

I. ACTIVITIES CHIEFLY OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES.  
 Approved For Release 2005/12/23 : CIA-RDP83-01034R000200240001-3

A. TYPE OF OPERATION	B. AGENCY ENGAGED THEREIN	C. MISSION AND EXTENT CARRIED OUT	D. TYPE OF COORDINATION	E. KNOWN FUTURE PLANS
Clandestine operations	X-2 / OSS	<p>Responsible for complete C.E. information under JCS Directive concerning efforts of other powers in Eastern Hemisphere directed clandestinely against U.S. (and against one another in areas where U.S. has an interest) by means of espionage, propaganda and subversion. To accomplish the mission, operations were carried on [REDACTED]</p> <p>Information secured from all usual sources including secret agents, double agents, penetrations, Ultra material, and from liaison with other American security agencies and with our Allies. Agency not executive. Information assembled, analyzed &amp; evaluated turned over to State, Army Navy, FBI, Treasury, etc. for action. Operated in Eastern Hemisphere solely. Because of lack of representation, due to Mac Arthur's prohibition against OSS, severely handicapped in Far East operations.</p>	<p>Maintained close liaison with State; FBI; Army; Navy; all Treasury security agencies (i.e. Bureau of Narcotics, Secret Service, Foreign Funds Control, bureau of Customs, bureau of Internal Revenue); Justice (including FBI, Alien Control Division &amp; the Alien Registration branch); FEA for smuggling of strategic commodities (e.g. industrial diamonds); Provost Marshal General; Civil Affairs; War Shipping Administration; Office of Censorship. Maintained close liaison with Allied counterparts and certain Security branches of neutral governments. Coordinated all C.E. activities with the Armies in ETO through the SHAEF War room (made up of X-2 personnel, MI-5 &amp; Sec. 5 of MI-6, and French C.E. representatives; direct lines of communications with Armies and Army Groups were maintained).</p>	<p>In the Office of the Under Secretary of War [REDACTED] maintaining JCI personnel in various Army Zones; maintaining Washington Staff for analysis of C.I. trends and activities; maintaining liaison officers with the occupation Armies; maintaining central files of enemy subversive personalities.</p> <p>This document has been approved for release through the HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM of the Central Intelligence Agency.</p> <p>Date <u>7/22/91</u>                  HRP <u>89-2</u></p> <p>From page 1</p>
	F.B.I.(Justice)	<p>Executive law enforcement similar to X-2 but limited to operations in West-</p>	<p>Maintained close liaison with State. Maintained liaison with all other Security agencies. Main-</p>	<p>Will maintain liaison representatives in various European countries, one representative in each</p>

II. ACTIVITIES CHIEFLY WITHIN THE UNITED STATES

A. TYPE OF OPERATION	B. AGENCY ENGAGED THEREIN	C. MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS CARRIED OUT	E. KNOWN FUTURE PLANS
STATE DEPARTMENT OPERATIONS	Office of Controls (formerly operational controls). During the war Adolf Berle was Chief. At present Fredk. B. Lyon is Acting Chief. Mr. Lyon was Chief of Foreign Activities Branch during the War. (See Section C) and during General Holmes' tenure as Asst. Secy. was Assist. to General Holmes in addition to his other jobs.	<p>The following branches are in the Office of Controls which during the War had, among other things, overall security responsibility in the State Department:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Passport Division - responsible for issuance of passports in the broadest meaning of the phrase.</li> <li>2. Visa Division - responsible for assembly and correlation of information necessary to determine the admissibility of aliens into the U.S. in the interest of public safety, and national security.</li> <li>3. Special War Problems Division - special problems concerning citizens abroad - i.e., whereabouts, welfare and transmission of funds to citizens abroad, evacuation and repatriation of citizens abroad, etc.</li> <li>4. Foreign Activities Correlation - presumably for security reasons, operated under the following loose directive: "Responsible for initiation and coordination of policy and action in all matters relating to foreign activities and operations". Among its responsibilities were the handling of Security matters, as they related to foreign service personnel and to personnel employed in any place in the world by the Department.</li> </ol> <p>This branch, because it was in the same division, and because its chief also was Assistant to the Chief of the Office of Controls, was able by controlling the use of passports, visas and exits, to effectively control movements of many individuals in certain counter-espionage cases. However, many aspects of C.I. work were incompletely handled. Almost never advised other agencies (or at least the working echelons) of policies and instructions to missions in advance. With more trained personnel and clearer operating directives, a better job would have been done.</p>	Plans to continue to handle the State Department Security job, within Office of Controls, NOT within the new intelligence set-up.
ARMY OPERATIONS	C.I.C.	Approved For Release 2008/12/23 : CIA-RDP83-01034R000200240001-3 investigative functions transferred to A.S.F.	Continues operations in certain service commands.

