

19 January 1972

DDI Reservations to Draft Revision of Executive Order 10501--  
NSSM 113

I concur in the proposed memorandum to the NSC Staff especially the changes recommended in paragraphs 1b and 1c.

My reservations concern how we implement specific portions of the proposed Executive Order. Strict compliance with certain procedures in this Executive Order concerning accountability for classified materials would increase the volume of paper work in this Agency enormously. This in turn would delay the processing of classified materials and the production of finished intelligence and would require a very large increase in CIA's clerical staff, especially in those components responsible for the receipt, dissemination, storage and retrieval of documents.

After reviewing the proposed Order in light of these difficulties, I believe there are three possible courses of action:

1. We could comply with these procedures with the inherent delays and the requirement for increased clerical manpower.
2. We could seek exemptions from several provisions of the Order, particularly those dealing with the accountability, logging, and inventory of classified materials.
3. We could concur and agree that we would try to comply with the spirit of these sections of the Order but that the Director would authorize the Director of Security to permit continuation of current procedures throughout the Agency with the understanding that those units concerned with the processing of classified materials would attempt to develop economical procedures that would bring practices closer to the letter of the Order. Nevertheless, the Director and Director of Security should recognize that this course of action would make us vulnerable to a charge of noncompliance if our procedures were to be examined by those bent upon a strict interpretation of the Order.

It is my opinion that Option 1 is out of the question because of operational needs as well as manpower and budgetary resources required. Option 2 would probably not be acceptable to the Administration because it would appear to undermine the intended impact of the Order. On this basis, I propose that CIA concur with the understanding that we will be able to implement the Order along the lines of Option 3.



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