

8 May 1953

22630/A

Approved For Release 2005/12/23 : CIA-RDP83-01034R000200080001-1

~~TOP SECRET~~  
Security Information

28 May 1948

## MEMORANDUM REPORT FOR THE SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE

Central Intelligence Agency has obtained only meager information on current "biological warfare activities and intentions of our potential enemies." We infer that the Soviets are engaged in research and development on biological warfare for such reasons as the following:

1. Unclassified publications in the USA and Britain show that we are engaged in research and development on biological warfare. For example, an article by Jerome Feiner in the current issue of Harper's Magazine discloses some of the biological agents on which we are working and the place where the work is being done. One would expect the Soviets to be developing defensive measures against these agents and to be engaged in offensive research and development on agents against which we would be most vulnerable.

2. Captured German and Japanese documents indicate that the Soviets were engaged in preparations for biological warfare during and before the war. It is probable that such work was continued after the war.

3. There are several hundred scientists in the USSR whose published work in bacteriology, immunology, etc., indicates that they are capable of developing agents for biological warfare.

4. Various scraps of information point in the same direction: rumors of biological warfare installations on islands in certain Soviet lakes; desire of the Soviets to purchase in the USA equipment for the manufacture of penicillin - equipment which could be adapted for the large-scale production of biological warfare agents; failure of the Soviets to send delegates to the recent Congresses of Tropical Medicine and Malaria here in Washington.

We want to know, of course, whether the USSR has installations devoted exclusively to research and development on biological warfare. If they have a central military installation similar to our Camp Detrick, it could be identified through espionage by a combination of characteristics given in our intelligence requirements. However, biological warfare research can be conducted within laboratories normally devoted to medical research. Such work would be almost impossible to distinguish from legitimate biological and medical research. Pilot plant or large-scale production of biological warfare agents might be done in plants that could not be distinguished, except by unusual security provisions, from plants in the legitimate pharmaceutical or fermentation industries. Testing facilities for biological warfare munitions could not be so easily concealed.

APPROVED FOR RELEASE 1994  
CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM

~~TOP SECRET~~  
Security Information

This is a TEMPORARY DOCUMENT  
only, for the use of DCI/HS.  
The record copy has been  
released to National Archives  
under the HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM.

30  
1005

200025

~~TOP SECRET~~  
Security Information

It is of the greatest importance for us to know what agents the Soviets are producing or are prepared to produce on a large scale. Possible agents are so numerous that we cannot prepare specific defenses against all of them. We should know whether the Soviets plan attack against our crops and livestock as well as man and whether by sabotage or open warfare. It seems to us that reliable answers to these questions are impossible to obtain in peacetime unless we should have the good fortune to find a disaffected Soviet scientist, intimately concerned with the program, who is willing to disclose it. We do not count on such a break, for scientists everywhere have shown that they can and do abide by security regulations. The best we can do, therefore, is to be sure that our intelligence requirements are understandable to operatives not specially trained in biology and that they are properly disseminated among those who might be in a position to get some of the desired information.

Dr. Wallace R. Brode, Chief of our Scientific Branch, and Professor I. L. Baldwin, Chairman of the Committee on Biological Warfare, Research and Development Board, recently flew to London to consult with British authorities on biological warfare intelligence. We are assured of full British cooperation in exchange of intelligence. The paucity of biological warfare intelligence from Russia was felt by the British and a considerable portion of the discussion at this meeting dealt with this subject. The British concur in the feeling that our best hope of specific details is thru disclosure by Soviet personnel rather than infiltration of our agents.

Of our own sources of intelligence we find that reports of military attaches and evaluations from the Scientific Branch, Intelligence Division of the Army give us the most useful information on biological warfare developments abroad. Reports of interrogations by agents of the Central Intelligence Agency both at home and abroad are becoming more numerous and helpful.

If we get little information on the activities and intentions of the Soviets in biological warfare, we can at least estimate their potentialities by a study of Russian publications from which we can determine the scientists capable of such research and their changing activities, the institutions in which they are working and the trends of their work. From such information, which will be assembled by this Agency, with the help of its Foreign Documents Branch, useful inferences can be drawn. For example, it is believed that the Soviets might hesitate to initiate open biological warfare because of present deficiencies in their medical and public health services; that is, in their potentialities for defense against our retaliation. We may expect Soviet sabotage, however, and, lacking reliable intelligence, we should prepare now to defend our most vulnerable crops and livestock and key personnel against agents to which our specialists believe they are particularly susceptible.

