THE UKRAINIAN LIBERATION MOVEMENT

The Armed Conflict: Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA)

The Political Leadership: The Ukrainian Supreme Council of Liberation (UEVR)

The Importance of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationals (OUN)

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I. Introduction

This discussion is intended to contribute objective information about the Ukrainian people's independence struggle and freedom movement in the Ukrainian homeland. The author seeks to be as objective as humanly possible and to leave out personal opinions.

A better understanding of the present situation and development requires a brief outline of the history of the Ukrainian revolutionary movement and its organizations. Apart from factual reporting, polemical notes will be included in the discussion because so many distortions and so much contradictory information have been spread about the independence struggle and its organizations - The Ukrainian Supreme Council of Liberation (UHVR), the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA), and the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN). Hardly one political reporter can claim to have an accurate picture.

The natural question which arises is how has this happened?

a. First: The Ukrainian question is still unknown in the world in spite of the liberation struggle of the Ukrainian people for many years.

b. Second: Soviet Russians, Russian emigres, and also a large proportion of Poles who are enemies of an independent Ukraine and who do not believe a Ukrainian problem should exist intentionally spread falsified reports to distort and slander the independence struggle of the Ukrainian people.

c. Third: The Ukrainian emigration has not previously been capable of presenting an accurate picture of the struggle in the Ukraine, primarily because of partisan reasons. Each emigration party tried to draw a picture which would enhance its role.

This threefold falsification prevented the political public of the world from having a clear picture about the present struggle in the Ukraine.

The non-Ukrainian literature about the Ukrainian struggle during World War II and at present is very modest and one can barely form an accurate picture from it. A few published works are cited in the bibliography, but they are not able to clarify circumstances comprehensively. The absence of a non-Ukrainian edition of Mykola Lebed's UPA is regrettable as well as the fact that only the first part, which deals with the German occupation of the Ukraine, is available. Until now, the basic documents of the Ukrainian movement, the Platform, the Provisional Constitution and Proclamation of the UHVR, the leaflet What Does the UPA Fight For, and The Resolutions of the Third Extraordinary Great Congress of the OUN, have not been published in a foreign language.

Not only does the Ukrainian press bear the blame for this, but also the world press, the foreign language periodicals and the publishing houses. Even the serious newspapers are no exception in reporting the UPA's struggle only from the sensational standpoint.

Considering all these previous difficulties, the author seeks to fill a gap with a brief, but comprehensive picture of the Ukrainian independence movement's political concepts and structure. He has relied on his personal experiences and knowledge as well as documentary materials at his disposal.

Three Perspectives for a Consideration of the Ukrainian Question

Since the Ukrainian question is much too comprehensive to exhaust here, one of three possible approaches has been selected; namely, the political revolutionary underground and its result—the armed military struggle.

The other two approaches are: a) the official policy of the powers which have occupied the Ukraine, until 1939; the Soviet Union, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Romania, and since 1944 the Soviet Union alone, and the legal politics of individual Ukrainian parties, including the KP(b)U (the Communist Party of Bolsheviks of the Ukraine), and b) the standpoint of the emigration after World War I and II.
Since these last two approaches can contribute to a clarification of the whole Ukrainian problem they are not to be rejected. However, they constitute a chapter in themselves which can, in all frankness, obscure and even distort the present struggle in the Ukraine.

The promise of the future for the Ukrainian people hinges upon the strength of the political underground; therefore, the latter will always be the most important approach. The emigration can and will only play a secondary role, and if it fulfills this it will have done its duty for the fighting fatherland. The guiding principle of the Ukrainian independence movement which holds that foreign policy is a function of domestic policy means that the center of gravity of decision is in the Ukraine. Consequently, the emigration can only be the representative of the fighting homeland, not its responsible political leader.

The inevitable subjectivity which an approach to the independence movement from the standpoint of the homeland involves does not obscure the objective picture in any case. On the contrary, this approach gives a lively picture and the political observer gains a thorough insight into the complicated characteristics. This is unconditionally necessary for every proper political question and the Ukrainian question is a European political question per excellence.

II. A Survey of the Years 1917-1923

The following document is important in regard to Great Britain's relations with the Ukraine. It originated in December 1917 after the Ukrainska Tsentralna Rada, the revolutionary parliament which had arisen in March 1917, proclaimed the formation of a Ukrainian state on 19 November 1917 under the name of the Ukrainian People's Republic (Ukrainska Narodna Respublika):

"Representative of Great Britain
To His Excellency the President of the Council of Ministers
of the Ukrainian National Republic
Excellency!
I have the honor to inform you that His Britanic Majesty
has appointed me by wire as the sole accredited representative
of Great Britain in the Ukraine.
My government has instructed me to communicate the
assurance of its good will to you. It will, with all its
strength, support the Ukrainian Government's undertaking
of making a good government, of maintaining order, and of
combating the Central Powers, which are the enemies of
democracy and humanity. In that which concerns me particularly,
Mr. President, I have the honor of assuring you of my
full cooperation in the realization of our common ideal.

Picton Bagge
Representative of Great Britain
in the Ukraine."

Mr. Picton Bagge had previously been the British consul at Odessa. General Toubou, "Commissaire de la Republique Francaise", submitted a document of similar content to the Ukrainian government at the time. /Dmytro Doroshenko:
Istorinya Ukrainy 1917-1923 (History of the Ukraine 1917-1923), Part I. Time
of the Central Council, Uzhhorod, 1932, pages 234-236. Ukrainian. /

The Ukrainian People's Republic, whose Central Council declared its political independence and sovereignty on 22 January 1918, was unable to cultivate its relations with the Entente. It had to conclude a peace treaty with the Central Powers at Brest Litovk on 9 February 1918 because of the war with the Russian Soviet government of People's Commissars which had started on 17 December 1917. The Ukrainian national government only succeeded in liberating the country from the Russian Bolshevik invasion with the help of German troops.

Frictions and tensions between the Ukrainian government and the Oberkommande of Heeresgruppe Eshhorn arose almost immediately, even though the treaty of Brest had recognized the Ukrainian People's Republic and respect for its sovereignty
might have been expected. The German command removed the Social Democratic government, drove the Central Council apart, and favored a putsch by General Pavlo Skoropadsky. He took the historical title of hetman as head of the state. This period of Ukrainian history is verified by the German and Austrian documents which are published in the collection Zusarnmensbruch der Deutschen Okupation in der Ukraine (Collapse of the German Occupation in the Ukraine). In 1936 it appeared in Moscow in Russian, and in German in Strassburg.

After Germany’s collapse, a national uprising broke out in November 1918 against Skoropadsky’s government. The latter had in the meantime proclaimed the federation of the Ukraine with Russia.

Ukrainian political publicists and writers of memoirs still claim today that Skoropadsky’s proclamation followed the suggestion of Entente diplomats at Sofia and Jassy who made it a condition for negotiating. France and Britain’s attitude toward the Ukraine changed completely in the course of a year, and Paris and London no longer liked to hear about the missions of Petro Hayg and General Taboulis.

The National Directory, which took over the Ukraine after the victorious uprising, tried to awaken an understanding for Ukrainian aspirations of independence in the Entente. It pointed to the danger of the Bolshevik Revolution which sought to destroy its revolutionary aims with slogans about "the rights of nations to self-determination to the separation and formation of independent states." (This slogan was adopted in April 1917 by the VII Party Congress of Bolsheviks). However, at that time, the Entente supported Kolchak, Denikin, and other Russian generals who were unable to seize the weapon of the Bolsheviks either in their national concepts or social policy. On the contrary this policy was only grist for the Bolshevik mill, Lenin, Trotsky, and Stalin knew what use to make of the Entente’s mistakes by also claiming to fight for the national aims of people suppressed by Tsarism.

The Ukrainian National Directory with Simon Petlura at the head was left completely to itself in these fateful struggles; at the end of 1919 it had to clear the battlefield and seek an alliance with the newly created state of Poland, whose head, Pilsudski, had a great understanding of the danger from the east. In April 1920, Poland and the Ukraine concluded a treaty in conjunction with a military convention. A joint Ukrainian and Polish campaign led to the liberation of Kiev in May 1920, but it had to be abandoned soon and the joint armies had to clear the Ukraine. Poland deserted its Ukrainian ally in the peace treaty at Riga in 1921 when it recognized the Soviet government in the Ukraine. The regular war between the Ukraine and Moscow ended at that time.

There were only two ways in which the Ukrainian people could fight for their political independence and sovereignty in this situation:

a. To master the Ukrainian Soviet Republic from within by strengthening the Ukrainian element so that a separation from Russia would only be a question of time.

b. To continue the regular war with insurrections which would not allow the Soviet Ukraine to be stabilized and thereby prepare the people for a national revolution.

The Ukrainian National Communists, the left-wing Social Revolutionaries, and the Independent Social Democrats took the first way. Their efforts met a tragic end in the thirties when they all became a sacrifice of the purge and liquidation machinery.

Our discussion is only interested in the second way because it proved to be correct historically. Those who took the first way were by no means traitors to the idea of Ukrainian freedom and a Ukrainian state. While they tried to bring the Ukrainian people its social and national freedom, their tragedy lay in placing the social above the national. The year 1923 sealed the Ukrainian independence struggle politically and in international law. The Ukrainian Soviet Republic became a part of the USSR, while the Council of Ambassadors finally granted the west Ukrainian territories to Poland.
in March 1923.

III. The Ukrainian Revolutionary Underground Movement Between Both World Wars

The national insurrection against Skoropadski's government was only able to succeed because the National Directory had the Sich Riflemen, the best Ukrainian military unit, on its side. This unit, which was under the command of Evhen (Sugen) Konovalets, grew into a corps in the course of 1919.

Konovalets and his officers, seeing that the Polish-Ukrainian alliance could not bring the Ukrainian independence, resolved to wage the battle by other means. Individual uprisings broke out against the Soviet regime but they lacked unified military and political leadership. With the complete breakdown of the Polish-Ukrainian campaign, the officers of the Sich Riflemen considered it their duty to organize such a leadership.

The idea of an underground organization which arose at this time led to the founding of the VOGS (Voykova Organizatsiya Stishchiv Striltsy - Military Organization of Sich Riflemen) in Kiev, the capital of the Ukraine. Its main task was the unified leadership and coordination of armed insurrectionary actions. At the same time, the UVO (Ukrainska Voykova Organizatsiya - Ukrainian Military Organization) arose in Lvov (Lemberg) and conducted the revolutionary struggle against the Polish occupation. Both underground organizations were subordinated to the so-called "Riflemen's Council", which was headed by Colonel Konovalets.

