibra) (YUGOSLAVIA, 1:250,000, Sheet Y-47, 194858). Its peaks have heights not less than 2,100 metres, while the two highest, the Korab (Point 2764, YUGOSLAVIA, 1:250,000, Sheet Y-47, 199887) and Deshat (Point 2374, YUGOSLAVIA, 1:250,000, Sheet Y-47, 195871) reach heights of 2,764 and 2,375 metres respectively.

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The Korab is a veritable natural wall, and if considered from a military point of view, could represent a considerable strategic advantage to ALBANIA, since this mountain shortens the border to a degree and the troops which would have been necessary to defend the area could be deployed elsewhere. The numerical weakness of the Albanian Army would mean that the border could not be defended equally, and the usage of all natural advantages would be to the Albanians' best interests.

In the event of a bi-lateral invasion coming from Prizren and Debar, the Korab Mountains would immediately become a negative position, since: (1) it would fall automatically should any of the two abovementioned positions become indefensible (which is probable) and (2) since it could not be evacuated in time by means of an organized retreat and would become a pocket of annihilation.

A good road connects Debar, in YUGOSLAVIA with Peshkop (YUGOSLAVIA, 1:250,000, Sheet Y-47, 188877). This road follows the Black Drin River. The locality of Topojan (YUGOSLAVIA, 1:250,000, Sheet Y-47, 187865), which is quite near the border (12 kilometres) and easily reached, and the locality of Zerqan are connected with Burrel (YUGOSLAVIA, 1:250,000, Sheet Y-47, 152871) by a road crossing the valley of the Mati River and running through Bulgizes (GREECE, 1:250,000, Sheet G-1, 169858). From Burrel a good mountain road leads to Kruje, Vorre (GREECE, 1:250,000, Sheet G-1, 121851), Tirane (GREECE, 1:250,000, Sheet G-1, 132842) and Durres.

The Black Drin River leaves YUGOSLAVIA to enter ALBANIA in the vicinity of Debar. It forms a valley about 5 kilometres wide, and this valley spreads out opening the Korab Mountain wall. This entry, if used as a point of the main effort, would offer considerable tactical possibilities to forces coming from the east. Another defensive wall, formed by a mountain chain, extends from Debar to Lake Ohrid, leaving Struga (GREECE, 1:250,000, Sheet G-1, 203818) in Yugoslav territory and Lin (GREECE, 1:250,000, Sheet G-1, 199807) in ALBANIA. The mountain chain is formed by the peaks of Jablanica (Point 2187, GREECE, 1:250,000, Sheet G-1, 186824) and Belica (Point 2257, GREECE, 1:250,000, Sheet G-1, 191828) and is uninterrupted, varying in height between 1,280 and 2,180 metres, with the highest summit reaching 2,257 metres. It dominates the road coming from YUGOSLAVIA, roughly following the western shore of Lake Ohrid. The road ascends to a fair height, then descends gently into the Shkumbin River Valley, crossing the important mineral zone of Qukes (GREECE, 1:250,000, Sheet G-1, 182810) and Libraghd (GREECE, 1:250,000, Sheet G-1, 172823).

A penetration of ALBANIA with strong forces taking off from Struga would not be too promising. Better possibilities are offered to a potential invading army by proceeding along the southeast shore of Lake Ohrid. Although there is no first class highway in this area, the entire region is flat, with a good community road connecting the town of Ohrid with the Monastery of St. Naum (GREECE, 1:250,000, Sheet G-1, 206788). From Naum a road leads to Strava (GREECE, 1:250,000, Sheet G-1, 200787) and Pogore (GREECE, 1:250,000, Sheet G-1, 198789).

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The area to the southeast contains the best road net in all ALBANIA. During the second phase of World War II, after the capitulation of ITALY, the Germans used this road net for their operations which led to the occupation of the country. The maneuver was conducted by the 1st Mountain Division (Erste Deutsche Gebirgsdivision) commanded by General Von STEFFNER.

The border area described above lying between YUGOSLAVIA and ALBANIA, is extremely unfavorable for the Albanians to hold should the Yugoslavs take the initiative. In a case like this, the Yugoslavs would undoubtedly execute a pincers movement, with lower Crna Gora serving as the take-off point toward Shkoder, and the White Drin Valley as the route of the second arm. Such a pincers movement would be an exact repetition of the first Yugoslav attempt which occurred during World War II.

The only difference to the abovementioned maneuver was that the Yugoslavs sought to conquer northern ALBANIA without using both arms of a pincer movement in a simultaneous flanking operation. Just one route of invasion was used since the Yugoslav General Staff, which should have co-ordinated the movements, had disintegrated in the meanwhile. A series of diverting operations could be conducted by the Yugoslavs in the Debar (Dibra) area. This would ease the conduct of offensive operations in the north and would offer opportunity for an advance toward the heart of ALBANIA, and the Adriatic. The advancing army would have already occupied Kruje, Elbasan, and Tirane.

It has been pointed out, however, that all possible Yugoslav offensive operations against ALBANIA would depend completely upon the time and tide of events in the Balkans. The probable successes of the Yugoslav Army on the Albanian front would be of secondary importance if compared with the main sector situated further east, i. e. Macedonia. If the Yugoslav Army were to lose the initiative, then the chances of success in this area would be greatly altered. The Yugoslavs would then be forced to conduct a retreat along the lines of communications existing between Lake Ohrid and the Kossovo flatland. The main effort in this instance would have to be diverted toward northern ALBANIA if the Yugoslavs were to check any advances into their territory from that direction. It would be to the vital interests of the Yugoslavs to keep an enemy force out of the flatland of Crna Gora, and also from reaching Boka Kotorska. The best means of accomplishing this would be for the Yugoslavs to have an alliance with GREECE, and to co-ordinate their military moves in such a manner as to keep any offensives conducted against either or both, from solidifying.

If such were not the case between YUGOSLAVIA and GREECE, then the south of ALBANIA would remain independent and could be used as a base for more extensive operations against the Yugoslavs. The reverse would be true in respect to GREECE. The Greco-Albanian border, including the area which crosses Lake Prespa, is 230 kilometres long. Within this distance are high mountains and open valleys of the rivers which flow into ALBANIA.

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The juncture of the Greek, Yugoslav, and Albanian borders lies in Lake Prespa. The Souhagra sector, wedging into the lake, belongs mainly to GREECE. The buttress of the mountain of Souhagra with its slopes southwest of Horovo, does not represent a valuable strongpoint of defense. Point 1728 of Souhara (GREECE; 1:250,000, Sheet G-1, 217768), however, protects the crossroad of the highway communications between Stenja (GREECE, 1:250,000, Sheet G-1, 220790), Resan (GREECE, 1:250,000, Sheet G-1, 230806) and Bitolj (GREECE, 1:250,000, Sheet G-1, 255797). This mountain faces north and is fortified with infantry trenches and field fortifications. Its left flank adjoins another fortified system, presently held by the Albanians.

This is the system of the Mali i That (Point 2035, GREECE, 1:250,000, Sheet G-1, 217778) which protects and controls the national highway leading from Pogradec and joins at Gabravica with a road following the coast of Lake Prespa. The road then continues to Korce, one of the most important centers of ALBANIA. This was the invasion route used by the Germans during the second phase of World War II. That invasion was simplified by the fact that the Italians had evacuated the area of Point 2035 on Mali i That in January 1943, and limited themselves to the defense of the localities around Starovo and Pogradec, and in the flatland of Korce. The Italian forces, however, maintained an occupation of Point 1806 (GREECE, 1:250,000, Sheet G-1, 213759), about 6 kilometres east of Mborja. This point was maintained and fortified with the sole intention of keeping the "Endartes" Partisans, commanded by the Greek General ZERVAS, under control.

The border, starting with the eastern corner of Lake Prespa, follows along the mountain of Kosik, its highest point of 1,549 metres being in ALBANIA, then follows a line which crosses the road coming from the entrenched field of Florina (GREECE, 1:250,000, Sheet G-1, 260769), which belongs to the so-called "METAXAS" line. The border then descends across a gorge into Bilisht (GREECE, 1:250,000, Sheet G-1, 223755) an entirely Moslem settlement, and then into the upper valley of the Devoll River.

The border area south of Korce is defended by a mountain chain, the Grammos, which has become universally known by the important role it played during the recent Greek revolution and civil war. The Grammos follows the border for about 30 kilometres, and protects the valley of Erseke (GREECE, 1:250,000, 194727) which is the most densely populated region of ALBANIA. The Grammos (GREECE, 1:250,000, Sheet G-4, ranging between 205734 and 200723) has an average height of over 2,000 metres, with heights of 2,036 metres in the north, 2,519 metres in the middle, and 2,041 metres in the south. A tributary of the Vjose River, very rapid in the first 25 kilometres of its course to Permet (GREECE, 1:250,000, Sheet G-4, 165717) but which slows down later at Kelcyre (GREECE, 1:250,000, Sheet G-4, 153728), has a source which originates in the springs under the south peak of the Grammos.

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The Grammos area is very poor in roads, and it may be safely added that no road communications exist between ALBANIA and GREECE in this region. There are mule paths which are of no military importance and which could be covered by light arms. Toward the south is the Sarandaporos River Valley, descending toward the bridge of Perat. This valley contains an excellent road which begins at Han Kalibaki (GREECE, 1:250,000, Sheet G-4, 188694). The Albanian territory in this region is entered by two roads, of which runs in the Vijose River Valley in the north, while the second crosses the Kakavi Bridge (GREECE, 1:250,000, Sheet G-4, 163681) to the east and penetrates the Dhrino River Valley. The two valleys are separated by the Nemeroke and Lunxheries Mountains (GREECE, 1:250,000, Sheet G-4, from 163713 to 181690, and the latter from 150715 to 167688). The first valley leads toward Permet and Tepelene (GREECE, 1:250,000, Sheet G-4, 138726), while the second reaches the important center of Gjinkaster.

The border between the two valleys (both of which are very favorable routes of invasion) is defended by Macricambe Mountain reaching a height of 1,671 metres (believed to be Point 1650, GREECE, 1:250,000, Sheet G-4, 162699). This area is the most dangerous point of the entire Greek-Albanian border, and the most favorable for a possible Greek offensive.

Kakavi is a fortified position which is reinforced with concrete emplacements, and faces southeast. It forms a unique defensive position together with the Strugara Mountain system (Point 1601, GREECE, 1:250,000, Sheet G-1, 153672). About 10 kilometres north of this position there is an aperture formed by a small tributary of the Dhrinos River, which has its springs below the Strugara. This opening offers particularly good possibilities to enter the wide and fertile Dhrino Valley, where the opportunity for the maneuvering of large units is quite good. It should be pointed out that the Dhrino River nearly dries out during the summer drought. It banks form an excellent ground for maneuvering armored vehicles and tanks. It is entered with comparative ease either from Kakavi or along the small tributary across from Doljana.

The population of the Permet and Perat regions is composed of Albanian Moslems, who have pronounced anti-Greek sentiments. Conversely, the inhabitants of the areas nearby Gjinkaster and Kakavi speak exclusively Greek. The Moslem elements are attached to Mali i Gjer (GREECE, 1:250,000, Sheet 144691) on one side, and on the other to Mali Ioser, immediately above Libohov (GREECE, 1:250,000, Sheet G-4, 157696). The relationship between the two ethnic groups living in this region is far from cordial. The Greek speaking population had suffered greatly from Moslem gangs who were openly collaborating with the Germans after the capitulation of the Italians during the late war.

A penetration into the sector between Gjinkaster and Permet would not be too difficult since Polican (GREECE, 1:250,000, Sheet G-4, 165706) can be reached by means of a provincial road starting at Libohov and wedging into the canyon called Grik Selci (Selci, GREECE, 1:250,000, Sheet G-4, 167695).

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Delvine (GREECE, 1:250,000, Sheet G-4, 142688) is reached by a road from Girguocat (GREECE, 1:250,000, Sheet G-4, 155685) crossing the Murzine Pass (GREECE, 1:250,000, Sheet G-4, 150684) and the Bridge of Gardhina (GREECE, 1:250,000, Sheet G-4, 147687). From Delvine another road descends toward Sarande. The Strugara Mountain zone, just west of the Greco-Albanian border, is difficult to defend. Its mountains are suitable only for a short defense, temporary in nature, and would serve better as a take-off point for an Albanian offensive launched against the towns of Calamas and Filicates (GREECE, 1:250,000, Sheet G-4, 156647). Point 1304 which dominates the flatland below, would be particularly well suited for this purpose. This route was used by the Italians in their attack upon GREECE, and even though the Italian campaign proved disastrous to them, their defeat was not due to improper usage of the terrain.

G. The Coastline of ALBANIA

The coastline exceeds 350 kilometres in length and forms a second negative factor in existing political and military circumstances. With borders and coastline to be defended, it will prove quite a task for a nation of 1,180,000 population to handle. Considered from this point of view, it is problematical as to how successful a defense ALBANIA could establish. It is true that an excellent highway parallels the coastline from the Montenegrin border to Sarande. The greatest part of this road is asphalted and would enable rapid movements of troops to be carried out to any sector of the coastline in the event of an emergency.

In spite of this, two important problems remain to be solved, and these are: (a) the lack of equipment to supply defense positions; and (2) the exceedingly short distances from the coast to the highway.

The first problem needs no explanation since it is an obvious and generally known fact. With regard to the second problem, it is evident that the Albanian roads in the coastal areas were built primarily for economic reasons without regard for military considerations.

The fact that the Albanian defense strategy is under the supervision of the Russians does not alter the gravity of the situation resulting from these shortcomings. An enormous expenditure would be required to offset these shortcomings in improving the line of defense.

It is not expected that the Russians would be willing to carry out any such program at direct expense to themselves. It may be assumed that any modern army equipped with an amphibious force could effect landings in most sectors between the mouth of the Bojana River and the Vijose River. Building the main highway at various points would contribute to the total disorganization of coastal defense, and would require the establishment of new lines. Due to the marshy, flat terrain of the country, these new defense lines would probably have to be dug in the foothills of the surrounding mountains. In exploiting the valleys in these mountains, some of the defending forces could be cut off or by-passed forcing them to conduct a guerrilla war rather than one of organized

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Soviet defense preparations in the southern sector, the areas of Vlone, Himara, and on the fortified island of Sazan (which has been taken over directly by the Soviet General Staff) must be considered as being of a permanent and stationary nature. These fortifications consist of weapons supported by permanent positions, concrete emplacements and underground artillery emplacements. In spite of this, it is doubtful that a long defense could be conducted in this area, since the entire area, although extremely well suited for defense purposes, is so narrow that there is no possibility of a long defense after the adjacent areas are attacked and occupied by the enemy. The Soviet General Staff is, without any doubt, aware of this precarious situation.

The Soviets have launched one of their usual political and military maneuvers in announcing through the press and radio that the Soviet Military Mission is about to retire from ALBANIA. The nature of this withdrawal was not explained in detail. However, some observers attempting to "read between the lines" of this announcement have come to the conclusion that this act on the part of the Soviets is due to the realization that this advanced position of the USSR cannot be successfully defended. One observer believes, however, that this statement hides a fact that the Soviets are anxious to conceal. In the event of complications in the Balkans, the Soviets would take the initiative by means of a large-scale offensive extending over the entire Balkan area.

The first blow would be directed against Yugoslav Macedonia (provided the Yugoslavs maintain their present attitude toward RUSSIA) in order to permit Cominform forces to penetrate the heart of the Balkans, to join forces with the Albanian troops, and by occupying ALBANIA they could relieve this southern bastion and supply enough arms and ammunition to carry on a defense. Meanwhile, should the Albanian coastal defense fall to pieces, enemy troops penetrating from the sea, Montenegro or GREECE would be confronted with Soviet armies. Yugoslav armies, advancing through the valley of the White Drin and those advancing from Debar would find themselves attacked from the rear by Soviet armies out of BUGGARIA.

The poor defense possibilities of ALBANIA as explained previously would, in this case, lose their validity. A situation such as that described in the preceding paragraphs would also prevent any possible military alliance between YUGOSLAVIA and GREECE. The Greeks would prefer to maintain a state of watchful neutrality, hoping all the while that the Western Powers would continue to preserve their bridgehead in GREECE from a Cominform invasion, by sending military assistance.

In the event of hostilities in the Balkans, the Soviets would be anxious to prevent any Allied landings in ALBANIA. It would try to prevent anything like this through the usage of submarines and military operations. Previous reports that mention the construction of secret submarine and torpedo craft bases are true enough to the extent that these reports should receive the maximum of attention.

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D. Military Defense of ALBANIA

**1. Organization of the Ministry of National Defense (Army)
(See Exhibit I)**

Under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of National Defense is the Army (Ushtrija), totalling approximately 60,000 to 70,000 men, under Chief of Staff (Kryetar i Shtabit Matheur) Mehmet SHEHU. Under the Army are the following specialized sections:

- a) The Navy and Marine Forces (Marina)
- b) The Air Force (Ajrit)
- c) The Political Direction (Drejtorija Politika) is supervised by Hysni KAPO. A Political Commissar and a Vice-Commissar are attached to the headquarters of each of the three divisions (and presumably to all other comparable groups). A Political Commissar is also assigned to each regiment, battalion and company.
- d) The Military Security Police (Sigurimit) is one of the infantry divisions, and is widely distributed throughout the country. The Sigurimit handles espionage and counter-espionage work in cooperation with the Peoples' Security Committees in each village.
- e) The Division for Popular Defense (Divizjoni i Mbrotjeses Popullit, or EMP) formerly was responsible for counter-espionage, but now constitutes an elite military unit, roughly the equivalent of the former Nazi SS troops.
- f) The Paramilitary Organization (Paraushtaraket) is designed to educate boys of 14 to 18 years in the preliminaries of military discipline and the handling of arms prior to their compulsory military service.

The names and positions of some important Albanian military and naval leaders are as follows:

Colonel General Enver HOXHA - Head of the Government and Chief of the Army.

Major General Mehmet SHEHU - Chief of Staff and former Commandant of the Partisan Units (in the south).

Major General Spiro MOJSIU - Chief of Operations of the Military High Command.

Major General Muco ZIHNI - Inspector General of the Army.

Major General Kristo TEMELKO - General Political Commissar.

Major General Mehmed TORIJATI - Chief Quartermaster.

Major General Bajram SINAJMERI - Chief of Artillery.

Commander Verjani MYRTO - High Naval Command

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Rexhep HAKA (rank unknown) - Ordnance

Qazim ARBEJA (rank unknown) - Ordnance

Teodor ZJIOTI (rank unknown) - Commanding Officer of the Air Force.

Ismajl XHEVARIJ (rank unknown) - Military Engineers.

E. Soviet Military Mission

It is an established fact that this Mission is much more than its capacity as an advisory group reflects, since it is a military command charged with the following responsibilities:

- a) Training and organizing the Albanian Armed Forces.
- b) Preparing and maintaining the defense of the nation.
- c) Exploitation of the economic possibilities of ALBANIA according to the general pattern of Soviet military and economic policies.

The Albanian General Staff, while seeming to maintain its independence, is subordinate in all fields to the decisions of the Soviet Military Mission or "Command". The main bases of the Mission are in Tirane, Vlone-Sazan, Himare, Durres and Shkoder. There are lesser commands established wherever there are Albanian headquarters, and also minor supervisory personnel in some areas which are considered of intelligence interest. The entire system forms a tight net which is operated by many capable Soviet agents using Albanians in various capacities.

It is estimated that there are about 12,000 persons attached to the Headquarters of the fortification works which are being developed particularly in the coastal areas. These projects are reported to be under feverish haste toward completion. There are entire military units employed on nothing but construction of defensive positions along the coast.

It has been ascertained that the majority of Russians in ALBANIA were shipped by sea to the Port of Vlone between January and March 1949. Other units have been flown in from BULGARIA, always arriving by night at either Shkoder or Tirane. These Russian units are equipped with the latest in weapons and faultlessly dressed. The artillery batteries are of the newest types. To the superficial observer, the great difference between the Albanian and Soviet military personnel in weapons, dress, and preferential treatment has been a source of major discord between the two. Due credit should be given the Soviets for purposely allowing the Albanians to remain poorly dressed and equipped since this prevents any possibility of having them to contend with should the Albanians decide not to fight with the Russians when the time came.

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The Supreme Command of the Marine Infantry and Coastal Defense Artillery units has been assumed by a Soviet Navy admiral, whose headquarters are on Sazan Island. The admiral is in charge of all island and coastal defense fortifications. However, he is subordinate to the Soviet General Headquarters of ALBANIA located at Durres, and commanded by a Red Army general. All armed forces in the country are subordinated to this command; Soviet forces directly, Albanian indirectly. Most of the Soviet forces in ALBANIA consist of Marine Infantry, Coastal Artillery, and Anti-Aircraft Units. There are also units of ground forces belonging to the Red Army. Strong contingents of civilian "technicians" have also been observed, which, in addition to other duties are the organizations of political security for the military headquarters.

The Soviet Military Mission attached its instructors to Albanian regiments and delegates to the higher headquarters. Each battalion and regiment of the Albanian Army has one such instructor. This instructor is also the officer-charge-of-training, and is in charge of all Albanian officers in the organization to which he is attached. The Mission also has assumed control of the entire Sanitation Service of the Albanian Army.

F. Ground Forces

(1) General

At the present time, the Albanian Army consists of 45,000 men trained for combat. The expression "trained for combat" in the Albanian conception, means that a man has a more or less proper uniform, a few days' food supply, and a weapon with some ammunition. The Albanian Army gives the impression of being well organized and that it is composed of regular military units from platoons to divisions. Although the Albanian troops present a military-like appearance, some are dressed in Yugoslav uniforms. The Albanian soldier is inclined to be dirty and disorderly. This fact is quite obvious when the troops are in town on pass.

Draftees, when subjected to rigid discipline, obey reluctantly. The draftees are in continuous training, with long and tedious military problems generally being carried out in rocky areas of the mountains, or the exact opposite in the valleys. During those problems, they bivouac in the open with no protection whatsoever. Leading Albanian officers are those who were partisans in former Communist brigades. It is considered a great honor to these officers to have been a member of a partisan brigade. All generals in the Albanian Army have been selected from partisan ranks. Albanian high-ranking officers were not sent abroad to YUGOSLAVIA or RUSSIA for military training because of national prestige. Many still hold the ranks they held while members of a partisan brigade during the German and Italian occupations. Many of these high-ranking officers are illiterate, and due to the basis of selection, there are many high-ranking officers. Approximately 600 lieutenants and captains were sent to YUGOSLAVIA for short military courses. Upon their return, they formed the core of the entire army. Many of them hold positions comparable to those of non-commissioned officers.

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There are cases where a small company is commanded by a lieutenant colonel, while the adjutant of a regiment is a captain who, by virtue of his attendance at a military course, rates this assignment. This fact was quite noticeable at Permeti, where the 13th Infantry Regiment Headquarters are located in former Italian barracks. It is interesting to note that the former Yugoslav Mission had opened three month courses for the instruction of low ranking Albanian officers prior to the Yugoslav-Albanian split. Before the conflict between TITO and the Cominform, practically every Albanian unit was commanded by Yugoslav officers. Due to the sympathy elicited from their troops and the people in the towns, these Yugoslav officers psychologically infiltrated the rank and file of the population and even today, the memories of the Yugoslavs are not comparatively unpleasant.

Upon the arrival of the Soviet Military Mission, a new atmosphere soon became apparent. The complete assimilation of command by the Russians asserted itself all down the ranks. There are five Soviet officers assigned to each infantry regiment, and a Soviet counsellor behind each infantry commander where once this position was occupied by an Albanian.

Due to the fact that the Russian counsellor must use an interpreter, understanding between the counsellor and the Albanian officers is often quite difficult. However, the Albanian Army has acquired a much more normal pattern as a consequence of Russian training, and the armament has been considerably improved. The Albanian Army in its present condition is much better equipped to fight a guerrilla war than a regular military operation. One main reason is the difficulty in moving troops from one locality to another due to lack of motorized equipment. It is also a proven fact that the Albanian is a better fighter when he fights alone. He is a stoic, courageous and resistant, but only when he fights alone. These troops cannot be relied upon because they are products of an individualistic, sectarian society, and they fight for what they consider their own territory rather than the nation as a whole. There are some exceptions, and these men are from the areas of the Zrino, Policani, and Kerce Valleys. These men are more Greek than Albanian since they practise the Orthodox religion, speak Greek, and think politically as Greeks. During the war, there were many of these troops who were attached to Greek partisan groups. The mountaineer of the Shkoder and Mirdita regions is not friendly with the philo-Greek of the South, while the Moslem from Malakstra distrusts his comrades from the Malissoria.

It is known that the various tribes of ALBANIA consider the present military and political situation as temporary. A minor military failure by the Albanian Army is enough to make the average soldier desert the army and return to his village, to take up arms there in defense of his home against the enemy.

G. Rates of Pay and Rations of Albanian Army Personnel

Monthly Rates of Pay - Albanian Army officers are paid according to the following rates; (Note: 1 leke equal 5 Italian lire)

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A. Survey of WEAPONS (cont'd)

2nd Lieutenant -	4,600	leke
1st Lieutenant -	5,500	"
Captain -	6,500	"
Major -	8,000	"
Lt. Colonel -	10,000	"
Colonel -	12,000	"

Monthly Rations for Officers (All ranks)

<u>Quantity</u>	<u>Price</u>
7 kg. of meat	50 leke per kg.
4 kg. of rice	80 leke per kg.
2 liters of oil	52 leke per liter
4 kgs. of pasta	36 leke per kg.
1.5 kg. of narmalado	100 leke per kg.
3 kg. of sugar	46 leke per kg.

As of 1 March 1950, the daily ration of bread for Albanian Army officers, as well as the enlisted personnel, was decreased from 800 grams to 600 grams. Cigarettes are not on the military ration nor is there any free issue of cigarettes. Albanian officers enjoy certain facilities regarding the purchase of various foods and articles of clothing which are obtainable by them in special military stores which are located in every major area of population. Every officer is entitled to purchase one winter and one summer suit (military or civilian) and a pair of shoes annually.

H. Order of Battle (See Exhibit II)

It is reported that the present Albanian Army is made up of four divisions, with individual headquarters and components located as follows:

<u>Hqs, 1st Infantry Division</u>	<u>Tirane</u>
1st Infantry Regiment	<u>Vlone</u>
3rd Infantry Regiment	<u>Tirane</u>
13th Infantry Regiment	<u>Permet</u>
1st Artillery Regiment	<u>Tirane</u>
<u>Hqs, 2nd Infantry Division</u>	<u>Korce</u>
9th Infantry Regiment	<u>Korce</u>
14th Infantry Regiment	<u>Korce</u>
26th Infantry Regiment	<u>Pogradeci</u>
3rd Artillery Regiment	<u>Korce</u>
<u>Hqs, 3rd Infantry Division</u>	<u>Gjinoqaster</u>
7th Infantry Regiment	<u>Delvino</u>
19th Infantry Regiment	<u>Karande</u>
31st Infantry Regiment	<u>Gjinoqaster</u>
3rd Artillery Regiment	<u>Gjinoqaster</u>

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<u>Hqs, Military and Political Defense Division</u>	<u>Tirane</u>
1st Infantry Regiment	<u>Tirane</u>
2nd Infantry Regiment	<u>Shkoder</u>
3rd Infantry Regiment	<u>Korce</u>

This division reportedly has no artillery; the regiments, however, have some armored cars and protective units. There also is a regiment of Frontier Guards, with headquarters at Shkoder. Frontier Guard units are located at Aniotti, Vernoshe, Tropoja, Kukes, Bicaj, Piscopeia, and Oboti.

