

FORM NO. 51-61A
MAY 1949

CLASSIFICATION SECRET

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
INFORMATION REPORT

REPORT NO. [REDACTED]

CD NO. 25X1

DATE DISTR. 22 Sept. 1950

NO. OF PAGES 1

NO. OF ENCLS. 35
(LISTED BELOW)

SUPPLEMENT TO REPORT NO.

COUNTRY Germany

SUBJECT Miscellaneous 1945 Seventh Army Reports on Germany

COPIES REQUIRED [REDACTED] 25X1

DATE OF INFO. REQUIRED [REDACTED] 25X1 25X1

THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE ACT SO FAR AS SUCH ACTS ARE COVERED BY SECTIONS 793 AND 794 OF TITLE 18, U.S. CODE, AS AMENDED, ITS TRANSMISSION OR THE REVELATION OF ITS CONTENTS IN ANY MANNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW. REPRODUCTION OF THIS FORM IS PROHIBITED.

The attached miscellaneous U.S. Seventh Army reports on the interrogation of various prominent Nazis are sent to you for retention.

25X1

Nov 9 3 46 PM '50
OSI/IC

RETURN TO ARCHIVES & RECORDS CENTER
IMMEDIATELY AFTER USE
JOB 78-2352 BOX

OCT 10 1950

CLASSIFICATION SECRET

M/ISO

232706

STATE	NAVY	NSRB	DISTRIBUTION						
ARMY	AIR								

25X1

~~_____~~ @/2 [redacted]
Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006200030002-7

25X1

Comment: - -

*These interrogations
are of general back-
ground information
- no value as current
intelligence*

Approved For Release 2004/02/19 : CIA-RDP83-00415R006200030002-7 [redacted]

25X1

S E C R E TRef No SAIC/23
25 May 45SEVENTH ARMY INTERROGATION CENTER
APO 758 US ARMY: S E C R E T :
:Auth: CG, 7th Army :
:Init: PK :
:Date: 25 May 1945 :
:.....:OBSERVATIONS ON ARMORED TACTICS

25X1

(Cf also Report Ref No SAIC/17, 24 May 45)

i) GUDERIAN, Hans, GENOBST (Col Gen), FUEHRERRESERVE (Officers Pool), former Chief of Staff, German Gd and Forces, and Inspector General of Armored Units, is a 57-year old officer who apparently wants to appear anti-Nazi. He talked freely and answered all questions willingly, but stated emphatically that he did so only because HITLER's death freed him from his oath of allegiance.

Rating: B-2 Date of Information: See Text Interrogator: R.W.

ii) VON GEYR, Leo, GEN D PZTRUPPE (Lt Gen), Inspector of Armored Units. Proud of his profession, of the old Prussian general type, source gave information grudgingly; his personal pride borders upon the ridiculous. Having been Military Attache in LONDON for several years, source claims to have an understanding of Anglo-American affairs.

Rating: B-2 Date of Information: See Text Interrogator: R.W.

1. PERSONAL HISTORY OF GEN GUDERIAN

17 Jun 1888 Born at CULM/VISTULA.

1894-1901 School at COLMAR.

01-03 Officers candidate institute (KADETTENANSTALT) at KARLSRUHE.

03-07 Main Off Candidate Institution (HAUPTKADETTENANSTALT) LICHT-ERFELDE.

07 Assigned as O C (FAEHNRIICH) to HANNOVERSCHE JAEGER BN 10 at BITCHE.

27 Jan 08 Promoted to 2d Lt.

09 Transferred to GOSLAR with Bn.

12-13 On DS with TELEGRAFEN BN 3 (3 Telegraph Bn).

13-14 War Academy (KRIEGSAKADEMIE) BERLIN.

Aug 14-Nov 14 CO of Radio Posts with various hqs.

8 Nov 14 Promoted to 1st Lt.

Spring 15 Intelligence officer with various hqs.

18 Dec 15 Promoted to Capt.

Spring-fall 17 On DS on staff of various hqs.
(up to that time, his basic organization was still 10 JAEGER Bn)

Feb-Nov 18 With a hq staff in Italy.

Dec 18-Sep 19 FREIKORPS (GRENLSCHUTZ) (Frontier Guards) for the EAST.
Source helped to organize these units.

S E C R E T

1

S E C R E T

Ref No SAIC/23
25 May 45

Oct 19-Jan 20 REICHSWEHR BRIGADE 10, HANNOVER.
 Jan 20-Apr 22 Company commander with 10 JAEGER Bn of 17 Inf Regt, GOSLAR.
 Apr 22-fall 24 REICHSWEHRMINISTERIUM (War Ministry) INSPEKTEUR DER KRAFT-
 FAHRTRUPPEN (Inspector of M/T Units).
 Oct 24-Sep 27 On 2d Div Staff, STETTIN.
 1 Feb 27 Promoted to Maj.
 Oct 27-Jan 30 REICHSWEHRMINISTERIUM (War Ministry), TRANSPORT ABT DES
 TRUPPENAMTS.
 Feb 30-Sep 31 CO, KRAFTFAHRABT 3 (3 M/T Bn), BERLIN LANKWITZ.
 1 Feb 31 Promoted to Lt Col.
 Oct 31-Jun 34 C of S, Inspector of M/T units.
 1 Oct 33 Promoted to Col.
 Jul 34-Oct 35 C of S, KOMMANDO DER PANZERTRUPPEN (command of armored
 troops).
 Oct 35-Feb 38 Commanding 2 Armored Div.
 1 Aug 36 Promoted to Brig Gen.
 1 Feb 38 Promoted to Maj Gen.
 Mar 38-Nov 38 CG XVI Corps, BERLIN.
 Nov 38-Aug 39 OKH, CHEF DER SCHNELLEN TRUPPEN (Chief of Mobile Units).
 Nov 38 Promoted to Lt Gen (GENERAL DER PANZERTRUPPE).
 Sep 39-May 40 CG, XIX Pz Corps (Poland and France).
 Jun 40-Jun 41 CG PANZERGRUPPE GUDERIAN
 Jul 40 Promoted to GENOBST (Col Gen).
 Jun 41-Dec 41 CG of PANZERGRUPPE 2 (Pz Group 2, later changed to 2 Pz
 Army).
 Dec 41-Feb 43 Placed in FUEHRERRESERVE (Officers Pool).
 Feb 43-Mar 45 Inspector General of Armored Troops.
 21 Jul 44 In addition to other duties, Chief of Staff, German Ground
 Forces.
 28 Mar 45 FUEHRERRESERVE (Officers Pool).

2. PERSONAL HISTORY OF GEN VON GEYR

2 Mar 1886 Born at POTSDAM.
 1892-1904 Gymnasium at STUTTGART.
 04-11 26 WUERTEMBERGISCHES KOENIGSDRAGONER REGIMENT.
 05 Promoted to 2d Lt.
 11-14 War Academy (KRIEGSAKADEMIE) BERLIN.
 13 Promoted to 1st Lt.
 Aug 14-Nov 14 Regt Adj, 7 Cav Div.
 Nov 14-summer 16 With 9 Cav Div Hq, as Russian interpreter.
 Jan 15 Promoted to Capt.

S E C R E T

S E C R E T

Ref No SAIC/23
25 May 45

summer 16-Jan 17 On DS with XXII Res Corps Staff.
 Jan 17-Apr 17 Liaison Officer, First Bulgarian Army.
 Apr 17-fall 17 Assigned to XXII Res Corps Staff.
 fall 17-Apr 18 G-2, Army Group (HERZOG) ALBRECHT.
 Apr 18-May 18 C of S, 30 Inf Div.
 May 18-Jun 18 C of S, 26 LANDWEHR Inf Div.
 Jul 18 G-2, Army Group SCHOLZ.
 Aug 18-Sep 18 On Staff of Bulgarian ORCHRIDA Div.
 Sep 18 Ill with malaria until end of war.
 Mar 19-Oct 19 GROSSER GENERALSTAB (Higher General Staff), BERLIN (Polish and Russian questions).
 Jun 20-Sep 22 Instructor of tactics at OCS WUENSDORF near BERLIN and at MUNICH.
 Sep 22-Jan 25 Squadron Commander of 18 Cav Regt, LUDWIGSBURG.
 Jan 25 Promoted to Maj.
 Jan 25-Oct 28 1-A (First Staff Officer) 3 Cav Div.
 Oct 28-Jan 31 1-A (First Staff Officer) WEHRKREIS IV DRESDEN.
 Jan 31-Apr 33 CO, 14 Cav Regt LUDWIGSLUST/MECKLENBURG.
 30 Promoted to Lt Col.
 Oct 32 Promoted to Col.
 Apr 33-Oct 37 Military and Air Attaché, German Embassy LONDON, and in the legations at BRUSSELS and The HAGUE.
 Sep 35 Promoted to Brig Gen.
 Oct 37 Promoted to Maj Gen.
 Oct 37-Feb 40 CG, 3 Armored Div, BERLIN.
 Feb 40-Dec 41 CG XXIV Corps (later changed to XL Armored Corps).
 Apr 40 Promoted to Lt Gen.
 Dec 41-Jun 42 Ill.
 Jun 42-Sep 42 CG, XL Armored Corps.
 Oct 42-Jan 43 Ill.
 Feb 43-summer 43 Deputy CG, LXXXVI Corps.
 summer 43-Jul 44 GENERAL DER PANZERTRUPPE WEST (Gen of Armored Forces, West), which was nucleus for the PANZERARMBEE DER PANZERGRUPPE-WEST (Panzer Army of Panzer Group, West), later renamed 5 Pz Army.
 Aug 44-May 45 Inspector of Armored Units.

In July 44, source was relieved from his command in the WEST because of differences in opinions regarding armored tactics.

3. NOTES ON ARMORED TACTICS - GEN GUDERIAN

Gen GUDERIAN considers air superiority an essential factor in a good coordinated tank attack. Another important point is that tanks should

S E C R E TRef No SAIC/23
25 May 45

always be employed in masses. On ideal terrain and with all necessary tanks available, a good attack can employ three armored divs, each with 300-400 tanks. If the attacking force has more than one corps available, all divs can be employed on a broad front without any reserves, while the other corps takes up positions to the rear as reserve unit. In the case of tank units in reserve, the General points out, it is difficult to bring them up to the critical points in time to be of decisive value. As an illustration, source recalls that when he attacked the MAGINOT Line in 1940, he employed three armored divs on a broad front, leaving the question of reserves to another corps.

The leader of tank units should always be far up to the front, since quick decisions and forceful leadership are by far more important in armored tactics than in engagements of any other arm. It is of paramount importance to recognize the exact moment when the unit should advance into battle to its best advantage.

Armored tactics, source points out, were substantially known even before the war. Source's "ACHTUNG PANZER", Gen de GAULLE's "L'ARMEE DE CHOC", and British tactics were essentially the same. However, these tactics were employed neither by the British nor by the French; thus, despite inferiority in heavy tanks, the Germans achieved victory in 40, mainly due to superior communications equipment, and through correct employment of armored tactics.

As regards tank production, it is better, in Gen GUDERIAN's opinion, to have quantities of an older-type tank available than to experiment with too many models and lack the necessary amount of armor. Through series production the many changes of the experimental stages (KINDERKRANKHEITEN - "children diseases") are avoided.

4. NOTES ON ARMORED TACTICS - GEN VON GEYR

Source stresses the importance of speed of decision as applied to armored tactics. A leader of tank units must be able to make decisions on a minute's notice, work constantly under the pressure of time; he must have a "stop-watch mind" (GEDANKEN DER STOPPUHR). American regtl, bn, and co commanders still require too much time for making decisions, source believes, and are thereby losing the surprise element. Leadership of armored units of div and greater strength should be characterized by its dynamic qualities, and should "deliver punches at the right time and at the weak spot".

Armored tactics must vary according to the opponents, source points out. He himself developed different tactics for the Eastern and Western fronts. The amount and execution of air-tank coordination are decisive in tank battles. In this connection, the failure of the GAF is mainly responsible for the Allied break-out in Normandy.

The ability of the individual tank gunner to aim a good shot at long ranges is also a most important factor in the outcome of tank engagements. Generally, proper organization and leadership of fire fights has to be stressed.

(NOTE: All information below has been obtained from Gen GUDERIAN)

5. FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS

Land warfare will be dominated by the use of the tank as long as no more efficient A/T weapons are developed. Three types of tanks will continue to be essential: a heavy penetration tank (SCHWERER DURCHBRUCHPANZER) for the main thrusts; a light reconnaissance tank (LEICHTER AUFKLAERER); and a tank destroyer, which should be heavily armed and speedy. Source points out that during this war there has been a German tendency to replace the light tank with a heavy one, and that only on account of his specific

4

S E C R E T

S E C R E T

Ref No SAIC/23
25 May 45

requests the production of light tanks was taken up again.

For close combat developments of the flamethrower tank are to be expected. The German flamethrowers suffered from the bad quality of the oil; also, the inflammable liquid was placed within the tank. The American solution of placing the inflammable liquid on a trailer was much more efficient and comfortable for the tank crew, and American oil is excellent. As a weapon, the flame throwing tank is limited to street fighting and fighting against an enemy that cannot be reached by the straight flight of the machine gun bullet. It should be used as support weapon only. Source, however, expects further developments of its fire technique which, he believes, will be carried along artillery lines. The morale effect of the flame throwing tanks upon the enemy is considerable.

Rockets, having the obvious advantages as to weight, etc, cannot yet engage point targets and are therefore unsuitable for mounting on tanks. Once this disadvantage of the rocket projectors is overcome, however, tank-mounted rocket projectors will be commonly used.

Source does not believe that tank-mounted arty weapons will undergo considerable changes. He points out that tank crews had already enough trouble with a long barreled 88 mm gun, especially in the case of a gun with a muzzle brake, when passing a ditch, for instance. A longer barrel would seriously limit the tanks' mobility. A limited number of tanks used for penetration only might be the exception.

Howitzers mounted on SP chassis did not prove very successful, except for specifically assigned special missions. The best suited weapons for mounting on tanks at present are guns of calibers between 75 and 90 mm.

German technicians had quite some trouble in finding a good tank engine; dust in Russia had a destructive effect on German engines. Source thinks that similar difficulties might be encountered by the Americans when employing tanks in China. He believes mass employment of tanks against the Japanese in China possible, but difficulties might be encountered trying to employ armor on a large scale on the Japanese islands. Due to the numerous rivers in China, further developments of amphibious tanks would be of value.

Source believes that extensive adaptations of infra-red rays to tank warfare are to be expected. He is of the opinion that years to come might bring in the field developments comparable to these in the field of radio equipment between 1918 and the outbreak of the present war.

6. COMPARISON OF EXISTING TANKS

Source rates the German Royal Tiger as the best tank employed at present. Next is the Russian T-34, especially the model mounting a 85 mm gun. Next is the American SHERMAN the main shortcoming of which are its too narrow tracks. The Russian T-34 has excellent tracks as well as a light metal DIESEL engine. The quality of the steel in Russian tanks was slowly declining, however, and the lack of easily turnable turrets as well as good radio communication equipment were obvious disadvantages.

Source credits the German Army with having the best tank units.

7. GERMAN - JAPANESE COOPERATION

Source does not believe that any attacks by the Germans and the Japanese were coordinated. To his knowledge, information on German tactics was given to the Japanese only once, in 1940. Afterwards the Japanese diplomatic representatives were seen by source with HITLER on rare occasions. During nine months of working close to the FUEHRER, source saw the Japanese Ambassador, Mr OSHIMA, only twice with HITLER. The Japanese Military Attache, Mr KOMATSU, was seen five times with HITLER during the same period. On the Japanese diplomatic staff was also a Mr NISHI (?), specialist in American questions.

S E C R E T

S E C R E T

Ref No SAIC/23
25 May 45

Source does not know whether Japanese aggressive measures which led to the declaration of war were coordinated with German efforts, but he believes that they were.

8. DETAILS CONCERNING HITLER

Source saw HITLER last 28 Mar 45, before being placed in FUEHRERRESERVE. At that time the FUEHRER was suffering from nervous attacks, and his left arm and leg were shaking strongly. HITLER was also still suffering from bruises on his right arm and from the injured right ear drum, results of the 20 July attempt on his life. HITLER talked clearly and in a precise manner, and was well informed about the last details of the military situation at that time.

Source thinks that after his rise to power in 33, HITLER worked in the interests and to the good of the German people. The following events source thinks passable, if not entirely "correct". This refers to the increase of the German Army, the occupation of the Rhineland, the Saar plebiscite and the annexation of Austria and the Sudetenland. German annexation of the remainder of Czechoslovakia and of Poland did not find source's approval.

HITLER, source states, was able to convince everybody that his decisions were right through his personal charm, throughout the war. Field Marshal KEITEL, whom source does not consider very clever, was particularly susceptible to HITLER's arguments. The German General Staff raised objections as to various contemplated operations, but HITLER had his successes to back him up, and repeatedly accused his generals of a lack of imagination. Source states that the General Staff did not like the idea of attacking Poland in 39, but that the generals finally agreed to attack knowing that they could not resist HITLER's wishes.

9. THE EVACUATION AT DUNKIRK

Source claims he was not allowed to enter the Port of DUNKIRK with his tanks. The British forces there were to be destroyed by the GAF alone. The Air Force, however, failed in this task, and the British evacuation at DUNKIRK was thus made possible. Source believes that, given permission to enter DUNKIRK, he could have annihilated all troops assembled there.

10. NORMANDY INVASION

While a number of mistakes were made in the German preparations for an Allied invasion of France, the factor mainly responsible for Allied successes was the failure of the GAF! At the time of the invasion the GAF was still at the level of 1940, with no new-type planes. The lack of air-superiority led to the complete breakdown of the German net of communications. Other failures were the neglect to modernize the SIEGFRIED Line, the neglect to fortify cities like PARIS, LIEGE, ANTWERP, and the wrong distribution of armor. Source claims that the sole responsibility for all these errors lies with HITLER alone who neglected to follow advice given by the General Staff. It was HITLER who decided that the Atlantic Wall was strong enough to withstand all attacks. Commanders of tank units opposing Gen PATTON were unable to use their initiative, but had to follow HITLER's own plans. Source thinks he could have stopped Gen PATTON in France, had he been left free to employ his own strategy.

11. NOTES ON THE RUSSIAN ATTACK OF FALL 44.

After source had been appointed Chief of Staff, German Ground Forces, he tried to work out a plan to stop the Russian advances. He found conditions similar to those prevailing in the WEST, namely that important places had not been fortified.

S E C R E TRef No SAIC/23
25 May 45

The GAF, unable to cope with Allied air superiority in the WEST, was completely absent from the Eastern front. Source believed that because of inferior technical developments of the Russian Air Force as compared to the Allied, the GAF could achieve more in the EAST. He asked for air support, but it was denied. When the situation became more critical, HIMMLER, formerly commanding Army Group Upper RHINE, whose primary function was, at first, to catch deserters, appeared at the Eastern front entrusted with the task of stopping the Russians. Source told HIMMLER that he considered his function as leader of the German Police more important, and asked him to "stop playing troop leader". HIMMLER reported this conversation to HITLER, and eventually brought about source's ousting as Chief of Staff. Source also had a conversation with RIBBENTROPP, in which he pointed out that a two-front war was too much to cope with, and asked him to make peace either in the WEST or in the EAST. This conversation was also reported to the FUEHRER, and helped in bringing about GUDERIAN's dismissal. Source claims that as early as 43 he had conversations with SPEER and GOEBBELS in regard to the seriousness of the situation. Both agreed with source's point of view, but were unable to influence HITLER to stop his "intuition warfare".

The contemplated date and location of the Russian thrust were well known to the top Eastern front leaders, source claims. HITLER, however, did not believe that the situation was dangerous, believing Russia too weak after the summer campaign to start a new offensive. All materiel prepared by source for the Eastern front was shipped to the WEST in Sept 44. HITLER also erroneously overestimated the value of the RUHR, in source's opinion. The RUHR was at that time already crippled by Allied air attacks, while the Upper Silesian coal mines were still working full blast. Still, it was decided to concentrate on the defense of the RUHR. Source points out that stronger resistance in the EAST would have helped German food problems, since East Prussia was an essential factor in assuring the necessary crops.

12. ARDENNES OFFENSIVE

Although source was not involved in this offensive in any official capacity, he was watching it closely, since all his reinforcements for the Eastern front were used up during this campaign. Source thinks that in the beginning the front, limited to valleys, was too narrow. According to his estimate, the offensive should have been broken off on 20 Dec, after American resistance on a larger scale appeared. RUNSTEDT, however, was ordered to hold his gains at all costs.

13. PERSONALITIES

Source considers VON RUNDSTEDT as the best of all German generals at the present time. He is serious and still commands the confidence of the German people. Source suggests him as a candidate for a role similar to that of HINDENBURG in 25.

HIMMLER, source believes, is responsible for the deeds of the SS. He is a man with bad illusions. Source expected HIMMLER to change the policy of Germany by putting HITLER in his proper place.

KESSELRING, source says, is very intelligent, clever, but an opportunist.

14. PERSONAL NOTE

When Gen PATTON broke out of Normandy, HITLER told his generals that they would be unable to employ such daring tactics. Gen GUDERIAN objected, recalling his historic breakthrough in the ARDENNES, in 1940.

7

S E C R E T

S E C R E T

Ref No SAIC/23
25 May 45

15. MISCELLANY

a) On 16 Jan 45 a German corps had to return toward WARSAW. The WARSAW garrison was weak, but the FUEHRER ordered the city held at all costs. Source gave this order to his C of S, Col VON BONIN. In the afternoon Col VON BONIN reported that the troops as well as the WARSAW garrison were withdrawing and source, after checking this information as best he could, designated the next stand of the withdrawing troops. At the FUEHRER's conference, source was asked by HITLER whether he had known of the seriousness of the situation. Source said he had; while they were conferring, a radiogram arrived stating that the WARSAW garrison was still holding out. HITLER again gave orders to hold to the last. At that time GUDERIAN's orders as to a next stand had not yet arrived at WARSAW and when they finally came, the WARSAW commander preferred to follow those orders than those of HITLER. When the FUEHRER received the news, he decided to hold VON BONIN responsible and put him, together with two junior officers into the STRAFGEFANGNIS (Prison) BERLIN-MOABIT, despite source's protests that he was the only responsible person. The two junior officers were finally released and given front assignments, while VON BONIN's case was transferred to the RSHA (Central Security Office). The RSHA investigation cleared VON BONIN of all charges, but HITLER stated he did not trust the investigating officers. VON BONIN stayed in prison for two months and was then transferred to the DACHAU concentration camp.

b) Col GRAF VON RITTBERG, an intelligent German officer, realized in Apr 45 that the war was lost for Germany. He said so, and was shot for his careless remark.

c) "Russia wants to eliminate Poland. The American and British policy in regard to the Russian question is not understandable".

d) Source believes that Germany cannot supply her own food as long as Russia keeps her Eastern provinces.

e) "Negro troops either from French colonies or from the United States used as occupation forces will damage all signs of good will".


25 May 1945

SEVENTH ARMY INTERROGATION CENTER

Paul Kubala
PAUL KUBALA,
Maj, MI,
Commanding.

S E C R E T

THIS IS AN E
DO NOT CLASSIFY



SECRET

25X1

.....
:Auth: CG, 7th Army :
:Init: PK :
:Date: 24 May, 1945 :
:.....

Ref No SAIG/22
25 May, 1945.

SEVENTH ARMY INTERROGATION CENTER
APO 758 US ARMY

REICH MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR

(This Report is being published in answer to Special Questionnaire provided by US Group CG, G-2, T-Section, 6th Army Group, 14 May 45).

I. PREAMBLE

The following information was obtained from Otto EHRENSBERGER, Dr Kurt HEINRICHS, Dr LAUBE, Dr Walther OTT, and Ernst PABST, all of whom are officials in the Ministry of the Interior. Most of the records and personnel of the Ministry are located in the following places:

- i) QUERFURTH, near HALLE
- ii) SCHLOSS LEUCHTENBURG, near JENA (KAHLA RR Station)
- iii) SCHLOSS SONNENSTEIN in PIRNA, near DRESDEN
- iv) BERLIN, DOROTHEENSTRASSE 46
- v) GARMISCH- PARTENKIRCHEN

It is possible that the personnel and records which were in BERLIN in March 1945 were recently evacuated elsewhere or the papers were destroyed.

Date of Information: See Text

Interrogator: G.P.M.

II. ORGANIZATION OF THE MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR

The chart as found in the Organization Charts of the German Ministries and Central Agencies is out of Date, due to the fact that certain changes were made in 1944 when HIMMLER became Minister. For revised chart showing the principal changes see Appendix. Personalities and their probable locations are listed under the respective Departments, below:

A. CENTRAL DEPARTMENT

1. Personnel

Ministerialdirektor WOELLKE - possibly in BAD SACHSA, in the Southern Harz.
 Ministerialdirigent BURKART - AUGSBURG.
 Ministerialrat Dr GRAU - vicinity of STUTTGART.
 Ministerialrat Dr OTT - AUGSBURG (SAIG).
 Reichsrichter HAHN - Southern Germany.
 A number of intermediate officials are in GARMISCH-PARTENKIRCHEN.

2. Records

The records of the Central Department are partially in QUERFURT and partially in SCHLOSS LEUCHTENBURG, near JENA. A few are in GARMISCH. The records in BERLIN are believed to have been totally destroyed.

B. DEPARTMENT I

1. Personnel

Ministerialrat Dr GLOBKE - KOEHEL, HINDEBURGSTRASSE 292.
 Ministerialdirigent Dr KESSLER - AUGSBURG.
 Reichsrichter SCHMIDT-BRUECKEN - AUGSBURG.
 Regierungsrat STIERWALDT - AUGSBURG.
 Ministerialdirektor Dr FAUST - presumably in Northern Germany.
 Ministerialrat Dr VON WOLFF - QUERFURT.
 Oberregierungsrat Dr HOFFMANN - in Southern Germany.

2. Records

The records are in QUERFURT, LEUCHTENBURG, and BERLIN.

SECRET

10 1140 B

S E C R E TRef. No SAIG/22
25 May 45C. DEPARTMENT II1. Personnel

Ministerialdirektor EHRENSBERGER, AUGSBURG (SAIG).
 Reichsrichter Dr PABST, AUGSBURG (SAIG).
 Johannes KAIBEL, AUGSBURG, (SAIG).
 Oberregierungsrat VOLLPRECHT, AUGSBURG.
 Ministerialrat MUTTRAY, TRAUNSTEIN.
 Regierungsrat VOM ROSTBURG, TRAUNSTEIN.
 Oberregierungsrat Dr FISCHER, GARMISCH-PARTENKIRCHEN.
 Reichsrichter Dr DANKELMANN, GARMISCH-PARTENKIRCHEN.
 Oberregierungsrat MAYER-VESTPHALEN, QUERFURT.
 Oberregierungsrat RITTER VON LEX, QUERFURT.
 Ministerialrat BUOKOW, EUTIN.
 Ministerialdirigent JACOBI, Presumably in Northern Germany.
 Ministerialrat KLAS, " " " "
 Ministerialrat GUELDEPFENNIG " " " "
 Oberverwaltungsrichter WEISE " " " "
 Oberregierungsrat Dr PETZ " " " "

2. Records

Most of the records were destroyed in air raids, at BERLIN and KUESTRIN. Some records may be found in QUERFURT, and possibly a few at GARMISCH-PARTENKIRCHEN.

D. DEPARTMENT III

Most of this Department, both personnel and records, is located at SCHLOSS SONNENSTEIN, in PIRNA. A smaller part remained in BERLIN, DOROTHEENSTRASSE 46.

III-A

Dr JOACHIM	GARMISCH-PARTENKIRCHEN
Ministerialrat BOETTOHER	PIRNA
Ministerialrat BOKE	BERLIN

III-B

Direktor Dr HOFFMEISTER	BERLIN
Ministerialrat Dr FITTEL	PIRNA
Oberregierungsrat KNAUT	"
Ministerialrat SIBETH	"

III-C

Ministerialrat Dr LAUBE	AUGSBURG (SAIG)
Ministerialrat KAEMPER	PIRNA
Ministerialrat ULRICH	"
Praesident KNEIP	"
Ministerialrat GOEDECKE	BAD HEILBRUNN, near BAD TOELZ
Ministerialrat MOLSEN	BERLIN
Oberregierungsrat KOBE	"

E. DEPARTMENT IV1. Personnel

Ministerialrat Dr HEINRICHS	AUGSBURG (SAIG)
Ministerialrat Dr HOFFMANN	" "
Ministerialdirigent Dr FUCHS	AUGSBURG
Regierungs-Kassenrat TESCHNER	LEUCHTENBURG, near JENA
Gauhauptmann Dr KREISSL	REICHENBURG
Reichsrichter BERNER	PIRNA
Ministerialrat VON LUCAS	BERLIN
Ministerialdirigent Dr LOSCHELDER	"

In addition, there are seven minor officials and seven employees in GARMISCH-PARTENKIRCHEN.

S E C R E T

S E C R E T

Ref No SAIO/22
25 May 45

2. Records

Most of the records of this Department were destroyed in an air attack on BERLIN in Nov 1943. Of the new records, part are in PIRMA, part in QUERFURT, and part in LEUCHTENBURG, near JENA. A few records were left in BERLIN, DOROTHEENSTRASSE 49, and a few were in GARMISCH-PARTENKIRCHEN, in the RATHAUS.

F. PUBLIC HEALTH MATTERS

1. Personnel

Dr KAUFMANN (MD)	GARMISCH-PARTENKIRCHEN
Ministerialrat ENGEL	" "

25 May 1945


SEVENTH ARMY INTERROGATION CENTER

Paul Kubala
PAUL KUBALA,
Maj, MI,
Commanding.

S E C R E T

3

Ref No SAIC/22
25 May 45
APPENDIX



100
101
102
103
104

S E C R E T

S E C R E T THIS IS AN ENCL
DO NOT BE AWA

S E C R E T
: Auth: CG, 7th Army :
: Init: P.K. :
: Date: 29 May 1945 :
:.....:

SEVENTH ARMY INTERROGATION CENTER
APO 758 US ARMY

HERMANN GOERING - FINANCIAL NOTES

The following notes, concerning Hermann GOERING's income, covering the period 1937 - 42, were found in his ledger:

<u>Date</u>	<u>Date of Deposit</u>	<u>Bank</u>	<u>Sum</u>
12 Jul 1937	Check from HAMBURG	DEUTSCHE BANK	RM 250,000.--
10 Oct 1937	" " "	THYSSEN BANK	" 250,000.--
31 Jan 1938	" " "	THYSSEN BANK	" 125,000.--
9 Feb 1938	" " "	DEUTSCHE BANK	" 300,000.--
7 Jul 1938	" " "	THYSSEN BANK	" 125,000.--
8 Dec 1938	" " "	DEUTSCHE BANK	" 250,000.--
13 Feb 1939	" " "	THYSSEN BANK	" 250,000.--
13 Apr 1939	" " "	DEUTSCHE BANK	" 125,000.--
1 Jun 1939	" " "	THYSSEN BANK	" 125,000.--
26 Oct 1939	" " "	DEUTSCHE BANK	" 125,000.--
12 Jul 1939	" " "	DEUTSCHE BANK	" 125,000.--
7 Dec 1939	" " "	THYSSEN BANK	" 125,000.--
24 Jan 1940	" " "	THYSSEN BANK	" 250,000.--
23 Apr 1940	" " "	THYSSEN BANK	" 250,000.--
11 Jul 1940	" " "	DEUTSCHE BANK	" 250,000.--
25 Oct 1940	" " "	THYSSEN BANK	" 250,000.--
8 Feb 1941	" " "	THYSSEN BANK	" 250,000.--
19 Apr 1941	" " "	THYSSEN BANK	" 250,000.--
11 Jul 1941	" " "	THYSSEN BANK	" 250,000.--
2 Jan 1942	" " "	DEUTSCHE BANK	" 250,000.--
19 Jun 1942	" " "	THYSSEN BANK	" 250,000.--
5 Sep 1942	2 checks from HAMBURG (Special account HOFER)	THYSSEN BANK	" 1,226,000.--
17 Oct 1943	check from HAMBURG	THYSSEN BANK	" 250,000.--
		TOTAL	RM 5,901,000.--

According to statements by Minister Dr FUNK these are checks of the Cigarette Factory REEMTSMA, with the owners of which GOERING had very good connections. A tax trial against this firm involving about 12 million marks was squashed, presumably with GOERING's help. The president of the finance dept in HAMBURG would probably know about this matter.

Further, there were the following notes in the ledger:

<u>Date</u>	<u>Check</u>	<u>Bank</u>	<u>Sum</u>
11 Feb 1937	from BERLIN	THYSSEN BANK	RM 150,000.--
11 Feb 1937	" BERLIN	THYSSEN BANK	" 100,000.--
8 Apr 1938	" ALLIANZ	THYSSEN BANK	" 100,000.--
10 Apr 1941	" OSRAM	THYSSEN BANK	" 100,000.--
3 Jan 1942	STAATSRAT HERMANN	THYSSEN BANK	" 1,000,000.--
		TOTAL	RM 1,450,000.--

S E C R E T

S E C R E TRef No SAIC/31
29 May 45

HERMANN was a publisher of insurance periodicals. GOERING reportedly helped him a great deal. The connections with the other firms are unknown.

During 1940/41 there are following transfers of larger sums:

<u>Date</u>	<u>Check</u>	<u>Bank</u>	<u>Sum</u>
30 Oct 1940	RHEINMETALL (ROHNERT)	BANK DER DEUT- SCHEN LUFTFAHRT	RM 100,000.--
30 Oct 1940	JUNKERS WERKE	" " "	" 100,000.--
6 Nov 1940	BANK DER D. LUFTFAHRT	" " "	" 100,000.--
8 Nov 1940	WITTKOWITZER BERGBAU	" " "	" 500,000.--
19 Nov 1940	REICHSWERKE HERM. GOERING	" " "	" 150,000.--
3 Jan 1941	REICHSWERKE HERM. GOERING	" " "	" 50,000.--
3 Jan 1941	BORSIG (RHEINMETALL)	" " "	" 50,000.--
7 Apr 1941	JUNKERS	" " "	" 100,000.--
28 Apr 1941	BANK DER D. LUFTFAHRT	" " "	" 100,000.--
30 Apr 1941	RHEINMETALL (ROHNERT)	" " "	" 150,000.--
16 Aug 1941	JUNKERS WERKE	" " "	" 100,000.--
17 Sep 1941	HERM. GOERING WERKE	" " "	" 100,000.--
20 Nov 1941	HERM. GOERING WERKE	" " "	" 250,000.--
		TOTAL	RM 1,850,000.--

Thus GOERING received nearly 2 million marks within two years through his control of these plants under the Four-Year Plan. GOERING admitted that he had "asked" all these plants to transfer some funds occasionally to his personal account, since under Party regulations members in public offices were not allowed to accept remunerations for services as board members.

29 May 1945

SEVENTH ARMY INTERROGATION CENTER

Paul Kubala
PAUL KUBALA,
Maj, MI,
Commanding.

2

S E C R E T

20X

S E C R E T

Ref No SAIC/14
19 May 45

: S E C R E T :
:Auth: CG, 7th Army:
:Init: P.H.:
US ARMY :Date: 19 May 1945 :
:.....:

SEVENTH ARMY INTERROGATION CENTER
APO 758

FRENCH WORKS OF ART OBTAINED BY
FORMER REICHSMARSCHALL HERMANN GOERING

(Of Questionnaire A C of S, G-5, Seventh Army, 10 May 1945)

Rating: C-3 Date of Information: See Text Interrogator: A.Z.

1. PREAMBLE

Although he has been depicted in many news reports as being half mad, GOERING gives the impression of being a highly intelligent and cunning man, with charming manners and a certain knowledge of art. He is very talkative, and once he has started to develop a favorite theme he can hardly be stopped.

He insists that he has no desire to conceal anything about the works of art which he has obtained in foreign countries. He explains his tremendous accumulation of treasures by claiming to be a great lover of artistic works, and by stating that it was his intention to transform CARINHALL into a National Museum. He says, "ICH BIN NUN MAL EIN RENAISSANCETYP" ("After all, I'm a Renaissance type"). GOERING also states that the low prices of jewelry and works of art in the occupied countries provided an incentive to buy them wholesale. He adds that he was astounded by the cheapness of diamonds at CARTIER's in PARIS in 1940. From 1942 onwards, the prices of antiques and artistic works rose enormously, and he had to exercise all his cleverness and every ruse in order to avoid being "stung" by the dealers.

Source states that in addition to the treasures which he bought, others were sent to him as gifts by Party members and units of the GAF, and that he also exchanged articles with dealers and other collectors, as a stamp collector swaps stamps. He claims that only about one percent of his collection comes from France.

2. FRENCH WORKS OF ART IN GOERING'S COLLECTION

GOERING states that no works of art were taken away from the French National Museums. He claims to have been very helpful to the directors of the French Museum in providing safe repositories for their treasures in specially constructed air raid shelters. He states that he exchanged two statues and a couple of paintings for one wooden statuette and one painting which he was very fond of at the LOUVRE. The negotiations, he states, were long and difficult, but there was no exercise of pressure on his part.

The Jewish properties were exhibited in the SALLE DES JEUX DE PAUME, under the supervision of French and German officials. The most valuable of these were sent, on HITLER's orders, to the Royal Castles of NEU-SCHWANSTEIN and HOHENSCHWANGAU, Bavaria, to the shelters of the FUHRERBAUTEN in MUNICH and of the REICHSCHANZEL-LORY in BERLIN, and to OBERSALZBERG. Their ultimate destination was the new National Museum at LINZ. Although he admits that some of those treasures were sent elsewhere, GOERING pretends to have no knowledge of their whereabouts.

The remaining works of art exhibited at the SALLE DES JEUX DE PAUME were sold at public auction. PW bought some paintings, statues, antique furniture, and GOBELIN tapestries. In these deals GOERING was advised by a French expert, a Museum official, and his bids never exceeded the evaluation set by this advisor. The only jewelry which he bought was antique. French and German antique dealers were also authorized to take part in these auctions. PW claims that the FUHRER demanded photographs of all works of art bought by other amateurs, and that the latter often had to turn over their purchases to HITLER's representative, for eventual shipment to the LINZ Museum.

GOERING states that he bought certain items direct from dealers in Paris, like any private collector. Also, he occasionally made purchases from chateaux and private collections through an intermediary.

S E C R E T

21105B

SECRETRef No SAIC/14
19 May 453. CONDITION OF THE COLLECTION

Source states that two specialists were responsible for the care of the works of art in his collection, and that all items were in an excellent state of preservation at the time of their evacuation to Southern Germany (See next section).

4. REPOSITORIES OF THE FRENCH WORKS OF ART

There was not sufficient time to evacuate GOERING's entire collection when the Russian advance menaced CARINHALL. A number of GOBELIN tapestries (no French ones) and a certain amount of furniture (Louis XV and Louis XVI) which came from the SALLE DES JEUX DE PAUME had to be left behind.

The most precious collections were sent to BERCHTESGADEN, by RR. At the time of PW's arrest there by the SS, 23 April 45, these treasures were loaded on freight cars which were inside the unfinished tunnel of the BERCHTESGADEN RR station, and on some other cars which stood on the tracks of the RR line from BERCHTESGADEN to KOENIGSEE. (Note: This information has since been confirmed.) Before his arrest GOERING had time to give orders for the security of these freight cars. Nevertheless he was informed that some of the guards attached to him (GESTAPO and SD men) had started to plunder the cars, as well as his villa at OBERSALZBERG, under pretext of putting them in greater safety. Source believes, however, that all the valuable works of art which he obtained from the SALLE DES JEUX DE PAUME can be located and returned.


Following the interrogation source made a written statement pledging his cooperation in the recovery of these art treasures (See Appendix). He also gave the following additional locations where some other works of art acquired at the JEUX DE PAUME might be found:

- a) A certain number of GOBELINS at the BURG VELDENSTEIN near NEUHAUS on the PEGNITZ (RR line from NUREMBERG to BAYREUTH).
- b) A certain number of GOBELINS in the air raid shelters of the LUFTWAFFE War Academy at WILDPARK-WERDER, near POTSDAM.
- c) One painting called the "Madonna of MEMLING" at PW's wife's present dwelling at ZELL am SEE. (This painting was returned by PW to G-5, Seventh Army, through this unit.)

GOERING claims to have had nothing to do with any French works of art or valuables other than those mentioned in this report.

19 May 1945.

SEVENTH ARMY INTERROGATION CENTER


PAUL KUBALA,
Maj, MI,
Commanding.

SECRET

2

S E C R E T

Ref No SAIG/14
19 May 45

APPENDIX

AUGSBURG, 18 May 1945.

I hereby declare:

- 1) That I am ready to return art treasures (exhibited in JEUX DE PAUME) which I acquired and bought at auctions of requisitioned property.
- 2) That I will do my utmost to find out about the location of these articles and that I will give all the pertinent information possible.
- 3) That the greater part of these articles and of my total property of art treasures are packed in several freight cars in BERCHTESGADEN. The storing of these articles in air raid shelters did not occur because of my imprisonment by HITLER the day after my arrival there.
- 4) That I informed the French liaison officer in charge about several other places where there could be some less important works of art.
- 5) That I am convinced that a conference with my former art custodian HOFER in the presence of Allied officers will lead to a speedy and extensive clarification of all questions.

/s/ HERMANN GOERING
REICHSMARSCHALL

S E C R E T

SEVENTH ARMY INTERROGATION CENTER
APO 758 US ARMY

BRIG GEN MAKATO ONODERA,
IMPERIAL JAPANESE MILITARY ATTACHE, STOCKHOLM

1. SOURCE

VOECZKOENDY, Ladislas a 49-year-old Hungarian diplomat who was Asst Military Attache at STOCKHOLM from Dec 43 to Nov 44. Owing to the fact that he speaks very good Russian he was able to make friends with Gen ONODERA, who speaks no other European language well and who therefore had few friends in STOCKHOLM. Source talked freely and appears to be entirely sincere and truthful.

Rating: B-2

Date of Information: See text

Interrogator: G.W.G.

2. PERSONAL HISTORY OF GEN ONODERA

Gen ONODERA, who is 43 years old, comes from a family of the Japanese nobility. His wife belongs to a Japanese family of the highest nobility and is said to be related to the Emperor, a fact of which the Gen is very proud. They have three sons; the eldest, who is 15 years old, is at a cadet school in Japan. They apparently live a modest, harmonious family life, go out rarely, and receive few guests. Gen ONODERA is a moderate man, drinks very little and does not smoke. He suffers from low blood pressure. Once or twice a month he communicates by telephone with his sons and relatives in Japan.

The Gen is a diligent and tireless worker. He speaks and writes good Russian, speaks and writes German poorly, and understands some English. He deliberates for some time before making a statement. He has frequently told source that the Japanese General Staff, as well as the Emperor, was highly satisfied with his work in STOCKHOLM, and on several occasions he has given source to understand that he was a future candidate for the post of Chief of the Japanese General Staff. He has never spoken to source in detail about his career, but during the course of frequent conversations between Feb and Nov 44 source was able to obtain the following information about the General's history:

- 23 Graduated from War Colloge, where he had learned to speak Russian.
- 24-27 Various assignments with higher commands.
- 28-30 Served as Capt (Intelligence Officer) on General Staff with troops opposing the Russians in Manchuria. There he perfected his knowledge of the Russian language, and is said to have done excellent work.
- 30-36 Assigned to various higher commands. Also served as instructor of tactics at War Colloge.
- 36-37 Organized the pro-Japanese "National Chinese Movement" in China. According to his own statements, he did a "perfect" job and received great credit for this work.
- 40 ? Commanded an inf div fighting in China for an entire year. Source believes it was in 40.
- 40- ? Returned to War Colloge as instructor.
- ? Assigned to STOCKHOLM as Military Attache.

3. OFFICE OF IMPERIAL JAPANESE MILITARY ATTACHE, STOCKHOLM

a) Location

This office is located on the fifth floor at LINNE-GATAN 38, adjoining the General's private apartment. In Nov 44 Gen ONODERA told source that he intended to rent another small apartment so that he would not have to receive visitors in his office. Source believes that this move was contemplated in order to safeguard the security of the work at the office.

b) Mission

The function of this office is to furnish military intelligence to the Imperial Japanese Government. Its importance was considered so great that it took precedence over the Japanese Legation at STOCKHOLM. Gen ONODERA's reports

S E C R E TRef No SAIC/29
28 May 45

went via German military transmitters in BERLIN directly to the Emperor, whereas the reports of the Minister went to the Prime Minister, who submitted to the Emperor only such portions of the reports as he considered of particular importance. Furthermore, Gen ONODERA claimed that he had orders to check the Legation's security measures, and that he could request the recall of the Minister if he did not consider him suitable for the post.

After the successful Allied invasion of France, Gen ONODERA told source that he had received orders to remain at his post after Germany's collapse in order to take charge of the Japanese intelligence system for all Europe. In source's opinion he already has a very considerable network of espionage agents at his disposal.

c) Office Duties and Personnel

Gen ONODERA and his wife do all the code work themselves in a special room of their private apartment. No one else has access to this room.

Two engineer specialists, whom source describes as co-workers, work at this office. One of them, SATO, is supposed to be an authority on aircraft construction. He is about 32 years old, and speaks very poor English. During 44 he made frequent trips to Germany. The other, name unknown to source, is said to be a naval construction engineer. He speaks German fluently. Gen ONODERA remarked that this man was very familiar with the composition of the Rumanian and Russian Black Sea fleets.

Two Estonian women, one of them the wife of a Swedish cavalry Capt, work in an ante-room. They translate Swedish newspaper articles and do general office work.

During 44 source frequently saw three or four other young Japanese in the office. ONODERA stated that they had been studying in Europe and were unable to return home, so he had given them employment in his office. In early Nov 44, ONODERA mentioned that he was expecting three additional Japanese for his office, and that five more would be added to the Legation Staff. At that time he was also trying to get a Japanese radio technician, as well as equipment, in order to have effective communications with Japan after the anticipated collapse of Germany.

