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<b>Remarks:</b>			
<p>In the event you may not have seen this assessment [albeit somewhat dated], it does represent one useful contribution to the problem of where we go vis-a-vis Turkey.</p> <p>It might be useful, once you are back and have caught your breath, to see what additional papers might be appropriate for our next production on Turkey. I suspect that another NIE is premature, given the most recent one, but we certainly should consider either a "Memorandum to Holders," or, if we want to go into a broader strategic arena, perhaps an IIM, but in any case, it is worth our discussion at your convenience.</p>			
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# **Turkey: Forging a New Order**

**An Intelligence Assessment**

**Secret**

*PA 81-10077  
March 1981*

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# Turkey: Forging a New Order

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## **An Intelligence Assessment**

*Research for this report was completed  
on 15 January 1981.*

This assessment was prepared by [redacted]  
[redacted] Western Europe Division, Office of Political  
Analysis. Comments and queries are welcome and  
should be addressed to Chief, Western Europe  
Division, OPA, [redacted]

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This paper was coordinated with the Offices of  
Strategic Research and Economic Research, the  
Directorate of Operations, and the National  
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
**Turkey:  
Forging a New Order** [Redacted]

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**Summary**

The generals' takeover in Turkey on 12 September 1980 brought to at least a temporary end an experiment in liberal parliamentary democracy launched by reformist-minded younger military officers in 1961. Rapid economic growth and social change during the 1960s and 1970s had led to unfulfilled expectations, ideological polarization, excessive partisan zeal, endemic violence, and a breakdown of political order. The near collapse of the structure set up by the constitution of 1961 highlighted Turkey's unreadiness for the stresses of an exceptionally freewheeling democracy [Redacted]

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The generals then intervened, suspending the constitution, banning all political activity, and extending martial law to the entire country. They quickly contained violence and began to lay plans for tackling the causes of terrorism and promulgating new political rules to ensure stability in a democratic framework. The commanders had little choice but to continue Demirel's much lauded economic austerity program, partly because it seemed to be bearing some fruit, and partly because Western creditors—on whom Turkey is heavily dependent—have made its continuation a condition for further assistance. Nevertheless, if the sporadic oil supplies coming from Iran and Iraq prove insufficient for Turkey's long-term needs, acute shortages of energy and other necessities and the lack of foreign exchange to pay for oil imports could create serious problems for the new regime. [Redacted]

The new political order that the military leaders envision is ambitious and comprehensive. The generals have promised to establish a constituent assembly next fall composed of nonpartisan individuals. The fundamental


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
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law that emerges, which must be approved by the military, probably will include:

- Provisions for a less freewheeling governmental system with a strengthened presidency, a revamped parliament, and a more responsible judiciary.
- An electoral law that will reduce the influence of small parties and measures that depoliticize the bureaucracy, labor unions, and the educational establishment.
- Measures that streamline the public sector and redefine the statist structure of the Turkish economy.
- Reinforcement for the secular system and provisions that will minimize religious and sectarian influence in politics. 

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In foreign policy, the generals face the same fundamental dilemma as previous governments: they depend on the West for economic aid and global defense, but they cannot function without the oil supplied by Middle Eastern countries. Nevertheless, by pulling Turkey sternly back onto the secularist path sketched by Ataturk and containing the violence that was tearing the fabric of Turkish society, the military has in effect made Turkey a more accommodating NATO ally. The new regime has shown a willingness to work toward a settlement of the Cyprus dispute and longstanding differences with Greece over territorial rights in the Aegean. Not having to worry about securing a parliamentary majority or political backing, the generals are better able than their predecessors to implement an agreement.



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On the other hand, Ankara is striving to cement closer ties with its oil rich neighbors in an effort to make up for the severe disruptions in energy supplies caused by the war between Iran and Iraq—which together account for some 75 percent of Turkey's oil supplies. This has led to a tilt away from Israel and is likely to induce the military regime to interpret Turkey's NATO commitment more strictly—probably ensuring that Ankara will be extremely reluctant to allow US facilities on Turkish soil to be used for any operations in the Middle East that fall outside the purview of the Alliance.



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Ultimately, the success of the military program to reform Turkish institutions depends on the unity of the ruling National Security Council and the level of public support for it. Although there are signs that the generals disagree on methods, unanimity appears to exist over long-range goals. The

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public has thus far supported the military government, but the longer the restoration of civilian rule is delayed, the more likely it is that the public will become restive and potentially troublesome. Large antiregime demonstrations, unlikely at this time, would undermine the generals' attempts to reassure Western creditors that democracy will be restored as soon as possible. [REDACTED]

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Western pressure is not likely to deter the generals from staying in power until they have achieved their stated goals. They could conceivably decide, once the new democratic framework is in place, to turn over formal authority to the civilians—perhaps as early as the spring of 1982. It is much more likely, however, that they will retain at least a behind-the-scenes political role until they are confident that their entire plan is completed and accepted by key groups—a process that will probably take several years. On balance, the commanders seem to have the will and the resources to succeed in restructuring the political system. If they do, the result will be a less freewheeling democracy in Turkey, but greater political stability. Whether such restructuring will address the fundamental causes that gave rise to the current situation is an open question, however, and if it does not, the steps the generals are now taking may not be sufficient to preclude future military interventions. [REDACTED]

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Unclassified photograph from Daily News, 1 October 1980. ©

*The National Security Council: (left to right) Admiral Tumer,  
Generals Ersin, Evren, Sahinkaya, Celasun, and Saltik*



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**Turkey:**  
**Forging a New Order**

**Anatomy of a Coup**

The Turkish General Staff assumed direct control of the government on 12 September 1980 after a protracted period of anarchy, economic uncertainty, and political turmoil. Although the generals were prompted to act by a series of events earlier in the year, the root causes for the military takeover lie much deeper.

