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Information Bulletin No. 3

50X1

Why and How Red China was drawn into Korean War

By

H. N. Wong

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Security Information

Now with sufficient data at hand, we have reason to believe that the Korean War which broke out on June 25, 1950, was a totalitarian expansionist war waged by the Kremlin under the irresistible urge of speculation and that the eventual involvement of Red China, under the guise of volunteers, into the war was an impromptu.

Around 1950, Joseph Stalin was pleased and proud of the Chinese Communist success in the mainland. It had strengthened his belief in the conquer of Asia. He was preoccupied with the problem of how to carry out his fundamental principle--it was suggested by Georgi Malenkov in 1948 and was adopted by Stalin and the Politburo of the Bolshevik Party--of guiding the decision of the satellite countries to help the Chinese Communists to consolidate their totalitarian rule and how to hold his firm grip over this new giant satellite. It was regarded in principle as a preliminary work to be fully and effectively accomplished for the next expansionist move. The Soviet Union has so far followed this fundamental principle in dealing with the satellite countries in the eastern Europe. In handling the Far East, there was originally no change or any other inclination. On the contrary, the Kremlin is extremely concerned with the development of Communism in the backward areas, and is striving hard to hasten the working of this policy to make the Chinese Communists a central force of communism in the Far East. The Russian-Chinese treaty of alliance concluded on Feb. 14, 1950 was an outstanding display of the enforcement of this measure.

Four months after the conclusion of the treaty of alliance, the Korean war started. The North Korean Communists and the Chinese Communists were thrown into the war in succession. In fact, both these new satellite countries were not strong yet, and they had not attained the conditions--to be in the position to discharge their mission in the next expansionist war--as required by the aforesaid resolved policy. The Kremlin's sudden alteration of its fixed strategy and its embarking on such hazardous war were apparently encouraged by the following situations:

The withdrawal of the American troops from the South Korea was completed in April, 1949. Dean Acheson, Secretary of the US State Department made a statement in January 1950 that South Korea was out of US defence perimeter. South Korea was not included in the Point Four Program; reports on US postwar demobilization and the distusted feeling towards war among the American people and the government furnished by the Soviet Embassy and its agents; the attitude of look-and-see taken by the US government during the Chinese civil war; the Soviet experts on Far East were of the opinion that the historical relation and commercial interest between South Korea and the United States were much less significant than those between China and the United States, and so the American government will not pay a costly price to demonstrate its concern toward South Korea; exaggerated reports on the accomplishments of setting up the North Korean army by the Soviet Military Mission in North Korea; in order to accomplish the right-wing arrangement for the encirclement of Japan, Marshall Malinovsky, the supreme commander of the Russian troops in the Far East, had made recommendation and given encouragement to Kremlin.

The combination of all these constituted an illusion on Stalin's judgment. He strongly believed that United States would not interfere directly in the next Far Eastern war. Under the psychological effect of no bothering, he boldly started this expansionist war under the cloak of a civil war.

At the onset, North Korea's activated military strength consisted of some 120,000 regular troops, about 25,000 of Korean troops under major general Lee Hung-kwang originally attached to Chinese Communist Army, and about 9000 of young local militia totaling approximately 214,000 men equipped with 120 Yak planes, 170 33-ton medium tanks, 20 10-ton light tanks and 32 warships of medium and small sizes. Their reserve (including those under training) was estimated at about 200,000 men. Both were not in excess of 420,000 men. (Among them, save major General Lee Hung-kwang's troops, US officials

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(gained in the Chinese civil war, the rest were newly trained by the Russians) In comparison with some 120,000 South Korean troops as their object of attack, they held an overwhelming supremacy. A force of much superior equipment and stronger combat strength other than the South Korean troops was apparently not included in their possible calculation. The sudden comeback of the American troops to participate in the defence of Korea was entirely out of expectation to the communists.