*From page 5*

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From page 1

	F.B.I. (Justice)	Executive law enforcement similar to X-2 but limited to operations in West-	Maintained close liaison with all other Security agencies. Main-	Will maintain liaison representatives in various European countries, one representative in each
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ARMY OPERATIONS	C.I.C.	<p>After Jan. 1 1944 all investigative functions transferred to A.S.F.</p>		Continues operations in certain service commands.

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP  
CENTRAL PLANNING STAFF

ROUTING SLIP

No. \_\_\_\_\_ Date 27 Feb '46

Enclosure: \_\_\_\_\_  
Outline - C.I. - C.E.  
x e  
Nicholas

To:		For:	
Planning		Note and Return	_____
Chief	_____	Information	_____
Deputy	_____	File	_____
Rev. & Policy	_____	Recommend routing	_____
Inf	_____	or reference	_____
Intell.	_____	Necessary Action	_____
Security	_____	Comment	_____
Support	_____	Recommendation	_____
Steno	_____	Prepare CIG Action	_____
Secy, NIA	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Review	_____
Reports Staff	_____	Suspense File	_____
Adm. Officer	_____		_____
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From: Planning Staff  
CM

Deadline: \_\_\_\_\_

Remarks: Recommend this be  
up-grabed for accordance  
with subject matter

OUTLINE OF AMERICAN COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE, COUNTER-ESPIONAGE & SECURITY ACTIVITIES

WORLD WAR II

The following outline indicates briefly in a general way the activities of the various American Counter-Intelligence, Counter-Espionage and Security Agencies which operated during the war.

The outline is divided into two sections:

- I. ACTIVITIES CHIEFLY OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES.
- II. ACTIVITIES CHIEFLY WITHIN THE UNITED STATES.

For the purposes of speedy assimilation of the types of C.I., C.E.,\* and Security\* activities and the agencies engaged therein, the following categories have been adopted: A. Type of Operation; B. Agency or Agencies engaged therein; C. Brief Description of Agency's Mission and Extent carried out; D. Type of Coordination of Agency's Activities with other Agencies engaged in C.I., C.E. or Security work; E. Known plans of Agency for Future Operations.

That American C.I., C.E. and Security efforts were anything but centrally directed or controlled will be obvious from the following outline. Neither were officers, experienced and trained in counter-intelligence work engaged in planning at the top or policy levels of the various agencies, with the possible exception of the FBI. Finally, a confusion concerning the objectives and techniques of counter-intelligence as opposed to Positive Intelligence existed in the minds of many in the intelligence field not intimately familiar with the details of C.I. work. Objectives, methods, training and personnel selection are very different from those used in the field of positive intelligence.

The lack of central direction is particularly acute today since the various agencies engaged in C.I. work no longer have the obvious German and Japanese targets.

It is not the purpose of this paper to suggest a plan for American Counter-Intelligence and Security effort, but rather to set down briefly the wealth of experience already gained and to indicate where this experience can be found, in order that it may not be overlooked when such planning is undertaken. Obviously, in addition to the experiences of the agencies and personnel in the agencies outlined below, consideration should be given to the experiences of other nations, particularly the British, concerning whose systems and methods we have full and detailed information.