**The Roots of Turmoil**

Many of the strains on Turkish society can be traced to the 1920s when Ataturk wrenched the country into the 20th century and superimposed a Western system of government on Turkey's historically authoritarian culture. But the dramatic transformation of Turkey's essentially stable and stoic society to one overwhelmed by instability and turmoil dates more clearly from the aftermath of the military takeover in 1960.

Ironically, the political structure created after the 1960 coup to turn Turkey into a modern democracy led instead to polarization, extremism, and instability. The liberal constitution of 1961, which granted extensive rights of association and almost complete freedom of expression, allowed political beliefs long suppressed by Kemalist philosophical dogmas to emerge. The growth of associations widened the ideological split between leftists and rightists and cut across ethnic, sectarian, and urban-rural cleavages.

Turkish society simultaneously entered a period of dramatic change—industrial production rose, new plants were built, the labor force grew, illiteracy declined, intellectual life prospered, and every segment of society came to demand more for itself. Growing economic inequities and the sharpening of class distinctions further exacerbated social tensions. Old values that had traditionally cemented social relationships were replaced by new “truths,” and this competition between old and new produced conflicts in every sphere.

Although Turks obtained greater democratic freedoms and more material benefits during the 1960s, political and social institutions failed to adapt to the new demands. An important reason for this failure was Turkey's Ottoman legacy of revolution from above—a process that creates the framework to represent and speak for the masses, but fails to provide sufficient avenues for participation or for access to power. Although a large number of Turks became emancipated, political institutions seemed ever more restricted. Frustration and alienation led to the creation of ideologically diverse, and at times extreme, political organizations.

Another reason for the failure was the relative immobility and ineffectiveness of Turkey's elected governments after the restoration of civilian rule in 1961. No single party was able to win consistent public support. The 1961 coalition came about only as a result of strong military pressure on the center-right Justice Party to join forces with its leftist rival, the Republican People's Party. Moreover, the political struggle that had been waged in the 1950s between two right-of-center parties had evolved by the 1970s into a confrontation between the sharply polarized left and right.

**Economic and Social Factors**

Demographic, economic, and social factors have further alienated many Turks. The population of Turkey has soared from 19 million in 1945 to 47 million in 1980, and in recent years the working age population (15 to 64) has grown by about 700,000 annually. Because of the lack of job opportunities, only about 250,000 people have actually entered the labor force annually, and less than half of these have found work. Total unemployment probably is close to 25 percent if one includes the “disguised unemployed”—those who

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want jobs but are too discouraged to actively seek them. Aided by \$4 billion in Western economic aid, Turkish economic growth averaged over 6 percent annually during 1948-75, but this did not keep up with the rising expectations fueled by increased educational opportunities and the experiences of Turkish workers in Europe. Moreover, Ankara placed too much emphasis on import substitution instead of developing competitive export industries [redacted]

The current economic crisis was triggered by the 1973 oil price hikes, but it is even more the result of bungled economic policy. Ankara tried to shield Turks from higher oil prices through subsidies, price controls, export restrictions, an overvalued exchange rate, and huge budget deficits. These measures disrupted production, curtailed exports, and caused imports to soar. Turkish governments did not, or could not, face up to these problems until January 1980 when Prime Minister Demirel introduced his stabilization program. These austerity measures probably were a major step in the right direction: they began to slow inflation, reduced the balance-of-payments deficit, and largely eliminated shortages of critical items. But given the severity of the crisis, it will require several years for them to be effective. [redacted]

Turkey's troubled economy—where the rate of inflation soared to over 100 percent before Demirel's austerity program took hold—contributed to the rise and spread of radical ideologies. When young people left the traditional self-sufficient life in the villages to seek employment and education in urban areas, they sought ideological "families"—rightwing and leftwing groups—that would provide warmth and shelter in return for their loyalty. Greater democratic freedoms allowed conflicts to come into the open by politicizing—indeed by polarizing—the civil service, educational institutions, and all public programs. Restraints fell away from groups that were once under firm discipline—youth (almost a class by itself in Turkey), the Alevi, the Kurds, the labor force—and left them caught up in a free-for-all. [redacted]

#### Immediate Causes

The minority Demirel government that came to power in October 1979 was confronted with myriad economic and internal security problems, compounded by a

political stalemate between the major parties. The failure of the political leaders to reach agreement on how to address the issues led to public frustration, political immobilism, and military impatience. [redacted]