In the middle of September 1950, the Korean communist main force was smashed and was forced to bid a general retreat toward the 38th Parallel. The Korean communist troops then sustained casualties of about 190,000 and were taken prisoners to an approximate figure of 100,000. There were almost no crack troops left to fight an effective delaying action. North Korean Premier, Kim Il Sung made an emergency appeal to Moscow and Peking respectively requesting them to fulfill their military alliances by sending reinforcements to his rescue. At that time Moscow and Peking seemed to have no immediate decisive replies.

Until September 24, a Mukden conference was held at the Mukden Railroad Guest House under the auspices of the Russians. The attendance included North Korean Premier Kim Il Sung, the Russian Marshal Malinovsky and General Sivonovsky, and the Chinese Communist General Mien Yun-Chin and General Lin Piao. The nature of the conference was merely a review of the critical situation caused by North Korean defeat and an exchange of views on the technical aspects of assisting North Korea. The obtained data show that there were no binding resolutions adopted. The minimum requirements roughly estimated by the three delegations for an effective stability on the Korean front consisted of 50 divisions, (about 600,000 men) 500 warplanes, 800 tanks, two divisions of heavy artillery and suitable quantity of other weapons and an abundant supply of ammunition. The Russians had made a pledge that the Soviet Government would soon consider the supplies of airplanes, heavy arms and ammunitions. North Korea was to supply provisions and part of communication tools, (in fact all these were supplied later by Chinese communists themselves), and Red China was to give men. The principle of division of labor referred to in the non-committal talks had chiefly drawn up the blueprint of the Chinese-Russian Agreement on Assisting Korea concluded in Peking on October 6.

Meanwhile, Chinese top army leaders expressed divergent views on direct assistance to Korea by sending troops. There were chiefly two tendencies. (in fact it is a matter of difference on opinion and there was no existence of distinct organizations) The leaders of the alleged right-wing conservatives are General Liu Poh-cheng, the Second Field Army Commander, and General Chen-I, the Third Field Army Commander, and they are backed by General Chu Teh, the Supreme Commander of Red Army. With the data on hand, the opinions of this group are as follows,

It is most inadvisable to plunge into an international war when reconstruction was not yet under way after a long-drawn civil war, and Fomosa and reactionary force were still in existence. Even it is extremely necessary, elaborate considerations and well-planned preparations are required. They sympathized with North Korea's anti-aggression war and might consider various suitable means of assistance other than "direct participation". The American imperialist threat to North East China could probably be averted by neutral countries through diplomatic channels. In case of failure, it will provide them with a pretext for sending expeditionary force and thus arouse their morale. The Korean peninsula is surrounded on three sides by waters, and without sufficient navy in operation (naval supremacy was on other side) it is too difficult for them to command a victory. (unless with an air supremacy strong enough to curb all the enemy naval activities). The geographical strip of the peninsula is no good for their talented mobile tactics. Rigid positional warfare would lend advantages to their enemy in better equipment and communication and vice versa. An outright participation in Korean war would give them no ground for muddling through in case of aggrandizement and defeat, and would provide the American imperialists with an excuse to invade the mainland: As no sufficient navy and modern coastal defence fortifications for the long Chinese coast line, there will be no effective defence against attack by enemy from the sea. The withdrawal of 50 divisions of troops into Korea would reduce the defence strength along the coast and the south-east

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frontiers to a point below the requirement of an effective defense.

In contrast to this was the international group led by General Lin Biao. They claimed:

The brave Chinese soldiers armed with Russian superior equipments and advanced tactical guidance will score victory wherever they march and are guarantee of successful action. Korean war is a justice war that displays the great patriotic spirit of internationalism, and victory is bound to be on the justice. All comrades must follow the direction of general outline of the international anti-imperialist strategy, and there shall be no consideration for individual interest. Because of approximation to their base, they are better off in the battle of inner line and vice versa for the enemy. The geographical strip of the peninsula is most suitable for a display of man-power in battle and it is easy for them to catch the enemy main force for annihilation. With their entry into Korean war, the Soviet Union would assist Red China to hasten its socialist economic construction with more enthusiasm and help. To resist enemy outside the threshold would save a defensive battle within the nation and ruin the land. North East China is the heart of industry and can never be lost and turned out to be a battle ground. Because of the existence of Soviet mighty strength, the paper tiger American imperialist dares not invade the mainland. To fight Korean war is equivalent to a war on Formosa and the victory in the Korean theatre is just the liberation of Formosa, and in the meantime, it is a short cut for Red China to walk into the United Nations.