The insurrectionary actions in the Ukraine did not last long. The Cheka eliminated the VOGS as a central institution and shot its leaders (Opoka and Andrukh). Actually the skilful policy of the Communist Party in the national and social fields, rather than the terror of the Bolshevik security police or Moscow's overwhelming military power, put an end to the insurrectionary action which continued in individual territories until 1924.

The so-called "Ukrainization period" deceived the masses into believing that the Ukrainian Soviet Republic was a Ukrainian state which could be enlarged into a national state. The somewhat liberal period of the NEP gave many the hope that the Communist economic system had to and would be modified under the pressure of realities. These two facts were the main reasons why every resistance movement in the Ukraine had to disintegrate and dissolve.

The underground movement felt compelled to pursue another tactic which involved the penetration of the state and Party apparatus. It had great success until 1932-1933 when Moscow struck a great blow at the "local" nationalists in the individual member republics. Already in 1929 the security police uncovered the SVU (Soyuz Vyzvolennya Ukhainy - Union for the Liberation of the Ukraine), made up of leading Ukrainian intellectuals, arrested its members, brought them to trial in the beginning of 1930, and condemned them to hard labor in Siberian concentration camps. At the same time, the police eliminated secret youth groups of the SVM (Spilka Ukrainskoj Molodi - Society of Ukrainian Youth). The so-called "Committee of Three" of the GPU condemned and executed thousands of arrested students and youths. Over 2000 young Ukrainians were shot in Kharkov, which was the capital of the Ukraine at the time.

Iona Kseniulovich Balytsky, the People's Commissar of the Interior in the Ukraine (chief of the GPU), gave a report to the Central Committee of the Ukrainian Communist Party (TAT VKP(b) U) in 1934 about combating the Ukrainian nationalist counter-revolution. He enlisted the following secret revolutionary organizations: The Ukrainian National Center, the Ukrainian Military Organization (UVO), the the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN). This was the second great blow to the Ukrainian underground.

The third occurred in 1936/1937 in connection with the great purges and liquidation which were carried out in the entire Soviet Union. At this time a ruthless liquidation of all national Communists, former Social Revolutionaries, and Social Democrats who had submerged into the Ukrainian Communist Party, took place. Many members of the Ukrainian resistance movement were also liquidated.
Between this wave of terror which Yeskov, the GPU People's Commissar, conducted and the outbreak of the Second World War in Eastern Europe in 1941, the Ukrainian underground was only able to maintain a very camouflaged existence. It must be admitted that the illegal network of this underground became very thin and had to be limited to individual persons in each town, and even then not in every town. But this underground outlasted the furies of Bolshevik terror.

In 1939, when the Soviet Union annexed the western Ukrainian territories of Galicia and Volynia, and in 1940 Bukovina and Bessarabia, OUN members established their connection with the illegal network.

From the UVO to the OUN:

After World War I, the territories of the Western Ukraine - Galicia, Volynia, Polesye, Polissya, Bukovina, Bessarabia, and the Carpatho-Ukraine fell to democratic or half democratic states like Poland, Romania, and Czechoslovakia. Thus, this gave the Ukrainian underground the opportunity to develop a kind of "state within a state" in spite of police pursuit.

The OUN, which was founded in 1920, changed from an organization of military conspirators to a political revolutionary movement under the influence of the masses revolutionized by it. It adopted the title Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) at the First Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists which took place in Vienna in February 1929. E. The Congress elected a leadership known as the OUN (Provid Ukrainskykh Natsionalistiv - Directorate or Leadership of Ukrainian Nationalists) which embraced members from the Eastern Ukraine, the Western Ukraine, and from the political emigration. Colonel E. Konovalets, the founder of the VOLS and the UVO, was elected head of the Provid (Holova Provodu).

Party headquarters were maintained abroad, while the OUN's press organ, Rozbudova Natsii (Construction of the Nation), a monthly periodical, was published at Prague for the years 1928-1934. Each part of the Ukraine which was occupied by a foreign power had a KE OUN (Krayeva Ekzekutyva - territorial executive committee): a KE OUN of the Western Ukraine in Poland, a KE of the Carpatho-Ukraine in Czechoslovakia, and a KE OUN of Bukovina and Bessarabia in Romania. The KE OUN of the Western Ukraine became the main foundation of the OUN's political activity. This was beneficial, in that the population of the Western Ukraine had an especially national consciousness and fully supported the OUN's political activity. On the other hand, it gave the OUN more and more of a Ukrainian character and an anti-Polish attitude which made it judge the situation in the Soviet Ukraine from this standpoint. This does not mean, however, that there were no connections between the Provid of the OUN and the underground in the Soviet Ukraine.

The revolutionary tensions reached such a high point in the Western Ukraine in 1930 that the Polish government felt compelled to intervene with the most brutal means to the so-called pacification action which embraced almost every Ukrainian town and village and aroused such attention abroad. The Polish action came before the League of Nations and resulted in a protest by members of the British Parliament headed by R. Davis.

1934 was another high point of revolutionary activity, the Polish police eliminated almost the whole of the OUN territorial executive committee of the Western Ukraine and carried out mass arrests among the population. Many Ukrainians were delivered to the newly constructed concentration camp at Bereza Kartuska. The police declared that its action was a reprisal against the attempt against the life of Colonel Bronialay Pieracki, the Polish Minister of the Interior. (The OUN declared in a pamphlet that the attempt was a punishment of the one chiefly responsible for the "pacification" of 1930).

A lawsuit against the KE OUN of the Western Ukraine in 1936 at Lvov followed a great lawsuit against numerous members of the KE OUN of the Western Ukraine for the attempt on Pieracki which took place in Warsaw in 1935. Both lawsuits, especially the stenographic and press reports in Ukrainian and Polish newspapers,
offer comprehensive material on the concepts and activity of the OUN.

The blows of the Polish administration and police could not paralyze the revolutionary activity of the OUN because the latter was too strongly rooted in the Ukrainian population and the political goals of the underground coincided with those of the people. The Polish policy of repression and extermination contributed to revolutionary agitation.

The importance of the Ukrainian underground grew not only in Poland but also in Rumania (a lawsuit was brought against the OUN members at Cernovray in 1937) and Czechoslovakia. The OUN contributed a great deal to the construction of the autonomous Carpatho-Ukrainian state in Czechoslovakia in 1938-1939. The "Karpatska Sich", which formed the basis for the Carpatho-Ukrainian army in March 1939, came into existence on the initiative of OUN members who occupied leading command posts. It was comprised primarily of OUN members who had resolved to resist an attack by the Hungarian Hohoveds.

The Death of the Leader of the OUN - Z. Konovalets

The building of communications between the Prohid of the OUN and the Soviet state led to the tragic death of Evhen Konovalets, the founder and leader of the UVO and the OUN, on 23 May 1938 at Rotterdam, Holland. A GPU agent who penetrated the OUN's lines of communication delivered a time bomb to Konovalets. Konovalets was the most striking personality of the Ukrainian independence movement between the two world wars. (Until now, the most comprehensive characterization of Konovalets appeared in the periodical Vyzvolna Politika, Volume II, No. 1-2 (11-12), January-February 1947, pages 17-25. V.P.B. "Evhen Konovalets - Attempt to Characterization." This article also clarifies the reasons for his murder at Rotterdam).

Colonel Andriy Melnyk became the successor of Konovalets. A. Melnyk, his closest collaborator at the time of the Ukrainian war of independence in 1917-1921 and chief of staff of the Sich Infantry Corps, took over the leadership of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) in October 1938 and was confirmed in this post by the Second (Great) Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists which took place in Rome at the end of 1939.

The following leading personalities of that time are identified: Colonel Evhen Konovalets, Omelan Hryhivsky-Senyk, Captain Riko Yary, Daytro Orlyk-Myron, Mykola Sciborsky, Daytro Andriyevsky, Kremiansky, Voldymyr Martynets, Zenon Kossak, Mykhyeyl Husar-Kolodisnky, Yaroslav Beranovski, Colonel Andriy Melnyk, Stefan Bandera, Ivan Babreusevich, Sydir Chuchman, Mykola Lebed, Yaroslav Starukh, Ivan Mitrings, etc.

IV. Two Years of Peace in Eastern Europe (1939-1941)

The Second Congress of the OUN took place shortly before the outbreak of the Second World War and balanced accounts for ten years of activity. The Prohid of the OUN saw in the approaching storm of war an opportunity to convert the Ukraine from an object into a subject of world politics. The first two years did not confirm these expectations. The Western Ukraine, which was the chief reservoir of Ukrainian revolutionary forces, fell to the Soviet Union through the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact of 23 August 1939 and was incorporated into the Soviet Ukrainian Republic after entry of Soviet troops on 17 September 1939. The Supreme Soviet of the Ukraine and the Soviet Union ratified the union on 1 November 1939.

This was a blow for the Prohid of the OUN which had not reckoned on such a development.

In all objectivity it must be said here that the Prohid of the OUN staked a great deal, though not everything, on the German card. This stake was, however, on the German, not on the National Socialist card. The OUN never entered into relations with the NSDAP, on the contrary they were always hostile to each other, as the documents which the Western Allies have on hand will confirm. The cause for this is difficult to explain since many German and Ukrainian documents are not available.
Perhaps their hostility may be explained by the fact that the goals of the OUN, which were neither racist or anti-Semitic, were diametrically opposed to those of the NSDAP. The OUN fought for the political independence and sovereignty of the Ukraine, while the NSDAP sought living space for the German people in Poland, White Ruthenia, and in the Ukraine. The OUN saw the chance of restoring the national Ukrainian state in the European war which had broken out. German policy required great caution because it made use of the Carpatho-Ukraine to make Poland more compliant, and later to tie Hungary to the German side and to play the Soviet Union against Poland. (See Stalin's speech to XVIII Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union on 10 March 1939, in which he compared the Carpatho-Ukraine to a mosquito to which one wished to annex the elephant of the Soviet Ukraine.)

In the summer of 1939 the Western Ukraine became a bargaining point to insure the neutrality of the Ukraine in the German-Polish war.