4. ASSOCIATIONS

In addition to his many meetings with source, Gen ONODERA frequently associated with the following:

The Finnish Military Attache and his Staff

The German Military Attache and his Staff

The German Air Attache and his Staff

Less frequently he associated with:

The Rumanian Military Attache

The Swiss Military Attache

Gen KELLGREEN, Director of the Swedish Attache Group

Maj PETERSON, Director of the Swedish Communication Group

He never made any mention of his relations with the Russian Military Attache.

Gen ONODERA visited his own Legation several times weekly. He sometimes made derogatory remarks about their work, such as, "These people don't do anything. They only read the newspapers, translate them, and that is what they send to Japan." He mentioned that he had often argued with the Minister about this type of work and also that he had found negligence in the code work.

S E C R E T

Ref No SAIC/29
28 May 45

5. SECRET AFFILIATIONS

a) Intelligence Concerning Russia

An Estonian, who according to repeated statements did excellent work, was a chief source of Gen ONODERA's intelligence on Russia. After the capitulation of Finland, Gen ONODERA established connections with Finnish intelligence officers who had escaped and who were anxious to work against the Russians.

b) Intelligence Concerning the Allies

ONODERA boasted of having an agent in the British Passport Dept in the BIRGEL-JARS-GATAN, STOCKHOLM. He claimed that he regularly read the reports of the Secretary of the British Legation, CHESHIRE, who is said to be a Capt and chief of the British Intelligence Corps. This was a source of considerable amusement to ONODERA, which is illustrated by the following story:

One day a Swedish journalist, Capt Goesta MELIN, invited VOECZKOENDY (source) to luncheon at the RICHE Restaurant. The journalist asked VOECZKOENDY several political questions; among others he asked him what would be the reaction of the Hungarian Army to an Allied landing in the Balkans. Source replied that Hungary would be very pleased about it, but stated that such an operation would require at least 20 divs, as the Germans were very strong in the Balkans. On the following day source visited the general's office and noticed immediately that ONODERA was suspicious of him. Just as source was leaving ONODERA suddenly asked him how he happened to know Capt MELIN. In reply source asked, "How do you know that I know him? Did you perhaps see me with him at the RICHE?" ONODERA replied that he had read the report which CHESHIRE had received from MELIN. Source then told the Gen what he had told Capt MELIN. ONODERA then stated, "The report which CHESHIRE sent to LONDON was not the same; apparently he had worked it over."

Gen ONODERA always waited for the British courier plane, and frequently he stated that he had received "something interesting" from England. He also sent money to England, as he inadvertently revealed to source on more than one occasion by such remarks as, "People say I am stingy, but I believe my men in England are satisfied; I always send money." Source believes that ONODERA's informants were British journalists, because he once mentioned knowing newspaper reporters formerly stationed in STOCKHOLM who had been recalled to England.

c) Intelligence Concerning Germany

As ONODERA frequently remarked, he knew practically everything about the disposition of German military forces. He and his assistants often travelled to Denmark, Norway and Germany to meet German officers.

6. GEN ONODERA'S OPINIONS ON MILITARY AND POLITICAL AFFAIRS

a) Reliability of ONODERA's Deductions

Gen ONODERA is a fine example of the Intelligence Officer. He is industrious, discreet, suspicious, and intelligent. He spares no effort in building up his net of agents. His deductions concerning the military situation in Europe were correct, and his predictions have been borne out by events. From information received from England regarding the buildup of supplies, he was able to estimate the date of the invasion of the Continent to within a month of the actual landing. After the landings in Normandy, he predicted that the Germans would not be able to repel Allied forces. Based upon his experiences in the Far East, he declared that the bridgehead would be destroyed within the first 24 hours, or not at all. He anticipated the destruction of Germany soon after the bridgehead was successfully established, and by early 1945 he was making every effort to revamp his espionage network accordingly.

Ref No SAIC/29
28 May 45

b) The European Situation after Allied Victory

At the end of Aug 44, ONODERA declared that all Europe would be exposed to the dangers of Bolshevism after Allied victory. Russia is slowly but surely gaining control of the Continent. In Scandinavia she is already at the Atlantic, and from there and from the Baltic Sea she already surrounds Sweden and threatens Denmark. After conquering Northern Germany, she will be able to work her way to the English Channel. Russia already dominates the Balkans, and from there she threatens the Middle East. The smoothly functioning Soviet propaganda machine will do everything possible to provoke revolutions in the Iberian Peninsula, in France, and in Italy, and then to tackle Europe from the Southwest. Soviet activities in North Africa are becoming more and more dangerous. Ultimately England will confront Russia alone, because the US will have no time to attend to Europe once she is fully committed in the East. Japan will confront the US with ever-increasing difficulties, and will tie down US forces completely.

The Russians, on the other hand, will receive military reinforcements from the 40 millions Germans in the occupied areas, and will also engage in strong propaganda activities among the impoverished German masses. Once Soviet Russia has had time to reorganize her disrupted agriculture and to bring her factories into full operation again, she will be so strong that she will tolerate no counter power in Europe.

c) Russo-Japanese Relations

ONODERA spoke frequently of Japanese hatred of the Russians, but he pointed out that Japan's primary enemy was the USA. In 44 he was firmly convinced that Russia would not attack Japan. He based his reasoning on Russia's need to rehabilitate her industrial and agricultural systems. Russia, he stated, must reorganize her KOLHOS and SOVHOS (collective farms), build more and more tractors, and generally revamp her agricultural set-up, which had proved a failure during the war. The Russian farmer would have to take to scythe and shovel to escape starvation. If the US had not shipped vast quantities of food to Russia in 43, a major disaster in the food situation would have occurred.

d) The USA

ONODERA stated in Oct 44 that he expected the European War to end in Feb 45. He declared that the US had already won the "American War" by binding to herself Canada, Central America, and South America. With the acquisition of numerous air and naval bases, the US had gained unquestionable superiority over impoverished Britain. However, Soviet propaganda in South America will greatly increase, and aside from the problems created for the US by Japan, the US will have to face others provided by Russia in Scandinavia, the Balkans, and the oil regions of the Middle East. With the discharge of many American soldiers after the European War, the US will be faced with severe labor troubles. All these factors, ONODERA hoped, would prevent the US from deploying all her forces in the continuation of the war against Japan.

e) German Policies

At the end of May 44, source had a lengthy conference with ONODERA, during which the latter severely condemned German policies. ONODERA stated that KOCH, German Plenipotentiary for Eastern Territories, had so conducted affairs in the occupation of the Ukraine that he might as well have been working for the Soviets and deserved the "Order of STALIN". The Ukrainians, who had greeted the German Army as liberators in 41, had already turned their backs on the German civilian occupational authorities as far back as 42, simply because of maltreatment and the transgressions of a few subordinates. The German civilian authorities, through their immeasurable lack of understanding of the people and through their ignorance concerning the Ukrainian question, had made enemies of the Ukrainians, whereas with understanding and cooperation they could have gained an army of three million men.

Gen ONODERA went on to say that the treatment of Japan by the German High

S E C R E TRef No SAIC/29
28 May 45

Command had been equally stupid. No conferences were held concerning coordinated conduct of the war. The last thing that the Japanese wanted was the German attack upon Russia. The Japanese High Command had a quite different plan. They wanted Germany to drive through the Balkans, Turkey, Iraq, and Iran to the Persian Gulf, and finally to link up with a coordinated Japanese drive in India. ONODERA said that it was high time, in these last hours, to try to work together. He had received word from TOKYO that conferences between the two high commands would shortly take place at the FUEHRER's Hq. Immediately afterwards, the German newspapers announced that extremely important conferences were pending concerning the common conduct of the war in future operations. Ten days later the subject was dropped completely, and no further word was published or spoken regarding the conferences. When source questioned ONODERA on the matter, the latter answered evasively, merely stating that Japan would continue the war to the end, regardless of the outcome in Europe. Source believes that the Japanese offer of common action in the conduct of the war was intended to mislead the German High Command and to influence Russia to conclude a "special agreement" with Japan, a different form of agreement from the "Five Year Non-Aggression Pact". Gen ONODERA appeared very pleased when he mentioned this pact.

7. CONCLUSION

From that time onward, ONODERA mentioned again and again that he would have to stay in STOCKHOLM for a long time. Prior to Nov 44 he had been receiving additional sums of money from various sources, including 150,000 Swiss francs from the Japanese Attache in Finland. Source believes that, owing to the present European situation and to the disruption of communications, there may be loopholes in ONODERA's organization; but he declares that a man of ONODERA's perseverance and ability would be able to repair them without great loss of time. He is convinced that Gen ONODERA has built an espionage and intelligence service which from henceforth will be the center of such Japanese activity in Europe.

28 May 1945.

SEVENTH ARMY INTERROGATION CENTER

Paul Kubala
PAUL KUBALA,
Maj, MI,
Commanding.

S E C R E T

SECRET

SECRET
 Auth: CG, 7th Army
 Init: WZO
 Date: 13 Apr 45

14 Apr 45

SEVENTH ARMY INTERROGATION CENTER
 APO 758 US ARMY

Copy No 30

If the information contained in this report is required for further distribution, it should be so paraphrased that no mention is made of the prisoners' names or of the methods by which the information has been obtained.

The following are the names and secret numbers of the prisoners mentioned in this report:

<u>Name</u>	<u>Rank</u>	<u>Secret No</u>	<u>Unit</u>	<u>Place and Date of Capture</u>
PAUER, Friedrich	GENLT a.D. (Maj Gen) (retired)	45/998	Retired	WUERZBURG, 9 Apr 45
GAEDE, Heinrich	GENMAJ i.G. (Brig Gen, GSC)	45/950	CG, 719 Inf Div	BERGZABERN, 30 Mar 45.
STEINBACH, Paul	GENMAJ (Brig Gen)	45/969	FUEHRER- RESERVE, OKH	KLEINRINDERFELD 2 2 Apr 45
RODENWALD, Ernst Prof	GENARZT (Surgeon Gen)	45/975	Mil Med Academy, BERLIN	HEIDELBERG, 1 Apr 45.
LUETKENHAUS, Hubert	GENMAJ a.D. (Brig Gen) (retired)	45/978	Retired	MOSBACH, 4 Apr 45.
MILTZOW, Hermann	OBSTLT i.G. (Lt Col, GSC)	45/951	Ia, 719 Inf Div	BERGZABERN, 30 Mar 45.
HACKEMANN, Ernst	OBSTLT (Lt Col)	45/992	Battle Group GERS- FELD	GERSFELD, 6 Apr 45
SCHREIBER, Kurt	LT (2nd Lt)	45/976	LUFTWAFFE Bn z.b.V. 6	HEIDELBERG, 31 Mar 45.

1

SECRET

SECRET

I. SOURCES:

- a) GENMAJ (Brig Gen) Heinrich GAEDE, CG 719 Inf Div, a 47-year old General Staff Officer, intelligent, arrogant, very Prussian, and violently anti-American. From 1942-1944 he was in Bulgaria as Chief of the German Training Staff attached to the Royal Bulgarian Army Staff.
- b) GENMAJ (Brig Gen) Paul STEINBACH, FUEHRERRESERVE OKH (German Army Officers' Replacement Pool), a 58-year old professional soldier with a non-Nazi attitude.
- c) OBSTLF (Lt Col) Hermann MILTZOW, Ia, 719 Div, a 35-year old General Staff Officer of typical Prussian caliber.

* * * * *

1. Personalities

M: They seem to have respect for KEITEL.

G: KEITEL is only a messenger boy; when the FUEHRER calls, he runs.

* * * * *

G: I wrote to Gen SEIFFERT in HAMBURG to do something about my wife, and I (also wrote to) the General of III Corps in BERLIN.

* * * * *

G: I was with the Arty Inspectorate in BERLIN before the war.

S: With HASE ?

G: Yes.

S: I made HASE's acquaintance in NUERNBERG when he was CG of a div, the 3rd. Then he became Arty Inspector.

* * * * *

S: ROMMEL and RUNDSTEDT are supposed to have told the FUEHRER on 25 July, i.o. after the invasion, that the war could no longer be won.

* * * * *

M: HIMMLER's train was always marked SZH.

G: What does that mean ?

M: SONDERZUG HIMMLER (Special Train HIMMLER). It was always well guarded.

* * * * *

M: Did you know LATTMANN (?) at the War College in DRESDEN ?

G: Recently he was a colonel with MODEL; an efficient fellow.

* * * * *

G: Are you the same age as SEIDOWSKI (?), he was also Ia under me, and so was ROTH (?).

SECRET

SECRET

M: SEIDOWSKI (?) was fat and blond ?

G: No, tall and thin; he is engaged to be married now.

M: VON ROTH (?) was in my class; we were together in STUTTGART with the MT troops.

G: They were all with me in SOFIA.

* * * * *

M: SEYDLITZ was always a blabbermouth, and so was his wife.

G: PFELSOH (?) was first Ib with Army Group, then he was Id (?), then he was transferred.

M: And Gen MERK (?) ?

G: Gen MERK (?) was first with (Army) Group BLACK SEA, then he was together with us.

* * * * *

2. Miscellany

G: The General Staff is the only good thing still left in Germany, and it will certainly still have a great influence on the civilian population.

* * * * *

G: As soon as the Party joined in the conduct of the war, the course of the war could be foreseen.

* * * * *

G: If this thing collapses, and we lose the war, we will have to work for the people with all our strength. The German people just cannot be destroyed. Many things that were done are difficult to defend, for example the mass murder of the Jews. As an officer it was sometimes difficult to participate in these actions. They should have solved the problem in another way. Sometimes it was horrible the way they shot women and children.

* * * * *

G: They want to sound out our attitude now; they expect us at any rate to support the military government.

* * * * *

G: We were sold out by Dutch and Russian workers.

S: That was bound to end badly, what with 25-30 nations running around in Germany.

* * * * *

S: Why do you dislike the Navy so much ?

G: Because they gorged themselves with hundreds of thousands of youths (int)..

S: And the Luftwaffe, too. Young fellows, classified 1A, who never heard a shot fired; they were on duty with searchlight units.

SECRET

S E C R E T

G: All the men in the Navy are young kids, while we had only 47 and 48-year olds.

* * * * *

G: They are all in flight at the approach of the Russians. The fields are not taken care of anymore, and we have to feed ourselves again. The SEYDLITZ government is supposed to be already on German soil. The Russians are rebuilding German industry for them, and after that the war against England will follow.

* * * * *

S: The war in the EAST has taken a shameful course. Women have been raped. The Germans are no better than the others. In the beginning the Germans shot all commissars who were taken prisoner. Plenty of Russian prisoners have simply been beaten to death.

* * * * *

S: How long does it take until a request for a decoration goes through?

G: 24 hours by telephone, three weeks by mail. I had an UFFZ in charge of a pillbox; he received the Knight's Cross and a lieutenancy immediately by order of the FUEHRER. He never went to OCS.

* * * * *

S: I was always horrified about concentration camps.

G: Well now, that depends on how you look at it, one could also consider them as penitentiaries.

* * * * *

S: Were the Bulgarians only committed to combat partisans?

G: They were not committed at all. They were used as guards along the railroad lines. They were only provisional divs, and not regular ones.

* * * * *

G: I was Chief of the Training Staff in Bulgaria. I had 20,000 men under me. I had a combat school. All the shipping on the Danube, security of mines, all that was under my control, the entire ABWEHR (Intelligence Service).

II. SOURCES:

a) GENLT (Maj Gen), GENERALSTABS INTENDANT (Quartermaster Gen), a.D. (retired) Friedrich PAUER, a 70-year old Bavarian who is too old to worry about politics and too senile to do anything else.

b) GENARZT (Medical Corps Gen) Prof Dr Ernst RODENWALD, a 66-year old HEIDELBERG Professor, one-time head of the Institute for Tropical Diseases in BERLIN, who is well acquainted with scientists all over the world. (See Report Ref No SAIC/7, 13 Apr 45).

c) LT (2nd Lt) Hans SCHREIBER, ASSISTENTARZT (Junior Medical Officer) Luftwaffe BEWAHRUNGSBTL (Punishment Bn), a 28-year old medical officer who did medical research in connection with criminal investigations in civilian life.

S E C R E T

SECRET

1. Bacteriological Warfare

R: My personal opinion is that bacteriological warfare is impossible. I do not know anything about it, and do not think that a German scientist will permit himself to be used for that, especially for ethical reasons.

* * * * *

P: If there had been any preparations made for bacteriological warfare, then we people from the Housing Administration would also have known about it, since we would have to make preparations for the protection of the population.

R: The following motto is valid in this case: what you yourself are working on, you do not talk about, and what others are working on, you do not ask about. I have received no indications of bacteriological warfare. What I worked on myself - malaria control - I will gladly tell them about.

* * * * *

P: I knew the man in charge of the Hygiene Dept in the OKH, Prof SOHREIBER.

R: Yes, he's now head of Training Group C, at present in POTSDAM. I myself am from the Institute for Tropical Hygiene, and also consultant of the SANITÄTSDIREKTOR (Medical Inspector) for tropical hygiene. Besides that I had my work at the University of HEIDELBERG.

* * * * *

S: Wasn't there a bacteriological institute in LEMBERG?

R: No, I think you are mistaken. It is in KRAKOW.

S: I knew a GENERALSTABSARZT (Surgeon Gen) who had worked as a bacteriologist, but I can't remember his name.

R: There is nobody outside of Prof ZEISS and myself. Altogether there are only 10 GENERALSTABSÄRZTE (Surgeon Generals) in the Germany Army.

* * * * *

R: I bred 80,000 mosquitoes (anopheles) in a mosquito breeding station near BERLIN for experiments with sprays.

III. SOURCES

a) GENMAJ (Brig Gen) Hubert LUETKENHAUS, a 54-year old professional soldier, ex-WEHRMACHTSKOMMANDANT (Army Commandant) MANNHEIM-LUDWIGSHAFEN, who was put on the retired list on 31 Mar 45.

b) OBSTLT (Lt Col) Ernst HACKEMANN, Battle Group GERSFELD, a reserve officer, who was employed at I.G. FARBEN before the war.

1. Dr ILGNER, Director of I.G. FARBEN

(Note: Dr ILGNER was a detainee at the Seventh Army Interrogation Center during the same period as sources above.)

H: Dr ILGNER, the plant manager of I.G. should not remain unpunished either. A Democrat until 1930, he then changed horses, a real profiteering Nazi. When I saw him again in 1940, 10 years later, he greeted me with "HEIL HITLER!",

5

SECRET

S E C R E T

Nazi from top to bottom. These swine! People like us have to sit here, and they run around free. (See note above).

* * * * *

H: You know, of course, that I.G. is a great concern with many branches in foreign countries. During the war these branches are not in direct contact with FRANKFURT. If, for instance, the branch in Argentina has a lot of foreign currency, and the branch in Chile does not have any, but needs money to build a branch office, then Argentina can send the money to Chile, and ILGNER supervises and approves these transmissions. For that purpose he travelled all over the world. He was the central financier.

This ILGNER is a miserable character, completely uninteresting as a person. He lets everybody down if it is to his own advantage.

2. Planning for the Future

L: It would be funny if I were to work for the military government now.

H: It would be a neat trick to be sent to BERLIN by the Americans. Then you would have something to eat, and you could still do what you wanted.

L: But we still have to feed ourselves.

H: We'll get something out of them yet. And imagine what freedom of movement you would have. You could travel again through all the countries.

* * * * *

H: Did you hear anything about the partition of Germany? As far as I know, Southern Germany, Baden, etc, will be occupied by the Americans. That's a good thing; we will be safe that way. All Northern Germany will supposedly be occupied by the British, and the rest will be given to the Russians. Well, that's terrible, and quite unthinkable.

L: Yes, the so-called ELBE Line for the Russians. There will be a mixed occupation for BERLIN.

H: What will happen to Austria and the Tyrol?

L: We shall soon see.

* * * * *

L: (Re Nazis) The responsible persons must be hanged, and the others must be put in labor battalions where they will have to pay for their guilt.

3. Miscellany

H: Shortly before Christmas I was a member of an Honour Court. A paymaster made some typical remarks. HIMMLER did not sanction the verdict. We acquitted the man shortly before Christmas, which had a resounding effect (KNALLEFFEKT). A miserable Party wench excused herself. She was one of the worst kind. Thank heaven the prosecutor and the foreman of the jury were decent people.

Then there was another case where a medical capt in the Army, a Party member, was supposed to have said, "the FUHRER should stick to architecture instead of the conduct of the war". That fellow was also acquitted; but HIMMLER reversed the verdict, with the demand that he be condemned to death.

* * * * *

S E C R E T

SECRET

L: (Talking about his days as WEHRMACHTSKOMMANDANT, MANNHEIM). A few months ago I officially invited a bishop for dinner. The bishop appeared, and so did the Party big shots (PARTEIBONZEN) - the bishop came in full regalia. Everything went off smoothly, but after a few weeks I received a notice saying that it was forbidden to invite bishops to official receptions. Well, I am a Catholic, but I let it go anyway.


* * * * *

H: (Re the hopeless situation near FULDA) There were no maps of the sector in which we were fighting; we made our retreat by means of an old atlas.


* * * * *

14 April 1945.

SEVENTH ARMY INTERROGATION CENTER


PAUL KUBALA, Maj, MI,
Commanding.

SECRET



THIS IS AN ENCLOSURE
ATTACH

S E C R E T

.....
S E C R E T:
:Auth: CG, 7th Army:
:Init: W R G:
:Date: 21 Apr 45:
.....

21 Apr 45

SEVENTH ARMY INTERROGATION CENTER
APO 758 US ARMY

Copy No 30

If the information contained in this report is required for further distribution, it should be so paraphrased that no mention is made of the prisoners' names or of the methods by which the information has been obtained.

The following are the names and secret numbers of the prisoners mentioned in this report:

<u>Name</u>	<u>Rank</u>	<u>Secret No</u>	<u>Unit</u>	<u>Place and Date of Capture</u>
RODENWALD, Ernst Prof Dr	GENARZT (Medical Corps Gen)	45/975	Mil Med Academy, BERLIN	HEIDELBERG, 1 Apr 45
LUETKENHAUS, Hubert	GENMAJ a.D. (Brig Gen, Retired)	45/978	Retired	MOSBACH, 4 Apr 45
WESCH, Ludwig, Prof Dr	Prof of Physics	45/987	HEIDELBERG Univ	- - - Beg Apr 45

1-908 B

S E C R E T

SECRETSOURCES:

- a) GENARZT (Medical Corps Gen) Prof Dr Ernat RODENWALD, a 66-year old HEIDELBERG professor, one-time head of the Institute for Tropical Diseases in BERLIN who is well acquainted with scientists all over the world. (Of Reports Ref Nos SAIC/7, 13 Apr 45 and SAIC/X/1, 14 Apr 45)
- b) GENMAJ (Brig Gen) Hubert LUETKENHAUS, a 54-year old professional soldier, ex-WEHRMACHTSKOMMANDANT (Army Commandant) MANNHEIM-LUDWIGSHAFEN, who was put on the retired list on 31 Mar 45. (Of Reports Ref Nos SAIC/X/1, 14 Apr 45, and PW Intelligence Bulletin MFIU 5/751, 18 Apr 45)
- c) Prof Dr Ludwig WESCH, a physics professor from the University of HEIDELBERG, who was engaged in research work on secret weapons.

* * * * *

I. Medical and Other Scientific Experiments

R: It is a pity that all the work one has done will be wasted. I have made a specific series of experiments, which were, so to say, concluded. They dealt with physical fitness tests of officials destined to work in the tropics. They were supposed to be put into practice with the acquisition of the Cameroons by the Germans. Everything was prepared to the last detail: The military organization and the medical installations for the troops were such that each company had special equipment, organic transportation for six people, a doctor specialized in tropical diseases and chemicals. In those days we could still get everything.

* * * * *

R: Three years ago I took a three-week course for colonial doctors (KOLONIAL-AERZTE) on the subject of sleeping sickness at the Prince LEOPOLD Institute at ANTWERP. The course was excellent.

* * * * *

R: In 1940 when I was in a Negro prison camp in the neighborhood of where we were making our studies, and I wanted to go to STARGARD, I had to get the signature of Gen OLBRIGHT (since executed). This always took 2 days.

W: What was the T/O in your organization?

R: It was about as follows:

18 technical assistants
 10 Army doctors (IVb STELLEN)
 4 positions for scientific studies
 2 officers' positions - technical officers
 2 " " - personnel (" ?)

At one time I had 25 professors under me. Most recently the following were still with me: Prof MARTINI; Prof FLIEGE (?), zoologist, University of MARBURG; Prof MATTES (?), zoologist, University of MARBURG; Prof LENZ (LINZ?), entomologist; Prof Dr PIKORWSKI (?), staff member (DOZENT); REGIERUNGSRAT (Government Counsellor) Dr FICK (?), BAURAT (construction engineer); MAJ Dr INNBECKER (?), TIEFBAUER (excavation engineer).

* * * * *

SECRET

2

S E C R E T

R: A few weeks ago I received an order stating that research work was to be carried on only in connection with vital war-decisive weapons. This rescinded an order I had received a few months before. Nothing but contradictions. -- The same confusion reigned in the question of SONDERFUEHRERS. There, too, they never found a proper solution. In the EAST in the occupied territories all kinds of people were put into SONDERFUEHRER uniforms.

* * * * *

R: The entomological station MALCHOW, BERLIN, where I was, and where 40,000 mosquitoes were being bred was directed by a Dr MEIER (?). He was an exterminator (SCHAEDELINGSBEKAEMPFER) and the station was the information office for the Army. He was shipped to the front as a lieutenant.

* * * * *

W: (Re KREBS Institute) At that time it was very interesting (at the Institute); I worked with ultraviolet and inorganic light-rays. I cured 85-90% of the tumour cases with ultraviolet rays. The bacilli were stimulated through X-rays. The knowledge gained (by these experiments) came in very handy when in 1939 parachute flares (LEUCHTSCHIRME) (?) and accessories were to be produced.

R: When I was at the Negro hospital at BORDEAUX, I had the opportunity of training young doctors in the subject of tropical diseases.

W: It is a pity that we cannot continue with our work. You undoubtedly know that we have produced insulin from the pancreas. A new method which I have just completed provided for the manufacture of a new antidote for . . . (?) . . . from mould and other plants. First it was supposed to have been manufactured in PRAGUE, and SIEBERT (?) had it ready in HEIDELBERG.

* * * * *

W: Until the end, I had a Dutchman as my colleague. He was very intelligent, industrious and thorough.

R: What kind of work did you do?

W: I worked in the U-boat. . . The work is more concerned with defensive weapons which can do Germany no harm (if they fall into Allied hands). Therefore my institute was allowed to remain.

* * * * *

W: I have made very great experiments. For the past year I worked on a particularly important new experiment. Everything was worked out and ready. And now everything is over, and we have to start afresh. It's awful to have to go through all that.

* * * * *

W: As GEHEIMRAT SCHMITZ (?) told me, five-ton nitrogen (bombs?) were supposed to have been manufactured, but that is a ridiculous idea.

* * * * *

S E C R E T

S E C R E T

II. Personalities

W: I would like to know the whereabouts of my father-in-law, Dr FLASCHER (?). He was director of milk distribution.

R: Is that your father-in-law? I know him too.

W: Yes, he always had to be very careful about informants. He was not a member of the Party.

W: Dr REICHERT (?) is deputy KREISLEITER (NS District Leader) and he is still there. Consequently, there is hope that my father-in-law stayed there too. (HEIDELBERG?)

R: He makes such a youthful appearance, about 45.

W: No, he is about 55.

* * * * *

R: Mr FERRLE (?) is the only one who left HEIDELBERG days before (the arrival of the Americans). He is a vice-director (PROREKTOR) and also a member of the SS, but that's really no reason (to run away). The people were very angry about it. It's different with SCHMIDHENER (?) - after all he is a minister.

W: I also gave myself up as an SS man - there is really nothing wrong with that. We really haven't done anything.

* * * * *

R: Do you know that HAGGEN fled just in time?

* * * * *

R: I could have escaped with the last Red Cross ambulance, as STEFAN (?) from MANNHEIM did, but I did not want to do that.

* * * * *

R: I also have worries about my Institute. Perhaps RILKE (?) is still there, but he is an SA STANDARTENFUHRER (Col), although only as a doctor. He could be denounced very easily. Dr STEPERT (?), an understanding man, is in charge of the (business) affairs in HEIDELBERG, I believe.

* * * * *

R: Prime Minister (MINISTERPRESIDENT) KOEHLER (?) is a nice man, straightforward and unassuming. But GAULEITER SPRENGER (?) is a pig.

* * * * *

R: Do you know KAUSCHE (?) of the REICH Biological Institute (BIOLOGISCHE REICHSANSTALT)?

W: No.

* * * * *

S E C R E T

SECRET

W: I have given all my employees permission to talk about their work. I wonder if they know (the Americans) that I was at the KREBS Institute from 1929-1934. At that time I was together with WERNER (?), whom I helped considerably in 1933. He came from the HULTS CHINER LAENDJEN and had a Jewish grandmother. After that he left for BRUNNEN. He was a very decent man; he worked on chemical and physical therapy.

* * * * *

W: I have been active in the HEIDELBERGER TEUTONEN, a LANDSMANNSCHAFT (student fraternity).

* * * * *

W: The Party in HEIDELBERG was quite moderate, not like in Saxony and Thuringia. In our town (HEIDELBERG) they never shot anybody. Do you remember AMBERGER, a former Social-Democrat, and STAFFERT (?). The latter was a clear and understanding person, who recently was the mediator between the Americans and the civilian population.

* * * * *

R: I had some Dutch stocks which were very low. I wanted to sell them immediately. The government received next to nothing from it, or only a ridiculous amount. You could not get along with the RM 10.00 which were permitted for private foreign travels. Had I not visited so many conferences in CAIRO, LONDON and PARIS I could not have escaped the mouse trap. In this manner I always had a little more money.

W: I married into a somewhat questionable democratic family, on account of which I had difficulties with the Nazis. My wife's uncle, for instance, was a Communist and interned in the concentration camp at ORANIENBURG. My marriage was very much resented in Party circles.

* * * * *

L: Have you been across (the ocean)?

W: No, but I hold many American patents. I also worked for TELEFUNKEN. Near . . . (?) I maintained an experimental station for I. G. FARBEN. My work had very little connection with military things; it was mainly research work.

* * * * *

R: I am glad, after all, to have declined the invitation of the University. It is better for the present, and besides, a proposed salary of 50,000 marks would be insecure and without a firm basis.

* * * * *

R: I had a conference with the Dean of the University, SCHMIDT (?) (of STRASBOURG?) this last January, together with STEIN and . . . At the time the taking over of the BUERGERHOSPITAL (STRASBOURG) by the University clinic was under way. STEIN was involved in this affair, for which he is being reproached severely in Alsace. The faculty became very rich through the acquisition. Besides, STEIN is rumored to be receiving salaries amounting to 300,000 REICHSMARK. He is a somewhat romantically inclined person.

* * * * *

SECRET

S E C R E T

W: I remained faithful to Science even as a Party member, and besides, I did not kill anybody.

L: Have you taken an active part in Army or Party life?

W: No, I had a serious operation, and was unable to do so.

* * * * *

III. Covering the Retreat

R: It was a crime that all the bridges in HEIDELBERG were blown up, but you couldn't talk the general out of it. Since the REMAGEN affair the military are scared to death. You couldn't get over the NECKAR; all the traffic was bottled up. Not even boat transportation was prepared. The people asked the general at least not to blow up the old bridge, but he said that he had received orders from higher up to blow up all the bridges.

W: I received orders from the armament inspectorate (RUESTUNGSINSPEKTION) to save the equipment, since it was the only equipment of its kind in Germany. GEHEIMRAT LEMBERG (?) was also still with me. I had an argument with the regimental commander that he should not erect a roadblock in the vicinity. I finally succeeded.

* * * * *

W: Shortly before the Americans arrived, an officer from the armament inspectorate came to see me. I turned over the establishment to him, because my instruments are irreplaceable and must not be destroyed.

* * * * *

W: MITTELHAUSEN was defended for four days by Navy petty officers, equipped only with PANZERFAUSTEN, without any heavy weapons - about 100 men, including two holders of the Knights' Cross. Finally only two men were left. The petty officers came from a school in MITTELHAUSEN.

* * * * *

W: I had to leave my wife in MITTELDORF with our three children. The youngest is 20 days old. The peasants are hostile to us, because they think that we were the cause of the battle for the village.

* * * * *

IV. Chemical Warfare

W: It has been learned that the Russians manufactured gases to cause anesthesia, and that they experimented with them in factories. They have never actually used them, however.

R: We Germans are very much afraid of it (gas) and would never make use of it ourselves. None of my colleagues would make himself available for such a thing - primarily on ethical grounds and also because it might boomerang (WEGEN DER ZWEISCHNEIDIGKEIT). My friend ZEISS has never mentioned anything about it to me, and that is proof that it does not exist.

* * * * *

S E C R E T

SECRET

W: The FUHRER is quoted as saying, "When they arrive they will only find a sleeping Germany." What do you suppose he means?

R: I am glad I do not know; it is so much simpler that way.

* * * * *

V. Military Government

W: The Americans conducted themselves quite differently from the way HITLER predicted that they would. They arrived in our little town, they did not destroy anything, did not steal or rape, but behaved like real gentlemen. Americans are, of course, to a large extent of German origin. Ration cards in MOSBACH have been issued and everything is going on as before.

* * * * *

L: Joiner (SCHREINERMEISTER) BRAUN in MOSBACH, a former democrat, is in charge of the gasworks. They (the Americans) kept him, because he is a particularly able fellow.

* * * * *

VI. Post-War Germany

W: The future looks dark to me. The Allies will take away the small amount of gold we have left - and all the treasures we robbed in France as well. The country will be occupied and since it is impossible to hide in the woods, it is better to give up.

R: What do you think the people from the SS STANDARTEN (Rogts) are going to do?

W: If the peasants keep their mouths shut, many people may be able to hide in the BAYRISCHEN WALD or in the valleys of the Alps. That's a good idea and it's being carried out in practice.

* * * * *

R: There is a price of four million dollars on HIMMLER's head. I would turn him over to the Allies, if I knew where he was.

* * * * *

R: We must not think about future developments. I said in the last faculty meeting (HEIDELBERG University) that we would have to appeal to the sentiments of the British and Americans. Perhaps we can get the University going again in this way.

W: Perhaps the stone plaque with the names of the Jewish founders such as WARBURG is still there. That might also help to some extent.

* * * * *

W: Now the question arises, how can I help the Fatherland without breaking the oath of allegiance? I believe that the best thing to do is to collaborate with the Americans. I can help Germany that way very much without doing myself any harm.

* * * * *

SECRET

S E C R E T

L: We have to forget the past and we have to work with the now masters.

W: Yes, that's right, that is the only way to preserve the German people, and we have to do it as good Germans.

* * * * *

R: I believe that our chemical industry will be the only one to remain in existence; also possibly the optical industry since we are so far ahead in that field. Whether the heavy industry will remain is very doubtful.

* * * * *

R: No other nation has accomplished what Germany has done. We stood from the Northern tip of Norway (NORDCAP) to the SUEZ Canal, from the Atlantic to MOSCOW. We introduced German art, culture, and way of living. That cannot be forgotten. And surely we shall become and shall be a great nation. The German idea will live, even if it takes twenty-five or fifty years. Germany will be victorious. What can America do against it? They will build a few factories and get industry into high gear. But they are still backward, without culture and barbaric. They can still learn from us. Imagine what we have accomplished in the war against malaria. Prof MARTINI and two of my assistants have achieved great things during the war. And on the Italian front, people such as medical Capt STIEBEL (?) worked splendidly.

W: I am a confirmed National Socialist and a German. It is wonderful to live at a time like this. NSDAP, NSKK, NSV, are all marvelous institutions! Prof BUTTEN (?) in PRAGUE is the only colleague in my field who comes up to my standards.

* * * * *

W: The lost war has shown Germany that she is a nation of leaders, that she will become a nation of leaders again, and that she will always remain one. Of course when the white flags hang out in HEIDELBERG, and when people run around with Red Cross armbands, it looks ridiculous to the Americans, and it is degrading for us.

R: The British want to take revenge, but they'll have to forget about that. We'll surely have it much easier under American occupation in Southern Germany.

* * * * *

VIII. German Occupational and Foreign Policy

R: In Belgium the Flemish expected great things from us when we came, but we were outsmarted by the Walloons; we wanted to unify the Belgian people. In the medical faculty in BRUSSELS we wanted to work together with Walloons and Flemish alike but it never got beyond the experimental stage. Whom did we

S E C R E T

SECRET

send as our representative? A German district physician (KREISARZT) to represent the German medical profession.

W: Yes, the Department of Education (KULTUSMINISTERIUM) and the foreign policy (AUSSENPOLITIK) have been beyond all description (UNTER ALLER KANONE) in Germany lately.

21 April 1945.


SEVENTH ARMY INTERROGATION CENTER

Paul Kubala
PAUL KUBALA,
Maj, MI,
Commanding.

SECRET

9

~~SECRET ENCLOSURE~~



19 May 45

SECRET
: Auth: CG, 7th Army:
: Init: 1115 B
: Date: 19 May 45

SEVENTH ARMY INTERROGATION CENTER
APO 758 US ARMY

Copy No 30

If the information contained in this report is required for further distribution, it should be so paraphrased that no mention is made of the prisoners' names or of the methods by which the information has been obtained.

The following are the names and secret numbers of the prisoners mentioned in this report:

<u>Name</u>	<u>Rank, Position</u>	<u>Secret No</u>
GÖRING, Hermann	REICHSMARSCHALL	45/1409
LAMMERS, Hans Heinrich	REICH Minister and Chief of Chancellory	45/1495

~~SECRET~~

1115 B

S E C R E T

NOTE: The following is a literal translation of a conversation between GÖRING, LAMMERS, and several interrogating officers.

I. HITLER's Successor

GÖRING: I must tell you something. You are the head of the Chancellery, you signed all documents. You became aware of a change in the situation only by accident, not through any official papers. You knew about it only after DÖNITZ' radio address. Anybody could appear tomorrow and declare, "I received a radio message after DÖNITZ received his; I am the head of the state now..." I, for one, have written proof (about the nomination of a successor)...., and when DÖNITZ appears now, he must have some sort of written orders.

LAMMERS: Yes, that's clear; he will have to produce documentary proof.

G: If he has any, he has to make it known to the German people in the REICHSANZEIGER (Official Legal Record). Here we have a case of a head of a state who really is not a head of a state, since no proof can be found. On the other hand, I am the only one who, as legal head of the state, could possibly be recognized by the American Government at the present time, and who could negotiate. This is the greatest deception ever foisted. The Law of 13 Sept 34, the original of which we have here, is the basis for the case. According to this decree, HITLER can name only one successor. There is also a decree issued after HESS' flight (reads HITLER's Decree of 29 Jun 41): "In the eventuality that I would be hindered in the execution of my duties, even if only temporarily, and should I be unable to give special directives during the time of my indisposition, I appoint as my successor in all my offices REICHSMARSCHALL of the Greater German REICH, Hermann GÖRING. Signed HITLER; This Decree voids the Decree of 23 April 38 concerning the FÜHRER's successor." This is the reason why the REICHSMARSCHALL (GÖRING himself) sent an inquiring telegram (in April)..... It wasn't really necessary that I inquire (whether HITLER had died); it was only out of loyalty that I did it..... The coup d'etat was made only because I wanted to avoid further bloodshed, on 23 Apr 45.... You can well say that BORMANN is crazy.

I: I had received the order concerning the FÜHRER's successor from the Deputy Chief of Staff of the WEHRMACHTSFÜHRUNGSTAB (Supreme Command of the Armed Forces) in the following manner. Gen WINTER wrote, "Inclosed I am sending you the contents of an order which was received by Grand Admiral DÖNITZ: 'In the place of REICHSMARSCHALL GÖRING, the FÜHRER appoints you, HERR GROSSADMIRAL, as his successor. Official documents follow. As of now, you will take all measures which are necessary according to the present situation' - from this it can be concluded that HITLER was dead - 'signed: REICHSLEITER BORMANN'".

G: Is there anything more fantastic than this fraud committed by BORMANN?...You know, the decisive point in my inquiry was (the request for) freedom of action in foreign matters.

S E C R E T

~~SECRET~~

I.O. : Could he have done ~~it~~ legally?

L: No, in that case he would have had to put it on paper.

G: Now I ask you, HERR LAMMERS, do you really believe that after the FUHRER had publicly declared my appointment as his successor, and since he further announced my illness or my withdrawal from office, he would not have been able to announce over the radio such an important change as that of his successor?

I.O.: Now, I'd like to know, did you withdraw from all your duties because of ill health, or was this step ordered from elsewhere?

G: It was ordered from elsewhere. He (HITLER) threatened to shoot me or to throw me out of all jobs, except my appointment as his successor.

I.O.: NOT to relieve you as his successor?

G: No. That has no connection with any office.

I.O.: You admit that you did not actually resign?

G: No. I was forced to do so. Otherwise I would have been executed immediately.

L: I would like to point out another thing which is of importance. After this action (GORING's demotion) a press notice appeared which stated that the REICHSMARSCHALL resigned as Commander of the Air Force, because of a heart ailment... he still retained his title as REICHSMARSCHALL... and the decree (about HITLER's successor) was therefore still effective.

G: Well, I must say, these damn crooks have put over a coup that is outstanding.... I have always known that, in the event of something happening to the FUHRER, my life would be in the greatest danger for the following 48 hours. After that time I would have performed the swearing in, and it would have been a legal fact. At any rate, I would have arrested BORMANN within 48 hours. He knew about it, too. I would have carried out two personal actions immediately: the arrest of BORMANN and the firing of RIBBENTROP.... They were the two thorns in my side.

G: I told some GAULEITERS who were close to me, about a year and a half ago, when everything became clear to me, that if fate ever designated me as (HITLER's) successor, I would place a High Court over me; I told myself that no man should assume the responsibility of not having anybody over him... A dictatorship must never come again, it does not work. We see it now. As long as a man is good, as HITLER was in the beginning, everything is wonderful... but (then) it came to extremes.

~~SECRET~~

S E C R E TII. Chemical Warfare

I.O.: I believed that HITLER would use gas at the last minute.

G: No. Once, toward the end, he considered CW, but we told him that gas was out of the question. I was told that all your gas masks would have offered no protection. The gas was so dangerous that I wouldn't permit another demonstration. I knew that the gas would have had to be transported to the rear when the Americans came, and the effect of an air attack on the train might have been catastrophic. Just imagine, a train of 75 loaded freight cars attacked from the air; a bomb frees the gas, and the fragments which fly 6,7,8, or even 10 km spread it!

I.O.: But experts are of the opinion that one needs many more gas bombs than HE or incendiaries to destroy a city.

G: Let me tell you this as a specialist: the most dangerous are the incendiaries. The Americans have really given us the works with HE bombs... A small incendiary falls into a house and the whole side of the street burns. If incendiaries are thrown against railroad yards, then, of course, it doesn't make sense at all.... Some of the factories (which had been attacked) - if you stood in front of them you could never believe that they'd be rebuilt. CITROEN, in PARIS, for instance. ... After six weeks they started working again. The whole roof was down. But where there was a fire, all machines were ruined. Fire is the worst of all... We knew that we were more advanced in chemical warfare and that we had more dangerous gases.

I.O.: When one has such gases, one must expect to use them some day.

G: Well, we thought America would start chemical warfare. It was pointed out that America did not have to fear for her cities. And the troops who attack with gas can protect themselves better than the population. We also planned to attack England with gas in case the Americans resorted to chemical warfare. The question of possible consequences of a bombing attack against a gas-manufacturing factory was raised on numerous occasions. Was the population to be evacuated? (But) the FUHRER never wanted to get the population excited about gas. That, of course, is understandable; I would have acted the same way. During the last few years the air superiority was so one-sided, so pronounced. We told ourselves that everything would be spoiled by bringing up the topic of chemical warfare.

I.O.: What did HITLER mean by his well-known saying: "God forgive me the last three days of the war"?

G: He NEVER said that.

III. HITLER's Death

I.O.: Do you actually believe that HITLER is dead?

G: Well, he WAS sick. A cerebral hemorrhage was doubtlessly with-

S E C R E T

S E C R E T

in the realm of possibility, in that condition. Whether this led to his end, or whether the man committed suicide...

I.O.: Are you definitely sure that he is dead?

G: I have no doubts about it.

G: The FÜHRER collapsed on the evening of the 22nd (April), as a result of the war situation. The whole thing was set off by my telegram in which I asked for freedom of action in matters of foreign policy. Since I had talked about negotiations (with the Allies) for weeks and months, they knew exactly that I would attempt to negotiate immediately, the very same day. Several generals wanted to surrender.

IV. Foreign Currency Account

L: There is an account with the REICHSBANK which originates from donations made in various currencies, even in gold coins. We opened the account for him (HITLER) under my name, but it belongs to the FÜHRER.

I.O.: You say the 76,000 dollars are with the REICHSBANK?

L: Yes, they are there. The REICHSBANK holds a gift from a man from Transvaal who donated 69,000 dollars; German-Americans donated 2,400 dollars, anonymous gifts amount to 478 dollars. I want to emphasize that it is not my account that I am turning over here - it is proved by the documents, too.

V. HITLER - SPEER Conference

G: The talk he (HITLER) had with SPEER was very interesting. Ten days before the collapse, on the 17th (April), HITLER called SPEER and accused him of sabotaging the "scorched earth" policy. SPEER replied that the people did not want this policy and that there wasn't enough time. The FÜHRER then said, "That's the end, then! Why don't you tell me you know that the war will be won?..." "No," said SPEER, "I can't say that." Said the FÜHRER: "Can't you say that you believe that this war will be won?" "No", replied SPEER, "I can't say that". The FÜHRER then asked, "Can't you say at least that you hope that the war can still be won?" Quoth SPEER, "I can't say that, it is perfectly clear to me that everything is over." HITLER then said, "SPEER, it HAS to be done, everything depends on it". "We are short of everything", was SPEER's reply. "Can't you say you wish that the war will be won?", asked HITLER. "Yes, I can say that", said SPEER. The FÜHRER then approached him and said, "I thank you for saying, at least, the best you could. But I can see only this" - perspiration stood on his forehead - "we must realize that we must hold out until the last hour, no matter how much lightning and thunder. I know we will come through!"