A. TYPE OF OPERATION	B. AGENCY ENGAGED THEREIN	I. ACTIVITIES CHIEFLY OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES.		E. KNOWN FUTURE PLANS
		C. MISSION AND EXTENT CARRIED OUT	D. TYPE OF COORDINATION	
Clandestine operations	X-2 / OSS	Responsible for complete C.E. information under JCS Directive concerning efforts of other powers in Eastern Hemisphere directed clandestinely against U.S. (and against one another in areas where U.S. has an interest) by means of espionage, propaganda and subversion. To accomplish the mission, operations were carried on under State Dept. cover in neutral areas and with the armies under name of S.C.I. (Special counter-intelligence) in the various theaters (except MacArthur's). Information secured from all usual sources including secret agents, double agents, penetrations, Ultra material, and from liaison with other American security agencies and with our Allies. Agency not executive. Information assembled, analyzed & evaluated turned over to State, Army Navy, FBI, Treasury, etc. for action. Operated in Eastern Hemisphere solely. Because of lack of representation, due to MacArthur's prohibition against OSS, severely handicapped in Far East operations.	Maintained close liaison with State: FBI: Army: Navy: all Treasury security agencies (i.e. Bureau of Narcotics, Secret Service, Foreign Funds Control, Bureau of Customs, Bureau of Internal Revenue); Justice (including FBI, Enemy Alien Control Division & the Alien Registration branch); FEA for smuggling of strategic commodities (e.g. industrial diamonds); Provost Marshal General; Civil Affairs; War Shipping Administration; Office of Censorship. Maintained close liaison with Allied counterparts and certain Security branches of neutral governments. Coordinated all C.E. activities with the Armies in ETO through the SHARF War Room (made up of X-2 personnel, MI-5 & Sec. 5 of MI-6, and French C.E. representatives; direct lines of communications with Armies and Army Groups were maintained).	In the Office of the Under Secretary of War, maintaining X-2 representatives under State covers; maintaining SCI personnel in various Army Zones; maintaining Washington Staff for analysis of C.I. trends and activities; maintaining liaison officers with the occupation Armies; maintaining central files of enemy subversive personalities.
	F.B.I. (Justice)	Executive law enforcement agency with mission similar to X-2 but limited to operations in Western Hemisphere. Mission in Central & South America operated under tripartite agreement with American Intelligence Service (for description see paragraph under U.S. Army) and Navy. FBI jurisdiction included enemy agents, couriers and enemy transmitters and was directed at repression rather than at the longer range objectives of counter-intelligence. Generally considered to have done first-class repressive job particularly in the U.S. Mission in North America shared with other agencies (Army, Navy, etc.)	Maintained close liaison with State. Maintained liaison with all other Security agencies. Maintained liaison officers with the various theaters of military operation during latter period of war to gather information particularly on renegade Americans for prosecution in U.S. by Justice. Liaison relations generally considered poor by most other agencies dealing with FBI. Reason: No general exchange of C.I. or C.E. information by FBI; too much publicity on security matters brought to FBI attention by other agencies; FBI prone to engage in jurisdictional disputes at all levels. Liaison with British better in most respects than with American Agencies.	Will maintain liaison representatives in various European countries, one representative in each Embassy in Central and South America at least until June 30, 1946. Will continue internal security activities in U. S.

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\* Footnote: Because of the tendency in Intelligence circles to confuse the terms "Counter-Intelligence", "Counter-Espionage" and "Security", the following definitions explain their use in this memorandum: (It is realized that these definitions are somewhat arbitrary -- that C.I. encompasses C.E. and both, in the larger sense, are practised to obtain National Security. However, in ordinary "Intelligence" parlance, the word "Security" while used in its broadest sense to mean National Security, is commonly used in the narrowest sense outlined below).

1. Counter-Intelligence: All efforts to neutralize, repress or eliminate the activity of enemy, inimical, or other persons, groups or governments or their representatives to secure intelligence, the obtaining of which would adversely affect the national security.

(continued as Footnote - page 2)