The younger elements of the OUN, especially those in the Western Ukraine, who bore the main burden of the struggle and who were determined to continue the stubborn struggle against the Soviet Union thought the caution well placed. On the basis of the foreign situation, the Provid of the OUN cautioned restraint.

The Crisis in the OUN

As a result of this attitude of the Provid of the OUN, a revolutionary opposition developed and selected as their spokesman Stefan Bandera (OUN district leader of the Western Ukraine in 1934, was sentenced to death in the Pierecki trials and the sentence was later commuted to life imprisonment) and Volodymyr Lopatynsky (this is a cover name) (he was the OUN district leader of the Western Ukraine in 1939).

The situation became worse. On 10 February 1940 a Revolutionary Command of the OUN was established and was given full responsibility for the underground movement in the Ukraine. In August 1940 it came to an open break which resulted in the formation of two Organizations of Ukrainian Nationalists and both groups started to fight each other. One was under the command of Bandera (called "Banderivtsi") and the other under Melnyk ("Melnykivtsi"). Although the crisis was of a political nature, personal ambitions of the two opponents played an important role. This split remains to this day and is being continued abroad among the emigrants.

The congress of the OUN in Krakow in March 1941, also designated the Second Great Congress, brought the OUN under the leadership of Stefan Bandera.

The Situation in the Ukraine

The OUN in the Western Ukraine, which continued its underground activity after the entry of Soviet troops, recognized the party leadership under Bandera because the latter's revolutionary attitude and political activity corresponded more to its own. The OUN used this opportunity to build up the weak communications with the national underground in the Western Ukraine. This was a difficult task because, since the formation of the Soviet Ukrainian Republic in 1921, a strongly guarded border existed between the various Ukrainian territories which could only be crossed with an official pass. Nevertheless, the OUN sent numerous emissaries into the Soviet Ukraine who either crossed the border illegally or went as workers to the industrial centers of the Donbas. The OUN also made contact with Ukrainians who came to the Western Ukraine as administrative officials and soldiers.

The nests of resistance in the Soviet Ukraine were strengthened. The most positive aspect of the new situation was the unified organization of the national underground which thereby added to its strength and revolutionary significance.

At the same time, the OUN tried to become active in foreign affairs for...
which the Finnish war offered an opportunity. Mykhaylo Kachmar, who was killed in the Ukraine in July 1944, travelled to Finland through Sweden as a delegate to the OUN to organize an action among the Soviet-Ukrainian prisoners of war. The Finnish Army command wanted an OUN delegation to establish contact with the Soviet Ukrainian regiments (¼ Soviet divisions) on the Finnish front, but the rapid conclusion of peace thwarted the dispatch of such a delegation. Kachmar tried to establish contact with the British in Stockholm through the Finns, but the British showed no interest in the Ukrainian question.

In the meantime the OUN, which had strengthened its illegal network, planned an insurrection in the Western Ukraine where the lines of communication between the Soviet Union and Germany ran. One must bear in mind the military importance of such an insurrection in 1940. The failure of Kachmar's mission in Stockholm and the complete disinterestedness of the British ruined this plan since it could not assure a success in foreign affairs. Furthermore, all signs pointed to a future armed conflict between Germany and the Soviet Union which would once more offer the chance of presenting the Ukrainian problem.

It should be emphasized here that only the OUN led the struggle against the oppressors of the Ukrainian people.

For a long time there had been no Ukrainian parties in the Soviet Ukraine. In order to remove the possibility of persecution of its members by the Bolsheviks, all parties like the UNDO (Ukrainske Natsionalne-Demokratyczne Czytelniki - Ukrainian National Democratic Union), the USF (Ukrainska Sotsialistichna Hidykline Partiya - Ukrainian Radical Socialist Party), the NNV (Narodno-Volynsky - Front of National Unity), etc. were dissolved. This political maneuver did not help and numerous members of these parties, including leading party politiisans, were banished to Siberian concentration camps. Many members, however, joined the OUN as the only party with a purposeful will from 1939-1941, through the German occupation of 1941-1944, and the return of the Russian Bolshevik occupation of 1943-1945. Subsequently it grew in extent. For this reason there is only one illegal Ukrainian party, which, however, does not pursue totalitarian tendencies nor a one party system. The OUN is fighting for a liberated Ukraine in which "freedom of the press, speech, opinion, conviction, faith, and world outlook" shall exist. The OUN fights "against the official imposition of philosophical doctrines and dogmas." (Cited from the OUN Program, Chapter 11, Point 10, paragraph 4, which was adopted by the Third Extraordinary Great Congress of the OUN meeting in the Ukraine 21-29 August 1943.)

The mistake of the party politicians in dissolving their parties rather than going underground became clear during the German occupation. At that time the organization of political leadership for the underground and the UPA, the resistance army, proved very difficult.

V. Will the Ukrainian Question Be Revived? - The War in Eastern Europe

When the German-Soviet conflict broke out on 22 June 1941, many Ukrainians, including some OUN members, falsely believed that Germany would solve the Ukrainian question as it had the Slovakian in the spring of 1939 and the Croatian in April 1941.

The Provi of the OUN under Bandera entertained no such illusions about the Germans and resolved to present them with accomplished facts. Since the OUN could not take the full responsibility for all future steps, it decided to form a representative Ukrainian National Committee (UNK), which the representatives of all former parties agreed to join with the exception of Melnyk's followers. Shortly before the outbreak of the war preparations were concluded for a congress to meet on 22 June 1941, not suspecting that this was the date for the outbreak of the war in Eastern Europe. It was a question of a congress of the political emigration and its party representatives.
The congress took place in Krakow and elected the following directors of the Ukrainian National Committee: General Vsesolod Petrov, President; Dr. Volodymyr Gorbony, First Vice-president; Professor Victor Andryjevski, Second Vice-president; and Professor Dr. Stefan Shukheveich, Secretary General. The following Ukrainian politicians also belonged to the Committee: Vasyl Madry, Mykola Lytvynsky, Dr. V. Yaniv, Ivan Pavlyk, etc. On 23 June a memorandum was presented to the Chancellery in Berlin demanding recognition of the natural rights of the Ukrainian people for their own independent state by the German government. Two days before, the leaders of the OUN submitted a memorandum of a similar content to the proper German ministries.

These memoranda remained unanswered because Nazi Germany had its own plans for the Ukraine and had no intentions of recognizing the rights of the Ukrainian people. Hitler's proclamation of 22 June 1941 did not mention nationalities of the Soviet Union, to say nothing of their rights.

The only possibility which remained for the leaders of the OUN was to face the German government with accomplished facts. In addition, it was necessary to unmask the imperialistic aims of the Nazis, since their complete war propaganda was built on the slogan "liberation from Bolshevism".

On 30 June a provisional Ukrainian government was formed in Lemberg (Lvov) and it proclaimed the restoration of the Ukrainian state. Since the plan called for the proclamation of the state government in Kiev, the Lemberg government bore the name "the territorial government of the Western Ukraine". This is what the Metropolitan Archbishop Andreas Count Sheptytsky called it in a pastoral letter of 1 July. Under the impact of the contemporary political situation, the territorial government became the provisional state government of the Ukraine in the following days. The Ukrainian population in the territories of Lvov, Drohobych, Rovno, Volhynia, Stanislaw, and Ternopil, as well as in some raions of the territories of Chernovtsi, Zhitomir, Vinnitsa, Kamenets-Podolski, Kirovograd, and Kiev demanded that the renaming be publicly announced.

On 30 June a provisional Ukrainian government was formed in Lvov and it subsequently proclaimed the restoration of a Ukrainian state.

The provisional government comprised the following members:

Chairman, for social and labor matters - Yaroslav Stetsko
First Deputy Chairman for health matters - Prof. Dr. Panabychyn
Second Deputy Chairman - Dr. Lev Rebet
Political Coordinator - Ivan Legenda-Klymin (a district leader of the OUN)
Foreign Affairs - Volodymir Stakhiv, his deputies: Dr. Kost Pankivski and Dr. Maritchak
Interior Affairs - Dr. Ivan Lysy
his deputy for Security Matters - Mykola Lebed
Military Matters - General Vsesolod Petrov
his deputies: Col. Miky Yary, Air Force
Maj. Roman Shukevich
Cpt. Aleksander Hasyn (or Gasyv)
Agriculture and Food Procurement - Eng. Eugen (Evhen) Khraplyvy
Forestry - Eng. Piasetski
Economy, Industry and Trade - Prof. Eng. Yulian Pavlykovski
Deputies: Eng. Dmytro Yasiv and Roman Ilnytski
Finance - Olkhovy
Information, Propaganda, and Press - Hay Holovko
Deputy: Yaroslav Starukh
Education and Culture - Prof. Dr. Volodymyr Razdeykevich
Deputies: Representative of the Orthodox Church (name unknown)
Father Prof. Dr. Havryl Kostelnyk (Catholic Church)
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Prof. Turayn (for universities)
In addition there were two members of the government whose names are not known: one for transportation and one for postal service.

The German government, which considered the formation of a Ukrainian govern-
ment provocative, decided to liquidate the Lvov "coup". Heinrich Blümner, who was commissioned with the liquidation, brought the leading members of
the government to Berlin. Here they were put under some pressure to renounce
the proclamation about the recreation of the Ukrainian state and the Ukrainian
Government. The Germans resorted first to arrest and then imprisonment in
concentration camps when their demand was absolutely rejected at the beginning
of August. On 15 September 1941, the Gestapo made mass arrests of OUN members
in the Ukrainian territories already occupied by the Wehrmacht. First it sent
the prisoners to prisons in Lvov, Krakow, and Berlin and later to the concen-
tration camps of Sachsenhausen and Auschwitz. Stefan Bandera, who was arrested
on 27 June and detained first at Krakow and then Berlin, was kept under strict
guard and in isolation at the concentration camp of Sachsenhausen until
27 September 1944.

Also arrested were Y. Stezo, V. Stakhiy, L. Rebet, R. Yary, Piasetski
(shot in Lvov in 1942), E. Yaev (died in Auschwitz), I. L. Klymiv (arrested
in Lvov and tortured to death), and R. Ilnytski.

The Ukrainian question was opened, but the Ukrainians stood on the front
against Nazi Germany.