**Violence.** Political and social polarization continued to increase during Demirel's tenure and led to rising violence. Terrorism took the lives of more than 1,500 people during the first six months of 1980. The trend was clearly ominous: the average number of deaths per day in 1978 was two or three, in 1979 it was four, and by September 1980 it had soared to more than 20. Although the statistics inevitably included some victims of nonpolitical crimes, the rise in violence primarily reflected clashes between the left and right fueled by tensions that had become endemic to Turkish society. [redacted]

The level of violence had been rising gradually for several years, but the first major shock came in December 1978 when over 100 people were killed in Kahramanmaras in fighting between extremists. Martial law was quickly imposed in 13 of Turkey's 67 provinces, and by September 1980, seven more provinces were added in response to what some—especially in the military—perceived to be Kurdish separatist activity in eastern Turkey and increasing sectarian conflict in central Anatolia. Martial law had little impact on the level of violence, however, and it involved the military in what is essentially police activity. Moreover, terrorists, hoping to provoke harsh military repression that would turn the people against the government, sought to deepen that involvement by killing prominent people—such as rightist political leader Gun Sazak (May 1980), former Prime Minister Nihat Erim (July 1980), and leftist leader Kemal Turkler (July 1980)—and attacking military targets. [redacted]

**The Political Impasse.** Rampant terrorism contributed to the political stalemate that developed immediately after Demirel's accession and continued throughout 1980. Lacking an effective parliamentary majority, Demirel created a minority coalition government with reluctant support from the Islamic fundamentalist National Salvation Party of Necmettin Erbakan and the more flexible rightist Nationalist

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Former Prime Minister Suleyman Demirel and opposition RPP leader Bulent Ecevit [redacted]

Unclassified photograph from *Briefing*, 2 June 1980. ©

Action Party led by Alpaslan Turkes. Demirel's precarious majority, however, was frequently tested by the opposition Republican People's Party and by Erbakan, who repeatedly threatened to withdraw his support. [redacted]

As the commanders became increasingly concerned by the deteriorating economic and security conditions, they began to issue warnings to civilian leaders to cooperate for the sake of the national interest. Their demarches in January and February 1980—apparently the result of pressure by the commanders on General Evren—emboldened the Demirel government to enact sweeping economic reforms and to propose new internal security legislation recommended by the military. The warnings also temporarily intimidated the opposition RPP into muting its criticisms and being more cooperative. This truce was soon broken, however, and the parties were unable to reach agreement on electing a new president even after the passage of six months and more than 120 ballots. Nor were the parties able to work together on additional military-backed internal security legislation that was proposed in late July. [redacted]

The last straw for the military came toward the end of the summer. It became increasingly obvious that the parties could not come to terms on holding early elections—the only hope of breaking the political stalemate—and at the same time the NSP joined forces with the RPP in an apparent attempt to bring down the government through censure motions against the government and its ministers. In other words, it became clear to the military that the politicians were incapable of putting aside their partisan interests for the good of Turkey. The commanders concluded that the politics-as-usual approach by civilian leaders would continue indefinitely as the country, crippled by the absence of a permanent president, headed toward civil war. [redacted]

**The Erbakan Factor.** One of the most galling aspects of the political situation for the military was the disproportionate amount of power NSP leader Erbakan acquired and used in Demirel's coalition government. To the generals, Erbakan seemed to threaten all that Ataturk had stood for—a strong, independent secular, and Westernized state—and that they were pledged to

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
defend. Trading on the key position of his party, Erbakan sought to strengthen the hand of religion in Turkish politics, a clear violation of Kemalist secular principles. He also demanded that Turkey put more distance between itself and the West and draw closer to its Islamic neighbors. It was the government's failure to break relations with Israel following that country's annexation of East Jerusalem that gave Erbakan the pretext to withdraw his support and begin work to oust the government. [redacted]

A religious rally sponsored by the NSP in Konya on 7 September, where Ataturk and the Turkish state were derided, further enraged the military. By itself, this incident was not the determining factor that made the military decide to intervene; [redacted]

[redacted] Nevertheless, it was a dramatic reminder to the generals that the Turkish state was in danger of departing from its underlying precepts. It also touched nerves in the military, and coming as it did after a series of volatile episodes—most notably bitter fighting in Corum Province and the ouster of the pro-West Foreign Minister Erkmen—it may have been the final nudge that made the generals act when they did. In hindsight, however, it seems clear that the takeover would not have been delayed long in any case. [redacted]

**The Turkish Way of Taking Over.** The military takeover of 12 September offers some useful insights into Turkish political dynamics. Although the commanders dismissed the Demirel government for its inability to cope with mounting problems, their action was prompted more by the disruptive tactics of the opposition than by the government's programs. Available information indicates that the commanders strongly favored some of Demirel's proposals, such as constitutional amendments to strengthen the presidency and holding early elections in the fall. It was the repeated efforts of the RPP and the NSP to prevent passage of military-backed legislation and their attempts to bring down the government that caused the military reaction. The Turkish press put the matter succinctly after the takeover when it characterized the coup as one of the few that "overthrew the opposition" instead of the regime in power. [redacted]