~~TOP SECRET~~  
Security Information

~~TOP SECRET~~  
Security Information

- 3 -

The "cold war" preparation of Russia might be slowed down in Russia, with regard to biological warfare, if we should supply Russia, at prices sufficiently low so that internal production was impractical, such biological preparations as serums, vaccines, penicillin, etc. This might deter them from the construction of productive plants for such materials. Such plants would be easily converted to biological warfare purposes and there has been recent inquiry by Russia concerning plant material for production of penicillin.

Signed by hand

28 May 1948

R. H. HILLENKOETTER

Rear Admiral, USN

Director of Central Intelligence

WRB:FLC/kt

Distribution:

- 1 - Secretary of National Defense
- 1 - Director of CIA
- 1 - Asst. Dir., ORE
- 1 - Chief, Scientific Branch, ORE
- 1 - Central Records
- 1 - Admiral Souers )
- 1 - Secretary of State ) per phone call from Jean Gray - A.B.

~~TOP SECRET~~  
Security Information

By Mrs. Hawley  
Sept. 22-23 1953

Chronology of Events in Whittaker Chambers-Alger Hiss Case

1948

August Records of House Committee on Un-American Activities made public.

1949

January 8 Mr. Acheson said he had known the family - two Hiss boys - from childhood and he could vouch for them absolutely.

May 6 Nixon questioned two hours re subversive activities. Told his colleagues on House Committee on Un-American Activities that they "stay out of" any current espionage case being considered by a grand jury. After interview, Nixon said he thought his committee had done a great service through its public hearings on the Whittaker Chambers-Alger Hiss controversy.

July

Hiss was under indictment by a Federal grand jury in New York on perjury counts in connection with secret documents removed from State Department files in 1937 and 1938. Prosecutor Asst. U. S. Attorney Murphy calls witness on typewriter's possession by Catletts late in March 1938. C. M. Eichelberger testified for Hiss as character witness. Thief in Far Eastern Division, State Dept. gave documents to Chambers.

Jury gets case - found guilty on two counts of perjury: 1st on denial he gave State Department documents to Chambers after January 1937; 2nd on denial he saw Chambers after January 1, 1937.

July 9 Jury's final ballot - 8 for conviction and 4 for acquittal.

July 10 Truman says he has never changed opinion that Un-American Activities Committee handling of case was "Red Herring" to distract public attention from 80th Congress blunders and crimes. Nixon criticized Judge Kaufman for barring testimony by Mrs. Massing and William Rosen.

1950

January 21 Hiss brought to trial on account of perjury for denying that he gave secret documents to Mr. Chambers, and charged perjury for denying that he had seen the ex-Communist after January 1, 1937. Second perjury trial - jury out 24 hours - reported verdict at 2:50 P.M. 5 years imprisonment and \$2,000 fine on each account, or 10 years imprisonment and \$4,000. The government contended that the documents were passed in February and March 1938.

This is a TEMPORARY DOCUMENT only, for the use of DCI/HS. The record copy has been released to National Archives under the HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM.

This document has been approved for release through the HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM of the Central Intelligence Agency.

Date 6/26/91 HRP 89-2

100-30  
item 4

200024

1950

January 22 Acheson's friendship with Hiss - his friendship "was not easily given and is not easily withdrawn." A friend had the right to be considered innocent until he was proved guilty. Acheson never condoned crime for which Hiss was convicted.

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

This document has been  
approved for release through  
the HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM of  
the Central Intelligence Agency.

Date 6/26/91  
HRP 89-2

This is a TEMPORARY DOCUMENT  
only, for the use of DCI/HS.  
The record copy has been  
released to National Archives  
under the HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM.

Date 6/26/91 HRP 89-2

On 7 October 1950 I will relinquish the position of Director of  
Central Intelligence to Lieutenant General Walter B. Smith, United States  
Army.

I cannot depart without expressing to each individual member of  
this Agency my heartfelt appreciation and gratitude for the fine and loy-  
al support which I have received during the more than three years I have  
held my present office.

We have experienced together the hard knocks, the real difficul-  
ties, and the successes involved in our mutual responsibilities, and I  
can say honestly that we have made very considerable progress together in  
a field beset by complexities and problems always inherent in pioneering  
a new field.