VI. The New Situation in Eastern Europe and the New Tasks of the Ukrainian
Revolutionary Movement

Gathering of New Revolutionary Forces

Mykola Lebed writes about this new period of the Ukrainian Revolutionary
movement in the book The Ukrainian Insurgent Army, page 16:

"The Ukrainian independence movement and its political carrier, the OUN,
entered into a new phase of the struggle in combating the German occu-
pation. Widespread revolutionary underground activity with the aim of mobilizing
the masses around the idea of political independence distinguished this
period. An open fight was impossible and useless for the following
reasons:

a. The entire territory had to be cleared of Bolshevik agents so that the
latter could not capitalize on the struggle for independence.
It was not waged against the Germans to facilitate the return of
Bolshevism and the Stalin dictatorship.

b. The Ukrainian masses, who had hoped for liberation from Bolshevism
and the creation of an independent state, were not yet prepared for a
direct struggle. First they had to recuperate from the Bolshevism
terror, to organize, and to learn to know the new occupier, his
system of domination, and his methods.

c. Under the Bolshevik occupation the leading cadres of the Ukrainian
people and the OUN had suffered important losses. When the Bolshe-
viks retreated they had butchered tens of thousands of Ukrainian
prisoners.

d. After the blow of the Bolsheviks and the Germans, the OUN had to
reorganize, increase its strength, and adopt tactics and organizational
methods to the mentality and methods of the new occupier."

Mykola Lebed, who was a member of the provisional Ukrainian government and
at the same time Deputy Chairman of the Provid of the OUN under the German
occupation, succeeded in evading arrest by the Germans.

At this time the command of the hour for the Ukrainian underground was "Gathering
of New Forces."
During the second half of September 1941, the First Party Conference of the OUN took place under the chairmanship of Mykola Lebed. The situation in the Ukraine was discussed, and the provisional OUN government of M. Lebed was confirmed, and the following guiding principles for the immediate future were adopted: a. The infiltration of lower administrations with nationalistic Ukrainians in order to continue the activities of the Ukrainian state government; b. the dispatch of leading members of the OUN into the territories of the former Soviet Ukrainian Republic in order to contact the Ukrainian underground movement there; c. the dissolution of the kolkhozy and sovkhozy, and the storage of grain for the Ukrainian population in order to prevent famines; d. the securing of printing presses and manning editorial staffs with reliable Ukrainians in order to utilize the press for furthering the idea of an independent Ukraine; e. active resistance against the delivery of grain to the Germans; f. enlightening the population about the forced deportation of workers to Germany; g. educational preparation and activities for the active battle against the German occupation together with simultaneous measures against any efforts for restoration of Bolshevism in the Ukraine; h. the collection of weapons and ammunition for an armed conflict against the German occupation forces and if necessary also against Bolshevik Russians; and i. supplementing the party program and political principles of the OUN with the political and social advances of the Ukrainian people achieved under the Bolshevist regime.

These resolutions which were adopted by the party conference show the departure from the illegal and political activity of the OUN. All activities were directed toward the preparation for an armed struggle and the defense of the Ukrainian people against the German despotism and the repetition of the Bolshevist terror regime. The decision on point i. proves that the OUN will adapt itself to the conditions in the Eastern (Soviet) Ukraine.

As has already been mentioned, in the course of its development the OUN adopted in part a Western Ukrainian character and was an outspoken nationalist party in its political program. This may have been sufficient for the Western Ukraine where the feeling of nationality was very pronounced. It was not, however, sufficient for the Eastern Ukraine where the population was already politically conscious of a Ukrainian state, and asked for a precisely formulated description of the nature of an independent national Ukrainian state. Words about the national struggle of independence did not suffice. They demanded accurate information about the construction and social structure of such a state. If the OUN wanted to mobilize all the people for the Independence struggle, it had to meet the demands of the people.

The Second Party Congress of the OUN in 1942

The Second Party Conference of the OUN took place in April 1942 and its resolutions dealt with the following:

"We base our policy on the following:

a. On the formation and extension of our own revolutionary forces, both political and military.

b. On a policy of revolutionary struggle which is dependent on no one.

c. We oppose the Russian-Bolshevist foreign policy concept of the international, and the German idea of a so-called "New Europe" with the international concept of a just, national, political, and economic new order in Europe based on the principle of free national states conforming to the solution 'freedom for all peoples and men.'

d. We emphasize the idea of an independent Ukrainian state for which the Ukrainian people have sought constantly as a necessity. Only a just solution of the Ukrainian question can establish the
balance of power in Eastern Europe and guarantee a free life to
the nations oppressed by Moscow.

VII. We regard the so-called agrarian reform as an economic maneuver
designed to divert the Ukrainian people from their struggle for their
own government by securing the power of the German occupation with the
help of a supposed measure of liberation. The so-called agrarian reform
does not serve the interests of the Ukrainian peasantry, but the
exploitative and practical aims of the Germans who wish to obtain as
much bread and labor power as possible.

XXI. We conduct a critique of the German economic system by means of
the enlightenment of the masses and by combatting the opportunists
and the servants of slavery . . . . .

XXIV. We connect the criticism of German colonial policy in the central
and eastern territories of the Ukraine with the combatting of the
Russian Bolshevism influences and the partisan mischief instigated by
Russian imperialism..."

It should be added in explanation that the OUN was completely absorbed in
the extension of a thick network of underground organizations since it knew
that only unified actions of resistance could lead to success. For this
reason the OUN had to take a strong position toward the partisan mischief.
The OUN was not interested in the collapse of German imperialism, but in
the restoration of an independent Ukrainian state. The OUN held that there
was still time enough for an armed attack on the German occupation. Besides
the Ukrainian underground had no wish to pull the hard pressed Stalin's
chestnuts out of the fire.

Mention of the agrarian reform referred to Rosenberg's decree of 16 January
1942 about the new agricultural order in the eastern occupied territories.
Practically, it only involved a change of name from kolkhoz to "Gemein-
d景色chaften". The Deutsche Ukraine Zeitung (German Ukraine
Newspaper) declared that the reform "should in the first place guarantee a maximum
of agricultural achievement."

The ordinance about compulsory labor service of 19 December 1941 was designed
to increase considerably the Ukrainian labor forces for the German war
industry.

Since the agrarian reform provided the legal basis for the robbing of the
village population and the labor ordinance the pretext for man hunts to
augment the number of deported workers in Germany, the OUN had to organize
the Ukrainian masses against the consequence of both.

The OUN joined national political tasks with practical actions in the
economic and social field.

Since this discussion is limited to the contribution of a better insight
into the political and organizational construction of the Ukrainian inde-
pendence movement, no detailed picture of the Nazi and Bolshevik occupation
can be given. That is why the terrorist actions of German security and
occupation forces and the Ukrainian counter-measures must be omitted.
The system of terror in the Ukraine was the same as in the rest of Europe,
only perhaps more cruel.

VII Out of Nothing Grows a Resistance Army - the UPA

The Ukrainians had more difficulty organizing an underground army than any
other European nation. In Europe there was recourse to the military ex-
periences of former officers, to their professional knowledge and to an in-
tact officer's corps. The Ukrainians only had a few reserve officers at
their disposal apart from a few revolutionary fighters with sufficient
military talents.

While other European nations could count on material, moral, military, and
political support from the freedom loving Allies, the Ukraine had to rely

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on its own strength.

The Ukrainian people did not lack the will to fight, even though their immediate future was not as hopeful as that of the other European nations who had no foreign occupation to fear after the defeat of the Germans. The Ukrainians had to count on a continuation of the struggle for independence against the Bolshevik dictatorship after the end of World War II.

Unlike the West, the Ukrainian people never let themselves be deceived by the democratic and anti-imperialist phrases emanating from Moscow.

In spite of all these difficulties, one of the most powerful resistance armies of Europe, which could hardly be surpassed by any other, arose in the Ukraine.

Since the aim of this discussion is to present a political survey of the Ukrainian independence movement, a detailed description of the construction of the resistance army and of its operational and tactical effects would be pointless.

The First Armed Clashes

Already during the last few months of 1941 the OUN organized small armed groups which acted as body guards of individual revolutionaries, since every request for surrendering identification cards by German security patrols (SD) could be answered only with shots. Individuals no longer let themselves be captured without resistance as happened during the first half of September. However, there were not many armed clashes because the members of the OUN avoided encounters with those patrols or they managed to obtain freedom of movement through other means (forged identification papers, march orders, etc.).

After the Second Party Conference of the OUN took place and the resolutions and directives of the conference were distributed over the country, increased terror measures of the SS were to be expected. Organized resistance against the forced deportation of laborers to Germany caused an increase in the number of persons having to go into hiding. The number of troops of the OUN increased and armed clashes became more frequent. By spring 1942 the number of these troops grew to such an extent that an unorganized and uncoordinated revolution was feared. The wooded areas of Volynia, formerly in Poland, and at the 1939 border of the Soviet Ukraine, offered particularly good hiding places for these troops which were organized into larger sections, into so-called military units of the OUN (Vyzvaki Viddly OUN). Small scale engagements of these units were avoided, because a still further weakening of the fighting spirit of the Soviet Union was awaited.

The time for an open armed struggle came in the summer of 1942 when the conflict between the agricultural Sonderfuehrer and the Ukrainian peasants over the harvest broke out. The peasants, supported by the "people in the woods", followed the directives of the OUN and refused to make grain deliveries. The militia units which the German administration sent against the "Ukrainian Torreads" and recalcitrant villages joined the resistance movement with their arms. Thereupon, the Germans sent Polish police units from the Generalgouvernement, organized Sonderabteilungen composed of Poles from Volynia, and dispatched Russian units. The day was cast for an armed struggle.

The OUN command took the initiative in the formation of a military general staff consisting of former Ukrainian officers of the 1917-1921 Ukrainian army as well as of the Polish and Soviet Army. All "battalions of the woods" and the military units of the OUN were subordinated to this general staff and received the same designation: Ukrainian Insurgent Army (Ukrainska Povstanska Armia - UPA).

On 14 October 1942 the first open battle took place and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army received its baptism of fire.

Colonel Savur took over the command of the Northern UPA Group and Colonel

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Stupnytski became his chief of staff. The latter was a general staff officer of the Ukrainian People’s Republic (UPR) Army between 1917-1921, and was promoted to general in 1944. He and Col. Savur were later killed during the battle against the Bolsheviks.

The combat area of the Northern UPA Group included the districts of Volhynia (Lutsk, Roza, Zhitomir) and Polesye (Pinsk and Brest-Litovsk).