The other distinguishing characteristic of the Turkish military is its strict adherence to Ataturkist principles. The commanders were manifestly reluctant to assume power—preferring instead to let the democratic process take its course—but were forced by mounting crises to conclude that if they did not, they could expect a steady worsening of the political situation and a growing challenge to Kemalist traditions. [redacted]



The Turkish military assumed power for similar reasons twice before, in 1960 and 1971, and each time it stepped down when it considered its task complete. The generals probably will act likewise this time, stabilizing the political situation, revamping the system according to Kemalist ideals, and planning the phasing out of military involvement in politics. [redacted]

Their job is more difficult this time, however, because the causes of the takeover spring from the roots of the Turkish political and social system. The house needs more than spring cleaning, it needs rebuilding. The task will almost certainly take longer than the 18 months that were sufficient for previous takeovers. [redacted]

**Military Perceptions of Civilian Government Failure**

By 1980, the generals had formed a low opinion of politicians as a class: they were divisive people who sought personal political gain at the expense of the national well-being. Political bickering—common in Western parliamentary systems—seemed to constitute

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Unclassified photograph from Daily News, 18 August 1980. ©

Justice Party chief Suleyman Demirel and Islamic fundamentalist NSP leader Necmettin Erbakan. [redacted]

a threat in the context of Turkey's more traditional and authoritarian political culture in which the concept of a "loyal opposition" has not taken root. [redacted]

The military government's program of action following the takeover amounted to an indictment of the 1961 constitution and the civilian leadership the constitution had given rise to. According to the new regime, political leaders were unwilling or unable to cope with:

- A weak and ineffective executive.
- An overly powerful judiciary.
- Extensive university autonomy.
- The incongruity of the liberal law on associations and groups and Turkey's traditional norms.
- The rapid growth of small ideological and religious factions that could, and did, enter the political arena.
- A politicized and polarized labor force, civil service, national police, and educational establishment.
- An ineffective and divided legislature.
- A stagnating economy. [redacted]

The generals hope to tackle these issues systematically by carefully drafting new laws that will ensure fundamental changes in the Turkish political system. When violence has been rooted out and the economy brought back on a sounder course, the commanders will restore civilian rule. [redacted]

### Military Aspirations

The regime's first priority is to restore order in a country that has been wracked by violence over the past few years. Harsher security measures—curfews, house-to-house searches, mass arrests, extended periods of detention without trial, and occasional executions—have drastically reduced extremist activities. In a determined effort to avoid the polarization of society that followed the earlier military takeovers in 1960 and 1971, the government has been scrupulously evenhanded, cracking down with equal vigor on leftist and rightist organizations. Although harsher measures have led to some human rights abuses, these appear to be isolated cases. There is no indication that the government has sanctioned brutality, and it has begun investigations into all reported abuses. [redacted]

Remarkable progress has been achieved, but no one, least of all the military, believes that terrorism has been eradicated. Although it is dormant, its roots are deep in Turkish society, and violence will blossom once again as soon as the freeze is over—unless those roots can be dug up. [redacted]

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The second priority item on the generals' agenda is economic stabilization. Lacking definite answers to the problem, the commanders have continued Demirel's austerity program and have persuaded the highly respected economic czar, Turgut Ozal, to stay on to implement it. Although the Turkish press has recently stepped up its attack on Ozal and his policies for failing to achieve dramatic results, the generals are not likely to make any changes, both because the package seems to be working—inflation appears to be down, exports and workers' remittances are up, and shortages of consumer items have largely been eliminated—and because Western creditors are making future loans conditional on the continuation of Ozal's measures or others like them. [REDACTED]

In the short term, however, the military regime may find that parts of Ozal's stabilization program work at cross-purposes to their goals of eradicating the social and economic inequities that breed extremism. The commanders might then be torn between short- and long-term goals—possibly exacerbating strains in the ruling hierarchy. [REDACTED]

Beyond controlling violence and pursuing economic recovery, the generals hope to make constitutional changes that would prevent those conditions that gave rise to the takeover in 1980. They envisage a series of reforms that include a new constitution and laws on political parties, elections, secularism, and the like that would critically alter the balance of power in favor of stability. [REDACTED]

#### A New Charter

The military regime's plan for the restoration of civilian rule is predicated on the assumption that many of the reforms can be achieved in three to five years. The basic objective is to create a more stable political system that would make future military interventions unnecessary. The military's reform effort is ambitious; it includes writing a new constitution, drafting new laws on political parties and elections, and restructuring many of Turkey's political institutions. The system created by the 1961 constitution, which was written by

<sup>1</sup> Ozal claims that the rate of inflation has been reduced to 40 percent, but his detractors insist that it is much higher. [REDACTED]

the military in the aftermath of a takeover, has not worked, and a whole new structure must be erected. [REDACTED]