The 1st and 2nd Artillery Regiments are composed of three groups. The weapons are war booty 75mm and 100 mm caliber (make unknown). Infantry regiments are composed of 3 battalions. Each battalion is made up of 4 companies, plus a headquarters unit. A company has 3 machine gun units (light machine guns). Each machine gun unit is composed of two weapons. Protecting weapon: 1 65/17 gun (horse carried), plus a mortar unit (81mm, French type) Italian make; 2 mortar units (45, Brixia type).

I. Organization of Armed Forces

1. Breakdown

a) General Staff

Commandant Albanian Army	Colonel General
Deputy Commandant Albanian Army	Major General
Political Commissar	Major General
Chief of Staff	Major General
Chief of Operations	Colonel

b) Division

- Division Headquarters
- Three Infantry Regiments
- One Artillery Regiment

c) Regiment

- Regiment Headquarters
- Three Infantry Battalions

One Artillery Unit

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d) Battalion

Battalion Headquarters

Three Rifle Companies

One Support Company

One Signal Platoon

One Supply Platoon

e) Rifle Company

Company Headquarters

Four Rifle Platoons

One Supply Platoon

f) Artillery Regiment

Regiment Headquarters

Three Artillery Units (3 batteries each)

One Signal Company

One Supply Company

g) Artillery Unit

Unit Headquarters

Three Batteries (4 guns each) NOTE: In case the battery is composed of heavy guns, it will have only two guns.

Signal Platoon

Supply Platoon

2. Armament and Personnel of A/M Units

a) Army Headquarters

40 Officers - 35 Non-Coms - 120 Corporals and Privates

75 pistols - 100 rifles - 5 machine guns - 25 sub-machine guns

20 automobiles - 22 motorcycles - one radio station connected with all units.

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- b) Division Headquarters Armament
15 Officers 18 pistols
12 Non-Coms 20 rifles
25 Corporals and Privates 12 sub-machine guns
5 machine guns
Other - 5 automobiles - 8 motorcycles
- c) Regimental Headquarters Armament
12 Officers 18 pistols
12 Non-Coms 20 rifles
20 Corporals and Privates 8 machine guns
Other 12 sub-machine guns
2 automobiles - 5 motorcycles - 5 bicycles
- d) Battalion Headquarters Armament
4 Officers 2 pistols
6 Non-Coms 4 rifles
6 Corporals and Privates 2 machine guns
Other 8 sub-machine guns
1 automobile - 2 motorcycles - 2 bicycles
- e) Company Armament
5 Officers 15 pistols
10 Non-Coms 50 rifles
150 Corporals and Privates 20 machine guns
Other 55 sub-machine guns
4 automobiles - 4 motorcycles - 10 bicycles
- f) Support Company
5 officers - 10 non-coms - 120 corporals and privates

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Armament

25 pistols - 50 rifles - 5 heavy machine guns - 8 light machine guns - 10 sub-machine guns - 8 mortars

Other

2 carts - 20 horses - 6 riding horses

e) Signal Platoon

1 officer - 1 non-com - 30 corporals and privates

Armament

5 pistols - 20 rifles - 3 machine guns - 5 sub-machine guns

Other

1 automobile - 4 motorcycles - 5 bicycles - 2 carts - 4 horses - telephones - 2 radios

h) Supply Unit

2 non-coms - 40 corporals and privates

Armament

5 pistols - 20 rifles - 2 machine guns - 5 sub-machine guns

Other

4 automobiles - 2 motorcycles - 10 carts - 20 horses

i) Artillery Regiment

Same as Infantry Regiment

j) Artillery Unit

Same as Infantry Battalion

3. Armament of the Albanian Army

The Albanian Army is equipped with Soviet, German, and Italian weapons. During the course of this year, most of the German and Italian weapons will be replaced by new Soviet weapons. Infantry units and mountain artillery will especially be equipped with new Soviet weapons.

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Types of Weapons

Artillery

150mm German guns	81mm French mortars
120mm German guns	80mm Soviet guns
105mm Howitzers	76mm Soviet mountain guns
100mm Italian guns	47mm Soviet anti-tank guns
88mm German guns (AA)	37mm Soviet anti-tank guns

There are also some Italian mortars of different caliber. All mortars and anti-aircraft guns are to be replaced soon by new Soviet guns.

Machine Guns

Soviet, Italian, and German 9mm type. Some of these units are armed with British machine guns received by partisan groups during the war.

Rifles and Pistols

Rifles for the most part are German and Italian, with the latter only recently being replaced with new Soviet rifles. Most of the pistols are Soviet and German, of various calibers.

Motor Vehicles

Most of the vehicles used by the Albanian Army are of German or Soviet manufacture which YUGOSLAVIA delivered to ALBANIA prior to the Cominform disagreement. A considerable number of these vehicles are in bad condition in view of the fact that there are no workshops in the country capable of maintaining these vehicles. Spare parts delivered by Soviet RUSSIA are being used only for the vehicles attached to Soviet units. There has been some dismantling of vehicles which have been out of order for some time due to the lack of spare parts.

Technical Equipment

There is a considerable lack of technical equipment. Even now, old German and British radios, which barely operate, can be seen. The number of radio sets delivered by RUSSIA is very small and limited. As yet, there has been no indication or any action on the part of the Soviets to supply the Albanian Army with new equipment.

J. Units Directly Subordinate to the High Command

1st Heavy Artillery Regiment, partially motorized; guns of 100mm caliber or larger are concentrated at Tirane.

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1st Armored Regiment, Tirane, has approximately 130 armored cars.

1st Engineer Regiment, Tirane.

There are four motor pools, one each at Durres, Shkoder, Korce, and Gjinokaster, equipped with material from various sources, and all quite old.

a) Organization of IMP (Popular Defense Division) (See Exhibit III)

Headquarters	<u>Tirane</u>
Tank Regiment	<u>Tirane</u>
Engineer Regiment	<u>Berat</u>
Heavy Motorized Artillery Regiment	<u>Tirane</u>
1st Infantry Regiment	<u>Tirane</u>
Infantry Battalion	<u>Tirane</u>
Infantry Battalion	<u>Elbasan</u>
Infantry Battalion	<u>Berat</u>
2nd Infantry Regiment	<u>Shkoder</u>
Infantry Battalion	<u>Shkoder</u>
Infantry Battalion	<u>Durres</u>
Infantry Battalion	<u>?</u>
3rd Infantry Regiment	<u>Korce</u>
Infantry Battalion	<u>Korce</u>
Infantry Battalion	<u>Gjinokaster</u>
Infantry Battalion	<u>Vlone</u>
Transportation Contingent (Regiment)	<u>Tirane</u>
Detachment (Battalion)	<u>Durres</u>
Detachment (Battalion)	<u>Korce</u>
Detachment (Battalion)	<u>Gjinokaster</u>
Truck Repair Shop (Regiment)	<u>Durres</u>

b) O.B. of Soviet Forces in ALBANIA

<u>Soviet Military Mission</u>	
Headquarters	<u>Tirane</u>
Military Delegates	
Military Instructors	
<u>Soviet Medical Services</u>	<u>Tirane</u>
Headquarters, Mountain Infantry Regiment	<u>Leskovik</u>
Mountain Infantry Battalion	<u>Leskovik</u>
Mountain Infantry Battalion	<u>Pode</u>
Mountain Infantry Battalion	<u>Erzeze</u>

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Mountain Artillery Regiment

Erzozë

Marine Infantry Regiment

Sazan Island

c) Military Radio Transmitters

The following is a list of known Albanian Army mobile radio transmitting units which were supplied by RUSSIA during early 1949:

- a) 1st Mobile Radio Headquarters is located on the Tirane Airfield on the right side of the highway that connects Tirane with Durres.
- b) 2nd Mobile Radio Headquarters is located at Shkjezi, a locality on Mount Tarabosh, approximately 4 kilometres from Shiroka, on the Lake of Shkoder.
- c) 3rd Mobile Radio Headquarters is located in the immediate vicinity of Gjinokaster near the Convent Bektaski (Moslem Sect) Teqje Baba Selin.
- d) Known fixed military radio stations are located at Perneti in the Voujusa Valley; at Korce; and at the 3rd Artillery Regiment Headquarters at Gjinokaster, in the old Venotian castle that dominates the city.

K. Navy and Coastal Defenses (See Exhibit IV)

1. Navy and Coast Guard

The Albanian Naval Headquarters is located at Durres, and is staffed by Albanian and Soviet naval personnel. In addition to its regular duties, the Naval Headquarters is also in charge of Coast Guard operations and of the Merchant Marine.

The Albanian Naval Force in Durres is made up of approximately six or seven minesweepers (Italian type) and about six motor launches. All of the minesweepers have a displacement of about 50 tons, and are armed with 3 machine guns of an unidentified caliber and type, and have crews of about 20 men each. Two of the minesweepers are equipped with additional armament in the form of two cannons each (caliber and make unknown). The motor launches have a cruising speed of ten or twelve knots, and are armed with one machine gun each, and each having a crew of six.

The Coast Guard is not a separate branch of the armed forces in ALBANIA, but it is a joint responsibility of the Navy and the "Sigurimit", insofar as every craft assigned to a Coast Guard mission carries two to four "Sigurimit" agents in addition to the regular complement. The Albanian coastline is divided into four zones, and these are as follows:

- a) Zone No.1 - Extends from Fula to Shon Gjin.
- b) Zone No.2 - Extends from Shon Gjin to Durres.
- c) Zone No.3 - Extends from Durres to Sazan Island.
- d) Zone No.4 - Extends from Sazan Island to Sarande.

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Guard and patrol duties are performed by 20 launches of the Albanian Navy. These launches average an approximate speed of seven knots, are armed with three machine guns of unknown caliber and make, have each has a complement of five or six sailors in addition to two or three "Sigurinit" agents. These craft are of various types and none of them are equipped with radio receiving and sending sets. Duty schedules of these boats are not known, except that in Zone No.1, between Pulaj and Shen Gjin, there are more patrols operating than in any of the other zones. The reason given for this move on the part of the Albanian Government is the desire to prevent any of the merchant craft or other types from escaping to YUGOSLAVIA or ITALY.

In bad weather or heavy seas, Coast Guard duties are assumed by the minesweepers in all four zones. The following particulars of these minesweepers were obtained:

Displacement -	2 to 4 tons
Armament -	1 heavy machine gun 2 light machine guns (German)
Maximum speed-	12 knots
Complement -	10 to 15 men 2 to 4 "Sigurinit" agents

One of the minesweepers is a seven ton craft and is equipped with an AA machine gun of unknown type, and two light German machine guns. She also carries a radio receiving and transmitting set. All of the minesweepers used by the Coast Guard have been supplied by YUGOSLAVIA after World War II. The motor launches used by the Coast Guard were captured from the Italian forces after the Italian capitulation on 8 September 1943. One of the launches, the "Muho Ulqinaku", is used on runs of 24 hours duration between Pulaj and Sarande. The particulars of this launch are as follows:

Displacement	5 tons
Length	30 meters
Width	5 meters
Engines	2 U.S. built "Hercules" type, 250 hp each
Maximum Speed	15 to 18 knots
Armament	1 cannon, type and caliber unknown 2 German-made twin-barrel AA machine guns (probably 20mm Flak 28)
Complement	10 to 15 men plus 3 or 4 "Sigurinit" agents.

She has an iron hull and carries a radio receiving and transmitting set.

Coast Guard regulations prohibit Albanian Merchant Marine vessels and fishing boats from leaving any Albanian port during the hours of darkness. Boats belonging to the Coast Guard that leave ports during the night must inform their respective commands as to the signals they will use to identify themselves prior to departing from port. Important ports (Durrës, for example) are off limits to all civilians not in possession of special permits issued by the "Sigurinit". The guarding of ports and their installations is also a function of this security organization.

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L. Marine Infantry and Coastal Defense

A Soviet Navy admiral whose headquarters are on Sazan Island, is in supreme command of Marine Infantry and Coastal Defense Artillery units, and also supervises all work concerning fortifications and coastal defense.

1. It is believed that that the Albanian coastline is divided into seven coastal defense sectors, a garrison company located within each. Centers of these defense sectors are as follows:

1st Sector	<u>Durres</u>
2nd Sector	<u>Vlone</u>
3rd Sector	<u>Sazan Island</u>
4th Sector	<u>Porto Palermo</u>
5th Sector	<u>Sarando</u>
6th Sector	<u>Butrinto</u>
7th Sector	<u>Shen Gjini (?)</u>

Every center of coastal defense consists of the following components: 2 motor launches, armed with one machine gun each; 3 motor-sailing craft, with one machine gun each; and one garrison company deployed along the coastal sector. Each garrison company consists of 1 officer (company commander), and three platoons led by non-commissioned officers. A company consists of 60 men. Each company is equipped with one mountain gun which is emplaced on the most prominent position of the respective sector, and two machine guns. Means of communication consist only of visual signals.

M. Coastal Fortifications

1. Vlone - This port is occupied by a military force of five to six thousand men, mainly personnel of a unit of Coastal Artillery. The troops are billeted between the city and the port of Vlone. Their barracks consist of about 30 or 35 buildings, located approximately two kilometers from the port. The so-called "Central Barracks" are located about 500 yards south of the port, and consist of three or four buildings. These barracks accommodate about one thousand engineer troops. A quartermaster dump is located in the immediate vicinity of the barracks occupied by the Coastal Artillery unit.

The area of Vlone has been closely guarded for the past two years. Its population is subject to political security checks and many of the inhabitants have been removed. No persons may approach this zone if not in possession of a special permit issued by the Soviet Command or the "Technical Branch" of the "Sigurinit". Recently this zone was described in an official document (proclamation) as a "Military Prohibited Zone". The reasons for this security are: secrecy of fortification works; loading and unloading of munitions, ammunition, and other supplies arriving by sea. In Vlone, there is a Technical Defense Command which draws the plans for a defensive system of Linguetta Peninsula, Hinaro, Sazan Island, and Vlone Bay.

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2. Sazan Island has a rocky and in some places, a precipitous shore line which is quite conducive to the construction of submarine pens and shelters for motor torpedo boats. Some of these works are being expanded and improved at present. The purpose is to add toward making Vlone Bay a bulwark of defense as well as offense. The island is located about ten miles northwest of the port of Vlone, and is about 15 to 18 kilometres long, and about 10 to 13 kilometres wide. The island is rocky and mountainous, reaching an altitude of 400 metres. It dominates the entire Strait of Otranto, and its strategic value is enhanced by the fact that it is a defense position for the entrance to Vlone Bay.

Installations and some of the fortifications built on the island by the Italians during their 24 years of occupation (1919-1943), were heavily damaged by the Germans during World War II. After the war, Yugoslav and Soviet engineers repaired the damage and increased the fortifications.

There are about 50 buildings on the island which are used as barracks, offices, quarters for officers and their families, a power plant which was repaired in 1946, and a radio receiving and transmitting station.

These installations are located along the eastern side of the island, facing toward Vlone and the Albanian coast. The island has its own port which consists of a quay 120 metres long, with a depth of 6 to 8 metres. The port will accommodate one ship not exceeding 5,000 to 6,000 tons.

In the event of bad weather, vessels of the Albanian Merchant Marine are permitted to anchor out or tie up in the harbor of Sazan. But it is not permissible under any circumstances for crews of such vessels to go ashore. Communication on the island is made possible by means of good roads. Soviet tractors have been observed from the port area of the island while being used in the maintenance of the roads.

There is one Soviet regiment stationed on Sazan Island (reported to be either Coastal Artillery or Marine Infantry). Previous reports indicated that there were no Albanian troops present, all of them having been replaced about two years ago by this Soviet regiment. In February 1950, however, an eyewitness observed Albanian military personnel on the island, and this source estimated the garrison strength at about 1,000 men. There is a Soviet frigate stationed at the island which may be used as a torpedo boat or mine tender.

According to one source, there are 70 artillery pieces defending the island. These guns occupy emplacements which have been built in the rock in such a position that their fire covers the northern, western, and southeastern approaches to Vlone Bay. The greater part of the artillery positions are concentrated in the southern sector of the island in order to cover the straits between Sazan and Kepi i Gloses (Linguetta, GREECE, 1:250,000, Sheet G-4, 078747). In addition to the heavy artillery, there are emplacements of cannons and AA machine guns located along the heights of the island, forming a second line above the heavier artillery positions. There are reportedly two batteries of AA artillery drawn by trucks.

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The Sazan Island garrison is also equipped with light AA guns of the "Oerlikon" type or similar. Strong nests of 20mm AA guns are located in the southern part of the island, with ammunition shelters having been cut out of the rock. Machine guns have been emplaced along the entire coastline of the island, forming an advance guard of the defense line. An observation post is stationed atop the highest point of the island, and is located in the northern part of Sazan. A winding road leads up to the OP. Southeast of Point 381, a rocket launching station has been constructed. It is believed that there are 24 rocket launchers on the island, and these may be moved to any of the stations by means of a narrow gauge railway. The launchers are stored in shelters dug in the rock.

Tunnels which shelter submarines, fuel, and ammunition have been built underneath the island. All tunnels have entrances facing east, and have been built in such a manner as to fully exploit all opportunities for camouflage offered by the rocks. Since the sea in this area is about 30 metres deep, submarines may enter and depart without fear of being noticed except from the air. There are reportedly four tunnels; Nos. 1 and 2 are located in the northern part of the island, while Nos. 3 and 4 are in the south. Each tunnel is supposed to be able to accommodate 15 submarines of medium size. In addition, the tunnels contain the following facilities:

No. 1 - A diesel oil depot, built into the wall of the tunnel. It is divided into eight tanks, each having a capacity of about 500,000 liters with a combined total of about 4,000,000 liters of reserve fuel.

No. 2 - A modern workshop, capable of executing all types of repair as well as installations on submarines.

No. 3 - A gasoline and diesel oil depot also built into the wall, and divided into six tanks of which each has a capacity of about 500,000 liters, and a total capacity of about 3,000,000 liters.

No. 4 - Supposedly an ammunition storage tunnel. Possibly torpedoes, mines, etc., may be stored here. (NOTE: Not considered practical to store torpedoes or mines in such a damp area).

Ammunition for all kinds of weapons which are on the island is stored in underground caves which are believed to be in the southern part of the island. The narrow gauge railway greatly facilitates the supply of ammunition to individual emplacements.

The island has no natural water springs, therefore, fresh water must be shipped from the mainland at Uji i Ftofet. Food supplies, water, mail, equipment, etc, are all transported to the island by means of an American built tug, which runs from the mainland to the island six times daily. The tug is also used for transporting troops. The tug has a displacement of about 50 tons, powered by a diesel engine, and supplied to ALBANIA by the USSR in 1946.

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3. Linguetta Peninsula - The heights of Linguetta are being perforated with tunnels. Large emplacements of heavy, long-range artillery weapons have been constructed along the windward side of the peninsula, which slopes westward from the Karaburu Mountains. At the present time (Dec 49 - Feb 50) there are, in a distance of not more than 15 kilometres, over 20 batteries of 150mm guns. The zone of Cape Glossa (Kepi i Gloses) is particularly well fortified. In well hidden caves, there are six batteries of 100mm guns of Soviet-Czech manufacture. All these weapons are rapid-fire guns. There are ammunition shelters hidden in the rocks. About 100 to 150 metres above the artillery emplacements are 20mm AA guns whose task it is to defend the artillery pieces below.

At present, a central ammunition depot is being excavated to ensure an adequate supply of ammunition to all gun emplacements. In order to secure sufficient amounts of drinking water for the garrison, concrete water cisterns are being constructed along the leeward side of the peninsula. Food deposits are also being set up. Special water barricades with secret entrances will be laid between Cape Karlovot and the southern point of Sazan Island. These barricades will be protected by a mine field.

4. Hinara Gulf - (Submarine Base) - Four submarines of light tonnage have been observed here. Their exact location when in a shelter cannot be learned since it is felt that these shelters are cut into the rock at water level, in the northern and southern sectors of the bay. These subs are reported to be part of the Soviet fleet of sixteen subs of different types.

5. Sarande - The city is occupied by about 3,000 Albanian troops which include Infantry, Artillery, and Engineer units. Personnel of the units are housed in barracks located 1 kilometer north of the town. It is reported that strong fortifications have been installed along the coast south of Sarande.

6. Gulf of Durres - The Command of a Marine Infantry regiment equipped with a large number of 150mm guns for coastal defense is located in Durres. The city is also the garrison for a special artillery contingent equipped with rocket launchers which consist of seven 210mm barrals. These weapons are vehicle-drawn. The two battalions are located along the coast from Cape Pali south to Durros (the center of defense) and from here on south to Cape Cadi. The southern battalion, which defends the marshy flatland of Dzung, is equipped with numerous anti-tank rifles, which are also meant to be used in the event of an enemy landing. A third coastal defense battalion, armed as the above-mentioned, is stationed between Cape Cadi and Kravaste.

N. Airforce

1. General

The Commanding Officer of the Albanian Air Force is Colonel (or Major) Teodor ZJOTI, a Communist of Greek ethnic origin from the

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Albanian zone of Konispoli. His functions are purely those of inspection, since a proper Albanian Air Force is not yet in existence. There are five Italian aircraft, old and repaired, which were left in Tirane after having been damaged after an American air raid. There are also some numerically insignificant Albanian Air Groundforce units in Tirane, but their strength does not exceed 150 men. Some of these men have been sent to RUSSIA for air training. Six Albanian pilots have returned from Krasnodar, in the Caucasus, and from Poltava, where they received training and became commissioned pilots. At the present time, these six pilots, together with Colonel ZOTI, form the command of the Albanian Air Force.

The Air Force Command maintains close contact with the Polish Military Mission, which is made up of four officers (two field grade, and two captains) with headquarters in Tirane. This mission has four modern reconnaissance planes. According to reliable information, the Polish mission will be recalled to POLAND. (Jan 50). However, the aircraft of the Polish Mission would remain in Tirane, since they were sold to the Albanian Government. In addition to the four Polish officers of the Mission, there are about eight non-coms who are called "specialists".

In the near future, a shipment of 16 pursuit planes for the Albanian Air Force is expected to arrive from RUSSIA as payment for minerals which had been delivered to the Soviet Union. As a result, the First Albanian Air Force Group would be formed and would be made up of about 30 pursuit and reconnaissance planes. There would also be 12 hydroplanes (origin not given) for coastal patrol and coastal defense work. The absence of a short or long range bomber group in the Albanian Air Force will handicap any future air operations of any size.

2. Albanian Airfields

- a) Lesh Airfield - located west of the Lesh-Durres highway on the flatland of Gajusi i Zojnenit (YUGOSLAVIA, 1:100,000, Sh 145, 2099b)
- b) Durres Airfield - located in the vicinity of the city.
- c) Kavaje Airfield - located in the vicinity of Kavaje (GREECE, 1:250,000 Sh G-1, 909826) along the Durres - Lushnje - Vlone highway. This is an auxiliary field.
- d) Libofshe Airfield - located near the town (GREECE, 1:250,000 Sh G-1, 105790). This was once an auxiliary field, but has since been converted into a permanent airrome.
- e) Vlone Airfield - located near Vlone. This is the largest permanent airfield in ALBANIA.
- f) Himara Airfield - located at Himara (GREECE, 1:250,000, Sh G-4, 113710). This is an auxiliary field which is being converted into a permanent field, and to be equipped with modern installations.

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- g) Sarande Airfield - located at Sarande (GREECE, 1:250,000, Sheet G-4, 133660). This is permanent installation and is used by the Air Force.
- h) Shkoder Airfield - This is a permanent field and is equipped with goniometric and other modern installations.
- i) Kruje Airfield - at Kruje (YUGOSLAVIA, 1:250,000, Sheet Y-46, 133861). A permanent field, used by the Air Force, and equipped for day and night flights.
- j) Tirane Airfield - A permanent field used by both the Albanian and Soviet Air Forces. Modern equipment.
- k) Elbasan Airfield - an auxiliary field which is being converted and having the runways extended.
- l) Kucove Airfield - (GREECE, 1:250,000, Sheet G-1, 135783). An auxiliary field.
- m) Ura Hasan Bout Airfield - (Hasan Bout, GREECE, 1:250,000, Sheet G-1, 134780). An auxiliary field.
- n) Gjinokaster Airfield - (GREECE, 1:250,000, Sheet G-4, 146701) is located east of the road between Gjinokaster and Vlone, in the Dhino River Valley.
- o) Berat Airfield - (GREECE, 1:250,000, Sheet G-1, 137772) located along the road leading to Elbasan. A former auxiliary field now being converted.
- p) Dutrinto Airfield - located on the northern shore of Lake Dutrinto (GREECE, 1:250,000, Sheet G-4, 133664).
- q) Kukes Airfield - located at the junction of the Black Drin and the White Drin Rivers, not very far from the Yugoslav border.
- r) Peshkopijs Airfield - located near the town (YUGOSLAVIA, 1:250,000, Sheet Y-47, 788876) which lies near the Yugoslav border. A permanent field which was in existence prior to World War II.
- s) Korce Airfield - a permanent field near the town (GREECE, 1:250,000, Sheet G-1, 206757). Equipped with modern installations which were left by the Germans during the war.
- t) Starove Airfield - (GREECE, 1:250,000, Sheet G-1, 200787) near the border junction of ALBANIA, GREECE and YUGOSLAVIA.

0. General Mobilization for Pre-Military Training

On 12 December 1949, the Albanian Communist Party held a meeting at Tirane for the purpose of organizing an association for the aid of the Albanian Army and to promote national defense measures. This plan for

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mobilization is to be known as "Shnoqnija Per Ndihme Ushtrise Dhe Mbrojtjes" (The Association for Assistance to the Army and Defense). The conference was inaugurated by the chief of the political direction of the Albanian Army, Major General Hysni KAPO, with 105 delegates in attendance and representing all sections of the country. These delegates represented 1,305 Communist organizations whose combined membership did not exceed 41,500 persons. The meeting was also attended by the following officials:

Dr. Omer NISHANI, President of the Presidium of the Peoples' Republic of ALBANIA.

Tuk JAKOVA, Secretary of the Albanian Workers' Party.

Beqir BULLUKU, Major General, Chief of the General Staff of the Albanian Peoples' Army.

Hysni KAPO, Chief of the Political Direction of the Albanian Peoples' Army.