In short, these two different schools of views had undergone lengthy debate and most probably it was solved by pressure from the Soviet Union. The following two points will reflect the rugged passage of Red China's participation into Korean war.

1. At the very beginning, Red China had to use its trump card, the Fourth Field Army. (the commander is General Lin Biao who advocated for entry into Korean war) The application of fundamental main force to a war without first knowing the combat strength and nature of enemy troops is a measure ill advised by strategist and was naturally not liked by Peking. This hazardous decision is probably due to one or both of the following factors, A. Assignment by the Soviet Union B. Because of the negative of the conservative group, General Lin Biao is compelled to take a voluntary lead.

2. The fact that the Chinese-Russian Assisting Korea Agreement was concluded in Peking 12 days after the Mukden Conference (during which the situation in the Korean battlefield was most critical and North Korean troops was retreating from the 38th Parallel to Pyongyang area) correctly indicated that during which works of harmony and persuasion had been carried on among the Russians and Chinese communists as well as within the Chinese communist rank and file, and perhaps pressure had been exercised to bring out an agreement.

Before September 1950, the writer was still in the mainland. According to sound understanding, all military preparations undertaken by the Chinese communists centered on "liberation of Formosa" and "march to Tibet". Since the outbreak of Korean war, Red China had only displayed a gesture of sympathetic assistance and donated some materials. There was categorically no sign or inclination of their participation in Korean war.

We definitely know that the time of their first crossing the border is in the night of October 15. (testimony of Chinese communist prisoners of war) (Pyongyang was most critical at that time (fall on October 20), so it might be proved that the earliest date of Red China's decision to participate in Korean war is in the early October, otherwise no toleration would be allowed for the havoc wrought on the capital of North Korea and plenty other places.

Retrospection of these events was an attempt to relate one fact, when Armistice started the war, there was an far-reaching operational plan and thorough preparations for consequences of possible agreement, contingency and defeat.

Some people are of the opinion that Korean war is a long-drawn out of consumption purposely engineered by the Russians to trap United States. (the communists also make such propaganda) This view is not all correct. The communists twice tried to force their way toward Pusan with attacks of waves of men regardless of tremendous sacrifices.

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Labor Condition in Red China.

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A ten-point platform had been adopted in the Sixth Plenary Session of the Chinese Communist Party. There was a resolution in connection with the labor problem. It stipulates "eight hours work, increase of wages, relief of unemployment, etc". We find this most fundamental clear-cut labor policy of the Chinese Communist Party in the embodiment of these important documents. It is an unmistakable pledge to the Chinese working class by the Party that their conditions will be improved to the standard as laid down in the platform. Because of Communist clamoring slogans, the working class, for the sake of realizing their dreams, had exerted in their great efforts, and during the civil war years, had sacrificed very precious lives and much liberty to help the development of the Communist Party. Undoubtedly, the working class had in the process of revolution performed their missions as expected by the Party.

Now, three years since the inauguration of the People's Government, what compensation had been given to the working class? Have the Communists improved the conditions of the working class as promised in their platform? These are the questions that you would like to have the answers.

Therefore, in accordance with the three standards (working hours, wages, and unemployment relief) stipulated by the Communist Platform, we have collected some data for those who are interested in the problem of Chinese labor to make a comparative study. Although the data are confined to Shanghai alone, but to our knowledge, there is little difference between Shanghai and other areas. Furthermore, as Shanghai is an industrial centre in China, the labor policy enforced in Shanghai by the People's Government is looked upon as a model in other cities. When we have made a survey of the conditions of the workers in Shanghai, it will not be difficult for us to know the rest.