The new constitution will officially be written by a constituent assembly, which apparently will be formed between next August and next October. The ruling council probably will limit the size of the assembly as much as possible—unlike the unwieldy group that wrote the 1961 constitution—and might exclude political leaders that were in office or were engaged in politics at the time of the takeover. In any event, the assembly probably will rubberstamp many of the constitutional provisions that the NSC will submit to it. Its job is not expected to last for more than a year, although its tenure will depend on the ease with which it reaches agreement and its receptivity to the NSC's prescriptions. [REDACTED]

#### A Stronger Presidency

The commanders would like to see a strengthened presidency that would provide for quick and firm decisionmaking. Turkish presidents under the 1961 constitution owed their meager, and largely ceremonial, powers to the prestige of the office as the symbol of the state and to their status as the link between the military and the politicians. The generals would like to give the chief executive real muscle and reduce the influence of political factors in national decisionmaking. The new constitution is likely to:

- Give the president wide discretionary powers to dissolve parliament in times of crisis and regulate the functions of government.
- Grant the president greater authority to address national problems and to initiate legislation in parliament.
- Streamline the election of the president either by popular vote or by the legislature; if the system of election by parliament is retained, failure to elect after a specified number of parliamentary rounds would result in the dissolution of parliament or early elections. [REDACTED]

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There has been some speculation that the NSC might carry on as the nominal executive even after civilian rule is restored—at least until the dust has settled and a permanent president can be elected. Although it is too early to be talking about candidates, Evren is in the best position to make the transition from “head of state” to president—effectively extending the military’s involvement by several more years. [redacted]

#### **A Weaker Legislature**

The most likely outcome of parliamentary restructuring would be a unicameral legislature with the Senate replaced by an advisory body, or simply absorbed by the lower house, the National Assembly. The new charter would presumably seek to amend those provisions of the 1961 constitution that have by general agreement promoted divisive political crosscurrents. Drafters will take a hard look at laws that allowed:

- The prime minister to co-opt ministers from outside parliament.
- The Constitutional Court to oversee and overrule legislative acts.

They will also look into reforming the proportional representation system that encouraged a plethora of parties and produced coalition or minority governments. [redacted]

#### **Stricter Electoral and Political Party Laws**

Electoral laws are of particular interest to the military rulers. With the example of Erbakan fresh in their minds, they would like to create a system where small parties would be denied access to disproportionate power. Under the electoral laws that were enacted during the 1960s and early 1970s small splinter parties were encouraged by the promise of seats in parliament, thereby siphoning off strength from the major political parties. The resulting profusion of parties almost always compelled the largest party to join forces with and accede to the demands of factions that had nothing in common with the major political forces. Coalition partners frequently became critics and at times joined the opposition to oust the government, thereby leading to virtually continuous impasses in parliament. [redacted]

The commanders envisage a tighter and more stringent form of proportional representation. One option is to create single-member constituencies where the winner

of the electoral contest would represent the district. This winner-take-all approach would perforce lead to a two-party system—also envisaged by the generals. Another option is to hold elections under a two-ballot system that would eliminate small parties, or at least reduce their power to wield significant influence. Or the generals might decide to adopt the West German model, which requires a minimum percentage of votes to qualify for a seat in parliament. Even proponents of proportional representation concede that majority rule might be salutary for a while—at least until greater stability is achieved. In any case, once electoral law reforms are on the books, the generals might permit political activity to begin, perhaps as early as the spring of 1982. [redacted]

Before they do that, however, the commanders would try to reform the parties. They believe that the 1965 Political Parties Act prevented internal party democracy, restricted alternative leadership, and promoted the perpetuation of an oligarchy almost impossible to unseat. They envisage drafting a new law that would liberalize the internal dynamics of parties and allow greater opportunities for leadership changes, thereby avoiding the personal politics exercised by such party leaders as Demirel and Ecevit. [redacted]

#### **Judicial Reforms and Law Enforcement**


The judiciary has posed special problems in Turkey’s centralist political system. The most independent branch of government, it bears the onus of having been in the best position to turn back the tide of extremism and violence and having failed to do so. In addition, the Turkish judiciary under the 1961 constitution acted to nullify or modify executive and parliamentary acts, thereby contributing to the politically charged atmosphere and to divisiveness. [redacted]

The generals, first of all, want to reduce the authority of both the Constitutional Court, which reviews legislative acts, and the Council of State, which oversees executive and administrative decisions. Military leaders apparently fault both for blocking measures reinforcing the state’s authority, such as essential security bills and electoral laws. [redacted]

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The commanders are likely to streamline the country's judicial organs without tinkering with their independence. They foresee the creation of State Security Courts that would deal—as they did in 1971-73—with crimes against the state. They hope such a measure would relieve the military of martial law duties in times of crisis and allow for swifter and more efficient meting out of justice. [redacted]



The commanders are also studying the possibilities of revising the penal and criminal codes with the objective of making them more stringent and more specific. The military criminal code will likewise be scrapped and replaced with penalties for violations of the penal code. [redacted]

In the meantime, the commanders have amended the law governing martial law duties. On 10 November, the number of days that suspects could be detained before bringing them to court was tripled to 90. If the investigation is not completed after 90 days, however, the detainee must be released. [redacted]