I am sure that each of you will give to your new Director, General  
Smith, the same loyal and vigorous support which I have received, and  
that the Central Intelligence Agency will continue to grow in capability  
and stature under his leadership.

I wish continued success and happiness for each of you, and you  
may be sure that I will miss our association when I have gone.

*R. H. Hillenkoetter*

R. H. HILLENKOETTER  
Rear Admiral, USN  
Director of Central Intelligence

ARCHIVAL RECORD  
PLEASE RETURN TO  
AGENCY OF ORIGIN

206 092

200025

OCT 12 1950  
100 181  
20-1-50

HS/HC-30

ITEM 1

HISTORICAL DOCUMENT

Destroy only with consent  
of the Historical Review

COPY  
EL

THE WHITE HOUSE  
Washington

April 30, 1947

My dear General Vandenberg:

The Chief of Staff of the U. S. Army has requested your return to assume important and necessary duties with the Army Air Forces. I regret losing you as the Director of Central Intelligence, but the reasons presented me are so cogent that I have acceded to his request. Your task has been exceptionally well performed, and all my good wishes go with you to your new post.

I have directed Rear Admiral Roscoe H. Hillenkoetter to relieve you as of May 1, 1947.

This is a TEMPORARY DOCUMENT

only, for the use of DCI/HS.

The record copy has been  
released to National Archives  
under the HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM.

Very sincerely yours,

/s/ Harry Truman

Date 6/26/91 HRP 89-2

Lieutenant General Hoyt S. Vandenberg  
Director of Central Intelligence  
Washington 25, D. C.

CERTIFIED A TRUE COPY:

(signed) John M. White, Jr.  
JOHN M. WHITE, JR.  
Major, GSC

This document has been  
approved for release through  
the HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM of  
the Central Intelligence Agency.

Date 6/26/91  
HRP 89-2

COPY

(in Basic Admin Authorities, folder #19, job 54-177, box 9, Rec Cent)

REC-30  
10m3a

200026

COPY  
EL

wdoas:cwm:ab

FEB 18 47

This is a TEMPORARY DOCUMENT  
only, for the use of DCI/HS.  
The record copy has been  
released to National Archives  
under the HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM.

Honorable David E. Lilienthal  
Chairman, U.S. Atomic Energy Commission  
Washington 25, D. C.

Date 6/26/91 HRP 89-2

My dear Mr. Lilienthal:

In extension of my letter of January 1 in which I expressed agreement with the proposed formula for the transfer of the Foreign Intelligence Section of the Manhattan District to the Central Intelligence Group, I wish to advise you that I have directed the transfer of the military and civilian personnel with the necessary working equipment and files be accomplished not later than February 23.

I find this necessary because of the requirement for adjusting the payment of the civilians in this group, as well as the need for providing suitable office space since they must vacate the space they now occupy not later than February 23.

The Director of the Central Intelligence Group, General Vandenberg, advises me that the files of the Foreign Intelligence Section will continue to be available to Messrs. Wilson, Volpe, and Huddelson as long as they require access to them.

I am furnishing the Secretary of Navy and the Secretary of State with copies of this letter.

Sincerely yours,

This document has been  
approved for release through  
the HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM of  
the Central Intelligence Agency.

(SIGNED) ROBERT P. PATTERSON

Robert P. Patterson  
Secretary of War

Date 6/26/91

HRP 89-2

COPY

(not classified)  
in Folder #19, Basic Administrative Authorities, CIG, beginning  
1946. Job 54-177, box 9, Rec Center

EC-35  
16m 2

200027



**SECRET** (When Filled In)

AREA OR COUNTRY(S)	ORGANIZATIONS	FUNCTIONS & TOPICS	PERSONALITIES	DOCUMENT
Hqs	DOD	Biological warfare		DATE:
USSR	OSI	Captured documents		28 May 1948
UK	RDB	Intell reporting		CLASS.: TS*
		Attaches		NO.:
IDENTIFICATION OF DOCUMENT (author, form, addressee, title & length) Memorandum Report of DCI, (RHH), for Secretary of National Defense; 2 pages.				22630/A  LOCATION: HS/HC-30 E Item 5 ✓

**ABSTRACT**

In this report the DCI points out considerable concern re the USSR capability in the field of biological warfare and the paucity of existing information. He noted need to rely on captured foreign documents and on attache reports.