Gogo NUSHI, Chief of the Central Committee of Professional Unions (labor unions) of ALBANIA.

Liri BELISHOVA, member of the Albanian Politburo of the Central Committee of the Albanian Communist Party.

The Sh.N.U.M. will be open for membership to all Albanian citizens and has the following program:

1) It will be the honor and duty of the Association to aid the Albanian Army, promote defense measures, and educate the Albanian juvenile masses for their future activity in the Army. The young members, prior to their being drafted for military service, must be trained in handling a rifle, automatic weapons, machine guns, and above all, must be apprenticed in a special line of the Army, such as wireless operators, telephonists, motor mechanics, and drivers of cars and tractors. In this manner, the Sh.N.U.M. will contribute to the efficiency of the Albanian Army and will become reserve forces.

2) It will also become the main task of the Association to educate the population in air defense and in anti-chemical warfare. In addition to the members of the Association, an active part in carrying out this program will be performed by the juveniles and by men and women of the country.

Major General Hysni KAPO will give the requisite instructions to the population in respect to precautionary measures to be taken in the event of air-raids and first aid to the wounded.

3) Another important item incumbent upon the Association is to promote the growth of military sports. In this connection, first consideration should be given to target practice, this being the main requisite in educating the masses for the defense of their country. All members of the Association must be trained in the use of fire arms. From their ranks the best marksmen will be selected (snipers) "Snajpera-Shonjues te dallour".

In addition, automobile and motorcycle exports must be developed.

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4) The Association will also introduce military tactics into schools and working centers of the villages, and organize the training in handling motors, radios, telegraphic equipment and telephones.

5) The task of the Association will also be to train their members in laying mines, thus constituting excellent support to the minelayers and sappers in case of war.

6) If circumstances permit, the Association will educate their members in handling sea and aircraft as pilots and mechanics.

In order to make the foregoing program operative, it will be essential to obtain the requisite instructive material and means of education. In the principal cities, circles of the Association will have to be established.

At these clubs or centers, literature or libraries of a military character would be available, and exhibitions of military significance should be held. At factories, shipyards, at schools, in villages, in public and governmental institutions, meeting places of the Association should be created for members of the Association, with material available for the accomplishment of the program of action of the Association. At schools and educational institutions, the handling and firing of arms should be practiced; moreover, cities, villages, factories, shipyards, and all enterprises should have their own centers where rifle and target practice can be carried out. At such centers, members of the Association should be drilled in operating machine guns, automatic rifles and other firearms.

The Association will methodically organize and introduce members of the Association into technical and military technical science. At the meeting places, theoretical training in the use of firearms will be given. The success of the work performed by the association will depend upon the elements conveying the instruction. The Association will, therefore, assist in all ways possible the educational elements in their efforts to attain perfection. As a general rule, the Association will select instructors from the ranks of demobilized soldiers.

The work performed by the Association can show no positive results without the active support of the Albanian labor unions, the juvenile working associations in ALBANIA, Albanian women's associations, the Albanian Red Cross, and other mass institutions. In the first instance, the Association will have the support of the Albanian Labor Party, the creator, organizer and leader of the Association in Aid of the Army and Defense. In the performance of its work, the Association will be guided by the doctrines of MARX, ENGELS, LENIN and STEALIN.

The fundamental organizations, in their course of action, will be guided by the decisions taken at the General Assembly of the members of the Association. The basic organizations for directing the work of their members will elect their executives for this purpose. In the districts, the supreme organ of the Association is the District Conference, which elects the Association District Council and the various commissions on revision, which performs the work during the period between conferences.

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The Association is based on a democratic-socialist structure. The organs of the Association and their chiefs are elected along democratic lines with the right to vote being given to all classes. The elected will be responsible to the voters for their actions. It will be incumbent upon the directive organs of the Association to educate and cooperate with the members of the Association, promote initiative, and foster the development of the program. It will be their task to cultivate interest in the program by means of interesting speeches, learn from positive experience, and to listen to suggestions of the members. Every Albanian citizen will be eligible for membership in the Association in Aid of the Army and Defense.

During this conference, Colonel Nexhip VINGANI promised unlimited support on the part of the Peoples Army to assist the Association in performing the duties assigned to them. The direction of the Association consists of the following personalities:

Haxhi LLESHI, Major General, President
Kolanoci TEKI, Secretary
Kahreman YLLI, Minister of Education (Public Instruction)
Sadik BEKTESHI, Vice President of the Central Council of the Professional Unions.
Modar SHETILLA,
Qamil BUXHELI
Fadil PACRAMI
Nefo MYFTIU
Ilazi LIPIVANI, President of the Committee of Physical Education in ALBANIA.
Mark NJODA
Nasho MATHANAILI

During the meeting, Liri BELISHOVA, in seconding the program of the newly created Association, stressed the many advantages of this organization and the many aids it will provide in support of the Albanian Army and for the defense of the country. Continuing, she stated that this institution will promote sport and enable the Albanian nation to face whatever situation may arise in case of an emergency. "With this end in view, the creation of this Association in Aid of Army and Defense is of foremost importance, and it will be the patriotic duty of every citizen of the People's Republic of ALBANIA to take active interest in this organization in order to promote its growth! Major General KAPO then rose to speak. He commended the initiative taken by the Central Committee towards the organization of the Association, whose coming into being has been welcomed by the enthusiasm of the Albanian youth and by the working classes. As all mass organizations, which in their foundation followed the principles of MARXISM-LENINISM, so also the structure of the Association is based on this doctrine, and will have its footing in Albanian industrial centers, in the shipyards, enterprises, and governmental institutions, in villages, and in educational circles, and in all spheres of action.

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P. Albanian Army Insignia of Rank, and Uniforms

1. Officers and soldiers serving in the Albanian Army are issued two uniforms, one for summer wear, and one for winter. The following is a description of those uniforms:

Albanian Officer's Summer Uniform:

White cotton blouse with a high neck.
Gray trousers (Yugoslav Army style) made of cotton material.
White garrison cap, with shiny black visor.
Low cut shoes, of black or brown color.

Albanian Officer's Winter Uniform:

Dark gray wool blouse and trousers.
Dark gray officer's overcoat (Yugoslav style).
Black boots.
Garrison cap with red star.

NOTE: In 1947 and 1948, part of the Albanian Army wore Bulgarian uniforms.

Albanian Soldier's Summer Uniform:

Brown cotton blouse with a high neck. The blouse is worn over the trousers, with a leather belt around the waist. High black boots.
Brown cotton trousers, trousers are worn tucked into the soldiers boots. Yugoslav style cap, with red star.

Albanian Soldier's Winter Uniform

The Albanian soldiers now wear two different types of winter uniforms. One is of the Soviet style in brown wool, while some wear the Yugoslav style in gray wool.

Wool cap with red star. However, many soldiers wear the garrison cap instead of the overcoat cap.

Overcoats are of the Yugoslav type, dark gray.

2. The insignia of rank for Albanian enlisted personnel and officers is as follows:

Albanian Army Enlisted Personnel:

Albanian enlisted personnel wear their rank in the form of gold colored chevrons on the epaulets of their uniforms. Rank is not worn on the sleeve of the shirt. An Albanian corporal wears 1. stripe (stripe is patterned as follows: >). An Albanian sergeant is distinguished by two stripes, while a master sergeant wears three stripes.

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The epaulet worn by the Albanian enlisted personnel is of the same material as the uniform (epaulet is of cloth and not stiff like the ones worn by Albanian officers). However, the epaulet is of a solid color according to the soldier's branch of service. In addition to the colored epaulet, Albanian enlisted personnel also wear a small triangle on each side of the collar, and these triangles are the same color as the epaulet, the color indicating the soldier's branch of service.

3. Officer Cadets:

All Albanian officer cadets are distinguished by a solid gold colored epaulet, with two small, raised gold lines running along the length of the epaulet, close to its edges. The epaulet also has a small gold star, on the second gold bar near the arm. In addition, the branch of service is indicated (Army, Navy, Air Corps) by a small, colored line near the edge of the epaulet.

4. Albanian Army Officers:

2nd Lt. - Solid gold epaulet, with one gold star near the arm. Branch of service is indicated by a small, colored line around the inside of the epaulet.

1st Lt. - Solid gold epaulet, with two gold stars running parallel to the epaulet. Branch of service is indicated by a small, colored line around inside of epaulet.

Captain - Solid gold epaulet, with three gold stars running parallel to the epaulet. Branch of service is indicated by a small line, colored, around the inside of the epaulet.

Major - Solid gold epaulet, with three gold stripes placed at equal intervals, running parallel to the epaulet. One gold star on the middle gold stripe. The star is worn at the half mark of the gold stripe. Branch of service is indicated by a small, colored line around the inside of the epaulet.

Lt. Colonel - A solid gold epaulet, with three gold stripes placed at equal intervals running parallel to the length of the epaulet. A gold star on the middle stripe (same position as on Major's epaulet) and a gold star on the first gold stripe, near the arm. Indication of branch of service is same as previously described for Albanian officers.

Colonel - A solid gold epaulet, with three gold stripes (as above). One gold star on the middle stripe (as a Major) and gold stars on the first and third gold stripe near the arm. Branch of service indicated as before.

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5. Color Description Indicating Branch of Service:

Red .. Albanian "Sigurinit" (State Security). Officers and agents of "Sigurinit" wear a large red star on the left arm, half-way between the shoulder and the elbow.

Green - Artillery

Light Green - Infantry

Yellow - Fiscal Police

6. The following are awards now existent in the Albanian Army:

- a. Seniority - Bronze Medal
- b. Courage - Bronze Medal
- c. Liberation - Silver Medal
- d. National Hero - Gold Medal

The first three decorations (a, b, and c) are allowed to be worn at all times. However, the National Hero decoration is worn only during national festivities or military parades. The National Hero decoration is given to very few persons. In fact, the last time this decoration was awarded was in 1947, to a corporal of the Albanian Navy who killed two Albanian soldiers who were attempting to escape in a small boat from ALBANIA.

PART VI

Albanian Economy

15. Mineral Wealth

1. The major industry of ALBANIA is constituted by the exploitation of underground resources. Various foreign enterprises contributed a great deal toward the development of mineral resources since 1918. In that year, S.I.M.S. (Societa Italiana Minerio di Selcnica - Italian Mining Industry of Selcnica) exploited the extraction of bitumen (6,000 tons annually), which was transported to Vlone by a narrow gauge railway. In the crude oil field, intense research was carried on by Standard Oil, Anglo-Persian Oil, and Sindicat Franco-Albanais. All three companies obtained important concessions, while other concessions were granted in 1925 to S.I.G.L. (Societa Italiana Giacimenti Lignito - Italian Enterprise for Lignite), and A.I.P.A. (Azienda Italiana Petrolio Albania - Italian Enterprise for Albanian Crude Oil). These two Italian companies had 164,000 hectares under their supervision. A.I.P.A. constructed a pipeline (annual capacity 300,000 tons) 74 kilometres long which connects the oil well of Kucava with the port of Vlone.

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S.I.M.S. searched for crude oil in the zone west of Selenice and Devoll. S.I.G.L. had the zone around Korce under its supervision for the production of lignite. After 1925-27, copper, iron, chrome, coal, and bitumen were being mined in the area of Mallakastra; bauxite was coming from Kruja district; asbestos from Korce; and cement from the area of Vlone.

2. Albanian oil wells have a monthly output of about 40,000 tons of crude oil. Crude oil is now obtained from two sources, the first being the basin of Kucovo - Devoll, which surrounds the city of Kucovo (GREECE, 1:250,000, Sheet G-1, 134784), while the second is the basin of Fatos (GREECE, 1:250,000, Sheet G-1, 111767). The most important mines in ALBANIA are the bitumen mines located in Selenice (GREECE, 1:250,000, Sheet G-1, 110755), the copper and chrome mines located at Brubis (YUGOSLAVIA, 1:100,000, Sheet Y-45, 320910), and the coal mines of Prisko and Krrabo (GREECE, 1:250,000, Sheet G-1, 148327).

A. The Basin of Kucovo - Devoll:

At present, there are about 4,800 to 5,000 oil wells in operation within the oil field of Kucovo - Devoll. These wells are operated by means of electrical pumps, receiving their power from a power plant located at Kucovo. The approximate monthly output of this basin amounts to 13,000 tons of crude oil. The Kucovo - Devoll oil basin employs about 7,000 to 8,000 workers, operating on a 24 hour basis, using three 8 hour shifts. Technical personnel of the field include Soviet, Rumanian, and Albanian nationals.

B. Basin of Fatos:

The oil fields of Fatos are located about 30 kilometres southwest of Kucovo, and are now given a certain priority, since no electrical power is required for the exploitation of oil. At present, there are only about 200 - 250 oil wells in operation in this area, but searches from this point are conducted daily in the quest for new fields. The Fatos oil fields have an output of about 27,000 tons of crude oil per month, employ about 8,000 workers, operating in three 8 hour shifts daily.

These employees include a number of Soviet, Rumanian, and Albanian engineers and experts. The best known Albanian engineer working in this area is Engineer Manol KOCIONI.

During the latter part of November and the early days of December 1949, five Soviet ships unloaded at the port of Durres a total of about 25,000 tons of oil well equipment, mostly steel pipes about 12 to 18 metres in length and unspecified diameter, all destined for the oil fields at Fatos. Most of the equipment has arrived at its destination by now, although a small part of it remained in storage in Durres. The oil well equipment was shipped to Fatos by rail and by roadway, using trucks and trailers.

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C. Transportation, Storage and Research

Crude oil is loaded on ~~ships~~ in the port of Vlone, by means of a special pipeline which has a daily loading capacity of approximately 10,000 to 12,000 tons of oil. The loading pier is located about 1.5 miles south of the port of Vlone and is known by the name Uji i Ftofot (Krienero, GREECE, 1:250,000, Sheet G-4, 095745). Oil is usually loaded on Soviet or Rounanian tankers, of which one arrives weekly. Crude oil reaches Vlone by means of a pipeline 74 kilometres in length. This is the pipeline that originates in the Kucovo oil fields. A second pipeline, about 40 kilometres long, extends from Fatos to Vlone.

In addition to the 500 to 600 oil storage tanks located within the oil fields, there are oil storage depots located at Reskovec, (GREECE, 1:250,000, Sheet G-1, 117778) about 8 kilometres from the town of Fier, (GREECE, 1:250,000, Sheet G-1, 104778), Salovec, and Vlone, the last named being an underground dump. Each of the latter four storage points has a capacity of approximately 4,000 cubic meters.

Research for unknown oil deposits is now being carried on by Soviet and Albanian experts in the areas surrounding Kerce, Milot, Marunas, (YUGOSLAVIA, 1:250,000, Sheet Y-46, 129889 and 127869) and Flashnik (GREECE, 1:250,000, Sheet G-1, 136756), the latter being located about 16 kilometres from Berat.

D. Mines (See Exhibit X)

1. Mines of Kukos and Krunc

This group of mines is located in the northeastern part of ALBANIA, in a vast area which is divided by the White Drin River. The two groups of mines can be roughly divided into those located north of the river, with their center being the Viran Kala Mountain (Point 1432, YUGOSLAVIA, 1:250,000, Sheet Y-47, 192929), and those located south of the river inside a bend of the stream, and having their center in the mountain system of Suka e Manzit (Point 828, YUGOSLAVIA, 1:250,000, Sheet Y-47, 187817). The ore layers appear on the surfaces of the mountain slopes in the form of rings. The serpentine deposits form the basis for metal ore layers, while the latter are covered with a calcareous deposit. These strata are composed of brown hematite, in a compact form, with a variable quantity of other oxides, especially magnetite. This ore occurs in quite an extensive area, and there is a deposit only 2.5 kilometres from the Yugoslav border at Morina (YUGOSLAVIA, 1:250,000, Sheet Y-47, 201927).

In the region of Manz (YUGOSLAVIA, 1:250,000, Sheet Y-47, 188919) located about 6 kilometres southeast of Kukos, the mountain of Suka e Manzit contains a calcareous structure with horizontal strata, resting on serpentine, at a height of about 500 meters above sea level. An approximate depth of 6 meters of brown hematite covers an area of not less than five square kilometres.

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Around Trulic (Point 1007, YUGOSLAVIA, 1:100,000, Sheet 140, 835145), about 3.5 kilometres southwest of Mount Suka e Manzit, there is also a calcareous mass resting upon serpentine. At about a height of 850 meters on the eastern side of the mountain, facing the village of Serroi (YUGOSLAVIA, 1:250,000, Sheet Y-47, 185913), there is a vast surface layer of ore lying between the calcareous and serpentine deposits mentioned above. Recent explorations of the western slope of the mountain have revealed a great quantity of mineral wealth. This indicates the continuity of the mineral stratum on the entire surface of the hillside, amounting to about two square kilometres. The thickness of the metal ore layer in this area amounts to at least 40 meters, of which more than 10 are composed of excellent hematite in a very pure and compact form, containing over 55% iron.

In the zone of Mali Kras, there is a third layer of hematite located on the southern slope of Suka e Manzit Mountain about 3 kilometres from the White Drin River, in the immediate vicinity of the village of Gislen. Compact layers of hematite, 7 meters in thickness, extend for about 2.5 kilometres at an average height of 700 meters above sea level.

In the zone of Kruma (YUGOSLAVIA, 1:250,000, Sheet Y-47, 192933), a series of surface stratum of iron ore, extending from north to southwest at a height of about 570 meters, start four kilometres southwest of the village. In this instance, the minerals are also located between layers of calcareous and serpentine, with the latter serving as a base. The mineral in this area is brown hematite, with some magnetite wedged in. The content of iron is between 62 and 64%. The mineral extracted from these mines (the exploitation is particularly intensive in the mines nearest the road leading from Kukes to Puka - to Shkoder). Minerals are transported by truck to Shan Gjin, a small port, from where they are transported directly to the Soviet ports in the Black and Baltic Seas, including Leningrad.

There are a group of mines located between Mikro and Prenjosh, and this area is in the central part of eastern ALBANIA near Lake Ohrid, between the sources of the Shkumbin River and the lake. These deposits have already been intensively studied by the former "Azienda Minerale Metalice Italiane" - A.N.M.I. - "Italian Metallic Minerals Enterprise".

The zone between Pogradec and Tibason contains mineral deposits at a high altitude. These deposits are also located between layers of calcareous and serpentine rocks. The deposits extend for a length exceeding 20 kilometres, from Pogradec to Fishkash (GREECE, 1:250,000, Sheet G-1, 190512). This stratum is brown hematite of "pisolitic" and "oolitic" character, and mixed with a large percentage of magnetite. The content of iron is between 55 and 60%, and contains no harmful impurities. The ore extracted from some of these mines contains chrome and nickel. The mining is facilitated by a thin layer of calcareous cover. Facilities for transporting the ore are good since the mines are located near the national highway which connects with Tibason, from where the railroad runs into Durrës.

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In the zone of Monishte the mines are located six kilometres from Forradoc, west of the road leading from Struga, on the slope of Mount Mokro.

These deposits are also compressed between layers of calcareous and serpentine rock. The ore lies at a height of about 500 meters above the surface of the lake in this area. In the Cervenaka Valley, there are sizeable quantities of ore lying very near the surface, being covered only by a thin layer of humus. These layers have thicknesses of not less than 4 meters, while the average thickness is much higher. It is believed that the 48 mines which are presently being operated here contain 20,000,000 tons of ore reserves. The ore is brown hematite containing 58 to 60% iron.

The Honeshi area is a continuation of the Cervenaka deposits. Strata of ore, six to nine meters thick and embedded between layers of calcareous and serpentine formations, appear for about a length of 2 kilometres.

This ore is brown hematite with strong inlays of magnetite and contains about 60% iron. The Hodonishte group of mines are located about 100 kilometres west of Lake Ohrid, consist of 6 mines. This group has an estimated reserve of 6,000,000 tons of brown hematite mixed with chrome and nickel ore. Another group of mines are located about ten miles west of Lake Ohrid. There are three mines in this area which are being excavated and these are estimated at having a reserve of 8,000,000 tons of brown hematite. The deposit is about three kilometres long, and seven meters thick.

The Frenies and Katolji group of mines form an important mineral deposit. They are located about two kilometres south of the highway connecting Lin and Elbasan. The veins are about two kilometres long and one kilometer wide, and estimated at 3,000,000 tons of hematite. The ore appears in a very pure form and contains about 55 to 60% iron. About two kilometers further south there is another mineral deposit of embedded hematite, (Fe₂O₃) almost on the surface, covered only with a very thin layer of earth.

This deposit is very pure and is known to contain approximately 5,000,000 tons of ore. In order to utilize these supplies of ore, a railroad will be built from Elbasan to Librazhd, following the Skumbin River Valley.

2. Chromium Mines

Chromium ore mines are also found in the principal mineral areas and usually quite near the iron deposits. Some of these are as follows:

a) Maja e Rind Mountain - this deposit is in the northeastern border area of ALBANIA, along the Yugoslav frontier, and lies in a mountainous area facing the Skatina River, a tributary of the White Drin. The area of chromium deposits is not less than 30 square kilometers, with its center at the village of Zogaj (YUGOSLAVIA, 1:100,000, Sheet 139, S26460). Research for minerals has been carried on in this area, namely along the western slopes of Mount Maja Urister (Point 557, YUGOSLAVIA, 1:100,000, Sheet 139, 777517); the Kodra e Luxha (Point 1236, YUGOSLAVIA, 1:100,000, Sheet 139, 740524); and Maja Plounit (Point 1157, YUGOSLAVIA, 1:100,000, Sheet 139, 785513) mountains, with the result that rich deposits have been discovered throughout the area. An evaluation of the ore contained in this area could not be made, since the layers are not continuous and lie in pockets of varying size and contents.

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This area represents an enormous reserve for the future since the lack of transportation makes the exploitation of the ore on a large scale, an impossibility. However, according to experts, this area contains the most important chromium deposit in all EUROPE, and perhaps, in the world. The ore is excellent, containing 48 to 50% chromium oxide.

b) The Kukes - Letai - Krung Area - located north of Kukes and divided by the White Drin River. The monthly production of this area is around 2,000 tons. The ore is transported by road and on very primitive vehicles. Upon arrival at the main highway, the ore is re-loaded on trucks and shipped via Shkoder to Shen Gjin and Durres. The entire output is transported to the USSR or one of the other Iron Curtain countries, particularly CZECHOSLOVAKIA.

c) Lake Ohrid Area - A mine system is being worked in the Monliste area, a few hundred meters from the provincial road, and quite close to the shore of the lake. Chrome is also found here in pockets of varying sizes and content. Some of these pockets may contain thousands of tons, while others produce but a few hundred. There are mines near Hodoniste, which is also located along the shore of Lake Ohrid. Other mines are in the Pojska Valley nearby, and along the Yugoslav frontier. There are some important deposits near Pranjes, near Peshkopi, near Skrosha, and Bocës. It is excavated by primitive means. The quality of ore in the Lake Ohrid region is slightly inferior to that of the northern region. It contains about 48 % of chromium "anidride".

3. Bitumen Mines - Important bitumen mines are located near Selenice, about 30 kilometers northeast of Vlone. The mines consist of about 70 to 80 shafts, with varying lengths between 800 and 4,000 meters.

Daily production of this area is not known. There are about 2,000 - 2,500 miners employed here, including an unknown number of persons who have been sentenced by the Albanian Government to terms at hard labor.

Prisoners have been observed working here for the past three years. The mines are operated on an 8 hour shifts. There is a mill which transforms bitumen from its raw state into a finished product in the village of Selenice. The mill employs about 300 to 400 qualified workers, operating on three 8 hour shifts daily. An unknown number of Soviet and Roumanian technicians supervise production at both the mines and mill.

A narrow gauge railroad running from Selenice to Vlone carries the entire output of the mines and mill. The monthly production of the mines runs between 20,000 and 30,000 tons. From Vlone, the total output is loaded aboard Soviet, Polish and Roumanian vessels for delivery to unknown destinations.

4. Rubag Area - An important location for chromium and copper ores. A smelting plant is also in operation here. Both the mine and smelting furnaces employ between 2,500 to 3,000 workers, on a three 8 hour shift basis. Production figures for the mine or the plant are not known. Coke for the furnace is imported from POLAND. In February 1950, large quantities of smelted copper, 70-80 centimeters long, and about 50 kilos in weight were seen in Durres awaiting shipment.

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f) "Uka" - a bridge building company, and the largest enterprise of this type in the country. At the moment, this company is engaged in the construction work at Dajti, of the large power plant previously mentioned. This plant is in the vicinity of Tirane.

g) Miscellaneous factories - a spaghetti plant employing 250 workers; 2 cigarette factories, employing about 200 persons in each; 1 olive oil refinery, employing about 200 workers; and 1 brick yard, using about 150 workers. In addition to these factories, there are two power plants in Tirane.

2. Shkoder

a) A cement factory, located on the bank of the Bojana River, 5 kilometers outside of town. The factory has a daily output of 50 to 60 tons of cement, and employs about 200 to 300 workers. There are three 8 hour shifts daily. Soviet and Albanian technicians direct the work here.

The factory has electrically operated equipment in addition to that powered by diesel engines. The coke is shipped in from POLAND.

b) Other industrial establishments in Shkoder include: 1 olive oil refinery, employing about 50 workers; 1 leather factory, 30 - 40 workers; 1 alcohol distillery, about 30 workers; 1 perfume factory; and 2 spaghetti factories. There are also 2 soap factories, employing a total of about 150 workers (one of the factories is the "Venus" which is the largest soap factory in the country); 3 cigarette factories, the "Gera", the "Drini", and the "Shkodra", employing a total of about 600 workers; and 1 diesel oil operated power plant, located northeast of the town.

3. Korce

The town contains 1 brewery, employing about 700 - 800 workers; 1 sugar factory, annual production about 2,000 tons, employing 400 - 500 workers; 1 textile factory; and 1 power plant, size unknown.

4. Fieri

The industries here consist of 1 spaghetti factory; 2 olive oil refineries; and 1 power plant, size unknown.

5. Durres

1 cigarette factory, the "Talat Noga", employing 250 to 300 workers; 1 leather factory, employing about 200 workers; 2 spaghetti factories, employing a total of 300 to 400 workers; 1 rice plant, 50 to 60 workers; 1 rubber shoe factory and tire repair shop, 70 to 80 workers; 1 shipyard with a capacity of 4 sailing boats of 500 to 600 tons displacement; and 1 power plant of unknown capacity.

6. Vlone

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a) "Skanderbeg" Distillery; 1 olive oil refinery and soap factory in conjunction with the distillery. The distillery produces brandy, pure alcohol, etc. The factory receives its power from its own 150 hp thermo-electric plant which generates power of 250 kwh. The distillery employs about 2,500 to 3,000 workers.

b) Another power plant of unknown type and capacity.

7. Elbasan

The industries of the town include 4 olive oil refineries; 1 spaghetti plant; 1 cigarette factory; and 1 power plant.