An additional amendment on 14 November was designed to speed up the trials of terrorists by removing the possibility of defense-inspired delays through procedural challenges. Not only did the amendment limit the defendant's rights to delay the case beyond 15 days, but it made martial law authorities immune from civil actions alleging that the rights of suspects have

been violated. Although the new law stacks the deck against the defendant and could be seen as a threat to civil liberties, it might have the beneficial effect of reducing the backlog of cases that has developed as a result of the military crackdown and roundup of terrorists. [redacted]

**Reemphasizing Kemalism in Education**

The Turkish generals ascribe some of the blame for the growth of anarchy to the country's educational establishment which, according to the military, has abandoned Kemalist principles in favor of extremist philosophies. They point directly to the 1961 constitution that allowed unprecedented autonomy for universities and associations, thereby permitting the dissemination of Marxist, "foreign," and religious ideologies considered contrary to the Kemalist foundations of the Turkish state. [redacted]

The commanders aspire to rebuild the educational system so that youth—considered a class by itself in Turkey—can once again be reared in the Ataturkist tradition. The takeover on 12 September appears to have had a salutary effect on education by driving underground many extremists who had used the schools as headquarters for their activities. The regime's program in the short term is to depoliticize education, and the military rulers have begun to purge the Ministry of Education of extremists. They are also bringing radical teachers' union leaders to trial. The commanders have been reluctant, however, to intrude into the universities and have instead let them police themselves. The military retains influence through administrative appointments and will probably become more forceful in its demands as its reform effort unfolds. [redacted]

Strong opposition to military policies has not appeared, and most academics are taking a wait-and-see attitude. Resistance to educational restructuring might grow if the military begins to impose its presence more forcefully in educational institutions or if the intellectuals are not consulted on the drafting of a new constitution. Criticism of educational reform would also intensify if the new rules are excessively restrictive. [redacted]

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**Greater Control of Provincial Administrations**

The generals—in an effort to purge extremists from government positions—also abolished provincial councils, dismissed the mayors, and replaced them either with military officers or nonpolitical individuals. [redacted]

Provincial administrations are under the direct jurisdiction of the NSC, and this centralization is likely to continue until the military pulls out from politics. [redacted]

The administrative reforms in Turkey's local governments illustrate a darker side of the military's rule. Because the generals are convinced that politicians are corrupt, they are replacing some competent, responsible officials with unqualified people who frequently thwart public projects supported by the people. The commanders also have the notion that once a nonpartisan administration is appointed, matters will automatically get better. That this has not been the case is demonstrated by the recent reshuffling of governors and security personnel in many of the provinces. [redacted]

The new constitution, however, probably will decentralize provincial administrations after civilian rule is restored. The practical result of such a move would be to free local governments from Ankara's influence. Along with a political parties law that decentralizes party machinery, it would also break the hold of central party administrative boards over local party councils. [redacted]

**Reinforcing Secularism**

The generals attach particular importance to maintaining the Kemalist tradition of secularism. Kemal Ataturk implemented a strict policy of excluding religion from politics in the 1930s that has distinguished Muslim Turkey from many of its Islamic neighbors. The commanders—guardians of the Kemalist tradition—have historically been wary of religious penetration into the political arena and have watched events in Iran with alarm. Attempts to bring Islam into government contributed to the takeovers in 1960 and 1971. Blatant disregard of Kemalist principles by Islamic fundamentalists and their verbal barrages against the Turkish state in 1980 contributed to the takeover on 12 September. [redacted]

The Turkish military probably will attempt to minimize the influence of religious political parties by carefully manipulating the new political parties law once civilian rule is restored. There are also likely to be provisions in the new constitution and the penal code that would control religious activity. Some resistance might be expected in rural areas—especially in the NSP strongholds of west-central Turkey—but for the most part Turks, who have lived with secularism for half a century, are likely to go along with the prohibitions. [redacted]

**Civil Service Reforms**

The Turkish civil service has become one of the most political sectors of Turkish society under recent civilian administrations. A change in government almost always meant stacking the bureaucracy with political appointees without regard to qualifications and competence. The requirements of coalition building also led to trade-offs where certain crucial ministries—such as Youth and Sports, Interior, or Labor—were staffed by supporters of small political parties who took the occasion to bring in their own people, thereby contributing to the polarization of the civil service. Not only has the Turkish bureaucracy been a hotbed of extremism, but it has also grown to such an extent that the civil service employs 10 percent of the labor force. [redacted]

Since the takeover military leaders have assumed virtual carte blanche to overhaul the civil service. Nevertheless, the commanders apparently are moving cautiously. They are making a conscious effort to depoliticize the system, eliminate inconsistencies, and gradually reduce overstaffing. The generals have

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changed governors in 27 of Turkey's 67 provinces and are seeking to remove ideologues from state economic enterprises, the Ministry of Education, the state planning organization, and the Ministry of Youth and Sports. They have also begun to reshuffle security officials in various provinces. Their aim is to create a civil service that is less divisive and bulky, more competent and professional, and more independent of political forces. [redacted]