Before the "liberation", the working hours in the great industrial organizations, had been very close or they had already carried out the system of eight hours work. Even the longest are not exceeding ten hours. After liberation, the Chinese Communists made no mention of the system of eight hours work. On the contrary, under the slogans of so-called "work for the people" and "work for our own working class", they demand the workers to increase their working hours in order to elevate "class consciousness". Through the agents of "radicals", and "progressive elements", a series of voluntary requests were being made for the prolongation of working hours as a display of the awakening of the workers' class consciousness. Up till now, the working hours have been raised to 12 hours per day. In reality, it is even worse. Owing to the introductions of "emulation", "challenge", "increase production and conservation", "inspection system" and "methods of increased production" etc as following each other in the form of waves, the workers, in general, must work 14 hours or even more to achieve the required quota. It is a phenomenon that the aged and the feeble have to work 16 hours to accomplish the standard quota for the day.

The Communists not only demand the prolongation of working hours but also the display of the ability of each worker at its best. In other words, within a fixed period, the workers must do more work than before. For instance, in the Sixth National Cotton Factory, a worker has to take charge of 250 to 300 spindles previously, but now the number of spindles for each worker has been raised to 400. Each worker in the past has to complete about 40 odd rounds of cotton yarns, but the quota is now fixed at 60 rounds. This is the highest output a man can do. The conditions of other factories are more or less the same.

In addition, they are required to participate in "cultural recreation activities" and "learning groups". These are the practices used by the communists to comfort the workers' spirit and to enlighten their political ideology. Though being exhausted, no matter how reluctant, they have no alternative but to participate in them. Because in a so-called "progressive society", no one dares to show oneself being lagged behind. Two to three hours are spent on these activities. One is considered lucky enough to have six hours in sound sleep for day and night.

After liberation, because of incessant overtime and over-strength work, the percentage of death, sickness, and accidents sometimes causing disabilities, sustained

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by the Shanghai workers is evidently heading an upward trend. This tendency reflects the ill effects by overtime and over-strength work.

The following three tables are prepared by the medical unit of the Shanghai General Labor Union. According to those who are familiar with the problem, the figures may have been reduced. But the trend of increasing is outstanding.

(Table 1, 2, 3.)

There is a common characteristic in the three tables. As of the months of August to November, 1951 when emulation boom reached its zenith, the rates of death, sickness and disabilities scored the highest record. We can see what a devastating effect on the health of the workers in the process of intense emulation.

In capitalistic communities, increase of working hours must be accompanied in proportion by an increase of wages. It is considered to be an act of exploitation if no extra wages paid for an increase of working hours or if no reduction of wages is followed by a decrease of working hours. It is most incomprehensible that on the one hand it is an increase of working hours and on the other it is a reduction of wages. But this has happened in the Communist held mainland without any deterrent. As in the case of prolongation of working hours, the communists put up a show as they merely accepted the voluntary request for reduction of wages by the workers themselves. Government and semi-government factories fall into this category. Private factories, under the condition of "factories owned by workers themselves" or "factories managed by workers themselves" are more or less imitating others. With regard to foreign owned factories, they have to pay wages even when they have been closed down.

Before October 1949, Shanghai workers in general, save the skilled labor, draw an average monthly wages of about 100 units. According to the statistics compiled in the month of February 1952, they have reduced, by voluntary request, the average to a low figure of 78 units. The indication in the following table provides a contrast between the increase of working hours and the reduction of wages for the last two years.

(Table 4.)

In fact, some labor done by many workers who had overworked on account of not being able to accomplish the working quota at fixed period is not recorded in the table.

What is the actual worth of this low wage? Out of these 100 units, the take-home pay is only 78 units. These 78 units are just sufficient to pay for 270 catties of rice or three and one half pairs of second-grade leather shoes, or two suits of clothes made of coarse material. Chinese workers have to live under such wretched condition for the month.

Those who have a family of more than two members to be fed, must find some work for the dependants, or they must do some family manual industry to eke out a living. Otherwise, even a minimum standard of living can not be maintained.