TOP SECRET

A. TYPE OF OPERATION	B. AGENCY ENGAGED THEREIN	C. MISSION AND EXTENT CARRIED OUT	D. TYPE OF COORDINATION	E. KNOWN FUTURE PLANS
Radio Intelligence	1. Naval Communications (delegated to Coast Guard) 2. FBI - certain categories 3. Army Signal Corps (through G-2) 4. British	Procurement of clandestine material under agreement of June 30, 1942, was the responsibility of Naval Communications (delegated to the Coast Guard) and the FBI with general agreements as to area of origination. Further general agreements were made with certain of our Allies as to area responsibility. Handling considered HIGHLY UNSATISFACTORY by counter-espionage agencies. Both Army & Navy communications were dictatorial in establishing priorities and in allocating material. For further information see separate memorandum of different classification.	Liaison on clandestine material virtually non-existent on American side. Close liaison with all interested agencies on this material by British.	Awaiting settlement of jurisdictional intelligence questions.
U. S. ARMY Operations	In Military Theaters: C.I.* under G-2. (i.e. Counter-Intelligence)	Organization as follows: <pre>                     G-2   C.I.   S.C.I.  C.I.C.                     </pre> <p>A. C.I.C. under the C.I. is an operational rather than a staff intelligence activity. Its mission is to provide effective C.E., counter-sabotage and counter-subversive security for units to which it was assigned WITHIN a theater. The C.I.C. is the executive security arm and responsible for all general security work in the theater. However, lacking central coordination, name files and research facilities, it was found necessary to set up S.C.I. units (Special counter-intelligence) staffed by X-2 representatives.</p> <p>B. S.C.I. is responsible for handling of all controlled enemy agents (w/T) in theater, and for carrying out such penetration and all double agent activity. Advised and assisted C.I. authorities in apprehension and interrogation of enemy intelligence personnel, on the basis of S.C.I.'s exclusive access to Ultra material.</p> <p>As compared to C.I.C. operations in Europe and the Middle East, results were poor in Far East. No S.C.I. activity in Far East.</p>	Excellent liaison on S.C.I. level through G-2, C.I. with all other agencies because of link with War Room in London. Virtually no coordination (due probably to theater responsibility) liaison between C.I.C. groups from one theater to another. Much excellent field work on part of C.I.C. was thus lost.	S.C.I. work has been combined with the work of the C.I.'s office. No central control or files above military scene level.
	In Neutral Areas: MILITARY ATTACHE	Military Attache did limited counter-espionage work. This work ordinarily delegated to X-2 representative in Eastern Hemisphere and Legal Attache in Western Hemisphere.	Generally good liaison with X-2, FBI, Naval Attaches & with other Allied representatives.	Awaiting coordinated intelligence plans.
	In South America: AMERICAN INTELLIGENCE SERVICE	Responsible for all enemy subversive efforts directed at War Department plans, policies, physical installations et. In tri-partite agreement with FBI - did not consider its primary mission to be directed against agents, but inevitably had to work against enemy agents to carry out its mission, hence overlapping of operations with FBI. Operation directed from Miami, Florida. Maintained large central files of subversive persons or those suspected of subversion.	Good liaison with FBI and Navy.	Service ceased in January 1944. Operation turned over to M.A. Files returned to Who's Who Branch, G-2 War Department, Washington.

\* Footnote: continued from page 1.

2. Counter-Espionage: All efforts to neutralize, repress or eliminate the practice of spying or employment of secret agents by enemy, inimical, or other persons, groups or governments affecting the interests of the United States.

3. Security: In its narrow sense, used to mean all efforts to shield or guard against the disloyalty or active espionage of, or sabotage or subversive efforts on the part of, any persons in or connected with U. S. establishments, installations, plants, factories, etc. and to insure the physical protection of such persons, plants or factories from espionage, sabotage or subversive activity.