8. Berat

The following industries are located here: 5 oil refineries; 1 automobile repair shop; 1 leather factory; and 1 power plant.

9. Fishing Industry

The fishing industry is an important economic factor, since 5,000 to 6,000 persons are engaged in this work. The fishing industry was formerly an individually operated enterprise, but in 1949, the industry was centralized by the Government, became state-owned and operated. The main offices for the industry are in Durrës. The Director General of the fishing industry is Muci PODGORICA. Affiliated offices, each controlling a section of the coast, are located in: Shkoder; Shën Gjini; Vlone; Sarande; Porzdec; Bubrinto; and Kravastar.

The fishing fleet is operated by the main office and its affiliates, and the types and numbers of craft are: 12 motor vessels of 60 tons each, with Ansaldo, GM, and diesel engines in them; about 30 craft of 5 to 6 tons each, powered by gasoline and diesel engines; and about 100 small boats without engines, displacing about 2 or 3 tons each.

Cold storage space and refrigerators are located in Durrës; Shkoder; Vlone; Sarande and Shën Gjini. The refrigerators were obtained in 1945, and were part of the UNRRA supplies furnished to ALBANIA. In fact, most of the fishing equipment now being used in ALBANIA was supplied by UNRRA, with the exception of what was purchased from YUGOSLAVIA.

The daily catch amounts to between 300 and 350 tons, but most of the fish are exported to unknown destinations. The sale of fish to the people is quite limited, as a result of this exportation. People can purchase fish twice a month on a ration coupon basis. The fish ration amounts to 250 grams per person every two weeks. Sea fishing is permitted only during the daytime, and no boat is permitted to fish more than 15 miles off shore. Each boat of any size is accompanied by two or three "Sigurinit" troopers, who are armed with sub-machine guns. Fishing on Sundays is prohibited.

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H. Transportation and Traffic

1. Maritime Traffic

During the latter half of 1949, about 25 Soviet, Polish, and Roumanian ships carried supplies into Durres. The Soviet vessels unloaded cereals, cement, coke, Zis trucks and trailers (5 to 10 tons), tractors, and iron. Polish ships, which arrived most frequently, brought supplies of ammunition, food and clothing for the Albanian Armed Forces, and during the last four months of 1949, food and clothing supplies were delivered for the Greek refugees in ALBANIA. The Roumanian ships delivered supplies of sugar, cement, oats and paper.

None of these ships made the return journey without taking a cargo aboard. The commodities which taken out of the country include: chromium, copper, bitumen, wool, leather, crude oil, tobacco, scrap iron and timber. Since the export center for crude oil is Vlone, the weekly scheduled Soviet or Roumanian ship called there for a cargo. All ships have direct orders not to approach the Yugoslav coast. Ship crews are instructed that in case of an encounter with a Yugoslav patrol boat, to disregard Yugoslav orders and try to prevent the ship's capture by sinking it.

2. Railroad Communications (See Exhibit V)

There are two main railroads in ALBANIA, one is 95 kilometers long and connects Tirane with Durres; while the second is 57 kilometers in length connecting Durres with Pegon. The latter line is of particular importance since it serves to transport chrome ore from Pegon to Durres. A narrow gauge railway connects Vlone and Selenice, and is used for the transportation of bitumen. The entire railroad system uses a total of seven locomotives, of which three were obtained from CZECHOSLOVAKIA; two from YUGOSLAVIA; while the origin of the remaining two is not known. There are about 250 railroad cars, and these include 1st, 2nd, and 3rd class passenger cars, and freight cars. A depot for railroad cars is maintained at Shkrozet, about 3 kilometers south of Durres.

The train schedules are as follows:

A combination passenger and freight train leaves Tirane at 0630 hours, arriving at Durres at 0900 hours. The train, on its return journey, leaves Durres at 1700 hours and arrives in Tirane at 1930 hours.

On the Durres - Pegon run, a combined passenger-freight train leaves Pegon at 0600 hours, arriving in Durres at 0900 hours. The return journey starts at 1105 hours, and arrives in Pegon at 1510 hours.

Any other regularly scheduled trains are unknown, but it is believed that in spite of the daylight schedules of the above trains, that there are trains which run at night.

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3. Highway Communications

The most important roads in ALBANIA are divided into three categories:

a) National asphalted roads - these roads are six and sometimes seven meters wide. There are but few instances where they narrow to five meters in width. Grades are variable according to the terrain, in mountainous areas, they reach 7%. For the most part, the ballast of these roads is composed of a base of 20 cm pebbles or stones; above this 20cm of rubble and 3 cm of sand; and the surface is 1 cm of asphalt-bitumen. These roads, for the most part, are in the central areas and along the coast.

b) National macadamized roads - Maximum width of these roads is six meters, and at times they are five meters wide. Most of this type have been constructed in mountainous areas.

c) Roads built on natural foundations - these roads are well built, with a maximum width of four to four and a half meters. The newest road of this type has been laid through the mountainous area between Burrelli and Zergani. Most of this road has been cut into the mountain sides. The road between Kopliku and Qkol has recently been improved and is now approximately four meters wide.

In general, the condition of all Albanian roads is bad since there has been no maintenance during the last few years. The only road that is reported to be in good condition is the one between Tirane and Durres. The highway between Shkoder and Tirane, 120 kilometers long and asphalted, has been heavily damaged between Beltoje (YUGOSLAVIA, 1:250,000, Sheet Y-46, 715920) and Lesh (YUGOSLAVIA, 1:250,000, Sheet Y-46, 723894). There is another section of this road which is need of repair. This is a 30 kilometers stretch between Shkalla Kakarritit (YUGOSLAVIA, 1:250,000, Sheet Y-46, 723899 to 718907). The portion of road near Ura e Zeze (GREECE, 1:250,000, Sheet G-1, 129856) is in very bad condition also. No vehicle may exceed a speed of 20 miles per hour at any of these points. The bridge crossing the Mati River, formerly known as the ZOGU Bridge, was repaired in 1946, but can accommodate only one vehicle at a time.

The road connecting Durres and Korce (140 kilometers) has the following damage: 32 kilometer strip between Errozghina (GREECE, 1:250,000, Sheet G-1, 118817) and Elbasan; the road between Librazhd and Idh (28 kilometers) GREECE, 1:250,000, Sheet G-1, from 172823 to 199806) is also badly damaged. The road leading from Pogradec to the Bridge of Milig (GREECE, 1:250,000, Sheet G-1, 200767) is in very poor condition. The 136 kilometers of highway between Vlone and Gjinokaster is in such poor condition that speeds of 15 to 18 miles per hour cannot be exceeded. The road between Shkoder and Hani Hotit (YUGOSLAVIA, 1:250,000, Sheet Y-46, 711257) a distance of 32 kilometers, is damaged between Vraka (YUGOSLAVIA, 1:100,000, Sheet Y3S, 152324) and Koplik (YUGOSLAVIA, 1:100,000, Sheet Y3S, 110430) a distance of 11 kilometers, and for a distance of 7 kilometers between Koplik and Kastrat (YUGOSLAVIA, 1:100,000, Sheet Y-3S, 088499).

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Since ALBANIA lacks an adequate railroad communications system, travelling is done mostly by buses. The types of vehicles used on the bus lines are mainly Fiat, Isotta, and Tatra. In 1949, about 10 buses were shipped in from HUNGARY. A few of the bus lines are: Tirane-Vlone; Tirane - Shkoder; Tirane - Gjinokaster; Tirane - Peshkopi - Kukog; Tirane - Elbasan; Tirane - Korco; and Tirane - Berat. It is believed that schedules are operated on a daily basis.

4. Aqueducts

The following aqueducts are known to exist in ALBANIA:

<u>Aqueduct</u>	<u>Capacity (liters per second)</u>
<u>Tirane</u>	75
<u>Shkoder</u>	36
<u>Berat</u>	11
<u>Korco</u>	50
<u>Vlone</u>	30
<u>Gjinokaster</u>	10
<u>Fieri</u>	15

5. The principal bridges which were rebuilt between 1944 and 1946 are:

<u>Bridge</u>	<u>Length (in meters)</u>
<u>Bucno River</u>	100
<u>Rrenci</u>	40
<u>Drini River</u>	100
<u>Vau i Dojes</u>	150
<u>Lesh</u>	120
<u>Miloti</u>	52
<u>Burrelli (1)</u>	10
<u>Burrelli (2)</u>	10
<u>Kolaj</u>	25
<u>Peshkopiie</u>	60
<u>Topojani</u>	40
<u>Ura Zeke</u>	45
<u>Gioles</u>	20
<u>Lana</u>	12
<u>Liruti</u>	40
<u>Salmanati</u>	65
<u>Shkambi Kavajes</u>	45
<u>Darcit</u>	45
<u>Buno Kraba</u>	30
<u>Elbasan</u>	45
<u>Murak</u>	100
<u>Librazhd</u>	100
<u>Rrogozhino</u>	260
<u>Sinana</u>	25
<u>Kucit</u>	100

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<u>Kucit</u>	100
<u>Ura Hasan Beut</u>	110
<u>Brosjar</u>	110
<u>Mefeli</u>	250
<u>Perkova</u>	140
<u>Palas</u>	45
<u>Borshi</u>	35
<u>Delfina</u>	35
<u>Konsilcep</u>	110

I. Agriculture (See Exhibit XI)

When the problem of economic reconstruction arose in 1924, competent authorities were appointed for the specific task of developing the agricultural potential of ALBANIA. This is not meant to infer that the Government undertook any agrarian reforms, but simply proceeded according to a rational plan of amelioration. In 1925, an association was founded and called "SVEA" (Societa Sviluppo Economico Albania - Association for the Economic Development of ALBANIA), whose task it was to supply the necessary means to the government to meet the requirements of the vast new program of public works. New Italian cooperatives and agricultural enterprises were created, such as: "E.I.A.A. (Association of Albanian Industry and Agriculture), which received 3,000 hectares as a concession, for a period of 99 years. This grant was in the flatland of Shjak, in the vicinity of Durres. S.A.P.I.A. (Societa Anonima Prodotti Industria Agricola - Society for the Industry of Agricultural Products) received 250 hectares in the vicinity of Tirane. The GRIFPO & BOANANNO Enterprise received 3,000 hectares in the vicinity of Tirane. S.I.F.E. (Societa Italiana Foreste Albania - Italian Enterprise for Albanian Forests) handled the exploitation of forests.

There are no exact statistics available, but the following are the approximate figures for the average annual production in the agricultural field from 1932 to 1935:

Grain	450,000 quintals	Cattle	2,500,000
Tobacco	20,000 "	Horses	110,000
Corn	1,900,000 "	Chickens	1,000,000
Rice	10,000 "	Hogs	15,000
Straps	14,000 "	Bee Hives	47,000
Olives	11,000 "		

J. Ports (See Exhibit VI)

1. Durres - the most important port in ALBANIA, reportedly absorbs 60% of the commercial traffic. The port has two huge artificial piers with a combined length of 2,500 meters. Following modern requirements, piers were built during 1927-28 by the "MAZZURANA Co." The installations were heavily damaged during the last war, and at present, only one pier, 160 meters long has been completely repaired. Another pier, 250 meters long, is under construction.

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Two small cranes and two narrow gauge railroad tracks were installed after the war. At present, Soviet technicians are handling the installation of a large crane at the end of the repaired pier.

2) Vlone - the city is located a few kilometers from the bay. In 1949 a pier, 400 meters long, was completed. It was constructed of reinforced concrete and is about 14 or 16 meters in width. Two 10,000 to 12,000 vessels can tie up at one time. Oil is loaded with special equipment at Krionoro, south of Vlone.

3) Other Ports - south of Vlone are the ports of Duierro and Sarande. Lack of piers or other docking facilities necessitates the usage of floating docks. Shen Gjin is the only port in northern ALBANIA. Until recently, the activity in this port was very low. It was used mainly for the unloading of coal and naphtha for factories in Shkodor (mostly for the cement factory). Two wooden piers, one 50 meters long and the other 120 meters long, were completed in January 1950. The port of Shkodor is relatively unimportant since it can only be used during the Fall and Winter, and even then, it cannot accommodate vessels exceeding 1,000 to 1,500 tons.

K. General Economic Information

Russian supplies for ALBANIA have been woefully inadequate, even during the period when the country was being handled quite diplomatically by the Soviets. The ships that passed through the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles, and rounded the tip of GREECE were far more heavily laden with arms and military equipment for the Greek rebels rather than with food for the Albanian people. What food was brought was, in a large measure, destined for the Albanian Army and the Greek rebels. The sporadic shipments of food which arrived for the people were paid for by minerals and other products which could be spared. Since the rupture of economic cooperation with YUGOSLAVIA, these seaborne imports have acquired a disproportionate significance for the Albanian economy; and during the past year, there has been a drastic reduction in the number of ships calling at Albanian ports. The people and the government are wondering anxiously about their economic position.

There seems to be no doubt that, at present, ALBANIA is uncomfortably short of food. Bread has always been a problem, because without the Kosovo region, the Albanians cannot grow sufficient amounts of grain. The meat situation is less marked; lamb, goat, and fowl used to be plentiful, i.e. those with money could eat as much as they wanted, while the poorer classes could at least afford an occasional meal which included meat or fowl. The main problem, from the point of view of providing basic commodities and staples for the average person, is the supply of such foods as: pasta (macaroni); beans; rice; sugar; and olive oil (which is universally used throughout the country as a medium for cooking). Provided that the stock of goats has not been too greatly reduced, there should be a fair supply of goat's milk or "kos".

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The general economic situation in ALBANIA is growing increasingly worse. The general poverty of the country is increased by the fact that the government centers its attention on the armed forces, particularly the "Sigurinit". The population is feeling the lack of food supplies since the rations issued for one month are hardly enough for one week, while articles on free sale are obtainable only through payment of exorbitant prices.

There is a particularly grave shortage of medicines and medical supplies. A medical prescription is required to obtain a single aspirin.

The percentages of illness increase daily, and the hospitals are overcrowded with tuberculosis patients. This latter disease cannot be combatted because of the lack of medical care. Streptomycin may be obtained at prices varying between 7,000 and 8,000 lako.

Prices of Rationed and Free Articles:

<u>Food Products</u>	<u>Free Market Price</u>	<u>Rationed Price</u>
1 kg of wheat bread	60 lako	6 lako
1 kg of corn bread	30 lako	4 lako
70 gr of hard bread	10 lako	
1 kg of pasta	100 lako	36 lako
1 kg of rice	200 lako	50 lako
1 kg of sugar	350 lako	46 lako
1 kg of marmalade	150 lako	100 lako
1 kg of meat	150 lako	50 lako
1 kg of coffee	1,500 lako	
1 kg of butter	900 lako	
1 kg of potatoes	40 lako	25 lako
1 kg of honey	350 lako	
1 kg of cookies	500 lako	
1 kg of cheese	300 lako	
1 kg of beans	60 lako	32 lako
1 kg of olives	60 lako	45 lako
1 kg of fish	80 lako	50 lako
1 kg of fish eggs	200 lako	
1 kg of peanuts	100 lako	50 lako
1 kg of figs, dried	200 lako	130 lako
1 liter of wine	110 lako	
1 egg	8 lako	5 lako
1 kg of prunes, dried	65 lako	
1 liter of milk	60 lako	

Prices of textiles obtainable with ration coupons or on the free market, as of 13 March 1950:

<u>Articles</u>	<u>Free Market Price</u>	<u>Rationed Price</u>
Cotton, 1 meter of various shades	700 lako	36 lako
40% wool cloth, 1 meter, made in CZECHOSLOVAKIA	5,000 lako	1,500 lako

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10% wool cloth, 1 meter	2,500 loko	900 loko
Lining, 1 meter	500 loko	96 loko
Handkerchief, 1, cotton	150 loko	30 loko
Cotton towel, 1m x 50 cm, various colors	1,500 loko	
Raw wool, 1 kg	700 loko	
Hose, 1 pair	1,300 loko	
Woolen socks, 1 pair	600 loko	
Cotton socks, 1 pair	400 loko	
Felt hat, standard type	600 loko	
Cloth cap	350 loko	
Pullover sweater, home-woven wool	1,500 loko	

L. Food Ration Quotas

1. Babies, up to six months of age: 250 grams of milk daily.
2. Children, up to three years of age: Children under this category receive the following monthly ration:
 - 1 kg of sugar
 - 2 kgs of rice
 - 3 kgs of dark flour
 - 2 bars of soap
 - 400 grams of laundry soap
 - 250 grams of cookies

In addition, children receive one egg every day and 350 grams of meat every week.
3. After children have attained the age of three years, their rations are decreased to 250 grams of sugar monthly; two eggs per week; 250 grams of meat per week; and 0.25 liter of oil per month. The quantities of the other food items remains unchanged.
4. School children, children in this category are classified as light workers and receive the following rations:
 - 600 grams of corn bread daily
 - 300 grams of pasta monthly
 - 400 grams of sugar monthly
 - 400 grams of meat or fish (optional) per week
 - 400 grams of olive oil-month
 - 2 eggs per week
5. Elementary school children also receive one cup of milk and 100 grams of bread and butter, distributed daily in the schools. This ration is free of charge.
6. Office personnel are classified in the same category and receive the same type of rations (light workers).
7. Category "ordiner#" includes all persons who have at least one member of the family employed by a state agency. The ration for this category consists of 400 grams of corn bread daily; 250 grams of meat or fish weekly; 250 grams of olive oil per month; 500 grams of pasta per month.

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250 grams of sugar per month; 100 grams of soap per month; 2 eggs per week. In 1949, personnel under this category were issued three meters of wool cloth and three meters of cotton material free of charge.

5. Category of heavy workers, such as: port workers; railroad laborer; drivers; mechanics; carpenters; etc.:
 - 900 grams of corn bread daily
 - 500 grams of meat or fish weekly
 - 500 grams olive oil monthly
 - 1,000 grams of pasta monthly
 - 500 grams of sugar monthly
 - 4 eggs weekly
 - 100 grams of soap monthly
 - 100 grams of shaving cream monthly
 - 400 grams of laundry soap monthly

Previously, members of this category received one suit of clothes per year, free of charge. However, in 1950 these suits will be sold for 700 laka each.

9. Merchant Marine Category, valid only for personnel at sea: 900 grams of wheat bread per day (prior to 1 January 1950, merchant seaman received 1,000 grams of wheat bread per day); 4,000 grams of meat or fish monthly; 500 grams of olive oil per month; 1.5 kilos of pasta per month; 750 grams of sugar per month; 45 eggs per month; 100 grams of soap per month; 100 grams of shaving soap per month; 400 grams of laundry soap per month (marine engineers receive 800 grams of laundry soap per month); 250 grams of butter per month; 2,000 grams of rice monthly; 1,000 grams of sausage per month; 1,500 grams of cheese per month; 600 grams of marmalade per month; 500 grams of cookies per month; 2,000 grams of beans per month; 4,000 grams of potatoes per month; and 7,000 grams of onions per month. With the exception of bread ration coupons, sailors aboard ship have no ration coupons. Their issue of food is free of charge. Seaman have received only one suit of clothes since 1945, but are entitled to purchase one pair of shoes annually at the price of 1,800 laka.
10. Miner's Category, this includes miners and workers employed in establishments attached to mines. Their ration entitles them to 900 grams of corn bread daily; 750 grams of fish or meat weekly; 1 liter of milk per day; and a monthly ration of 500 grams of olive oil; 15 eggs; 100 grams of soap; 100 grams of shaving soap; 400 grams of laundry soap; 1,500 grams of pasta; and 1,500 grams of rice.

PART VII

Conclusion

The first section of this part of the survey is comprised of information derived from an official source of this organization. The material contained herein was published by the Albanian Government for dissemination amongst various Party groups in foreign countries, Albanian legations, and for the obvious purpose of informing foreign observers that espionage activities in ALBANIA are short-lived due to the "security police and the faithfulness of the masses to the People's Government".

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250 grams of sugar per month; 100 grams of soap per month; 2 eggs per week. In 1949, personnel under this category were issued three meters of wool cloth and three meters of cotton material free of charge.

8. Category of heavy workers, such as: port workers; railroad laborer; drivers; mechanics; carpenters; etc.: 900 grams of corn bread daily
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The material appears here as a verbatim translation and in no way has it been altered, with the exception of grammatical corrections of the translation itself. (This report will appear as SOI - 903-338).

FACTS REVEALED IN THE TRIAL OF THE SPIES DROPPED BY PARACHUTE INTO ALBANIA

On 24 May 1950, three spies, Eton GAKO, Kasem ZHUPA, and Llukman LUFTIU were tried in Tirane. These men had been dropped by parachute into ALBANIA from an Italian plane on the night of 5 July 1949. The leader of this group of subversives was Eton GAKO, a former small businessman, who later became a corporal in the police force during the regime of King ZOG, and in 1942, joined the BALLI KOMBETAR.

As a collaborationist of the power in occupation; as a chief of a group of criminals belonging to BALLI; and later in his capacity as police commissioner for the District of Delvina; Eton GAKO committed many crimes during the war. After having been in the services of SIM and GESTAPO, GAKO went to GERMANY toward the end of the war; subsequently entered ITALY and placed himself at the disposal of the American intelligence service. These subversives agreed to carry on espionage activities, followed a special course of training in ITALY, became activists of the subversive party known as BALLI KOMBETAR, which serves the enemies of ALBANIA, and were finally dropped by parachute into ALBANIA with the assigned task of sabotage and espionage work.

Immediately after their landing in ALBANIA, instead of finding support from the people, they were pursued by them and by the police, and captured. A companion of theirs, Zyber LIKA, was killed. After the capture, they were forced to maintain connection by radio with the Italian Secret Service, under the control of the State Police. The defendants were sentenced to death by the High Court-Martial.

Crimes Committed by These Spies During the War as Members of BALLI KOMBETAR

The leader of this gang of spies, Eton GAKO, admitted in court that in March 1943, he joined the committee of BALLI for the Delvina area and in June 1943, was appointed a member of the District Committee for Gjinokastor. During the course of the trial, GAKO related many of the crimes, robberies and massacres committed by the BALLI groups under the protection of the occupier during the war. He described the Gling Massacre, ordered by the Italian, Colonel MURGIA, and approved of by the delegate of BALLI for the Gjinokastor area, in which 26 peasants were shot. Eton GAKO also stated that the BALLI ordered their groups not to take any action against the Italians. "On the contrary, the Italians were to be aided in their fight against the Partisans," he added. "Upon the arrival of the Germans, (related Eton GAKO) I became a battalion commander. In January 1944, following the order of the BALLI Central Committee, Ismail HAKI TATZATI told me that it was necessary to join the Germans, for the Communist movement of national liberation was gaining too much ground.

In compliance with the orders of the Central Committee, I was appointed police commissioner for the Delvina District. During that period, I admit having perpetrated robberies, tortured people, and issued orders of arrest. However, I deny having personally shot anybody".

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The prosecutor proves the execution of people with written evidence from which it is revealed that in the home of Eton ÇAKO were found rings, earrings, and gold teeth which had been taken by him from the victims. Further evidence discloses that Eton ÇAKO, in his capacity as a BALLI commander killed Vaso MARTO from Kakodhigi and the brother of Kamber HAXHI, who died as a result of tortures. In addition, four more persons from the village of Taxtat were also killed by ÇAKO. He also admitted to having arrested 30 persons at Taxtat, from whom he took 1,000 gold napoleons; in Zukovo he arrested 40 persons and robbed them of another 1,000 napoleons.

The prosecutor read many statements concerning the robberies, arrests, and attempted housebreakings committed by Eton ÇAKO. Most of these crimes were admitted by the defendant. Kasem ZHUTA also admitted that in 1943 he escaped from the Fascist Militia and joined the BALLI KOMBETAR groups with the rank of corporal. As a member of BALLI he participated, in conjunction with the Germans, in many operations against the National Liberation Army (Communist), such as: the action at Muzina, where the entire population of the village was deported and 30 persons arrested; the action of Sonica, where the partisan Jashar LUCI and Pastor Haxhi DEME were murdered; the action at Kranega, where the entire village was set on fire; and the action at Shen Vasijas, where 400 persons were arrested and 60 of them shot.

The British, Italian, Greek and Yugoslav Secret Services, Together With BALLI KOMBETAR and Other War Criminals Under the Command of the American Intelligence Service, Are Plotting Against the People's Republic of ALBANIA.

After the war, all these spies and criminals were gotten together in the "Santa Maria di Leuca" Camp in ITALY. There, the Anglo-American imperialists attempted to reorganize them, putting them in touch with agencies operating inside our territory, and setting up an armed force with the ultimate goal of overthrowing the people's power in ALBANIA. At present, the criminals-at-large have become a small group of agents caring only to serve those who pay them best, even though apparently they are divided into several dissenting groups. The American Intelligence has direct contact with BALLI KOMBETAR; the British with LEGALITETI (Monarchists); the Italians with BLOKU KOMBETAR INDEPENDENT; the Titoists with PARTITO AGRARIO; and the Greeks with that small group of members of BALLI KOMBETAR which are led by the subversive Abas ERMENI.

During the past few months, in order to gain control directly over all the abovementioned groups, the American imperialists formed the "Committee of Free ALBANIA", put Midhat FRASHERI in as its leader, and subsequently replaced him with Hasan DOSTI. The spies dropped by parachute into ALBANIA constitute only a part of the criminal activities conducted by the Anglo-American imperialists and their collaborators against the Albanian Republic and our people. The facts revealed in the course of this trial prove once more the criminal intentions of the Anglo-American imperialists, their collaborators, and the Albanian war criminals in their service. The leader of this gang of spies, Eton ÇAKO, has confessed all these activities before the court, giving full details.

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Anglo-American Intelligence Activities

The patron of all the intrigues directed against the Albanian people is the American Intelligence Service, under whose guidance, all other groups are cooperating. Eton ÇAKO made the following remark, "the American Intelligence Service attempted on several occasions to organize the war criminals assembled at the "Santa Maria di Louca" Camp, and failing to obey the orders dictated by the Americans, they threatened us with handing us over to the Albanian Government. A commission went to the Vatican to ask an intervention in our favor, and was advised by Padre VALENTINI to accept any order from the Americans, and to show them that we were a political force strong enough to bring about a change in the Albanian situation. This proved to be an American move, because when I came to know Hasan DOSTI, he told me, "Don't care about gossip, look at plain facts".

Subsequently, Eton ÇAKO explained how the BALLI KOMBETAR was organized by the Americans under the threat of deportation to ALBANIA: "In the course of a meeting held in September 1945, Zef PALI submitted a proposal and appointed a mission which was sent to Rome to meet an official of the American Embassy, a Mr. ANDERSON, who advised not to accept in the direction of the party people who were "much compromised", such as Kolo BIDA, etc.

