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Approved For Release 2000/08/04 : CIA-RDP83-00764R000400030024-0

17 APRIL 1972
(APPROX. DATE)

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Plans

SUBJECT : CS Information Under the Control of the
Historical Staff

ACTION : Recommendations for DDP's Action are Contained
in Paragraphs 4, 5 and 9

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1. There is an extensive collection of CS material, including sensitive operational data, currently held by the CIA Historical Staff (HS) in Rosslyn. Since 1969, this information has been outside CS control with its use protected only by the fortuitous presence of Mr. [REDACTED] (Documents Officer, CIA/HS). Mr. [REDACTED], currently assigned to HS, is a longtime CS officer who is keenly aware of the security risk of making available sensitive CS materials (particularly relating to sources and methods) to persons outside the CS. To date, he has avoided releasing such CS information to unauthorized researchers despite pressures from his supervisors in HS. However, he will retire in October 1972 and will be replaced. If the Chief, CIA/HS has the option, the protection to CS information which Mr. [REDACTED] has provided will cease with his retirement.

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2. This office instructed Mr. [REDACTED] (CI/RMO) to carefully delineate the potential security problem. On 7 March 1972, he met with [REDACTED] (CS Historical Officer) and [REDACTED] for an information briefing and a tour of the HS records area. The pertinent points of his survey follow:

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a. The situation described in para 1 exists and resulted from a series of events which began in 1965 when Mr. [REDACTED] was instructed by the DDP to establish a reference and file system for CS records considered to be of historical value. In 1967 the Executive Director contracted with Prof. [REDACTED] Department, [REDACTED] to be a consultant regarding the establishment of an

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Agency-wide historical program. His basic recommendation was that it should be patterned after the existing CS Program. In 1969 Prof. [REDACTED] was employed under contract to head the Agency Historical Program and Mr. [REDACTED] was transferred to the HS as Documents Officer. Mr. [REDACTED] was subsequently directed by Prof. [REDACTED] to include references, in an integrated reference and file system, to historical information held in all the Directorates. Prof. [REDACTED] and Dr. [REDACTED] (Deputy Chief of the Historical Staff) thus established jurisdiction over Mr. [REDACTED] files, under authority given them by the Executive Director. Prof. [REDACTED] later granted access to finished histories to his Chief Editor (Mr. [REDACTED], DDI Staff Officer). The group at Rosslyn, where the CS references are kept, now includes Mr. [REDACTED]'s counterparts from all the other Directorates and is under immediate supervision of Dr. [REDACTED]. Prof. [REDACTED] maintains his office in the Headquarters building.

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- b. Mr. [REDACTED] files consist of approximately 110,000 5X8 index cards the majority of which refer to CS information (samples attached as Item #1). Most cards contain detailed comments concerning the content of the documents and their location. The cards are separated into the following four categories:

- (1). Geographic Areas - with references to operations run in various countries of the world.
- (2). Organizations - includes the structure of predecessor organizations, CIA's current structure, other elements of the U.S. Governments, and Foreign Intelligence services.
- (3). Personalities - includes information concerning individuals outside CIA (perhaps with the exception of DCIs, past and present) who have influenced Agency policy.
- (4). Specific Subjects - these cards refer

to specific subjects with which our source material deals (e.g., Audio-surveillance, Beacons, Consultants, Doctrine, Exfiltration, Foundations, CA matters, CI functions, Policy, FI subjects, PM matters, Support to operations, etc.).

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- c. The documents to which the cards refer, ^{25X1A9a} with the exception of four safes held in Mr. ██████ vault, continue to be held in the responsible DDP component. The documents held by Mr. ██████ consist of information considered to be of historical value but not ones which the parent component wishes to retain in its own files. Mr. ██████ estimated that there are 2,500 documents in his holdings most of which are CS.

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- d. Mr. ██████ also holds in a separate safe materials he believes too sensitive to be integrated into his central system. He makes this information available to authorized CS officers only, generally to those from the component responsible for the information. Examples of the type of information being discussed here are cards containing information regarding large CA operations and a listing of COSs assigned to stations worldwide since the opening of the stations.