VI. Miscellanny

I.O.: Was resistance in the mountains not anticipated?

G: Oh, yes, it was anticipated. The SS was working on it but

S E C R E T

5

SECRET

they made a mess of it. that's quite clear to me. It was also too late. Like in other instances, nobody ever listened to the officers.

I: We want to offer our services to the Allies. We are not war criminals.

G: We want to see to it that there is order and peace, especially until matters regarding the relationship to the Allied forces have been cleared up; to avoid uprisings in connection to Communism, etc, which would be very embarrassing to the Americans and English. This is the only aim we can possibly have after the collapse, and I am the one who can not only help, but who also knows all the episodes of the past.

I: The last time I was with the FÜHREER on 27 March. A lot of papers awaited his signature. Some were weeks old. He said, "You sign them!" I declined. His main topic was that Frederick the Great did not know when the war would end, either. ...HITLER was greatly excited about the REICHSMARSCHALL attempting to start negotiations with the Allies. And then they mentioned in the last leaflet that the REICHSMARSCHALL was going to flee...

19 May 1945.

SEVENTH ARMY INTERROGATION CENTER

Paul Kubala
PAUL KUBALA, Maj, MI,
Commanding.

SECRET

[Redacted Box]

ENCLOSURE TO

S E C R E T

.....
: S E C R E T :
: Auth: CG, 7th Army :
: Init: W.W.G. :
: Date: 24 May 1945 :
:.....

24 May 45

SEVENTH ARMY INTERROGATION CENTER
APO 758 US ARMY

Copy No 30

If the information contained in this report is required for further distribution, it should be so paraphrased that no mention is made of the prisoners' names or of the methods by which the information has been obtained.

The following are the names and secret numbers of the prisoners mentioned in this report:

<u>Name</u>	<u>Rank, Position</u>	<u>Secret No</u>
GOERING, Hermann	REICHSMARSCHALL	45/1409
VON BRAUCHITSCH, Bernd Walter	Col, GAF; GOERING's Adjutant	45/1410

This report should be read in conjunction with Reports Ref No SAIC/X/3, 19 May 45 and Ref No SAIC/X/4, 21 May 45.

S E C

1146 B

S E C R E T

24 May 45

I. PERSONALITIES

INTERROGATING OFFICER: When was the last time that you personally saw HITLER alive?

GOERING: In the evening of the 20 Apr, around half past eight. We raced away.

IO: To get away that same evening?

G: Yes, yes. Afterwards he retracted his order that I was to go South-- in his usual manner, and ordered me to be at his cave on the following day. The room was very small. He (HITLER) sat at a large table, and we all stood around it--about twenty of us.

IO: Was that in the cellar of the chancellory?

G: Yes, deep down in the shelter. I can't believe that he let himself be shot. You should have seen him--his whole body shook violently. And he grew more vicious with every moment.

+ + +

IO: By the way, this Professor HOFFMANN, the photographer, should be able to tell quite a bit about the FUEHRER.

G: More than anyone else.

+ + +

G: You ought to know how he (HITLER) lived in the last two or three years. As long as nothing unusual was going on, he would get up at half past eleven, after being awakened at nine o'clock. He would read the newspapers and then sleep some more. Then he'd get up and the daily routine would start. Then came the discussion of the (military) situation. Ordinarily this discussion lasted from three to four hours--during which he would get terribly excited. We had to remain throughout the conference. Then he would eat dinner and during the evening he used to talk to some officer from headquarters. After discussing the evening situation he would go to bed at nine o'clock, and at twelve o'clock he would get up again.

IO: Wasn't there a discussion of the evening situation in the morning?

G: Yes, the second one was at half past twelve or one o'clock, and lasted two hours. After that we had the conference. It was attended by GUDERIAN, BORMANN, FEGELEIN (HITLER's liaison man to HITLER) and BURCKHARDT(?). Everything was brought up there to the least little detail. All sorts of things were rushed through at this conference.

+ + +

G: BORMANN was not only head of the party offices, but one day--about a year and a half ago--we were surprised by the following interesting letter: "The FUEHRER has repeatedly given me assignments and orders which do not come under the jurisdiction of the party, but

2

S E C

24 May 45

are of a military nature. He did this in order to give me the authority to pass his orders along in this line as well, and to supervise their execution. As of today, the FUEHRER has made me his secretary." So now he was secretary to the FUEHRER! And then there was another thing. The minister of justice had to submit to him the sentences pertaining to disloyalty trials in the Army. BORMANN returned them with the remark, that they were a disgrace, that such an antagonism of the court was impossible--he would see to it that the attorneys would be dismissed from office. He had the minister of justice completely under his thumb. By rights, SEYSS-INQUART in Holland should have made his reports to the State inspector, SOMMERS(?). But no, he had to give his reports directly to BORMANN. The only one who put up a struggle was TERBOVEN in Norway, but he was taken care of.

+ + +

G: HIMMLER said that Count BERNADOTTE had come to see him. He told me: "You know, he must have been the man EISENHOWER sent as a negotiator. I replied: "I can't believe that. Don't take offense, but I doubt whether they will accept you as a negotiator." Then he retorted: "Sorry to contradict you, but I have undeniable proof that I am considered abroad to be the only person who can maintain peace and order." And after that, he didn't care what happened. And I thought he might have more proof than I, and restrained myself. So I said: "I just can't picture that."..... And he always came back to the same thing: "If anything should happen to the FUEHRER, and you are unable to take over--after all, that might happen--can I say such and such?" That occurred at least 10 times during those 2 or 3 hours I kept wondering: "Why should I be unable to take over?-- Why should I be cut off?....Then it suddenly dawned upon me....POPITZ (?) already had mentioned something like that...And when I mentioned that to him (HIMMLER), he said: "Well, maybe POPITZ (?) may have said something like that. He might claim to know something. But as far as I am concerned it is an unheard-of impertinence." I wanted to talk with POPITZ (?) again, and they said: "Of course, of course!" And when I asked, when our talk could be arranged, they told me: "It may not be possible to arrange it today, but on the day after tomorrow." That day passed without the talk. Then I heard one day that the FUEHRER had ordered POPITZ (?) sentenced to death. The execution was postponed until later... Well, I couldn't help that either....

+ + +

G: This HIMMLER--he really startled me during this last conversation of ours. He made the ridiculous suggestion, that I nominate him as Chancellor upon becoming HITLER's successor. I replied to him: "I cannot do that, because according to our constitution the offices of Chancellor and President are combined." Then he said: "Sir, if anything should prevent you from becoming the successor, can I have the job then?" There I replied: "My dear HIMMLER, we'll have to wait and see. That will depend upon the circumstances. I can't see what should prevent me from taking the office. What could stop me?.... And that happened in our last conversation at least ten times. As I sat there, I pleaded with him. All he would have to do,

3

24 May 45

would be to say just one word to his SS men, and I would be free. (G was arrested by SS end of Apr 45) But he dodged the question, and said that unfortunately my detention had been ordered by the FUEHRER. He knew for sure that it was a mistake. Everything would be cleared up shortly. So he just let me sit there. Lt Col FRANKE of the SS can testify to that.....

+ + + + +

II. ART TREASURES AND FUNDS IN FOREIGN COUNTRIES

G: I'd like to get the whole thing straightened out. I can tell you confidentially, that certain objects were destroyed completely. And I will confide a secret to you: there are some things buried at KARIN HALL. There are large objects--four beautiful sculptures. I'll tell you what's there-- including these sculptures. Then you'll have the whole story. Where I have traded things, I'll give you others. Those things which belong to me, can be stored for the time being....But I am not responsible for the FUEHRER's stuff. All I can do for you is to tell you where my own things are. It will do good to be able to say: "These items are taken care of--I can forget about them."

+ + +

G: One day I was approached by a man who owned an insignificant house in a suburb. He had his own glass workshop. He owned a tremendous collection, and sold me a few valuable pieces. From him I bought two church windows, 8 m high.

IO: You must have built some sort of a chapel.

G: No, I did not. However, I bought an entire chapel in France, an old one. I took only its windows. I was given a Gothic house in ABBEVILLE with all the trimmings. All I could use were the inside panelling, the winding stair-case and the big gate. Then a woman wanted to sell me a Spanish Harem. So I looked at it. There were wonderful things in it. But I couldn't use anything with the exception of a beautiful davenport, which I purchased. Hardly six months later FRANCO asked me what had happened. He said he had heard that I purchased a castle in Spain. Thank goodness that wasn't so.

+ + +

G: I don't have a cent abroad. A number of the most crooked deals were made in the name of the FUEHRER or the REICHSMARSCHALL (himself). And everything passed through the German customs sanctioned with our names.

von BRAUCHITSCH: And some of the most notorious orders, of which no one knew whether they were genuine, were given in the name of the FUEHRER or REICHSMARSCHALL.....

G: I made a present to my sister-in-law in Sweden, so that she could buy a small house for herself. That was my famous Swedish castle... The last time I was in Sweden, was in 1935....

4

24 May 45

III. AIR FORCE

G: I have looked through all these casualty reports. And I found more losses than we had announced. It was important for us, of course, to prove that we had shot down always one or two more planes than the others. You should have seen what ridiculous statements we made--you couldn't help laughing when you read them. Take for example the time when we wrote that we were to get a plane with a 12 cm cannon.....

+ + +

IO: Did you know anything about remote-controlled bombs?

G: They had one disadvantage. They (the planes) had to reach an altitude of 6000 meters and had to fly in an absolutely straight line toward their targets for two minutes, without being able to dodge.

+ + +

IO: Did you know where EISENHOWER's headquarters were in Africa?

G: No. But we knew that there was a meeting in CASABLANCA. We did not like to attack headquarters anyway. We thought that might be a mutual understanding.

+ + +

G: The heaviest casualties were in HAMBURG, WUPPERTAL, and DRESDEN. It was terrible. The people of DRESDEN couldn't believe that you would bomb the city, because they thought DRESDEN was too well known as a cultural center. The city was overcrowded.

+ + +

(G on planned air attack on Russia's power plants)

G: In spite of the existing fuel shortage, enough gasoline was reserved for this attack. Everything was ready. And then the FUEHRER would have to order the demolition of these ridiculous bridges across the ODER river, which the Russians could repair overnight anyway! Ridiculous to use this magnificent machinery just to destroy these bridges.--It was maddening. All these large-scale plans had to fall through. I just couldn't stand it anymore. I finally worked myself into a nervous condition.

IO: And what did you do for relaxation?

G: I took vitamin tablets, read detective stories, and smoked my cigars very slowly. You know, I can read the same detective story three times without tiring of it.

IO: Did the FUEHRER read stories like that, too?

G: No, that was only I. He got them for me. The FUEHRER read only very serious literature..... And so, little by little, I was

24 May 45

disgraced. But what was I to do? I'd give an order, only to find out on the next day that it was all nonsense..... He attacked my friends, but he meant me. And then, toward the end, just because he heard the word "negotiations" he wanted to cut me off from everything--and that after 23 years.....

+ + + + +

IV. CONCENTRATION CAMPS

G: These pictures (of DACHAU) which you showed me yesterday must depict the activities of the last few days. It is beyond me, just what was behind all that. HIMMLER must have suddenly gotten a fiendish pleasure out of such things. I have heard such stories before, for example that a large load of Jews left for Poland during the winter, where some of the people froze to death in their vehicles. I heard of these things mostly from the ranks of my employees and from the people. When I made inquiries, I was told, that such things would not happen again--it was claimed that the trains had been sent on the wrong route. Then there was some talk about what you call "VERNICHTUNGSTRUPPEN" (Extermination troops). It was claimed that there were many diseased people in these camps and that many died of pestilence. These troops had the job of bringing the corpses to a crematorium where they would be burned.

+ + +

G: All cruelty was repulsive to me. I can name many people whom I have helped, even Communists and Jews. My wife was so kind--I really have to be grateful for that. I often thought, if only the FUEHRER would have had a sensible wife who would have said to him: "Here is a case where you can do some good, and here another, and this one....." that would have been better for everyone..... It was very depressing for me. In some cases I had to write to HIMMLER, that he should release this one and that one. And he would reply, that he was very sorry, but that he could not do it, or perhaps that he didn't want to do it. But there were quite a few cases, where he did it anyhow.... But now it is pretty clear to me that all my efforts were wasted. Whoever attacked HIMMLER, was eliminated. On top of that, he lied to me. Not a single report was read to the FUEHRER.....

+ + +

G: I wanted the foreign workers to be rounded up so that they could be turned over to the advancing enemy troops at some central point instead of being allowed to run around loose. And then I told him (HITLER) that the concentration camps should be guarded if at all possible, until the British or the Americans arrived, because we were detaining quite a number of criminals there which neither we nor they would want to release. They should have been guarded, and the enemy should have taken the responsibility of segregating those whom he did not wish to release. You surely can't be interested in freeing a lot of criminals. And the same thing goes for workers from foreign territories--that was my biggest worry. I told him that something would have to be done about them, as well as about prisoners of war. We also mentioned Russian prisoners of war--but

24 May 45

there we knew what would happen if they broke loose. The French were very decent....they were mainly employed as farmhands.

+ + + + +

V. JEW BAITING AND RELIGIOUS DIFFICULTIES

G: These NUREMBERG laws came as a great surprise to me. I am still wondering today, where they could have originated. I knew only too well that they would cause bad feelings abroad. ... I was in charge of the Four-Year Plan. At that time SCHACHT came to see me and said: "Sir, these incidents will cause us serious economic difficulties abroad." So I went there, and they showed me the laws, saying that they had not been approved yet. Some of the clauses were being changed, but there were no major changes. And from then on the Jew-baiting really started. The United States responded with a most disagreeable boycott. And I was given a lecture, that from now on it would be very difficult to maintain any kind of commercial relation with America. But all this was temporarily forgotten in the excitement over the Sudeten incident in Sep 38. Then the war started in '39. For the time being, all was well. Then, early in '40 they went to it again--paying particular attention to the Jews in the occupied countries. I have to admit that things kept getting worse, and that they were sanctioned by various groups. All sorts of impossible excesses occurred. I didn't approve of them, but unfortunately I couldn't do anything against them. I didn't have too good a name with the party myself. The first time when they really attacked me was in '38. They didn't say anything about the wedding, but when I had my child christened in the first year of my marriage, I was attacked vehemently. It was claimed by the party, that the christening of my child would put the FUEHRER into a terrible dilemma if it ever became known. They wanted me to name my child, without a religious ceremony. That may all be well and good, except that the FUEHRER had been put up to this--particularly by the Minister of the Interior and GOEBBELS. Then LUTZE, chief of the SA, started to reproach me, saying that such a step against the Nazi party was intolerable. And from then on there was no end of trouble--someone would always point out this incident. Later on we had some serious arguments. It was intended to merge the two religions...Next we had these terrible days in Tirol--there were some uprisings when these silly Hitler youth boys started trouble in a church. KERRL, who is a smart man, said: "I am a catholic myself, I do not want to have anything to do with that." WAGNER of MUNICH had the same attitude. The whole thing was just plain madness.

+ + + + +

VI. MISCELLANY

G: It was only since very recently--say for the last 4 weeks--that he (HITLER) said: "We can't help it anymore."

+ + +

G: I had the feeling that it would take nothing short of a miracle to save our cause. But I believed we might be able to fight to a

7

24 May 45

draw by taking more radical measures. Unfortunately I wasn't boss. There were a lot of other things too. The Army was so unwieldy--it should have been reorganized. The leadership of the Army was broken up through SS interference--there was a serious split. The maddest scheme hadn't even been introduced yet, that was to come soon. There was to be a merger of the party leadership with the Army command. BORMANN was to draw up the necessary legal measures. He would have had to pass judgement on every little general.

+ +

G: If you'd ask me now, when I first gave up the war for lost, I'll have to admit that I had some doubts and worries for quite a while--but I only realized our inevitable defeat since the very last few days. You see, I made every effort to find a way out, because I believed we had a good chance to hold out much longer. I think I can tell you frankly that things would have gone differently, if I had been supreme commander. We would have used jet-propelled planes much earlier--and that would have been most unpleasant for you.

+ + +

(Re: Counterattack in Hungary)

G: DIETRICH then went down there with the Sixth Panzer Army. The order to attack was given. The offensive was made by two divisions after a 70 km forced march, and repelled. When HITLER received the news he went raving mad. He said: "If we lose the war it will be his (SEPP DIETRICH's) fault." And he immediately issued these two orders: First of all, the four divisions, "HITLER JUGEND", "ADOLF HITLER", "DAS REICH" and another one, were to take off their brassards immediately, and were not to wear any decorations for three days. And HIMMLER was to go to VIENNA right away in order to tell SEPP DIETRICH, he should by rights be sentenced to death. Also that he (HIMMLER) was to set an example of this man who had been a traitor to his country. Then all was quiet for a few days. But later it started all over again. We were really done for.

+ + +

G: But BORMANN charged Frau SCHOLTZ-KLINK with the formation of 2 women battalions. Many already had participated in anti-aircraft work, such as operation of searchlights; that is true. But just imagine, such women's battalions were to be committed against the Russians in the second line. Their training was supposed to include the use of machine guns.

+ + +

IO: To what extent did Germany use liquid air?

G: Liquid air, how do you mean that?

B: Liquid air was an addition to explosives, since they became scarce.

IO: We heard that it had been used in Russia. The Russians demanded that it be discontinued immediately, otherwise, they would use gas.

24 May 45

G: No, that is a lot of nonsense.

+ + +

G: THE PEOPLE NEVER CALLED ME ANYTHING ELSE BUT "HERMANN"! ONLY HERMANN! NEVER ANYTHING ELSE BUT HERMANN! TO BE CALLED BY ONE'S FIRST NAME - THAT IS THE HEIGHT OF POPULARITY.

24 May 45

SEVENTH ARMY INTERROGATION CENTER

Paul Kubala
PAUL KUBALA, Maj, MI
Commanding.

SECRET

25X1A

28 May 45

ENCLOSURE TO

DO NOT DETACH

SECRET
:Auth: CG, 7th Army :
:Init: WVQ :
:Date: 28 May 1945 :
:.....:

25X1A

SEVENTH ARMY INTERROGATION CENTER
APO 758 US ARMY

Copy No 3

If the information contained in this report is required for further distribution, it should be so paraphrased that no mention is made of the prisoners' names or of the methods by which the information has been obtained.

The following are the names and secret numbers of the prisoners mentioned in this report:

<u>Name</u>	<u>Rank, Position</u>	<u>Secret No</u>
GUDERIAN, Heinz	GENOBST (Col Gen) FUEHRERRESERVE (Officers Pool). Formerly Chief of Staff German Ground Forces and Inspector General of Armored Units.	45/1559
VON GEYR, Leo	GEN D PZTRUPPE (Lt Gen), Inspector of Armored units, formerly German Mil Attaché in LONDON.	45/1562
HAUSSER, Paul	OBSTGRUF (Col Gen of WAFEN SS), ex-CG, Army Group "G".	45/1561

SECRET

D1158B

SECRET

28 May 45

I. THE RUSSIAN CAMPAIGN

GUDERIAN: Everything went well at the start. After the fall of SMOLENSK our high command was faced with the same choice of decisions as NAPOLEON in 1812: Should I first go to MOSCOW, or should I first conquer the UKRAINE and occupy Russia's national granary,..... or should I go to conquer LENINGRAD in order to get the Baltic Sea under my control. This problem had been considered earlier, because everyone knew that such a decision would have to be made sometime. Even before this campaign the FUEHRER had decided to take LENINGRAD first, in order to have the entire Baltic Sea under his control, and thus establish a naval base supporting the German left flank. At the time when our troops stood at the gates of LENINGRAD, and when the drive was held up at KIEV, on our right flank, he suddenly changed his mind. He abandoned the idea to take LENINGRAD first--an attempt which could have succeeded. Nor did he attempt to take MOSCOW as NAPOLEON had done--in spite of our firm conviction that MOSCOW could be taken. In fact, I had already given orders for an attack on MOSCOW for 15 Aug with my PANZER Army. Instead he decided, after weeks of thought, to conquer the UKRAINE first. Thus, on 25 Aug, I had to head back in a southwesterly direction toward KIEV, instead of being allowed to start my drive toward MOSCOW. Well, at least the capture of KIEV resulted in the isolation and surrender of an army group. But it set us back 4 weeks in our advance toward MOSCOW. It got us into the muddy season, where the mud made traffic on ordinary roads impossible, and retarded it very much even on hard-surfaced roads. It was winter before it got too cold. You mustn't underestimate MOSCOW's importance. MOSCOW is not only the capital of Russia, but considering the conditions of 1941, it was the hub of Russia's communication system. All the connections between North and South which were still usable, all double-track railroad line, all the main telegraph and telephone lines, all canals and navigable rivers,...everything passed through MOSCOW. Whoever controlled MOSCOW also controlled the political affairs, a powerful armament industry, and a traffic and communications center of that nation, and could split Russia into two parts. I personally presented this case to the FUEHRER on the night of 23 Aug 1941. Then he was still undecided. Later the order was given to take the UKRAINE. I was called to him to present my plan for the attack on MOSCOW once again. And once again I tried to change his mind. At that time he still could control himself sufficiently to listen to me and let me finish my story. Once more I pictured the vital importance of MOSCOW to us and explained to him, that if we could capture MOSCOW in the early fall toward the end of September, we could cut Russia in two parts. And then we could still decide whether to occupy the Southern or the Northern half first. That was the purely military angle of the affair. Now let us consider the political angle, which was equally important. It was believed that the STALIN regime would break down politically. But in order to bring this regime to a collapse it was necessary to occupy MOSCOW. We should have pursued a policy of convincing the Russian people that they would get a better deal if they cooperated with us. We should not have said, as we did: "We shall cut Russia into small pieces. We shall divide it and make a German colony out of it." Thus the Russians, even those who were against STALIN, the White Russians, said: "No, we won't have that." This was our great political error. The decision to take the UKRAINE first, which resulted in the unsuccessful winter campaign against MOSCOW, and the misguided policy toward the Russian people--these two were the reasons why we did not find the necessary support among

SECRET

SECRET

28 May 45

the population, nor the military strength to finish this campaign as quickly as possible. And this was so essential, because there still was an undefeated enemy in the West. On top of everything, Japan and America came to grips, and we thought we might have to enter that conflict too. So we issued a new declaration of war, which added America to the side of our enemies. I don't know the reasons for this last decision. But I was at the front, commanding my army, and thus couldn't familiarize myself with every detail.

+ + +

(Re: Why KIEV was taken first and not MOSCOW)

GUD: I conferred with the FUEHRER twice about this question; once on 3 Aug and once on 23 Aug. At that time the general staff, too, was in favor of attacking MOSCOW first.

GEYR: When the PANZER Army GUDERIAN finally did attack, we had a temperature of 35 deg (C) below and an icy wind..... At that time the only way to employ armored divisions was to gather the tanks of a number of different divisions. That shows how few tanks we had left. There was no time for repairs, nor did we have the necessary equipment and spare parts. My own division, which I had led up to that campaign, was reduced to 12 tanks at MOSCOW.

INTERROGATING OFFICER: How high do you estimate the casualties at that time?

GUD: During the winter campaign of 1941 they were not too high. Our principal losses were caused through the cold. But to be honest, our casualties weren't abnormally high until we came to STALINGRAD. Those were our first catastrophic losses. Then we had these terrific envelopments. We had some 300,000 casualties there. From then on, with these continued envelopments of large units, we suffered our first irreplaceable losses. That was also where the German soldier's morale started its downward slide. There he lost his sense of invincibility. Our men took part in practically every attack, without complaint. But in this final campaign we no longer could attack. None of our attacks succeeded. And before that, not even our most difficult attacks failed.

+ + +

(Re: Count VON SCHULENBURG)

GUD: He was a native of MOSCOW, went to school there, and was said to be exceedingly well acquainted with the country. From a military point of view, he was one of the best authorities on Russian tactics, and in addition to that he had very good connections in Russian military circles. I knew that for a certainty. He operated just like a Russian. The Russians were more open and more friendly toward him than they were toward most foreigners. Thus we always were well informed. Nobody can say that his reports were incorrect, but no one would believe them.

+ + +

GUD: If fewer of our outstanding strategists had been dismissed in 1943 and at the end of 1941, we would have fought an entirely different war. I myself, was relieved of my command on the basis of a false report which a senior general had made about me. In Jan 1942, after returning from Russia, I demanded an investigation by a military court. It was my intention to have the facts straightened out. My

SECRET

3

SECRET

28 May 45

request was not granted. In the case of another general, an investigation was also refused. One general filed a suit, which, however, was not carried through. In the following spring a law was passed which suspended the regular courts. Thus the dictatorship was firmly entrenched in the army. From then on it was impossible to file a suit, or to demand a trial. Later, when the law was intensified, it even became impossible to resign. My predecessor as Chief of the General Staff handed in his resignation five times, but it was never accepted. When I was assigned to the General Staff without being consulted about the assignment, I was received with these words: "I do not want you to start out by tendering your resignation. It wouldn't be granted anyway. It is up to me (HITLER) whether you stay in your office or not--your wishes are of no consequence. I alone am responsible for what happens--not you!"

+ + + + +

II. THE INVASION

IO: There is a sharp difference between the tank battles on the Eastern front, and those of the Western front. Those in the EAST were always on a larger scale.

GEYR: That is just what we wanted. We wanted to spare our tanks, in order to be able to engage the Americans and the English in a real fight where we could put our experiences of the Eastern front to good use. I was of a different opinion than ROMMEL. I expected your landing to be successful. The Anglo-Saxon world had prepared itself for a landing--and we could not stop the guns of the Anglo-American fleet and its aircover with merely a few mines. The troops would simply walk ashore. There was our one chance to engage the Allies in a real tank battle, while PATTON was still assembling his units. It would have been a boon to my old days, if I had another chance to fight with the divisions I had trained myself. But fate wouldn't have it so....ROMMEL's armored divisions were largely dispersed, and under constant AT fire.

IO: But it was almost 2 months after the invasion before PATTON broke through at AVRANCHES.

GEYR: That made our mistake a worse one yet.

IO: He forced you into a very small pocket.

GEYR: That is the reason why I was relieved. After CHERBOURG was taken, everyone realized, including MARSCHALL RUNDSTEDT that the CAEN bridge head would have to be vacated. I proposed that in order to save the armored divisions, so that I could let them get some rest and then commit them on the left flank. Every would-be officer realized that the Americans would come down from CHERBOURG to break through our 7th Army positions. I had the divisions (to stop them) but was not permitted to employ them in this manner.

IO: It was too late, even then. We already had CHERBOURG.

GEYR: There was slim chance of success. But our chances would have been much better at AVRANCHES. At that time you could have been defeated.

IO: I still remember that there were armored divisions opposing us. And we always wondered when they would be committed.

SECRET

4

28 May 45

SECRET

GEYR: I can tell you exactly, which divisions I had in store for you. The 17 SS Division and the division "DAS REICH," a first rate outfit, were reserved for the Americans. Then we had saved for you the "LEIBSTANDARTE" and "HITLERJUGEND" divisions and large components of the 21 Armored and the 5 Armored. That was quite a far cry from the overstrained 17 Division. They were a brave new unit, more or less the only ones in the 7 Army sector who fought brilliantly. Besides that there were a few medium-sized armored units which did not belong to the 7 Army sector.

HAUSSER: There was also the LEHR division. It was further back, on the right flank.

GEYR: According to the original plan, the (PANZER) LEHR division was not to be committed. But I could not withdraw it from the vicinity of BAYEUX except by vacating the CAEN bridgehead. That bridgehead was no longer of any use to us anyway. The time for throwing the British from the bridgehead back into the sea had long passed. It was only a matter of holding a few plain fields.... Unfortunately I was not to have the pleasure of crossing swords with General PATTON. I really would have enjoyed that. It was beyond me, why we could not have committed a PANZER army in this decisive battle against your forces. Then at least we would have fought on an even basis.

+ + +

GEYR: The situation at CAEN was as follows: On the morning after the attack there were but 300 men left with the surviving commander of the division which had been hit on the coast! That is what I found when I took over two days later, having missed the beginning. The remainder of the division had been destroyed by the allied warships of which you know more than I do. But I know how effective they are! And then no one wanted to believe us when we told them how far inland the guns of these warships could fire. They just wouldn't believe our reports. There I had but one reply: "Gentlemen, just stand there for a while and you'll find out how far they can fire."

GUD: In our reports to headquarters these and many other descriptions were simply not believed. That was our hard luck. Our misfortune in this war, one of many, was that the majority of our leading personalities never had any front line commands during the war. When it was reported, for example, that the British fleet was outside CAEN, that they could fire as far as 30 km inland, and that therefore it would be senseless to leave our armored divisions within the range of their artillery--someone would simply maintain that they couldn't fire that far. And they would claim next, that just these last 3 or 5 km would make all the difference. The people who made these statements never took an active part in the war themselves. They got all their experience at sessions around conference tables.

+ + +

IO: We could not understand why the invasion in the South of France succeeded so easily. You must have been prepared. After all, you had daily reconnaissance missions over Corsica, North Africa, and Italy. You must have suspected something. And you must have seen our boats which were on reconnaissance patrol along the coast.

SECRET

5

28 May 45

SECRET

GUD: The reason for this lies in our peculiar evaluation of defensive strength, which is indicative of our strategy during the last year of this war. It was purely a strategy of lines (LINEAR-STRATEGIE). Our system of fortifications was arranged along a number of lines. First the WESTWALL, which was only one line for all practical purposes. The line behind it had not been completed. Then the ATLANTIKWALL was built, again nothing but one line. And this was the line in which all available divisions were committed. When it was suggested to assemble our armored divisions behind it, as a mobile reserve which could be used to oppose an attack, regardless of where it may come from, we were told: "No, they would be too late, everything will have to be thrown into the front line." ROMMEL was the main proponent of this strategy.

IO: How is it, that ROMMEL favored such a theory? He should have learned his lesson in North Africa.

GUD: ROMMEL was the principal proponent of this theory in France. Later on KLUGE followed suit. And it was impossible for me to do anything against it. A fortress such as ANTWERP, for example, was not utilized. It had neither ammunition or armament worth mentioning. That was the worst blunder we could possibly have made. And we did not fortify PARIS! Nor did we repair the fortresses VERDUN, EPINAL, BELFORT, METZ, or STRASSBURG so that they could be used. We simply had two lines: the ATLANTIKWALL--which was expected to fail like any other installation of its kind wherever the enemy would attack; and then the WESTWALL--another line which was expected to succumb wherever the enemy would concentrate all his efforts.

H: ROMMEL and I were at odds about this for many months. Then General GUDERIAN himself came to France in order to back me up. But unfortunately it was impossible to achieve anything.

GUD: I was sent to ROMMEL for that particular purpose. But HITLER told me: "I can't tell the Fieldmarshal in command how to run his business."

H: We knew exactly, even before the invasion started, that the ratio of allied armored recon cars (PANZERSPAHWAGEN) to ours was 15 to 1; tanks, 10 to 1; and planes, 30 or 50 to 1. And in view of this situation our only hope for victory lay with mobile warfare.

GEYR: ROMMEL was a fairly good tactician, but he didn't have the faintest idea about strategy.

GUD: ROMMEL was excellent as high up as a corps commander. He was a first rate divisional commander, because he was courageous, went to the front, and participated in everything. But later, when he commanded an army, using the same technique, he lacked the vision which is essential for such a task. You know, it takes time to learn to lead large and fast armored units. And ROMMEL was not a tank expert. After all, you can't suddenly replace years of schooling by intuition. ROMMEL lost some of his nerve in Africa.

IO: What do you think of our General PATTON?

GUD: General PATTON did what we would have liked to have done and what we used to do. He was very fast, which could already be seen in NOR-MANDY. I was with the FUHRER when PATTON's drive started. He said:

SECRET

28 May 45

SECRET

"That is nothing but the shameless daring of a few tanks. Our Generals never could have done that." I told him that our breaking through the French Maginot line toward the Atlantic coastline had proceeded in the same manner. Our breakthrough to the Swiss border, our closing of the Russian pocket, both were based on the same principle. A tank commander who doesn't lead recklessly can never be successful. Fate gives him just a few minutes or a few hours in which to do his stuff.

GUD: The coordination of your air force with your armored force in the Lorraine campaign was so outstanding, that I immediately included these American tactics into the curriculum of our armored forces' school at BERGEN.

GEYR: Even earlier than that, in NORMANDY, we could distinctly recognize the American spearheads by the planes which circled over them continually in order to clear the way--and which gave us no end of trouble. Did you know that the TIMES (London Times) gave us the clue as to the length of time for which American armored divisions would not be liable to attack? I saw the article myself where the censor missed it, and I also showed it to MARSCHALL RUNDSTEDT. I knew the TIMES very well and therefore read it very thoroughly. If you know the British well, you'll know that not one of them reads the first or second page of a paper--including their censors. They begin with the middle. Since I am very much interested in English reading matter, I discovered on the second page--among notices of the pork market and agricultural news--a short report of a meeting between representatives of American armored units, the War Office, and landholders, dealing with negotiations for maneuver areas for American armored divisions. Speeches were made, warning the landowners that they would have to expect quite a lot of damage, since the maneuvers were to be primarily night operations. All this was printed in the TIMES, as well as the fact that the divisions would not arrive before 15 Feb, if I remember the date correctly. We could deduce from that, how long it would take you to get ready for an invasion.

H: Right after the invasion started, and when the FUHRER complained because we hadn't pushed the Americans into the sea, I explained to him that I couldn't make up with my armored contingents alone for the failure of the Navy and the Air Force.

+ + + + +

III. MISCELLANY

GEYR: I was deeply grieved when I heard that ALSACE was definitely to become French. ALSACE is German soil--LORRAINE is French. I was hoping that there was the possibility of a compromise using the U.S.A. as an intermediary, and that the decision might be postponed for the time being. After all, no true German can ever forget ALSACE. Twice, Germany treated the Alsations awkwardly. The first time after 1870 and again this time. The point at present is not to incorporate ALSACE into Germany. It would be a better policy, if the Alsations would have a neutral administration like that of the United States for a few years, and were then given the chance to hold a plebiscite.... Therefore it was considered good news, that the

SECRET

28 May 45

~~SECRET~~

SAAR territory was to be under American jurisdiction. No European can be unbiased about these questions, not even the British. The idea of a "Balance of Power" is of prime importance to the Englishman. There was a bitter struggle between EDEN's and SAMUEL HOARE's schools of thought concerning this point. England under her present leadership is not in the position to be as impartial toward European problems as the United States would be. One must look at this realistically. A farreaching and fair solution of Europe's economic problems is possible only under the leadership of the United States.

+ + +

(Re: DACHAU)

GUD: We can't understand that. Even our own circle was affected. The chief of my operational department was in DACHAU. I never got any news from him. My wife couldn't utter a word, or she, too, would have been sent to DACHAU. We knew of a few of these dirty affairs in the concentration camps.

IO: Couldn't you go there yourself?

GUD: No, that was impossible....HIMMLER was responsible for all the atrocities.

+ + +

GEYR: I was with RIBBENTROP for one year as a military attaché. I only stayed with him out of a sense of duty. He was no professional diplomat who knew his business. He had lived in Canada for a while, and thought that the British were just like the Canadians. But they are quite different--you can't compare the two nations. And guided by his ignorance he believed that he understood the English people.

+ + +

GUD: In the Summer of '43 and the Fall of '44 our generals explained to our Foreign Minister that a two-front war would be impossible. The front in the East could be held only if the West could be pacified. We would have to be free on one side. I presented these ideas not only to the Foreign Minister, but also to the FUEHRER. It was impossible to get them to consider these questions seriously.

+ + +

GUD: During the Polish campaign, the FUEHRER was with me, only 50 meters behind the front line--he was still with me in France--but never in Russia.

IO: He would stay around as long as everything went well, but no longer.

GUD: That was not the reason--he left because he had to fly South. Only a few weeks ago he was still with some divisional headquarters near the ODER. He was not to be blamed himself; the FUEHRER was no coward. But the fault lay with his friends, who kept him more and more in the dark, without themselves knowing anything about warfare. Too bad he didn't follow my advice to join his men. However, his health wasn't up to standard and there actually were some men in his

~~SECRET~~

28 May 45

SECRET

circle, men of Supreme Headquarters such as JODL, ZEITZLER or BOR-MANN, who never came anywhere near the front.

GEYR: At least ZEITZLER commanded a Corps at one time.

H: But he never left his headquarters to go forward. He never came closer to the front than his corps headquarters. I remember him from the French campaign with the PANZERGRUPPE KLEIST, where he was was my superior. Not once during the entire campaign did he come to my headquarters.

+ + +

GUD: I never heard anyone present a viewpoint at the FUEHRER HQ which differed from that of the FUEHRER.

IO: That is not what GOERING told us. He claimed that he had numerous quarrels with HITLER about the employment of the air force.

GUD: That is unquestionably true. They argued at every meeting...but those were onesided arguments.

+ + + + +

28 May 1945

SEVENTH ARMY INTERROGATION CENTER

Paul Kubala
PAUL KUBALA,
Maj, MI,
Commanding.

SECRET

~~SECRET~~ IS AN ENCLOSURE TO

NOT DETACH

26 May 45

SEVENTH ARMY INTERROGATION CENTER
APO 758 US ARMY

.....
: ~~SECRET~~ :
:Auth: CG, 7th Army :
:Init: P He :
:Date: 26 May 1945 :
:.....:

RISE OF NAZISM IN VIENNA

1. SOURCE

FRAUENFELD, Alfred Eduard, Major, GAF, former GAULEITER of VIENNA.
Subject was born 18 May 1898 in VIENNA, of a family of artists and architects. After finishing REALSCHULE (High School), he entered a TECHNISCHE HOCHSCHULE (Technical College) but was obliged to leave because of financial difficulties. He served in World War I from 1916 to 1919 as Lieutenant in the Austrian Air Corps. In 1923 he became a bank clerk. From about 1920, he became interested in literature and started to write.

Rating: C-3 Date of Information: May 45 Interrogator: E.H.

2. POLITICAL ACTIVITIES IN VIENNA

Subject claims he entered the Nazi Party in 1929 because the financially desparate situation of the State made existence for the individual almost impossible. Young people met strong obstacles trying to obtain jobs (subject claims he tried through the Christian Social Party and Citizens National Party, but in vain) and were therefore forced into one of the two radical parties, Communist or Nazi. Subject believes that National Socialism is a direct product of the Versailles Treaty.

FRAUENFELD advanced quickly in the NSDAP and became GAULEITER of VIENNA in the beginning of 1930 ("or rather made myself GAULEITER"). He held this post until the party was officially banned in June 1933. Subject passes over the political period lightly by saying, "The climax consisted of brawls in pubs and fights among the students at the University. I myself was beaten up three times. In these four years our opponents had no dead, while we suffered three dead as casualties of the struggle with the Communists."

FRAUENFELD became member of the LANDESREGIERUNG (VIENNA Government), STADTRAT (City Counsellor), LANDTAGSABGEORDNETER (Member of Parliament), and member of the GEMEINDERAT (City Administration). He founded Nazi publications. According to him the entire political fight was typical for the usual political differences in VIENNA and did not transgress the usual level. FRAUENFELD was only GAULEITER of VIENNA; the command of Austria was in LINZ, entrusted to PROKSCH and THEO HABICHT, who had been sent from Germany. In 1932 the Austrian leaders of the NSDAP started party action against FRAUENFELD because of Jewish connections. This petered out after strong admca-
ition.

Things gradually became tougher. SS leaders arrived from Germany, and "sinister" characters came to him as collaborators. In June 1933, after HITLER's advent in Germany, acts of violence started, and as a result, the party was outlawed. FRAUENFELD claims he opposed this violence, refused to obey the order to flee to Germany like all other Nazi leaders, and offered to resign his party position. Except for being "shadowed" by detectives, he was allowed to move freely in VIENNA from the time of the ban until Dec 33. Arrested on suspicion of having authored a leaflet, and released a month later, he was arrested again and was sent to prison in WOELLERSDORF because of negotiations with Prince STARHEMBERG. He was released at the end of May 34 and this time DOLLFUSS, thru his representative STEPAN, started negotiations of his own and offered him a position in his cabinet.

Meanwhile the LANDESLEITUNG of the NSDAP, whose seat was in MUNICH, had repeatedly ordered him to flee Austria and threatened him with reprisals. At the same time he found out that Prince STARHEMBERG had discovered his negotiations with DOLLFUSS and wanted to have him arrested. This concurrence of events was decisive for FRAUENFELD - he fled to MUNICH.

At the LANDESLEITUNG in MUNICH he was rather ungraciously received, and was subsequently assigned to minor propaganda activities. In July of that

~~SECRET~~

S E C R E T

26 May 45

year he was involved in a severe plane accident and suffered critical injuries plus nervous shock. It took several weeks until he recovered, and immediately afterwards had an automobile accident. Offers this as proof that he couldn't possibly have had any connection with the abortive uprising in Austria and the assassination of Chancellor DOLLFUSS.

All Austrian Nazi offices in Germany were dissolved. FRAUENFELD himself, who claims to have been profoundly shocked by the events of those last few months, asked for permission to return to Austria. This was refused, and he was told that if he wanted something to do, he would have to find a job in Germany. He contacted Secretary of the State, FUNK and accepted the post of GESCHAEFTSFUEHRER (Financial Secretary) of the REICHSTHEATERKAMMER DER REICHSKULTURKAMMER (Theatrical Wing of the National Dept of Culture). According to FRAUENFELD this marked the end of his active political career in Austria and Germany.

He claimed that within a year he already had differences and troubles at his job, and that one of his close collaborators was removed from office, and moreover, that his job was made impotent by the appointment of a Chief KAMMERPRAESIDENT. FRAUENFELD sought refuge in writing and in speaking tours. This gave him opportunity to travel extensively and be more independent than it would have been possible under normal circumstances. His speeches and lectures during the first years were at times contrary to official policy, and he was forbidden to lecture on several occasions. He also taught in the School of the German Theater in BERLIN, at the Theater School in BOCHUM, and at SCHOENBRUNN in VIENNA.

FRAUENFELD expected to return to VIENNA after the ANSCHLUSS, but discovered that the city was forbidden to him by Reich Commissar BUERCKEL. However, under the pretense of scheduled lectures at SCHOENBRUNN and various other art institutions, he managed to visit the city occasionally.

3. VIENNA DISILLUSIONED

In time, the "sobering up process", as he calls it, followed: "We Austrian dreamers who fought for the old idea of the Reich now found ourselves sold out. All that happened was the creation of a Greater Prussia (GROSSPREUSSEN): VIENNA, on the other hand, was robbed of her cultural importance and was degraded to a subordinate provincial town."...According to him the population of VIENNA, tired of the machinations of GLOBOTSCHNIGG and BUERCKEL, demanded a Viennese. FRAUENFELD denies having campaigned in any way, and claims that the movement was entirely spontaneous. This brought about the second party investigation of FRAUENFELD. The principal cause for this action was the impression created by previous events in VIENNA. However, the accusations against him included having used his official position to give aid and comfort to MISCHLINGE (half-Aryans) formerly active in theatrical circles. The case arrived at a negative conclusion and was dropped. He asked to be allowed to resign from public office in favor of a seat on the Board of a VIENNA bank. This was flatly refused.

After that episode FRAUENFELD decided it would be safer for him in the Army, and in 1940 entered the GAF as a Captain. He was detailed to the Foreign Office as Liaison Officer for various Army headquarters in occupied countries. His duties terminated with a spinal injury received in an automobile accident during the latter part of 1940. Thereafter his job consisted of writing articles and giving lectures on the political and economic situation of the world.

4. ACTIVITIES AS COMMISSAR IN THE UKRAINE

In 1942 he was suddenly pulled out of the Army, sent to the OST MINISTERIUM (Ministry for Eastern Affairs), and assigned as GENERALKOMMISSAR (General Commissar) for the Crimea. He claims that he and GAULEITER ERICH KOCH, who was Reich Commissar of the UKRAINE, clashed immediately. FRAUENFELD claims

S E C R E T

2

26 May 45

that KOCH's administrative policies, and not his, were directly responsible for the "breeding of partisans". Source states that under his own methods he obtained the best harvest in the Crimea, and never had a case of terrorism or partisan violence. He administered the northern half of the Crimea from Sep 42 to Sep 43.

As a result of his differences with KOCH, two of his assistants were arrested and removed from office. How he always managed to slip through the fingers of the Gestapo has not as yet been clearly determined. Later, disciplinary action was again started against him, but the Russian advance interrupted proceedings. FRAUENFELD returned to Germany and dissolved the financial and personnel sections of his Crimean administration and, upon his own request, re-entered the Army. He was assigned to the OKW WEST PRUSSIA and travelled to various sectors of the front dispensing political propaganda to the troops. In the course of his duties he arrived in VIENNA in the fall of 44. Here he was prohibited from lecturing by Baldur VON SCHIRACH.

5. ANOTHER INNOCENT

Subject repeatedly claimed that since 1933 he has not been politically active, and that all his friends were either artists, or businessmen who were lukewarm toward the regime. He also claims that during his term as GAULEITER, the police and other authorities never had occasion to arrest him for any criminal acts, and that his two arrests were of a purely political nature. Of course FRAUENFELD did not explain what the authorities recognized as criminal acts. He never belonged to the SA or SS, and did not hold any rank (except GAULEITER) in any of the party organizations. His party membership, in addition, was discontinued after his entry into the army. The latter, it must be remembered, was not voluntary, since all members of the Nazi Party had to relinquish their membership upon entry into the Service.