Later, Mr. ANDERSON sent a "British expert" by the name of HERBERT to the "Santa Maria di Louca" Camp. This latter named summoned to the villa #45 the following personalities: Hasan DOSTI; Loc KURTI; Vasil ANDONI; Prof. PAPALIKO; Zef PALI; Seli MYFTIU; Xhonal MECO, and gave them indications and suggestions concerning the organization of BALLI. A certain number of criminals under the leadership of Padre MARTI and Kolo BIDA took the advice of the Vatican; Sheuqet VERLACI and Ernest KOLIÇI consulted the Italian Minister of the Interior, SCELEBA; while ZAPOI asked the advice of the Italian Foreign Office. These individuals decided not to accept the viewpoint of BALLI and proceeded to form the party known as "BLOKU KOMBETAR INDEPENDENT".

Evidence disclosed in court clearly indicates that the organization of the war criminals is nothing but an espionage center supported by the enemies of ALBANIA, and seeking to come to power in our country. After the organization of the BALLI, the Americans set to work in order to join together all the war criminals in a single committee. Consequently, they scheduled a meeting in Turin, where BALLI KOMBETAR, LEGALITETI, and BLOKU KOMBETAR INDEPENDENT were represented. In Turin, the discussions concerned the problem of assembling all the Albanian refugees who were still at large, forming a committee to represent them and guide them in the struggle against the Government of Tirana. This meeting of criminals under the protection of the American intelligence resulted in the formation of the so-called "Comitato Albania Libera" -(Free ALBANIA Committee). The attempts of the American espionage net developed into the expedition into ALBANIA by the subversive gang led by Eton ÇAKO. This action was conducted with the direct participation of the Italian Secret Service. Briefly explaining his arrival in ALBANIA, criminal Eton ÇAKO said, "In the last week of October 1943, I was summoned by Hasan DOSTI who told me that, following the decision of the Americans, some groups had to be formed and sent into ALBANIA.

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After having chosen the elements, contacts were established in Naples with an Italian, Pietro GRILLI, and later with another Italian, DE AGOSTINI, who was in charge of the espionage training courses under American supervision. I subscribed to a declaration which was submitted to me by the instructor, DE AGOSTINI, under which I accepted to work for the American Intelligence Service for a period of ten years".

After Pietro GRILLI had provided Eton GAKO with false identification under the name of Giuseppe FIORE, Eton GAKO and his companions commenced the training course which was held at Villa Linda, six kilometers from Bari.

Upon the termination of the course, they were furnished with two radio transmitters, 300 gold sovereigns, and civilian clothes to be worn in ALBANIA. However, none of these items helped them in their designs of treason because our people know how to defend the power conquered with our blood, and know how to retaliate when it comes to any attempt of the enemies to destroy the independence of our country.

Activities of the Italian Secret Service

Among the activities conducted by the imperialist agents against the Republic of ALBANIA, a prominent post is held by the Italian Secret Service.

The fact that the gang of spies led by Eton GAKO was trained in ITALY, sent into ALBANIA in an Italian plane, and was linked by radio with the Italian Ministry of the Interior, proves that ITALY has become an important base for the aggression of the American imperialism against the Albanian republic. The Albanian war criminals are not only supported by the Italian Government in their activities against our country; they have also formed a party of their own, led by the son of the rich landowner Shouget VERLACI, and known as the BLOKU KOMJETER INDEPENDENT. About these old Fascists, Eton GAKO stated, "The members of BLOKU KOMJETER INDEPENDENT are paid by the Italian Government according to the functions which they performed in ALBANIA; some as ministers, some as police commissioners, etc. Many of them have received large sums of money as an adjustment of arrears. So, for instance, Neshat KOLONJA; Hysen LEPENICA; Hysen PRISHTINA, each received 1,600,000 lire each, while Kamber PRODANO received 1,300,000 lire. Members of BALLI are not paid on a regular basis, however, they receive recompenses in the form of bonuses and subsidies, such as that of Mrs. HERBERT who gave Midhat FRASHERI a sum of 1,500 pounds in 1947, and which amount was appropriated by the leaders". The mercenaries of BALLI and the other subversives sold to the enemy, prove once again that for greed of money, they are ready to trample upon any interests of their country, as they did with the Italians and the Germans during the war.

The Italians also keep in touch with the criminals of BALLI KOMJETER, in order to better coordinate the action against the Albanian Republic and use BALLI information and other services. In this regard, Eton GAKO stated that Hasan DOSTI, Midhat FRASHERI, and other leaders of BALLI have kept in constant touch with the Italian Minister of the Interior, Mario SCALFA, with the Chief of Police, MIGLIORI, and in some instances, even with Premier Alcide DE GASPERI.

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These intrigues came to full light when, after the capture of the gang, Eton ÇAKO was forced to maintain liaison by radio with the Italian Ministry of the Interior, under the control of the Albanian State Police.

In 110 cipher messages exchanged between Eton ÇAKO and the Italians, the latter asked information concerning the military strength in the town of Gjino-kastor; this, just before the attacks launched by the Greek Fascists on the southern border. Information was also required concerning the development of these events: the zone where agents were dropped by parachute; the armament of the Albanian Army; the guerrilla bands, etc.

When Eton ÇAKO requested batteries for his wireless sets, foodstuffs, etc., two Italian planes readily came over the scene and dropped the requested items. The public prosecutor revealed, during the course of the trial, the existence of military plans given to ÇAKO by the Italian spy in the service of the Americans, DE AGOSTINI. This fact was confirmed by ÇAKO himself. However, due to the secret nature of these documents, the court session was held behind closed doors. All these facts reveal with the greatest evidence the hostile activities of the Italian Government against the People's Republic of ALBANIA. The Italian Government, following the orders of the Americans, and in cooperation with the war criminals and the British, Greek and Yugoslav secret services, attempts to overthrow our power.

Greek Intelligence Activities

In its wide net of spies, Greek intelligence also tries to perform its designs to the prejudice of ALBANIA. Greek intelligence works in close cooperation with the American, British, Italian and Yugoslav agencies, and keeps in its employ, several criminals of BALLI KOMBETAR. There is a clear indication that the Americans have agreed to the cession of Southern ALBANIA to GREECE. Now it is up to the subversives of the BALLI to work in order to realize the dreams of the Greek chauvinists. In regard to this, Eton ÇAKO made the following statement, "The leaders of the BALLI were considering the American project of ceding Korce and Gjino-kastor to GREECE, and since this was the American decision, we had nothing to do but approve of it. However, for political reasons, this decision had to be kept secret".

"An exhaustive explanation about the agreements between the leaders of BALLI and the Greeks was given to me by Hasan DOSTI in 1946, when I was destined to go to GREECE". In his statements, Eton ÇAKO stressed the connections of BALLI with the Greek intelligence service. "The conversations with the Greeks", said ÇAKO, "took place in Rome, at the Greek Legation, and in Athens with personalities of the Greek Government, among whom I recall one FIPINELIS, of the Foreign Office. Negotiations were initiated early in 1946 and came to a conclusion in September of the same year. At that time, a special envoy of the Greek Government by the name of Kostas HIMARJOS, came to the Greek Legation. His conversations with Midhat FRASHERI, Hasan DOSTI, and Lec KURTI were conducted secretly.

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HIMARJOS accepted the following terms: 1) the Greek Government agreed to put at our disposal the entire border line for future operations, under certain conditions, among which I remember were those: all the subversive activities of our groups had to be controlled and supervised by the Greeks; groups entering Albanian territory must refrain from any propaganda against the intentions of the Greek Government concerning southern ALBANIA; all the Albanian groups sent into Albanian territory through the Greek border pledged themselves, upon their return, to furnish the Greek Secret Service with all available information concerning ALBANIA. As a counterpart, GREECE agreed to establish bases at Korfu, Janina, Kostur, or Follonia, to be used by DALLI KOMETAR. The conversations were secret, however, and I learned their contents from Hasan DOSTI, due to the fact that I was chosen as the man in charge of the base at Janina. DOSTI added that I was to collaborate with a Major ZAHARIADHIS; one Miltiadh MUCO (who prior to 1939, was in the Greek Consulate at GjinoKaster), and some other persons whose names I do not recall. Hasan DOSTI explained that the task of the Janina base was to prepare and send agents into ALBANIA, where they would carry on propaganda against the Government at Tirane, and spreading the rumor that its days were numbered because it was not liked by the Anglo-Americans, and that it would be attacked by GREECE soon. In addition, these groups had instructions to murder prominent members of the Government, in doing so, create a panic and a state of uneasiness all over the country; to perform sabotage by destroying depots, bridges, etc.; set fire to vital installations, etc. Furthermore, these agents were instructed to pick up any information on the military, political, and economic situations in ALBANIA. To secure false identification papers, they had to kill innocent peasants and grab their documents".

For unknown reasons, Eton ÇAKO was not sent to GREECE. Eton ÇAKO was aware of the fact that, in 1946, one Musa KRAJA had been sent to ALBANIA from the base at Korfu by Eski RUSHITI and MUZAQITIS, a Greek lieutenant colonel. Musa KRAJA was given orders by Hasan DOSTI to meet one Izet VRAZHDO in ALBANIA, who was at large in the region of Kurvclosh. Once together, their task was to set up sabotage work. However, this mission failed because Musa KRAJA returned from ALBANIA soon after he met Izet VRAZHDO there.

Eton ÇAKO also related about another group formed by Eski RUSHITI, MUZAQITI, Dhimitër MAKSA KULLI, and PANARITIS, who were sent to ALBANIA. This group murdered Kico HAQE, and were attacked by the Border Guards leaving 4 dead, 6 wounded, and 4 prisoners in our hands. Eton ÇAKO also explained about the anti-patriotic activities of DALLI KOMETAR in relation to the territorial integrity of ALBANIA along the Greek border. He stated, "The Americans gave us directives to obtain evidence against the Albanian Government and report it to the Inquiring Commission. To this end, Midhat FRASHERI assigned to me the task of preparing a document in which it stated that the Albanian Government shipped war material to the Greek Communists. I accepted this job, asking to know some particulars concerning the concentration of Greek troops along the border. Then Midhat FRASHERI gave me a letter for Kosta HIMARJOS at the Greek location in Rome". ÇAKO went on explaining how he met Jani GJKA and how they worked in the home of HIMARJOS on the important document which had to be submitted to the Inquiring Commission.

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Other contacts between BALLI and the Greeks occurred in 1945, when Midhat FRASHERI went to Athens with a diplomatic passport issued by the Italian Government. In Athens, FRASHERI met an official of that Foreign Office, PIPINELIS, and a lawyer, Vangjol QIRKO who was later sent to Rome by the Greek Ministry of the Interior. In Rome, QIRKO met the Albanian criminals and on 26 November, he delivered a speech to them full of hope in the "liberation" of ALBANIA.

The representatives of BALLI in GREECE are led by Abas BERMENI, the greatest criminal of them all. He receives 1,500,000 drachmas per month.

Activities of the Yugoslav Intelligence Service

The gang of Eten CAKO revealed once again the links existing between RANKOVIC's secret service and the imperialists. The representative of the Yugoslav Intelligence in this group was Llukran LUFTIU, who lived in GREECE since 1945, after having escaped from Kosovo. From GREECE he was sent to the Italian camps by the Americans. These camps were where the other Albanian criminals were confined. There, Llukran LUFTIU joined the ranks of BALLI KOMBETAR. In 1946, he was engaged by TITO's agent Doqir MALOKU, an ex-colonel in the Royal Yugoslav Army, and "questore" under the Italians at Gjakova. LUFTIU signed the contract of engagement, took the cover name of "VARDARI" and adopted the password "ZASTAVA". He received a sum of money and continued his activities in the service of TITO's government. In 1948, Qenan HYSKA, a member of BALLI, advised LUFTIU to attend an intelligence training course at the termination of which he would be dropped by parachute into ALBANIA. Upon the approval of his Titoist master, Lluk CUNI, LUFTIU signed the contract binding him to collaborate with the American Secret Service for a period of ten years. He completed the training course and in due time was dropped into ALBANIA in company with other spies who also had made arrangements with TITO's clique. LUFTIU stated that all the activities conducted by RANKOVIC's agents along the Albanian borders; all the provocations and propaganda, are created by order of the American masters.

The trial also revealed the activities of King ZOG and BALLI in their combined efforts against the Albanian Republic, under the orders of foreign powers. A conference was held at Cairo, where ZOG stated that the Greek Government had agreed to the concentration of Albanian refugees in Greek territory, from where they might start an attack against ALBANIA. Eten CAKO also described the kind of propaganda made by BALLI and consisting of false statements tending to prove that BALLI had fought the occupiers of ALBANIA.

While discussions were in progress at the U.N. concerning the acceptance of ALBANIA as a member, these falsities were also submitted to the Secretary of the U.N., in an attempt to deny the entry of ALBANIA into that organization. Witnesses at the trial furnished ample evidence of the crimes committed by these spies during the war when they fought against the people in the ranks of BALLI KOMBETAR, and for the powers in occupation.

The counsel for defense, acknowledging the guilt of the defendants, appealed to the court for clemency, and so did the defendants themselves, who

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pleaded guilty and admitted all their crimes and treason in detailed statements. On the basis of incontestable evidence obtained, and pursuant to Articles 4 and 5 of Law No. 372, dated 12 December 1946, concerning the crimes committed against the people and the State, the High Court-Martial sentenced the three spies to death by shooting.

The Albanian people were indignant against the spies and their masters, who are the sworn enemies of our country, since this has been confirmed by their criminal deeds.

* * * * *

2. Some time ago it was reported in ALBANIA that the Western Powers had instructed the Greeks not to cross the Albanian frontier in their pursuit of Greek rebels. For a number of soldiers, this made desertion into GREECE morally permissible and irresistibly tempting. It was permissible because so long as there was no danger of invasion, they no longer felt bound to hold themselves in readiness for the defense of their country; and it was tempting because the prospect of rescue from Enver HECHEA's regime suddenly became more remote. Some of these deserters who were questioned by United Nations observers reported that the military authorities are having increasing difficulty in preserving discipline.

For the Communists in ALBANIA, the threat from GREECE is extremely convenient, because it procures for them support of anti-Communists who hate the Greeks more. From the nationalistic point of view, the policy of provoking GREECE is disastrous, because it alienates sympathy in the matter of the Greek claims in Southern ALBANIA. Four times in forty years, international commissions established and confirmed the frontier where it is now; yet, all this may go for nothing if the whole Western world sides in with GREECE against so ill-behaved a neighbor. In ZOG's time, when relations with GREECE were secure in comparison to today, Greek claims on what they called "Northern Epirus" appealed to a limited section of the Greeks and to no one else.

3. Recently a press report of unknown reliability from Rome states that Marshal TITO is making his own arrangements for the "liberation" of ALBANIA, and has set up a rival "Liberation Committee" in Belgrade. The Chairman of this committee is said to be Gani KRYEZIU, brother of Said, who recently finished serving a five year prison sentence for the offense of fighting the Germans in Kosovo without placing himself under the orders of the local Yugoslav partisans. It is reported that another member of the committee is Can Elezi NDEBU, who with his sixteen sons, played an active part during the war around Dibra (Debar); the Germans burned his house, after a battle, for harboring Colonel Peter KEMP (a member of a British Mission in ALBANIA at that time). If this report is true, it is interesting that a tribal chieftain fleeing from Communist ALBANIA should now be a welcome refugee in professedly anti-Communist YUGOSLAVIA.

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A Survey of ALBANIA (cont'd)

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At present, Enver HOXHA is faced with starvation, incipient mutiny, and isolation, while his prospective successors make their preparations on foreign soil. It was expected in some quarters that in these circumstances he would make his peace with TITO; but this he evidently could not or would not do, for the Yugoslavs gave as their reasons for denouncing the Treaty of Friendship with ALBANIA last November that the Albanians had not only created border incidents, but had rejected an offer from YUGOSLAVIA to resume economic cooperation. Enver HOXHA has taken another course, it appears, and has set afoot a reconciliation with ITALY, thus bringing the wheel a full circle to the situation twenty five years ago.

However, this time it is a different ITALY to be dealt with — democratic, peaceful, and not entirely free from the danger of Communism. It may be, of course, that the Russians are purposely allowing ALBANIA to be maintained at someone else's expense, but will want to make use of her at a later date. Meanwhile, HOXHA must reach some sort of arrangement with ITALY to procure aid as quickly as possible, in order not to force the Soviet hand in demanding that they send him supplies. ALBANIA has much to offer ITALY in exchange for her patronage. Oil is being produced in greater quantities than before from the wells of Kucove; and the chrome, copper and coal are also better developed than they were the last time ITALY was interested in ALBANIA. A benevolent and unaggressive ITALY is now, indeed, the obvious and proper country to be ALBANIA's patron, to their mutual advantage. The two countries have already exchanged ministers, and Count SPORZA has expressed in the Italian Parliament his country's disposition toward maintaining ALBANIA's independence.

4. Possibilities of Revolt

It is interesting to speculate on the chances of a successful revolt in ALBANIA. Before the TITO-Cominform split, it seemed quite obvious that any such enterprise would be suppressed by the Yugoslav Army. For a year after that, there was some probability that RUSSIA would bestir herself to protect the Albanian regime. It seems likely that the people at large are not so much interested in the dispute between the two brands of Communism, as they are in getting rid of all Communists whatever, both TITO's and STALIN's types.

The bare possibility of a successful rebellion has greatly encouraged the Albanian exiles. Some of the more naive, weary of exile, decided to return home, where they were promptly arrested. Others, in accordance with Albanian political tradition, swallowed their differences and formed a new movement of liberation. The leader of this movement was the elderly, literary man of Western culture and unblemished ideals, Mihal SHASHERI. At one time he was Minister in Athons, but gave up his diplomatic career because of a disagreement with King ZOG. He then operated a bookshop in Tirano, under the name of "Tumo SKENDER". He gave encouragement to young students, and his burning love for his country made him an inspiration to Albanian youth. During the war, he founded a republican resistance movement, BASHI KOMITETAR (National Front), and for a time, actually took to the moun-

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A Survey of ALBANIA (cont'd)

Page 102

DALLI, which combined most of the best republican elements in the country, was militarily defeated by the Communists (who used weapons and supplies given to them by the Allies to defeat their future political enemies, although they were killing more Germans than the DALLI), forced into a measure of collaboration with the Germans during their occupation, and due to this, they were discredited. Midhat FRASHERI and a hundred of his followers retired into ITALY, where he never ceased to work for the well being of his fellow exiles, and toward the eventual liberation of his country. In August 1949, he succeeded at last in forming a united movement.

FRASHERI had four colleagues in the Executive Committee of the movement. One of them was Major Abas KUPI, the military leader of the Royalist "LEGALITARI" Party. Another, Zef PALI, a Roman Catholic who was a teacher from Shkoder. A third, the son of Kostaq KOTTA, one of ZOG's prime ministers who died recently in a Communist prison. Finally, Said KRYEZIU leads a party calling themselves Social Democrats, combining the younger and more progressive elements among the exiles. Said Day is the younger brother of the better known Gani KRYEZIU, and also of the late Gema Day, brother-in-law of King ZOG. Gani and Said fought the Germans on the Kossovo frontier until they were sabotaged by the Communists.

The Committee paid a visit to London towards the end of August 1949, going on to Washington in September. Returning to ITALY, the Committee left its leader behind to open permanent offices in the UNITED STATES. The movement then sustained a terrible blow, for the universally loved and respected Midhat FRASHERI, who was sixty nine, died suddenly on 3 October 1949.

Midhat Day's own party, DALLI KOMUNISTAR, promptly appointed as its new leader, Hasan DOSFI. He was also the DALLI representative on the Executive Committee. DOSFI, however, does not enjoy the same reputation as an "older statesman" as did FRASHERI, and the Committee was unwilling to accept him as its president. For the moment, the Chairmanship of the Committee is to rotate among its members, thus probably playing into the hands of King ZOG (now living in exile in Alexandria), since no other element in the movement has produced as yet a leader of comparable standing.

As far as active resistance groups within ALBANIA are concerned, it is difficult to estimate their strength, but it is known that some pockets of resistance do exist. Many small clashes between guerrillas and Communist authorities have been reported during the past few months (Jan 1950). Guerrillas are reportedly carrying on armed resistance in the hills of the so-called Mirdita Zone (YUGOSLAVIA, 1,100,000, Sheet Y-45, from 309100 to 400090). Rumors spread among the people have listed Gen ELEZI, Gen HABILI, Colonel Sulo BANUSHI, and some relatives of Prince Gjoni Marka GJONI as the leaders of the anti-Communist resistance. On 5 March 1950, a clash between anti-Communist resistance forces and "Sigurimi" units is reported to have taken place in the vicinity of Wilot. Allegedly there was a number of casualties on both sides.

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A Survey of ALBANIA (cont'd)

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It is rather apparent that any successful revolt in ALBANIA today must develop out of a combination of forces rather than sporadic outbursts which serve to minimize the main effort. An almost impossible situation exists today in comparison to the times during 1943-44 when efforts were expended in trying to consolidate a single movement against the Italians and later, the Germans. Then, there were semblances of resistance groups, which, if brought together under a single leader or group, could have done a great deal more than was actually accomplished. Today, it is difficult to ascertain the scope of the resistance movement; who are the leaders involved; where the groups operate; and what chances exist to consolidate them. Any underground movement would require a leader or leaders of such stature that any problems involved in developing a successful movement would have a fair opportunity for solution. It is doubtful that any such resistance leaders exist in ALBANIA today. The best elements are in exile, and thus, the problems of revolt, on a successful plane, are multiplied.

Therefore, the only alternative which could serve to eliminate the present regime would be the repercussion of a Third World War in which the Atlantic Powers were successful. Should a revolution begin in ALBANIA, it is more than likely that Russian or Bulgarian troops would be on the scene within a reasonable time, since these troops would have to cross either Greek or Yugoslav territory. Such a revolution would then serve as the prelude to a third world war.

Burton J. Rain
BURTON J. RAIN
Special Agent, CIO

Dino Merione
DINO MERIONE
Special Agent, CIO

APPROVED:

Leo J. Pagotta
LEO J. PAGOTTA
Operations Officer
For the Commanding Officer

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A Survey of ALBANIA (contd)

7 August 1950
Ref. No. M-903-5

ANNEX "A"

SUBJECT: MARA, Petrit (Albanian Refugee)

1. The following military information was obtained from SUBJECT who is presently under interrogation by this Office:
(F-6)

2. Military Information:

The present strength of the Albanian regular army is estimated approximately to 90,000 men (including the Sigurimit division). This information was casually given to MARA, Petrit by Major ASLLANI, Bego from Valona, attached to the general staff of the Albanian Army in Tirana. Same information has reportedly been confirmed to MARA, Petrit by Capt. SELMANI, Nuri, a political commissar presently attached to a battalion stationed in Permet.

On 25 April 1950, a considerable movement of Albanian troops has been noticed in ALBANIA; these troops came from Tirana and Elbasan and proceeded to the following localities in north-eastern ALBANIA: Kukes, Puke, Zogaj, and Shkoder. The strength of these troops was approximately 15,000 men, all Albanians. Immediately after the movements were completed, Major General BALLUKU, Beqir, Chief of the Albanian General Staff, inspected the troops and their new quarters, together with a Russian general.

The divisions of the Albanian Army and their respective headquarters are stationed in the following localities:

1st Division - Tirana (Barracks "Ali Riza" and Spital Rd.)

2nd Division - Korce

3rd Division - Gjinoaster

4th Division - Shkoder
(also Sigurimit units included)

The commander of the 1st Division stationed in Tirana is Colonel CAKO, Hito; the commander of the Tirana garrison, Major General MOISIU, Spiro; the commander of the Durazzo garrison, Colonel SPAHIU, Muhamer. At least 80 per cent of the equipment of the Albanian Army is Russian material, the remnant Yugoslav. The type of uniform is the same as that of the Russian army: gray color; military tunic worn outside the trousers, with

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Ref. No. M-903-5 dated 7 August 1950 (contd)

Page 2

belt; shirt, of Russian make; trousers of the skier type. This is the summer dress, of cotton. The winter dress is also gray, with tunic and long trousers. The officers' uniform is like the Russians: all wear black top boots. Rank badges are worn on the epaulets, both by officers and enlisted men; the former wear stiff epaulets and the latter limp ones.

There are no Russian units in ALBANIA; however, there are approximately 50 Russian officers ranking from major to general; they are employed as instructors of the Albanian army, and belong to the Russian Military Mission in ALBANIA.

The Russian technical staff in ALBANIA may be estimated to 3000 - 5000 persons, stationed in all major industries, shipyards, mechanical works, etc. The headquarters of the Russian Military Mission is located in Tirana, Durrës Street, near the Russian legation. The Chief of the Mission is General SOKOLOV. TCHUVAHIN, Dimitri is the Soviet plenipotentiary in ALBANIA. Russian officers are always active; they keep Albanian drivers with them, armed with pistols; however, TCHUVAHIN's driver is Russian. In each Albanian division, or regiment, there are Russian officers as "instructors"; they give orders and supervise any activities of the Albanian army. Within the Albanian army there is also a Political Office, headed by Major General KAPO, Hyari (Albanian). In the same office there is a Soviet general who dictates all the policies. There are also many Russian physicians in the civil and military hospitals. There are approximately 100 Russian advisers among all the ministries, planning commissions and control commissions in ALBANIA. In addition, there are also an estimated 200 German technicians. A German ex-colonel, who is an engineer specialized in repair work and spare parts of plane engines, works in the plant "Enver" at Tirana. Soviet technicians get a monthly pay of 13,000 to 25,000 lek; in addition, they are issued with special cards for food and clothing. A Soviet engineer gets from 25,000 to 38,000 lek per month; a physician, 35,000 to 50,000 lek; an Albanian technician earns a monthly salary not exceeding 5,000 lek; an Albanian physician 6,000 to 7,000 lek.

The airfields in full efficiency are: Tirana and Valona. Tirana is connected with Moscow with the regular air line Moscow-Budapest-Belgrade-Sofia-Tirana. On the Tirana airfield there is always a heavy bomber (Russian, three-engines); this plane takes off from Tirana at irregular times and returns to the base within the same day of departure or on the day after, at the latest. The plane coming to Tirana from Moscow is Hungarian and so are the pilots, who belong to the Civil Airlines. A Soviet civilian plane also arrives in Tirana from Prague on a regular weekly service. This plane carries civilian personnel. The runway of the

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Ref. No. M-903-5 dated 7 August 1950 (contd)

Page 3

Tirana and Valona airfields is made of concrete and is 1200 to 1500 meters long; the airfields are provided with modern hangars, signal and wireless installations. In Tirana, the ground personnel number approximately 200 persons, all Albanian, including the officers. There are approximately 260 Albanian pilots, all officers with ranks varying from second lieutenant to major. The uniform is like that of the Russian fliers. The Albanian pilots have been trained, and are still being trained, at Baku, RUSSIA.