**Economic Measures**

Radical labor confederations—like the Confederation of Revolutionary Labor Unions (DISK), Confederation of Nationalist Labor Unions (MISK), and Hak-Is—have contributed to the polarization of society and to violence. Their political activities, moreover, have led to a decline in productivity, thereby exacerbating Turkey's economic problems. With the exception of the moderate Confederation of Turkish Labor Unions (TURK-IS), the military government has banned all labor union activity and recently appointed trustees to administer the dormant unions. The generals want to write a new labor and associations law that would keep labor confederations out of politics. [redacted]

The military is moving cautiously but firmly on labor reform. The National Security Council ordered all strikers back to work shortly after the takeover, but gave them a 70-percent pay raise. The NSC also pushed through a severance pay law that makes it easier for businesses to fire people without putting much financial strain on the employer. [redacted]

Some progress has been made toward restoring limited collective bargaining; a draft bill now being considered will mandate contracts for those ordered back to work in September, recommending that existing contracts be used as benchmarks. The law would also probably impose a ceiling on wage and fringe benefits. Judiciously applied, these new labor rules could have the desired effect of prodding workers into greater productivity and labor unions into more responsible behavior. [redacted]

The government is also working on tax reforms to alleviate the inequities and disincentives that have crept into the system partly as a result of inflation. Measures so far include a reduction in most income tax rates and an extension of coverage to the largely untaxed agricultural sector. The remaining laws are expected to alter the tax structure both to alleviate the burden on lower and middle income groups and to meet requirements of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and the International Monetary Fund. Tax reform should boost revenue, thus reducing the budget deficit—a possible key to further progress in slowing inflation, which is still running at 40 to 60 percent. [redacted]

In addition to measures aimed at boosting productivity, the military hopes to attack inflation through budgetary measures. Although Turkey's 1981 budget is 105 percent higher than that approved for 1980, it was written in the context of the January 1980 austerity program and attempts to be anti-inflationary. Among other things, it commits the government to fiscal conservatism in supporting public enterprises. A novel change is that the entire cabinet—instead of the Minister of Finance—will have authority to increase appropriations. The Finance Minister previously was independent in fiscal matters and frequently increased appropriations beyond set limits. Now deficit spending will be more difficult to justify. [redacted]

The economic plan—drafted simultaneously with the budget—calls for \$3.5 billion in exports and \$9 billion in imports, reflecting Turkey's dependence on foreign goods; crude oil requirements account for a large share of the import bill. To reduce the trade deficit the government program includes provisions for stimulating exports through incentives and an export insurance structure. Ankara has for a long time recognized that the public sector is less productive than the private sector and is now attempting to alleviate the import-export discrepancy by making Turkish industry more competitive in world markets, particularly in such areas as food processing and agriculture-related industries. Exports have picked up sharply in recent months and were almost two-thirds higher than the corresponding period a year ago. Workers' remittances

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from Europe—a key item in Turkey's balance of payments—also are at a record high, and Ozal attributes this to Turkey's "flexible exchange rate policy," whereby the Turkish lira is devalued frequently in small increments to keep it competitive. [REDACTED]

The military will also try to restrain government spending, in particular by continuing the effort begun in January 1980 to make the state economic enterprises, among other sectors of the Turkish economy, subject to market forces and therefore more competitive. State subsidies were to be reduced and in some cases eliminated. The generals have continued this policy and are expected to pursue the revamping of public enterprises. They may also seek to turn over to private enterprise those state-run businesses that continually operate at a deficit and might examine the entire statist structure to see which public services might be run more efficiently through market mechanisms. This would be done carefully and perhaps reluctantly, however, because statism was one of Ataturk's guiding principles. [REDACTED]

### Foreign Policy

By and large, Turkey's foreign policy under the military regime will not differ significantly from that of the Demirel government. The generals face the same fundamental dilemma: they depend on the West for economic aid and global defense, but they cannot function without the oil supplied by the Arab countries. [REDACTED]

Nevertheless, in the process of pulling Turkey back onto the secularist and pro-Western path marked by Ataturk, the military has in effect made Turkey a generally more accommodating NATO ally. Moreover, the new regime has shown a willingness to negotiate the Cyprus issue and longstanding differences with Greece over territorial rights in the Aegean. Not having to worry about securing a parliamentary majority or political backing, the generals have been more flexible than Demirel could be on such issues as Greek reintegration into NATO—which was accomplished in October largely because of Turkish concessions—and the lifting of airspace controls over the Aegean. The military leaders would like to eliminate the economic

and military burden of maintaining troops on Cyprus, and they are pressing the Turkish Cypriots to work for an agreement with the Greek Cypriots. [REDACTED]

The extent to which the commanders will pursue rapprochement with Greece (and the Greek Cypriots) will depend in large measure on their success in carrying out domestic programs. Their flexibility on foreign policy issues will be determined by the nature of the political system that emerges in Turkey, what Turkish leaders perceive the national interest to be, and the level of political resistance they encounter along the way [REDACTED]