26 May 1945

SEVENTH ARMY INTERROGATION CENTER

Paul Kubala
PAUL KUBALA,
Maj, MI,
Commanding.

S E C R E T IS AN ENCLOSURE

DO NOT DE FOR

27 May 1945

.....
: S E C R E T :
: Auth: _____ :
: Init: P K e :
: Date: 27 May 1945 :
:

SEVENTH ARMY INTERROGATION CENTER
APO 758 US ARMY

HANS FRANK CLAIMS INNOCENCE

1. SOURCE

FRANK, Hans, GOVERNOR GENERAL of POLAND. After reporting for duty as a lieutenant to the 9 Ini Regt upon the opening of German hostilities against Poland, source received orders from HITLER to take over the administration of Poland. He proceeded to Silesia, where the FUEHRER welcomed him in his special train and gave him his final order, by which source claims to have guided himself throughout the period of his regime in Poland: "(You will) so administer the country that we may draw from it the greatest possible use for the war."

Source took office 7 Nov 39 in CRACOW. In 44 he returned to Germany, with his staff and documents, having fled before the Russian advance. He was captured at his estate at NEUHAUS/SCHLIERSEE by American troops.

FRANK has attempted suicide twice since his captured. Weakened through loss of blood, he talks only with effort.

Source is clever and, knowing the danger of his present situation in the light of his past record, is dramatic and persuasive in trying to vindicate himself. He now condemns the Nazi ideals, although, as president of the Academy of German Law (AKADEMIE DES DEUTSCHEN RECHTES) he had a strong voice in the formulation of the Nazi conceptions of right.

Rating: C-3 Date of Information: See text Interrogator: W.K.

2. ATTEMPTS TO JUSTIFY RECORD

Source is familiar, through the press, with the accusations made against him as Governor General of Poland. He insists that he wanted only to further Polish interests, but that he always encountered difficulties, and had actually very little to say in the administration of the country.

He says that the Poles, a Slavic people and not Asiatic, should be considered absolutely Western and European. Their upper strata are enemies of Bolshevism, and of Russia. But at the same time unfortunately, they are enemies of Germany.

Source made the following explanations, which he is very anxious to have considered in the examination of his record:

a) "Beside me in Poland stood the 'REICHS Commissioner for the Strengthening of German Nationalism Abroad' (REICHSKOMMISSAR FUER DIE FESTIGUNG DEUTSCHEN VOLKSTUMS IM AUSLAND), HIMMLER, who commanded the Police, and upon whom I had no influence."

b) "Economically the country was under GOERING, who, as chief of the Four-Year-Plan, could exploit the country as he pleased. GOERING's motto was, "Let the Poles starve; I need grain for Germany."

c) "GAULEITER SAUCKEL had the Polish manpower at his disposal, and could deport Polish men and women for labor without consulting me."

(NOTE: The above statements, confirmed by REICHS MINISTER Dr LAMMERS, do NOT remove FRANK's responsibility, but help to establish the guilt of HIMMLER, GOERING and SAUCKEL.)

Source also tries to place responsibility on the German military commanders in Poland, particularly GENOBST (Col Gen) VON BLASKOWITZ. He claims that atrocities - murder and looting - had been committed by German troops in Poland prior to his taking office there in Nov 39; and that it was at that time that the Polish resistance movement originated.

S E C R E T

S E C R E T

27 May 45

3. GOVERNOR GENERAL'S STAFF IN POLAND

Source gave the following as the personnel of his staff in Poland:

SEYSS-INQUART, Dr	Deputy to FRANK.
BUEHLER, Dr	Chief of Government; Secretary of State.
SIEBER, Dr	
VON KRAUSHAAR (Later)	Dept of Interior.
EMMERICH, Dr	Dept of Economics.
SPINDLER	
SENKOVSKY (Later)	President of the Treasury.
FRAUNDORFER	Dept of Labor.
WILLE	Dept of Justice.
NAUMANN	Nutrition
GERDEIS	Railways
LAUXMANN	Postal Dept
KRUEGER, HOEHERER SS u. POLIZEIFUEHRER: (Superior SS and Police Leader)	Liaison men to HIMMLER; carried out his orders in police matters without PW's knowledge.
KOPPE, HOEHERER SS u. POLIZEIFUEHRER: (Superior SS and Police Leader).	

4. CONCENTRATION CAMPS

Source declares that he had nothing to do with the establishment of concentration camps, nor with sending persons to them. He claims he became familiar with the atrocities committed in MAJDANEK only through the foreign press after the entry of the Russians, and immediately addressed a letter to KOPPE demanding an explanation.

Previously he had known of the camp only as the "Central Collecting Point for the Security Service" (ZENTRALES SAMMELLAGER FUER DAS SICHERHEITS-WESEN). His only other previous knowledge about concentration camps was that early in the war the police had been taking prisoners to the camp at AUSCHWITZ, Silesia.

When the interrogator observed that the German governors in LUBLIN (under FRANK) must have known of the awful conditions in MAJDANEK, source became involved in self-contradictions, and finally had to admit that the question had been brought up before the chief training leader (HAUPTSCHULUNGSLEITER) of the Party, SCHMIDT. The responsible LUBLIN governors were:

ZOERNER, Dr	Former OBERBUERGERMEISTER, DRESDEN.
WENDLER, Dr	Former BUERGERMEISTER, HOF

The man responsible for the MAJDANEK camp was GRUF (SS Maj Gen) GLOBOT-SCHNIG, a native of KAERNTEN, and of Slovenian descent. Source says he was a rather brutal man, and a one-time GAULEITER in VIENNA.

5. ANTI-SEMITIC ATROCITIES

Regarding the systematic murder of the Jews in Poland, source spoke as follows: "As a lawyer I am opposed to lawless disregard and killing of human beings. I believe a secret law exists providing for the extermination of

S E C R E T

2

S E C R E T

27 May 45

the Jews, and agreed upon only by HITLER, HIMMLER, and HEYDRICH."

Source further stated that HITLER must have known of these murders and approved of them, since he himself had once notified HITLER of the unlawful activities of the SS in Poland.

Source claims that besides HITLER, guilt is on the heads of HIMMLER, HEYDRICH, GLOBOTSCHNIG, and the smaller SS leaders who carried out mass murders without orders from above.

27 May 1945

SEVENTH ARMY INTERROGATION CENTER

Paul Kubala
PAUL KUBALA,
Maj, MI,
Commanding.

S E C R E T

27 May 45

SEVENTH ARMY INTERROGATION CENTER
APO 758 US ARMY

SECRET
: Auth: CG, 7th Army :
: Init: P.H. :
: Date: 27 May 1945 :
: :

REICHSKULTURKAMMER (NATIONAL DEPARTMENT OF CULTURE)

1. SOURCES

a) FRAUENFELD, Alfred Eduard, MAJ, GAF, GAULEITER of VIENNA until 1933; GESCHAEFTSFUEHRER (Business Manager) THEATERKAMMER (Theatre Dept) of the REICHSKULTURKAMMER (National Dept of Culture). (Cf Report Ref No SAIC/25)

b) HINKEL, Hans, REICHSFILMINTENDANT (National Film Director) under Film Department, Propaganda Ministry. Source for Appendix only (Cf Report Ref No SAIC/28)

Rating: B-2 Date of Information: See Text Interrogator: E.E.

2. ORIGIN AND FUNCTIONS OF THE REICHSKULTURKAMMER

The REICHSKULTURKAMMER (National Dept of Culture) was an attempt to combine the entire cultural life of the nation under one organization. Its existence was provided for in law, and the orders of its seven department heads (KAMMERPRAESIDENTEN) in turn had the powers of law. During the lifetime of the RKK (REICHSKULTURKAMMER), other agencies were constantly demanding its manpower for their own uses, but it managed to maintain its existence nevertheless.

The functions which the RKK was supposed to fulfill include the following: Creation and supervision of art and music schools, representation of the interests of its members, social security, examination and classification of talent, pensions, relief, and legal aid for members.

3. ORGANIZATION (See Appendix)

Heading the RKK were the following personalities:

- | | |
|---|--|
| President: REICHSMINISTER FUER VOLKS-
AUFKLAERUNG u. PROPAGANDA (Minister of
Public Enlightenment and Propaganda) | Dr Paul Joseph GOEBBELS. |
| Vice President: State Secretary of
Propaganda Ministry | Dr FUNK, GAULEITER HAHNKE.
State Secretary NAUMANN,
chronologically in the
order named. |
| GESCHAEFTSFUEHRER (Business
Manager) - the actual head | Hans HINKEL, Dr SCHADE. |
| Legal Expert | Dr SCHMIDT-LEONHARD |

Source is of the opinion that greater power was vested in the office of the GESCHAEFTSFUEHRER not for reasons of necessity or efficiency, but simply as the result of the personal ambitions of HINKEL who, in addition to his post as GESCHAEFTSFUEHRER, held the title of General Secretary of the organization.

The RKK was further divided into departments (KAMMER), each being devoted to some field such as the theater, music, radio, etc. The Propaganda Ministry itself, however, had similar departments (music, film, literature, etc). There was no clear boundary between the province of these departments and those of the RKK. The result was an unnecessary duplication of functions, and, frequently, confusion and friction.

S E C R E T

27 May 45

During HINKEL's regime the power in the RKK was shifted at times to the departments, then to departments in the Propaganda Ministry itself; yet HINKEL would always manage to regain his place at the helm. The centralization of authority in the RKK was accomplished through frequent changes of the presidents and business managers of the different departments, thus undermining their influence and importance.

Source says that HINKEL lacked technical background, and considers his work to have been of small value. He says further that under HINKEL there was a ruthless turnover of personnel, with reasons for dismissals seldom given.

In addition to the titular head of the RKK, there was a REICHSKULTURSENAAT (Culture Senate) of 130 members, at first divided equally between "culture administrators" (KULTURVERWALTUNGSFUEHRER) and creative artists. After a few years the administrative personnel were removed from this body. The Senate convened once a year to hear a speech by the President of the RKK.

4. DEPARTMENTS OF THE RKK

Seven departments (KAMMER) functioned under the RKK: theater, music, film, press, literature, creative arts, and radio. The last named department was dissolved in 1939 or 1940. Each department had a president, vice-president, and business manager, who as in the case of the RKK itself, was the actual head.

There was, however, a certain amount of fluctuation in the division of power among these various offices within the departments. For example, Richard STRAUSS, as president, was the leading figure in the music department, followed by Prof Peter RAABE. Similarly, Richard BLUNK, as president, led the literature department, followed later by Hans JOHST, while Prof Richard SUCHENWIRTH was business manager.

The presidents of the theater department were Otto LAUBINGER until 1935, and Dr Rainer SCHLOESSER until 1937 (both also in charge of the theater department of the Propaganda Ministry); later the actor Ludwig KOERNER until 1942 and finally Paul HARTMANN, with Eugen KLOEPPER as vice-president.

The departments had from 100-400 employees each. The departments of the Propaganda Ministry maintained branch offices in the districts (GAUE), but the departments of the RKK maintained only their central offices.

Each department of the RKK was divided into sections (FACHSCHAFTEN), which were further divided into special groups (FACHGRUPPEN). The theater department, for example, was divided into the following sections: Stage (BUEHNE), light entertainment (ARTISTIK) (circus, vaudeville, etc), dance (TANZ), actors (SCHAUSPIELER), publishers for the stage (BUEHNENVERLEGER). Membership in the sections varied widely. The stage section, for instance, had about 40,000 members, the dance section about 6,000, light entertainment about 13,000.

The stage section of the theater department was divided into the following special groups:

- a) Producers: State, district, city, KRAFT DURCH FREUDE (Strength Through Joy); private enterprises.
- b) Directors: GENINTENDANTEN (General managers), INTENDANTEN (Managers), DIREKTOREN (directors).
- c) Stage managers: play and opera managers; artistic, technical, commercial managers; conductors, ballet masters, etc.
- d) Actors.
- e) Singers.
- f) Dancers.
- g) Choir singers.

2

S E C R E T

27 May 45

h) Technical personnel, secretaries, etc.5. FUNCTION OF THE DEPARTMENTS

The primary function of the departments was the representation of their members in the securing of positions. Political directives were supposed to emanate from the corresponding departments in the Propaganda Ministry.

The primary function was carried out individually by the various sections. Membership in the sections was subject to racial restrictions under the NUREMBERG laws. Thus, membership was possible only for "pure" Aryans, for "mixed Aryans Second Class" (MISCHLINGE 2. KL), and Aryans married to "mixed Aryans First Class" (MISCHLINGE 1. KL). Special permits were necessary for mixed Aryans First Class and Aryans married to non-Aryans. As far as source knows, nobody who was eligible under the above rules was denied membership in the theatre department, though it became necessary at times to negotiate for members with local authorities who, through caution or prejudice, were opposed to their employment. In 1937 the granting of special permits was taken over from the departments by the central office of the RKK since, in the opinion of that body, the departments had been too liberal in their interpretation of the law.

Source states that in the cases of certain well-known artists the question of their eligibility for membership was sometimes referred to higher authority, and eventually decided upon by GOEBBELS himself. The result of this system was that prominent artists had the opportunity to receive "favorable consideration", while those of lesser reknown were certain to suffer.

6. FINANCING OF CULTURAL LIFE

Cultural life under the Propaganda Ministry was subsidized by the State. Funds were allocated to the theatre ("T") department of the Propaganda Ministry, and distributed to districts and cities through their local finance facilities (the DEUTSCHER LANDTAG in the case of the cities). Thus the RKK had no direct connection with the State subsidization.

Public funds in the amount of RM 90-100,000,000 were allotted yearly to the theatre. In addition, HITLER and GOEBBELS made contributions running into the millions.

7. THEATRE FACILITIES UNDER THE NAZIS

Germany had about 220 permanent theatres. Two-thirds of these divided their efforts among opera, light opera, plays and the dance, while the remainder devoted themselves to one or another of these fields. In addition to the permanent theaters, there were about 100 traveling theaters, mostly presenting performances of plays. Many of these performed in small towns during the summer months, their tours being arranged under the supervision of the RKK.

27 May 1945

SEVENTH ARMY INTERROGATION CENTER

Paul Kubala
PAUL KUBALA,
Maj, MI,
Commanding.

S E C R E T

3


S E C R E T

27 May 45


APPENDIX

(Names shown are of those men who last held the positions.)

Source: H. H. HINKEL



S E C R E T



W

S E C R E T

IS AN ENCLOSURE TO
OF THE ACR

Ref No SAIC/28
28 May 45

SEVENTH ARMY INTERROGATION CENTER
APO 758 US ARMY

.....
: S E C R E T :
: Auth: CG, 7th Army :
: Init: PKC :
: Date: 28 May 1945 :
:.....

HANS HEINRICH HINKEL

(Cf also Report Ref No SAIC/27, 27 May 45)

1. SOURCE

HINKEL, Hans Heinrich, Civ, Former Business Manager, REICHSKULTURKAMMER (National Department of Culture).
Source is a 44-year-old native of WORMS, whose father owned a butcher shop and vineyard. Because of organic heart trouble source was never drafted into the army. He studied philosophy at the University of BONN, and attended the University of MUNICH in 1920-21. There he became a member of the student organization OBERLAND, which was incorporated into the VATER-LAENDISCHE VERBAENDE (Fatherland Organizations) in spring 23. During the same year he was forced for financial reasons to leave school and earn his living, which he did by working first in a bank and later on a canal construction project. In Oct 23 he was overtaken by physical exhaustion and retired to the farm of a friend in Lower Bavaria. On 8 Nov 23 he was called to MUNICH by the OBERLAND organization and participated in the HITLER Beer Hall Putsch at that time. He received the BLUTORDEN (Order of Blood) in 1934, undoubtedly in recognition of this participation. From MUNICH he returned to the farm, where he remained until Mar 24. In 27, through is connection with the STRASSER publishing firm, source resumed his activity in German and Nazi politics. His career, which reached its high point in his appointment as business manager of the REICHSKULTURKAMMER, is described in the following sections of this report.

Though a generally reliable type, source tried during interrogation to play down his own importance in Nazi cultural and political life. He tries to color the facts in his own favor;

Rating: C-3 Date of Information: Mar 45 Interrogator: E.H.

2. ASSOCIATION WITH GREGOR STRASSER

During his stay on the farm following the HITLER Putsch of 23, source made the acquaintance of the pharmacist Gregor STRASSER and his two brothers, Dr Otto and Franz STRASSER, the latter a member of the Order of Benedictines. In 1927, when source had been editor of the newspaper INN u. SALZACH WACHT (NEUOETTING/-INN) for three years, Gregor STRASSER invited him to invest in the publishing firm VERLAG GREGOR STRASSER GmbH, BERLIN. Source invested RM 40,000 (which he had acquired through his marriage) in the venture. He thus came into control of 49 per cent of the stock of the firm, the other 51 per cent being divided among the three STRASSER brothers. Source was made administrative and business director of the firm, while the policies were in the hands of Gregor and Otto STRASSER.

Gradually the firm was enlarged, and after about three years it owned all six weekly papers of the Nazi Party in Northern Germany. Its position NORTH of the MAIN was comparable to that of the Party publishing firm of Franz EHER, MUNICH, for Southern Germany.

The political trend of the brothers STRASSER differed in many respects from the official Party line as expressed in the papers of the NSDAP EHER firm and in its chief paper, VOELKISCHER BEOBACHTER, published by Adolf HITLER with Alfred ROSENBERG as chief editor. The differences centered around questions of religion, the Jewish question, foreign policy and social policy. The STRASSER papers considered themselves aligned against the "heathenistic-Fascistic tone of anti-Semitism" of ROSENBERG, who, because of his "intellectual superiority" over HITLER, had free rein in the running of the VOELKISCHER BEOBACHTER.

S E C R E TRef No SAIC/28
28 May 45

Through the growing importance of STRASSER in Northern Germany - especially among the workers in the industrial regions of the Ruhr, Saxony, HAMBURG, etc - his papers continued to gain in circulation, and the expansion of the firm demanded new funds. Source sent home for more money and contributed sums of RM 40,000 and later RM 30,000 - the entire family fortune - to the firm. The growth continued, despite the fact that Dr GOEBBELS, who had been called to BERLIN by HITLER, did not make use of their weekly to propound his views, but founded a new paper, sharply anti-Semitic in tone, DER ANGRIF. F.

DER ANGRIF was the official Party organ of the BERLIN district and was made possible through the contributions of thousands of the first Nazis, mostly poor people, in the national capital. Later when the EHER publishing firm took over DER ANGRIF, this fact was not taken into consideration, and GOEBBELS received a large sum of money for it.

3. HINKEL'S REVOLT (?) AGAINST THE PARTY

In 1930 the first rebellion of Gregor STRASSER and his friends against the Party took place. This was mainly against the more and more one-sided interpretation of the program by ROSENBERG, GOEBBELS, STREICHER, ESSER, Gbtt-fried FEDER, and others. Gregor STRASSER was considered an "outsider". After a terrific struggle between the STRASSER publishing firm on one side and HITLER's EHER publishing combine on the other, STRASSER consented to liquidate his firm as rapidly as possible and to demand that his brother Otto leave the NSDAP.

HITLER promised STRASSER and HINKEL that the money invested in the firm, which would be lost through the liquidation, would be considered an "honor debt of the Party" and would be repaid as soon as possible. Thus through a legal bankruptcy process the STRASSER firm was liquidated. HITLER, however, never kept his promise. When source later mentioned the debt to HITLER's private secretary, Rudolf HESS, he was told that he would be given a seat in the REICHSTAG as compensation. This would give him a monthly salary of RM 600. Gregor STRASSER advised him to accept, and in Sept 30, when the number of Party seats in the REICHSTAG increased from 12 to 107, HINKEL was elected a member. He claims that he never received any of the RM 110,000 invested with STRASSER, and that he refused to collaborate in GOEBBELS's paper DER ANGRIF, as he was in favor of the political views represented by STRASSER and his brother.

4. "BATTLE UNION FOR GERMAN CULTURE"

Wishing to do some work outside his regular political job, source founded a branch of the "Battle Union for German Culture" (KAMPFBUND FUER DEUTSCHE KULTUR) in Berlin in 1930. This organization had been started a few months before in MUNICH by the well-known art publisher BRUCKMANN, with the aid of a few prominent artists. There was a danger, pointed out to him by BRUCKMANN and STRASSER, that ROSENBERG might attempt to dominate this non-Party organization, since HITLER had made ROSENBERG his "Pope of Culture".

Source called on all artists in the national parties (DEUTSCHNATIONALE PARTEI, DEUTSCHE VOLKSPARTEI, etc) to become members of his organization. The principal attraction for most of these artists was the fact that membership in the NSDAP was not necessary, while at the same time they were enabled to participate in the reconstruction of the financially ruined theatrical and musical professions. Members of "Marxist" parties were not accepted, as the danger of "complete domination by the Communist Party" became more and more threatening. In BERLIN the KPD (Communists) had polled over 1,000,000 votes.

In the theatre all the classics and classical composers were slowly disappearing from the programs. In attempting to restore them, the organization became a success in certain circles, despite the fact that the Party through DER ANGRIF called it a "colorless, bourgeois union".

S E C R E T

S E C R E T

Ref No SAIC/28
28 May 45

5. PRUSSIAN THEATER COMMISSION

In 1931 the revolt of the BERLIN SA leader STENNES occurred. As in the previous year during the STRASSER rebellion, source claims that an expulsion process from the Party was started against him. As active participation in the revolt could not be proved, he was let off, but was never to get an office in the Party.

During the spring of 1933 source was put in charge of the Prussian Theatre Commission (AUSSCHUSS) by Hermann GOERING. Members of this commission were almost exclusively artists, among them Ludwig KOERNER, later president of the National Department of the Theatre (REICHSTHEATERKAMMER). This commission was to submit plans concerning personnel and programs for all the official theatres in Prussia to GOERING, after the Jewish managers of the theatres had been removed through national laws.

6. JEWISH CULTURAL ORGANIZATION (KULTURBUND)

In July 1933 various Jewish personalities, whom HINKEL knew from theatrical and musical circles, asked him if there was any possibility of their finding employment in Germany, as they could not or would not emigrate. According to source, it was he who suggested to the Minister for Culture for Prussia, Bernhard RUST, and to GOERING, the creation of a Jewish cultural organization (KULTURBUND). This organization was to provide performances by Jewish artists for exclusively Jewish audiences. This was very much desired by many Jews, since, because of existing laws in many districts and cities, it was forbidden for them to attend public artistic performances. The plan was to create the organization first in Prussia, and then on a national scale, with the collaboration of the Jewish communities. Despite the great fanaticism in many circles, permission for this undertaking was granted after a few days, first by RUST and then by GOERING. (RUST is supposed to have told source that "he had picked up an extremely hot iron" and that he was curious to see how long the ROSENBERG-STREICHER-GOEBBELS clique would remain silent).

In Aug 33 the BERLIN executive council of the Jewish KULTURBUND had its first session. The chairman was the former conductor of the State Opera (STAATSOPER) of BERLIN, Dr SINGER. The theatre, formerly the HERRNFELD-THEATER, was called the THEATER DES JUEDISCHEN KULTURBUNDES and was located in the KOMMANDANTENSTRASSE. From among the artists of opera, stage and music who had been dismissed after 30 Jan 33, groups for opera and stage performances were formed. This was carried out later on throughout Germany, and resulted in a fairly well organized Jewish cultural life.

In Feb 34, after a conference with RUST, FRICK and GOERING, source was made "Commissioner for non-Aryans Artistically Employed within REICHS Territory." He held this office until 1941. Source claims that through this activity he made himself many enemies and only the position of GOERING, which was untouchable until 2-3 years ago, made it possible for him to continue. (He was considered GOERING's special agent.) Source claims that he was supported in his endeavours by Dr Hjalmar SCHACHT and Dr Walter FUNK.

7. POSITION IN REICHSKULTURKAMMER (NATIONAL DEPARTMENT OF CULTURE)

During the autumn of 1933 the legal foundations were laid for a REICHSKULTURKAMMER (RKK) (National Dept of Culture). During the summer of 35 source, allegedly much to his surprise, was made third business manager (GESCHAFTSFUEHRER) of this agency by Dr GOEBBELS. The other two business managers were GRUF (SA Maj Gen) Franz MORALLER and Prof Dr SCHMIDT-LEONHARD. The latter was the originator of all laws and executive regulations pertaining to the REICHSKULTURKAMMER. For this legal work, done at the request of Dr GOEBBELS, he was made Professor of Culture Law (KULTURRECHT) at the

S E C R E T

S E C R E T

Ref No SAIC/28
28 May 45

University of BERLIN. SCHMIDT-LEONHARD was notorious as a fanatical Party member.

Source claims that he was gradually reduced in importance within the RKK, despite great success in organizing a sort of USO organization for the troops on the front. Finally he was left only two purely artistic jobs: since 1 May 44 that of REICHSFILMINTENDANT (director in charge of the movie industry), and since Apr 42, that of director of the artistic programs on the radio. His successor in his job of general business manager (HAUPTGESCHAEFTSFUEHRER) of the RKK, as well as that of General Secretary, was Dr Hans SCHRADE, who at the same time was business manager of the Department for Theatre (REICHS-THEATREKAMMER).

a) Regulation of German Film Industry

When source took over the film industry in 1944, he says movies in Germany were faced with cultural ruin. Dr Fritz HIPPLER, who had held the position from 36 to 43, had completely failed. He was followed in rapid succession by three other men within one year. Almost simultaneously with source's taking over his new position, the Film section in the Propaganda Ministry received a new boss, GAU Propaganda Chief of HANOVER Kurt PARBEL. PARBEL, a former HITLER Youth leader, was the "Party man" for the movie industry, and had been appointed to this job through BORMANN. As Propaganda Chief of HANOVER he had come to the attention of the GAULEITER for HANOVER, LAUTERBACHER, and later was brought to the Party office of BORMANN. Here he received a certain amount of schooling and was known as a "coming man". Source concentrated on making movies for entertainment, while the special office under PARBEL's direction made newsreels and special productions.

As REICHSFILMINTENDANT (Director of the German film industry), source was placed over the production chiefs of the various film studios, including: UFA, TOBIS, TERRA, BAVARIA, WIENFILM, BERLINFILM and PRAGFILM.

Dr WINKLER, as Deputy for the film industry (REICHSBEAUFTRAGTER FUER DIE FILMWIRTSCHAFT) was the governmental representative in control of the financial heads of the same film companies. It was also his responsibility to bring all movie firms under state control by buying them up through the CAUTIO GmbH, of which he was the director.

Also through CAUTIO, which was financed by the REICHS Finance Ministry, Dr WINKLER bought the SCHERL magazine from HUGENBERG.

b) Regulation of German Radio

The agency in over-all control of the German radio was the Radio section of the Propaganda Ministry, whose function was exactly analogous to that of the Film section. Subordinate to this section was the REICHS-RUNDFUNK (National Radio) GmbH, which actually presented the programs to the radio public. Hans FRITSCHE, besides heading the Radio section of the Propaganda Ministry, was responsible for news broadcasts, speeches, lectures, commentaries, and all "spoken words" emanating from the REICHS-RUNDFUNK.

In charge of administration of the REICHSRUNDFUNK was Dr GLASMEIER, while source was head of music. Source claims to have had only two programs under his control, one at the REICHSENDER, the other at the DEUTSCHLANDSENDER. These were purely artistic, he claims, and received the applause of soldiers, who were tired of the dry political program served them by FRITSCHE.

8. RESIGNATION AND CAPTURE

On 15 Dec 44 source was dismissed at his own request, with his salary as MINISTERIALDIREKTOR (title for high government official) continuing. It was his intention to embark on a commercial undertaking in the film

S E C R E T

S E C R E TRef No SAIC/28
28 May 45

industry, which would not have been allowed while he held a government position.

On 10 Apr 45 source received an order from GOEBBELS to go to Southern Germany to supervise music at the radio stations, and if possible to assemble officials of the Propaganda Ministry. This source did gladly, as it gave him a chance to leave BERLIN and to visit his wife, who had been ill ever since she was dismissed from the concentration camp in RAVENSBRUECK.

He visited the Bavaria Film Company in Munich for a short time and ordered a continuation of production, against the orders of the GAULEITER GIESSLER. From there he went to MITTENWALD, where other members of the Music department of the REICHSRUNDFUNK were assembled. He turned over all his equipment to American authorities when they arrived at MITTENWALD, and was arrested there by US soldiers.

Subject claims that the singer Anita SPADA, who later became his second wife, was thrown into the RAVENSBRUECK Concentration Camp for five months for "defeatism and pacifism". His subsequent marriage to her was considered unfavorably by Dr GOEBBELS, whom source describes as his arch-enemy.

28 May 1945.

SEVENTH ARMY INTERROGATION CENTER

Paul Kubala
PAUL KUBALA,
Maj, MI,
Commanding.

S E C R E T



13

S E C R E T THIS IS AN ENCLOSURE
DO NOT DETACH

Ref No SAIC/30
29 May 45

SEVENTH ARMY INTERROGATION CENTER
APO 758 US ARMY

: S E C R E T :
: Auth: CG, 7th Army :
: Init: P.H.e :
: Date: 29 May 1945 :
: :

DR ROBERT LEY

1. SOURCE

LEY, Robert, REICHSORGANISATIONSLIETER, Leader of the DAF (German Labor Front) and REICHSWOHNUNGSKOMMISSAR (Commissioner of Housing).

His thick, stocky, sullen composition makes him appear brutal and unpleasant. Even after his world collapsed, he remains the fanatical Nazi. Compared with other Nazi bigwigs, his attitude to share the blame is surprising. He says: "Now they all want to picutre HITLER as a sick man who was lead by BORMANN. HITLER is sick and BORMANN dead - a clever maneuver! No, all of us who had a leading position are responsible for everything, so are the "red pants" (generals) who claim to have "Wanted only the best," now that the war is lost. He makes a theatrical impression, he might even be slightly demented. He willingly gives information regarding his own self, however, his statements regarding other Nazi officials must be accepted with reservation.

LEY claims that he did not become a follower of HITLER out of ulterior motives. He drew RM 1000 monthly as chemist for the IG FARBEN Works, became enthused by a speech of HITLER, resigned his position, and worked exclusively for HITLER. This action he based on his fighting nature, calling attention to his having fought as a pilot until the last minute of the first World War.

About the accusations made against him by the press abroad that he was a heavy drinker and a woman chaser, he said, "I have been a teetotaler for the last ten years (FUNK claimed this to be a lie, stating that he was drunk repeatedly). He admits that he appreciated women, claiming that he needed diversion since the death of his wife in 1942, which affected him greatly. He did not become rich in the party. He drew only RM 4000 per month and his property consisted only of a three hundred hectare estate. The many houses which were claimed to have belonged to him were property of the Workers' organization and used for official business.

Rating: C-3 Date of Information: May 1945 Interrogator: W.K.

2. LAST MEETING WITH HITLER

HITLER appreciated LEY to the last. LEY met HITLER for the last time during the night 19 Apr in the shelter of the Chancellory. Although HITLER had been holding conferences since four o'clock that afternoon, he received LEY at midnight appearing alert and fresh. It was well known however that HITLER had undergone an operation on his vocal cords and suffered from trembling of his arms and legs. HITLER gave LEY the order to go south, adding that he would follow.

3. MEETING OF GOEBBELS AND SEPP DIETRICH

LEY talked with GOEBBELS on 20 Apr and had asked him to take at least his (GOEBBELS) family to safety. GOEBBELS replied, "These generals are incapable of defending BERLIN. I will have to do it myself. If necessary I shall die here and Magda, (my wife) has decided to do likewise."

LEY proceeded to the ALPS where he was joined by SEPP DIETRICH who assured him that he would fight to his death with his SS men. LEY said, "if he (DIETRICH) did not do it, his wife is to blame who later came to visit him. DIETRICH is no army soldier - - only a political soldier of HITLER."

S E C R E T

Ref No SAIC/30
29 May 45

4. LAST COMBAT MEASURES OF LEY

LEY denied having had a conference with HIMMLER on 12 Apr regarding the continuation of underground activities after the collapse.

LEY however organized the "FREIKORPS HITLER" in mid-May. He consulted with HITLER and begged him to form a "FREIKORPS" consisting of men, women and children from the "German Labor Front", who were to fight to their death. To this HITLER agreed. However, this Corps was formed only in the North, it was organized by the staff of the DAF. It was put into action in the neighborhood of BERLIN where the people all died in action, according to LEY. (LAMMERS and FUNK confirmed the formation of the "FREIKORPS HITLER"; LEY had told them that the generals were worthless and the ministers had to lead the army).

5. LEY'S ACTIVITIES

As chief of organization, LEY supervised the education of the replacements for Party leaders, because HITLER considered him an especially fanatical party member. Subordinated to him were the three ORDENSBURGEN (Schools for Nazi Leaders) in Germany.

As leader of the DAF he administered the funds of the Workers' Association, which he described as being the largest organization in the world. His capital was 10 billion marks. This capital originated from property of former trade guilds, and at the time of collapse consisted of the largest insurance company in the world, the VOLKSWAGEN automobile factory, the VULKAN shipyards in STETTIN, large factories in the food industries, thousands of homes and stores, hotels and convalescent homes, the "BANK DER DEUTSCHEN ARBEIT" (Bank of German Labor) and a cash reserve of three-quarter billion marks. The association was administered by experts in their fields and belonged to the German workers. All documents are in BERLIN, from which LEY claims, it can be seen that he did not acquire any property from these funds. According to LEY, the workers believed in him, and his most loyal followers are in the RUHR district. "During the war", said LEY, "my workers naturally worked for victory, and I strengthened their will to victory with speeches. I would have liked to fight with weapons alongside my workers. I treated the foreign workers well. They will see when they return to their homelands how little is being done for them and will insist that the truth come to light; that the workers in Germany are better off than workers in any other country. No foreigners were put in concentration camps by me. However, I take responsibility with others for the cruelties which happened there. "It is known that I am anti-Semitic, even if I could start over again, I would not do otherwise; however, I would make changes in the racial laws. Because of them, primitive people are easily lead to acts of violence."

6. OPINIONS ABOUT OTHER POLITICAL FIGURES

In this respect LEY is very careful, he considers such expressions treason to the party. Nevertheless he made the following criticisms:

a) GOERING:

"GOERING was never able to win the heart of the workers. He was considered a comical figure. I can best describe him as the "pus-bag" (EITERBEVLE) not only of the party but of Germany as well." LEY also called him a conceited, egotistical windbag, who by his measures damaged the party considerably, and now does not stand by the party.

S E C R E T

S E C R E T

Ref No SAIC/30
29 May 45

b) BORMANN

BORMANN never controlled HITLER. LEY was present many times when HITLER yelled at BORMANN. "BORMANN had many faults but was a loyal party member, who may have died with HITLER."

c) FEGELEIN:

Herman FEGELEIN is not a politician like BORMANN. He was the liaison officer between HIMMLER and HITLER because he was handsome and dashing. He met Eva BRAUN, who was HITLER's mistress, at the Chancellory where he met her sister whom he married about two years ago. LEY believes that FEGELEIN did not die in the shelter together with HITLER but that he received an assignment at the front.

29 May 1945

SEVENTH ARMY INTERROGATION CENTER

Paul Kubala
PAUL KUBALA,
Maj, MI
Commanding.

S E C R E T

S E C R E T

THIS IS AN ENCLOSURE
FOR DETACH

Ref No SAIC/32
29 May 45

SEVENTH ARMY INTERROGATION CENTER
APO 758 US ARMY

.....
: S E C R E T :
: Auth: CG, 7th Army :
: Init: P. K. :
: Date: 29 May 1945 :
:.....

HEINRICH LAMMERS, CHIEF OF REICH CHANCELLORY

1. SOURCE

Heinrich LAMMERS represents the typical German official and jurist. He tries to emphasize the point that since the Party took over control of all matters of German policy, foreign and interior alike, he was not more than a figurehead in the Reich Chancellory, but he apparently realizes that these claims are subject to strong arguments. He joined the Party in 32 and, as expert in state and administrative law procedures, was indispensable in the legal transfer of the state functions to Party authorities, especially in the first period, when HINDENBURG was still alive. Due to his position he is a highly important witness for unlawful actions of the Nazi regime.

Source, like almost every REICH Minister and high-ranking military leader, received a considerable monetary gift for his services, which apparently weighs heavily upon his conscience.

Rating: C-3 Date of Information: See Text Interrogator: W.K.

2. ACTIVITIES AS CHIEF OF REICH CHANCELLORY

According to his position as Chief of the Chancellory, source was to instruct the Reich Chancellor concerning the current political situation. This task was performed by LAMMERS in the first years of the regime, before HINDENBURG's death. After the governing of Germany was taken over by the Party alone, source claims matters of interior policy were no longer the concern of the Chief of the Chancellory, and after NEURATH was fired as Foreign Minister and RIBBENTROP took over his functions, this field was also eliminated as one of LAMMER's affairs.

The nominal functions of the Chief of the Chancellory were as follows:

a) State Legislation Matters

Until 37, laws were either decreed by the Reich cabinet or submitted in writing. They were then submitted to all ministers concerned and finally signed by HITLER. Since 37, all laws were counter-signed by LAMMERS, who was responsible for the legal aspects of the drafts and was therefore called "Notary of the Reich".

LAMMERS claims the NUREMBERG Laws "were prepared and made legal by the National Socialist REICHSTAG. They had probably been prepared by Reich Minister of the Interior Dr FRICK. I received notice of them only after they had been made legal".

b) Matters Concerning FUEHRER Decrees

Such decrees were issued directly by the FUEHRER, for the most part upon suggestion by one of the Ministers. LAMMERS checked the drafts concerning their form, and afterwards, they were published.

c) Administration of Chancellory Funds

As Chief of Chacellory, source administered special funds at the disposal of the Head of State. These funds consisted of the following:

i) General Purpose Funds (FONDS FUER ALLGEMEINE ZWECKE), amounting to 30-40 million marks annually. HITLER used these funds for making monetary gifts to his high-ranking collaborators, both civil and military. LAMMERS defends this procedure by recalling that Frederick the Great granted his collaborators so called "dotations", and that Napoleon likewise gave large monetary rewards to his marshals.

D1163B

S E C R E T

Ref No SAIC/32
29 May 45

The order for the payment of a larger sum was given either by HITLER, by HITLER's Chief Adjutant, or by BORMANN. LAMMERS recalls that Field Marshal RUNDSTEDT received RM 250,000 on 11 Dec 41; GENOBST (Col Gen) Heinz GUDERIAN received nearly RM 1,000,000 to purchase an estate in WARTHEGAU (Pomerania); Field Marshal LEEB received about RM 500,000 for the acquisition of a forest estate in Bavaria; Field Marshal BRAUCHITSCH as far as source remembers, also received a larger donation; as to Field Marshals LISZT and WEICHS, source assumes that they were also favored with monetary gifts, but he does not recall the exact figures; but Field Marshal ROMMEL received nothing and neither did Field Marshal WITZLEBEN. The GAF Field Marshals received similar "allotments" directly from GOERING. LAMMERS recalls that Field Marshal MILCH received a large amount of money to purchase an estate somewhere near BRESLAU.

"Representation Expenses" (AUFWANDSENTSCHAEDIGUNGEN) for the Ministers were also paid from the General Purpose Fund. GOERING, for example, received as REICHSMARSHALL at first RM 48,000, then RM 96,000, and finally RM 240,000 a year, in addition to his salaries through the various other official posts he held (cf Report Ref No SAIC/16, 23 May 45). LAMMERS admits that the simultaneous receipt of several salaries was unlawful.

ii) Aid Fund (HILFSFOND), amounting to 90-100 million marks a year. This fund was further subdivided into a Housing Fund (L) (BAUFOND), from which HITLER financed special building projects, e.g. in LINZ, where he had attended school; a Charity Fund (W) (WOHLTAETIGKEITSFOND), from which subsidies were paid to hospitals and similar institutions; and a Reserve Fund (R), which contained a reserve capital to replenish the other funds. The assets for all these funds came from the Reich Ministry of Finance.

d) Coordination of the Reich Ministries

The task of coordinating the activities of the various ministries also was the concern of the Chief of the Chancellery. Laws proposed by a minister had to be submitted to all other ministers who were interested in the matter. LAMMERS also had to confer continuously with the Director of the Party Chancellery, at first HESS, afterwards BORMANN, since all laws had to be submitted to the Party authorities prior to their publication.

e) Decisions Concerning Petitions and Complaints were also part of the functions of the Chief of the Chancellery.

3. REICH CHANCELLERY STAFF

GRITZINGER was Secretary of State and LAMMERS' deputy. In addition there were four Cabinet Counsellors (KABINETTSRAETE): Dr MEERWALD, MINISTERIAL-DIREKTOR (rank equiv to Maj Gen); STUTTERHEIM, whose special field was occupied territories; WILLUHN, commerce and communication problems; Dr FICKER, administration, organization and state law matters; Dr KILLY, whose special field was civil service law, social security, and finances, was finally removed because of his non-Aryan origins, under pressure by BORMANN. All these officials were specialists.

4. DEALINGS WITH HITLER

In the beginning, when HITLER did not yet govern exclusively through the Party, LAMMERS was an indispensable link between the Reich President and the Reich Chancellor. HINDENBURG at first disliked HITLER because of the latter's loud manner and because HITLER did not fit into HINDENBURG's environment. LAMMERS coached HITLER into controlling himself when reporting to HINDENBURG, and finally the Field Marshal came under HITLER's spell. In this connection LAMMERS recalls that when he came to the NEUDECK estate a few days prior to HINDENBURG's death in order to have some papers signed, HINDENBURG, extremely weak, told LAMMERS: "Give my regards to my dear HITLER!"

S E C R E T

Ref No SAIC/32
29 May 45

Until 37 LAMMERS reported to HITLER four times a week on the current affairs of state. After 37 the Council of Ministers did no longer assemble, and HITLER began to transmit his political will through orders addressed directly to the respective ministers and generals. LAMMERS had no say in matters regarding foreign policy since RIBBENTROP's appointment, he claims. He learned about the attack on Poland only after the beginning of hostilities, LAMMERS claims, and then he had to issue the necessary decrees. GOERING, according to source, was not very much in favor of the war against Poland.

LAMMERS made his last official report to HITLER on 24 Sep 44. He does not recall the subject matter of the report, but states that details are noted in his diaries which are packed in wooden cases and are stored in his official residence in BERCHTESGADEN.

LAMMERS last saw HITLER on 27 Mar 45, when HITLER signed some papers without any comments. LAMMERS subsequently fell into complete disfavor and was even sentenced to death upon BORMANN's urging, he claims.

5. NOTES ON HITLER, BORMANN, RIBBENTROP

a) HITLER

During his first few years in office HITLER repeatedly demonstrated his desire to govern according to laid down laws. This tendency was caused by the fact that HINDENBURG was still alive, and by the somewhat insecure feeling of HITLER as executive. Already after the ROEHM Putsch, however, HITLER started to pay less and less attention to his ministers and governed more and more as a dictator. In matters of foreign policy he relied more on his intuition than on actual facts. He did not tolerate any objections or news of unpleasant happenings. Whoever talked back fell into disgrace and was removed.

After the outbreak of the war with Russia, the Party was the sole ruler in the inner administration of the country. HITLER was particularly annoyed that according to law he could not just fire generals and high officials, but had to pension them. As a result, the REICHSTAG was assembled in fall 43 and a law stating that any man in Germany could be removed from office by HITLER without trial, HITLER being the highest judge in similar matters, was passed. On this occasion HITLER made his speech in which, aside from the generals, he attacked the judges as parasites of the state.

HITLER always tried to avoid harsh measures against deserving Party members who, in source's opinion "did not deserve any decent treatment".

b) BORMANN

Source associated with BORMANN almost daily in line of duty. BORMANN, already Chief of Staff of the Party Chancellory (STABSLEITER DER PARTEIKANZLEI) under Rudolf HESS, came into particularly close contact with HITLER because he also looked after the OBERSALZBERG affairs. HESS paid little attention to current Party matters and BORMANN, who was very industrious, gained more and more in importance. After HESS' flight, HITLER nominated BORMANN as Chief of the Party Chancellory (LEITER DER PARTEIKANZLEI), since he did not want to nominate a successor to HESS; thus BORMANN was given the most important post in the Party administration, and since 42 it could be stated that the Party governed the State, BORMANN was the leading man. In spring 43 BORMANN was appointed secretary to the FUEHRER, which meant that no statesman or Party member could approach HITLER without seeing BORMANN first. Only the generals still retained free access. Whoever objected to BORMANN was removed.

At first BORMANN got along with HIMMLER, but later, when BORMANN tried to interfere with HIMMLER's "Police State", their relationship deteriorated. The unlawful treatment of concentration camp victims was undoubtedly known to BORMANN, but source claims that it had not been ordered

S E C R E TRef No SAIC/32
29 May 45

by him. Most likely HIMMLER is the responsible person, source believes. BORMANN, however, succeeded in removing even the last "non-Aryans" from their positions.

BORMANN was by profession a farmer. He was a small, tough man, intelligent, ambitious, double-faced. He learned quickly. He like alcohol and was frequently criticized by HITLER, who had a dislike for drunks. BORMANN was married to the daughter of Party Judge BUCH; he ill-treated his wife and had difficulties with his father-in-law, whose discharge he finally brought about.

BORMANN at first tried to maintain good relations with LAMMERS, since he could learn a great deal from him. Later, when LAMMERS did not want to submit to him, BORMANN became source's personal enemy.

In source's opinion BORMANN did not dominate HITLER, but he had a strong influence upon him.

c) RIBBENTROP

After HITLER's rise to power, NEURATH's position became difficult, since the Party Office for Matters of Foreign Policy strongly influenced the foreign policy of Germany. HITLER finally dismissed NEURATH, whose ideas he considered too old-fashioned.

HITLER's foreign policy was not stable, because of the multitude of Party agencies interested in the subject. In addition to RIBBENTROP, there was also ROSENBERG and even the Hitler Youth who maintained their own foreign-political offices.