Unemployment in Shanghai has become a serious problem. Because of the Communist oppression of the national capitalists and the general shrinking of purchasing power, factories on the lay-off or part-time work are daily increasing. According to the tabulation prepared by a director of one of the well-known Shanghai manufacturers, the principal factories in Shanghai at the end of 1951 which are on the lay-off or part-time work are listed in the following table.

(Table 5.)

Although the table shows that the number of the closed-down factories is exceeding 50 percent of the total, but they are of the medium and small sizes, so the figure of the unemployed is about 25% in comparison to the employed. As of February 1952, registration of unemployment prepared by the Shanghai General Labor Union shows a total of 245,087 persons. There are also a great number of the unemployed who evade registration because they fear that they may be sent to work in the remote frontiers or they will be enlisted in the army. There is no reliable estimate for this category.

Because of the communist enforcement of the policy of "exterminating the intermediary businessmen", the number of the firms which apply to the Industry and Commerce Bureau, Shanghai, for cessation of business has reached a record of 13,000.

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There will be more applicants as a result of the "Anti-five" campaign. Assuming each firm has a staff of six persons, then the total will be over 100,000 persons. By adding this figure to the registered figure of the unemployed in industry, the total of the unemployed in Shanghai will be around 350,000 persons.

Aids administered by the communist for the relief of these groups of unemployment are: General Labor Union is to issue 30 catties of rice plus the relief fund of J.M.P. \$20,000 (HK\$4.00) to each person per month. It is a sort of subsidy. It is hardly enough to maintain the minimum standard of living. The relief fund is not paid out from the government coffer. It is levied from the workers on work and the employers. Each working man has to donate 5% of his wages monthly to the fund of mutual benefit, and the employers have to pay the exact amount for the same purpose. Strictly speaking, it is the workers who help the other workers.

Considering the city economy as a whole, the communists although they pay no money for the relief work, still recognize it as a great burden. They are trying by all means to solve the problem. The measures enforced by the communists for wiping out unemployment are roughly as follows,

1. To launch a campaign to enlist the young unemployed workers into armies to replace the casualties sustained in the Korean war by the Chinese communist army. As of February 1952, those enlisted are about 22,000 men, far short of the expected 100,000 men.

2. To coerce them to work in the north-western and north-eastern provinces. Even by means of persuasion, the communists failed in this attempt. Because of their ties to families or inconveniences due to habits, most of the workers are reluctant to leave for frontier provinces.

3. To force them to build roads, to dig in rivers, to repair streets, and to do similar work of temporary nature with half pay.

4. To organize the unemployed labor into groups for collective cultivation of the undeveloped areas. It is due to the reasons stated in item 2 that few are interested in it.

The communist measures of wiping out unemployment have so far yielded little result. It is estimated that about 30,000 men have got some kind of jobs. There remain at least 300,000 odd who undergo the hardship for being unemployed. If we add the family dependents to the unemployed, assuming one member for each average family then we shall come to a total of 600,000 persons who are reduced to the verge of starvation. The problem of unemployment perplexing the communists is still existing in the industrial centre of Shanghai.

The above mentioned facts are strong enough to prove that the communists, after three years of their rule over the mainland, have not done their best to improve the workers' standard of living, but instead made it worse. The labor policy they are now enforcing is apparently and fundamentally inconsistent with their unmistakable pledge of "eight hours work, increase of wages, relief of unemployment....." as written in their platform. Even worse than that, the Chinese communists are exploiting more surplus value from the workers than in the capitalist society. They create a system of extorting slaved labor. All these are meant for the expansion and consolidation of their totalitarian rule, and for their colossal expenditure in the Korean war. The only significance we can find in the communist pledge to the working class lies in their tactics of enticing the working mass as their "manipulating tools".

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They obviously attempted to drive the allied troops into the sea to achieve an advantageous fait accompli.

Let us see what consumption did they get for themselves and whether the war of consumption is what they wished for. According to reliable reports, Red China's losses after twenty-two months in Korean war (till the end of August 1953) are as follows. Expenditure is estimated at a total of US\$7,500,000. Casualties including dead, captives and wounded (incapable of fighting again) are estimated at about 1,050,000 men.