Although the military's strong commitment to the West was prescribed by Ataturk, their sensitivity to Western views is also dictated by economic necessity. OECD members pledged a substantial amount of aid in 1980, and another pledging round may be held this spring. Western banks have advanced enormous loans and large amounts of credit to Turkey, and a re-scheduling of commercial loans—amounting to some \$3 billion—could also take place in the spring. This assistance is crucial to Turkey's stabilization program, and the commanders are loath to strain ties with their creditors. [REDACTED]

On the other hand, Turkey is no less dependent on foreign oil. Hard hit by the disruptions in oil flows caused by the war between Iraq and Iran—which together account for some 75 percent of Turkey's oil supplies—Ankara is striving to cement closer ties with its Arab neighbors. This has led Turkey to tilt away from Israel, and relations between Ankara and Tel Aviv have been reduced to the second secretary level. [REDACTED]

The generals will continue to seek economic aid from the West while angling for more oil from the Arabs. These conflicting interests will induce the military regime in Ankara to interpret Turkey's NATO commitments more strictly—probably ensuring that it will not allow US facilities on Turkish soil to be used for any operations outside the purview of the Alliance. [REDACTED]

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Evren addressing people in Adana. [redacted]

Unclassified photograph from *Daily News*, 17-18 January 1981. ©

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### Will They Be Successful?

The success of the military program will depend on:

- The level and degree of unity among the commanders on fundamental issues.
- The nature and strength of resistance from politicians and intellectuals.
- The degree to which the public perceives the program to be in its interest and supports it [redacted]

Because the commanders are not hindered by requirements for parliamentary approval or public mandates to carry out their program, they are likely to write and implement those laws that they have promised. There are contradictory reports on the unity of the ruling NSC, however, and any internal strife among the rulers, of which there is little evidence, would torpedo the speedy return of civilian rule. [redacted]

[redacted]

Although the commanders have been particularly careful to be impartial, the prosecutions of far rightist Turkes and Islamic fundamentalist Erbakan have left the NSC open to charges of favoring the left. The generals have begun

to bear down on leftists—particularly radical union leaders—and are likely to continue to do so; these actions might undercut accusations of favoritism if the NSC continues its deliberate evenhandedness. [redacted]

The monolithic facade of the government also has begun to show cracks over the government's program. [redacted]

Some of the disagreements stem from the inevitably divergent views of technocrats on social and political issues. The generals, however, have thrust themselves into the political arena—however reluctantly—and now must act as politicians as well as soldiers. Disharmony, therefore, is likely to focus on the personalities within the nonpartisan government [redacted]

The level of public support for military operations and the government program is also important for the success of the reform effort. Thus far, public support for the ruling council and its decisions has been impressive, and it is likely to continue at least for the near

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future. There was a general sense of relief when the military took over in September, and despite reservations about the loss of democracy, the dominant public reaction was satisfaction over the return of public order. [redacted]

Public perceptions of the government's program have been mixed because the action plan is vague; people do not know what to expect. This wait-and-see attitude could turn to open support if:

- Political stability is achieved and maintained.
- Polarization of society is reduced and extremism rooted out.
- The economy shows visible improvement over the short term.
- The groundwork for restoring democracy is laid in the near future. [redacted]

The public's mood is volatile, however, and resistance could increase if the commanders take too long in implementing their reforms and restoring civilian rule, or if the economy begins to deteriorate once again. The latter is critical because Turks are currently preoccupied with bread-and-butter issues. Any serious disruption—such as the Iranian-Iraqi war—could stall economic recovery. The resulting pinch, even if perceived to have been caused by external factors, would probably translate into dissatisfaction with the military government. Large-scale public discontent would undermine the regime's attempt to reassure Western creditors that democracy will be reinstated as soon as possible and jeopardize the political stability established by the generals. [redacted]

[redacted]

The level and nature of resistance from politicians and intellectuals will depend on how radical the generals' surgery on the political system turns out to be. There is little doubt that the commanders will not tolerate polarization and extremism in the political and educational spheres. They are bound to take strong restrictive measures that will become focal points for resistance. [redacted]

If the ruling council decides merely to establish the framework for political reform and leave the details to the civilians to complete, political resistance probably will be relatively subdued. Political leaders would count on being able to tinker with the implementation of reforms not to their liking. [redacted]

The more probable outcome, however, is for the military government to pursue its complex program to the end, whatever delays this may entail for the resumption of democratic government. As the length of military rule stretches out, discontent and the chance of organized resistance will increase. The government's response will be the key factor, but given the clear determination of the generals to go ahead with their program, it seems likely that they will succeed in restoring stability in the short term. [redacted]

[redacted]

General Evren announced in mid-December that the NSC will provide a timetable this year for the return of civilian rule. So far, the regime has only promised to create a constituent assembly by the end of October—barring major setbacks. The process of drafting a new charter could take a year or more, and after that the generals would have to oversee a host of fundamental changes as well as setting up legislative and, finally, presidential elections before withdrawing. [redacted]

On balance, the commanders seem to have the will and the resources to succeed in restructuring the political system. If they do, the result will be a less freewheeling democracy, but greater political stability. Whether such restructuring will address the fundamental causes that gave rise to the current situation is an open question, however, and if it does not, the steps the generals are now taking may not be sufficient to preclude future military interventions. [redacted]

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