RIBBENTROP is described by source as a cool, realistic person, vain and susceptible to flattery. HITLER thought highly of him, because he encountered little opposition from his part. Source frequently had occasion to report to HITLER minor wishes of foreign diplomats, only to receive the standard answer: "Tell it to RIBBENTROP".

Source claims that all important conferences concerning the war against Poland were held by HITLER with RIBBENTROP and other statesmen "under four eyes only".

29 May 1945

SEVENTH ARMY INTERROGATION CENTER

Paul Kubala
PAUL KUBALA,
Maj, MI,
Commanding.

S E C R E T

4

S E C R E T

AN ENCLOSURE
NOT DETACH

.....
: S E C R E T :
: Auth: CG, 7th Army :
: Init: CK :
: US ARMY: Date: 26 May 1945 :
:.....

Ref No SAIC/24
26 May 45

SEVENTH ARMY INTERROGATION CENTER:
APO 758

AMANN'S CONTROL OF GERMAN PRESS

I. SOURCE

MAX AMANN, Director of REICHSPRESSEKAMMER (State Press Commission).

Rating: C-3 Date of Information: May 45 Interrogator: W.K.

AMANN made few appearances in the public life of the party, but through brutal seizure or suppression of German publications, he built up an enormous Nazi newspaper concern. Through the books and newspapers he published, he had a strong influence on the minds of the German people. AMANN himself, despite mediocre business ability, became a multi-millionaire.

In appearance AMANN is homely and has only one arm; the other he lost in a hunting accident. He is coarse by nature and speaks in a Bavarian dialect.

His relationship to the party stems from the fact that as Feldwebel (Sgt) he was HITLER's immediate superior in World War I.

II. PERSONAL RELATIONSHIP TO HITLER

During World War I when HITLER joined the staff of the 16th Bavarian Reserve Inf Regt as messenger, AMANN was regimental Sgt Major. AMANN describes HITLER as having been a homely, pale soldier, whose civilian occupation was listed as "Kunstmaler" (artist painter). HITLER was courageous and stood up well under strain; even then he showed a passion for war. He was not promoted because there was no opening.

After the war AMANN was a clerk-accountant and made good money. HITLER met him on the street and asked him to join his party and organize the press. AMANN joined only after his wife encouraged him.

AMANN describes HITLER as a sexually normal man. HITLER's only woman friend, with whom he had occasional intimate relations, was EVA BRAUN, a former employe of the photographer HOFFMAN. She had a little house in MUNICH/BOGENHAUSEN. During the last months she was constantly around HITLER.

Otherwise AMANN seldom met HITLER. HITLER had very little understanding of economic matters; so AMANN had less occasion than other party leaders to visit HITLER in person. However, he alone had the right to address HITLER with "Good morning, Herr HITLER". Since the beginning of 1943, according to a decree by BORMANN, no party leader could come near HITLER without BORMANN's permission. AMANN met HITLER for the last time on 24 Feb when HITLER spoke to the leaders in the REICHSKANZLEI. Even then HITLER appeared physically failing, and he was very much under the influence of BORMANN.

III. OTHER POLITICAL PERSONALITIES

a) BORMANN, chief of the REICHKANZLEI. After HESS' flight, BORMANN, an uneducated, brutal individual, gained more and more influence over HITLER. Together with HIMMLER he maintained a spy system against everybody, including party leaders. During the last months he had made HITLER a tool for himself and had the nickname, "HITLER'S RASPUTIN". BORMANN's friend, GAULEITER GIESSLER, of MUNICH, was also unscrupulous. The often met and conspired together.

b) HIMMLER. AMANN's neighbor on the TEGERNSEE, HIMMLER seems to be of a homely nature, and his outward appearance belies his tyrannical rule. AMANN regards HIMMLER as a kind of Robespierre, or as a witch-burning Jesuit. HIMMLER considered it his duty to eliminate all enemies of the

S E C R E T

10/1/45

S E C R E T

Ref No SAIC/24
26 May 45

Nazi ideology, and he did so calmly and impersonally, without hate and without sympathy. During the last months HIMMLER's importance went to his head and he played the great commander with a special train and great surroundings. In the end, BORMANN pushed even HIMMLER aside.

c) GOERING. GOERING was no National Socialist, but always the big gentleman. He never had contact with little party people like AMANN. He alone led HITLER into the war, by giving him wrong impressions of the power of the LUFTWAFFE, on which HITLER based his great hopes. (As AMANN was saying this, GOERING, by coincidence, was being led past as a prisoner. AMANN jumped up excitedly, pointed out the window at GOERING, and said, "This fat slob here, you should hang him. He is responsible for the war and the death of my son. It is him, and not we small people.")

AMANN has no proof of GOERING's war responsibility. He states merely that "the people say it".

d) GOEBBELS. AMANN considers GOEBBELS his enemy because he always wanted to interfere in the management of the press, which AMANN says was solely his responsibility. AMANN believes BORMANN, HIMMLER, and GOEBBELS were the three bad spirits of HITLER.

IV. THE EHER PUBLISHING CO.

a) Establishment.

AMANN, upon HITLER's wish, took over a small MUNICH publishing house for the party in 1920. This concern was owned by a widow named EHER. It is characteristic that AMANN allowed the moneyless widow a monthly rental of only 50 RM until her death.

The paper, at that time the "VOELKISCHER BEOBACHTER", was not solvent, and was kept going only through the sale of books. HITLER never received a fee from the concern for his articles. For his book, "MEIN KAMPF", which the EHER firm published, HITLER asked only 10 per cent of the sales price. A large sum was still owed to HITLER by the publishing firm, was never claimed.

b) Organization.

AMANN admits that he could not have succeeded in the organization of such a big concern without help of men experienced in the publishing field. Especially helpful were Dr WINCKLER and Dr RIENHARDT, both of BERLIN. After RIENHARDT went to HIMMLER, Wilhelm BAUER was AMANN's right hand man.

The system controlled about 700 daily newspapers. The "VOELKISCHER BEOBACHTER" with its three editions (BERLIN, MUNICH, VIENNA) had a total circulation of 1,500,000. AMANN admits that the small number of subscriptions was a result of poor contents. The "STUERMER", STREICHER's organ, was independent; AMANN did not want it in his system because it was too filthy. On the other hand, HIMMLER's paper, "DAS SCHWARZE KORPS", was part of the chain, but was directed only by the editor, D'ALQUEEN.

For organization of the system see appendix.

AMANN himself was in charge of the main office in MUNICH (bombed out several months ago). Individual districts of the party received one-third of the income of the district publishing houses. The GAULEITERS appointed district editors, but AMANN held the final jurisdiction.

To implications that AMANN had ruthlessly destroyed other publications, AMANN replied that he had compensated the owners. The ULLSTEIN Publishers got 12 million RM, HUGENBERG got 65 million; and likewise SCHERL Publishing Co., KNORR & HIRTH Publishing Co. in MUNICH, and the Stock Exchange paper were paid. AMANN admits that some of these "made trouble", but he sees no injustice in his acquisition of these concerns.

2

S E C R E T

S E C R E TRef No SAIC/24
26 May 45

The suppression of the "FRANKFURTER ZEITUNG" was accomplished by HITLER himself.

When asked which foreign newspapers were subsidized, AMANN replied he did not know. That information is known to either the press department of the Foreign Office or to Dr WINCKLER.

c) Financial Statement.

AMANN does not know the exact balances of the concern. These statements could be made by his financial director BICKEL in MUNICH; Dr RICHTER, also of the EHER concern; or Dr RIENHARDT.

At any rate, the concern was one of the greatest undertakings in Germany, and equaled IG FARBEN in sales and profits. Net yearly income averaged 100 millions. Net profits of about 500 millions have been deposited in the REICHSBANK. Asked why he did not use profits to acquire paper factories, forests, etc., AMANN replies, "I don't want to let myself in for such things."

AMANN's personal economic status is according to his own statements as follows: As head of the EHER concern he received a yearly income of 120,000 RM, and 5 per cent of the net profit. He does not know the exact sum of his capital; it is, however, several millions. Of real estate he possesses the following: one apartment house in MUNICH/BOGENHAUSEN, WASSERBURGERSTRASSE 6, and one villa in ST QUIRIN on the TEGERNSEE. Upon HITLER's request he furnished it luxuriously for display purposes. In addition he had large hunting grounds. He did not invest any money for himself or his concern in foreign lands.

26 May 1945


SEVENTH ARMY INTERROGATION CENTER

Paul Kubala
PAUL KUBALA,
Maj, MI,
Commanding.

3

S E C R E T

ORGANIZATION OF THE GERMAN PRESS



SECRET

SECRET

14
 S E C R E T IS AN ENCLOSURE TO
 DETACH

Ref No SAIC/21
 24 May 45

SEVENTH ARMY INTERROGATION CENTER
 APO 758 US ARMY

.....
 : S E C R E T :
 :Auth: CG, 7th Army:
 :Init: P.K.:
 :Date: 24 May 1945 :
 :.....:

INFORMATION ON THE GERMAN MINISTRY OF POSTS

SOURCE

OHNESORGE, Wilhelm, Minister of Posts, joined the Nazi Party in 1920, left it in 23, rejoined it again in 33. He held no position in the Party, but was OGRUF (Lt Gen) in the NSKK since 37. Source was president of the REICHSPOST ZENTRALAMT (Central Office) from 29 to 33; he then became Assistant Postmaster General and finally, in 37, Postmaster General (Minister of Posts). Source is the inventor of the "four way switch" for cables. He was very cooperative during interrogation and stated that he was able and willing to help in the reconstruction of the Post Ministry.

Rating: B-2 Date of Information: See Text Interrogator: B.M.

GENERAL NOTE: This report is submitted in accordance with the questions presented by Sig O, US Group CC, G-2, T-Section, 6th Army Group, APO 23. Many documents and records which were not absolutely essential were destroyed because of transport difficulties, source stated.

1. What responsibility did the REICHSPOST (DRP) have in supplying facilities for use of the Propaganda Ministry?

REICHSPOST had responsibility for all mechanical matters such as transmitters, cables, frequencies, etc. Responsibility for network inside radio stations was with Propaganda Ministry. Postal employees did not enter stations.

2. What were the various units of the Central Division (MIN-Z or ZENTRAL ABTEILUNG)? Very briefly, what was the function of each of the units?
- i) REFERAT Party Chancellery--Political supervision of personnel matters.
 - ii) REFERAT Postage Stamps--New issues, etc.
 - iii) REFERAT Fieldpost.
 - iv) REFERAT Social Benefits of Employees--Vacation and VERSORGUNGSANSTALT (Welfare Institutions). Latter was a kind of additional insurance for postal employees which was paid to them in addition to social security.
 - v) REFERAT Instruction in Postal Matters.
 - vi) REFERAT Press.
 - vii) REFERAT Postal Advertisements.
 - viii) REFERAT Statistics--Records of numbers of letters, parcels, etc.
3. What private companies are partly owned by the DRP?
- i) DEUTSCH ATLANTISCHE TELEGRAPHEN GESELLSCHAFT, BERLIN.
 - ii) RADIO AUSTRIA, VIENNA.
 - iii) FERNKABEL GESELLSCHAFT.
 - iv) POSTREKLAME GESELLSCHAFT (all shares were owned by RP but it was chartered as a private company).

S E C R E T

1

S E C R E T

Ref No SAIC/21
24 May 45

4. Which grades of civil workers were placed strictly on merit?

From Postal Assistant up, all grades were strictly on merit. Lower services had age and merit promotions.

5. Who was the Secretary of State working under you?

Jakob NAGEL

6. Do you and your chiefs of Telecommunications have a record of all the permanent telecommunications installations in Germany, even of part of the facilities used by the military? Who by name would have this information?

These records should be in UNTER HACHLING, near MUNICH. MINISTERIALDIREKTOR FLEISCHMANN should have this information.

7. What is the function of the "FACHAMT FUER BEAMTE" in the DRP?

Source claims there was no "FACHAMT FUER BEAMTE" in the DRP.

8. By whom and by what method has censorship of the German civilian mail recently been carried out?

By the WEHRMACHT and GESTAPO. The WEHRMACHT censored all mail going to foreign countries. The GESTAPO gave certain addresses to post offices and received letters addressed to them. Address lists were with the individual post offices.

9. By whom and by what method has censorship of the German civil telecommunications recently been carried out?

GESTAPO gave certain numbers to mail employees. These numbers were automatically connected with a secret room in the telephone office. Arrangements were made so that postal employees had no chance to listen in.

10. To what extent is the BILDTELEGRAMMDIENST ("Facsimile Telephotography Service") used?

The DRP had a large network which was not used very often during the war. Source thinks that television will be much more efficient. Facsimile Telephotography was not profitable.

11. Give the locations of the storage depots for telecommunications equipment and spare parts.

REICHSPPOST ZENTRALAMT. Storage depots of the RP ZENTRALAMT were moved and MINISTERIALDIREKTOR FLANZE should know where they are now.

12. What is the basic system used in the Railway Post Office? For example, who or what department owns the RR mail cars, etc?

The DRP once owned approximately 3,500 Postal RR cars. Division VI (MINISTERIALDIREKTOR HUBRICH) was in charge. One official of this department, who is supposed to be an expert, is in KEHLHEIM/DANUBE.

S E C R E T

S E C R E T

Ref No SAIC/21
24 May 45

13. What general devices, such as a scrambling device, were used in the DRP telecommunications? What type of messages were sent on such systems?

The "Inverter" system. It was for military and Party use. Source invented a new system which was in use on the BERLIN-OSLO line.

14. In the DRP, how did the various division heads keep informed in a general way of the work of the other divisions?

There was a monthly conference where all urgent questions were brought up. There was also a weekly session within each section.

15. How does the GAF teletypewriter network fit into the teletypewriter network of the DRP?

Part of the network was rented to the Air Force. Special machinery was Air Force operated and procured.

16. To what ministries (e.g. Propaganda Ministry) and in what proportion are the Wireless license fees allotted?

Propaganda Ministry got half of first 8 million participants. For all participants over 8 million, the Propaganda Ministry received 3/4 and the DRP received 1/4. Each registered radio listener paid 2 RM monthly.

17. Approximately what proportion of the income of the DRP comes from each of the income producing services?

Approximately as follows:

Letters and parcels	62%
Telephone	35%
Automobile	2%
Telegrams	1%

18. Does the DRP collect taxes? If so, what type?

The DRP does not collect taxes.

19. Where are the policy-making records (basic records) of the REICHSPOST?

Might be in KEHLHEIM/DANUBE and/or UNTER HACHING, near MUNICH.

20. How many, and which ones, are left in BERLIN? Exact location?

Old, historically valuable records were left in BERLIN, WILHELMSTRASSE between LEIPZIGERSTRASSE and ZIMMERSTRASSE.

21. When did OHNESORGE leave BERLIN?

On approximately 10 Apr 45.

22. Get data on his movements.

First he went to ALTMUENSTER/TRAUNSEE where he stayed at HAUS TRAUNBLICK for 3 or 4 days. Then to THANKKIRCHEN, near DITRANISZELL, where he stayed 8 days with the ESSER family. Thence to the BAD TOELZ Post Office for 4 or 5

S E C R E T

S E C R E T

Ref No SAIC/21
24 May 45

days. Thence to KITZBUEHL Grand Hotel for 5 days; LOFER POSTHEIM for 3 days; and BAD GASTEIN Post Office and Hotel Mozart for 4 or 5 days.

23. Does the Advisory Board (BEIRAT) exist now? If so, who are its members?

The Advisory Board still exists. Source cannot remember names because the Advisory Board has not functioned for 6 years. The Board had up to 12 members. A list of names could be obtained through source. "BEIRAT" had only limited advisory function.

24. Who makes up the National Defense Group (GRUPPE REICHsverTEIDIGUNG?)
What were the basic functions of this group?

MINISTERIALDIRIGENT HORNOLD was head of the Group. All army orders as to cable connections and networks were sent to him. In case the Army gave up certain districts, the cables were returned to the Defense Group.

25. Why was the Postal Police (POSTSCHUTZ) taken over by the SS? What were the functions of this group? How were its members obtained? What percentage of RP personnel were full time members? What percentage were part-time members?

Source claims that there was no connection with the SS whatever, except that uniforms were obtained through SS QM offices. Postal Police Officers and men were not members of the SS, but postal employees. Groups of employees were used mainly as air raid protection squads. Later members were put into the VOLKSTURM. The members of the Postal Police were obtained on a voluntary basis from among the employees. Only instructors were full time members. A total of only about 80 people, in all directorates, were full time members. Approximately 5% of personnel were members before the war.

26. REICHSPSTFILMSTELLE in DAHLEM.
a. Who was in charge?

Postrat MACK

b. What were the functions of this organization?

To produce pictures concerning internal organization of postal affairs and to procure instructive pictures for employees.

c. Number of employees?

About 15.

27. Where is the board for allotting frequencies within Germany, according to the allotments of the World Frequency Board? Who is the head of this Board?

RP ZENTRALAMT: National frequencies; Division VII: International frequencies. MINISTERIALDIREKTOR FLANZE is head of the board.

28. Is there a long term development group for cables, other technical installations, etc? If so, where is it in the RPM organization? Also where is it located?

RP ZENTRALAMT for cables and machinery, Research Institute of the RPM for television, infra-red, and relay stations. The RP ZENTRALAMT was in

S E C R E T

Ref No SAIC/21
24 May 45

BERLIN-TEMPELHOF. The FORSCHUNGSANSTALT (Research Institute) of the RPM was first in BERLIN-KLEIN MACHOW, later in STADT STEINACH, Thuringia.

29. In the last five years, has the RP operated with a profit or loss? Do you remember the approximate figures?

The RP operated at a profit. The gross income was about four thousand million marks. In 1944 this figure decreased to three thousand million. 6% of the gross income was given to the Ministry of Finance, which was in control of spending.

30. Explain liaison and coordination with other ministries, such as Navy and Transport, for communications with ships. Did RP personnel or RP approved personnel do the work? Who installed, maintained and developed the equipment?

Liaison with other ministries was done by writing alone. MINISTERIAL DIRIGENT HORNOLD kept up coordination with the Army. Part of the postal network was taken over by the Army. Exchanges of the Army network were run by Army personnel. Postal employees were used to repair cables. Army installed and developed equipment.

31. Give a detailed description of the branches and sub-branches of the Central Office (RP ZENTRALAMT).

- i) Telephone Transmission Technique.
- ii) Telephone Exchange Construction.
- iii) Operation of Long Distance Network.
- iv) Acoustics, Microphones, Telephones, Calibration of Instruments.
- v) Telegraphy, AC Telegraphy, Multiplex Telegraphy, Telegraphic devices.
- vi) Mechanized Operation (parcel transport, pneumatic post).
- vii) Furniture Standardization.
- viii) Testing of Materials.
- ix) Workshops.
- x) Checking of costs of all DRP installations.

32. Explain organization of RPF (Reich Research Institute). Who was head of it? Where is it located? What subjects were being recently pursued? To what organization was the research information supplied and how was it gotten into practical use by the Armed Forces?

President GERWICH of the RPF was in charge. He is believed to be in AACH, Baden. The former president was a Mr GLADENBECK who is with the ALL-GEMEINE ELEKTRIZITAETS GESELLSCHAFT. The RPF was located for a time in STADT STEINACH, Thuringia. Subjects recently pursued were television and development of infra-red research. In peace time yearly publications were issued. During the war the HEERESWAFFENAMT (Army Procurement Office) received the information. Source states that the Army made too little use of postal research results.

33. Give evacuation addresses of all services, offices, archives, etc, not already supplied.

Division I: MINISTERIALDIREKTOR HUEHN. Left BERLIN for Northern Germany

S E C R E T

5

S E C R E T

Ref No SAIC/21
24 May 45

Division II: MINISTERIALDIREKTOR FLEISCHMANN. Believed to be in UNTER HACHING, together with some documents.

Division III: MINISTERIALDIREKTOR FLEISCHMANN.

Division IV: MINISTERIALDIREKTOR KOERNER. Believed to be in KEHLHEIM/DANUBE, with documents.

Division V: MINISTERIALDIREKTOR RACKOW. Believed to have been last in BAMBERG.

Division VI: MINISTERIALDIREKTOR HUBRICH. Left BERLIN for Northern Germany.

Division VII: MINISTERIALDIREKTOR FLANZE. Left BERLIN for Northern Germany.

Foreign Division: Dr RISCH was last in BERLIN.

"OST" (EAST) Division: General Consul KOEHN is believed to be near STADT STEINACH, Thuringia, possibly with some records.

STAATS SEKRETAER NAGEL left BERLIN in order to join Admiral DOENITZ.

RP President. FRAHM and a Dr KLEINSTICK were last in BAD TOELZ. Source states that both men have extensive knowledge of postal affairs.

There are approximately 100 postal employees in KEHLHEIM/DANUBE. Among them are experts belonging to all divisions. Some records might also be there. There are 20 telephone and radio officials in UNTER HACHING, near MUNICH. A Dr SCHNITZGER, expert on radio tubes, is in GEHLBERG, about 50 km from STADT STEINACH, Thuringia. The last office of the Post Ministry was in BAD GASTEIN. Certain records should still be there. STAATS SEKRETAER NAGEL was supposed to open an office in BARGTE HEIDE, near HAMBURG. The Central Telegraph and Telephone Office was in UNTER HACHING, near MUNICH. Situation plans for cables and lines might be found there.

RP ZENTRALAMT: MINISTERIALDIREKTOR FLANZE.

Postal Savings Institute VIENNA (5000 employees): MINISTERIALDIREKTOR NIRSCHER is believed to be in a home for postal employees near the MONDSEE in Austria.

Central Administration of charities: OBERPOSTRAT GIERKE.

REICHS Printing Works: DIREKTOR MOELLER, BERLIN.

STAATSDRUCKEREI (Govt Printing Office) VIENNA: HOFRAT FISCHER, VIENNA.

REICH Television Corporation does not exist anymore.

34. In addition to regular civilian telecommunications, what other telecommunication services did the RP supply? Were the other services mentioned operated by the same operators who performed the civilian telecommunications service? Were the same facilities used for more than one type of service -- if so, a general description of how this was controlled.

Networks of the Army, Navy and Air Force belonged to the Posts and rental was paid for them. The networks were operated by the Army. The Party had its own network and had to pay rent to the Posts. This network was operated by the Party. Industrial firms like SIEMENS, AEG, etc, had their own nets which were privately operated. The European POSTVEREIN (Post Society) was in VIENNA.

6

S E C R E T

S E C R E T

Ref No SAIC/21
24 May 45

35. Was the SCHULUNGSLAGER of the DRP abolished?

Yes.

36. When was it operated last?

One year ago. When the Ministry in BERLIN was bombed, the camp became the seat of the RP Ministry.

37. Where is OHNESORGE's wife?

In ELLBACH, near BAD TOELZ.

38. How long was she connected with the DRP?

Six years.

39. What was her official position?

Source states that she had no official position. Since her marriage to the Minister she was only interested in the postal employees' vacation homes.

40. When you last heard of it, was the Field Post Office still in FRANKFURT/ODER?

The Field Post Office was last in ST JOHANN, in the Tyrol.

41. Where is MINISTERIALDIRIGENT Dr FRITZ SCHUSTER of the Field Post?

He went to Admiral DOENITZ together with STAATSEKRETAER NAGEL.

42. How were the Postal Funds administered?

Short term loans were given to Govt Banks (REICHSBANK, SEEHANDLUNG) which took over the administration.

43. Who was the final policy authority for paying out the funds?

Minister OHNESORGE.

44. Is the POSTSCHUTZ still under a MINISTERIALRAT in the Min. Z.?

The POSTSCHUTZ was last in "OST" Division.

45. Who was the last known MINISTERIALDIREKTOR of the POSTSCHUTZ?

General Consul KOEHN.

46. Where is he now?

Believed to be in LOBENSTEIN, Thuringia.

47. Did HIMMLER have complete authority over the DRP personnel?

Source states that HIMMLER had no authority whatever over DRP personnel.

S E C R E T

S E C R E T

Ref No SAIC/21
24 May 45

48. Where is the main POSTSCHUTZ Camp?

In ZEESEN next to "SCHULUNGSLAGER".

49. What was the total number of POSTSCHUTZ employees?

Formerly the "TRANSPORT ABTEILUNG" had 4,000 men with 1,600 vehicles. In the last few months only a few hundred men were left.

50. Did the POSTSCHUTZ personnel receive training in sabotage functions?

No.

51. Who was responsible for the forwarding of Red Cross PW packages to Allied PW's in Germany?

Source believes it was Division I. Possibly POSTDIREKTION STETTIN (from Sweden) and POSTDIREKTIONEN KARLSRUHE and STUTTGART (both from Switzerland).

52. Why were so many packages undelivered?

Because of the breakdown in communications lines.

53. Who was responsible for this breach of faith?

The President of the REICHSPPOSTAMT STETTIN.

54. Where is the largest cache of these packages at this time?

Possibly in STETTIN.

55. What was your policy in disposing of undelivered packages?

Source states that he ordered them sent back to the Red Cross. It became known that great quantities of parcels were given to bombed out persons in STETTIN. Persons responsible for this were imprisoned.

56. How many vehicles were owned and operated by the DRP?

Six thousand busses. Source did not know how many trucks or cars.

57. Does Division I deal with the administrative as well as the operational matters such as the DRP Bus service?

Administrative matters only. Operational matters were in the hands of REICHSPPOSTDIREKTIONEN.

58. Does Division I control the operational and administrative side of the DRP Savings Bank?

Yes.

59. Did Division I keep records of all stocks of stamps?

The different "DIREKTIONEN" kept these records.

S E C R E T

S E C R E T

Ref No SAIC/21
24 May 45

60. Are stocks of stamps still intact or have they been destroyed?

Some stamps may have been destroyed by air attacks, etc, but not intentionally by postal employees.

61. Where are the stocks located principally at this time?

There should be stocks of stamps in every Post Office.

62. Describe how the R.P.O. functioned in handling the WEHRMACHT postal system.

Field Post officials were members of the Army. Postal officials were in charge of transportation until mail reached a certain secret point where the field post employees took over. The Army paid 20 pfennigs per man per day in order to take care of the free mailing privilege for soldiers.

63. If regular postal rates are required of all discharged WEHRMACHT personnel, will the revenues be sufficient to hire the personnel required in the DRP?

Yes.

64. How long would it take for the State Printing Plant to replace all printed stocks of stamps necessary for six months of operations?

Replacement would be very fast as long as auxiliary printing plants could be put back in operation.

65. Assuming that war damage has already destroyed all postage stamps and the time to provide temporary new issues is 30 days hence, what is your recommendation or plan to re-establish first class postal service in Germany?

Find printing plants that are still operative. Auxiliary printing plants have the necessary material. Try to find President ROST (formerly in BRESLAU) now in the American occupation sector. Contact Presidents of REICHSPSTDIREKTIONEN in the American sector as to personnel questions. Contact all personnel in KEHLHEIM/DANUBE and UNTER HACHING, near MUNICH. Great numbers of trucks of all kinds would be necessary. Former German Army vehicles could be used. Long stretches in rural districts could be serviced by female mail carriers. Wooden barracks could be used as post offices. Former postal employees who are now PW should be selected for help in order to re-establish mail service. German signal troops and communication troops should not be dismissed, but should be used for repairs.

24 May 1945

SEVENTH ARMY INTERROGATION CENTER

Paul Kubala
v.

PAUL KUBALA,
Maj, MI,
Commanding.

S E C R E T



SECRET AN ENCLOSURE TO
SECRET

Ref No SAIC/20
24 May 45

SEVENTH ARMY INTERROGATION CENTER
APO 758 US ARMY

.....
: SECRET :
:Auth: CG, 7th Army :
:Init: AK :
:Date: 24 May 1945 :
:.....:

REICH MINISTRY OF FINANCE; LOCATION OF PERSONNEL AND DOCUMENTS

(This Report is being published in answer to Special Questionnaire provided by US Group CC, G-2, T-Section, 6th Army Group, 14 May 1945)

I. PREAMBLE

The following information was obtained from Permanent Under Secretary REINHARDT and Under Secretaries WOOTHE and KALLENBACH. They are very cooperative and state that they are willing and able to help in the reorganization of the Ministry and its departments. In connection with the records and documents, it was pointed out that many had been destroyed in air attacks. Furthermore, all non-essential documents were destroyed because of the difficulty of transporting them and because of their constituting a fire hazard during air raids. Many of the records of all departments were evacuated to WUERZBURG and left there with two employees as custodians.

Date of Information: See Text Interrogator: G.P.M.

II. MINISTRY OF FINANCE

A. DEPARTMENT I

Most of the personnel and records were last located in BERLIN/CHARLOTTENBURG, BISMARCKSTRASSE 48-52. The records of IB were in BEELITZ near BERLIN. About twelve officials, under Ministerialdirigent AUGUSTINE, together with some records, were last in BAD-TOELZ. Some officials, notably Ministerialrats KALLENBACH, GERTH, and SCHMIDT-SCHWARZENBERG, were in GARMISCH-PARTENKIRCHEN, but were taken into custody by OIG around May 4. The chief officials still located in BERLIN are Directors KLUGE and MEYER.

B. DEPARTMENT II

This department came directly under the control of REINHARDT. Most of the records and personnel are in ILMENAU, Thuringia. A few, under Director Dr SIEGERT and Ministerialrat SCHERER, are still in BERLIN.

C. DEPARTMENT III

This department was also under the control of REINHARDT. Most of the records and personnel are in ILMENAU, Thuringia. In addition to these, there is a Regierungsrat SCHADT and one other official in WEILHEIM, Oberregierungsrat Dr LENSKI in BAD-TOELZ, and Steueramtmann PAULIG in BERLIN.

D. DEPARTMENT IV

Ministerialdirigent WOOTHE (AUCSBURG) was one of the men in charge of this department. Most of the personnel and documents remained in BERLIN and POTSDAM, under Ministerialdirektor WEVER. Ministerialrat VOGELS was last in OBERLAINDERN, near MUNICH. In addition, there were three officials in BAD-TOELZ: MOLTER, KIMMEL, and HORN.

E. DEPARTMENT V

Most of the personnel and documents remained in BERLIN, under Ministerialdirektor Dr BERGER, although this man may now be in HAMBURG. It is believed that one official, Dr BREYMAN, went to BAD-TOELZ. Some officials and documents were in QUERFURTH, in the Harz, under Ministerialrat BAENFER. Ministerialrat SCHMIDT was in GARMISCH, but was taken into custody by OIG on 4 May, 45.

F. DEPARTMENT VI

This department is divided into four sections as follows:

VI-A Documents and personnel were last in BODENBACH, in the Sudetengau, under Ministerialdirigent Dr BROHTZ, who is either in BODENBACH or in WALDSASSEN, in the Oberpfalz.

VI-B Last located in ILMENAU, Thuringia, under Ministerialrat ROSENBAUER. Some personnel and records were in MALLERSDORF, Lower Bavaria, under Ministerialdirigent VON DIETZ.

SECRET

181144B

S E C R E TRef No SAIC/20
24 May 45VI-C In ILMENAU, under Ministerialrat ENGELBRECHT.VI-D Partly in ILMENAU, under Ministerialrat ENGELBRECHT, and partly in MALLERSDORF, under Regierungsdirektor WUNSCHHEL.G. DEPARTMENT VII

This department remained in BERLIN, under Ministerialdirektor Dr RECK. Address: BERLIN/CHARLOTTENBURG, BISMARCKSTRASSE 48-52.

H. DEPARTMENT VIII

This department was formerly the Prussian Finance Ministry. It remained in BERLIN, under Ministerialdirektor Dr SCHECHE. Some of the personnel and records were sent to NEU-RUPIN, Brandenburg.

I. CHIEF REGIONAL FINANCE OFFICES

These departments were directly under the control of Under Secretary REINHARDT, who states that there are practically no records left, most of them having been destroyed in the last few years, and that it will be necessary to start from scratch. He states that he would be able to reorganize and reestablish these departments.

J. DEPARTMENT FOR TRAINING AND EXAMINING

This function was carried out by Under Secretary REINHARDT, who states that there will be no difficulty in reestablishing it.

K. INSPECTOR GENERAL OF CUSTOMS POLICE

This function was transferred to the SS Police under HIMMLER.

L. MAIN OFFICE FOR GENERAL FINANCE AND CREDIT QUESTIONS

This office remained in BERLIN in the REICHSBANK, under Ministerialdirigent BAYERHOFFER. His office was in the OBERFINANZPRAESIDIUM on the KURFURSTENDAMM. Some of the officials and documents were sent to BAD-TOELZ, under Ministerialrat BUSSMAN.

M. STATISTICAL OFFICE

Records were last in ARNSTADT, Thuringia. The head of the office, Ministerialdirigent FIEDLER, was last in GARMISCH.

N. OFFICE OF MAIN TRUSTEE FOR CONFISCATED PROPERTY - EAST

This office no longer exists as such. Its functions were taken over by Department VIII (Par H; above).

O. OFFICES IN THE SPHERE OF INFLUENCE OF THE MINISTRY


These offices were, for the most part, still in BERLIN, with the exception of the Direction of the Austrian Salt Mines, which was last in VIENNA, and the Supreme Financial Court, which was last in MUNICH/BOGENHAUSEN, MONTGELASSTRASSE. The Directorate of REICH Building was last located in BERLIN, at KURFURSTENDAMM 193. The REICH Debt Administration, under Dr FISCHBACH, was completely burned out. Dr FISCHBACH's home is in BERLIN/DAHLEM.

P. REICHSHAUPTKASSE (TREASURY)

The Treasury was still located in BERLIN on 13 April 45, in the REICHSBANK Building on the JAEGERSTRASSE. Plans had been made to evacuate a portion of it to Southern Germany, but they had not yet been carried out.

24 May 1945

SEVENTH ARMY INTERROGATION CENTER

PAUL KUBALA,
Maj, MI,
Commanding.

2

S E C R E T

46

SECRET

IS AN ENCLOSURE TO
ATTACH

Ref No SAIC/19
24 May 45

SEVENTH ARMY INTERROGATION CENTER
APO 758

US ARMY

.....
: S E C R E T : 25X1A
:Auth: CG, 7th Army :
:Init: PK :
:Date: 24 May 1945 :
:.....

HOFER, THE EXPONENT OF PEACE

1. SOURCE

HOFER, Franz, OGRUF (Lt Gen) NSKK, GAULEITER and REICHSSTATTHALTER of Tyrol - Vorarlberg. HOFER's career is a typical example of success under the Nazi Regime. He rose from modest beginnings to heights of power attainable only in a totalitarian state. Clearly seeing where his advantages lay he joined the Austrian branch of the Nazi Party in 1931, and when the organization was outlawed, sought refuge in Germany, where he joined in plotting the future ANSCHLUSS. Having been placed in charge of elections for Austrians residing in Germany, his work may be considered one of the contributing factors of the Nazi "success" in 1938. He was rewarded with the appointment as GAULEITER of Tyrol.

Rating: C-3 Date of Information: See Text Interrogator: E.H.

2. ADMINISTRATION OF ITALIAN TYROL

HOFER held the office of REICHSSTATTHALTER (Governor) of Tyrol - Vorarlberg (Italian Tyrol) since Sep 41. After MUSSOLINI's fall he was the head of a stringent military government and had absolute authority in this area. The only duties left to the DUCE were to collect taxes, pay his officials, and contribute 10,000,000,000 LIRE to the German war effort monthly. Approximately 40,000,000 LIRE of this sum was appropriated by HOFER, supposedly for the purpose of road improvement, billeting of troops, construction of air raid shelter, payments of bomb damages, etc.

Source claims that he suppressed both the Nazi and Fascist parties in BOZEN and TRIENT under the pretext that this was foreign territory. He installed DE BERTOLINI, an 80-year-old anti-fascist lawyer, who had previously arrested MUSSOLINI, as prefect of TRIENT.

3. HOFER'S EFFORTS FOR EARLY SURRENDER

HOFER got in touch with SS OGRUF (SS Lt Gen) WOLF, Chief of the SS and Police in Italy, who had had talks in early March with a certain Mr. DULLES, who claimed to be a representative of President Roosevelt, in Switzerland.

The purpose of these talks was to arrange for the withdrawal of German troops to a predetermined line in front of the Alps, and cessation of hostilities until the defeat of the Nazis in BERLIN.

In March and April HOFER visited the FUEHRERHAUPTQUARTIER (Supreme Headquarters of the FUEHRER) where, according to his claims, he advocated the retreat in Northern Italy during an interview with Genls JODL, BORMANN, and WINTERDEER (?). Upon his return from HITLER's Headquarters, HOFER contacted GENOBST (Col Gen) WITTINGHOF, Commander of Army Group "C", the German ambassador to Italy RAHN, and WOLF, and told them of the curt rebuff and harsh treatment he received from HITLER. The General was noncommittal.

Later he contacted OGRUF (SS Lt Gen) KALTENBRUNNER, Chief of the SICHERHEITSPOLIZEI (Security Police) for the SOUTH German area, a direct representative of HITLER and successor to HEYDRICH, for the purpose of reaching a definite line of action to avoid further bloodshed and destruction in his (HOFER's) area. No impression was made in this quarter.

On 24 Apr the STEIRMARK, OBERDONAU, KAEFNTEN, and SALZBURG regions were added to HOFER's jurisdiction. On 26 Apr he had a conference with Field Marshall KESSELRING and GENCBST (Col Gen) WITTINGHOF, and claimed that he

SECRET

S E C R E T

Ref No SAIC/19
24 May 45

implored them to end a hopeless fight. KESSELRING declined to accept his appeal and a few days later sent him a message ordering him to keep his nose out of military affairs.

As a result of talks with an American officer who came to discuss surrender terms, HOFER ordered the removal of the numerous AA guns surrounding INNSBRUCK, and that all the bridges in INNSBRUCK and vic be left intact.

4. THE FUEHRER MISINFORMED

According to HOFER, HITLER was completely misinformed on production figures. HITLER received his misinformation from a certain HERR SAUER, production expert from Dr SPEER's office. Although all figures were practically bare-faced lies, HITLER claimed SAUER to be his best source of information and trusted him completely. HOFER cited the following examples:

HITLER was convinced that he received 2500 cars monthly from Italian factories, while actually only 500 were produced. In one of SAUER's reports for a certain period ending 1 Dec 44, he stated that a certain factory in FOICCHI, Italy was producing 4,000,000 rounds of machine pistol ammunition. However, this factory had not been completed by that date, and did not begin production until 20 Feb 45. Another instance cited by HOFER was a report issued by SAUER in which production of 81 mm mortars in a factory in VIPITENO, Italy was claimed to be 8000 per month. During a conversation with HITLER, HOFER was told that this plant produced at least 1000 mortars per month. The truth, however, was that the factory had just been completed, and production had not started. The monthly quota was set at 200 mortars.

5. WEHRWOLF

HOFER claims that he refused to organize a WEHRWOLF in his district, but despite his opposition that it was organized through other channels. However, in order to keep "order" and to "avoid unnecessary trouble which could only lead to disaster for the people" he appointed a certain TOEPPER, manager of a factory in INNSBRUCK as liaison man between him and the WEHRWOLF organization. Source claims he does not know the name of the leader but that TOEPPER has all the needed information to disrupt this organization. He claims, however, that he knows the No 2 man (but not by name) and offers his services to assist the Allies in rounding up the gang and locating their stores of weapons.

6. ART TREASURES

- a) Czech or Hungarian State Property: Source claims that these objects were stored in a railway car near LANDECK, and were supposed to move in the direction of Switzerland.
- b) Italian Gold Treasure: Cached in a bunker in the castle FESTE FRANZENS-FESTE, vic VIPITENO and BRESSANONE.
- c) Property of Florentine Art Galleries: Stored with the knowledge of the Italian government in the ST LEONHARD courthouse. Source claims that persons who may have more information on the subject are Dr RINGLER, who can be reached through the LANDESMUSEUM, INNSBRUCK and GRAF (Count) TRAPP INNSBRUCK.

S E C R E T

S E C R E T

Ref No SAIC/19
24 May 45

7. FACTORIES

BOZEN: Underground munitions factory, was to have started production 10 May with a monthly capacity of 20,000, 000 rounds.
Underground ball-bearing factory.
Steel and Aluminum factory.
Truck factory with monthly capacity of 250 trucks per month.

SINNICH: Saltpeter and nitrogen plants.

VIPITENO: A completed factory for mortars; had never started production. Estimated capacity, 200 per month.

**KIRCHBICHL (vic
WOERGL-KUFSTEIN):** A 40,000 sq m light machine gun factory, located in a lignite mine. It is also equipped to build aircraft engines.

8. PERSONALITIES

GAULEITER HABICHT: First leader of Austrian Nazis in exile in Germany; killed on Russian front.

WEISSENBORN : Chief of weapons section in production office headed by SAUER. Last seen in Tyrol, supposed to be hiding in a tunnel in vic REITH.

Dr BILGERI : Former president of INNSBRUCK Chamber of Commerce; later GAUWIRTSCHAFTSBERATER (District Economic Advisor). Expert on food, public utilities. Lives in BRIXLEGG, Austria.

**SS OGRUF (SS Lt
Gen) GREIFELD :** Chief of REICHSKOMMISSARIAT (REICH Commission) for the security of the German people (DEUTCHES VOLKSTUM); in charge of repatriation and relocation.

SS OGRUF PRUETZMANN: WEHRWOLF leader for Germany, second to HIMMLER.

SS OGRUF GLUECKS : Inspector General of Concentration Camps.

SS OGRUF POHL : In charge of finances and business exploitation of Concentration Camps.

24 May 1945

SEVENTH ARMY INTERROGATION CENTER

Paul Kubala
PAUL KUBALA,
Maj, MI,
Commanding.

3

S E C R E T

S E C R E T AN ENCLOSURE TO19
Ref No SAIC/18
24 May 45SEVENTH ARMY INTERROGATION CENTER: Init: P.K.
APO 758 US ARMY: Date: 24 May 1945: S E C R E T :
: Auth: CG, 7th Army: :
: :
: :
: :HITLER'S LAST SESSION IN THE REICHS CHANCELLORY, 24 FEB 45

Note: No authentic reports of this session have been published in the Press or announced over the Radio. Reports which have been released did not contain the true facts.

SOURCES

- i) WAHL, Karl, GAULEITER of AUGSBURG.) Both these men were present at
ii) AMANN, Max, Nazi Party member No 3.) the meeting described below.

Rating: C-3 Date of Information: 24 Feb 45 Interrogator: W.K.

The meeting was called on very short notice. It was to take place at 1300 hrs, and the leaders were told to come by car and to return the same day. There were some 60 or 70 people, all told, REICHSLEITERS, GAULEITERS, SA and SS leaders, but no generals or leaders of the WAFEN SS. The members were lined up on three sides of a large and still undamaged room of the REICHS Chancellory. In a few minutes HITLER entered, followed by BORMANN. Both men shook hands with all present, and thereafter HITLER spoke briefly to REICHS Labor Leader HIERL. He spoke in a low voice, and only parts of the conversation could be understood, but at the end HITLER presented HIERL with a case containing the highest German decoration. The reception was followed by a simple luncheon, consisting of stew and real coffee. HITLER left the room at 1530, and an hour and one-half later the leaders reassembled to hear his speech.

When he returned to make his speech, HITLER sat at a small table, on which were his notes and a glass of water. Everyone noticed his stooped position and the fact that his left hand - not the right one which was wounded on 20 July - was shaking so badly that at times his entire body was trembling. It seemed to be causing the FUEHRER great discomfort. At first his voice was low, but it gained strength and later reached its customary climax. No change in his voice was noticeable.

HITLER's speech lasted approximately one hour and one-half. For the first time the impression upon his listeners was not convincing. HITLER seemed to be struggling to convey a feeling of inner hope to the assembled Party leaders, but the sensational news which all anticipated was not forthcoming. The substance of his address follows:

He stated that the Russian onslaught was of paramount concern to the people, because it was accompanied by serious misdeeds against them. However, it was expected that the attack could be stopped. A large-scale counter-attack was planned, but had been delayed chiefly because of great losses of heavy weapons. HITLER praised the brave deeds of certain generals, and expressed the wish that others were also "carved of the same wood". Many lacked the ability to improvise, which was a necessity. He singled out as especially brave Gen HUBE, who had been killed.

In the main message of his speech, however, he called upon them not to become faint-hearted but to develop supreme strength, and then the war could still be won. The leaders would have to guide the people personally, and bring out a "Teutonic Fury" in them. He declared that this was the time to find out the true quality of the German people. Should the German people give up, then it would be demonstrated that they had no moral worth, and in that case they would deserve destruction. That would be the rightful judgement of history and Providence.

1

S E C R E T

S E C R E T

Ref No SAIC/18
24 May 45

Concerning military affairs he brought out four points:

i) Germany must remain on the defensive in the WEST. (HITLER had great faith in the Westwall and the RHINE).

ii) In the EAST a powerful counter-offensive would be prepared. (He did not indicate the sector).

iii) The new U-boats were outstanding; they represented a revolution in the technical field. DOENITZ was a phenomenally outstanding leader.

iv) The new MESSERSCHMITT fighter plane, ME-262, was without equal anywhere in the world. It could not be damaged in combat, the only losses occurred as a result of accidents in take-offs or landings, and these were insignificant. Production was on a tremendous scale, and the results would soon be noticeable in the air. HITLER then spoke of the mistakes of the German Air Force, declaring that the greatest fault had been the choosing of the wrong models.

Towards the end of his address HITLER spoke of political events. He stated that England would hold out to the end; she was firmly allied to Russia and would not give in. On the other hand, he predicted that, if Germany held firm during the crisis, a day would come when serious conflicts would arise between Russia and the US.