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A. TYPE OF OPERATION	B. AGENCY ENGAGED THEREIN	C. MISSION AND EXTENT CARRIED OUT	D. TYPE OF COORDINATION	E. KNOWN FUTURE PLANS
U. S. Navy Operations	Fleet Commands: STAFF INTELLIGENCE OFFICER.	In many instances had Security Officer handling C.I. work, particularly in Amphibious operations. Navy policy, however, is to turn over all Security and C.I. work to an Army G-2 wherever possible. This in turn usually is assigned to local C.I.E.  Rear Echelons and Base operations ordinarily have Security Officer.	Decentralized operation. Studies, manuals, name information provided and coordinated by Domestic Branch (D) through ONI channels. Good liaison usually with local C.I.C.. Intelligence officers in the Fleet Command working on security, trained and administered by ONI but not directly responsible to ONI.	Awaiting new coordinated intelligence plans.
	Neutral Areas: NAVAL ATTACHE	Some C.I. work done at the request of Domestic Branch (D) ONI (formerly Op-16-B). Sometimes shared work and responsibility with Intelligence Unit of Staff of nearest fleet. N.A.'s & N.O.B.'s early in the war initiated C.I. work in South America before FBI was in the field.	Channeled C.I. information through F.Branch ONI to D. Branch. Relations with N.A.'s generally considered unsatisfactory by C.I. Branch (D) because of N.A.'s responsibility to F. Branch. Maintained where necessary liaison with other American, Allied and neutral C.I. and security organizations.	Awaiting new coordinated intelligence plans.
	Domestic Branch (D) ONI (Formerly Op-16-B)	While located in Washington, this Branch provided the research facilities for Naval C.I. work. Many of the studies prepared by this Branch eventually turned over to CIC since CIC often served as executive arm. Agency well staffed and did excellent C.I. job though severely limited by indirect contact with sources and action agencies in field.	Maintained liaison with all security agencies, but provided for no adequate exchange of counter-intelligence.	While awaiting new intelligence plans, contracting operations. Eventually during peace period D will probably be simply a staff operation.
C.I. Combined Allied Effort	SHAEP WAR ROOM	The Counter-Intelligence War Room, London, was an integrated Anglo-American organization with united French participation; it operated under general authority of SHAEP from its inception (1 March 1945) until dissolution of SHAEP (July 1945) and since later date is directly controlled by the three contributing agencies: MI-5, MI-6 and OSS/X-2. C.I. War Room has been central information and advisory agency directly servicing British, U.S. and French counter-intelligence authorities in Germany and Austria with information, reports and recommendations on personnel and operations of German Intelligence Services. In Summer 1945 had maximum staff of 200 people.		Now reduced to liquidation basis of about 25 people.
Deception Combined Allied Effort	212 Committee  Nothing known of similar activities under MacArthur.	212 Committee - Mission and Accomplishment. 212 Committee was organized August 1944 by deception authorities of 21 AG and 12 AG in order to: (1) Approve all material sent out by CEA's (controlled enemy agents) in the theater (except the UK where this function was handled by the XX Committee or Committee of Twenty as it was generally known). (2) Direct deception policy for the traffic of CEA's. (3) Authorize the use of CEA's for particular operations. Meeting weekly or fortnightly until end of war, the Committee eventually became little more than a clearing house for discussions of CEA problems. It rarely offered deception directives, and its function as approving authority for deception material gradually disappeared.  212 Committee - Coordination with other Agencies. 212 Committee, originally composed only of deception authorities of the Army Groups and the chief CEA officers of British and American SCI, was eventually enlarged to embrace all British and American agencies interested in CEA matters in the ETO (including ANCXF (with links to the Admiralty); AFAF (with links to the Air Ministry); G-2 and G-3 of SHAEP (with links to the XX Committee); G-2 and G-3 of 12 AG; I(b) and G(R) of 21 AG; and G-3 of 5 AG as well as SHAEP CE War Room) and from all three Army Groups. The French, however, were never allowed to participate in the deliberations of the Committee.		Operations closed down when SHAEP dissolved.
Department of State Operations	Chief of Mission	Coordinated all intelligence and security in neutral countries. In the Eastern Hemisphere ordinarily delegated the C.E. work to the X-2 representative; in Central and South America delegated C.E. work to Legal Attache.	In most instances (with few outstanding exceptions) liaison was passive and would scarcely be called thorough.	Policy continues as outlined in Column "C".

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ACTIVITIES CHIEFLY OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES, continued:

A. TYPE OF OPERATION	B. AGENCY ENGAGED THEREIN	C. MISSION AND EXTENT CARRIED OUT	D. TYPE OF COORDINATION	E. KNOWN FUTURE PLANS
Economic Security Operations	A. BLOCKADE CONTROL DIVISION, FRA.	A. Charged with coordinating all information on the smuggling and illicit movement of strategic materials outside the U.S. Charged with supplying coordinated information to action agency (e.g. - Navy, Army) to stop said smuggling.	A. Did good job of coordination and liaison both in obtaining information from agencies in the clandestine field and with the action agencies using the finished product.	A. Now in State Department.
	B. WORLD TRADE INTELLIGENCE DIVISION - STATE (Now Economic Security Control in the Office of Economic Security Policy.)	B. WTID charged with handling proclaimed list of blocked Nationals.  Both agencies (A & B) relied on OSS and FBI, Army, Navy, for clandestine information; both obtained overt information from own sources, State, from other sources, etc.	B. Did good job of coordination and liaison both in obtaining information from agencies in the clandestine field and with the action agencies using the finished product.	B. Awaiting new coordinated intelligence agency plans.
SAFHAVEN PROJECT - STATE DEPT.		Project to utilize the concerted efforts of the Allied powers to investigate enemy plans, investments and individual activities which could be employed to preserve their economic, political and military potential abroad following the cessation of hostilities. Material gathered from all intelligence and security agencies handled by Division of Economic Security Policy for economic security matters; by Foreign Activities Correlation, Office of Controls, for political security matters. Project very ambitious. Needed closer coordination of aims and operation within State Department.		Project continues to be handled by two different divisions within State, although recommendations have been made to consolidate.