Albanian Army:

The Albanian army effects maneuvers once a month, employing one regiment at a time. The localities where these drillings take place are: Dajiti, Qafe Shtambe, Qafe Krabe, Krve, Karaburun and along the Yugoslav frontier on the northeastern part of ALBANIA. The armament used in these maneuvers is a secondary one, the weapons being constituted of machine guns, sub-machine guns, light artillery and mortars, anti-tank and anti-aircraft guns. 80 per cent of these weapons are Russian, the remnant German, Italian and Yugoslav. Maneuvers on a wider scale occur three times in a year, involving the participation of the divisions, in rotation. On these occasions, the Russian military mission is represented by 2 or 3 high ranking officers.

New fortifications are being built along the Yugoslav northeastern frontier, precisely, in the localities of Kraja, Kures, Puke and Peshkopia; the reason: fear of Yugoslav attacks. Laborers employed in these works are all Albanian; the technicians are Albanian and Russian. The concrete used in these works comes from POLAND and CZECHOSLOVAKIA.

On the Island of Saseno, there is a garrison of approximately 2,000 to 3,000 men, all Albanian and belonging to various branches of the army and navy. It is not known if there are any submarine bases at Saseno. In regard to submarines, it has been learned that, after the Cominform Resolution against TITO, some Soviet submarines made their appearance in the Albanian waters, and they even entered the ports of Durazzo and Valona, staying there for a short time. During the current year, from January to April, Soviet submarines have also been noticed three or four times in Valona and Durazzo. There are no new fortifications along the coast, however, the existing installations are continually repaired and improved.

The zone of Porto Palermo has been placed off limits to everybody, having been declared military area. Works are in progress there; however, no indication as to the nature of such works has been disclosed. The possibility exists that the works consist of submarine pens or installations for long-range weapons.

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Ref. No. M-903-5 dated 7 August 1950 (contd)

Page 4

In ALBANIA, there are large ammo depots; Source recalls those of Ali Riza (Tirana Barracks) on Durrës Street; those of the Truck Pool, near the Tirana airfield, and the ammo depots in Valona (near the barracks). There are food supply depots in Tirana (near the tomb of the queen mother); in Durazzo (near the playground); in Valona (port area); in Shkoder (behind the hospital); and in Korce (Boulevard Emistokli Germani, at the end, right).

Conditions of roads are very poor; at present, the construction of an asphalted road is in progress between Tirana and Shkoder; the road is presently completed to Ura and Zeze, 35 km. from Tirana.

Source is not aware of any amphibious maneuvers, past or present, conducted by Albanian troops.

The Greek Partisans left ALBANIA in three groups, during the month of March 1950. It is believed that the amount of men involved did not exceed 10,000 men. They were concentrated at Libri, zhdi, Burel and Cyril (Lizha e Elbasanit) with their families; they all belonged to combat units and were equipped with war materials and cattle. They left ALBANIA via Durazzo on board Russian and Roumanian boats. Before their departure, they were disarmed and all their armament remained in the hands of the Albanian government. At present, there are approximately 1000 Greeks in ALBANIA, including children and old people. However, there are still some Greek Partisans, who are continually crossing the border into GREECE and return to ALBANIA very often. The exact number of these Partisans is unknown; they are causing incidents and probably act as Informants; they are dressed in civilian clothes. There are even some Greek Partisan officers left in Tirana; one of them has often been seen at the Hotel Dajti in the company of members of the Albanian Central Committee, among which is one ALIJA, Ramiz.

"Resistance" movements are almost insignificant; it is rumored that Colonel BAJRAKTARI, Muharrem is at present in ALBANIA.

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Possible invasion routes into ALBANIA





CHART I
A SURVEY OF ALBANIA

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
BREAKDOWN OF SOVIET MILITARY MISSION AND ALBANIAN WAR MINISTRY



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BREAKDOWN OF SOVIET MILITARY MISSION AND ALBANIAN NATIONAL DEFENSE DIVISION




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EXHIBIT "III"
A SURVEY OF ALBANIA

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BREAKDOWN OF SOVIET MILITARY MISSION AND ALBANIAN NAVAL HEAD QUARTERS IN VALONA




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
EXHIBIT "IV"
A SURVEY OF ALBANIA

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PORTS OF VALONA AND DURAZZO



VALONA BAY AND OIL PIPELINE
(PIPELINE, 74 KM, DIAMETER 200 MM, CAPACITY 1000 TONS DAILY)
(UNDERWATER PIPELINE, LENGTH 250M, DIAMETER 250 MM, CAPACITY 600 TONS PER HOUR)



DURAZZO PORT
WATER SURFACE 86 HECTARES, 1050 METRES OF BEACH TO THE WEST; IN THE CENTER SMALL AND MEDIUM PIERS, 840M LONG; A 250 M LONG BREAKWATER TO THE SOUTH, 828 M LARGE PIER TO THE WEST, 920 M LANDING QUAY IN THE CENTER; DEPTH 6,48 M NORTH-EAST OF THE QUAY.


(LEGEND TO DRAWING OF DURAZZO PORT)

- MOLO DI PONENTE — WESTERN PIER
- MOLO DI LEVANTE — EASTERN PIER
- ATTRACCO GRANDI NAVE — LANDING QUAYS FOR LARGE SHIPS
- MOLO DI MEZZOGIORNO — SOUTHERN PIER

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ALBANIA

RELIEF MAP OF ALBANIA AND DIVISION OF THE TERRITORIAL SURFACE




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ALBANIA CLIMATE

MEDIUM TEMPERATURE DURING THE PERIOD BETWEEN 1851 and 1900 (Compiled by HANN and CONRAD)



	BERAT	SHKRELL	ELBASAN	BIERRE	PELA	SOFTIAN	TIRANA	VALONA
LONGITUDE EAST	19°47'	19°27'	20°4'	20°47'	19°54'	20°36'	19°49'	19°29'
LATITUDE NORTH	40°42'	41°19'	41°0'	41°31'	39°3'	40°4'	41°19'	40°20'
HEIGHT IN METRES	60	7	130	603	661	13	114	10
JANUARY	4,1	3,3	4,0	4,0	1,0	4,4	3,3	3,0
FEBRUARY	7,0	6,9	7,2	6,4	1,4	5,9	6,7	6,7
MARCH	14,1	11,0	10,2	7,1	4,0	9,5	9,0	11,0
APRIL	13,9	14,3	14,3	11,3	10,1	14,4	13,8	13,8
MAY	16,1	16,3	17,4	16,1	12,0	19,4	19,7	19,8
JUNE	21,3	22,2	19,0	18,0	17,5	22,3	21,0	22,7
JULY	24,1	24,0	20,0	21,4	21,2	22,1	22,3	24,0
AUGUST	23,0	24,3	20,2	21,5	21,2	22,1	22,3	24,0
SEPTEMBER	20,1	21,4	20,2	17,9	16,2	22,9	19,6	21,7
OCTOBER	16,2	17,0	15,3	13,5	11,3	16,1	15,5	15,3
NOVEMBER	10,4	12,0	11,0	9,2	9,2	10,3	10,1	13,0
DECEMBER	7,7	8,3	7,4	6,0	4,1	6,0	7,0	10,1
ALL YEAR (AVERAGE)	14,5	15,1	15,1	12,5	10,6	14,9	14,3	16,6

AVERAGE NUMBER OF RAINY DAYS

	BERAT	SHKRELL	ELBASAN	BIERRE	PELA	SOFTIAN	TIRANA	VALONA
JANUARY	13	13	10	11	9	8	11	9
FEBRUARY	6	13	10	14	8	9	10	12
MARCH	5	5	3	6	6	7	6	7
APRIL	17	4	7	7	7	5	9	6
MAY	7	8	8	13	13	12	11	8
JUNE	2	3	3	10	11	7	9	6
JULY	1	1	2	1	2	2	3	1
AUGUST	5	2	0	6	4	1	3	4
SEPTEMBER	3	1	2	3	3	3	2	2
OCTOBER	9	14	11	13	10	12	10	11
NOVEMBER	17	15	20	14	17	17	20	20
DECEMBER	12	20	16	12	17	16	21	20
ALL YEAR AVERAGE	97	99	103	109	106	102	100	99

AVERAGE MONTHLY TEMPERATURE IN TIRANA

JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP
MAX MIN	MAX MIN	MAX MIN	MAX MIN	MAX MIN	MAX MIN	MAX MIN	MAX MIN	MAX MIN
10 -7	20 -9	27 -6	27 -1	31 4,5	36 9,2	37 14,1	28,5 13,3	20 6
AVERAGE MONTHLY								
6,4	6,3	9,9	12,1	17,9	21,2	24,2	24,2	21,2

OCT	NOV	DEC
MAX MIN	MAX MIN	MAX MIN
24,5 2	22,4 0	20 -6
AVERAGE MONTHLY		
10,4	11,6	9,3

NOTE: PLEASE SUBSTITUTE DECIMAL POINTS WHERE COMMAS APPEAR IN THE ABOVE TABLES-


PRECIPITATION IN MILLIMETERS

A SURVEY OF ALBANIA - EXHIBIT "VM"

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ALBANIA



MINERALS

THE NUMBERS CORRESPOND TO THE LOCATIONS AS PER ATTACHED GEOLOGICAL MAP.

- IRON PYRITES, COPRITES, AND PYRITES: 1, 2, 3, 4; BRAKATHIVET-5; KAMENIZIA-6, 7, 8, 9, 10 (46.50% IRON, 53.50% SULPHUR); 11, 12; RENOVA, VITUS-13; RENOVA, LUBONIA-14 (40% IRON, 13.5% COPPER AND NICKEL); 15
- BAURITE: 16 - KUITZA, 48% METAL
- MAGNESITE AND ARABGHITE: 23 OPARI
- LIGHTITE: 17, 18; OKUK - 19; MBOVIA, DRENOVA, AND DRENOVA BOBOTICE; 20, 21, 22 ERABA PASS; 23 MEBALIA; 24 PRITUMENTI, 25, 26, 27
- BITUMEN: 28 SELENIZIA-NATURAL BITUMEN WITH 70-80% HYDROCARBON, SOLUBLE IN CARBON SULPHUR; FURNACE BITUMEN WITH 80-90% HEAVY BITUMEN OR "JAVOR" FOR COMBUSTIBLES; 21, 22, 23, 24 - THROUGH HYDROGEN PROCESSING COMBINED WITH HIGH TEMPERATURES AND PRESSURE, AN 80% OCTANE IS OBTAINED.
- OIL: 21, 22, 23, 24

MINERAL PRODUCTION IN 1938

"SOCIETA ITALIANA MINIERE DI SELENIZIA" (ITALIAN COMPANY OF SELENIZIA MINING): 12, 800 TONS OF NATURAL BITUMEN FOR: PAVING, BITUMENOUS FELDS, ANTI-RUST VARNISH, AND HIGHWAY CONSTRUCTION

"AZIENDA ITALIANA PETROLI ALBANESE" (ITALIAN ALBANIAN PETROL COMPANY): UP TO 31 DEC 1938: WELLS DRILLED BY MEANS OF "ROTARY" DRILLING EQUIPMENT. 308,832 METRES PERFORATED (BASE DEPTH VARYING FROM A MINIMUM OF 500 METRES TO A MAXIMUM OF 900 M. PROCEDURE - EAST TO WEST.

IN 1938: 148 WELLS CONSTRUCTED
101,902.00 METRES PERFORATED

PRODUCTION - TO 31 DEC 1938: 224,700 TONS OF WHICH 216,870 TONS WERE EXPORTED
IN 1938: 128,850 TONS OF WHICH 117,428 TONS WERE EXPORTED.

NOTE: ALBANIA IS GEOLOGICALLY FORMED OF RECENT ROCKS, COMPRISED MAINLY OF CALCAREOUS OF THE MESOZOIC AND ALLUVIAL CLAYS OF THE PRESENT PERIOD.
ERUPTIVE ROCKS OF THE EOCENE: SERPENTINE STONE AND DIABASE EMERGE.

A SURVEY OF ALBANIA

EXHIBIT "X"

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
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ALBANIA HYDROGRAPHY

AREA OF THE PRINCIPAL FRESH WATER LAKES (PARTLY BELONGING TO ALBANIA)

SCUTARI (SKADARSKO) LAKE	36,173	HECTARES
OCHRIDA (KOHIMOSKO) LAKE	31,100	"
PRESBA (PRESPIANSKO) LAKE	30,918	"

TOTAL AREA OF WATERS (LAKES, MARSHES, COASTAL LAGOONS) WITHIN THE POLITICAL BORDERS OF ALBANIA: 136,000 HECTARES



AREA OF THE PRINCIPAL DRAINAGE BASINS (SOLELY WITHIN ALBANIAN TERRITORY)

№	BASIN	LENGTH (KM) OF PRINCIPAL RIVERS	AREA OF BASIN IN HECTARES
1	SCUTARI LAKE AND BOJANA RIVER BASIN	44	161,301
2	COAST BETWEEN BOJANA AND DRIN	—	8,910
3	DRIN RIVER BASIN (ALBANIA)	280	984,209
4	COAST BETWEEN DRIN AND MATI RIVERS	—	12,714
5	MATI RIVER BASIN	104	240,480
6	COAST BETWEEN MATI AND ISMI	—	29,480
7	ISMI RIVER BASIN	70	89,303
8	COAST BETWEEN ISMI AND ARZEN	—	29,448
9	ARZEN RIVER BASIN	80	77,806
10	COAST BETWEEN ARZEN AND SCUMBI	—	29,887
11	SCUMBI RIVER BASIN	147	127,888
12	COAST BETWEEN SCUMBI AND SEMENI AND KRAVASTA MARSHES	—	86,887
13	SEMENI BASIN (ALBANIA)	292	906,929
14	COAST BETWEEN SEMENI AND VOIUSSA	—	30,164
15	VOIUSSA RIVER BASIN	227	426,886
16	LAGOON AND BAY OF VALORA	—	48,884
17	COAST BETWEEN CAP LINGUETTA AND BUTRINTO BAY	—	20,259
18	KALASA BASIN AND BUTRINTO LAGOON	—	88,817
19	PAULA BASIN	—	23,888
20	COAST BETWEEN PAULA AND PRELIA	—	988
21	BASIN BETWEEN PRELIA AND POINT IGOE	—	3,871
22	LIN RIVER BASIN (ALBANIA)	—	18,881
23	BASIN OF PRESBA LAKE (ALBANIA)	—	20,248
24	BASIN OF VISTRIEZA	—	1,881
TOTAL SURFACE OF ALBANIA			* 2,874,247

* ACCORDING TO OFFICIAL ALBANIAN STATISTICS, THE TERRITORIAL SURFACE OF ALBANIA AMOUNTS TO 2,789,000 HECTARES

ESTIMATE OF THE EXPLOITATION OF ALBANIAN RIVERS:

SEMENI-DEVOLI RIVERS	: 25,000	HP
DRIN (WHITE AND BLACK)	: 18,000	HP
SCUMBI AND ARZEN RIVERS	: 8,000	HP

LEGEND: DIVIDED BETWEEN DRAINAGE BASINS AND RIVER SYSTEMS.

EXHIBIT " IX "

A SURVEY OF ALBANIA

SECRET

ALBANIA

AGRICULTURE AND FORESTS (SURFACE)

STATISTICS OF 1956-1957

QUANTITY	SURFACE IN HECTARES	% OF SURFACE	GROUND, CULTIVATED WITH	SURFACE	%
CULTIVATED GROUND	331,478	12	WHEAT	40,084	12.4
GROUND CAPABLE OF USE FOR AGRICULTURE	301,918	11	BARLEY	7,810	2.3
PASTURES	826,140	30	OATS	11,817	3.5
FORESTS & WOODS	991,268	36	SPELT	1,861	0.6
LAKES & PONDS	15,680	5	RYE	3,580	1.1
NON PRODUCTIVE	165,228	6	CORN	91,976	27.8
TOTAL SURFACE	7,538,000	100	RICE	427	0.1
			VEGETABLES (LEGUMINOUS)	955	0.2
			VETCH, LENTIL	1,796	0.5
			MEDICAL HERBS	727	0.2
			COTTON AND FLAX	208	0.1
			TOBACCO	2,063	0.6
			POTATOES	806	0.2
			ONIONS AND TOMATOES	1,231	0.4
			WATER-MELONS	1,104	0.3
			VINEYARDS	3,955	1.2
			MEADOWS AND OTHER FORAGE CULTURES	161,552	48.5
			TILLED GROUND	331,456	100.0

SCUTARI DISTRICT:

WHEAT	33	30 KM.
BARLEY, OATS	6	
CORN	91	
TOBACCO	8	
POTATOES	1	
VINEYARDS	1	
RYE	3	
FORAGE CULTURES	445	
TILLED GROUND	968	

PASTURES, WOODS, FORESTS, NON PRODUCTIVE 4,294 SQ. KM.

KOSSOVO (KURRESI) DISTRICT:

WHEAT	5	50 KM.
BARLEY, OATS	8	
CORN	26	
TOBACCO	0.5	
POTATOES	1	
VINEYARDS	0.2	
RYE	4.3	
FORAGE CULTURES	129	
TILLED GROUND	175	

PASTURES, WOODS, FORESTS, NON PRODUCTIVE 1,940 SQ. KM.

DURAZZO DISTRICT:

WHEAT	10	30
BARLEY, OATS	4	15
CORN	64	111
TOBACCO	1	1
POTATOES	4	1
VINEYARDS	1	1
RYE	3	3
FORAGE CULTURES	113	302
TILLED GROUND	307	373

PASTURES, WOODS, FORESTS, NON PRODUCTIVE 2,900 SQ. KM.

TIRANA DISTRICT:

WHEAT	4	24
BARLEY, OATS	6	101
CORN	24	4
TOBACCO	1	3
POTATOES	2	0.8
VINEYARDS	0.8	0.8
RYE	2	2
FORAGE CULTURES	95.8	184
TILLED GROUND	123	184

PASTURES, WOODS, FORESTS, NON PRODUCTIVE 2,700 SQ. KM.

ELBASAN DISTRICT:

WHEAT	68	20
BARLEY, OATS	81	41
CORN	237	82
TOBACCO	4	1
POTATOES	4	1
VINEYARDS	3	1
RYE	3	1
FORAGE CULTURES	128	160
TILLED GROUND	643	160

PASTURES, WOODS, FORESTS, NON PRODUCTIVE 3,300 SQ. KM.

BERAT DISTRICT:

WHEAT	62	30
BARLEY, OATS	81	30
CORN	118	97
TOBACCO	0.8	1
POTATOES	4	0
VINEYARDS	4	19
RYE	6	17
FORAGE CULTURES	119	17
TILLED GROUND	280	17

PASTURES, WOODS, FORESTS, NON PRODUCTIVE 3,200 SQ. KM.

ARGIROCASTRO DISTRICT:

WHEAT	62	30
BARLEY, OATS	81	30
CORN	118	97
TOBACCO	0.8	1
POTATOES	4	0
VINEYARDS	4	19
RYE	6	17
FORAGE CULTURES	119	17
TILLED GROUND	280	17

PASTURES, WOODS, FORESTS, NON PRODUCTIVE 3,200 SQ. KM.



TILLED GROUND	3,365 SQ. KM.
GROUND CAPABLE OF USE FOR AGRICULTURE	3,029 SQ. KM.
LAKES AND PONDS	1,367 SQ. KM.
NON PRODUCTIVE	1,652 SQ. KM.
TOTAL SURFACE	2,753,800 HECTARES

EXTENSION OF DRAINAGE WORKS CONDUCTED: IN ZADRIMA 7,700 hectares
 IN PEZA FLOODLAND 2,500 hectares
 IN DEVOLI VALLEY AND MALIQT LAKE 3,000 hectares


NOTE UNDER % SUBSTITUTE DECIMAL POINTS FOR THE COMMAS.

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ALBANIA


DENSITY OF POPULATION

1941



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ALBANIA
POPULATION STATISTICS OF 1941



PROVINCE	CAPITAL	SQ. KMS	CENSUS 1941	DENSITY
ARGIROCASTRO	GINOCASTRO (10,836)	4,128	159,695	38.7
BERATI	BERATI (10,403)	3,666	169,431	46.2
KORCIA	KORCIA (22,807)	3,750	169,234	45.1
KOSOVO	KUKESI (200)	2,038	48,666	22.9
DIBRA	PESHKOPIJA (1,000)	2,151	83,491	38.8
DURAZZO	DURAZZO (9,739)	1,550	90,243	58.2
ELBASAN	ELBASAN (13,796)	3,549	110,447	31.1
SCUTARI	SCUTARI (29,909)	5,560	160,929	28.9
TIRANA	TIRANA (30,806)	911	59,160	64.9
VALONA	VALONA (9,106)	1,448	86,607	39.0
		28,743 *	1,105,903	38.6

* THIS FIGURE EXCLUDES THE ISLAND OF SASENO (5.8 SQ.KMS) WHICH WAS RETURNED TO ALBANIA AFTER THE SIGNING OF THE PEACE TREATY WITH ITALY. THE ISLAND IS UNINHABITED BY CIVILIANS.

NOTE - UNDER "DENSITY", SUBSTITUTE DECIMAL POINTS FOR THE COMMAS.

EXHIBIT "XIII"

A SURVEY OF ALBANIA

SECRET

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

REPORT NO.

INFORMATION REPORT

CD NO. 25X1

COUNTRY Brazil

DATE DISTR. 26 Sept. 1950

SUBJECT Communist Propaganda Material Distributed in Sao Paulo

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- Enclosures:
- Porque e Urgente Assinar O Apelo de Estocolmo (pamphlet, 4 pages)
 - Cruzada Humanitaria (pamphlet, 32 pages)
 - Sheet for signatures against the atom bomb
 - Poster against the atom bomb
 - Appeal of the Uniao Geral dos Trabalhadores of Sao Paulo, with place for signatures in support of the Stockholm Appeal (1 page)
 - Leaflet entitled Brado de Alerta do Camarada Prestes (1 page)

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BRADO DE ALERTA DO CAMARADA PRESTES!
Prestes lança corajosamente um manifesto do Partido Comunista do Brasil, para impor a vontade do povo e derrotar os opressores externos e internos. Nesta hora em que paira sobre o nosso povo, o mais grave perigo, a Guerra! Prestes aponta com firmeza o caminho da Paz, das lutas revolucionárias, pela libertação Nacional. Se a guerra nos bate à porta e ameaça a vida de nossos filhos e o futuro da nação. Que nos sirva de exemplo, o heroísmo do povo Coreano, que repele o invasor de sua pátria, os imperialistas americanos. São os patrões de Dutra que nos querem atirar na guerra contra os nossos irmãos: "Nem um soldado para a Coreia, é o que devemos afirmar" Nossa luta é uma só, nosso inimigo é o mesmo. Responderemos a Dutra e a todos os traidores que jamais faremos guerra a um povo que luta por sua libertação, e sim, continuaremos lutando pela nossa libertação, contra os opressores de nosso povo, que são Dutra e sua camarilha. Leia o manifesto de Prestes, programa de libertação que traduz os anseios do povo, por Paz, Terra e Liberdade. Jamais faremos guerra à União Soviética, pátria dos trabalhadores. VIVA O P.C.B e PRESTES!

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APELO DE ESTOCOLMO

EXIGIMOS a proibição absoluta da ARMA ATÔMICA, arma de terror e de extermínio em massa de populações.

EXIGIMOS o estabelecimento de um rigoroso controle internacional para assegurar a aplicação dessa medida de interdição.

CONSIDERAMOS que o governo que primeiro utilizar a arma atômica, não importa contra que país, cometerá um crime contra a humanidade e será tratado como criminoso de guerra.

PEDIMOS a todos os homens e mulheres de boa vontade do mundo inteiro que assinem este apelo.




Assine contra a BOMBA ATÔMICA



CRUZADA HUMANITÁRIA PELA PROIBIÇÃO DAS ARMAS ATÔMICAS

RUA WENCESLAU, BRAZ, 146 - 3.º ANDAR - SALAS 312-313 - SÃO PAULO

Assine e colha o maior número de assinaturas e concorra ao prêmio de viagem à Europa



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Cruzada Humanitária

APÊLO DE ESTOCOLMO

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
1 E 1/2 MILHÃO

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CONTRA AS

ARMAS ATÔMICAS

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CRUZADA HUMANITÁRIA CONTRA AS ARMAS ATÔMICAS
RUA WENCELAW BRAZ, 146 — 3.º ANDAR — SÃO PAULO, 912-918

Assinaturas Que Salvam Milhões de Vidas


Já no fim da grande guerra de 1939-1945, o mundo inteiro foi abalado com o bombardeio de duas cidades japonezas : Hiroshima e Nagasaki (Japão). Depois de tantos bombardeios, os povos viram surgir uma nova e terrível arma de guerra — a bomba atômica — com a capacidade infernal de reduzir a cinzas, em poucos minutos, milhares de criaturas e construções. Mas, pouco foi dito sôbre os incríveis sofrimentos de milhares de pessoas que morreram lentamente e dos que ficaram vivos para vêr o que nunca imaginaram ser possível: o inferno na terra.

Um sábio inglês — P.M.S. Blackett — que recebeu em 1948 o Prêmio Nobel de Física como recompensa pelos seus inventos e descobertas, escreveu um livro (*) que produziu grande impressão em todo o mundo, contando o que as bombas atômicas fizeram aos homens, mulheres, crianças, edificios e instalações daquelas duas cidades japonezas. Nesse livro, o sábio inglês reproduziu trechos inteiros de relatórios oficiais dos governos dos Estados Unidos e da Inglaterra, não deixando dúvidas sôbre o que aconteceu em consequência da explosão das duas bombas lançadas sôbre o Japão.

Depois e antes desse livro, apareceram diversas histórias sôbre a bomba, mas, o povo nunca ficou sabendo bem o que acontece nos bombardeios atômicos. No ano de 1949, surgiu mais um documento importante — o relatório da Comissão de Energia Atômica dos Estados Unidos. A publicação deste livrinho, entre nós, tem por fim esclarecer o povo sôbre o que é realmente uma guerra atômica, mostrando que ela pôde ser evitada.

(*) — "AS CONSEQUENCIAS MILITARES E POLITICAS DA ENERGIA ATÔMICA" — LONDRES, 1946

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ISTO É A GUERRA!



Mães! Foi êste o destino que sonhastes para vossos filhos?

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Nestes dias que correm, quando é cada vês maior o perigo de uma nova guerra, a ameaça de um dilúvio de fogo está sôbre a cabeça de todos os seres humanos, sem exceções. Mais de um país no mundo possui bombas atômicas.

Todos sentem que é urgente evitar que a guerra comece, mas, poucos são os que realmente sabem o que será uma nova guerra, com o uso das armas atômicas.

Depois de lêr este livrinho, será fácil compreender que é preciso IMPEDIR QUE A PRIMEIRA BOMBA ATÔMICA SEJA ATIRADA, porque, depois desse início trágico, os bombardeios atômicos entre os países em guerra, transformarão o mundo numa enorme fogueira.

As crianças, os moços, os homens e as mulheres de tôdas as idades, raças, religiões e nacionalidades, do nosso país, por desgraça nossa, estão sob essa terrível ameaça. O Brasil é produtor e exportador de matérias primas para a fabricação de armas atômicas, e isso, além do mais, nos coloca dentro do campo de uma guerra que venha a se desencadear.