Concluding his speech, HITLER thanked the assembled leaders for their cooperation and loyalty, and then spoke a few words concerning his health. This he had never done before, so it was especially noteworthy and had a depressing effect upon his listeners. He said that Frederick the Great had returned from the wars an ill and broken man. Now he, himself, felt the burdens of war, which had become evident in symptoms of ill health. Previously, owing to great worry he had suffered from a trembling leg. Now, however, the infirmity was in his left arm. He hoped it would not move to his head, for a shaky head would be unpleasant. But even if that occurred he could only say, "My heart will never quake; that remains ice-cold". He went on to say that after the attempt of 20 July the doctor read his pulse and found that it had remained at its customary 72 beats. He also mentioned trouble with his vocal chords and admitted that he had undergone an operation not long before.

In closing he stated that he would in the future be forced to take some harsh measures. The leaders should not misjudge him if he should take steps which they did not understand.

When HITLER had finished, BORMANN spoke a few words about loyalty and courage and readiness to follow HITLER unto death. Before leaving, HITLER conversed briefly with a few people - Dr GOEBBELS, Dr LEY, GAULEITER HIRTZ, and BACKE. Then he said he must leave, as others were already awaiting him in another room.

24 May 1945

SEVENTH ARMY INTERROGATION CENTER

Paul Kubala
C.M.V.

PAUL KUBALA,
Maj, MI,
Commanding.

S E C R E T

2

S E C R E T

Ref No S.I.C/16
23 May 45

During periods when the situation was unfavorable, HITLER took it out on the different branches of the armed forces and blamed their heads for all mistakes. Source was singled out quite often, and had to take rebukes in front of all the officers present. This led to the point where the officers began to lose their respect for GOERING's military ability.

At the meetings HITLER always presented the latest dispatches of the foreign press, which he then discussed in his well-known manner.

During the last few months the situation meetings were held in the Winter Garden of the Chancellory and then to the very last in HITLER's bunker underneath the Chancellory. This bunker had a dimension of only 3x3 m. All the officers had to crowd into this small space and many of them fainted during the meetings.

The night meeting which usually started between 2400 and 0100 hours was not attended by all the officers, but HITLER was always present. After the meeting HITLER's famous tea would take place. Here a small circle of trusted friends would make decisions of prime political importance. Here, too, BORMANN used his strong influence to overrule HITLER, who was usually tired after the previous meeting. GOERING maintains that all things not directly connected with the conduct of the war became the responsibility of BORMANN.

The FUEHRER's tea guests usually included the following persons:

BORMANN,
FEGELEIN, GRUF (SS Maj Gen),
BURGDORF, GEN d. INF (Lt Gen),
All or some of the adjutants, and
Mrs JUNGE
Mrs SCHROEDER
Mrs CHRISTIAN

b) HITLER'S PLANS FOR THE VIOLATION OF THE GENEVA CONVENTION

i) Prisoners of War

PW claims that it was HITLER's intention to denounce the GENEVA Convention if the war would have lasted another three months. All Allied PW except those valuable to the German war economy were to be exterminated.

According to source, this plan became known to the generals and the Nazi Party leaders, all of whom took a stand squarely against it, with the exception of GOEBBELS.

It was pointed out to HITLER that German PW in Allied hands would have to expect the same fate. To this the FUEHRER replied that these millions of Germans were of no more use to the war effort anyway, but that after his proposed action there would be no more deserters from the German Army. The German people, said he, would then fight to the last man.

ii) Chemical Warfare

PW states that HITLER was restrained from the use of CW during the last period of the war only by his fear of Allied retaliation. He often admitted that he had missed the chance to use CW at the right time (i.e., during the earlier stages of the war). At that time he had believed German victory certain with the use of normal weapons.

c) HITLER'S DEATH

When the situation in BERLIN had deteriorated beyond hope, HITLER allowed his personal physician, Dr MORELL, to escape to the SOUTH of Germany. MORELL had been administering a very large daily dose of hormones to the FUEHRER. Source believes that it was the sudden absence of these hormones which caused HITLER's general breakdown and subsequent death.

Following 20 July 44 the FUEHRER's health had been declining. His right leg and arm trembled spasmodically, and the smallest contradiction irritated him to a high degree. Only BORMANN, GOEBBELS and FEGELEIN still had any influence on him. PW says the atmosphere of HITLER's shelter was horrible. His secretary and his mistress could stand it only by being drunk all day long.

S E C R E T

Ref No SAIC/16
23 May 45

3. ROMMEL'S DEATH

PW claims that ROMMEL had plotted against HITLER in the 20 July Putsch. On the following day the FUEHRER sent a high SS officer to ROMMEL with the order either to accept arrest and trial or, as a special privilege because of his meritorious service, to shoot himself with the pistol which was handed to him at the same time. He was allowed five minutes in which to make up his mind. ROMMEL chose the second alternative.

4. GOERING ON SCIENCE AND INDUSTRY

a) ATOM SMASHING

PW claims that German scientists have made tremendous progress in smashing the atom. He believes that this will be the revolutionary source of energy in the future.

Although he was chairman of the German Scientists' League, source does not have an appreciable amount of knowledge of the field.

Basing his statement on a booklet he once saw dealing with the subject, PW claims that American research in the field of the atom is far below that of other nations.

b) NEW GERMAN U-BOAT

Source is very proud of the success which he claims for a new German turbine-driven submarine which "does not need to surface for air". Only a few of these subs were ready in spring 45; in large numbers they would have inflicted serious damage on Allied shipping. Their under-water speed is claimed to be almost as high as the speed of the fastest surface vessels.

5. GOERING'S ECONOMIC STATUS

a) REGULAR INCOME

In the light of one of the Party's foremost early aims - namely, that no one earn more than RM 1,000 per month - GOERING's economic status is grotesque.

In answer to questions concerning the source of his income, PW replied that he received "very decent" wages as President of the Prussian Ministry, and that "large checks" were placed at his "disposal" (ZUR VERFUEGUNG) by the member firms of the Supervisory Council of Manufacturers (AUFSICHTSRAT VON FABRIKUNTERNEHMUNGEN), although he did not receive a regular salary as head of this agency. He would not make any precise statements as to the total of his income, which would be difficult to establish, his resources being in the hands of a number of different banking institutions.

Examination of a bankbook, however, revealed the following information:

Income as Minister of Aviation	approx RM 3500 per mo
" " member of "REICHSTAG"	1700 " "
Special expense account from REICHS Chancellory	20000 " "

Adding to this his estimated salary of RM 25,000 per month as President of the Prussian Ministry, his total monthly income from the above sources was over RM 600,000 per year.

In addition, there were regular checks from the EHER Party Publishing House amounting to RM 120,000 per year, for his writings on the Four-Year-Plan. Allowing for salaries accruing from other public positions, a yearly income of RM 1,000,000 may be considered a fair estimate.

b) ADDITIONAL INCOME

The above-mentioned bankbook also shows occasional checks and credits from large firms - for example, semi-yearly amounts of RM 300,000, RM 250,000, etc. from the REENTSMa Firm (Cigarettes), HAMBURG. (Note: Minister of Finance FUNK

S E C R E T

S E C R E TRef No SAIC/16
23 May 45

explains these amounts, stating that REENTEMA was involved in a trial for evasion of taxes amounting to several millions, from which it was able to extricate itself with GOERING's aid.)

As chief of the Four-Year-Plan, source was able to have any amount of money put at his disposal, more or less "voluntarily". Thus it may be said that for all practical purposes, money was not a matter of concern in PW's life.

Questioned about a possible fortune in foreign countries, source replied, "I can await any revelations of your agents concerning my 'foreign fortunes' with an untroubled mind."

(Note: It was possible, however, to learn from REICHSMINISTER FUNK that GOERING had probably smuggled money abroad through MEDEL, a partner in the WITZIG banking concern. MEDEL, a native of Germany and a naturalized Dutchman, married to a Swiss woman, worked for GOERING in some sort of illegitimate deals in foreign currency. About three to four months ago he flew to Spain, probably with a large share of GOERING's fortune, which was in all likelihood to be deposited in Portugal or South America.)

It may be noted that GOERING asked the interrogating officer repeatedly whether living conditions were better in Argentina, or in Chile.

Dr FUNK explained that GOERING, as director of the Four-Year Plan, could dispose of foreign currencies independently, and that he used them unhesitatingly for his own purposes, such as the purchase of art treasures.)

c) PRIVATE FORTUNE

PW's fortune consists mainly in objects of art, which he robbed from foreign countries, bought, or accepted as "voluntary" gifts. Some of this fortune came from towns such as NUREMBERG, which presented him with objects of art - jeweled daggers, swords, boxes wrought of gold, and the like - at every possible occasion. Other works of art came from foreign nations, statesmen, industrialists, craftsmen, museums, and from the FUHRER. They combined to form a collection worth many millions, which, judging by his emotion in discussing it, he wanted to build up into the largest treasure in the world, something like the two fabulous hoards of German folklore, the NIEBELUNGENSCHATZ or the WELFENSCHATZ.

6. VANITY OUTRAGED

PW complained about his treatment as a prisoner, saying that it is usual for a marshal to have a house of his own to live in. Considering his position as a Nazi, however, he thought he would have to be satisfied to live in the same manner as the other officer PW.

He says he asked the Americans for safe conduct when he gave himself up, and now he finds himself a prisoner of war. He is worried about his private possessions. Judging by the way the Allies have been dealing with them, he says, he fears that one day "they will take the pants off me".

23 May 45

Paul Kubala
PAUL KUBALA, Maj, MI
Commanding

S E C R E T

4

S E C R E TTHIS IS AN ENCLOSURE TO
DO NOT DETACHRef No SAIC/17
24 May 45SEVENTH ARMY INTERROGATION CENTER:
APO 758

US ARMY:Date: 24 May 1945

: S E C R E T :
: Auth: CG, 7th Army :
: Init: P.X. :
: :
: :OBSERVATIONS ON ARMOR EMPLOYMENT(This Report is in answer to Questionnaire, Hq Seventh Army,
Office of the Armored Officer, dated 18 May 1945)SOURCES

i) GUDERIAN, Heinz, GENOBST (Col Gen), Officers Repl Pool, OKH, formerly C of S, German Ground Forces, and Inspector of Armored Units. Apparently wanting to appear anti-Nazi, the General answered all questions freely; he stated emphatically, however, that he did so only because HITLER's death freed him from his oath of allegiance.

Rating: B-2Interrogator: R.W.

ii) VON GEYR, Leo, GEN D PZTR (Lt Gen), Inspector of Armored Units. Proud of his profession, of the old Prussian general type, source gave information grudgingly; his personal pride borders upon the ridiculous. Having been Military Attaché in LONDON for several years, source claims to have an understanding of Anglo-American affairs.

Rating: B-2Interrogator: R.W.

iii) DIETRICH, "SEPP", OBSTGRUF (Col Gen of WAFFEN SS), CG 6 SS Pz Army. Impressed by his own position and deeds, blaming everybody for lack of courage, the notorious SS General appeared to criticize Allied equipment and tactics because he thought it was "expected of him" rather than as a result of actual experiences. He emphasized his 35-year-long Army affiliations.

Rating: C-3Interrogator: R.W.

iv) HAUSSER, Paul, OBSTGRUF (Col Gen of WAFFEN SS), ex-CG, Army Group "G". Source is a firm believer in HITLER's theories, and attempted to justify most of the FUEHRER's deeds, but he talked freely on military matters. Formerly a Prussian general in the Army, source stressed the fact that he was primarily a military leader and not a politician.

Rating: B-2Interrogator: R.W.ANSWERS TO SPECIAL QUESTIONNAIRE

1. What do you think of the offensive fire power of the American tank and tank destroyers?

While Gen GUDERIAN and Gen Von GEYR felt that they were not sufficiently experienced to answer the question, the former because he did not command troops opposing American armor, the latter due to the limited employment of armor during the part of the Normandy campaign when he was in command, the two SS generals praised American tanks and tank employment. "SEPP" DIETRICH stated that in his opinion the SHERMAN engine was very good, but that a larger cal gun could be mounted on the SHERMAN tank. The new American heavy tank, he said, was even more satisfactory and could be favorably compared with the best German tank, the Royal Tiger. Gen HAUSSER called the fire-power of American tanks "immensely strong".

1

S E C R E T

S E C R E T

Ref No SAIC/17
24 May 45

2. In general, what is our greatest weakness in armor and armored tactics?

Gen GUDERIAN is of the opinion that the tracks on our tanks are too narrow, causing them to get stuck when operating in snow or mud. Thus the American tanks are "Good Weather Tanks" (SCHÖNWETTERTANK). Gen von GEYR thinks American armored tactics were good, given American air superiority; when difficulties were encountered, air support was called for and the matter taken care of. If called to fight an enemy with equal or stronger air power, however, American tank tactics would have to be more daring to be successful. Attacks were not carried through to the last. Flexibility of leadership (WENDIGKEIT DER FÜHRUNG) was sometimes lacking when large tank concentrations were employed. Gen DIETRICH points out errors in armor employment, notably the fact that armor was not always employed in sufficient masses. This, he says, is a tactical error which results in lack of offensive power. In the case of large armor concentrations, the Germans were always aware of them due to lack of proper security. Gen HAUSSER thought that a lower-echelon commander would be better acquainted with these problems. He stated, however, that the idea of tank concentrations instead of individual tank employment was correctly recognized by the Americans and carried out in the best possible way. The tendency to avoid frontal attacks has proven successful.

3. What are your views on effectively combatting infantry A/T measures in the use of the PANZERFAUST?

Gen GUDERIAN thinks the PANZERFAUST an excellent weapon, easy to transport, cheap and easy to manufacture on a mass production basis, and easy to handle in a foxhole. Its disadvantages, as seen by Gen GUDERIAN, are its short range and the jet flame.

Both DIETRICH and HAUSSER think that although invented as a result of the A/T gun shortage, the PANZERFAUST has proven itself to a point where it can no longer be regarded as a pure "emergency weapon". As Gen DIETRICH puts it, even if he could obtain as many A/T guns as he wanted, he would not like to omit the PANZERFAUST in organizing A/T defenses.

Gen von GEYR regards the PANZERFAUST as an emergency weapon par excellence. His answer, in full: "Faute de mieux, on se couche avec sa femme..."

4. Have you found that the bridging problems for Pz Kw V and Pz Kw VI greatly limit their tactical mobility?

All sources answer this question in the affirmative, but all point out at the same time that, in general, the root of the problem lies in the specific types of German bridging equipment, and in supply difficulties. In this connection Gen von GEYR states flatly that, with the technical quality of American equipment, no difficulties whatsoever should be encountered. Gen GUDERIAN and Gen HAUSSER point to supply problems as the main difficulty. Gen DIETRICH thinks the K-type bridging equipment insufficient, but the I-bridges very good, except in the case of large rivers, like the RHINE!

5. To what do you attribute German tank losses by percentages? Air, A/T, Arty and mechanical? Which was most feared by tank crews?

S E C R E T

S E C R E T

Ref No SAIC/17
24 May 45

- Gen GUDERIAN: 60-70% through mechanical failures (Eastern front); 15% A/T; 5% Arty; 5% mines; 5% others. (Note: figures are only a very rough approximation; source was very hesitant about answering this question)
- Gen von GEYR: Source could not give any approximate figures. He thinks air-tank cooperation the most deadly combination. Air attacks are very effective and most feared by tank crews.
- Gen DIETRICH: 30% mechanical failures; 10% air; 15% A/T; 45% tanks and TDs. Losses due to arty are negligible. Most feared by crews: Allied tanks and TDs.
- Gen HAUSSER: During long movements to the zone of action, 20-30% of all tanks en route fall out due to mechanical failures. Considering the remainder as 100%, 15% are lost through mechanical failures; 20% through air attacks; 50% through A/T defense; and 15% are knocked out by arty. Tanks and TDs are feared most by German tank crews.

6. What developments have been made in the use of Infra-Ray or similar ray devices for night operations by tanks? Where can technical data be found on the subject? Who were the manufacturers? What men developed this device?

All sources agree that these developments have not yet passed the early experimental stages. Gen DIETRICH knows about experiments carried out at the TRUPPENÜBUNGSPLATZ (Training Area) PADERBORN; Gen GUDERIAN thinks the GAF was developing similar devices, and heard about tests with PKWs (passenger cars).

Gen GUDERIAN thinks the ENTWICKLUNGSSTELLE DES LUFTFAHRTMINISTERIUMS (Research Center of the Air Ministry) should know details; Gen DIETRICH refers to the HEERESWAFFENAMT (Army Weapons Dept), BERLIN, as the place where details might be found. Gen von GEYR is of the opinion that the British lead in the field of Infra-Ray research, and mentions specifically Prof LINDEMANN, of OXFORD. He does not know any details as to German Infra-Ray developments, and also refers to the GAF for details.

7. What do you think of American reconnaissance tactics?

Gen GUDERIAN thinks that American tactics are generally the same as those employed by German units. Advanced (VORGESCHOBENE) motorized rcn with air support is very effective, he states. Gen von GEYR thinks that the organization of American rcn units is superior to the German, particularly in the number of vehicles, where the proportion is 15:1. The most dangerous moment for the opponent is mass rcn after a penetration, he points out. Gen DIETRICH praises American air rcn ("excellent"); but thinks our ground tactics lack aggressiveness. Movements have to be executed in shorter time, he thinks. Gen HAUSSER particularly likes American cav groups; he thinks they are "very effective" because they are used to close dangerous gaps in addition to their rcn missions. The German Army lacks a similar unit, he points out, and in units which could perform similarly to our cav groups, equipment is inferior.

8. What do you think of American rcn equipment? What are its weaknesses?

With the exception of von GEYR, who claims no knowledge of the subject,

S E C R E T

S E C R E T

Ref No SAIC/17
24 May 45

all other sources describe the light rcn tank as "excellent". Gen HAUSSER also thinks the radio communication system and equipment is efficient; Gen DIETRICH thinks the rcn car is not heavy enough. Gen GUDERIAN enviously admits that German equipment is inferior.

9. Has much German technical data on armor been given to the Japanese?

All sources except Gen GUDERIAN had no knowledge of the subject. Gen GUDERIAN thought that according to a statement by the FUEHRER, the Japanese automatically received information on all German new developments. He could, however, furnish no details.

10. Do you know of any important developments in Japanese armor?

All sources claimed no knowledge of any such developments.

11. Approximately how many tanks did Germany have operative on the Western front on 1 Mar 45?

Gen GUDERIAN: Rough estimate: 400-500. At the time of the beginning of the invasion a total of 1,200 tanks were operative, and losses could usually be replaced in time. After Jan 45, the transportation breakdown caused failure of delivery to units. The most acute shortage was in assault guns, and other SP guns.

Gen von GEYR: Rough estimate: 200-300.

Gen DIETRICH: 300 was the maximum, according to his estimate.

Gen HAUSSER : Army Group "G" had approx 100 tanks and assault guns available. Estimate of the total, which he believes probably incorrect: 1,000.

12. What is the total number of each of the following types, Mk V, Mk VI and JAGDTIGER w/128 mm?

Gen GUDERIAN was the only one who could answer the question at all. He did not know any total figures except in the case of JAGDTIGER, which he stated to be not more than 100. The monthly production of Mk V was approx 300, on the average; Mk VI were produced at the average rate of 100-120 per month; JAGDPANTHER, 88 mm: 50-70 on the average.

24 May 1945.

SEVENTH ARMY INTERROGATION CENTER

Paul Kubala
PAUL KUBALA,
Maj, MI,
Commanding.

S E C R E T

4

~~SECRET~~ THIS IS AN ENCLOSURE TO
DO NOT DETACH

Ref No SAIG/15
22 May 45

SEVENTH ARMY INTERROGATION CENTER
APO 758 US ARMY

.....
: ~~SECRET~~ :
: Auth: CG, 7th Army :
: Init: P.K. :
: Date: 22 May 1945 :
:

HEDWIG POTTHAST, REICHSFUHRER HIMMLER'S MISTRESS

I. SOURCE

Hedwig POTTHAST is an attractive woman in her early thirties, who might be termed the prototype of the Nazi "DEUTSCHE FRAU". She gave the impression of being an unassuming woman rather than a forceful or calculating type.

Rating: C-3

Date of Information: See Text

Interrogator: J.M.B.

II. HISTORY

Source was born 6 Feb 1912, in COLOGNE, the daughter of a merchant of middle class family. She attended school in TRIER, and later studied at the Economic Institute for Interpreters in MANNHEIM, earning her degree in 1933. From 33-34 she worked as a clerk in a govt office in COBLENZ.

In the autumn of 35 she applied for transfer to a post where she could utilize her knowledge of English, and she was subsequently given a position in the Newspaper Dept of the GESTAPO Office in BERLIN. However, she still had no opportunity to make use of her English, and she asked for a transfer or for permission to resign. She was not permitted to leave the GESTAPO Service, but was given a new position as private secretary to Heinrich HIMMLER, a post which she occupied from Jan 36 until the beginning of 41.

Source states that she supervised HIMMLER's "PRIVATE KANZLEI" (Private Chancellory) and that her work was in no way concerned with his SS activities.

III. AFFAIR WITH HIMMLER

In the course of source's work with HIMMLER an attachment developed which eventually led to a serious love affair. Source left her job in 1941 to lead the life of a loyal, devoted mistress, and she bore two children to HIMMLER in the years which followed. The alliance was not legalized by marriage only because HIMMLER felt that a divorce might result in his wife's death, as the latter had been very ill ever since the birth of her only child. In the autumn of 42 source moved to BERCHTESGADEN, where she remained until just before the Allied occupation.

IV. RECENT CONTACTS WITH HIMMLER

Source states that the last time she saw HIMMLER was during the week ending 22 March 45. At that time HIMMLER was confined to bed in a hospital at HOHENLUTCHEN near BERLIN, suffering from an attack of grippe. While visiting him there source encountered Dr Felix KERSTEN of LINNEGATAN 6, STOCKHOLM, a massage specialist who had been treating HIMMLER for years. Dr KERSTEN told her to call upon him if ever she needed any help. (A wire from source to Dr KERSTEN was intercepted by Allied authorities, disclosing source's location and leading to this interrogation).

While she lived in BERCHTESGADEN, she used to receive daily telephone calls from HIMMLER. She presumes that the calls came from BERLIN, but she is not certain. The last call from him came on 19 April 45. As usual he discussed only personal matters over the phone, although he mentioned the fact that the situation was getting more difficult every day. Before saying goodbye he promised to call again the following day, but source states that she never spoke to him again. A letter from him arrived the same day, however, delivered by

~~SECRET~~

1

S E C R E TRef No SAIC/15
22 May 45

one of HIMMLER's staff officers. It contained the usual personal messages, but ended with another phrase about difficulties and the hope that God would protect her, the children, and Germany. The letter gave no hint as to HIMMLER's plans, and no directions for source. Source states positively that this was the last word, direct or indirect, which she has received from him.

Previous to the interrogator's arrival, source had been shown a copy of "Stars and Stripes", announcing HIMMLER's capture. She apparently believed this to be true, because she was obviously deeply concerned and shocked when it was suggested that the story might not be true. She could offer no opinion as to his whereabouts, but by a question revealed that she thought he might be in hiding somewhere, "trying to save something for Germany". She does not believe that he has fled to another country, and she claims that he never gave any indication of having any plans in case of a German collapse.

V. HIMMLER'S STAFF

Source mentioned the following personalities on HIMMLER's private staff:

STAF (SS Col) BAUMERT	acted as private courier between HIMMLER and source
STAF (SS Col) Dr BRANDT	
Lt Col of Police SUCHANEK	
OSTUF (1st Lt) GUTGESEN	

VI. AFTERMATH

When the Allied advance threatened BERCHTESGADEN, source moved with her children first to ACHENSEE, Tyrol, and subsequently to another address, where this interrogation took place.

After repeatedly protesting that she had burned all her letters from HIMMLER, source finally admitted that she had burned only a small portion of them, as she couldn't bear to destroy anything so precious to her. Appropriate authorities have been notified regarding the disposition of these letters.

VII. HIMMLER

Source states that HIMMLER never discussed politics or SS activities with her, and that she has been completely uninformed on these matters since leaving her job. She considers HIMMLER an idealist with tremendous faith in Germany and in the FUHRER.

She believes that everything he did was for the sake of Germany. He never enriched himself, and never kept valuable presents but gave them to the SS. His only property is his house in GAUND/TEGENSEE, which he bought on a mortgage and paid off over a period of years.

HIMMLER was privately opposed to a continuation of the war against the Western Allies. He attributes the fact that England and the US fought Germany to VON RIBBENTROP's ineptitude, and believes that another Foreign Minister might have avoided such a disaster.

22 May 1945

SEVENTH ARMY INTERROGATION CENTER

Paul Kubala
PAUL KUBALA,
Maj, MI,
Commanding.

2

S E C R E T

THIS IS AN ENCLOSURE TO

SECRET

SECRET :
:Auth: CG, 7th Army:
:Init: P.K.:
:Date: 19 May 1945:
.....

Ref No SAIC/13
19 May 1945

SEVENTH ARMY INTERROGATION CENTER
APO 758 US Army

HERMANN GOERING TALKING

I. SOURCE

GOERING, Hermann, REICHSMARSCHALL. Source is by no means the comical figure he has been depicted so many times in newspaper reports. He is neither stupid nor a fool in the Shakespearean sense, but generally cool and calculating. He is able to grasp the fundamental issues under discussion immediately. He is certainly not a man to be underrated. Although he tried to soft-pedal many of the most outrageous crimes committed by Germany, he said enough to show that he is as much responsible for the policies within Germany and for the war itself, as anyone in Germany. GOERING took great pride in claiming that it was he who was responsible for the planning and successful execution of the paratroop landing in Crete, that it was he who had drawn up the plans for a capture of Gibraltar, a plan which was never carried out because HITLER was opposed to it at the last minute, that it was he who was responsible for the development of the Luftwaffe. On the other hand he denied having had anything to do with the racial laws and with the concentration camps, with the SS and the atrocities committed both in Germany and outside. GOERING is at all times an actor who does not disappoint his audience. His vanity extends into the field of the pathological, as is exemplified by the pearl-grey uniform, the heavy, solid gold epaulettes and an enormous diamond ring on his right hand, even though his medals were limited to two, including the Grand Cross of the Knight's Cross with Swords and Diamonds. Just as much a part of GOERING are two of his aides, OBST (Col) VON BRAUCHITSCH, son of the Field Marshal, and HPTM (Capt) KLAAS. GOERING was only too pleased to be able to discuss the history of the past 12 years, and he gave all information more than willingly to a group of interrogators.

II. THE WAR

Outbreak And The Polish Campaign

GOERING claims that he tried to prevent HITLER from launching the Polish campaign, and when he did, and France and Britain did not declare war immediately, he attempted once more to bring about a peaceful solution to the problem. From 1-3 Sept 1939 the German forces were advancing into Poland without a declaration of war. GOERING received a message through his personal courier in SWEDEN at noon on 3 Sept from Viscount HALIFAX, in which the latter asked him once more, and for the last time, to halt the operations before it was too late. GOERING begged HITLER to stop the German forces and to make an offer to Britain and France to the effect that they would be willing to solve the problem peacefully, if they would be allowed to keep the territory already occupied in the first three days of Sept. This would have meant the elimination of the Polish corridor--all this territory had been overrun in the first three days--and would have given Germany an area, which for a long time was being jealously watched and very much coveted by Germany. GOERING feels that the offer might have been acceptable to Britain and France, on the grounds that it would have left Poland a buffer state between Germany and Russia. However, before these proposals could be submitted to Britain and France, the declaration of war arrived from both those countries.

The Invasion Of France And The Lowlands

GOERING credits HITLER for the plan of the invasion of France and the Lowlands. Originally it was intended to invade France at a much earlier date, sometime during the winter of 1939-40. HITLER asked GOERING to inform him as soon as a period of fine weather was in sight, so that the Luftwaffe could be committed for at least five days in a row, a period which was considered sufficient to disorganize the French lines and to launch a powerful offensive, the main effort of which was to come around NAMUR. GOERING claimed that at that time he was very much opposed to the invasion of France, and suggested repeatedly that it be postponed until Spring. He

SECRET

S E C R E T

was in constant fear all through the winter that a period of fine weather might precipitate the offensive against France.

It was during the winter of 1939-40 that a certain mishap occurred which almost resulted in GOERING's end, at least as a political figure, and might have meant Germany's end, if the accident would have been exploited properly by the Allies. A German courier was given the complete plans for the invasion of France and the Lowlands, which were to be delivered at a General Staff Conference at Cologne. The pilot, according to GOERING, got lost and landed in BELGIUM by mistake. The papers were promptly captured, but everybody refused to believe that they were anything but a fake. When the courier discovered the mistake and found that the plane had landed, not on the destined airfield on the right bank of the RHINE, but in BELGIUM, he made an attempt to burn the papers, but he succeeded only partially, and most of them were captured either intact, or at least, in such large fragments, that the main gist of the documents could not be mistaken. When the news broke of what had happened, HITLER raved at GOERING and told him that the Luftwaffe was responsible for this faux pas. GOERING told his audience how he sat at home by the fireside with papers trying to reconstruct what had happened, and he even burnt his fingers trying to find out whether or not the courier had had time to burn most of the papers. At the instigation of his wife, he called in several diviners and fortune tellers who finally reached the conclusion that the detailed part of the plan for the invasion must have been destroyed.

The result of all this was that a new plan was drawn up, which was better than the first, and which was finally executed, i.e. the breakthrough at SEDAN.

GOERING was very enthusiastic about the way in which HOLLAND was conquered, priding himself again and again for his own ingenuity in this connection. He tells the story of a Dutch first lieutenant who told about this incident: Gen WINKELMANN, Commander of the Dutch Armed Forces, was called up on the telephone by this Lt who was holding a certain bridge near the Albert Canal. The latter asked him for permission to blow up the bridge because there were parachutists dropping down in the immediate vicinity. Gen WINKELMANN refused to believe the story, and told him to refrain from blowing up the bridge. A few minutes later the Lt called again, and again Gen WINKELMANN refused to believe it, and adding that he refused to have two divisions cut off from retreat,--these divisions were being hounded by the Germans from the front--and that it was absolutely impossible that any paratroopers would dare to drop behind the lines. A few minutes later the Lt called for the last time, saying "General, I am about to be arrested", and at that moment the German paratroopers captured the Lt and the bridge intact.

The Bombing Of ROTTERDAM

GOERING's story of the bombing of ROTTERDAM was very much in divergence with the published stories and the known facts. GOERING claims that only one wave of 36 planes carrying incendiary bombs, none of which exceeded 50 kg, dropped its bombs. GOERING became very excited when he was asked for his explanation for the large number of dead and wounded. "What large numbers of wounded?" he cried. "I tell you what happened, the fire brigade was so scared to death (HAT SO EINEN SCHISS GEHABT) that it refused to move out and do anything about the fire. That's why such a large part of the city burnt down. The destruction could have been restricted to a very small area, if the fire brigade would have taken any action on it. You can ask the BUERGERMEISTER of ROTTERDAM about that, and he will tell you the same thing. All those stories of hundreds or thousands of dead and wounded are just inventions and fairy tales (ERFINDUNGEN UND MAERCHEN). At the most some twenty or thirty people could have died from fumes, while they were hiding in the cellar. When the second wave came over, Gen STUDENT ordered a red flare to be fired to prevent the dropping of more bombs, and this was done, and no further bombs were dropped."

GOERING's Plan For The Mediterranean

In 1941 GOERING had made plans for a massive offensive in the Mediterranean. The plan was about as follows: Three Army Groups were to take part in what was intended to

S E C R E T

2

S E C R E T

be a vast envelopment operation. One Army Group was to go through Spain, capture Gibraltar, move into Morocco, and roll up the front as far as TUNIS, a second Army Group was to go through Italy and move into Tripolitania, and a third Army Group was to go through the Balkans and Greece and capture the Dardanelles, ANKARA, and cut through to the SUEZ Canal. Upon the completion of this move, it was planned to offer the following proposal to Great Britain: to present them with the fait accompli that the Mediterranean is no longer theirs, but that they could use it again, if they would ally themselves with Germany and fight against Russia. GOERING felt that this offer would have had to be accepted by Great Britain, since they could ill afford to lose the Mediterranean as a passage to the Far East.

Actually the original plan for the move through Spain was GOERING's brainchild. He claims that everything was prepared for this move, which was substantially as follows: fifteen divisions, including two parachute divs and three flak corps, were lined up for this purpose. Approx 600-88mm (sic) AA guns, and a number of specially constructed 80cm pieces, plus a number of "smaller" 60cm arty pieces were to bombard GIBALTAR until it was pulverized. It was felt that no living soul could have remained in the galleries under such a bombardment. The new 80cm guns were already mounted on railcars and were ready to roll through Spain. The guns, when in firing position, occupied four railroad tracks. The two parachute divs, which were part of the fifteen divs, were held in readiness to jump on the plateaus which surround the rock of GIBALTAR. GOERING believes that these two divs would never have been necessary, since the bombardment by all the guns, which was to be an incessant procedure, would have brought the garrison to its knees.

At the last minute HITLER refused to carry out the plan, which ultimately included the entry into Portugal for the purpose of securing the ports and establishing new U-boat bases to substitute or supplement those on the French Atlantic Coast. GOERING felt that HITLER's refusal to carry out the plans was a big mistake.

The War With Russia

GOERING says that one of his greatest shocks was experienced when HITLER decided to wage war against Russia. GOERING told him that what he was doing was against his own beliefs and contrary to what he had written and promised the people in "MEIN KAMPF". HITLER told him that it was unavoidable, that the Russians were becoming a greater menace every day, and that he would smash the Russian Army before winter. GOERING pointed out to him that even if he smashed the Russian Army, Germany would still not be able to make peace with the Russians, but HITLER refused to listen.

It was in the winter 1941 that GOERING had his first disappointment in HITLER. Forced to retreat some distance in Russia, HITLER became increasingly more ill-tempered and unreasonable. GOERING then realized that HITLER was not able to withstand setbacks. This was in evidence even more during the days of the battle of STALINGRAD. HITLER refused to let the Army of 200,000 men under VON PAULUS cut its way out, despite the fact that he was implored to do so by GOERING and a great majority of the military. HITLER called GOERING one day and asked him for a statement on the total number of transport planes available and their total loading capacity. GOERING told him but added that the number of planes would be inadequate for the task ahead. HITLER then asked GOERING whether it was possible to carry in supplies by bomber, and GOERING told him that it could be done, but that it was not advisable, since many bombers were being used in the battle against Britain. HITLER calculated that by the use of all available transport planes and bombers, including the use of a brand new wing of He 177's, which was just in the process of training for a spring offensive, and for which GOERING had a particularly soft spot in his heart and which he was desperately trying to keep intact during the training period--he (HITLER) could supply the Army of 200,000 with ease. GOERING protested bitterly, stressing the impossibility of the job due to a number of factors, including the weather; GOERING told HITLER that he could not expect to have constant flying weather, and that some days it would be impossible to fly at all, and in that case, the quantity of supplies required the following day would be doubled. HITLER persisted and GOERING tried to comply with the orders. The attempts to supply the surrounded Army soon

S E C R E T

3

S E C R E T

broke down for just the reasons indicated by GOERING. The weather was atrocious and most of the planes were either wrecked on the ground or lost in the air through accidents. The result of this venture was that after a short time, most of the transport planes, many bombers and the entire He 177 wing were immobilized, and that the battle of STALINGRAD was lost anyway.

GOERING states that from that time on, the relationship between himself and HITLER steadily deteriorated. HITLER would give and countermand orders so often, that GOERING was completely unable to keep abreast of the situation. He would have a conference with him in the afternoon, and return to his quarters in the evening to find a certain order waiting there for him which the FUEHRER had not mentioned to him during the conference. Many of these orders were quite impossible to carry out. As an example of one of these controversies, GOERING cites an order from HITLER which ordered the entire Luftwaffe to make an all-out attack on LENINGRAD in an attempt to knock out the city. When GOERING told him that he could not possibly transfer the entire airpower against one objective, and leave all other objectives, especially LONDON, untouched, HITLER accused the Luftwaffe of cowardice, claiming that it was afraid of the AA guns in LENINGRAD. It was useless to tell him that the AA protection of LONDON was considerably stronger than that of LENINGRAD, and that the German fliers had not shied away from the task of bombing LONDON.

GOERING's attitude with regards to the Russian war was as follows during winter 1941: "It would be the best thing to hold on to what we have got--the Ukraine--and not attempt to penetrate any further. Let us build an East Wall with all the millions of workers which we have at our disposal, and no Russian Army will ever break through, because we have a superior Luftwaffe, and they can never break through the defenses without an effective Air Force". However, the following spring the offensive was renewed with the well known results.

GOERING claimed that during the first few days of the Russian campaign, the Luftwaffe had terrific successes. On one day they knocked out 2,700 Russian planes, almost all of them on the ground. The Russians, he claims, did not have any idea of what was happening in the first few hours of this devastating attack. GOERING, supported by VON BRAUCHITSCH, then went on to say that they themselves did not believe the phenomenal success at first, and only announced the loss of 1,900 Russian planes.

20 July Putsch

GOERING said that he was supposed to have been present at the meeting which was scheduled to take place between HITLER and MUSSOLINI at the FUEHRERHAUPTQUARTIER, in East Prussia, but that due to his dislike of MUSSOLINI, he decided not to attend the meeting. It was only due to this fact, that he avoided either being killed or wounded.

GOERING says that it was impossible to organize an effective anti-HITLER movement at the time. To do away with HITLER would have probably meant coming to an agreement with the SS on that matter, and the SS could not be trusted, GOERING felt. When asked why he did not protest to HITLER, and why he did not give up his position as Chief of the Luftwaffe, GOERING replied that he was afraid that he would consequently lose his place as successor to HITLER, and that he would be replaced by BORMANN, for whom he claimed to have a special dislike.

The Racial Policies Of Germany

GOERING's explanation for the racial policy in Germany was as follows: The prosecution was not intended to take on the aspects which it did later on. It was originally intended to squeeze only those Jews who were in leading positions, since they "represented a serious danger for the German nation". "After all, those Jews who fought in the World War and received the Iron Cross 1st class, were allowed to

S E C R E T

4

S E C R E T

remain. We even encouraged their emigration to Palestine, and helped them to leave Germany." GOERING made no attempt to hide the fact that he was very much in favor of the "aryanization" of Germany, it was just the "methods" with which he was not quite in accord. "Anyway, during the first few years of National Socialism we did not persecute the Jews." He admitted that the pogroms of 1938 were "pretty bad" (RECHT SCHLIMM), but claimed that this was the first instance of persecution of the Jews in Germany. "It was never intended that the "Aryanization" of Germany should take on such forms" (ES WAR NIE VORGESEHEN DASS DIE SACHE SOLICHE FORMEN ANNEHMEN SOLLTE).

Although GOERING openly admitted that he knew of the "existence" of concentration camps, he claimed that he never realized that they were particularly bad institutions. "I always thought that they were places where people were employed for some useful work." After seeing some of the pictures taken at DACHAU Concentration Camp, GOERING said "all this must have happened in the last few weeks". He said that he could not "understand" that there are some people in Germany who could commit such atrocities.

Atrocities In France

GOERING said that he did not believe in the atrocities which the Allies claim the Germans had committed in France. "You should have seen some of the bodies of German soldiers who were killed in France. It was simply ghastly, indescribable the way these people looked." He dismissed the mutilation of French patriots as "propaganda" and compared the stories with those of the last war where people were supposed to have been found with some limbs cut off. With this answer, he dismissed the matter.

GENOBST (Col Gen) BECK And Gen GAMELIN

GOERING considered Generals BECK and GAMELIN, both one-time Chiefs of Staff of the German and French Armies respectively, to be in the category of "drawing-room" generals (SALONGENERALE). GOERING felt that both generals knew only the theory and not the practice. Both of them would spend most of their time weighing the different possibilities, all of which sounded very nice on paper.

Italy And MUSSOLINI

GOERING did not have one good word for Italy and MUSSOLINI. He felt that Italy was a millstone around Germany's neck, and that Germany would have been much better off if they had never bothered about Italy. GOERING seems to have a personal dislike for MUSSOLINI. He imitated MUSSOLINI during his meeting at the BRENNER Pass, when HITLER had hurriedly arrived from Germany after hearing that Italy planned to march into Greece, HITLER apparently tried to persuade MUSSOLINI to refrain from such a venture.

GOERING said that he had full "sympathy" for the French if they despise Italy. He felt that Italy's entry into the war one week before the end of the French campaign was a "treacherous" move. "If I were a Frenchman, I would spit on the ground every time I saw an Italian". The most ridiculous thing of all, according to GOERING, was MUSSOLINI's speech at the conclusion of the French campaign, when he said that Italy's soldiers had accomplished the very difficult task of overcoming "tremendous fortified positions", and worst of all had triumphantly announced the capture of a certain mountain peak, which had always been Italian.

19 May 1945

SEVENTH ARMY INTERROGATION CENTER

Paul Kubala
PAUL KUBALA,
Maj, MI,
Commanding.

5

THIS IS AN ENCLOSURE

DO NOT DETACH

SECRET

Ref No SAIC/12
17 May 45

SEVENTH ARMY INTERROGATION CENTER
APO 758 US ARMY

.....
: SECRET :
: Auth: CG, 7th Army :
: Init: P.K. :
: Date: 17 May 45 :
:.....

NOTES ON PERSONALITIES AND ESTABLISHMENTS
ASSOCIATED WITH DEVELOPMENT OF V-WEAPONS

I. SOURCE

LARSSON, Nils, a Swedish engineer who has worked for two years in Germany on rocket research. He appears to have a well-rounded picture of German rocket production and plans, and although he admits that he is only a "small man" in this field, he knows the more important men and where they can be found. He volunteered the information published below, which is given in source's own words.

Rating: B-2 Date of Information: 10 May 45 Interrogator: E.V.H.L.

II. CHIEF FOR DEVELOPMENT OF V-WEAPONS

"The Chief for Development of V-weapons, Gen DORNBERGER, is staying in HINDELANG, near OBERSTDORF, Allgäu, according to source's latest information. The General has a complete set of documents on the V-2 in his possession. To avoid destruction of these documents, the General should be approached with the utmost caution. He is believed to be carrying false identification papers. Therefore it would be advisable to have someone who knows him personally make the first contact."

III. ROCKET BOMB MATHEMATICIAN

"Dr Franz KALSCHUEER, who is one of the outstanding mathematicians in the field of ballistics for rocket bombs (AUSSENBALLISTIK DER R WAFFEN), is reported to be at present in TRAUNSTEIN, Upper Bavaria. He has with him all the supporting data for a newly developed slide rule for rocket bombs, and also the Handbook of Rocket Science of the VA (Experimental Station ?). Furthermore, he guards all secret designations (code designations) for rocket science, as well as the key for thermodynamic computations.

For the further development of the rocket bomb by the US Army the apprehension of this man is absolutely essential, and it should be undertaken with extreme caution, as noted in II above. Dr KALSCHUEER is residing with a family named RHODE, evacuated from DANZIG, and is engaged to be married to a daughter of the family."

IV. VINAPAS

"The firm WACKERCHEMIE, MUNICH, has a stock of VINAPAS in the storeroom of its factory building at BURGHAUSEN on the SALZACH River, Upper Bavaria. This is a raw material of great importance in the development of the rocket bomb, and the entire stock should be secured."

V. MEASURING INSTRUMENT FOR ROCKET DEVELOPMENT

"One of the most important instruments connected with rocket development is a measuring device designated GM 40 I. This instrument is located in the GASTHAUS BAECKERALM, in BAYRISCH ZELL, Upper Bavaria, and is in the care of Engr Waldemar THOMAS, who is the only man in Germany who is fully qualified to service the instrument. He has orders to blow it up if he can no longer safeguard it."

VI. ORIGINAL DATA FOR ROCKET BOMBS

"Engr Karl Heinz SCHLESIGER, from the experimental laboratory of the WAFFEN-UNION (Weapons Union) in PIERANS, Czechoslovakia, is in possession of the original exact data for the rocket bombs. SCHLESIGER was in FEILNBACH, near ROSENHEIM, on 10 May 45, in a hotel now requisitioned by the Red Cross. This mountain resort (BERGHOTEL) was used until recently as a transit camp for Slovenes. FEILNBACH is situated approx 5 km SOUTH of the detour to BAD AIBLING on the SALZBURG-MUNICH AUTOBAHN."

SECRET

S E C R E T

VII. AMMONIUM PERCHLORATE

"The DEUTSCHE SPRENGSTOFFCHEMIE WERK, at KRAIBURG on the INN, Bavaria, has in stock 600 kg of ammonium perchlorate, a substance which forms the basis for new developments in explosives. It is stored approx 500 m NW of the main entrance, in explosives bunker No 138, which is partly destroyed."

VIII. RAY TRANSMITTER AND INTEGRAL CALCULUS MACHINE

"The original and only existing ray transmitter for the remote control of rocket bombs is located at PRIBRANS, Czechoslovakia, 60 km SW of PRAGUE, and 3 km WEST of the main PRAGUE-STRAKONITZ highway. The instrument is in the former physics building of the experimental laboratory of the WAPPEN UNION, SKODA, BRUENN. This building is known as DREIECKGEBAEUDE and is situated on the slope of HEILIGEN BERG (Holy Mtn)."

"In the assembly dept of the so-called work shop building, adjoining the DREIECKGEBAEUDE is the only existing model of an integral calculus machine."

Source believes that both instruments described above are of great importance.

17 May 1945

SEVENTH ARMY INTERROGATION CENTER

Paul Kubala

PAUL KUBALA, Maj, MI, ^{WAV.}
Commanding.

S E C R E T

2

THIS IS AN ENCLOSURE
~~SECRET~~



Ref No SAIC/9
20 Apr 45

SEVENTH ARMY INTERROGATION CENTER
APO 758 US ARMY

.....
: SECRET :
:Auth: CG, 7th Army:
:Init: PX :
:Date: 20 Apr 45 :
:.....

PROPOSED PLAN FOR OCCUPATION OF SOUTHERN GERMANY

SOURCE

GRAF VON ORIOLA, GENLT (Maj Gen), comes from an old Silesian aristocratic family. He is cooperative, expressed a pronounced non-Nazi attitude, and has an intense interest in the reconstruction of Germany. (Cf PW Int Buls Nos 5/750 and 5/751)

Rating: B-2

Interrogator: W.M.B.