End of "Activities Chiefly Outside the United States"

Part II begins on next page.

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ARMY OPERATIONS	C.I.C.	After Jan. 1 1944 all investigative functions transferred to A.S.F. except for limited activity in certain service commands. While in G-2, the pattern of confusion between Security, C.E. & C.I. very marked. G-2 War Department continues to exercise general staff supervision over all C.I.C. policies and activities in the military establishments.		Continues operations in certain service commands.
	A.S.F.	Internal Security & Intelligence activities in the zone of the interior consolidated under A.S.F. PMG responsible for supervision of all investigative functions and activities.	Good coordination with Army, Navy and FBI.	Awaiting future Army plans.
G-2 War Department WHO'S WHO BRANCH		None	None	Setting up under recent G-2 directive, organization whose mission is very similar to that of X-2, FBI and D-4 Navy.
G-2 War Department CPM BRANCH		Responsible for interrogation (among other things) of all military POW's in the U.S. Refused to use services (in many instances the advice) of trained counter-espionage personnel in all interrogations. This Branch probably the worst perpetrator (in Washington) of bottlenecks and withholding devices in the name of security. As a result of this attitude, a number of important C.I. cases held up and sidetracked.	Close coordination in joint effort with Naval counterpart, but because of lack of C.I. interest, poor liaison with X-2, D-4, et al.	Awaiting future intelligence plans.

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A. TYPE OF OPERATION	B. AGENCY ENGAGED THEREIN	C. MISSION AND EXTENT CARRIED OUT	D. TYPE OF COORDINATION	E. KNOWN FUTURE PLANS
NAVAL OPERATIONS	O.N.I. DOMESTIC BRANCH	Counter-Intelligence work done in the Domestic Branch (formerly Counter-Intelligence Branch), in the following sections: (The titles are self-explanatory): D-1 - Investigations Section D-2 - Security of Naval Information D-4 - S.E.C. Section (Sabotage, espionage and counter-subversion) D-22 - Naval Censorship Section (inactive) D-23 - Commerce & Travel Section (inactive) All D.I.C. information of a C.I. & Security nature from the field was processed through this Branch.	Remarks under Navy-Domestic Branch in Section I apply here.	Remarks under Navy - Domestic Branch in Section I apply here.
JUSTICE DEPARTMENT OPERATIONS (other than FBI)	Immigration and Naturalization Service	See Security -- Port of Entry Section, Page 7. Responsible for admission, exclusion, registration, fingerprinting and deportation of aliens and investigation of alleged violations and administration of laws pertaining to the above functions. Operates the Immigration Border Patrol to detect smuggling and surreptitious entry of aliens into U.S. One important phase of this responsibility during the war period covered the control of alien seamen arriving in American Ports.	Good coordination with other agencies.	Planning to expand its activities.
	The War Division	Supervises the Alien Registration Division and Enemy Alien Control Division which had charge of supervising and controlling all agents of foreign governments and registered under the Foreign Agents Registration Act.	Good coordination with other agencies.	Activities contracting.
U.S. CENSORSHIP OPERATIONS	Office of Censorship	Maintained staff which censored all mail and cables terminal to the U.S. Maintained Secret Watch List on persons suspected of espionage, sabotage or subversion (names provided by Army, Navy, X-2/OSS, FBI) for special treatment.  Maintained Laboratory for special treatment of suspected communications. Made all information available from Censorship.	Maintained excellent liaison with all agencies. Effectively coordinated censorship operations for the benefit of all user agencies.	Upon cessation of activities recommended that a special committee be appointed to maintain liaison with OSRD and to observe censorship techniques as they were carried on with other countries and to be prepared to implement the plan prepared by the Office of Censorship in the event of future hostilities.
Security Operations concerning ATOM BOMB	Manhattan District Engineering Project	Responsible for Security of project processes, personnel and plant. Maintained large security staff in the U.S. FBI assisted in security protection upon request of District.	Liaison with our Allies. Maintained offices in London.	Some planning - probably informal - of a Security Agency to cover the world on all forms of atom security from location and control of ores to finished project.
WAR SHIPPING ADMINISTRATION	Ship Movement Section, Division of Security & Communications.	Responsible for the location and date of arrival of all merchant ships. Supplied all security agencies with information of great use in the controlling of couriers.	Good coordination with Security agencies.	
Security of Joint Operational Plans	Joint Security Control	1. Security 2. Deception	Fair coordination with Security agencies which were one major outlet for such deception as was engaged in from this country.	