Suggested was a plan to sell biological preparations to Russia at a price so low as to preclude their own manufacture which could actually be preparation of agents for BW.

[Darling History Transcript]

Approved For Release 2005/12/23 : CIA-RDP83-01034R000200080001-1

**SECRET (When Filled In)**

AREA OR COUNTRY(S)	ORGANIZATIONS	FUNCTIONS & TOPICS	PERSONALITIES	DOCUMENT
Hqs	Approved For Release 2005/12/23 : CIA-RDP83-01034R000200080001-1			DATE:
	Congress	Subversion	Nixon	Aug 1948 -
		History	Alger Hiss	22 Jan 1950
			Whittaker Chambers	CLASS.: no clas
IDENTIFICATION OF DOCUMENT (author, form, address, title & length)				NO.:
"Chronology of Events in Whittaker Chambers-Alger Hiss Case," by Mrs. Hawley; 2 pages.				LOCATION: HS/HC-30 D Item 4

**ABSTRACT**

This is a chronology of incidents in the trial of ~~Whittaker Chambers~~  
~~Alger Hiss~~ for the charge of subversive activities. Hiss was  
 charged with taking secret documents from State Department files in  
 1937 and 1938 which he supposedly passed on to Chambers.

AREA OR COUNTRY(S)	APPROVALS	FUNCTIONS & TOPICS	PERSONALITIES	DOCUMENT
Hqs	CIA	Appointment	R.H.	DATE:
	DCI	Personnel	Hillenkoetter	7 Oct 1950
			Lt. Genl. Walter	CLASS.:
			B. Smith	no class
IDENTIFICATION OF DOCUMENT (author, form, addressee, title & length)				NO.:
Letter from Rear Admiral R. H. Hillenkoetter, Director of Central Intelligence to employees of CIA; 1 page.				LOCATION:
				HS/HC-30 A
				Item 1 ✓

# ABSTRACT

In this letter Rear Admiral R. H. Hillenkoetter announces that he is relinquishing his position as DCI to Lieutenant General Walter B. Smith effective 7 October 1950.

[Darling History Transcript]

**SECRET** (When Filled In)

AREA OR COUNTRY(S)	ORGANIZATION	FUNCTIONS	PERSONALITIES	DOCUMENT
Hqs	DCI	Appointment	Pres Harry S.	DATE: 30 April '47
	CIG	Personnel	Truman	30 April '47
	White House		Lt. Genl. Hoyt	
	Army/air		S. Vandenberg	
			R. Adm. Roscoe	CLASS. no class
			H. Hillenkoetter	for
IDENTIFICATION OF DOCUMENT (author, form, addressee, title & length)				LOCATION:
Letter from President Harry S. Truman to Lieutenant General Hoyt S. Vandenberg, Director of Central Intelligence; 1 page.				HS/HC-30
Letter from President Harry S. Truman to Rear Admiral Roscoe H. Hillenkoetter; 1 page.				Item 3

**ABSTRACT**

In these letters President Truman tells Lieutenant General Hoyt S. Vandenberg that the Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army had asked for him to return to the service, and that Rear Admiral Roscoe H. Hillenkoetter had been appointed the new Director of Central Intelligence, effective 1 May 1947.

The same message is relayed to Adm. Hillenkoetter in a separate letter.

[Darling History Transcripts]

Approved For Release 2005/12/23 : CIA-RDP83-01034R000200080001-1

**SECRET (When Filled In)**

AREA OR COUNTRY(S)	ORGANIZATIONS	FUNCTIONS & TOPICS	PERSONALITIES	DOCUMENT
Hqs	Approved For Release 2005/12/23 : CIA-RDP83-01034R000200080001-4			DATE: 18 Feb 1947
	Manhattan	Atomic Energy		
	District	Records		
				CLASS.: no class
IDENTIFICATION OF DOCUMENT (author, form, addressee, title & length)				NO.1
Letter from Robert P. Patterson, Secretary of War, to the Honorable David E. Lilienthal, Chairman, U.S. Atomic Energy Commission; 1 page.				LOCATION: HS/HC-30B Item 2

**ABSTRACT**

In this letter Mr. Robert P. Patterson reveals the plans for transferring the Foreign Intelligence Section (FIS) of the Manhattan District to the Central Intelligence Group.

[Darling History Transcript]