Assim como foi proibido o uso dos gazes venenosos na guerra, assim como são fiscalizados em todo o mundo a produção, o comércio e o uso de certos venenos (ópio, cocaina, etc.), também é possível um acôrdo entre as nações, proibindo a fabricação de armas atômicas e fiscalizando a aplicação da energia atômica, a fim de que ela seja empregada sómente para o bem da humanidade.

No passado, milhares e milhões de pessoas, envolvidas no fogo e na destruição da guerra, repetiram muitas vezes esta pergunta : Porque não evitamos isto ?

Agora, porém, é preciso responder com rapidês, porque depois de começada a guerra, será difícil saber quantas pessoas poderão, ainda, fazer essa pergunta.

Todos os homens e mulheres de boa vontade, sem nenhuma exceção, têm em suas mãos o meio de evitar a guerra atômica, condenando desde já o govêrno que seja o PRIMEIRO A UTILIZAR A ARMA ATÔMICA contra qualquer povo.

A opinião pública do Brasil e do mundo inteiro, unidas pelo sagrado direito à vida, sem cogitar de política, de religião ou de quaisquer outras diferenças, estão realizando uma grande eleição, em que dirão o que pensam da guerra atômica, em que exigirão a garantia de que ela nunca seja começada, mas, desde já afirmando que amaldiçoam o govêrno que iniciar tal guerra.

No começo deste ano de 1950, em Estocolmo, essa grande eleição foi iniciada pelos Partidários da Paz. Milhões de pessoas, em todos os paí-

ses do mundo, estão votando pela proibição e controle das armas atômicas, pondo à sua assinatura neste documento que se chama

APÊLO DE ESTOCOLMO

EXIGIMOS a proibição absoluta da arma atômica, arma de terror e de extermínio em massa de populações.

EXIGIMOS o estabelecimento de um controle internacional para assegurar a aplicação desta medida de interdição.

CONSIDERAMOS que o governo que primeiro utilizar, a arma atômica, não importa contra que país cometerá um crime contra a humanidade e será tratado como criminoso de guerra.

PEDIMOS a todos os homens e mulheres de boa vontade do mundo inteiro que assinem este Apêlo.

Cada pessoa que não vota nesta grande eleição, também contribui para tornar possível a guerra atômica. Não é justo pensar, apenas na própria vida. As crianças, os moços, todos os que nasceram para viver e ter um futuro, não ficarão sabendo, talvez, quem assinou ou não assinou pela proibição. Mas, cada um, no seu íntimo, responderá a si mesmo sobre o que fez pela vida de milhões de inocentes.

É apenas uma assinatura, mas, milhões delas farão saber que a humanidade exige a proibição das armas atômicas e que está disposta a punir os carneiros que comecem essa barbaridade. dos responsáveis pela sorte da paz e da guerra.

É essa a maior força que tem cada ser humano — a sua vontade e a sua ação — mas que precisa ser levada ao conhecimento dos responsáveis pela sorte da paz e da guerra.

**ASSINE E AJUDE A COLHER MILHARES DE ASSINATURAS NO
APÊLO DE ESTOCOLMO — ORGANIZE O SEU GRUPO DE COLE-
TORES DE ASSINATURAS**

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ISTO É A GUERRA!



Minha mãe, minha querida mãezinha...

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Algumas das Milhares de Manifestações para Proibição e Controle das Armas Atômicas

EMBAIXADOR OSWALDO ARANHA, *ex-presidente da Assembléia das Nações Unidas*: “A interdição da bomba atômica será o primeiro passo no sentido do desarmamento geral, sem o qual a paz viverá ameaçada pela fôrça e pela brutalidade”.

CIENTISTA CESAR LATTES, *Físico de Energia Nuclear*: “Quanto à energia atômica, acho, da mesma forma que a esmagadora maioria dos cientistas em todo o mundo, que ela deve ser utilizada unicamente para fins pacíficos”.

PROF. DR. HANS BETHE e mais doze físicos norte-americanos: “Julgamos que nenhuma nação tem o direito de empregar tal bomba, mesmo por uma causa justa. Esta bomba não é mais uma arma de guerra, mas um meio de exterminar populações inteiras”.

DR. HERBERT MOSES, *Presidente da Associação Brasileira de Imprensa*: “Quanto à bomba atômica, arma terrível de destruição em massa, entendo que deve ser proibida”.

DEPUTADO PLINIO BARRETO, *do Congresso Federal*: “Julgaria o primeiro govêrno que utilizasse a bomba atômica contra qualquer

outro país como indigno de pertencer à comunhão das nações civilizadas. O mínimo que lhe devia acontecer era o fuzilamento de todos os seus membros”.

PROF. LUCAS NOGUEIRA GARCÊZ, Secretário da Viação de São Paulo :
“Neste particular, quero declarar que, desde 1948, quando Sua Santidade o Papa Pio XII se pronunciou contrário ao emprêgo da energia atômica como arma de destruição, me convenci, ainda mais de que a proibição e contrôle das armas atômicas é um desejo profundo que está no coração de todos os homens de boa vontade”.

PADRE JOÃO BATISTA DE CARVALHO, Deputado Estadual de São Paulo :
“São armas desumanas, anti-cristãs, cujo emprêgo é lesivo aos mais sagrados interesses da humanidade”.

PROF. DR. THEMISTOCLES CAVALCANTI, ex-Procurador Geral da República :
“Proibir o emprêgo da bomba atômica é garantir a paz”.

FREI ISAIAS RAYUSI, do Convento dos Capuchinhos do Rio de Janeiro :
“Nós somos homens pacíficos. Amamos a paz e desejamos a felicidade dos povos. Rogamos diariamente a Deus que nos livre de uma nova guerra. Mas, é preciso que se peça também aos homens de govêrno para que entrem imediatamente em entendimentos pacíficos e nos livrem de uma nova hecatombe”.

IRMÃ DULCE, Diretora do Círculo Operário da Baía e do Colégio Santa Bernadette :
“A bomba atômica é uma arma de destruição e eu penso que devemos tratar de construir e não de destruir”.

DR. FRANCISCO PATTI, presidente da Cruz Vermelha de São Paulo :
“Sei faço votos para que o próprio Direito Internacional acabe com as guerras, só posso aplaudir, evidentemente, qualquer medida de contrôle efetivo da energia nuclear e a proibição da bomba atômica”.

PROF. SAMUEL PESSÓA, Catedrático da Faculdade de Medicina de São Paulo e presidente da “Organização Brasileira de Defesa da Paz

e da Cultura” (São Paulo) : “A bomba atômica espalha a destruição cega, o sofrimento atrás, estendendo os seus efeitos até sobre gerações vindouras, por afetar, nas suas irradiações, os órgãos geradores do homem”.

FLAVIO COSTA, Técnico futebolista responsável pela seleção brasileira na disputa da Copa do Mundo, a célebre taça “Jules Rimet” : “Assinarei o Apêlo de Estocolmo com muito prazer. Acho que a guerra e o esporte são duas coisas antagônicas. A guerra só serve para dividir os povos. O esporte, ao contrário serve para uní-los”.

GENERAL RAYMUNDO SAMPAIO, do Exército Nacional : “A maior energia descoberta pelo homem não deverá servir para a sua própria destruição, mas, para a construção de um novo mundo de paz e de progresso constantes”.

DR. ALVARO MOUTINHO RIBEIRO DA COSTA, Ministro do Supremo Tribunal Federal : “Totalmente contra o emprêgo da bomba atômica em qualquer circunstância. Totalmente a favor da paz e da solução pacífica dos problemas fundamentais de todos os povos, sem distinção de raça, de religião e de credos políticos”.

Outras manifestações favoráveis à proibição das armas atômicas e ao Apêlo de Estocolmo:

Gabinete do Governo Finlandês, Associação dos Cientistas da Inglaterra, Conselho Nacional da União Nacional dos Estudantes, Movimento Republicano Popular (da França), Comitê Internacional da Cruz Vermelha (Genebra, Suíça), Joliot-Curie (França), III Congresso Brasileiro de Escritores (realizados na Baía), Associação da Juventude de Hiroshima e Nagasaki (Japão), Selecionado Italiano à Copa do Mundo, Soviet Supremo da União das Repúblicas Socialistas Soviéticas, Frades do Convento dos Franciscanos (S. Paulo), II Congresso dos Estudantes Secundários do Brasil, Rev. Gonçalves Pacheco, presidente das Igrejas Evangélicas de S. Paulo, Assembleia Legislativa de Pernambuco, Câmaras Municipais de — Monte Alegre do Sul, Campos do Jordão, Guarulhos, Rio Claro, Salto de Itú, Tanabí, Mogi das Cruzes, Piquete, São Vicente, Nhandéara, Itú, São Caetano do Sul, Botucatú, Lins, Jaboticabal, Poá, Santa Adélia e Santo André (São Paulo), — Ladainha, Carmo do Cajurú, Nova Lima, Sabará, Uberlândia e Cataguazes (Minas) — Rcife, Olinda, Pau D'Alho e Jaboatão (Pernambuco), — Curitiba, Ponta Grossa e Londrina (Paraná)

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— Nova Iguassú e São Gonçalo (Est. do Rio) — João Pessoa (Paraíba)
— Salvador e Bonfim (Baía) — Goiânia (Goiás) — Vitória (Espírito
Santo) — Porto Alegre (Rio Grande do Sul) — Fortaleza (Ceará) —
Cuiabá (Mato-Grosso), Liga de Defesa da Constituição, União Estadual
dos Estudantes, Centro Acadêmico XI de Agosto, Grêmio da Faculdade
de Arquitetura e Urbanismo de São Paulo, Comissão de Assuntos Exte-
riores da Câmara de Deputados da República Argentina, Episcopado Ca-
tólico da Polônia, Dr. Torres Bodet, presidente da UNESCO; além de
centenas de vereadores, deputados, escritores, jornalistas, professores, uni-
versitários, cientistas, artistas, militares, diplomatas, estudantes, líderes,
operários, etc. etc.

O POVO DE SÃO PAULO DARA' 1.500.000 ASSINAURAS PELA PROI-
BIÇÃO E CONTRÔLE INTERNACIONAL DA ARMAS ATÔMICAS NO
APÊLO DE ESTOCOLMO

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I

Os Horrores dos Bombardeios Atômicos em Hiroshima e Nagasaki

O que aconteceu em Hiroshima e Nagasaki (Japão), quando explodiram as duas bombas atômicas lançadas em agosto de 1945, é explicado com muitos detalhes em dois relatórios oficiais, um dos norte-americanos e outro dos ingleses. O relatório dos americanos chama-se: "Efeitos das Bombas Atômicas, Pesquisa dos Bombardeios Estratégicos, Estados Unidos, U.S.S.B.S., 4 e 5". O inglês, tem o nome de "Os efeitos das bombas atômicas sobre Hiroshima e Nagasaki", publicado em Londres no ano de 1946.


Os ataques contra essas duas cidades japonesas, não encontram outro igual em toda a história militar do mundo. Os aviões B.29, carregados com bombas atômicas, partiram da ilha de Tinian, escoltados por um ou dois aviões de observação. Num desses aviões de bombardeio ia, o capitão Robert Lewis; esse avião tinha o nome de "Enola Gay".

A meia noite do dia 5 de agosto de 1945, o capitão Lewis e sua tripulação receberam, sem maiores explicações, a seguinte ordem: "Prepara-se para voar". O coronel Tibbets, chefe da expedição de bombardeio foi informado, apenas, do seguinte: "O "Enola Gay" deverá voar dentro em breve. Que a tripulação esteja a postos."

As duas horas e cinquenta minutos da madrugada do dia 6 de agosto, o "Enola Gay" levantava vôo, com uma tripulação de 7 homens, sem saber outra coisa além de que a missão era arriscadíssima. No comando



1
JOSE DA SILVA LEU O QUE ACONTECEU NUMA CIDADE ATACADA POR ARMAS ATOMICAS E DISSE COM OS SEUS BOTAS: "DEUS ME LIVRE!" CRIAR MEUS FILHOS PARA SEREM TORNADOS NESSA BARBAUIDADE! NUNCA! VOU IA PROCURAR ESSE TAL DE "APELO DE ESTOCOLMO"



2
DEPOIS DE TER COLHIDO ALGUMAS CENTENAS DE ASSINATURAS NO SERVICO (PEGANDO DESDE O PAINAO ATE O PORTEIRO), JOSÉ DA SILVA IA DE CASA EM CASA, SOSINHO, VENDO QUANTA GENTE QUE QUERIA ASSINAR O APELO DE ESTOCOLMO.



3
JOSÉ DA SILVA JA ESTAVA RESOLVIDO A COLHER, PELO MENOS, 1.000 ASSINATURAS QUANDO FICOU SABENDO QUE A "CRUZADA HUMANITARIA PELA PROIBIÇÃO DAS ARMAS ATOMICAS" OFERECIA, DE GRACA, UMA VIAGEM A ITALIA PARA QUEM MAIS ASSINATURAS CONSEGUISSSE. ENTAO PENSOU: 1.000 ASSINATURAS É CAFÉ PPOQUENO! SOSINHO NAO VOU VENCER ESSA PARADA!



4
REUNIDOS OS AMIGOS E PARENTE, J. S. EXPLICOU, BEM EXPLICADO, O QUE PODERA ACONTECER SI A BOMBA ATOMICA NAO FOR PROIBIDA. DEU, ENTAO, A IDEIA DE FORMAREM UM GRUPO DE COLETORES DE ASSINATURAS E PROPÓS QUE A MARIA RIBEIRO, MUITO ESTIMADA POR TODOS NA REDONDEZA, FOSSE A CANDIDATA DO GRUPO PARA A VIAGEM A ITALIA. "TODOS JUNTOS — DISSE O JOSE — PODEMOS MANDAR A MARIA NESSA VIAGEM. EU SEM QUE QUERIA IR, MAS, TEMOS QUE TRABALHAR EM COMJUNTO PARA PODER MANDAR O NOSSO CANDIDATO". TODOS GRITARAM: "VAI A MARIA!"




5
O JOSÉ DA SILVA FOI ESCOLHIDO PARA PRESIDENTE DO GRUPO. O PEDRO MANZINI FICOU ENCARGADO DE RECEBER, CONTAR E ENTREGAR AS ASSINATURAS NA CRUZADA. A MULHER DO FIRMINO DEU A IDEIA DE INSTALAR UM POSTO RECEBELO NA QUITANDA DO MARIDO. E TODOS FICARAM ENCARGADOS DE ARRANJAR MAIS COLETORES DE ASSINATURAS E ALGUM DIABEIRO PARA AJUDAR A CRUZADA.



6
NO 1.º DIA DE TRABALHO, O GRUPO COLHEU 2.000 ASSINATURAS. NO POSTO DA QUITANDA DO FIRMINO MAIS 1.000 ASSINATURAS. O TRABALHO EM GRUPO PROVU QUE ERA MUITO MELHOR.



7
NO MESMO DIA O GRUPO DO JOSÉ DA SILVA ENTROU DE NOVO NO TRABALHO, COLHENDO ASSINATURAS EM TODO O BAIRRO. O PESSOAL SE DISTRIBUIU POR RUAS PARA EVITAR DUPLICATAS NAS ASSINATURAS E NÃO PROCURAR AS MESMAS PESSOAS. ALGUMAS NÃO SAIBAM DO QUE SE TRATAVA. MAS, O PESSOAL DO GRUPO, EXPLICOU BEM O ASSUNTO. TODO MUNDO ASSINAVA



8
AGORA, DE 3 EM 3 DIAS O PEDRO MANZINI VAI ENTREGAR AS ASSINATURAS COLHIDAS. BEM CONTADAS E SEPARADAS: AS DA FABRICA, AS DO BAIRRO, AS CONSEGUIDAS NO JOGO DE FUTEBOL. LEVA AINDA, POR ESCRITO, O QUE FIZERAM PARA MELHORAR O TRABALHO, O QUE DIZERAM AS PESSOAS PROCURADAS E OUTRAS EXPERIENCIAS. COM AS PRIMEIRAS 1.000 ASSINATURAS O GRUPO GANHOU UMA COLEÇÃO DE 10 LIVROS, O QUE QUEREM E A VIAGEM PARA A MARIA. MAS, PRINCIPALMENTE, ESTÃO DECIDIDOS A VER A BOMBA ATÔMICA PROIBIDA.

ia o coronel Tibbets. Já no ar, receberam pelo rádio o rumo que deveriam seguir.

Ao entrarem em território japonês, receberam a seguinte ordem: "Voe sempre a 5.000 metros de altura. Evite combates com caças inimigos. Não aterrise em terra japonesa. Seu aparelho deve voltar à base intacto ou desaparecer por completo."

Depois de nove horas de voo, ouviram nova ordem: "Dentro de nove minutos estará em cima de uma cidade; lance a bomba número 1."

A primeira bomba, de acordo com os relatórios oficiais, foi lançada a 6 de agosto de 1945, às 8 horas e 15 minutos da manhã, sobre Hiroshima.

O relatório americano -- "U.S.S.B.S., 5" diz:

"A maior parte dos trabalhadores já se encontrava em serviço, mas um grande número deles ainda se achava a caminho do serviço; quasi todas as crianças das escolas e um certo número de operários, trabalhavam ao ar livre, ocupados na demolição de prédios bombardeados, para proteção contra o fogo e enviando o material aproveitável para fóra da cidade."

O ataque realizou-se 45 minutos depois de tocado o sinal de perigo passado. Por causa da falta de aviso e da indiferença da população em face da presença de pequenos grupos de aviões, a explosão ocorreu em condições de surpresa quasi total, quando ninguém se encontrava nos abrigos subterrâneos. Muita gente se encontrava de fóra dos abrigos subterrâneos; outras pessoas, na maior parte, achavam-se no interior de habitações frágeis ou em edifícios comerciais."

Mais ou menos 11 quilômetros quadrados da cidade de Hiroshima foram completamente destruídos pelo fogo.

"A surpresa, o desabamento de inúmeros edifícios, o incêndio, fizeram um número de vítimas até hoje nunca visto; 70 a 80 mil pessoas foram mortas, desapareceram ou foram consideradas mortas e quasi outro tanto de feridos. O grande número de vítimas é tanto mais impressionante si se compara com os resultados do raide sobre Tóquio, realizado entre 9 e 10 de março de 1945, na qual o número de mortos não foi tão elevado, conquanto tivessem sido destruídos 42 quilômetros quadrados da cidade..."

Três dias mais tarde, em Nagasaki, a cidade quasi nada sabia a respeito do que ocorrêra em Hiroshima, a não ser umas vagas notícias do desastre de Hiroshima que apareceram nos jornais de 8 de agosto." (U.S.S.B.S.,5).

Nenhum aviso, portanto, tinha sido dado quando, a segunda bomba atômica, foi lançada sobre Nagasaki. Sómente 400 pessoas se encontravam nos abrigos subterrâneos da cidade, construídos para conter mais ou menos um terço da população.

“As testemunhas de vista de Hiroshima são unânimes em dizer que viram um clarão brilhante e branco no céu, sentiram um sopro violento do ar e ouviram um trovão seguindo-se o barulho da quebra e desabamento de casas. Falam também de uma escuridão crescente e de uma nuvem de poeira densa que envolvia a todos. Pouco depois viram os incêndios que destruíam os diversos quarteirões da cidade”. (Relatório inglês, página 2.)

Os números referentes aos resultados dos bombardeios atômicos das duas cidades japonesas, comparados com os do raide incendiário realizado sobre Tóquio (Japão), em março de 1945, mostram o poder de destruição das bombas atômicas.

O raide sobre Tóquio foi realizado por 279 aviões, que despejaram 1.669 toneladas de explosivos comuns e bombas incendiárias. Essa capital tinha, em média, por quilometro quadrado, cerca de 50.000 habitantes. Os resultados foram os seguintes: 83.600 mortos e desaparecidos; 102.000 feridos; 2.000 mortos por quilometro quadrado destruídos; e 4.500 vítimas por quilometro quadrado.

O bombardeio de Hiroshima foi realizado por 1 avião, que lançou 1 bomba atômica. A cidade era menos populosa do que Tóquio e só tinha 14.000 habitantes por quilometro quadrado. Os efeitos produzidos foram os seguintes: 80.000 mortos e desaparecidos; 70.000 feridos; 5.800 mortos por quilometro quadrado; e 12.000 vítimas por quilometro quadrado (entre mortos e feridos).

Os efeitos da explosão da bomba atômica sobre Nagasaki e Hiroshima foram muito elevados, sem dúvida. Isso se deve, em grande parte ao fato de que os bombardeios atômicos são feitos de surpresa, com aumento atual na rapidez dos aviões e outros meios de transportes aéreo, o aviso de alerta é quase impossível.

O que aconteceu em Nagasaki é descrito pelo governo americano, na seguinte maneira:

“No momento da explosão deu-se uma libertação de energia sob a forma de luz, de calor, de irradiações e de pressão. Todos os tipos de raios espalharam-se com a velocidade da luz, compreendendo os raios X e Gama, os ultra-violetas, os raios visíveis e os infra-vermelhos, estes com

seu calor irradiante. Uma onda de pressão, criada pelo enorme deslocamento do ar, formou-se quasi instantaneamente em torno do ponto de explosão mas espalhou-se mais lentamente, mais ou menos com a velocidade do som. Os gases super-aquecidos que constituem a bola de fogo inicial espalharam-se e subiram mais lentamente ainda... O clarão não durou mais do que uma fração de segundo, mas, foi tão grande a sua intensidade que chegou a produzir queimaduras de terceiro grau sobre a pele humana não protegida dentro do raio de um quilometro e meio... Nas proximidades do ponto zero (ponto do solo exatamente em baixo da explosão), o calor torrou os cadáveres e tornou-os irreconhecíveis". ("U.S. S.B.S., 4 — página 22).

O desabamento dos prédios, causado pelo deslocamento do ar, produziu uma série enorme de incêndios, que se espalharam em tôdas as duas cidades e as destruíram quasi que totalmente. Esses incêndios, que foram produzidos pelas radiações atômicas, por curto-circuitos e pelo próprio fogo das cozinhas, produziram um grande número de vítimas.

"A força do sopro causado pelo deslocamento do ar, que se seguiu ao clarão, foi tão grande que afundou os telhados dos edifícios de cimento armado e achatou totalmente os prédios menos resistentes. A pressão máxima do sopro, no ponto zero, não foi muito elevada por causa da altura em que se deu a explosão, não tendo sido maior que a de uma bomba comum de alto poder explosivo; essa pressão diminuía à medida que a sua propagação se distanciava do ponto inicial. Não obstante, a pressão atingiu uma distância maior e teve maior duração que a de uma bomba comum de alto poder explosivo; a maior parte das construções de cimento armado foram danificadas ou destruídas até a uma distância de 200 metros em Hiroshima e de 600 metros em Nagasaki. Os prédios feitos com tijolos foram derrubados, numa distância de 2.200 metros, em Hiroshima, e 2.500 em Nagasaki." ("U.S.S.B.S.,4 — página 23).

Para se ter uma idéia dos efeitos das duas bombas atômicas sobre a vida e o movimento das duas cidade, basta dizer que

Tanto em Hiroshima como em Nagasaki, as proporções do desastre atingiram a um tal nível que reduziram à completa paralização a vida urbana e industrial. Os ataques clássicos mais destruidores, como os raios de Hamburgo, no verão de 1943 e o de Tóquio, na primavera de 1945, não conseguiram produzir efeitos comparáveis, parализando tôda a organização da comunidade." (Relatório inglês, página 3).

Quanto à destruição em Hiroshima, os efeitos da explosão atômica mostram o que poderá acontecer com cidades maiores e mais pequenas.

“Das 90.000 casas que existiam na cidade, cerca de 65.000 foram totalmente destruídas e quasi tôdas as restantes foram danificadas, pelo menos superficialmente. As canalizações subterrâneas não foram arreben-tadas, a não ser nos pontos em que passavam sôbre pontos que transpõem os cursos d'água que cortam a cidade. Tôdas as pequenas fábricas situadas no centro da cidade foram destruídas. As grandes emprêsas, localizadas nos arrabaldes da cidade quasi nada sofreram e, mais ou menos, 94% dos seus operários saíram ilesos. Quasi 74% da produção industrial local resultava dessas grandes emprêsas. Calcula-se que trinta dias depois do bombardeio, elas poderiam recuperar o seu nível de produção, si a guerra tivesse continuado. As vias ferreas que atravessam a cidade foram con-sertadas e, dois dias depois do ataque, a 8 de agosto, estavam em condi-ções de funcionar novamente”. (“S.S.B.S., 4 — páginas 23).

Esses resultados mostram que a maior destruição causada pela bomba atômica é, realmente a de vidas humanas, sendo que os estragos materiais não têm a mesma gravidade.

Em Nagasaki, das 57.000 casas da cidade, foram destruídas 20.000. Quanto aos efeitos sôbre a indústria, nessa cidade, êles foram os seguintes:

“Calcula-se que se a guerra tivesse continuado e si o abastecimento de matérias primas fosse favorável à reconstrução, os estaleiros de cons-truções navais poderiam ter recuperado pelos menos 80% da sua produ-ção máxima em 3 ou 4 meses; as siderurgicas teriam sido consideravel-mente recuperadas no prazo de um ano; as usinas de eletricidade atingi-riam novamente, em dois meses, uma bôa parte de sua produção e, em seis meses, voltariam à sua capacidade normal; as fábricas de material belico voltariam a funcionar com 60 a 70% da sua produção anterior, em quinze mezes.” (“U.S.S.B.S., 4 — página 23).

Tanto em Hiroshima como em Nagasaki, foram os edificios de cimento armado que melhor resistiram à explosão, aguentando-se, semi-destruí-dos, no meio das cinzas da cidade. Mas, em contraste com a sua apa-rência exterior, êsses prédios estavam completamente queimados por dentro e os respectivos incêndios haviam matado os seus moradores. Os prédios destinados à suportar a explosão atômica, devem ser construídos segundo os modelos de segurança contra terremotos.

Os dados e informações reunidos e estudados pelos técnicos e cien-tistas, mostram que as bombas atômicas de Plutonio causam grande des-truição e outros efeitos numa área de 20 quilômetros quadrados, isto é,

quasi um alqueire de terreno. Além disso, o deslocamento de ar ou sopro produzido pela sua explosão é igual ao que produz a explosão de 20.000 toneladas de dinamite.

A mortandade causada em Hiroshima e Nagasaki (120.000 pessoas mortas) não foi maior porque o número de pessoas por quilometro quadrado era relativamente pequeno. Os relatórios oficiais calculam que uma explosão igual, numa cidade como Tóquio, teria matado 300.000 pessoas e um número igual de feridos. Isto quer dizer que, uma explosão atômica em cidades como Rio e São Paulo poderá matar de 150.000 a 200.000 pessoas de uma só vés.