Note: The following is presented substantially in source's own words.

OCCUPATION OF SOUTHERN GERMANY (See Appendix)

Source considers three corps fully sufficient for the occupation of Southern Germany EAST of the RHINE and bounded in the NORTH by the approximate line: Mouth of the LAHN - BAD NAUHEIM - NEUSTADT/SAALE - COBURG - ASCH. The distribution of the occupation forces would thus correspond to the distribution of the German military forces in the pre-war years. Source believes that it would be of advantage to have the sectors occupied by the three occupation corps correspond to the German WEHRKREISE sectors, as this would facilitate cooperation with the existing military and civilian offices. For the same reason, and also to make the best use of the local transportation and communication facilities, source suggests that the corps CP's be located either in the cities where the WEHRKREISE Hq were formerly located, or in their immediate neighborhood.

The proposed areas allocated for the occupation forces, within the boundaries considered above, and excluding all territory WEST of the RHINE as well as the SUDETENLAND, are as follows:

- Army Staff The DONAUWOERTH area, because of its central location.
- First Corps CP: MUNICH; comprises WEHRKREIS VII.
- Second Corps CP: NUERNBERG; comprises WEHRKREIS XIII and Southern corner of WEHRKREIS IX.
- Third Corps CP: STUTTGART; comprises WEHRKREIS V and Eastern part of WEHRKREIS XII.

The following locations are suggested by source for div hq:

- First Corps: First Div - ROSENHEIM
- Second Div - AUGSBURG
- Third Div - GARMISCH
- Second Corps: Fourth Div - WUERZBURG
- Fifth Div - REGENSBURG
- Sixth Div - BAYREUTH

SECRET

1874

S E C R E T

Third Corps: Seventh Div - DONAUESCHINGEN
 Eighth Div - KARLSRUHE
 Ninth Div - WIESBADEN

The div boundaries proposed by the General correspond to the probable occupational capacity of each district. The boundaries are lines that may be easily plotted, viz, AUTOBAHNEN (super-highways), highways, rivers, etc.

Source thinks it neither practical nor necessary to quarter the occupation troops in dispersed and broken-up groups; he believes central grouping more advisable. This would facilitate the operation and maintenance of the units. Such an arrangement would, furthermore, permit the use of existing and, for the most part, recently constructed barracks. The dense net of good roads would permit quick shifting of troops, should the need arise.

The following training grounds are in the army sector:

- i) GRAFENWOEHR - Second Corps, but also within easy access of First Corps;
- ii) HAMMELBURG - Second Corps;
- iii) MUENSINGEN - Third Corps;
- iv) WILDFLECKEN - Second Corps;
- v) SONTHOFEN - First Corps; primarily for mountain training.

If the use of armored divs for occupation troops is intended, source thinks it advisable to locate them in the immediate proximity of these training areas, in order to decrease the damage to the crops caused by the maneuvering tanks.

20 April 1945.

SEVENTH ARMY INTERROGATION CENTER


Paul Kubala
 PAUL KUBALA, Maj, MI,
 Commanding.

S E C R E T

2

S E C R E T

Appendix



SEVENTH ARMY INTERROGATION CENTER

Ref No SAIC/9

S E C R E T

THIS IS AN ENCLOSURE
DO NOT DETACH

SECRET

Ref No SAIG/10
22 April 45

SEVENTH ARMY INTERROGATION CENTER
APO 758 US ARMY

: SECRET :
: Auth: CG 7th Army :
: Init: JK :
: Date: 22 Apr 45 :
:.....:

EVENTS LEADING UP TO 20 JULY PUTSCH
(Cf Report Ref No SAIG/2, 10 Apr 45)

A. EARLY UNDERGROUND MOVEMENTS

I. SOURCE

HENK, Emil, HEIDELBERG, KAISERSTRASSE 33, a 51-year-old Socialist, who appears to have considerable knowledge of anti-Nazi movements. He paid for his political convictions by being imprisoned for almost two years (between 1934 and 1936), after trying to create an underground organization in SW Germany.

Rating: C-3 Date of Information: See Text Interrogator: H.W.F.

II. ANTI-NAZI GROUPS

It should be understood that only the so-called intelligentsia were engaged in the underground movements mentioned in this report, and that the various groups so engaged were to have formed a small cadre for organizations to be created after a successful putsch.

LEUSCHNER, former Minister of the Interior of Hassen, who is mentioned several times in this report, had by 1941 become the leader of a group of anti-Nazi intellectuals and former trade union chiefs. GOERDELER, former Mayor of LEIPZIG, seems to have first taken an active part in these ventures in 1941. He became the principal liaison man between the generals and the other factions, but he had no underground movement to give him a personal backing. LEUSCHNER and GOERDELER collaborated with the generals, who had been plotting HITLER's downfall since 1939.

In addition to the clique led by LEUSCHNER, GOERDELER, and the generals, another small group had been formed which met at Count MOLTKE's castle at KREISA, Silesia. According to source, the leading personalities were:

- Count MOLTKE
- Count York VON WARTENBURG
- Dr MITRENDORFF (Former Social Democratic Party Representative)
- Dr HAUBACH " " " " "
- Prof REICHWEIN, HALLE " " " " "
- LEBER " " " " "
- Father DELL, S.J., MUNICH (Representing the German Catholics)
- OBERKONSISTORIALRAT (Spiritual leader of the German Protestants since NIEMOELLER's imprisonment)
- (Equiv Archbishop)
- Dr GERSTENMEIER
- Emil HENK (Source)

III. EARLY ATTEMPTS

The first preparations for an insurrection against HITLER were made during the winter of 1939, when GENERALFELDMARSCHALL VON BRAUCHITSCH had concentrated a number of armored divisions in the BERLIN area. However, Gen GUDERIAN lost his nerve at the last moment, and the whole undertaking had to be called off. (This story was told to source by LEUSCHNER).

The next try, so far as is known to source, was made in Dec 41. Then again VON BRAUCHITSCH was ready to liquidate HITLER, and the preparations had reached such an advanced stage that the Field Marshal asked LEUSCHNER to name those

SECRET

S E C R E T

prominent Nazis whom it was essential to kill at all costs. The coup was planned for Christmas 41, but VON BRAUCHITSCH was relieved of his command 12 Dec, and the scheme collapsed.

In 42, LEUSCHNER, MASS, another Socialist union leader, and KAISER, the former chief of the Catholic unions, reached complete agreement as to the action to be taken. With GOERDELER acting as intermediary, LEUSCHNER established contact with the generals, who were represented by Gen VON BECK. Other generals known to have taken part in the talks were Gen FALKENHAUSEN and Gen KUECHLER. Gen MANSTEIN refused to take part, stating that he was a soldier, not a politician.

The third attempt was planned for April 43, but during a meeting between source and Drs MIERENDORFF and HAUBACH, at source's house in OBERSTDORF, Allgaeu, it was decided that a putsch in 1943 would be untimely. The Russians were still far away, and their political intentions were unknown, while the Americans and the British had not yet had any important military or political success. A new government would have had to face tremendous problems. The insurrection was therefore postponed, after Gen VON BECK had been notified through Count MOLTKE.

In the same year, GOERDELER, LEUSCHNER, and the former Ambassador to MOSCOW, Count VON DER SCHULENBURG, drew up a plan to establish contact, first with STALIN, and later with the British and American governments. Count SCHULENBURG was to have crossed the Russian lines in Gen KUECHLER's Army sector, but in the end permission was refused by the Gen's Ia, because the fact could not have been kept secret. (This was told to source by LEUSCHNER and MIERENDORFF, who had also shown him a memorandum from SCHULENBURG to HITLER, written in May 41, in which the Count pleaded with the FUEHRER not to go to war against Russia since the vast spaces and the severe climate presented insurmountable difficulties).

In the summer of 43, the generals declared that a revolt on their part was impossible, but that they would welcome a revolution and would give it their immediate support. The Jesuits, who had encouraged the underground movement from the start, were assigned the task of conducting a poll of popular sentiment. When this poll disclosed a negative reaction everywhere except in MUNICH and VIENNA, it was concluded that a popular rebellion was out of the question, and that HITLER would have to be overthrown by men with political and military power. Source states that HIMMLER attempted to establish an entente with LEUSCHNER during the course of the summer, and it is source's opinion that he was successful in this and that he maintained contact with LEUSCHNER from that time onward.

Count MOLTKE's clique and the group formed by GOERDELER, LEUSCHNER, and the generals had certain political differences, but by early summer 44 they had reached an understanding concerning the proposed personnel of a new government. GOERDELER was to have been Prime Minister at first, but LEUSCHNER was to succeed him after a short time - at least so LEUSCHNER was led to believe. Source, who was a member of Count MOLTKE's circle, claims to have been offered the governorship of Southern Germany, which he refused because he did not want to hold public office. To this refusal he attributes the fact that he is still alive.

Austria was to remain a province of Germany, but a separate government was planned, which included SCHUSCHNIGG, SEITZ, the former Mayor of VIENNA, and Dr GLEISSNER, a Social Democrat. SEITZ had reluctantly agreed to participate in the spring of 43.

IV. THE 20 JULY PUTSCH

Early in July 44, LEBER got in touch with the three-man Central Committee of the Communist Party. Source believes that one of those men was a Nazi agent. At any rate LEBER and REICHWEIN, together with the members of the Central Committee, were arrested shortly thereafter. At one of those meetings the name of Col VON STAUFFENBERG was mentioned, and source thinks that the possibility that he had become known to the GESTAPO may have influenced VON STAUFFENBERG to advance the date for the putsch.

S E C R E T

S E C R E TV. PERSONALITIES

Source believes that the following personalities connected with the underground activities described above may still be alive:

Dr GLEISSNER	FALTERWEG 11, BERLIN. (Mentioned above).
Mrs SCHWAMB	BURGFELD 243, or c/o WEBER, MITRASSTRASSE 9, FRANKFURT/ MAIN. Her husband was one of LEUSCHNER's collaborators, and source believes that she may know a number of per- sonalities who might be useful.

B. CONSUL MOVEMENTI. SOURCE

LINDEMANN, Reinhold Moritz, O/GEFR (Cpl), 639 SCHW FLAK ABT (Hv A/A Bn), a 44-year-old native of RODACH, near COBURG. His records show that he joined the Nazi Party in 1932, and that he held the rank of TRUPPFUEHRER (S/Sgt) in the SA. He was cooperative during interrogation, but it is apparent that he is an opportunist who is anxious to ingratiate himself with the winning side. Although his cousin, GENLT (Maj Gen) Fritz LINDEMANN, was implicated in the 20 July putsch, source denies having had any connection with the affair himself.

Rating: C-3 Date of Information: See Text Interrogators: R.E.T. and E.W.

II. THE MOVEMENT

Source believes that the attempt on HITLER of 20 July 44 had its inception in the CONSUL movement, which was founded during 1940-41, and which was named after an anti-Communist organization of the early 20's. The group was made up of lawyers, economists, and high-ranking Army officers, and its ideals, according to source, were democratic. Its purpose was to overthrow HITLER, and to end the war, by bringing about an insurrection.

PW received his information from his brother, Dr Kurt LINDEMANN, who was killed by a bomb a few weeks ago, and from Maj Dr REUSSE, an old family friend. Source states that neither of those men were involved in the movement, but both had indirect connections with it. Maj REUSSE was at the LUFTWAFFENFACHSCHULE (GAF Trade School), WUERZBURG, where he directed the training program.

III. PROMINENT PERSONALITIES

GRAF HELLDORF	Former STADTKOMMANDANT, BERLIN.
GENMAJ (Brig Gen) HASSE	
Dr GOERDELER	OBERBUERGERMEISTER (Mayor), LEIPZIG.
GENLT (Maj Gen) Dr Fritz LINDEMANN	Source's cousin.
GENOBST (Col Gen) HIPPER (?)	
OBSTLT (Lt Col) BENARDIS	General Staff Officer.
OBST (Col) GRAF VON STAUFFENBERG	
GENOBST Fritz FROMM	His murder of a General Staff Officer following 20 July, and his subsequent disappearance, were reported in the press.
Field Marshal VON WITZLEBEN	Tried by a people's court after 20 July. The Judge in the case was killed, and further news was suppressed, source states.

The leading members after the founding of the movement were Field Marshal VON

S E C R E T

S E C R E T

WITZLEBEN and GRAF VON STAUFFENBERG. The number of members in the movement is generally estimated at 500, according to source, of whom approx 400 are thought to have been executed following the 20 July putsch, including all the above-named personalities excepting possibly Gen FROMM, whose connection with the plot was never proven.

22 April 1945

SEVENTH ARMY INTERROGATION CENTER

Paul Kubala
PAUL KUBALA, Maj, MI,
Commanding.

S E C R E T

25X1A

SECRET
THIS IS AN ENCLOSURE
DO NOT DETACH

Ref No SAIC/11
5 May 45

SEVENTH ARMY INTERROGATION CENTER
APO 758 US ARMY

UNDERGROUND MOVEMENT IN MUNICH AND SCHLIERSEE AREAS

SOURCE

MOHR, Siegfried, civilian, pharmacist, 51/II R KLEINZESSMASSE, MUNICH; anti-Nazi and cooperative during interrogation.

Rating: C-3 Date of Information: Beg May 45 Interrogator: W.H.V.

ANTI-NAZI UNDERGROUND ACTIVITIES

Source claims to be a member of an underground organization which, he claims, was at least partly responsible for the limited resistance offered to the Allies in MUNICH. Source joined the movement about four weeks ago, after having deserted from the Army. The organization was very secret, and source came to know only one of its sector leaders (ABSCHWITTSLEITER), Hans MUELLER, 18 HIRSCHBERGSTRASSE. MUELLER, source suggests, would be able to supply a long list of Nazi and anti-Nazi personalities in MUNICH.

In SCHLIERSEE, SE of MUNICH, a Dr Gustav ZEITLER was the leader of the anti-Nazi underground organization. He told source about a week ago that a coup was planned for the time when the Americans would be on their way to SCHLIERSEE. It was decided to do away with the Mayor, the KREMLLEITER, and an unidentified high SS leader (HOEHRER SS FUHRER). The underground movement was camouflaged as the local WERWOLF, because that was the only way of obtaining arms. For this purpose Josef "STAPP" WALDHERR served as liaison man with the SS. The SCHLIERSEE organization was 80 men strong; another estimated 40 men were scattered about the countryside and in the surrounding mountains.

Source was sent by Dr ZEITLER to establish contact with the Allies in order to help the underground organization in their attempts to prevent organized resistance on the part of the SS and to capture the leading SS personalities in the area. Dr ZEITLER could be reached at either of the following places: KEMNABENHOF, SCHLIERSEE; or at his brother's house, in JOSEFSTHAL. Josef WALDHERR could be found in JOSEFSTHAL.


A number of unidentified Nazi Party and SS leaders passed through SCHLIERSEE about two weeks ago on their way to BAYRISCH ZELL and the mountains beyond, source states.

5 May 1945.

SEVENTH ARMY INTERROGATION CENTER

Paul Kubala
PAUL KUBALA, Maj, MI, 50
Commanding.

3/100415



DO NOT

M

S E C R E T

Ref No SAIC/8
18 Apr 45

SEVENTH ARMY INTERROGATION CENTER
APO 758 US ARMY

.....
: S E C R E T :
:Auth: OG, 7th Army:
:Init: P.K. :
:Date: 18 Apr 45 :
:.....

ELECTROLYTIC CONDENSER FOR V-2 RANGE-CONTROL DEVICE

(This report should be read in conjunction with Report Ref No SAIC/6)

SOURCE

WAGNER, Karl, Prof Dr, a 43-year old scientist, prof at the DARMSTADT Technical Institute. Source is a close-mouthed, lonely individual who is interested solely in his research work. He talked rather reluctantly at first, but once on the subject of his scientific developments he did not hesitate anymore. Source claims to be at the Allies' disposal, but his sincerity is open to some doubt.


Source was assigned the task of compiling evaluation tables of rocket fuels by the PEENEMUENDE Experimental Center. Eight days before the Allied occupation of DARMSTADT, however, he was ordered to destroy them.

Rating: B-3 Date of Information: Mar 45 Interrogator: A.Z.

ELECTROLYTIC CONDENSER FOR V-2 RANGE-CONTROL DEVICE

Source developed the electrolytic condenser for Prof Dr BUCHOLD's V-2 automatic range-control device (of Report Ref No SAIC/6). He used a sodium chloride solution (see below) as electrolyte, and silver for one electrode; the other electrode, also of silver, was covered by a thin layer of silver chloride.

While loading the condenser, the current is sent through it in such a way that the silver chloride layer is moved from one silver electrode to the other:



The amount of silver chloride used for the layer is predetermined by the charge with which the condenser is to be loaded. By reversing the polarity of the condenser (during the flight of the V-2 missile), the silver chloride layer is moved back to the first electrode. As soon as the silver chloride has been completely moved to the other electrode, a sudden increase of voltage from .1 v to 1.0 v is produced, due to the hydrogen layer formed around the silver. This voltage is impressed upon the grid of an amplifier tube which activates a relay (Relay J, Report Ref No SAIC/6); the relay, in turn, operates the mechanical device which stops the fuel combustion in the projectile.

The exact composition of the solution is $\frac{1}{2}$ mol of sodium chloride, 1 mol of acetic acid, and 1 mol of sodium acetate. Source emphasized that most of the difficulties were encountered in obtaining a pure solution.

The actual condenser was built in a container 2 cm in diameter and 6 cm high. The accuracy of the final signal was .0015 under laboratory conditions, but less in actual operation.

18 April 1945.

SEVENTH ARMY INTERROGATION CENTER

Paul Kubala
PAUL KUBALA, Maj, MI,
Commanding.

S E C R E T

D. 856-B

THIS IS AN ENCLOSURE
DO NOT DETACH

S E C R E T

Ref No SAIC/7

13 Apr 45

SEVENTH ARMY INTERROGATION CENTER
APO 758 US ARMY

S E C R E T : 25X1A
Auth: CG, 7th Army
Init: P.K. a
Date: 13 Apr 45

GENERALARZT (GEN OF MEDICAL CORPS) PROF DR ERNST RODENWALD

I. SOURCE

Dr RODENWALD is a 66-year old HEIDELBERG University professor who is acquainted with leading medical scientists throughout the world. He appears to have an open, honest character, and to abhor falsehood. Although he admires HITLER's social policy, he disagrees with most of the National Socialist principles because of his religious beliefs (Roman Catholic) and his humanitarian sentiments, and he cannot understand why the German leaders do not stop the war, since it is obviously lost for Germany. Nevertheless he still considers himself bound to the present government by his military oath of allegiance to HITLER.

The Professor became a Party member in 1932, while living in BATAVIA, Java, but when he discovered that the Party was trying to force a political policy on the "BUND DER AUSLANDSDEUTSCHEN", he quit the Party, never to enter it again. This attitude was held against him, and he encountered difficulties when he returned to Germany, although he was permitted to continue his scientific research without molestation.

Dr RODENWALD is prepared to contribute his services as a hygiene scientist to assist the Allied authorities, and is also willing to place his laboratory and research center completely at their disposal. It is possible that he has been influenced in making this decision by his anxiety to reinstate himself in the good graces of the Netherlands Govt, which was paying him a pension before the war.

Rating: B-3

Date of Information: Mar 45

Interrogator: A.Z.

II. HISTORY AND MOVEMENTS

- 1897 Student at the Military Medical Academy, BERLIN.
- 1907 Student at the Institute for Marine and Tropical Diseases, HAMBURG.
- 10 Official govt doctor in Togoland, Africa.
- 15 Medical advisor on hygiene to the Fifth Turkish Army, with Turkish rank of Major.
- 19 Left the Army to finish his doctorate at HEIDELBERG University.
- 21 Medical advisor on hygiene in Netherlands East Indies.
- 26 Medical Inspector, East Java.
- 34 Returned to Germany as Prof of Hygiene at HEIDELBERG.
- 39 Called to XII Army Corps.
- 40- CO of the Institute for Tropical Medicine, BERLIN,
- 45 but continued as professor at HEIDELBERG.
- 41 With an anti-malaria mobile laboratory train in Italy and the Balkans.
- 43 Promoted to GENERALARZT.

III. BIOLOGICAL WARFARE

Source claims that he never heard of any experiments in this field. He emphasizes that he was strictly a specialist in hygiene and tropical diseases. He states that when the question of BW was raised at an official dinner for Army doctors in 1943, all present agreed that this type of warfare was impracticable owing to the danger of contaminating friendly troops. In this connection he cites the case of Australian troops who brought dysentery to the Allied units attacking the DARDANELLES in 1917. The resulting epidemic forced the Allies to withdraw, but the German troops were also contaminated, and they lost half their numerical strength. Source states that none of his fellow university professor with whom he is acquainted would be willing to lend assistance in the field of BW.

1

S E C R E T

S E C R E TIV. POSSIBLE BW EXPERIMENTAL CENTERS

In BERLIN/MALCHOW source directed a station where anopheles mosquitoes were bred at the rate of 8,000 per month. In 1944 a girl was sent there from an SS zoological research institute in Bavaria, in order to study the breeding operations. Source states that there are several institutes of this nature, known as "SS AHNENERBE INSTITUT", but he does not know where they are located. He suggests that these SS research institutes would be the most likely centers for any experimental work in BW.

V. PARA TYPHUS "C"

Source states that the bacillus of para typhus "C" can be carried by human beings for months without harm to the carrier. But should the carrier contract malaria, the bacillus becomes virulent and is then fatal.

VI. ATOM SMASHING

At HEIDELBERG University source knew a Chinese girl who had been making successful experiments in this field. After the commencement of the Allied offensive, most of her laboratory equipment was moved to TAUBERBISCHOFHEIM (now in friendly hands). Source cannot recall the girl's name, except that she belongs to the GO family.

VII. ORGANIZATION OF WEHRMACHT SANITAETSINSP (GERMAN ARMY MEDICAL INSPECTORATE)

CO of the Inspectorate is GENERAL O/STABSARZT Dr HANDLOSER.

There are four sub-inspectorates:

A. Ground Forces Inspectorate, CO Dr WALTER.

1. Personnel Department.
2. Science Department (Statistics and dissemination of sanitary regulations).
3. Organization Department (T/O and T/E for medical and sanitary units).
4. Administration and Finance Department.

B. Air Forces Inspectorate, CO Dr SCHROEDER.

C. Navy Inspectorate, CO Dr GREUL.

D. WAFFEN SS Inspectorate, CO not known to source.

VIII. GERMAN MILITARY MEDICAL ACADEMY

CO of the Academy is GENERALARZT Dr ASALT, a Nazi.

The Academy is composed as follows:

A. Teaching Section, also called "PEPINIERE", where military doctors receive instruction.

B. Research Section (CO GENERALARZT Prof Dr SCHREIBER) made up of the following LEHRGRUPPEN (Institutes):

1. Hygiene, CO Prof Dr ZEISS.

S E C R E T

S E C R E T

2. Tropical Diseases, CO Prof Dr RODENWALD (Sept 43 part of this Institute was moved to the WILLIAM KERKHOFF INSTITUT in BAD NAUHEIM).
3. Toxicology, CO Prof Dr WIRTH, who is also a CW specialist.
4. Pharmacology, CO Col GEMEINHARD.
5. Physiology:
 - a) Bio-climatic Section: Prof RANKE.
 - b) Alimentation Section: Prof LANG.
6. Pathology and Anatomy: Prof ANDERNATH.
7. Photography and Training Films: (?)
8. Air Technics: Prof STRUCHHOLD. (This is no longer a part of the Research Section.)

IX. GERMAN GENERALARZTE

The only German medical officers of general rank (all university professors) are:

Prof Dr SAUERBRUCH	BERLIN (surgeon)
" " HABERER	COLOGNE (surgeon)
" " LAEVEN	KOENIGSBERG (surgeon)
" " KREUZ	BERLIN (orthopedist)
" " ROSTOCK	" (surgeon)
" " ZEISS	" (hygienist)
" " GUTZEIT	BRESLAU (internal diseases)
" " LOEHE	BERLIN (dermatology)
" " FLURY*	WUERZBURG (pharmacology)

(*Prof Dr FLURY is one of the key German scientists in the field of CW.)

13 April 1945.

SEVENTH ARMY INTERROGATION CENTER

Paul Kubala
PAUL KUBALA, Maj, MI,
Commanding.

3

S E C R E T

THIS IS AN ENCLOSURE
DO NOT DETACH

S E C R E T

Ref No SAIC/6
13 Apr 45

SEVENTH ARMY INTERROGATION CENTER
APO 758 US ARMY

: S E C R E T :
: Auth: CG, 7th Army :
: Init: PK :
: Date: 13 Apr 45 :
:

V-2 EXPERIMENTS AT PEENEMUENDE

V-2 AUTOMATIC RANGE-CONTROL DEVICE

SOURCE

BUCHOLD, Prof Dr, Technical Institute of DARMSTADT, a 45-year old DARMSTADT scientist employed by the BROWN-BOVERI Works, MANNHEIM, from 1923 to 1934, when he accepted a professorship at the TECHNISCHE HOCHSCHULE, DARMSTADT. Reluctant to give any information when first interrogated (not at this Center), source now claims to have been authorized by the rector of the school to disclose the details of his research work to the Allies. He was cooperative during interrogation and is ready to collaborate with the Allies.

Rating: B-2 Date of Information: Spring 45 Interrogator: A.Z.

I. INTRODUCTION

In Sept 39 the PEENEMUENDE Experimental Center ordered several scientists of the Technical Institute of DARMSTADT to meet at PEENEMUENDE. During the meeting these scientists were informed of the intended large-scale experiments with rocket-propelled missiles. Each was given specific assignments for developing various parts of the experimental projectiles.

Source was assigned the following:

- a) A device maintaining a constant frequency of 500 cycles in a 27-volt current - of secondary importance to the V-2, according to source.
- b) The automatic V-2 range-control unit (See III, below).
- c) Later, source had the task of developing measuring instruments for the HEIDELBERG cyclotrons.

II. V-2 EXPERIMENTS AT PEENEMUENDE

The father of V-2, source states, was Prof VON BRAUN, an engineer of little importance before the war who had carried out some rocket experiments in the post-World War years together with OPEL Jr. When he proposed his V-2 ideas to the German General Staff in 1939, he was put in charge of the PEENEMUENDE laboratories. Dr STEINHOFF, only recently given the title of professor, and described by source as being exceptionally able, was assigned to work on the experiments as a specialist in electrical matters.

The research on V-2 proceeded very slowly at first. In spring 43, however, orders to speed up the experiments arrived. Most of the component parts of V-2 were built and tried at PEENEMUENDE; only a few devices were given to scientists for development outside the Experimental Center. These were given to the DARMSTADT Technical School professors for the most part, because Prof Dr STEINHOFF was a former student at that School.

Source successfully completed the automatic range-control devices for the V-2 by the end of 43, but he was still trying to improve it, as well as finding ersatz materials for some of its parts.

Gen DORNBERGER, Knights' Cross holder, was CG of the PEENEMUENDE Experimental Center.

III. AUTOMATIC RANGE-CONTROL DEVICE FOR V-2

Since the explosions giving the V-2 missile its forward thrust are irregular,

S E C R E T

S E C R E T

it is impossible to predetermine the time at which the combustion should be stopped for any given range. The only way to increase the range accuracy of the missile is, therefore, to cut off the fuel combustion NOT at a time set in advance, but only after the missile attains a definite velocity, calculated in advance. This, in turn, can be deduced through the well-known integration formula by considering the acceleration at the moment of each explosion, i.e., at the instant of each forward thrust of the missile.

a) Principles Involved

In source's device, the thrust of the missile at the instant of the explosion is transformed into a direct current, which is proportional to this forward thrust. This current is directed through an electrolytic condenser previously charged with a capacity calculated to correspond to the velocity of the missile at which the fuel combustion is to be stopped. During the flight of the missile, the generated current builds up a charge equalizing that of the condenser. As soon as the charge thus built up reaches the proportion of the condenser charge the resulting rupture of voltage operates a mechanical device which stops the fuel combustion.

b) Operation (See Schematic Diagram, Appendix)

A rotating coil B is placed in the magnetic field A. In front of the coil, and placed eccentrically with it, is a copper plate C, which, in turn, is placed in the center of the field originated by two coils, D' and D'', through which passes an induction current of 500 cycles.

When the missile is given a forward thrust at the instant of each explosion, the mass of the copper plate C tends to move. By doing so, the plate disturbs the constant magnetic field created by the coils D' and D''. The current created in the coils D' and D'' originates in the secondary of the transformer E an alternating current which is applied to the grid of tube R'. This current flows through the transformer F into the copper oxide rectifier G, and from here, as (pulsating) D.C., it charges special electrolytic condenser H and flows back to the rotating coil B. Here it creates a rupture of voltage which nullifies the original effect of the forward thrust of the missile on the copper plate C.

As soon as the current flowing through the valve H becomes equal to the predetermined charge stored there, a discharge of voltage occurs, which is impressed on the grid of tube R''.

A relay J, placed in the plate circuit of tube R'', is operated by this grid reaction and, in turn, operates the mechanical device which stops the fuel combustion.

PW states that an accuracy of .001 is obtained by this device.

In order to charge the electrolytic condenser H, source developed an instrument (KONTAKTUHR) which operated on a 50-cycle current. This special current was created by a buzzer working on 50 cycles, also developed by source.

13 April 1945.

SEVENTH ARMY INTERROGATION CENTER

Paul Kubala
PAUL KUBALA, Maj, MI,
Commanding.

2


S E C R E T

S E C R E T

Appendix

V-2 AUTOMATIC RANGE-CONTROL DEVICE

(SCHEMATIC DIAGRAM)



Legend

- A - Magnet
- B - Rotating Coil (DREHSPULE)
- C - Copper Plate
- D')
- D'') - Coils
- E - Transformer (GITTERUEBERTRAGER)
- F - Transformer
- G - Copper Oxide Rectifier (TROCKENGLEICHRICHTER)
- H - Special Electrolytic Condenser (ELEKTROLYTISCHE ZELLE)
- J - Relay
- R')
- R'') - Tubes

Report Ref No SAIC/6, SEVENTH ARMY INTERROGATION CENTER

S E C R E T

DO NOT DETACH

S E C R E T

Ref No SAIC/1
6 April 45SEVENTH ARMY INTERROGATION CENTER
APO 758 US ARMY

.....
 : S E C R E T :
 : Auth: CC, SAIC :
 : Init: FR :
 : Date: 6 Apr 45 :
 :.....

INFORMATION ON GESTAPO IN BENSHEIMSOURCES

- i) METER, Francisca, 40 years old. Claiming that she now sees the treachery of the Nazis, she is very cooperative and volunteered all information.
Rating: C-2 Date of Information: Mar 45 Interrogator: R.W.
- ii) METZGER, Eleanore, 21 years old, cooperative but unobservant; she still appears to have some pro-Nazi sentiments.
Rating: C-3 Date of Information: Mar 45 Interrogator: R.W.
- iii) GANTNER, Anneliese, 21 years old, not very observant, but fully cooperative.
Rating: B-2 Date of Information: Mar 45 Interrogator: R.W.
- iv) LEONHARD, Erna, a 22-year old stenographer and typist who was very cooperative and helpful.
Rating: B-2 Date of Information: Mar 45 Interrogator: W.M.B.
- v) BOE, Marie Therese. A 26-year old girl who claims to be a French citizen and who was forced to work for the GESTAPO. Refusing to obey orders to be transferred to the interior of Germany upon the approach of the Americans, she went into hiding and remained behind until the arrival of American troops.
Rating: B-3 Date of Information: Mar 45 Interrogator: W.M.B.

Note: Sources, all employees in GESTAPO Hq, BENSHEIM, were brought to the Center for the purpose of interrogation on the shooting of American soldiers at BENSHEIM (See I, below). Some general information, however, was also obtained during interrogation.

I. SHOOTING OF AMERICAN SOLDIERS

All sources with the exception of Source METZGER agree on the following story:

On 24 Mar 45, at about 2300 hours, when the arrival of advancing American troops was imminent, two American soldiers were shot by the KRIM SEK (Criminal Secretaries) STADTMANN and RAAF, at GESTAPO Hq, BENSHEIM. A Polish subject KAMINSKI, the janitor (address not known) was present at the execution. None of the sources were present, but all heard the story from KAMINSKI the following day. A Mrs SEITZ, who lives in the building of the former GESTAPO Hq, was also present at the shooting. The two Americans were buried in the GESTAPO Hq courtyard. The order for the execution was given by a major of the BENSHEIM garrison.

One day after the air attack on WORMS on 15 or 20 Feb 45, an American soldier was brought into the BENSHEIM GESTAPO Hq and put into a room, face to the wall. He was interrogated, left the building after two hours, and was not heard of since. Source LEONHARD heard from her landlady that this man had been shot. Source GANTNER, who kept the register of all men coming into and leaving Hq, was not given the name of this soldier, and made out no papers for his shipment to another camp. As this was a most unusual procedure, she assumes that the man was shot.

II. GESTAPO FILES B-2 (Source: LEONHARD)

(See SHATF, CI Brief, 1 Mar 1945)

i) General SUCH-UND SPEZIALKARTEI

This department was known also as the FAHNDUNGSKARTEI (Searching File). Pink colored cards (FAHNDUNGSKARTEN) were designated for foreign nationals, while

1

S E C R E T

S E C R E T

yellow colored cards were for German nationals.

The information contained in these cards is at the same time to be found in book form in the FAHNDUNGSBUCH. This is a monthly publication of the RSHA in which all wanted persons are listed with their personal descriptions. The information is transferred from the book to the cards.

ii) HAUPTKARTEI (Main Index File)

The cards of ABT II were blue, while the files were yellow, indicating that they contain a list of political crimes and suspects.

The cards of ABT III were orange, and the files were green, indicating that they contain a list of espionage crimes or suspects.

The above color system pertaining to both the SUCH UND SPEZIALKARTEI and the HAUPTKARTEI is prescribed by the RSHA in BERLIN and applies to the whole of Germany.

iii) A-KARTEI (Riders)

This index file contained a list of political criminals or of those people who had not adopted the National-Socialist point of view. Most of the people indexed were in concentration camps. On these cards green, blue, and red riders were used. Source believes that green referred to "Marxism" and red to "communism", but ignores the meaning of the blue rider.

The index was always kept locked and stored away in a safe. Only one person was handling the index and nobody was supposed to see the contents of these cards. The files for the green, blue and red cards were only in two colors, green and yellow.

All entries on the index cards were made in plain language and not in code.

iv) GESTAPO Files in DARMSTADT

All records of the GESTAPO in DARMSTADT were completely destroyed by fire during a bombing attack on 11 Sept 44. When this Hq was moved to BENSHEIM, new records and files had to be compiled. They were forced to start again from scratch.

III. GESTAPO AUSSENDIENSTSTELLE (Foreign Branch), DARMSTADT B-2 (Source: GANTNER)

A number of people who were arrested by the GESTAPO were transferred from BENSHEIM to DARMSTADT for a so-called special treatment (SONDERBEHANDLUNG). KOMMISSAR WANGEMANN was in charge of this department. Source was responsible for filling out the travel papers. At one time she noticed on one of the papers that the person involved was rapidly dying of a disease, which, source claimed, could not have been the case.

IV. FORGED SOLDBUECHER FOR THE WAFFEN SS B-2 (Source: GANTNER)

OSCHAF MUSCH was observed by source one evening in the process of forging SOLDBUECHER for the WAFFEN SS for REG RAT GIRKE, KRIM RAT HELLENBROICH, BAUMEISTER, and a driver.

V. CONCENTRATION CAMPS B-2 (Source: GANTNER)

Persons arrested by the BENSHEIM GESTAPO Hq were shipped to the following institutions:

i) Male political convicts and foreign workers who had sexual relations with German women were sent to DACHAU (major offenses), BUCHENWALD (minor offenses), and FLOSSENBURG (minor offenses).

S E C R E T

2

SECRET

ii) Female political convicts and women who had sexual relations with foreign workers were shipped to RAVENSBRUECK and FLOSSENBUERG.

iii) Persons convicted of sabotage, of failing to appear for work, of prohibited sexual relations which did not result in pregnancy, et al, were sent to DARMSTADT Reformatory (for the Saarpfalz Region); MAINZ Reformatory (RHINE Region); HEDDENHEIM; and HIRZENHEIM. The maximum punishment was 56 days.

6 April 1945.

SEVENTH ARMY INTERROGATION CENTER

Paul Kubala
PAUL KUBALA, Maj, MI, *40*
Commanding.

3

SECRET

Appendix

GESTAPO PERSONALITIES

Name	Civilian Title	ALLGEMEINE SS Title	Department	Section	Age(+)	Height(+)	Description
I. <u>GESTAPO HQ BENSHEIM, ADOLF HITLER STR 52</u> (Responsible for District HESSEN)							
GIRKE, Fritz	REG RAT	STUBAF	Chief of Hq		32	1.70 m	Stocky build, broad shoulders, dark hair, scar behind right ear (3 cm)
HELLENBROICH	KRIM RAT	STUBAF	Deputy	LEITER IV	39	1.75 m	Speaks English, good-looking, brown eyes, black hair, good teeth.
SCHWINN, Peter	POL RAT	OSTUF	Personnel	LEITER I	45	1.75 m	Very slender, blue eyes, dark blond hair, nervous eye twitch.
STEIN, Ernst	POL OB INS	HSTUF	Finance	LEITER II	55	1.72 m	Broad shoulders, grey eyes, grey hair.
BENKWITZ, Gerhard	POL INS	OSTUF	Transp to Conc camps, visas, passes	IV 6 a&b	32	1.75 m	Medium blond receding hair, blue eyes, wears glasses, thick lips.
BATZ, Joachim	POL SEK				32?	1.73 m	Dark hair, brown eyes, very nervous.
EIDMANN, Julius			Preventive detention; filing	IV 6 a&b	37?	1.74 m	Bald, grey eyes, right leg stiff, healthy complexion.

(+) Estimated
 Report Ref No SAIC/1

SECRET

S E C R E T

Appendix (Cont'd)

Name	Civilian Title	ALLGEMEINE SS Rank	Department	Section	Age(+)	Height(+)	Description
EWALD			Interpreter	EAST IV 1c 2	65?	1.72 m	Grey hair, stocky, wears civ clothes, Latvian dialect.
MUSCH		OSCHAF	Personnel		30?	1.70 m	Blond, blue eyes, stocky, broad face.
KLEIN, Isolda			Typist		24	1.68 m	Dark blonde, blue-grey eyes, protruding teeth.
APPEL, Wilhelmine			Mail		24	1.58 m	Dark hair, blue eyes, quiet disposition.
AUBRECHT, Hans	POL SEK		Finance		42?	1.75 m	Blond hair, grey eyes, slender, bony face.
FREUDENBERGER, Fritz	POL SEK		Administration		30?	1.69 m	Dark blond, dark complexion, unstable disposition, indistinct pronunciation.
AMSTUZ			Admin; food		29?	1.80 m	Dark blond, grey eyes, slender, wears glasses.
GISS, Fritz			Admin		37	1.78 m	Light blond hair, light blue eyes; strong, energetic disposition.
WEISS, Gertrud			Mess Hall		32	1.65 m	Black hair, blue eyes, stout, energetic manners.

(+) Estimated
Report Ref No SAIC/1

S E C R E T

2

S E C R E T

<u>Appendix (Cont'd)</u> <u>Name</u>	<u>Civilian</u> <u>Title</u>	<u>ALLGEMEINE</u> <u>SS Rank</u>	<u>Department</u>	<u>Section</u>	<u>Age(+)</u>	<u>Height(+)</u>	<u>Description</u>
NETZGER, Miss			Typist, Admin				
GELBRICH, Magda			Secretary to	GIRKE	28	1.65 m	Black hair, dark eyes, beautiful teeth, delicate complexion, charming manners.
SCHMANK, Maria			Secretary to	HELLENEROICH	31	1.65 m	Black hair, remarkably blue eyes, long eyelashes, very slim.
GANTNER, Miss			Transp to CC				
BENGLER	KRIM SEK	USPUF	Jews	IV 5	37	1.73 m	Black hair (greying), black eyes, pointed face, Swabian dialect.
STATTMANN	KRIM SEK		Jews	IV 5	32	1.75 m	Greying hair, black eyes, fine face, Viennese dialect, cordial manners.
BÜDINGER, Helmi			Jews (typist)	IV 5	22	1.69 m	Brunette, blue eyes, noticeable large mole on left forehead, stout.
WARLICH, Ilse				IV 6a & b	23	1.70 m	Black hair, blue eyes, fine appearance, very intelligent, GIRKE's girlfriend.

(+) Estimated
Report Ref No SAIC/1

S E C R E T

S E C R E T

Appendix (Cont'd)

Name	Civilian Title	ALLGEMEINE SS Rank	Department	Section	Age(+)	Height(+)	Description
DAHNER, Andreas	KRIM OB SEK	STUSCHAF	WESTAUSLÄNDER	IV 1c 1	53	1.68 m	Almost bald, black eyes, one of upper teeth missing, thick pronunciation.
GOTZ, Karl	KRIM ASST	HSCHAF	WESTAUSLÄNDER	IV 1c 1	29	1.76 m	Blond hair, blue eyes, fresh complexion, artificial right leg.
FRISCHBIER, Karl	KRIM SEK	STUSCHAF	WESTAUSLÄNDER	IV 1c 1	41	1.70 m	Dark hair, dark eyes, scar on back of head, exceptionally broad hips.
SPIEGEL, Laver		STUSCHAF	WESTAUSLÄNDER	IV 1c 1	42	1.69 m	Bald, exceptionally black eyes, sick appearance, Bavarian dialect.
BOF, Miss			Interpreter	IV 1c 1			
KNOLL, Erika			Interpreter	IV 1c 1	21	1.70 m	Dark blond hair, blue eyes, slender, bad complexion, two gold teeth.
WALTHES, Georg	KRIM SEK	STUSCHAF	ORTSAUSLÄNDER	IV 1c 2	46	1.75 m	Black hair, grey eyes, thick eyebrows, healthy complexion, strongly built.
RAAF, Michel	KRIM SEK		ORTSAUSLÄNDER	IV 1c 2	34	1.69 m	Dark blond hair, grey eyes, slim appearance, pale complexion.
WAGNER, Karl					40	1.69 m	Dark hair, blue eyes, red complexion, scar on face, stout.
RETZER, Seppel (+) Estimated				IV 1c 2	38 ?	1.75 m	Wavy black hair, grey eyes, slim, Bavarian dialect.

S E C R E T

S E C R E TAppendix (Cont'd)

Name	Civilian Title	ALLGEMEINE SS Rank	Department	Section	Age(+)	Height(+)	Description
GÖTZ				IV 1c 2	44 ?	1.68 m	Graying black hair, grey eyes, strong, wears an exceptionally beautiful diamond ring on small finger of left hand.
EBERT			Russian Interpreter		42 ?	1.70 m	Black hair, dark eyes, scar on right corner of mouth.
GLOCKNER, Hans		Capt(Army)	Counter-espionage	IV 3a & b	56 ?	1.70 m	Grey hair, grey eyes, mustache, scar on back of right hand, friendly disposition.
HEUSEL, Georg	KRIM OB SEK			IV 3a & b	51 ?	1.75 m	Grey hair, grey eyes, pronounced belly, strongly built, plump appearance.
BERTHOLD, Heinrich				IV 3a & b	48 ?	1.68 m	Dark hair, grey eyes, wears glasses, slim, quiet disposition.
LACKS, Heinrich				IV 3a & b	26 ?	1.70 m	Straw-colored hair, dark eyes, slender, stomach ailment, hollow cheeks, ESSEN dialect.
LEONHARD, Miss			Typist	IV 3a & b			
BRÜBACH, Martin		Capt(Army)	Counterespionage, War industries	IV 3c	49 ?	1.72 m	Dark blond, somewhat bald, blue eyes, round face.
WEBER, Ludwig	OB SEK	USTUF	Guard & escape; Communism, Marxism	IV 1a & b	53 ?	1.70 m	Black hair, grey eyes, heart ailment, strongly built, quiet disposition.

(+) Estimated
Report Ref No SAIC/1

S E C R E T

S E C R E TAppendix (Cont'd)

Name	Civilian Title	ALLGEMEINE SS Rank	Department	Section	Age(+)	Height(+)	Description
PETERS, Karl					36 ?	1.70 m	Wavy black hair, dark eyes, high cheek bones, quiet disposition.
BLUMEISTER, Josef					32 ?	1.70 m	Blond hair, blue eyes, Bavarian dialect.
GANSS					50	1.70 m	Dark blond, grey eyes, long face.
DENGER, Elfriede			Typist		23	1.68 m	Black hair, black eyes, light complexion, slim.
RECHEL, Maricchen			Telephone Operator		22	1.67 m	Blond hair, blue eyes, healthy complexion.
<u>II! GESTAPO AUSSENDIENSTELLE (Foreign Service Post), DARMSTADT</u>							
WANGEMANN, Julius	KRIM KOM	OSTUF			52	1.80 m	Grey hair, grey eyes, thick grey eyebrows, strong appearance.
KORBELL, Karl	KRIM O SEK				52	1.68 m	Grey hair, grey eyes, stocky, tip of right hand middle finger missing.
STENDAL	KRIM SEK				46?	1.70 m	Dark blond hair, slender.
GERMAN, Rina					25	1.67 m	Dark blond hair, slender, blue eyes.
MAUL, Miss					37	1.67 m	Dark blond hair, protruding teeth.
KIRSCHNER, Christine					36	1.70 m	Brunette, grey eyes, strong appearance, energetic manners.
FREUDENBERGER, Erika			Registration		20	1.55 m	Black hair, dark eyes, pale, slender.