- e. When a researcher comes ^{25X1A9a} to the Historical Staff for information, Mr. ██████ discusses with him the history being written to determine the type of information needed. Mr. ██████ then checks his ^{25X1A9a} index cards personally and selects the pertinent cards. Mr. ██████ also makes a judgment concerning the release of sensitive information. He bases his decision on the nature of the information, the component of the researcher and the intended use of the information. He then furnishes the researcher with copies of the selected cards. These cards lead to documents in the HS and throughout the Agency.

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- f. Pressures have been exerted on Mr. ██████ to reduce, if not eliminate, the compartmentation of information in the HS. These pressures result primarily from the facts that many histories of components

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outside the CS include details of their support to CS operations; writers of histories naturally try to collect all background details, including operational, they feel may be relative to their histories; and some Historical Officers (such as the Chief, CIA/HS) have had limited experience working with and/or protecting operational information. Mr. [REDACTED] has been able to resist these pressures coming from outside the HS. The situation becomes difficult, however, when Mr. [REDACTED] is directed by Prof. [REDACTED] or Dr. [REDACTED] (Mr. [REDACTED] immediate supervisors who are responsible for preparing his fitness reports) to furnish sensitive information to individuals who Mr. [REDACTED] believes from his experience should not have such access.

g. While recognizing the possibility of a reduction in the quality and efficiency of his records system, Mr. [REDACTED] unilaterally has taken two positive steps to protect sensitive CS information. (1) He has tried to make meaningful index cards which incorporate a minimum amount of sensitive information and (2) when he has access to sensitive CS documents for carding purposes, he insists that all copies of the documents be returned to the component responsible so that he will not have it to release.

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3. The CI Staff appreciates and commends Mr. [REDACTED] valuable contribution but believes there should be formal rather than ad hoc controls on the release of CS material of historical value. Mr. [REDACTED] has informed us that Chief, HS has already indicated he wants a replacement for Mr. [REDACTED] who would be younger and more "malleable" and who would be more responsive to the chain of command in the HS. The CI Staff believes strongly that to assign a new CS Staff Officer in the HS chain of command (as Mr. [REDACTED] has been) would place him in an untenable position.

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4. To protect the CS information discussed above, the CI Staff recommends the following action be taken:

a. Transfer the jurisdiction of the CS materials maintained in the Rosslyn complex out of the HS chain of command, and assign a CS Documents Officer responsible to the EA/DDP or the Chairman, CS Historical Board.

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- b. Remove the index references to CS materials from the central HS index and maintain them as a CS historical index. (A relatively simple chore since the reference cards have been color coded and are readily separable by Directorates. It is estimated that it would require a knowledgeable clerk two days to pull the CS cards from the index. The CS documents held by the HS have never been integrated with other material and are maintained separately in two safes).

5. If these recommendations cannot be effected, we then suggest that all CS holdings be removed from the HS area and placed under the control of IS/DIP or the CS Historical Board.

6. The survey surfaced a separate but related problem involving CS information included in histories written by other Directorates, particularly DDS. Attached as Item #2 is a list of such histories. Histories written in CS components are produced in duplicate - one copy being held in the office of the EA/DDP and the other in the component of origin. It has been the practice in the CS that the only copy made available to an interested party is the component copy. This permits that component to exercise control. The histories written in other Directorates are produced in multiple copies some of which are maintained outside the component of origin. For example, copies are held in the HS file area, with only two exceptions noted (the DDS history on "Cover Procurement", and the DDI history on "The Six Day Suez War"). We are aware that many, particularly DDS histories, include sensitive details concerning the CS operations the DDS supported. The CI/RMO noted copies of these finished histories, and observed at a brief glance that an Office of Communications history of the European area contained sections covering the types of equipment used, its location, crypts, liaison with [REDACTED], the people involved, and the Berlin tunnel operation. We believe such information, involving sources and methods, falls within the protection responsibility of the DDP, notwithstanding the fact that it did not necessarily come from information developed in the CS. To ensure control of information concerning CS operations included in histories of other Directorates, the CI Staff recommends that the CS obtain the following commitments from the other Directorates:

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- a. That they limit the number of copies of such histories, and register with the CS the disposition and/or location of each copy.
- b. That they make available such histories for review by the CS to establish agreed access restrictions.
- c. That, to assure adherence to agreed access restrictions, they authorize the CS to review the logs of readers of such histories.

7. This Staff will be happy to work with anyone you designate to produce a document formalizing your recommendations on this subject.

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Deputy Chief
Counter Intelligence Staff

Attachments: a/s

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