Os estudos dos dois bombardeios realizados sobre as cidades japonesas, confirmaram que os danos causados a edifícios, máquinas, instalações industriais, etc. foram relativamente insignificantes quando comparados com a destruição e inutilização de vidas humanas. Além disso, os efeitos retardados da explosão atômica, sobre o organismo humano, ainda não são totalmente conhecidos e vão sendo registrados à medida que se revelam. Isso demonstrou que as armas atômicas são principalmente, **ARMAS DE TERROR CONTRA POPULAÇÕES CIVIS**, armas de destruição indiscriminada de populações não participantes das operações militares.

Uma outra conclusão tirada dos bombardeios da duas cidades japonesas é que a destruição causada pela bomba atômica é maior nas zonas do terreno plano (Hiroshima), mas essa "vantagem" desapareceria com o lançamento de diversas bombas.

Quando o capitão Robert Lewis, de volta à sua base, desceu do avião que lançará a bomba atômica sobre Hiroshima, seus chefes foram abraça-lo, dizendo: "Capitão Lewis, você lançou a primeira bomba atômica!" A celebridade esperava-o. Jornais e rádio passaram a ocupar-se do acontecimento em todo o mundo.

Lewis referindo-se ao que acontecera em Hiroshima, dizia: "Olhei no coronel Tibbets e pareceu-me que tinha os olhos de sangue, como se todos os horrores da guerra e do mundo o queimassem."

O capitão Lewis, que era católico, pensando na catástrofe de que fôra o instrumento, remoia: "Cem mil mortos... Vinte mil católicos..."

Hoje, depois de ter estado às portas do desespero, o capitão Robert Lewis já não é mais um militar. Num convento dos Estados Unidos, êle esconde a sua desgraçada sorte, a sorte do homem que apertando um botão de comando, abateu de uma só vés 100 mil vidas inocentes.

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ISTO É A GUERRA!



Pae e filho. Só eles restaram...

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Os efeitos dos bombardeios atômicos ainda estão presentes em Hiroshima e Nagasaki. Os queimados, os aleijados, o grande número de pessoas que vão se tornando cegas, o monumento aos milhares de mortos, as sepulturas que se abrem para os que ainda estão morrendo, o campo de cinzas e escombros que ficou no lugar onde antes estavam duas cidades, ainda estão presentes no espanto de toda a humanidade. Mas, já se anuncia uma nova guerra, já se faz alarde de poder destruir novas cidades pela bomba atômica, calcula-se friamente quantas pessoas será possível eliminar com uma só explosão.

Hiroshima e Nagasaki eram duas cidades como outras que existem pelo mundo, apenas diferentes nos seus aspectos exteriores, na população e nos seus problemas. Mas, eram habitadas por seres humanos, com as suas crianças, sua juventude, suas escolas, seus hospitais, suas fábricas e sua vida própria.

Hoje, novamente, ergue-se sobre todas as cidades e criaturas do mundo, a ameaça atômica.

E' urgente meditar sobre esses fatos e compreender que a luta pela sobrevivência está acima de todas as diferenças. O que importa saber é quem está disposto a impedir um novo massacre, sem indagar de onde possa partir a iniciativa de novos ataques atômicos, sem procurar dividir pelas diferenças que necessariamente existem entre os seres humanos, a grande cruzada pela sobrevivência dos povos.

Os homens de boa vontade do mundo inteiro, aos milhões, declaram, pelo APÊLO DE ESTOCOLMO: — Consideramos que o governo que primeiro utilizar a bomba atômica, não importa contra que país, terá cometido um crime contra a humanidade e deverá ser tratado como criminoso de guerra.

ASSINE HOJE O APÊLO DE ESTOCOLMO

I

"Eu vi os Sobreviventes de Hiroshima"

Narrativa da Senhora Tosiko Yuasa.

Na margem do boletim que reclama a proibição absoluta da arma atômica, a senhora escreveu: "Espero de todo o meu coração que a bomba atômica não caia jamais sobre nenhuma parte do mundo." E assinou: Tosiko Yuasa.

Esta senhora é japonesa. Estava no Japão em agosto de 1945, quando a bomba atômica foi lançada sobre a cidade de Hiroshima. É uma das raras pessoas, na França, que viu os sobreviventes daquela catástrofe e que sabe, por experiência própria, o que significa a "atomização" de uma cidade. Esclareceu que a sua qualidade de estrangeira lhe impede qualquer julgamento político, mas conta o que viu e ouviu.

"Antes — disse ela — vou contar uma história horripilante."

"No momento em que a bomba caiu sobre Hiroshima, um homem estava sentado num dos marcos de mármore da rua, diante de um banco. O homem foi completamente volatilizado. Encontrou-se, depois, sobre o mármore, uma mancha muito nitida, indelevel: a sombra da desgraça, a única coisa que restou dele..."

O sopro da explosão produziu estragos terríveis. Num grande número de vítimas, os olhos foram projetados para fóra das orbitas. Encontraram-se cadáveres cujos olhos pendiam das pontas dos nervos.

Pode-se dizer que, praticamente, a vida cessou num raio de um quilometro; entre uns dois quilometros, a morte não é imediata, mas as vítimas sofrem queimaduras atrozes. Geralmente, nas pessoas atingidas, aparecem tumores na pele; êsses tumores se alastram cada vês mais pelo corpo, escurecem, tornam-se duros. Os membros, braços e pernas, começam a parecer com pinças de carangueijos.

As criaturas perdem os cabelos. Mas, si chegam a sobreviver, os cabelos não nascem mais.

Outro detalhe ainda mais horrível: a pele cai aos pedaços e muitas vêzes totalmente. O ser humano se transforma em um miserável frangalho esfolado, torcendo-se de dores.

Assim, pois, era impossível socorrer a tôdas as vitimas. Os serviços sanitários dividiram as vítimas em duas categorias. De um lado, os que pensavam poder salvar ainda; era para êstes que se reservavam os cuidados médicos; de outro lado, os que tinham sido por demais atingidos. Êstes eram atirados a um canto, onde ficavam a morrer lentamente.

Num raio de três quilometros, a maior parte das pessoas não liquidadas pela explosão sofreram hemorragias: o sangue corria de tôdas as partes — do nariz, dos ouvidos. Para esas pessoas era quasi impossível comer, engulir. Podia-se introduzir um pouco d'água na bôca de um doente: êle nos olhava com ar aparvalhado, a água lhe escorria de um lado e de outro da bôca, misturada com sangue.

Os médicos verificaram que mesmo nas vitimas menos diretamente atingidas, o número de glóbulos brancos do sangue diminuia. O corpo começava a se decompor interiormente e era assim que, em Hiroshima, seres vivos começavam já a sentir-se cadáveres.

A tudo isso se juntaram as vitimas do fogo: o calor produzido pela explosão da bomba provocou um incêndio monstro em Hiroshima, que não fez senão agravar o pânico geral. Uma chuva negra como tinta começou a cair, mas o incêndio continuou a se espalhar, enquanto os que escaparam tentavam fugir, descalços, sôbre o asfalto em brasa.

Vi pessoas que se achavam três quilometros do ponto onde a bomba caiu. Tinham tido muito medo, mas estavam aparentemente ilesas: não tinham queimaduras, nem feridas, apenas de tempos em tempos sentiam uma impressão de ligeira vertigem, que atribuíam à emoção. No fim de um mês ou dois, estas pessoas estavam mortas. Os efeitos rádio-ativos da bomba agiram, lenta mas implacavelmente. Não se pode afirmar que alguém tenha saído ileso do bombardeio atômico, mesmo quando, aparentemente, nada tivesse sofrido.

Em Hiroshima, os membros de uma mesma família, não tiveram todos a mesma sorte. Conheci o caso do prefeito da cidade: achava-se ali com sua mulher e três de seus filhos, no dia do bombardeio. Ele e dois filhos foram mortos pela explosão. Sua mulher e um filho não sofreram mais do que queimaduras; acreditava-se poder salvá-las.

Um outro caso, de uma menina que não estava na cidade. Entrou em casa para socorrer sua mãe e seu irmão. Dois meses depois, os dois sobreviventes sucumbiram, vítimas dos ferimentos sofridos; a menina, que não estava presente no momento do bombardeio, também está morta. O contáto com as pessoas atingidas matou-a... a não ser que tenha perecido à fome; não se sabe ainda ao certo.

Fala-se, às vezes, nos livros de aventuras, em raios invisíveis, em raios de morte. A bomba atômica é um pouco assim; não provoca destruições incríveis apenas pela explosão: semanas e semanas depois de sua queda, ela age ainda, misteriosamente, pela radioatividade e faz novas vítimas.

Ainda agora, perto de Hiroshima, os camponeses contam que quando cultivam a terra, têm uma impressão de vertigem e sono."

A senhora Tosiko Yuasa, agora residente na França, mostrou ao repórter do jornal uma pedra trazida de Hiroshima. Cinco anos depois, essa pedra é rádio-ativa. Foi feita a verificação: a pedra foi colocada sob um contador de Geiger, aparelho a que os técnicos da química nuclear chamam "escala" e que parece uma espécie de mesa de bordo. Quando o aparelho foi posto a funcionar, feixes luminosos se acendiam, uns após outros. O caráter rádio-ativo da pedra estava demonstrado.

Eis o que declarou essa mulher japonesa que viu os sobreviventes de Hiroshima.

Compreende-se que não tenha vacilado um minuto em assinar o APELO DE ESTOCOLMO.

OS PAULISTAS DARÃO 1.500.000 ASSINATURAS AO APELO DE

ESTOCOLMO

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ISTO É A GUERRA!



Um intervalo do bombardeio...

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Haverá Defesa Contra a Bomba Atômica ?

Em julho de 1949 foi publicado o relatório da Comissão de Energia Atômica dos Estados Unidos, com muitas outras informações sobre os efeitos dos bombardeios atômicos. Outras publicações, da Inglaterra e da França, trataram também da questão de saber si existe defesa contra os bombardeios atômicos.

Ficou provado que, em caso de guerra, qualquer cidade, um pouco importante, poderá ser o alvo dos bombardeios atômicos, porque essa arma de destruição é destinada sempre às grandes concentrações de população. Os portos, como Santos, por exemplo, entroncamentos ferroviários como Baurú, centros industriais como São Paulo, Sorocaba ou Santo André, as localidades importantes pela sua produção agrícola, como é o caso de muitas cidades do interior, incluem-se automaticamente na lista dos alvos prováveis no caso de uma guerra.

O que acontece quando uma bomba atômica explode sobre uma cidade?

Durante uma fração de segundo, um sol artificial, mais brilhante de que o nosso, brilha a algumas centenas de metros de altura e uma nuvem em forma de cogumelo se eleva a 13.000 metros de altura.

Em redor do ponto da explosão, numa distância de 800 metros, todas as construções que não sejam feitas de cimento armado ou de aço, são arrazadas pelo sopro da explosão e 70% do restante é destruído. As pessoas que não estiverem muito bem abrigadas, serão mortas pelo sopro da explosão ou perecerão sob os desabamentos e pelos escombros que

são atirados a grandes distâncias. Quem não ficar soterrado sob uma parede ou não tiver o crânio fraturado, receberá queimaduras tão profundas por tôdas as partes não protegidas do corpo, que não poderá viver mais do que alguns momentos. A temperatura se eleva de tal maneira, que os objetos inflamáveis pegam fogo; os incêndios se alastram com grande violência, principalmente no sentido do vento. Além disso, as radiações fazem numerosas vítimas. Milhões de projéteis invisíveis e de ondas ultra-penetrantes destroem as células do corpo, mas a morte é procedida de uma agonia horrível, que pode durar de quatro a cinco dias. Algumas pessoas duram mais tempo: são as vítimas das hemorragias generalizadas. A destruição das defesas do sangue (glóbulos brancos) faz com que as pessoas menos atingidas morram por causa de moléstias como gripe ou simples resfriados, doenças que os organismos normais geralmente suportam e vencem.

As experiências e os bombardeios de Hiroshima e Nagasaki demonstraram que quando a bomba explode próxima do chão, a rádio-atividade torna perigosa, por muito tempo, a zona afetada.

A bomba atômica sub-marina explodida nas experiências de Bikini, levantou uma coluna de água de quase um quilometro de largura e com a altura de dois quilometro. Essa coluna de água produziu uma chuva de elementos rádio-ativos que chegou a atingir pontes distantes a quase 4 quilometros do lugar da explosão. Esses raios quando atingem uma pessoa, ela tem poucos minutos de vida. Três anos depois da explosão, ainda havia na ilha de Bikini uma zona perigosa por causa da radioatividade. Mesmo mais tarde, os peixes ou plantas dessa zona podia produzir câncer a quem os comesse.

Qual a defesa contra a bomba atômica?

Em primeiro lugar é preciso não esquecer que os bombardeios atômicos começam sem aviso, de surpresa, e os seus efeitos imediatos, têm a velocidade de poucos segundos. Nessas condições, a proteção do povo em abrigos subterrâneos teria que ser permanente. Isso naturalmente, exigirá da parte dos governos enormes despesas, que se tornam ainda maiores por causa da necessidade de proteger também as indústrias, os meios de transportes e as instalações militares.

Quanto aos socorros às vítimas, é preciso considerar que, no caso de um bombardeio atômico, as linhas telefônicas, telegráficas e os cabos condutores de eletricidade são destruídos pelos desabamentos, incêndios, etc. Dessa forma, as ligações entre vários pontos da cidade teriam que ser feitas por um serviço especial de rádio-transmissão, com gerador de energia elétrica independente. Por outro lado, considerando-se o grande

número de vítimas que os bombardeios fazem, elas teriam que ser tratadas no próprio local do desastre, exigindo-se para isso um treino especial de pessoal responsável pelos socorros.

Uma comissão de peritos ingleses considera que no caso de serem atingidos 100.000 habitantes de uma cidade, somente 50.000 teriam possibilidade de sobreviver, e desses, 20.000 são casos graves. A experiência da última guerra demonstrou que num caso desses, seria exigido o trabalho de 200.000 pessoas durante 5 horas pelo menos, para que os socorros não fossem quasi inúteis para a maioria das vítimas.

Os carros de socorro teriam que contar, também, com o bloqueio das ruas, entulhadas de escombros. Isso tornaria preciso, antes de mais nada, um reconhecimento aéreo para determinar as zonas de menor destruição, por onde poderiam penetrar mais rapidamente na zona a ser socorrida. Por outro lado, as zonas afetadas pela radio-atividade teriam que ser muito bem localizadas, pois, elas são extremamente perigosas. Em tais partes da cidade os socorros seriam praticamente impossíveis, porque as turmas de salvamento morreriam com as vítimas, em maior ou menor prazo. Além disso, um médico ou enfermeira que penetrasse numa zona rádio-ativa ficaria perigoso para as demais pessoas por causa das radiações que passariam a espalhar dos seus próprios corpos e roupas.

Nos subterrâneos, aqueles que conseguem abrigar-se, devem verificar constantemente, com aparelhos especiais, si o ar que respiram não está sendo portador da morte pela rádio-atividade.

Os incêndios que se iniciam em grande número de prédios ao mesmo tempo, se alastram como nas florestas. Em tal caso, é inútil utilizar água. Torna-se preciso dinamitar quarteirões inteiros para evitar que o fogo se espalhe, salvando, assim, o que é possível do resto da cidade.

No caso de serem lançadas várias bombas atômicas sobre uma mesma cidade, torna-se difícil prever as proporções da catástrofe e as possibilidades de algum salvamento ou de defesa.

A utilidade dos abrigos subterrâneos é muito duvidosa como meio de defesa civil no caso dos bombardeios atômicos. Seria necessário, antes de tudo, dar o alarme em tempo, cada vez que se aproximasse um avião suspeito, enquanto que no caso dos bombardeios comuns, procura-se primeiro barrar o avanço do inimigo com esquadrilhas de defesa. Isso tornaria necessária que a população permanecesse quasi que todo o tempo nos abrigos, o que desorganizaria completamente a produção, já que as pessoas teriam que ficar inativas. A hipótese de se instalar toda a indús-

tria debaixo da terra não parece realizavel em pouco tempo, e por outro lado, os problemas de defesa não se resumem em cuidar sómente das fábricas.

O sistema de alarme contra a aproximação de aviões inimigos deve ser muito cerrado e atingido grandes distâncias, por causa da grande velocidade que hoje têm os aparelhos à jacto. Mas, por outro lado, quanto maior fôr essa rêde de alarme, maior é a zona em que a população terá que se recolher aos abrigos para proteger-se. No caso de rêdes de radar que cubram milhares de quilometros, os alarmes teriam que ser dados para regiões inteiras de um país, porque o curso do avião inimigo que se aproxima pode mudar constantemente.

A noite, a maior parte da população das grandes cidades teria que dormir nos abrigos, mas, no caso de um bombardeio noturno, grande parte do povo ficaria impedida de sair para a superficie: por causa da enorme destruição, dos incêndios e da formação de zonas de rádio-atividade.

Em face dessas circunstâncias, um grupo de físicos ingleses declara: "E' tal a extensão dos problemas provocados por um bombardeio atômico, que as medidas de defesa são praticamente inúteis, si não incluírem preparativos em tal escala que, todos os detalhes da situação possam ser previstos e meditados com grande antecedência."

Tudo o que se disse a respeito das medidas da defesa civil contra os bombardeios atômicos demonstra que seria preciso modificar, radicalmente, o modo de vida do homem. O pavor dos bombardeios atômicos não deve ser encaminhado no sentido de fazer o homem voltar à situação em que vivia no começo do mundo: em cavernas ou debaixo da terra, como bicho.

A solução está, evidentemente, na proibição e contrôle das armas atômicas, pois, elas constituem um perigo para todos os povos do mundo, sem exceção. Mas, além disso, é preciso não esquecer que, nestes dias que passam, a paz mundial se acha sériamente ameaçada e que não há, portanto, tempo suficiente para modificar totalmente o modo de vida da humanidade, como solução para a sua sobrevivência.

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E' urgente, portanto, que todos os povos, sem distinções exijam a proibição e o controle imediatos das armas atômicas. Essas exigências já está sendo realizada através de milhões de assinaturas no APELO DE ESTOCOLMO.

ASSINE COM SUA FAMILIA E SEUS AMIGOS O APELO DE ESTOCOLMO E AJUDE A COLHER MILHARES DE OUTRAS

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EIS O FUTURO!



O que estamos fazendo por eles?

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PELA PROIBIÇÃO DA BOMBA ATOMICA
APELO DA UNIÃO GERAL DOS TRABALHADORES DE SÃO PAULO

A BOMBA ATOMICA é uma arma criminosa de extermínio em massa de populações. Assim, se vier a ser utilizada em uma guerra, atingirá principalmente os trabalhadores, que constituem a maioria da população das grandes cidades. Por isso mesmo, e atendendo às recentes resoluções da FEDERAÇÃO SINDICAL MUNDIAL e da Conferencia Sindical do Sul do Continente, a UNIÃO GERAL DOS TRABALHADORES DE SÃO PAULO apela para todas as suas organizações aderentes, bem como para todas as comissões de reivindicações, para todos os trabalhadores sindicalizados e para o proletariado em geral a fim de que assinem e façam assinar por seus companheiros de trabalho e por suas famílias o APELO DE ESTOCOLMO pela proibição da bomba atomica.

Deixando de lado todas as divergências e diferenças de pontos de vista sobre outros assuntos, TODOS OS TRABALHADORES devem assinar o apelo pela proibição da bomba atomica. Lembremo-nos de que se UMA ÚNICA bomba atomica cair sobre São Paulo matará mais de 200.000 pessoas.

TRABALHADORES! Assinemos o APELO DE ESTOCOLMO! Organizemos em todas as fabricas e locais de trabalho COMISSÕES amplas e unitárias CONTRA A BOMBA ATOMICA, abrangendo todos os trabalhadores! Unamo-nos contra a arma criminosa! Unamo-nos em defesa da vida de nossas familias! Unamo-nos em defesa da humanidade!



25X1

APELO DE ESTOCOLMO

EXIGIMOS a proibição da arma atomica, arma execravel e de extermínio em massa de populações.

EXIGIMOS o estabelecimento de um controle internacional para assegurar a aplicação desta medida de proibição.

CONSIDERAMOS que o govêrno que primeiro utilizar, contra qualquer outro paiz, a arma atomica, cometerá um crime contra a humanidade e sera tratado como criminoso de guerra.

Nome Bairro

Nome Bairro

Nome Bairro

Nome Bairro

Nome Bairro

PORQUE

E URGENTE ASSINAR

O APELO DE ESTOCOLMO?

**ISTO TAMBÉM PODE ACONTECER
NA SUA CIDADE**

UMA SÓ BOMBA ATÔMICA ATIRADA SOBRE
HIROSHIMA (JAPÃO) CAUSOU:

90.000 mortos e desaparecidos

70.000 feridos gravemente

80.000 casas destruídas

Luto em milhares de famílias de todo o País

25X1

SAIBA COMO RESPONDER
AS OBJEÇÕES E DUVIDAS

"CRUZADA HUMANITÁRIA PELA PROIBIÇÃO DAS ARMAS ATÔMICAS"

RUA WENCESLAU BRAZ, 146 — SALAS 312 e 313

— SÃO PAULO —

Aos Que Afirmam:

"Essa campanha pertence a um partido político"

DIZEMOS:

"O Apêlo de Estocolmo foi lançado por diversas personalidades de renome mundial e pertencentes a correntes políticas as mais diferentes. A primeira assinatura foi a do grande sábio francês Joliot-Curie. Com êle assinaram mais de cem pessoas de fama internacional, tais como Madame Cotton, presidente da Federação Internacional das Mulheres, General Lázaro Cárdenas, ex-presidente do México, o ex-procurador geral dos Estados Unidos, John Roger, amigo e colaborador de Roosevelt, o escritor soviético Ilyya Ehrenburg, o abade católico Jean Boulier, o líder sindical mexicano Lombardo Tolledano, Pietro Nenni, presidente do Partido Socialista italiano e o Deão de Canterbury, além de outros. São essas algumas das personalidades que compõem o Comitê Permanente eleito no Primeiro Congresso dos Partidários da Paz realizado em Paris e em Praça em abril de 1949, cujos delegados representavam 600 milhões de seres humanos.

No Brasil, êsse mesmo Apêlo já foi assinado pelo Ministro do Supremo Tribunal Federal Dr. Alvaro Moutinho Ribeiro da Costa, General Leitão de Carvalho, bem como deputados e senadores de diversos partidos, como o senador Mathias Olimpio (UDN), os deputados Plinio Barreto (UDN), Gurgel do Amaral (PTB), sacerdotes como o Padre João Batista de Carvalho (deputado do PSD), Frei Ludovico, provincial dos Franciscanos de São Paulo, professores universitários como o Dr. Euripedes Simões de Paula e Dr. José Quirino Ribeiro, da Faculdade de Filosofia, o cientista Cesar Lattes, artistas como Mara Rubia, Gregorio Barrios e Nhô Totico, radio-atores como Leonor Navarro, Gessy Fonseca, Mário Lago e Lia de Aguiar. Além disso, foi aprovado em moções de 20 Câmaras Municipais de São Paulo."

AOS QUE AFIRMAM:

"Não adianta proibir só a arma atômica; é preciso proibir tôdas as armas de destruição coletiva."

RESPONDEMOS:

"Proibir a arma atômica significará livrar a humanidade da ameaça mais grave e será o meio de acabar com a "guerra fria" e criar um clima favorável a negociações entre as grandes potências, dando-se, assim, o primeiro passo para o desarmamento geral. Contra a bomba atômica, que ameaça sem distinções milhões de homens e mulheres, pode-se realizar uma campanha de união de todos os seres humanos e, por isso, essa campanha é mais eficiente.

A arma atômica, que extermina cidades inteiras, não se presta para a defesa de uma linha militar porque atinge os exércitos de ambos os lados. Essa arma foi criada para aterrorizar populações de cidades inteiras e o seu emprêgo produziria a guerra total. Proibir a arma atômica é a maneira de iniciar a interdição de outras armas."

AOS QUE AFIRMAM:

"Ninguém ousará utilizar a bomba atômica"

RESPONDEMOS:

"A bomba atômica já foi utilizada em 6 de agosto de 1945 contra Hiroshima

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foram escolhidas exatamente por causa de sua densidade de população. Em maio deste ano o Presidente Truman disse em Pocatello o seguinte, referindo-se ao primeiro bombardeio atômico por ele ordenado e à possibilidade de repetição: "Eu o fiz então e vos digo que fa-lo-ei outra vez si fôr necessário."

AOS QUE DIZEM:

"Há criminosos que não respeitarão a proibição da arma atômica"

RESPONDEMOS:

"Si centenas de milhões de criaturas humanas se manifestarem pela condenação antecipada do govêrno que venha a utilizar a arma atômica em primeiro lugar, contra qualquer país, isso dará a tal govêrno e aos responsáveis por êsse crime monstruoso a certeza de um castigo severo do qual não poderão escapar. Essa advertência, feita por todos os povos do mundo, é o mais seguro argumento para fazer recuar os que estejam pensando em cometer o monstruoso crime do bombardeio atômico. A história do mundo mostra que quando os povos se opõem decididamente a um agressor deshumano, a punição é terrível."

AOS QUE DIZEM:

"Jamais se impedirão as guerras"

RESPONDEMOS:

"Não é verdade que sempre haverá guerras. As guerras são feitas com os povos e não podem ser feitas sem o seu consentimento, si eles se opõem resolutamente a participar de tais carnificinas. Cada assinatura no Apêlo de Estocolmo é uma voz que diz NÃO à guerra. Si, com êsse gesto tão simples, são unidas as vontades de centenas de milhões de homens e mulheres de todos os países, essa gigantesca união, jamais alcançada, torna possível fazer recuar a guerra e salvar a Paz. Si outras guerras de agressão ocorreram no passado é porque os povos não estavam unidos e decididos a punir os responsáveis por elas. Mas, na guerra contra o nazismo já vimos como o ódio dos povos do mundo inteiro pode derrotar um govêrno agressor. No caso da guerra atômica, milhões de assinaturas no Apêlo de Estocolmo já significa uma condenação prévia do govêrno criminoso."

AOS QUE DIZEM:

"Para que pode servir uma simples assinatura?"

RESPONDEMOS:

"As assinaturas reunidas, de todos os países do mundo, traduzirão a vontade irresistível de Paz dos povos. Os mandatários eleitos pelo povo deverão levá-la em conta. Os parlamentares deverão preocupar-se com elas. Os governantes lhes deverão prestar a maior atenção. Os fatores de guerra recuarão diante desta reprovação de milhões de seres humanos, pois cada assinatura é a ameaça de um castigo implacável para aqueles que tentarem contra a vida e o patrimônio da humanidade."

AOS QUE DIZEM:

"Essa campanha serve aos interesses de um país ou governo"

RESPONDEREMOS:

"O Apêlo de Estocolmo limita-se a colocar três questões muito simples:

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