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A. TYPE OF OPERATION	B. AGENCY ENGAGED THEREIN	C. MISSION AND EXTENT CARRIED OUT	D. TYPE OF COORDINATION	E. KNOWN FUTURE PLANS
<p>A. SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS &amp; Police Type Security</p> <p>A. Including Personnel Security investigations; war plant security; security of all Army and Navy installations, etc.</p>	<p>G-2 ONI FBI ASF (OPMG) CIC (ASF) OSS (Security Branch) Coast Guard A-2 State Civil Service Navy, Base maintenance Treasury</p>	<p>Made policy and directed investigations of a security nature.</p>	<p>Little coordination between the various agencies doing Security investigations. C.I.C., F.B.I. and Navy did certain amount of coordination on plant security work. OPMG not coordinated too well with others early in war. Later it took over many of CIC investigative functions.</p>	<p>Only God knows. (On second thought, maybe Schwarzwelder)</p>
<p>B. SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS of people at the various PORTS OF ENTRY.</p>	<p>Handled by a Panel originally as follows:</p> <div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 5px; margin: 5px;"> <p>Panel</p> <div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 2px; margin: 2px;">F.B.I.</div> <div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 2px; margin: 2px;">O.N.I.</div> <div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 2px; margin: 2px;">G-2</div> </div> <div style="margin-left: 20px;"> <p>Second Screening</p> <div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 2px; margin: 2px;">State</div> <div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 2px; margin: 2px;">Third Screening</div> <div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 2px; margin: 2px;">Immigration</div> <div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 2px; margin: 2px;">Fourth Screening</div> <div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 2px; margin: 2px;">Customs</div> </div>	<p>Directed all interrogations at the Ports of Entry. There seems to be general agreement that the panels did not accomplish much since screening already had been done abroad by Army, Navy, State, X-2 and by F.B.I. in South America. Previous screening in many instances done by Allies. The Navy dropped out first, was followed by the Army and eventually the F.B.I. Routine State queries of Gripsholm passengers and the usual Immigration and Customs examination continue at the various Ports of Entry.</p>		<p>Immigration and Customs to carry on.</p>
<p>Security Operations of TREASURY DEPARTMENT</p>	<p>a. Bureau of Customs</p> <p>b. Division of Narcotics</p> <p>c. Foreign Funds Control</p> <p>d. Secret Service</p>	<p>Among its functions important in War were enforcement of customs and other laws by patrolling international borders of U.S. Inspection of all international traffic entering continental U. S. Prevention of smuggling of contraband merchandise into U.S. Examination of all tangible communications entering and leaving the U.S. other than thru regular mail channels. These controls exercised through 46 Customs Collections districts and three border patrol districts.</p> <p>1. Responsible for legal importation of narcotics. 2. Responsible for prevention of illicit traffic and production of narcotics in the U.S. During War maintained no agents abroad but relied on X-2/OSS for information and coordinated efforts with F.B.I. and other enforcement agencies on all matters of a security nature.</p> <p>Controlled flow of American currency and securities abroad; controlled property and funds of enemy aliens or enemy dominated and neutral countries. Relied on overt sources and on OSS, State, FBI, Army, Navy, etc. for clandestine information.</p> <p>Charged with Security of the President and Staff; and with the prevention of counterfeiting.</p>	<p>Maintained good liaison with other Security agencies during the war. All Treasury law enforcement agencies coordinated under Chief Coordinator, Elmer Irey.</p> <p>Good coordination, but because narcotic imports were reduced drastically, did not participate to any great extent. Works closely with the Bureau of Customs which is the action agency at all Ports of Entry and on all borders of the U.S.</p> <p>Good liaison with FEA, State, etc.</p> <p>Close coordination with Justice. Only fair coordination with other C.I. agencies.</p>	<p>Planning to expand operations. Recently one Treasury agent was attached to Embassy in London. Will build up organization abroad gradually. These Treasury representatives will use covers of Special Treasury Agents examining weights and grades of merchandise, etc. Their actual targets will be obtaining information concerning the smuggling of contraband into the United States.</p> <p>Planning to expand operations. Will have a few representatives abroad to spot large stocks of narcotics which may be sent to the U.S.</p> <p>The Branch is concerned with liquidation of all funds seized during War.</p> <p>Planning to continue operations on about same basis.</p>

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