In 1943 the following combat areas of the UPA were established:

a. UPA Group East (regions: Kamenets-Podolski, Vyshnytsya, and Kiev)

b. UPA Group South (regions: Bukovina and Odessa)

c. UPA Group West (Galician regions: Stanislav, Lvov, Ternopol, Drohobych, and, since 1945, also the Carpatho-Ukraine).

During 1945 the UPA Group Westmark was formed and it embraced the territory west of the Curzon Line in Poland. It was dissolved in spring 1948 after the Ukrainian population was deported from the territories west of the San and the Bug Rivers and the West-Beskids.

The names of the commanders of these UPA groups are not listed because it has not been established whether they are still active or died in battle.

High Command of the UPA

The military general staff was later transformed into the High Command of the UPA, which was headed by Colonel Taras Chuprinka (a pseudonym). 4./

Chuprinka was promoted to general by the Presidium of the Ukrainian Supreme Council of Liberation (VUHR) on 19 February 1946, effective 22 January 1946.

Chief of the general staff was Major Perehyms who was killed on 1 November 1945 and posthumously promoted to general.

The UPA issued the following political thesis to the underground army entitled: What Does the UPA Fight For?

"The UPA fights for an Independent United Ukrainian State (Samostiyne Oboryna Ukrainy) and together with other oppressed peoples fights for independent national states on their own territories. We recognize the right of every people - Poles, Czechs, Russians, and others - to their own state in their own borders. We only fight against imperialists and their servants. The UPA defeats all those who seek to subjugate the Ukraine in one way or another."

Further on in the thesis we read:

"Peasants, workers, and intellectuals in the ranks of the UPA fight against the oppressors for national and social liberation, for a new state order, and for a new social order in the Ukraine.

They fight for the destruction of the Bolshevik kolkhozy and the German Gemeinschaften, for land for the peasants without compensation, for a free economy, and for the free use of the products of labor.

They fight for the national-state ownership of large industry and cooperative ownership of small industry.

They fight for the participation of workers in the factory managements and for the professional but not party commission principle in the management.

They fight for the respect of the intellectual professions, for the creation of material conditions which will enable the intellectual to dedicate himself to cultural activity without worrying about the future and the fate of his family, and for working conditions which will enable him to enrich his knowledge and to raise his cultural milieu.

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They fight for the freedom of the press, speech, religion, and philosophy and against the imposition of doctrines or dogmas.

They fight for the right of national minorities to cultivate their national culture...

"...We fight to have every nation live freely in its independent state, for the abolition of national oppression and exploitation, and for the political system which can lead to a solution of the national and social question in the whole world, a system of free national states.

"...We shall only achieve victory with a national Ukrainian revolution involving an armed struggle. That is why no one can stand aside and only observe and wait."

These new principles which were adopted by men who decided on an open and armed fight were new in the Ukrainian liberation movement particularly if compared with the resolutions of the First (Vienna), Second (Rome), and Second (sic) (Krakov) Congresses of the OUN.

In the years 1929, 1939, and 1941 the ideology of the OUN was extremely nationalistic, strongly leaning on other European national movements (Italy, France, Germany, and Belgium). It clearly had authoritarian and even totalitarian tendencies.

The new political program originated in the struggle with the two authoritarian and totalitarian powers and this struggle had to be executed not only physically but first of all ideologically. The UPA thesis, What Does the UPA Fight For?, was a complete re-evaluation of previous axioms which it appeared were not to be shaken. This was the consequence of two underground movements, one of which had existed in the totalitarian reality of the Soviet Union and the other in the territories of the Western Ukraine, growing into each other. The first rejected totalitarianism in every form even if it came from the right and pledged itself to a democratic constitution and a just social order. The second was only filled with the spirit of a national idea and did not concern itself with constitutional and social questions. Under the impact of a struggle against the totalitarian terror of a nationalistic occupation power and against the propaganda for the return of a Communist colored authoritarian regime of Russian imperialism, a political, national, social, and cultural program was developed which conformed to the democratic traditions of the Ukrainian people.

The ideas of the UPA found a mighty response in the Ukrainian working population and among the idealistic youth, demonstrating that a correct step had been taken. Thus, the UPA became a political-military force of the Ukrainian people. In its new development the OUN only had political tasks to fulfill, which became specially apparent in the decisive year of 1943.

VIII. The Year 1943 in the Ukraine

The Third Party Conference of the OUN took place on 17 - 23 February 1943, at which time directives for an open armed conflict were laid down.

The following are extracts from these resolutions:

"Article 1: The present war in the east which was unleashed in the interests of German National Socialism and Russian Bolshevism is being conducted for reactionary and anti-popular purposes; namely for the colonial exploitation and plundering of people and countries. This brings with it a moral, economic, social, and political exploitation and subjugation; in other words a complete suppression and subjugation of people and nationalities. This war is especially being fought for the possession of the Ukraine, which is considered by both German and Russian imperialism as the central goal of their expansion policy in Eastern Europe and as the base for further aggression."
"Article 6: The Ukraine is at present between the hammer and anvil of the two opposed imperialistic powers from Moscow and Berlin; both consider the Ukraine as their colonial territory....."

Article 22: We recognize that only organized armed efforts of the Ukrainian people... can lead to the restoration of a Ukrainian state...

"Article 24: The execution and realization of our revolutionary liberation plans and aims of our struggle for an Independent United Ukrainian State... required and continue to require the task to strengthen and expand new centers of organized might of the people".

This conference of the OUN confirmed herewith the initiative of the party leadership in the formation of a special military organization for armed resistance, the establishment of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA).

During the first half of 1943 the UPA experienced rapid growth: eager and able-bodied young Ukrainians, coming from all classes and all regions, streamed into the forests of Volhynia. Large areas were liberated from the German administration and the UPA had to set up its own civil administration. This task, too, was mastered. So-called "UPA Republics" were formed where the entire life of the Ukrainian population (administration, economics, education, church, printing press, health service, etc.) was under the supervision of the UPA and its various organs.

Numerous publications, appearing either periodically or non-periodically, were issued. To enumerate them all would take an entire chapter. Only the most important ones are given here:

a. Povstanets (The Revolutionary) - organ of the press department of the UPA.

b. Idnya i Chyn (Idea and Action) - organ of the party command of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN), the then leading organ of the Ukrainian underground movement.

c. Za Samostiyu Ukrainu (For an Independent Ukraine), organ of the regional headquarters of the OUN for the eastern and central districts of the Ukraine.

d. Za Ukrainsku Derzhavu (For the Ukrainian State), organ of the regional headquarters of the OUN for the western district of the Ukrainian revolutionaries.

e. Perets (Pepper) - a satirical publication of Ukrainian revolutionaries,

Later, in 1944, there also appeared the publication Visnyk (Gazette) as the organ of the Presidium of the Ukrainian Supreme Council of Liberation (UNH), which, in 1945, was renamed Zamostiyist (Independence) and which continues to the present.

In addition there were numerous printed and mimeographed leaflets, daily reports, radio broadcasts, and propaganda pamphlets.

The Third Extraordinary Great Congress of the OUN

The Third Extraordinary Great Congress, which met from 21-25 August 1943 under the protection of armed UPA units, made accounts of the previous activity of the OUN, confirmed party leadership's activity, and made the resolutions of the three party conferences its own. These resolutions were elaborated, made more exact, and extensively interpreted.

The Congress made many changes in the party, the most important of which was the substitution of a three member party bureau for the former party leader. This bureau (bureau of the Provid), which was completely responsible to the party executive committee, was to make decisions between the meetings of the committee, which was itself responsible to the party conference or the congress. This finally eliminated any trend for a...
leadership principle which some OUN circles sought to establish. New
men, who had distinguished themselves in political and armed struggle,
were elected to the bureau, while the former deputy chairman of OUN
retired. In November 1945, Taras, a member of the bureau, met a hero's
death.

In addition, the Congress adopted a new party program which, in the
introduction, is called an "achievement of the theory and practice of the last
two years." Also included in the introduction to the party program is
the following:

"The idea of the new society is the free man. Even though a free
act is the fundamental impulse of social life, it cannot be directed
towards personal material interests and lead to the exploitation
of other free men as happens, for example, in the capitalist system."

These principles greatly resemble the fundamental thesis of What Does
the UPA Fight For? of October 1942. A few points are cited for compari-
son:

I

1. "The OUN fights for an Independent United Ukrainian State and so
that all people can live a free life in their own independent state.
The abolition of national oppression and exploitation of one people
by another, and a political system of free people in their own
independent states is the only order which will bring a just solution
of the national and social question in the whole world.

5. The OUN is for the complete liberation of the Ukrainian people
from the Bolshevist Russian and German yoke and for the creation of
a Ukrainian state without large landowners, capitalists, as well as
Bolshevik commissars, NKVD executioners, and Party parasites (party
bosses)."

II

"Peasants, workers, and members of the intelligentsia fight in the
ranks of the OUN against the oppressor, and for the Ukrainian state,
for national and social liberation, and for a new state and social
order.

1. They fight for the destruction of the Bolshevist and German system
of serfdom in economic organization. Operating on the principle
that the soil is the property of the people, the Ukrainian government
will not impose a uniform system of farming. The question of individ-
ual or collective farming will be left to the will of the population."

The program for the workers was almost indistinguishable from the UPA
thesis of 1942. The workers should "participate in the management of an
enterprise, "every labor can only be done voluntarily," for which the worker
shall receive a just wage, and the workers shall have a share in the
profits of an enterprise."

The program of the OUN insists upon free trade unions and the abolition
of the Stakhanovite system. Handicraft shall be free and the craftsmen
shall have the right to unite voluntarily in handicraft artels.

Only small trade shall be private; large trade shall be nationalized
and medium trade cooperative.

The party program, which was worked out in detail, had the following
to say about the rights of citizens. The OUN fights for:

"10.
 a. For freedom of press, speech, thought, religion, and world out-
look; against the official imposition of philosophical doctrines
and dogmas."
b. For the freedom of worship, in so far as it does not conflict with social morality.

c. For the separation of church and state.

d. For cultural relations with other peoples, for the right of all citizens to travel abroad for the purposes of vacation, study, and to become acquainted with the life and cultural achievements of other peoples.

11. For the full right of national minorities to cultivate their own culture.

12. For the equality of all Ukrainian citizens regardless of their nationality in all political and civic rights and duties and for the equal right of all to work, income, and recreation.