The expenditure so incurred is equal to the total of three times the annual normal expenditure of the Peking Government. The casualties so sustained are a bit more than 1/3 of Red China's total regular army. What should be particularly pointed out is that the crack Fourth Field Army suffered a loss of some 400,000 men and the Third Field Army a loss of some 190,000 men. Both figures constituted 5/6 strong of the total casualties sustained in Korean war. It is no doubt a huge loss to Red China's assets.

Reflection of this serious loss in military strength and finance is found in the military and political circles in Peking. It heralds the rise of the conservative group. With two years' bitter experiences in Korean war, they believe that Red China and North Korea with Russian's limited material assistance have no hope of achieving victory and continuation of Korean war is of no particular significance to Red China. The Soviet Union in fact has no intention of coming out to lead the fight against aggression. Even if the war extends to the mainland, there is no guarantee that the Soviet Russian will not treat the Chinese communists with the same attitude as they did to North Koreans. What the Chinese communists fear most, greater than their losses in Korean war, is whether the flames of Korean war will engulf the mainland. They admit that what protects China mainland now is the fragile psychological pressure--the enemy thinks that an attack on the mainland will draw the great power behind curtain into an allout war. Naturally it is not a reliable and effective protection. Once this consideration undergoes changes or disappears, the existing navy and coastal fortifications can hardly put up an effective defence against enemy attack by superior air force and navy. Therefore, they are in favor of an opportune end to Korean war. Such a voice originated in the spring of last year, but reached its zenith in June and July this year. We believe that this opinion will gradually crystallize into a force and most probably it is already seriously reflected in the recent Chinese-Russian talks just ended in Moscow.

-----The End-----

Latent News

We have to announce some important news just received from most reliable source.

In the recent Chinese-Russian talks in Moscow, Stalin has agreed in principle to bring an opportune end to Korean war and in compliance with Red China's request, the Soviet Russians have promised to assist the Chinese communists' ten-year plan on economic reconstruction and details are still under discussion.

The conclusion was reached after lengthy discussion on the request to bring an opportune end to Korean war by the Chinese communists. The Soviet Russians will by all means support the necessary continuation or intensification of war to force more concessions from the allied army, as the western nations are more anxious for the settlement.

Both Russian and Chinese reds believe that the development and achievement of the Chinese communist planned economies will be faster than the Russian preliminary stage.

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
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
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Table 1. Monthly record of deaths of Shanghai workers.




- (1) Deaths in the labor hospitals are recorded, and those at home are not included.
- (2) Deaths of workers in the commercial firms or shops do not belong to this category. It only shows the deaths of industrial workers.

Table 2. Monthly record of patients of Shanghai workers.



- (1) Those who are not hospitalized are not included.
- (2) It shows only the patients of industrial workers.
- (3) Those who consult with the old-fashioned Chinese doctors are not recorded.

Table 3. Monthly record of accidents causing disabilities.



Note: It is a total of the wounded caused by incidents and the disabilities caused by serious wound.

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as of October in 1949working hours and wages  
as of February in 1952

- (1) Each unit is approximately equal to J.M.P. \$5200. At official rate, every 100 units are approximately equal to HK\$134. (In free market, it is less than HK\$110.) or about US\$20.
- (2) From October, 1949 to February 1952, the real wages have been reduced by 53% strong.
- (3) From the wages 10% will be deducted for labor union fee and unemployment mutual benefit fund.
- (4) Provisional donations such as "Resist U.S. and Aid Korea!" "Contribute air-planes and guns" "Patriotic donation" etc., will take away 12% of the wages, so the workers' take-home pay is 78%.

WORKING HOURS

TABLE 5.

	Noe. of factories	in operation	in part-time work	on lay-off
weaving & knitting industry	75	25	17	33
wool industry	100	3	30	67
dye industry	500	24	212	284
iron foundry	569	100	118	351
rubber factory	74	36	25	13
paper mill	29	2	7	20
soap factory	50	4	24	22
shipping industry	49	8	28	13
electric parts & appliances	225	60	101	64
Total	1691	262	562	867

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