(+) Estimated
Report Ref No SAIC/1

S E C R E T

S E C R E T

Appendix (Cont'd)

Name	Civilian Title	ALLGEMEINE SS Rank	Department	Section	Age(+)	Height(+)	Description
SCHRÖDER, Karl	POL O SEK				46	1.68 m	Black hair, black eyes, small face, high cheek bones.
			III. <u>GESTAPO AUSSENKOMMANDO (Foreign Service Hq), GROSS UMSTADT</u>				
UNMAGHT, Karl		STUSCHLAF			40	1.65 m	Dark hair, flat nose, stout.
DISSSELBECK, Karl-Heinz		OSCHLAF		IV 1c 1	29	1.66 m	Bald, black eyes, slim.
SCHRÖDER, Hedwig					21	1.63 m	Brunette, dark eyes, high cheek bones, slender.
			IV. <u>GESTAPO AUSSENDIENSTSTELLE (Foreign Service Post), GIESSEN</u>				
KEPPEL		HSTUF			45		
WINZER	KRIM KOM		Was relieved by KEP- PEL		56	1.67 m	Greying hair, fat, wears glasses.
LOESCH	KRIM SEK				45	1.75 m	Dark hair, slender.
			V. <u>GESTAPO AUSSENKOMMANDO (Foreign Service Hq), WORMS</u>				
LEHRMÜHLER		HSTUF			45	1.58 m	Dark hair, grey eyes, fat, stocky.
			VI. <u>GESTAPO AUSSENDIENSTSTELLE (Foreign Service Post), HANAU</u>				
WEGER	KRIM KOM	Not SS			33	1.68 m	Dark blond hair, stocky.
WEILLER, Heinrich	KRIM SEK				43?	1.70 m	Dark blond hair, slender.
SCHMITZ,	KRIM SEK					1.75 m	Black hair, slender.
			VII. <u>GESTAPO AUSSENDIENSTSTELLE (Foreign Service Post), MAINZ</u>				
WAGNER	KRIM KOM	OSTUF			38?	1.70 m	Dark blond, slender.

(+) Estimated
Report Ref No SAIC/1

S E C R E T

S E C R E T

Appendix (Cont'd)

Name	Civilian Title	ALLGEMEINE SS Rank	Department	Section	Age(+)	Height(+)	Description
BRÄNER	KRIM SEK				33?	1.80 m	Black hair, dark brown eyes, slender, self-assured.
SOMMER	KRIM SEK				45?	1.70 m	Black hair, brown eyes, stout, fresh complexion, good appearance.
ZORN, Lulu			Typist		23	1.60 m	Red hair, blue eyes, stout, wears glasses.
VIII. <u>REFERAT N - GEGNER NACHRICHTENDIENST (Enemy Signals), BENSHEIM, AM MARKTPLATZ</u> (Agents recruited by Ref N worked in MAINZ, BINGEN, WORMS, DARMSTADT, and GROSS UMSTEDT)							
BÖHM, Bruno	KRIM SEK				36	1.68 m	Light blond hair, light blue eyes, nervous, flat nose, Saxon dialect.
KNÖRZER, Erna			lately in	FRANKFURT	31	1.71 m	Black hair, black eyes, long pale face, arrogant manners.
IX. <u>REFERAT N, Sub-Sec BINGEN</u>							
FRISCH	KRIM SEK				43	1.73 m	Dark blond hair, strong build.
SNYLIK					33	1.70 m	Black hair, dark eyes, Polish citizen, speaks some German.
X. <u>REFERAT N, Sub-Sec WORMS</u>							
HEERWAGEN	KRIM SEK				45	1.65 m	Grey hair, slender, very intelligent, speaks French; furniture store KARLSTR 1, DARMSTADT.
PETRI	KRIM ASST				29	1.76 m	Dark blond hair, grey eyes, slim.
XI. <u>INSPECTOR FOR RSHA, BERLIN, PRINZ ALBRECHT STR. 8-9</u>							
ACHMER-PIEFRADER, Dr	(formerly Chief of GESTAPO Hq, DARMSTADT and INSPECTEUR WIESBADEN)				48	1.80 m	Dark blond hair, very good appearance.

(+) Estimated
Report Ref No SAIC/1

S E C R E T

S E C R E TAppendix (Cont'd)

Name	Civilian Title	ALLGEMEINE SS Rank	Department	Section	Age(+)	Height(+)	Description
<u>XII. GESTAPO Hq MINSK (Russia) Jan 43-Jan 44</u>							
STRAUCH		OSTUBAF			42	1.75 m	Dark blond, dark brown eyes, scar on left part of face, healthy teeth, good appearance, very lively.
FRIEDRICH		STUBAF			33	1.78 m	Dark blond, slender, quiet person.
ISSELHORST, Erich Dr		OSTUBAF			38	1.75 m	Greying hair, light blue eyes, stout, very intelligent, hard worker, good appearance.
EHRLINGER, Erich		STUF	Now in BERLIN, RSHA AMTSCHEF		32	1.80 m	Black hair, dark eyes, slender, good appearance, ambitious.
SCHILLING, Dr		STUBAF	Later chief investigator at GESTAPO Hq, WIESBADEN		37	1.70 m	Dark blond, wears glasses, scar on left part of face, very intelligent.
DAHLHEIMER, Karl		OSTUBAF			35	1.65 m	Light blond hair, light blue eyes, slender, energetic.
MÜLLER, Alfred		USTUF			46	1.60 m	Bald, dark complexion, wears glasses, fat, quiet disposition.
MÜLLER, Gerhard		USTUF			35	1.65 m	Dark blond, stout, good looking.
GEHB, Karl	REG O INSP	HSTUF			45	1.70 m	Black hair, dark eyes, slender, quiet disposition.
WILKE, Artur		HSTUF	SONDERKOMMANDO leader against partisans		34	1.70 m	Black hair, dark eyes, tall, slender, heavy drinker.
DIRLEWANGER		OSTUF		SD	38	1.73 m	Dark hair, slender, snappy appearance.

(+) Estimated
Report Ref No SAIC/1

S E C R E T

S E C R E T

Appendix (Cont'd)

Name	Civilian Title	ALLGEMEINE SS Rank	Department	Section	Age(+)	Height(+)	Description
MADECKER		HSTUF	SD		38	1.60 m	Black hair, dark eyes, stout, good-looking, cordial manners.
OSWALD		OSTUF	SD - former	in KIEL	46	1.69 m	Grey hair, light blue eyes, strong appearance, was always looking for company.
SCHMIDT, Fritz		STUBAF	SONDERKOMMANDO IV; leader against partisans. Later chief of KIEL GESTAPO.		36	1.70 m	Light blond hair, grey-blue eyes, stout, easy-going.
<u>XIII. SD AUSSENSTELLE (Foreign Service Post) DARMSTADT</u>							
SCHONHALS		HSTUF	Chief of DARMSTADT Office				

THIS IS AN ENCLOSURE
DO NOT DETACH

S E C R E T

Ref No SAIC/5
12 Apr 45

SEVENTH ARMY INTERROGATION CENTER
APO 758 US ARMY

S E C R E T
:Auth:CG, 7th Army:
:Init: P.K.
:Date: 12 Apr 45:

I N D E X

I. SOURCE	Page No 1
II. LOCATION OF OKH AND OKW	1
III. KURIERSTELLE (Courier Hq) OKH	1
IV. KRIEGSAKADEMIE	1
V. THE GERMAN SEVENTH ARMY LINE	2
VI. NATIONAL REDOUBT	2

(See SHAEF, German Army Questionnaire No 24, 2 Apr 45.)

I. SOURCE

MESSEN, Hans, O/LT, Courier Officer at Courier Hq, OKH, BERLIN. A 31-year old bank employee from KISSINGEN. He is of Dutch descent, but had to accept German citizenship in order to keep his work. Anti-Nazi; source gave himself up to Allied troops on 7 Apr 45. Source was cooperative during interrogation.
Rating: B-3 Date of Information: See Text Interrogator: W.K.

II. LOCATION OF OKH AND OKW

Source knows of the following Hq locations, as of 25 Mar 45:

a) OKH (FELD) and OKW (FELD): ZOSSEN, approx 40 km SOUTH of BERLIN. All mail for front units, for armies and lower echelons, is delivered to OKH (FELD).

b) OKH (ERSATZ) and OKW (ERSATZ), with most of its departments, moved to WEIMAR. Chief of the General Staff, OGRUF (Lt Gen) JUETTNER, is still in BERLIN, BENDER STRASSE. All preparations are made to move the entire OKH and OKW to an undisclosed location in Southern Germany. Upon receipt of the order "OLGA 1" the advanced party of these Hq will move to the new location. When the order "OLGA 2" will be given, the entire staffs of OKH and OKW will move.

HIMMLER and his Operations Section no longer have a permanent Hq. They operate from an armored train named "PANZERZUG STEIERMARK".

Part of the REICHSFUEHRUNG SS is still located in BERLIN, KAISERALLEE (ATRIUM), and in GRUNEWALD. The remainder has moved to the METTEN Monastery, near DEGGEN-DORF/DANUBE.

III. KURIERSTELLE OKH (Courier Hq OKH)

This Hq, at first under the ZENTRAL ABT (commanded by GENERALSTABSINTENDANT KUEHLE), was put under the ALLGEMEINES HEBRESAMT (AHA) in Oct 44. In charge of the AHA is GENLT GREINER, a Nazi. OBERSTLT BRUCHMANN, who went through an SS training course, is in charge of the KURIERSTELLE. By his command all non-Nazi officers, including source, were removed from the Post. In all, 30 officers belong to the KURIERSTELLE.

IV. KRIEGSAKADEMIE

On 23 Mar 45 the KRIEGSAKADEMIE (GENERALSTABSLEHRGAENGE - General Staff Classes) was moved from BAD KISSINGEN to the TRUPPENUEBUNGSPLATZ GRAFENWOEHR, GSGS 4416/U-6, First Edition/P-0031. Source spoke with the CG of the School, GEN DER INF SPAETH, and with his adj MAJ VON LOCHWITZ, before the AKADEMIE had moved. He was told that it was planned to move the KRIEGSAKADEMIE to Southern Bavaria at a later date, and he was asked to suggest a nice, quiet place for its location. Source suggested BAD TOELZ, approx 50 km SOUTH of MUNICH.

S E C R E T

S E C R E T

V. GERMAN SEVENTH ARMY LINE

A certain Lt ZIMMERMANN, Weapons and Amn Officer at Seventh Army Hq, told source on 2 Apr 45 that Seventh Army intended to move to defensive positions in the COBURG-LICHTENFELS-BAMBERG-FORCHHEIM area and that digging was already going on in this general area. Lt ZIMMERMANN's task was to blow up all amn dumps between the then-held lines and the above-mentioned positions.

VI. NATIONAL REDOUBT

Although unable to furnish definite information on the planned National Redoubt, source recalls talks in the Officers' Casino at the OKH to the effect that HITLER and his elite SS troops intended to retreat into the mountains, and that fortifications are being built there. The moving of the OKH and the KRIEGSAKADEMIE into the neighborhood is also significant of these plans, source thinks.

12 April 1945.

SEVENTH ARMY INTERROGATION CENTER

Paul Kubala
PAUL KUBALA, Maj, MI
Commanding.

2

S E C R E T

THIS IS AN ENCLOSURE



25X1A

SECRET

Ref No SAIC/4
11 Apr 45

SEVENTH ARMY INTERROGATION CENTER
APO 758 US ARMY

.....
: SECRET :
: Auth: CO, SAIC :
: Init: F.H.S. :
: Date: 11 Apr 45 :
:.....

CHEMICAL PLANTS

I. SOURCE

HENDRICKS, Fred, a civilian who lived in the US for almost sixteen years, running a contracting business in ROCHESTER, N.Y. He was very observant, and gave all information willingly. He has been giving voluntary assistance to CIO in BUCHEN.
Rating: B-2 Date of Information: Feb 45 Interrogator: F.J.S.

II. PLANT NEAR KOENIGS-WUSTERHAUSEN

Source claims to have worked for three years as a maintenance man and "trouble shooter" at a large chemical plant located seven km NORTH of NIEDERLAHME, GSGS 4072/NE 52/10, Third Edition/V-03, a suburb of KOENIGS-WUSTERHAUSEN. He states that this plant manufactured formaldehyde, hexa, hexalol, and a powerful high explosive (hexogen ?), from methanol brought from a nearby plant at WILDÄU. The factory employs approx 300 French and German workers.

The buildings are placed among tall pine trees, in an area approx 1200 x 1,000m. (See Sketch). Each building is of brown brick and has a sixteen-inch concrete roof built to hold earth, and planted with small trees. Wire trellises are affixed to each building to support vines. However, all these efforts at camouflage are of no avail, because the plant's two "smokeless" chimneys emit poisonous fumes which turn all nearby vegetation brown. The location is also given away by a large pile of lime waste, white against the light brown of the blighted surrounding terrain.

Chemical products are carried from building to building in overhead pipes, supported by conspicuous concrete piers. All buildings are connected by paths 2 m wide, in addition to the service roads shown on sketch, which are approx 4 m wide. The water supply, which is essential to the operation of the plant, is carried in pipes laid approx 4 feet underground.

III. ALTERNATE PLANTS

According to source, two similar factories, intended for use as alternates in case the NIEDERLAHME plant should be destroyed, have been built at SCHROBENHAUSEN, Bavaria, GSGS 4416/W-5/6002, and at BODENFELDE/WESER, GSGS 4416/Q-4/2539. These plants are laid out in the same manner as the one at NIEDERLAHME, and the same blighting of vegetation is caused by chemical fumes from the chimneys. Source states that these sites would also be easily detected from the air due to the large piles of lime waste.

IV. LIST OF INSTALLATIONS AT NIEDERLAHME PLANT

(Note: Numbers refer to Sketch on following page).


- | | |
|--|--|
| 1. Workmen's living quarters; not camouflaged; looks like country house. | 13. Formaldehyde plant. |
| 2. Garage. | 14. Laboratories. |
| 3. Underground chemical storage tanks. | 15. Hexa plant, with 16-foot tower. |
| 4. Main electric switchboard shed. | 16. Storage room for machinery. |
| 5. Filling station for methanol. | 17. Storage for finished products. |
| 6. Office building. | 18. Storage building. |
| 7. Officials' living quarters. | 19. Chemical processing building. |
| 8. Workers' mess and kitchen. | 20. Repair shop. |
| 9. Washrooms. | 21. Electric power building; quarters. |
| 10. Steam power plant, with 55-foot "smokeless" chimney. | 22. Waste disposal building. |
| 11. Electric power house. | 23. Concrete air raid bunker. |
| 12. Truck repair shop. | 24. Pipe line tool shed. |
| | 25. Wooden tower for drying hoses. |

SECRET

S E C R E T

- 26. Electric switchboard building.
- 27. Formaldehyde processing building.
- 28. Hexalol plant.
- 29. Concrete air raid bunker.
- 30. Chemical processing building for high explosives.
- 31. Pump house for water system.
- 32. Small pond.

V. SKETCH: CHEMICAL PLANT AT NIEDERLAHME NOT to scale.




11 April 45

SEVENTH ARMY INTERROGATION CENTER

Paul Kubala
 PAUL KUBALA, Maj, MI,
 Commanding.

S E C R E T

DO NOT DETACH



Ref No SAIC/3
11 Apr 45

SECRET

.....
: SECRET :
: Auth: CO, SAIC :
: Init: W.M.B. :
: Date: 11 Apr 45 :
.....

SEVENTH ARMY INTERROGATION CENTER
APO 758 US ARMY

HIGH-RANKING GERMAN ARMY PERSONALITIES

SOURCE

VON PFUHLSTEIN, Alexander, GENMAJ a.D. (retired). Involved in the 20 July incident and imprisoned by HIMMLER, source considers himself at last out of danger and talks freely on any subject. He is anxious to cooperate with the Allies (See Report Ref No SAIC/2).

Rating: B-2 Date of Information: Beg 45 Interrogator: W.M.B.

LIST OF GERMAN ARMY PERSONALITIES

a) Field Marshals and Generals

i) Field Marshal KEITEL, GENOBST JODL, GENLT WARLIMONT - According to PW the three most important personalities in the WEHRMACHT, are well known to source. They are unscrupulous men, cowardly, lazy, unwilling to sacrifice themselves. They worship HITLER to the last and have betrayed the Army to him.

JODL - Very narrow-minded, a typical armchair general; he never realized that his orders were impossible to execute; held his unit commanders responsible for all setbacks and denounced them to HITLER; his main shortcoming was the inability to see the incompetence of HITLER as a military leader.

WARLIMONT - A good society man, knows languages fluently, a "smooth operator" (AALGLATT); if necessary he can work with people of every political belief; he has no fixed line and changes his mind very easily.

ii) VON BRAUCHITSCH, Field Marshal - Opposed to HITLER but not outspokenly anti-HITLER. He was undoubtedly suspected of sympathizing with the generals of the 20 July plot. However, he emphatically denounced the 20 July affair in a newspaper article and hailed the appointment of HIMMLER as Chief of the Replacement Army, thus saving his life.

iii) VON MANNSTEIN, Field Marshal - Probably the most gifted military leader in Germany; has no clear-cut political beliefs. Afraid to take part in the 20 July events, he now pretends that he knew nothing about them.

iv) FREIHERR VON WEICHS, Field Marshal - At heart an enemy of HITLER, he clearly recognizes the crimes which HITLER committed against the German people. Yet, against his principles and beliefs, he was the first to sign a written oath of loyalty to HITLER.

v) BUSCH, Field Marshal - Of little importance as a military personality; a typical 100% Nazi general; worships HITLER completely.

vi) VON BOCK, Field Marshal - At heart against HITLER, he is too ill with stomach trouble and too cautious to take an active part in the elimination of the FUEHRER.

vii) MODEL, Field Marshal - An evil, ambitious and characterless person, whose actions are dictated solely by his personal ambitions. He has an incredible lack of consideration for his subordinates. Worships HITLER.

viii) KESSELRING, Field Marshal - There is considerable doubt as to his military ability. ROMMEL and many other generals in Africa hated him or laughed at the military measures he took. His incredible optimism did not reflect the actual

SECRET

1178843

S E C R E T

state of affairs. He sent optimistic reports regarding the situation in Africa to HITLER from ROME; the troops in Africa suffered considerably as a result of his leadership.

ix) ZEITZLER, GENOBST - Took over the post of C of S, Army High Command, full of idealism and confidence in HITLER, but within a few weeks he learned to recognize HITLER's incompetence as a military leader and his mean character. ZEITZLER was particularly shocked to find that HITLER was completely indifferent to the death and misery of hundreds of thousands of German soldiers. He hated and despised the FUEHRER, but could not bring himself to the decision to overthrow him.

b) General Staff Officers (Of GERMAN GENERAL STAFF OFFICERS, MIRS(b)/RL/haS/18/44)

Note: (*) indicates promotion known to source since publication of Seniority List of 1 May 44.

(#) indicates that the name does NOT appear in the above publication.

- i) ALDINGER, MAJ Son of Gen LADINGER who lives in FREUDENSTADT, Black Forest.
- * ii) VON BENTIVEGNI, GENMAJ Div commander. Previously he was active in the ABWEHR.
- iii) VON BILA, OBSTLT Probably Ia of a div.
- * iv) BIRCK, OBST Related to BLOMBERG. He is in the QUARTIERMEISTER ABT of an army.
- v) VON BOEHMER, OBSTLT Related to HUGENBERG; he was seriously injured on the Eastern Front and is probably no longer with a combat unit.
- # vi) TREUSCH VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELD, GENMAJ Since a few years in the Army Operations Sec, Joint Operations Staff, and an important collaborator with JODL. Very clever and well-informed about the WEHRMACHTSFUEHRUNG, he sees all its weak points and those of HITLER, but is too clever and cautious to state clearly his opinions.
- vii) BRENDEL, Joachim, OBSTLT Ia in a div; an officer with no fixed political opinions.
- viii) BRUDERMUELLER, MAJ In the Army Operations Sec, Joint Operations Staff. Expert on Balkan affairs. Born in WUERZBURG, is known to have democratic ideas; his opinion of HITLER unknown.
- * ix) BUCHER, OBST Killed in 1944 on the Eastern Front where he was Regtl CO.
- x) SCHULZE-BUETTGER, OBST Hanged as a result of his participation in the 20 July plot. Last assignment: Ia, Army Group SOUTH.
- xi) GRAF ZU CASTELL-CASTELL, OBSTLT Ia of a SICHERUNGS Div in the EAST. Nickname: "TOENT".

S E C R E T

- xii) COSSMAN, OBST For a long time C of S to GEN STUELPNAGEL; now
C of S of a corps.
- xiii) VON GROLLMANN (Rank un- Married; has six children. Previously C of S,
known) (NOT the one on Second Pz Army in the Balkans; lately C of S,
the list) Army Group SOUTH, under VON WEICHS.
- xiv) VON HOBE, Heinz, OBSTLT Relative of GENOBST HALDER; probably leads the rem-
nants of a div on the Western front.
- xv) KEITEL, MAJ Son of the Field Marshal; unimportant as a military
figure; is on the General Staff Officers' list
solely because of the position of his father.
- xvi) KLEIKAMP, OBST Important personality. He works in the HEERESPER-
SONALAMT (Army Personnel Office) and is concerned
with the General Staff Officers' files.
- xvii) LAHOUSEN, GENMAJ Austrian, active officer of the Austrian Army who
* was absorbed by the German Army after the occupation
of Austria. Worked in ABWEHR both for the Austrian
and German Armies. Lately sec chief in the ABWEHR,
now CG of an inf div.
- xviii) LASSEN, Ernst August, Ia to GEN WEISS, CG Second Army; probably captured in
OBST East Prussia.
- xix) VON LINSTROM, OBST Hanged because of his participation in the 20 July
plot. Successor to COSSMANN, C of S to the C in
G, France. His wife and two children are living in
MUNICH.
- xx) BARON FREYTAG VON Committed suicide after the 20 July plot. Was AB-
LORINGHOVEN, MAJ WEHR sec chief. His wife and three children are
living in SALZBURG.
- xxi) VON LOSSBERG, OBST Son of the well-known GENOBST VON LOSSBERG of the
World War. C of S of a corps in Norway. He fell
into disgrace because of some political remarks
and his promotion was held back.
- xii) NIEFOLD, OBSTLT Killed on the Eastern front in 1944.
- xiii) GRAF VON NOSTITZ, OBST C of S of the Division Commanders' School in HIRSCH-
BERG.
- xiv) OSTER, MAJ Son of GENMAJ OSTER. He is Ia of a div on the Ital-
ian front.
- xxv) PALTZO, OBST Was ABWEHRSTELLENLEITER in DRESDEN until 1939.
- xvi) RADKE, OBST In the OKH. Was HAUPTREFERENT (Chief Adviser) for
Nazi indoctrination in the Army, directed the NSFO
School. A confirmed Nazi, he was nevertheless
suspected of having been connected with the 20 July
plot. He was imprisoned for four weeks in the
RSHA Prison, and then released, reportedly com-
pletely rehabilitated.

S E C R E T

S E C R E T

- xxvii) RAUSER, OBST Supply expert in the QUARTIERMEISTERABT of an army group.
- xxviii) REINHARDT, Hellmuth, OBST Was C of S to Gen. OLBRIGHT, who had him relieved because he was not suitable for taking part in the 20 July plot. GRAF STAUFFENBERG took his place.
- xxix) SASS, OBSTLT Lately Ia of 58 Inf Div, he was seriously wounded in Russia. He lost a leg and is probably no longer in the service.
- xxx) SAUERBRUCH, OBSTLT Son of the famous physician; holder of Knights' Cross. Was for some time Ic (G-2) of Second Pz Army in the Balkans. Seen by source in the RSHA Prison, BERLIN, where he remained for a few days. Source believes, however, that SAUERBRUCH was at the Prison as witness rather than suspect.
- xxxi) SCHOENE, OBST In General Staff position in PRAGUE.
- xxxii) SCHROETTER, OBSTLT For some time in the HEERESPERSONALAMT as adviser (REFERENT) for the personnel files of the General Staff Officers' list under OBST KLEIKAMP (See xvi, above).
- xxxiii) SCHWATLO-GESTERDING, OBST Author of some military pamphlets. In 1939 Chief of ABWEHRSTELLE HANNOVER.
- xxxiv) SEMPER, MAJ In the QUARTIERMEISTERABT, OKH. Important collaborator of GENMAJ STIEF.
- xxxv) SMEND, OBSTLT Personal adjutant to ZEITZLER. Dead (Cf Report Ref No SAIC/2).
- xxxvi) ULMS, OBST C of S of a corps on the Eastern Front in 1944.
- xxxvii) VON VOSS, OBSTLT Committed suicide after the 20 July plot (Cf Report Ref No SAIC/2).

11 April 1945.

SEVENTH ARMY INTERROGATION CENTER

Paul Kubala
 PAUL KUBALA, Maj, MI,
 Commanding.

S E C R E T

Ref No SAIC/2
10 Apr 45

**S E C R E T THIS IS AN ENCLOSURE
DO NOT DETACH**

SEVENTH ARMY INTERROGATION CENTER
APO 758 US ARMY

THE 20 JULY PUTSCH

I. SOURCE

VON PFUHLSTEIN, Alexander, GENMAJ a.D. (retired) has been a professional soldier since 1917, but he acts and talks like a businessman rather than a German general. He is related by birth and marriage to many a family of German high nobility. However, he is not a land owner, does not have independent sources of income, and has been living on his soldiers' pay. He seems to be strongly under the influence of his wife. He has six children, all of whom are being brought up not to believe in the ideas of soldiering or of National Socialism.

At the time of the interviews source was highly nervous and excited, due to the fact, he explained, that he had gone through a great deal of suffering and that, at last, he considered himself out of danger. He talked freely and without hesitation or doubt on any subject, and his story is believed to be accurate and to the best of his knowledge.

Gen VON PFUHLSTEIN is extremely anxious to be employed by the Allies in any capacity.

Rating: B-2 Date of Information: See Text Interrogator: W.M.B.

II. PERSONAL HISTORY

17 Dec 1899 Born in Danzig.
1912- 1917 KADETTENANSTALT (Military Academy) POESDAM-LICHTERFELDE.
19 Mar 1917 Entered Army as FAEHRICH with 4 Guard Regt.
14 Dec 1917 Commissioned LT.
1918 In 100,000-man Army.
1 Apr 1925 Promoted to O/LT.
1 Apr 1933 Promoted to HPTM.
1933 Secondary General Staff position to the Arty FUHRER III, BERLIN.
1935 CO, JAEGER Co in HIRSCHBERG/Silesia.
1936- 1937 Ic, XI Corps, MANOEVER.
1937 Promoted to OBSTLT.
1938 Ia, 19 Div.
1939 Ia, 58 Div
1941 CO, 154 Inf Regt, Eastern Front.
1 Feb 1942 Promoted to OBST.
1 Feb 1943 CO, BRANDENBURG Div.
1 Jul 1943 Promoted to GENMAJ.
1 Apr 1944 Relieved of command because of political unreliability.
1 Jul 1944 CG, 50 Div, Eastern Front.
18 Jul 1944 Wounded.
1 Aug 1944 CG in charge of defensive fortifications, HOHENSTEIN-ORTELSBURGER-WALD, East Prussia, by order of Gen GUDERIAN.
1 Sep 1944 Arrested by SD because of participation in plot against HITLER on 20 July 44.
14 Sep 1944 Officially dismissed from Army and imprisoned in BERLIN.
24 Nov 1944 Transferred from BERLIN Prison to KUESTRIN Prison (Concentration Camp for officers politically unfavorable to HITLER).
30 Jan 1945 Dismissed from prison, where he was under HIMMLER's custody as a political prisoner.
2 Apr 1945 Surrendered voluntarily to an American unit at WERTHEIM.

Present address: KREUZWERTHEIM, near WERTHEIM/Main. In the castle of his cousin FUERST zu LOEWENSTEIN-WERTHEIM-FRUIDENBERG.

1

S E C R E T

S E C R E TIII. BRANDENBURG DIV

At the time source took over the BRANDENBURG Div, on 1 Feb 43, its personnel was composed exclusively of volunteers who knew of its special purpose. A number of SS men were also in the Div at that time. During 1943 HIMMLER took out some of the SS personnel and used them as political spies in foreign countries. In summer 44 elements of the Div, viz, 2-300 men commanded by OBSTLT WALTHER and his former adjutant, O/LT GERLACH, were transferred to the SS and placed under the command of SKORZENY. The force behind the move to return all reliable SS men under the command of the SS was O/LT VON FOLKERSAM, a native from the Baltic states.

IV. 20 JULY PLOT

Note: The following is an account of the happenings connected with the German generals' plot culminating in the attempt to assassinate HITLER on 20 July 44, in source's own words. For the sake of continuity, and for the general interest it may present, the story of the actual assassination attempt has been included, despite source's absence from the scene of the event.

1. Preparations of the Plot

"On 1 Feb 43 I was relieved as regtl CO on the Eastern front and given the command of the newly organized BRANDENBURG Div. GENMAJ OSTER, C of S, ABWEHR ABTEILUNG, disclosed to me, in numerous official conversations, substantially the following:

a) "In the opinion of a considerable number of enlightened officers, including Field Marshals VON KLUGE and VON MANNSTEIN, GEN DER INF VON STUELPNAGEL, and many others who were well informed, the war could no longer be won militarily. Every day that the war was prolonged meant unnecessary bloodshed and would ultimately lead to the complete collapse of Germany. The newly appointed Chief of General Staff, GENOBST ZEITZLER, was of the same opinion since the STALIN-GRAD debacle.

b) "It was of primary importance to end the war somehow, as quickly as possible. The prerequisite for this would have to be the elimination, or at least the exclusion of HITLER and the Party, since any negotiations between the Allies and HITLER were impossible, - HITLER and his close supporters would never take such steps, in the first place. My opposition to HITLER and the Party had been known to Gen OSTER for years. Field Marshals VON KLUGE and VON MANNSTEIN, GENOBST BECK and GEN VON FALKENHAUSEN have decided to remove HITLER, at first from the military command only, at the earliest opportunity. The plan was approx as follows: On the appointed day the FUHRER's Hq in East Prussia was to be seized by trustworthy anti-Nazi troops. VON KLUGE and VON MANNSTEIN, together with other officers, then wanted to see HITLER and confront him with the following demands:

- i) Appointment of a REICHSGENERALSTABSCHEF (REICH Chief of General Staff) with full powers of command for the entire conduct of the war in all theaters;
- ii) Subordination (UNTERSTELLUNG) of all three WEHRMACHT branches to a single person;
- iii) Re-appointment for the vacant post of Army C in C (OBERBEFEHLSHABER DES HEERES);
- iv) Establishment of a single General Staff for all three WEHRMACHT branches.

Should HITLER not accede voluntarily to this plan, suitable steps to apply

2

S E C R E T

S E C R E T

force were to be taken. These measures would probably consist of placing HITLER under temporary arrest. Preparations were made to cut off all communications between the FUHRER's Hq and the outside world at the designated time, until the desired decision would be reached one way or another. BERLIN was to be seized by anti-Nazi troops at the same time.

The intentions were further to incorporate the WAFFEN SS into the Army, with the appointment of a REICH Chief of General Staff.

Along with this plan there were other designs, of a political and economic nature, with the details of which I am not familiar. It is fairly certain that it was hoped to establish contact with America and England through the Vatican, with the purpose of negotiating for an armistice. I think that the Vatican was chosen as the neutral meeting place for the diplomats concerned; I do not know whether the cooperation of the Pope himself was sought.

c) "It was further made clear to me that my appointment as Commander of the BRANDENBURG Div was only a blind, that it would be my task to occupy a certain district of BERLIN with elements of the Div which were located in the town of BRANDENBURG and, above all, to eliminate Party officials, the SS, and the SD.

d) "GEN DER INF OLBRIGHT handled the technical preparations in the interior. But he was unable immediately to make any headway with his preparations, due to the lack of capable and dependable officers. He finally succeeded in obtaining OBST GRAF VON STAUFFENBERG as chief, and only with the arrival of this officer did the preparations begin to make progress. All preparations had to be handled with the greatest care. Only very few officers could at first be let in on the secret. Spying by HEIMLER, the SD, and the Party increased daily. The fact that the Chief of the Army Personnel Office (PERSONALAMT), GENLT SCHMUNDT, was a 100% Nazi and could not be told about the plot made the situation especially difficult, because officers who were urgently desired for the accomplishment of the proposed coup could not be secured.

e) "The further arrangements of the plan called for holding the Eastern front under all circumstances, at least to protect the German border from a Russian invasion. It was intended that a British-American invasion in the WEST should not be opposed; German troops were to be withdrawn to the interior of the REICH and to reinforce the Eastern front. The plan was to let in the Americans and British, without fighting and as fast as possible, far into Germany. The necessary preparations in the WEST were in the hands of GEN DER INF VON STUELPNAGEL, Military Commander of France, and GEN VON FALKENHAUSEN, Military Commander of Belgium.

f) "In the course of time it developed that Field Marshal VON KLUGE was somewhat undecided and had postponed the date of the undertaking. In spite of all pressure he kept postponing the appointed time for the coup. Weeks and months passed, in summer 43, during which I and many others came to the conclusion that the plan would never be carried out because of the indecision of VON KLUGE. VON KLUGE was advised, and even urged by his Ia, GENMAJ VON TRESKOW, to go on with the plot. OBST SCHULTZE-BUETTGER, Ia to Field Marshal VON MANNSTEIN, was also let in on the plans.

g) "I received the mission of determining, during a visit to the OKH, the position and attitude of GENOBST ZEITZLER and the Operations Sec (OPERATIONS ABTEILUNG) of the Army High Command. It was essential to know whether ZEITZLER could be let in on the plot. Through several conversations with the officers of the Operations Sec, particularly with OBST GRAF VON KIELMANNSEGG and OBSTLT SMEND, I received the impression that ZEITZLER, while he had taken over the position of Chief of the General Staff with great confidence in HITLER, realized after a few weeks that HITLER was totally incompetent as far as military matters were concerned and was making one catastrophic decision after another.

S E C R E T

S E C R E T

ZEITZLER was especially shocked by the fact that losses in men which ran into hundreds of thousands, as at STALINGRAD, did not make the slightest impression on HITLER. ZEITZLER learned within those short weeks to recognize HITLER's military incompetence and to hate and despise him because of his personal characteristics. But he was not yet thinking about the overthrowing of the FUEHRER. He rather considered it his duty, come what may, to remain at his post. The inevitability of the collapse was painfully clear to him and to the officers of the Operations Sec. They continued to work out of a sense of duty, and without any hope.

I communicated this impression to Admiral CANARIS; the decision was reached NOT to inform ZEITZLER of the plans.

h) "In the course of the year 1943, particularly in the fall and winter, the determination to overthrow HITLER ripened. There were various ideas as to the methods of realizing this aim. For a long time it was hoped that an opportunity would present itself during one of HITLER's so-called "visits to the front" (FRONTREISEN). HITLER's visits usually carried him only as far as Army Group Hq. At Army Group Center as well as at Army Group SOUTH preparations for an assassination were made. It did not come to pass, because HITLER could no longer be persuaded to make a visit to the front. Thus the decision was gradually reached to bring about the overthrow of HITLER, and if possible also HIMMLER, in the FUEHRER Hq.

i) "In Jan 44 I was reported by a junior officer, O/LT BOECKEL, as having a suspicious political outlook. I was classified politically unreliable and, therefore, relieved on 1 Apr 44 of the BRANDENBURG Div command and placed at the disposal of the OKH. After I left BERLIN, I had no opportunity to witness the further unfolding of the plan. I was sent to a div commanders' course at HIRSCHBERG. Having been appointed CG 50 Inf Div on 1 July 44, I was on the Eastern front at the time of the attempted assassination on 20 July".

V. THE EVENTS OF 20 JULY, 1944

"In KUESTRIN, while under detention, I had occasion to speak to the following officers, HITLER's political prisoners like myself: OBST VON CANNSTEIN, Commandant of the Cav School, BROMBERG; MAJ VON HASSELT, son of the diplomat; and MAJ VON KLUGE, son of the Field Marshal. These three officers were apprehended just after me, and were able to give a detailed account of the attempted execution of the plan. The greatest part of the story, as far as I can recall, was told by OBST VON CANNSTEIN.

OBST GRAF VON STAUFFENBERG, as C of S to the Commander of the Replacement Army, had to report to the FUEHRER Hq to give an account on the state of the replacement forces. This report was to be delivered as part of the so-called situation conference (LAGEBESPRECHUNG) in which HITLER, KEITEL, JODL, ZEITZLER, WARLIMONT, and other officers took part daily. Often HIMMLER, and occasionally GOEBING were also present. STAUFFENBERG had no control over the appointment of the date for his report. On the designated day STAUFFENBERG flew in his private plane to the FUEHRER Hq at LOETZEN, East Prussia. He had with him large maps and special large graphs for his report, and also a briefcase with a strong explosive charge. After arriving at the FUEHRER Hq, STAUFFENBERG declared that before the conference he would have to go into the conference room to lay out his maps and graphs. Thus STAUFFENBERG had the opportunity, immediately before the conference, to go alone into the conference room. He spread his maps out on the table so that the view of the floor beneath the table was obstructed. Under the map table, protected from sight, he placed the briefcase with the explosive charge and probably a time fuze.

Since the situation conferences usually lasted several hours, and STAUFFENBERG was to be the last to report, it was not noticeable that he left the FUEHRER Hq at the beg of the conference. Without waiting for the explosion he flew back to BERLIN and there reported to GEN OLBRIGHT that the assassination was accom-

S E C R E T

S E C R E T

plished. Based upon this belief, the program proceeded further. All the prepared orders were given. These concerned first of all the taking over of the most important government offices in BERLIN and the arrest of the most important Party and SS members such as the higher-ranking SS police officials, GAULEITER, etc. GENOBST BECK tried at the same time to get in touch with the army groups by telephone. As I understand it, the following conversation took place:

GENLT KINZEL, C of S, Army Group NORTH, received the telephone call from BERLIN. A voice, probably that of STAUFFENBERG, said, "I am turning over the call to GENOBST BECK". GENOBST BECK then said, substantially, "I am not sufficiently informed regarding the details of the situation in the Army Group NORTH. However, I am giving you the following directions for the further conduct of the struggle: Take care that Army Group NORTH under no circumstances be cut off and lose contact with the REICH. If necessary the Army Group front must be withdrawn towards East Prussia". With these words the conversation ended. It can be assumed that GENOBST BECK, GEN DER INF OLBRIGHT, and OBST VON STAUFFENBERG gave numerous orders and directives in the same vein. Thus it was easy for the SD later to grab a high percentage of all officers connected with the case, since through the unhappy outcome of the attempted assassination practically all the cards were on the table.

I know that many officers who were not immediately apprehended, their nerves strained by mental uncertainty, sought and found death on the front or through suicide. This was the case of OBST VON VOSS, C of S, Army Group Center, and probably of HPTM VON KOEHNEN and HPTM Helmut PINKERT of BRANDENBURG Div. Some officers, such as MAJ VON HASSELT, are of the opinion that a high percentage of the officers involved in the plot were seized by the SD and that perhaps only one-fifth were ~~not~~. I personally know of only one, GENLT VON ROST, C of S, III Corps, in BERLIN, who was definitely involved in the preparations for the coup. Until recently he was OG HOCH-UND DEUTSCH WESTER Div on the Eastern front, EAST of VIENNA. At first instrumental in the plans for the overthrow of HITLER, he later got "cold foot" and stopped aside".

VI. RSHA PRISON, BERLIN

"On 1 Sept I was arrested by the SD, thrown into the RSHA Prison, BERLIN, PRINZ ALBRECHT STRASSE, and shackled. The prison cells were located along two corridors in the collar. I was confined to Cell No 13 from 1 Sept to 24 Nov. 30 single cells were occupied. In this SD prison I saw the following persons, some of whom I came to know personally, and others whom I know only by sight.

- i) REICHSMINISTER SCHACHT, Cell 4. Probably released Jan 45.
- ii) MINISTER POPITZ, Prussian Finance Minister. Probably hanged.
- iii) GENOBST HALDER, Cell 17. Probably now out of prison and in a concentration camp in MECKLENBURG.
- iv) GENOBST FROMM. Fate unknown to me, probably not hanged, but certainly still detained.
- v) The diplomat GRAF VON DER SCHULENBURG. Certainly sentenced to death, and hanged.
- vi) The diplomat, VON HASSELT, certainly hanged.
- vii) OBERBURGERMEISTER GOERDELER (LEIPZIG). Sentenced to death. He was bound hand and foot, then probably hanged. Cell 7 or 8.
- ix) GENMAJ OSTER, C of S, ABWEHR ABT, almost certainly subsequently hanged.

5

S E C R E T

S E C R E T

- x) OBSTLT GRAF VON KIELMANNSEGG, C of S in the Operations Sec, OKH. Confined near me in Cell No 12 for six weeks, then released because of insufficient evidence. Is supposed to have command of an armed regt now.
- xi) GENLT SPEIDEL, C of S, OBERBETRIEBSHABER WEST, under RUNDSTEDT and KLUGE. Detained only for a very few days. I met him again later in the KUESTRIN Fortress.
- xii) My personal friend, PRINZ ERNST AUGUST VON HANNOVER. Is supposed to have been released subsequently. He is probably with his parents in BLANCKENBURG/HARZ.
- xiii) The two personal adjutants of GENOBST ZEITZLER, - OBSTLT SMEND and the other, whose name is unknown to me. SMEND was to be hanged or shot later.

There were 32 small single cells in all, and during my stay at the prison most of them were continuously occupied. As soon as one occupant was hanged another was brought in.

About 200 to 300 persons were held in the prison of the Criminal Court in MOA-BIT, BERLIN. All of these were confined because of participation in the 20 July incident. Among these 200 persons were numerous other officers, members of the Foreign Office, economists, merchants, intellectuals. Another prison was located in FUERSTENBERG. In all the larger cities the jails were filled with similar personalities. These were all somehow involved, or suspected of having been involved in the 20 July affair. GENOBST ZEITZLER was probably also apprehended. His whereabouts are unknown to me. A BERLIN lawyer, whose name has escaped me, was asked for advice by my wife. This lawyer, who was well informed on these matters, told my wife that in his estimation about 25,000 persons had been arrested in connection with the 20 July incident".

VIII. FORTRESS OF KUESTRIN

"On 24 Nov I was transferred from the RSFA Prison to the KUESTRIN Fortress. Here the SCHLOSSKASERNE was designated as a concentration camp for politically unreliable officers. There were about 25 persons in KUESTRIN among whom I recall the following:

- i) GEN DER KAV VON ESEBECK; last assignment: Acting JG in VIENNA;
- ii) GENLT SINZIGER, Commandant of VIENNA;
- iii) GENMAJ VON STUELPNAGEL, Siegfried, discharged. Last assignment: Commandant of STETTIN.
- iv) GENLT SPEIDEL, C of S, OB WEST;
- v) MAJ VON HASSELT;
- vi) MAJ VON KLUGE, son of the Field Marshal;
- vii) OBSTLT HOEPPNER;
- viii) HPTM VON PAULUS, son of the Field Marshal;
- ix) OBST CANNSTEIN, Commandant of the Cav School, BROMBERG.

When the Russians stood before the gates of KUESTRIN on 30 Jan 45, the fortress of KUESTRIN was evacuated in panic, and many of the prisoners released in utter rashness. I myself was able to go home. The fate of the other officers

S E C R E T

S E C R E T

is not known to me. A new concentration camp for officers was to be set up in Central Germany, in the neighborhood of ERFURT, but I do not know whether these plans have been realized".

VIII. TREATMENT OF OFFICER PRISONERS

"After the 20 July Putsch GOERING approached HITLER and asked him to treat the arrested generals humanely and in a manner befitting their position. This request was rejected by HITLER in the roughest manner possible, and GOERING was thrown out together with his request. SS OBERGRUPPENFUEHRER (Lt Gen) Sepp DIETRICH (also ROMMEL?) reportedly supported this request. All three fell subsequently into disgrace."

IX. SEPP DIETRICH

"In KUESTRIN GENLT SPEIDEL told me the following: SS OGRUF Sepp DIETRICH had realized a long time ago that HITLER's policy and his methods of waging war would lead to a catastrophe. SPEIDEL told me that DIETRICH saw these things as they really were. It must be remembered that Sepp DIETRICH, as a unit commander, got his impressions directly from the front and from his contacts with many Army officers, - impressions completely different from those of HITLER, able only to estimate the situation from behind a desk. There exists mutual mistrust between HIMMLER and DIETRICH; HIMMLER felt that DIETRICH had grown too powerful and that he might become a dangerous rival in the future.


SPEIDEL described DIETRICH as an uneducated country yokel, but having sound common sense. I saw a chit of paper on which DIETRICH had written to SPEIDEL in fall of 44: "With cordial greetings, Yours, Sepp DIETRICH (and not HEIL HITLER)" (MIT KAMERADSCHAFTLICHEM GRUSS, IHR SEPP DIETRICH (UND NICHT HEIL HITLER)).

X. PERSONALITIES

- i) SONDEREGGER, - KRIMINALKOMISSAR, interrogator in RSHA Prison, BERLIN. Medium height, slim; narrow, wrinkled face. Brown hair, balding.. Slightly sloped shoulders. Southern dialect. Brown eyes. About 40 years old.
- ii) HUPPENKOTHE, - SS STUBAF (Col), interrogator in RSHA Prison, BERLIN. 1.80 m tall, Westphalian origin. Broad shoulders, slender, strongly built. Remarkably round head, round smooth cheeks. Large, slightly protruding blue eyes. Dark blond, thick hair. Swaying walk. About 30 years old.
- iii) KALTENBRUNNER, - SS OGRUF (Lt Gen), Chief of the SD. Medium height, broad shoulders, stocky. Large, fat hands. Dark blond, almost black hair. Talks quietly. Slight Austrian dialect.

10 April 1945.

SEVENTH ARMY INTERROGATION CENTER


PAUL KUBALA, Maj, MI,
Commanding.

7

S E C R E T