Some Europeans might consider this program dated because many of its demands have been achieved in Europe, but for a nation which has only known a system of totalitarian dictatorship for over 25 years, the points in the program are fighting slogans. The introduction to the program says among other things: "A program must also be a mighty weapon which must lead to the increase of our powers and facilitate our victory." The long resistance of the Ukrainian people and the resistance movement demonstrate that the idealistic principles of this resistance have the power to mobilize and to infuse the people with an enthusiasm for such a struggle.

Fighting slogans joined with the honest conviction that they can be realized guarantee the victory of people struggling with total tyranny. The idea of freedom is indivisible and it must be realized in personal, political, national, social, and economic areas of life.

Preparation for the Fight Against the Return of Bolshevism

The Third Extraordinary Great Congress of the OUN is a symbol of the increased power and importance of the OUN on the one hand and of the withdrawal of the German occupation and likewise the advance of the Soviet Army on the other hand. The problem now was to prepare for an even more difficult struggle, to arm oneself for it morally and ideationally, and to organize more tightly politically.

The strength of the OUN and its combat operations assumed such a volume that one political organization could not carry alone the full responsibility for this armed conflict. The battle for independence and national freedom was not to become the concern of one political organization for it had already become the concern of the entire Ukrainian population. Thus, a solution had to be found for the assumption of the political responsibility. A national resistance center comprising all political factions had to be formed. Unfortunately, there were no longer any other parties in the Ukraine; some of them were obliterated in the 25 year struggle against the Bolshevist regime in the Eastern Ukraine and formed a united underground movement, while others - in the Western Ukraine - were disbanded in 1939. There did exist in the Ukraine the semi-illegal OUN group under A. Melnyk which, however, following extended negotiations, refused to set up such a united resistance center. The reason for this refusal was that the group desired to continue its fight only under the anti-Bolshevist banner and it displayed a very reserved attitude with respect to the continuation of the fight against the German occupation. At the beginning of 1944 the leading personalities of this group were arrested by the Gestapo. The group had not profited from its reserve. In addition, there was also a small illegal group of the Ukrainian People's Party operating in Volhynia. The negotiations with this group unfortunately led to no success either.

IX. The Ukrainian Supreme Council of Liberation (UHVR) and Its Aims

In the summer of 1943 the Soviet Army began its attack for the reconquering of the Ukraine, and, by autumn, reached the Dniepr River. At the beginning of November Kiev, the capital of the Ukraine, fell, and all oblasts located on the left bank of the Dniepr River were reoccupied by the Soviet Army.
The UPA, operating in the wooded area in the western part, i.e., in the "oblasta" located on the right bank of the Dniepr River, found itself between the hammer and the anvil. This was the start of the two-front warfare with all its fateful consequences. But there was no alternative for the UPA. The continuation of the struggle against the retreating German armies gave it the moral-political strength to resume also its fight against the Moscow regime. It knew that the Ukrainian people would follow it in this heavy struggle.

Toward the end of 1943 the wooded Carpathian region, too, became a combat area of the UPA. The UPA units which were formed here were subordinated to the command of the Western UPA Group.

The Germans fought the UPA units with foreign troops: units of the legions of eastern people (Turkestansians, Uzbeks, Turkmen, Kazakhs, Azer-baidzhanians, Armenians, Georgians, Tatars, etc.) as well as regiments of the Central-European Allies, predominantly Hungarians. The command of the Northern UPA Group in Volynia established contact with these anti-partisan units, and as the result of skillful explanations, these foreign soldiers deserted to the UPA in large numbers and formed autonomous foreign units within the UPA. The Hungarian regiments displayed a benevolently neutral attitude, concluded a "non-agression pact" with the UPA and even assisted it with weapons. The situation was similar as to the Romanian regiments in the combat area of the Southern UPA Group.

All these facts - in internal and foreign politics - enabled the High Command of the UPA to grasp the initiative, to resume negotiations with the existing Ukrainian political circles (as mentioned previously, parties no longer existed) in order to form a representative central political organ of the Ukrainian resistance. The High Command secured the full assistance of the GPU whose leadership declared its readiness to follow the commands and directives of such a central body. Negotiations were carried on with the following circles: The Christian-Clericals, Monarchists, Christian-Socialists, National-Democrats, Socialists, Social-Revolutionaries, and the Social Democrats. They ended in complete success. Each of these circles sent delegates to a committee whose task it was to arrive at a political platform and to establish the constitution of such a political center of resistance. It was agreed upon to direct a proclamation to the Ukrainian people.

All representatives agreed that the struggle against the German occupation must be continued, even though the Soviet Army had occupied more than half of the Ukrainian territory. The risk of a two front war had to be taken to bring the independence struggle to a successful conclusion, because neutrality towards the Germans would have taken UPA's weapon against Bolshevism away.

The Founding Congress

The secret congress of representatives of all Ukrainian political groups, which were determined to fight actively for liberation, opened on 15 July 1944. Representatives from all Ukrainian regions were present. UPA detachments guarded the safety of this meaningful congress.

The outcome of the congressional work was the formation of the Ukrainian Supreme Council of Liberation (Ukrainska Holona Vyzvolna Rada) as the "supreme organ of the liberation fight of the Ukrainian people" in the words of the Proclamation.5/

The council elected a permanent Presidium headed by a president which had the task of making important decisions, otherwise left for the congress, during the periods between congressional meetings. Representatives of all political groups were elected to the Presidium. The Presidium suggested congressional approval of the chairman of the Council of Secretary-Generals (of the executive organ of the UHHR). He appointed the individual secretary-generals; such as, for military affairs, foreign affairs, internal affairs, finance, etc. The Supreme Commander of the UPA, General Taran Chuprinka, became Secretary General for Military Affairs. Mykola Lebed became Secretary General for Foreign Affairs, and Rostyslav Voloshyn-Pavlenko, who
was killed later in 1944, was appointed for Internal Affairs. The names of
the other secretary-generals cannot be mentioned for security reasons.

The Ukrainian Supreme Council of Liberation addressed a Proclamation
(called "Universal" in Ukrainian) to the Ukrainian people which was dis- 
tributed on both sides of the eastern front by soldiers of the UPA and by
members of the Ukrainian resistance.

The Proclamation stated the following among other things:

"The UHVR places the following vow in your hands, Ukrainian people. 
To fight so that you will be the only master on your soil. 
To fight for a just social order without oppression and exploitation, 
for the destruction of serfdom, and for the free labor of the Ukrainian 
peasant on his soil. 
To fight for the free labor of the workers, for the broad initiative 
of the working population in all fields of economic activity, and for 
the full development of Ukrainian national culture."

The UHVR had the following to say about its origins:

"Various freedom loving revolutionary forces and various political 
actions from all Ukrainian provinces have united in the UHVR. They 
consider the political platform of political independence as the only 
proper one.

The UHVR is the highest and the only governing organ of the Ukrainian 
people during the period of its revolutionary struggle, until the 
organization of a government of an Independent United Ukrainian 
State.

The Ukrainian underground printed this Proclamation on the anniversary of 
the founding of the UHVR in July, and distributed it in all Ukrainian 
territories. This Proclamation, which was especially widely distributed 
after the Second World War upon the return of Soviet troops from Central 
Europe, is not only well known in the Ukraine but all over the Soviet Union.

The political Platform circumscribed the goals and tasks of the UHVR as 
follows:

1. "To unite and coordinate all independent forces of the Ukraine within 
   and outside the country..."

2. To set up the ideological program of the Ukrainian people's independence 
   struggle.

3. To lead the entire liberation struggle of the Ukrainian people until 
   the achievement of independence and the organization of the organs 
   of government for an independent Ukraine.

4. To represent the struggle of the Ukraine at home and abroad as the 
   supreme all-Ukrainian center.

5. To create the first Ukrainian government and to call the first popular 
   assembly."

Mention is made of the political and social platform in Paragraph II, 
Point 6:

"The UHVR adopts the following political and social platform for the 
unification of Ukrainian revolutionary forces:

a. The ensuring of a democratic political constitution for the Ukrainian 
   state by popular representation.

b. The ensuring of freedom of opinion, of philosophy, and of religion.

c. The ensuring of a just social order..."
f. Ensuring the rights of all national minorities in the Ukraine.

And in other points:

e. "Freedom of all citizens before the law"

f. "Freedom of initiative in economic activity"

i. "Socialization of natural resources"

k. "Nationalization of heavy industry and communications, the transfer of light and food industry to cooperatives"

l. "Free trade"

m. "Free craftsmanship"

n. "Protection of the workers through social legislation."

Point 7 speaks about "the alliance with all oppressed peoples of Europe and Asia who fight for their freedom and recognize the Ukraine's right to political independence. Point 8 speaks about "understanding and cooperation with all the neighbors of the Ukraine on the principle of mutual recognition of the right to a state within the ethnographic borders of each people."

The Provisional Constitution of the UHVR, which the founding congress adopted in July 1944 and which is still valid today, is one of the most important documents. 8/ Among other things it set forth:

1. The UHVR is the supreme organ of the Ukrainian people during the time of its revolutionary struggle for an Ukrainian state.

2. The source of power of the UHVR is the will of the Ukrainian people which has expressed itself in the efforts of all active forces of the people for independence.

4. Any nationally active Ukrainian can become a member of the UHVR providing he recognizes the Platform of the UHVR and is at all times prepared to assist in the realization of it.

5. The UHVR can increase its 25 members through cooption. These cooptions are executed on the recommendation of the Secretary General through the Great Congress (Veliki Zbir) of the UHVR or the Presidium.

7. The UHVR is active through the following organs: a) the Great Congress, b) the Presidium with the President at the head, c) the General Secretariat headed by the Secretary General, d) General Court of Justice headed by the Chief Justice, and e) the Comptroller Body headed by the Comptroller General.

11. The UHVR is located in the Ukraine. It can send delegates abroad.

The powers of the Great Congress are more exactly defined in Section II, Paragraphs 1-8; of the Presidium and the President in Section III, Paragraphs 1-13; of the General Court of Justice in Section V, Paragraphs 1-5; and of the Comptrolling Body in Section VI, Paragraphs 1-4.

Section IV has the following to say about the General Secretariat:

1. The General Secretariat is the executive organ of the UHVR.

2. The General Secretariat is composed of: a) the Chairman (Secretary General) of the General Secretariat, b) the Secretary for Internal Affairs, c) the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, d) the Secretary of Military Affairs, e) the Secretary for Finances and Economic Affairs, and f) other secretaries.

3. The Great Congress of the UHVR elects the Chairman of the General Secretariat.
4. The Chairman of the General Secretariat appoints the secretaries to their posts and the President of the UHVR confirms them.

10. The General Secretariat reaches decisions by majority vote..."

The political platform of the UHVR established the following to eliminate any misinterpretations and misunderstandings in the future:

The initiative for organizing the UHVR belongs to the UPA, in the operation of the armed struggle of the Ukrainian population against the plundering and violence of the occupiers of the Ukrainian lands.

In the fight against the Russian Bolshevist conquerors of the Ukraine the following leading Ukrainian personalities and members of the UHVR met their death:

a. Rostyslav Voloshyn-Pavlenko, organizer of the UPA in Volhynia and Polissia, Chairman of the Third Extraordinary Great Congress of the UON in August 1943, Chairman of the First Conference of Oppressed Nations (also reported as the First Conference of Enslaved Peoples) in November 1943, Chairman of the First Congress of the UHVR in July 1944, and the Secretary General of Internal Affairs, was killed in August 1944.

b. Yosip Puzyczaniuk-Shukay, a revolutionary from the Soviet Ukraine, well-known young poet, organizer of the UPA in the Zhitomir and Vynysta areas, a member of the First Conference of Oppressed Nations, and a member of the UHVR, was killed in February 1945.

c. Peter Mykola Halant, Chancellor of the Ukrainian Catholic Archdiocese in Lvov and a member of the UHVR, was killed in June 1945.

Also killed were Dr. Yuri Lyapa, Chief of the Medical Service of the Western UPA Group, and a well-known Ukrainian physician and writer; Peter Roman-Rafael Khomyn, friar of the Studiten Order; Khaitima Kononenko, a well-known Ukrainian suffragette in Volhynia; etc.

The delegation sent abroad, designated the Foreign Representation of the UHVR (Zakordonne Predstavnystvo UHVR), is the only authorized representation of the Ukrainian underground movement and its leading political and military organs.

This Foreign Representation was sent abroad towards the end of July 1944. It consists of several members of the UHVR. Some of its members are: Prof. Dr. Ivan Ernyloch of the Presidium of the UHVR, Mykola Lebed, Secretary General for Foreign Affairs, and Mrs. Daria Rebet. Other members of this delegation cannot be named for security reasons. The cited names have already been mentioned officially in the Ukrainian emigration circles.

The Foreign Mission of the UPA, headed by Major I. Hykul, is subordinated to the Foreign Representation. The UPA soldiers who had the task of fighting their way to the west, still constitute the so-called "Pai Detachment of the UPA Abroad" and are commanded by their senior officer, Major M. Babda.

X. The End of Fighting in Europe - The struggle of the UPA Continues - An Appeal of the Leaders of the UON.

The Presidium of the UHVR and the High Command of the UPA issued appeals after the end of the war in Europe in May 1945, which stated that the struggle of the Ukrainian people continued. Calling upon the Ukrainian people for perseverance, endurance, and the support of the UPA, the Presidium contended that it was now a question of a more difficult struggle with Bolshevist totalitarianism.

The following citations are characteristic of a declaration of solidarity by the Prosv of the UON:
"The struggle of the people oppressed by the Soviet Union shall be conducted with the following revolutionary watchwords:

For the destruction of Muscovite Bolshevik imperialism, which drives whole populations to war.

For the overthrow of the Stalin regime.

For the complete democratization of the entire political and public life.

For the realization of national political self-determination and political separation.

For the organization of a just system of states which shall be based on real friendship and cooperation involved in the watchword: "Freedom of all peoples and all mankind."

We number the Russian people among the oppressed nationalities of the Soviet Union. The imperialist elements of the Russian people, who offered their services to Stalin and his clique, became the enemies of their own people..."

And later one of the most important declarations: "We, the Provid of the OUN, remain on the battlefield for independence with our people in the Ukrainian homeland..." (This declaration was first published abroad in the monthly periodical Vyzvolena Politika, Vol. III, No. 1 (18), January 1948.)

All of these appeals made an especially strong impression on the Soviet troops returning home, many of whom spread them throughout the entire Soviet Union. Some Soviet officers made contact with the UPA, passed over into it, or declared that they knew what side to fight on in the hour of national revolutions.

This attitude of officers and men forced the authorities in the Soviet Union and in the Soviet Ukraine to use only special MVD and MGB detachments (police and security troops) in the fight against the UPA. The command of these troops was in the hands of Vasyl Stepanovich Riasny, Security Chief in the Ukraine and a Lieutenant General of the Police, who together with the Soviet Partisan General Kovpak led the "fight against the partisans".

Toward the end of 1946, when the UPA changed its tactics and Riasny's troops ceased to show any important successes, Riasny was relieved of his command. He appeared again in 1949 when he commanded the MVD and MGB troops in Carpathia, Volynia, Polissiya, and Podoliya (Zhitomir and Vynnytsya). The fights here began in May 1949, and toward the end of August Riasny was decorated with the Order of the Red Banner.

XI. The year 1946 - Change of UPA Fighting Tactics - The Ukrainian Underground Newspapers Idea and Action and Independence

In 1945 the UPA carried on raids from its main areas of activity into other Ukrainian territories like Podolia, Odessa, Bessarabia, and into the neighboring territories of Rumania, Hungary, White Ruthenia, and even the Baltic states. The world press gave the most publicity to the raids into Slovakia.

The world press also reported the heavy fighting of UPA Group Westmark in the territories west of the Curzon Line where an effort was made to protect the Ukrainian population from the violence of the Bolshevik Polish police authorities and compulsory resettlement in the Soviet Union. The press unfortunately twisted the truth in significant matters.

In the winter of 1945/1946 there was hardly a day of no fighting and all UPA units had a hard time. The fighting increased in the following spring after the UPA had undertaken successful action against the elections to the Supreme Soviet on 10 February 1946. The Soviet police and security forces concentrated on the Westmark Group.
forces had to strengthen their action against the UPA. The Ukrainian situation at that time is reported in detail in the underground periodical of the OUN Ideya i Chyn, Vol. 5, No. 10, and in Samostylnist, the organ of the UHV, Vol. 1, No. 1. The organ of the UHV especially gives an accurate account about the struggle of the Ukrainian people. It was moved abroad in 1941.

The article about the "Terror of the NKVD Garrisons" published in it from pp. 116-128, gives exact information which makes it clear that during the elections 2000 to 5000 NKVD soldiers were stationed in every Ukrainian raion, 25-100 per village.

The article "A Tragi-Comedy of the Elections" (pp. 128-138) pictures the electoral methods of the "democratic" Soviet Union, which are not inferior to those of Fascist countries in anything.

The article "Combat Performance of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army" enumerates UPA's encounters between January and July 1946.

The main articles of the periodical Independence are:

a. "The Wileness of the 20th Century", an excellent analysis of the untruthfulness of the Bolshevist regime in all areas of political, social, and cultural life with many examples. (pp. 11-68).

b. O. Honcharuk - "The Ukrainian Insurgent Army as the Bearer of the Ideal of Liberation and Friendship of all Peoples" (pp. 68-96) in which the ideal of the UPA is clearly presented. Citations from its pamphlets and appeals illustrate the cooperation with the undergrounds of other peoples.

c. O. Hornovy - "About the Freedom of Press in the Soviet Union" (pp. 96-116). This unmasks the Soviet press as an instrument of oppression and deception of the Soviet government.

Besides this, the periodical published the Appeal of the UHV of November 1946 and 7 October 1946.

Although we cannot go into these documents in detail in this discussion, we should like to point out that, among other things, the appeal of November 1946 declared: "The Foreign Representation of the UHV (ZSUHV) shall inform the world about the situation in the Ukraine, why the Ukrainians are fighting, and for what. It shall unmask the deception of the Bolshevist regime and popularize the independence struggle."

The ordinances published the distinctions gained by individual UPA commanders. The ordinance of 9 February 1946 announced that Lieutenant Colonel Tares Chuprinka, the Supreme Commander of the UPA, had been promoted to the rank of general, effective retroactively, on 22 January 1946. Vychylyt, the commander of UPA Group West, was promoted to colonel; and Captain Havrysh, who was of Jewish origin and who headed the medical service of the group, was promoted to major.

The Periodical Idea and Action

The OUN's main press organ, Ideya i Chyn, published a detailed and profound interpretation of the political and social program of the organization by P. Poltava entitled "Revolutionary Elements of Ukrainian Nationalism". Poltava sees the strength of the Ukrainian resistance movement in its democratic idealism and clearly circumscribed social program. Both give the Ukrainian people a strong support in the struggle for political and national independence.

Poltava's discussion, which appeared in the Munich weekly emigration paper Ukrainska Trybuna Nos. 15 - 23, from 13 March to 15 May 1949, aroused heated discussions in all emigration papers on both sides of the Atlantic. The arguments revealed that only Ukrainska Trybuna, which was close to the Foreign Representation of the UHV, and Vpered (Forwards) in London defended the principles of the Ukrainian resistance movement in the homeland.
The periodical Ideya i Chyn made a report of the resolutions of the Fourth (Extraordinary Great?) Congress of the OUN which had struck a balance of the three year struggle since the Third Extraordinary Great Congress in 1943, when it met in June 1946 in the Ukraine.

The content of Volume 5, No. 14 is made up of a report about the fighting Ukraine and a few political articles analyzing the Leninist interpretation of Marxism in the Stalinist actuality.

Change of Tactics of the Ukrainian Underground Movement

The months of difficult fighting in 1945 and during the first few months of 1946 forced the High Command of the UPA to change their fighting tactics. Until the middle of 1946 strong units of the UPA, about 100 - 250 men strong operated in and controlled large areas where they also maintained their own administration. These tactics were leftovers from World War II when the front in the east constantly changed and neither the German nor the Russian occupation forces were sufficiently strong to completely control the entire area. Therefore, the fighting struggle, the Belarus-Sovietist regime proceeded energetically, with the support of local Party groups and MVD/MGB units, to expand its administrative apparatus up to the smallest and most remote village. Only the large forest areas in the northern Ukraine and in the Carpathian Mountains offered protection to UPA units.

The larger fighting units in the strength of a company, battalion, and regiment had to be reduced in order to insure their flexibility. Therefore, groups of 15 to 30 men were formed and they had to carry out raids at all times. Earth bunkers were built in the distant, impassable wooded areas of Polesiia and Zhitomir, and in the Carpathian Mountains. These bunkers became the garrisons of the UPA. 10/

The camouflage of the earth bunkers prevents them from being found and the Soviets cannot put their hands on the small UPA units because they are so mobile. The armed struggle goes forward in spite of everything, demanding the greatest readiness for sacrifices of the part of the UPA soldiers. The resistance struggle could only be continued because of the Ukrainian people who supported their troops in the face of a terror which was carried ad absurdum. The significance of the resistance lies in the destruction of the myth that the MVD/MGB apparatus is almighty.

Neither the most brutal terror nor the enticements of the Soviet regime could force the Ukrainian people to give up its resistance, as Independence and Idea and Action have reported.

M. Hrechukha, the President of the Soviet Ukraine, and Nykyta Khrushchov, the Secretary General of the Communist Party and a member of the Stalinist Politburo, issued amnesty appeals 12 February 1944 and during the course of 1945 urging the UPA soldiers to give up.11/ Since the struggle has come to be for the existence or non-existence of the Soviet dictatorship in the Ukraine and the Soviet Union, and there are no more appeals which speak of the "Forgiveness of the Soviet government and the Soviet fatherland".

XII. Principles of the Ukrainian Liberation Movement

The title of this chapter is taken from a book of collected materials dealing with the questions of the struggle for an independent Ukraine which the UPA soldiers brought to Western Europe in their raid of 1947.

It contained the following articles: P. Poltava - "The Concept of An Independent Ukraine and the Universal Tendency of Political Development in the Present"; O. Borovy - "At the Bolshevik Ideological Front"; and U. Kushri - "The Scientific Foundations of Dialectical Materialism".

Since leading members and publicists of the underground in the Ukraine wrote these discussions, they reveal the secret of success of the revolutionary resistance. The discussions included a treatment of the spiritual principles of the independence struggle and future constitutional problems, social policy, and economic and cultural questions.
The common denominator of these articles is, as P. Poltava wrote, that "the motivating power of the national idea", the democratic political constitution, and the concept of life, social justice, and economic democracy connected with political democracy only can assure the freedom of the individual and of peoples.

The discussions which came from the fighting homeland provoked attacks from the Bandera and Melnyk groups, whose nationalism differed from the one in the homeland. These two emigration groups accuse the resistance movement in the Ukraine of Socialist deviation and seek to slander it with the name of national Communism. In the first place The Principles of the Ukrainian Liberation Movement have nothing in common with Marxist Socialism, and in the second place they are only extensions of the theses in the program adopted by the Third Extraordinary Great Congress of the OUN which met in August 1943.

The task of this discussion does not include going into these principles any closer.

XIII. The Messenger of the Ukrainian Liberation Movement in Western Europe

In September 1947 the world was startled to hear about the breakthrough of UPA units through Poland and Czechoslovakia to Bavaria. This armed raid commanded by Major M. Balda was undertaken to prove to the world that the fight for liberty continues in the Ukraine and to develop world understanding for it.

In the summer of 1947 several UPA units received the order from the High Command of the UPA to fight their way through to the west similar to the armed raids into Slovakia, Byelorussia, Rumania, Hungary, and the Baltic countries. To the amazement of the whole world these units succeeded. Several small detachments arrived as late as 1948 and two more small groups followed in July and August 1949. Another task of these raids was to offer military protection to couriers of the President of the Ukrainian Supreme Council of Liberation sent to the Foreign Representation. This is the only way to get through the double iron curtain, the first one at the Lubeck-Leibach line, the second at the borders of the Soviet Union.

This first breakthrough of the UPA to the west is extensively discussed in the book The UPA in Western Europe, New York-Paris-London, 1948, published by the Ukrainian Press Service (UPS) with the aid of the Foreign Representation of the UPA. Among other things, this book mentions the note of Mykola Lebed, Secretary General for Foreign Affairs of the UPA to George C. Marshall, US Secretary of State, asking for the right of asylum for UPA soldiers. The book also contains an appeal of the Foreign Representation of the UPA to the entire civilized world.

Those UPA soldiers who are outside the Soviet orbit and who have not received orders to make their way back home form the Raid Section of the UPA abroad. Through the Foreign Mission of the UPA it is politically subordinate to the Foreign Representation of the UPA. The task of the command of the Raid Section is to take care of UPA soldiers coming with orders from the UPA High Command.

Any UPA soldiers abroad who intend to be active in party politics are released from the "raid detachment" and assume the status of former UPA soldiers and of political emigres. As such they do not have the right to appear publicly in the name of the UPA.

XIV. A Fighting Front of Oppressed Peoples

The UPA's armed and the Ukrainian underground's political revolutionary struggle aim not only at the liberation of the Ukraine but of all people oppressed by the totalitarian Bolshevik regime. This is clearly established in the fundamental documents of the Ukrainian resistance and in the numerous appeals and pamphlets issued to the representatives of other peoples in the Soviet and German armies.

These principles are obligatory for the UPA's armed struggle and for the
practical policies of the UHVR.

Because many Eastern European and Asian nationalists have gone over to UPA since the summer of 1943, the High Command of the UPA decided to form units of foreign nationals which are completely autonomous though subordi-
nate to the UPA High Command tactically and operationally.

In the fall of 1943 an entire battalion of the Azerbaijani Legion and several companies of Turkmenians and Georgians joined the UPA. The UPA High Command developed a plan to call a political conference of representatives of these nationalities and to form a Fighting Alliance for the Liberation of Oppressed Peoples. The soldiers of foreign nationalities warmly welcomed this plan and a special committee was formed to prepare the program of such a congress.

The First Congress of the Oppressed Peoples of Eastern Europe and Soviet Asia took place in the east Volhynian forests from 1 to 22 November 1943. The day before, a German police battalion attacked the region in which the congress was to take place and the members of the congress also participated in the combat actions against the German police.

Thirty-five delegates from 13 nations participated in this congress. There were five Azerbaijani, one Bashkirian, two Byelorussians, four Armenians, six Georgians, one Kazakh, two Ossetians, four Tatars, five Uzbekians, one Circassian, one Chuvashian, and ten additional guests of honor of various nationalities.

The results of this congress were the "Resolutions of the First Congress of Oppressed Peoples of Eastern Europe and Soviet Asia" and a common pro-
clamations to the oppressed peoples".

Among other things, the resolutions stated that "the First Congress of the Oppressed Peoples of Eastern Europe and Soviet Asia welcomes the heroic struggle of the peoples of Western and Central Europe and declares its solidarity with them."

The coordination of a common struggle against Bolshevik imperialism which was getting ready to flood Central Europe was another result of this Congress.

The pamphlets which gave the goals of the struggle of many individual peoples and which were widely distributed in the Soviet Army achieved significant success.

In 1945 and 1946 the "foreign" units of the UPA asked to be disbanded and the insurgents returned through semi-illegal ways to their home countries in order to carry the fight for liberation to their people. Many of these soldiers and officers, however, remained with the UPA and are still fighting in its ranks.

At present single pamphlets are distributed in all of the USSR calling for a fight for liberation. Such individual pamphlets appear everywhere: in Moscow and in Kazakhstan, in the Donbas and in the Transcaucasus, and in Leningrad and in Magnitogorsk.

These facts should not be overestimated or played up as sensations. But they should not be underestimated, for they are like a snowpile which has begun to move and may be turned into a snow avalanche at any time by a slight thrust.

The Soviet dictatorship has been wounded in its Achilles heel: the unsolved question of nationalities policy and the social contradictions of the regime.

XV. Conclusions

The armed struggle of the UPA, politically guided by the UHVR, forms one of the greatest dangers to the Bolshevik regime of the Russian people.
This regime, which thirty years ago with the outbreak of the Bolshevik Revolution prevented the Russian empire from falling apart into its constituent nationalities, has become the last expression of Russian imperialism.

Lenin and after him even more Stalin became the preservers of Russian imperial unity. In this way they were the suppressors of the only true motive force in history, the idea of the nation. This raises the question of whether imperialist tendencies can in the long run resist the national idea.

The development of the Soviet Union and the consequences of the Second World War lead to a negative answer. Not even the cruelest methods of terror or the most artful measures of oppression can hinder the advance of the national idea.

The fight of the peoples of the Soviet Union cannot only be regarded from the standpoint of these peoples, but must also be considered from the international viewpoint, from the standpoint of other national interests.

If it was appropriate to begin this discussion with the writing of Mr. Picton Begge to the national government of the Independent Ukrainian Republic, then it is not out of place to conclude with the observations of another British diplomat who, even though he had no relations with the Ukraine, correctly evaluated the situation.

Viscount E. d'Abernon, the first British ambassador to the German Republic after the First World War, noted the following in his diary An Ambassador of Peace. (See pages from the diary (Berlin 1920-1926), Vol. 1-3, London 1929-1930 under the date of 30 August 1922):

"British policy faces the question of whether a large, unified Russian empire is desirable for us? American gives a decidedly affirmative answer to this question probably because it needs a strong Russia to counterbalance Japan. It is certainly not in the English interest. India is severely threatened as long as there is a strong Russia. The Balkanization of Central Europe is regrettable but the Balkanization of Central Asia would be an unquestionable relief for British policy. The division of Russia into several states with stronger trade interests rather than political ambition would be more favorable for our position on the Black Sea and in the Mediterranean area than the reconstruction of a mighty empire. The ascension of the Ukraine would unquestionably make the situation on the Black Sea more secure and healthier and facilitate a commercial control of the straits as a balance to a political control."

Since this entry was made, twenty-five years have passed, and twenty since it became public. The Second World War has demonstrated that Viscount d'Abernon evaluated the Ukrainian problem very clearly whereas the politicians of the democratic west did not. A proper evaluation of the national forces in Eastern Europe during the Second World War would perhaps have led to the overthrow of Hitler and Stalin and brought about a proper balance of power on the European continent.

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Comments:

1. [For another report on the history of the Ukrainian resistance movement covering the period 1900-1947.]

2. [Lists the 1929 Vienna Congress as the third rather than the first. However, all previous accounts list it as the first. 1929 lists the First Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists as taking place in Berlin in 1927, the Second Congress in Prague in 1928, and the Third Congress in Vienna in 1929.]