




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# **The Italian Christian Democrats: An Uncertain Future**

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**A Research Paper**

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# **The Italian Christian Democrats: An Uncertain Future**

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## **A Research Paper**

*Information available as of 1 September 1981  
has been used in the preparation of this report.*

The author of this paper is [redacted]  
European Issues Division, Office of European  
Analysis. Comments and queries are welcome and  
may be directed to the Chief, European Issues  
Division, [redacted]

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**The Italian Christian  
Democrats:  
An Uncertain Future**

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**Overview**

In June 1981, the 35-year grip of the Christian Democrats (DC) on the Italian Prime Ministry ended when the office was assumed by the leader of a small coalition party, the Republicans. Although the DC remains strong, the loss of this key position was but the latest in a series of defeats and checks beginning in 1974 that have clouded the DC's future. Calls for party renewal have a hollow ring after eight years without evidence of effective action. Over the same period, the DC's main rival, the Communist Party (PCI), has enjoyed a steady rise in electoral strength, but in 1979 it slumped for the first time in parliamentary elections.

Conventional wisdom holds that Italy's Government is unstable, but detailed analysis shows three decades of stagnation and immobility while the DC became virtually inseparable from the Italian state. Also, since at least 1953, all major Italian parties—except the PCI— have retained an almost identical share of the electorate. The average lifespan of governments since World War II is 11 months, but only one party, the DC, and a relatively small number of its leaders have managed the government.

Except in politics, Italian life has undergone a metamorphosis since 1945, and profound change has occurred in the Catholic Church. The result is a governing "confessional" political party which has changed little while the nation has leapt into the postindustrial world. Now a major industrial power with a high standard of living, Italy is still ruled by a DC-dominated government

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Assessment of various facets of political activity permits identification of changes in progress. The crisis of DC party organization, leadership, and support groups, for example, shows an increasing divergence from the basic trends in national life. Study of regional, provincial, and communal levels of government and election results also suggests that traditional assessments of parties' strengths, particularly of the DC, based solely on national election results are inaccurate.

The evidence is insufficient to indicate whether the DC will achieve true renewal or suffer imminent and dramatic decline. One thing is clear: the nature of the party's power and role in government is changing. Even though its traditional interclass appeal is disappearing and its ability to deliver spoils is declining, the DC may retain at least 28 to 30 percent of

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the electorate for the near future and is assured of a major share of national life for some years to come. But the DC's longstanding inability to govern except in coalition will become progressively more subject to increased demands from potential partners.

Coalitions of opposites in Italy are sanctioned by more than a century of practice. Hence a *modus vivendi* between the DC and PCI is not without precedent. Should that occur, however, the DC would suffer some shrinkage of its electorate, and conservative factional elements might bolt the party. Thus, should current trends continue, there will be a reduction of DC power in the next few years.

Crisis is endemic in the DC's history, yet it has continued to survive against all predictions. Nevertheless, in the 1980s, continued juxtaposition of postindustrial society to a DC-dominated government described as a "35-year Watergate" is ultimately a volatile mixture.

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*NOTE: Throughout the text of this paper, in cases where place names differ in Italian and English the English name is used. In the figures, the Italian name is used in most instances.*

## **The Italian Christian Democrats: An Uncertain Future**

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Christian Democracy's emergence as a major political force is one of the most significant events in Western Europe since World War II. Five of the 10 member nations of the European Community have large parties of this bent, the dominant one being in Italy. The rather dramatic rise of Christian Democracy after the war stems from its appeal as a moderate center movement at a time when the right was discredited by nazism and fascism and the left was associated with Stalinism and the Soviet Union. Also the Christian Democratic appeal was broadly based because of the movement's adherence to Christian principles on human rights, particularly those of the individual, as well as to democracy, class reconciliation, and transnational cooperation and integration. While Christian Democracy's strength is its nonideological, wide-ranging approach to politics, its weakness is the lack of any firm and articulated creed of specific goals. Still, its mild conservatism attracts many adherents because of its defense of private property, aversion to Marxism, and general rejection of excessive state intervention. In essence, Christian Democracy has drawn together pragmatists of all classes who desire the resolution of problems through conciliation and compromise. In the Italian case, it has had the added appeal of providing a broad opening to Catholics who were long excluded from national politics in the wake of Church-state hostilities during and after Italian unification.

Christian Democracy has varied considerably in each of the countries where it has developed. The very vagueness of its programs plus the diversity of particular country experience fostered the growth of somewhat divergent groups under the same label. This is particularly true of the Italian Christian Democrats (DC) because of the Holy See's presence in Italy. Much more so than elsewhere, century-old conflicts between Church and state in Italy still influence an Italian's perception of the role of the Vatican and of Catholics in public affairs. It is thus the prime example of the cliché that Italy has a long historic memory.

From 10 December 1945 to 28 June 1981, in unbroken sequence, governments headed by Christian Democratic premiers governed Italy (see figure 3). Either alone or in coalition with smaller parties, the DC's record of 39 consecutive governments is unequaled in the West. Only in Asia with the Liberal Democrats of Japan can a comparably long tenure be found. Unlike Japan, though, Italy has become virtually synonymous with instability.

Whereas many observers believe that Italy's frequent changes of government are indicative of weakness or fragility, the DC's persistent and pervasive presence suggests something quite different. Indeed, continuity of political administration in democracies is normally regarded as evidence of a sound body politic. And when compared with some of the lurches and wrenchings of postwar France, Italy appears rather stolid. Admittedly, however, the number of government crises in Italy is the stuff of which instability is made. Also, a decade of recurrent Red Brigade terrorist activity has given Italy high international visibility with overtones implying governmental impotence, notably in the 1978 abduction and murder of former Premier Aldo Moro. There are also the electoral gains made by the Communist Party in the 1970s as well as the returns on various issues submitted to referendum since that on divorce in 1974, all connoting growing challenge to DC rule. Furthermore, an average lifespan of 11 months for cabinets is hardly characteristic of stable government.

Examined in detail, however, Italy's political condition seems to suggest stagnation or atrophy rather than instability. Government crises rarely have resulted from fundamental political differences. Instead they have been more an exercise in political ritual—jockeying by rival DC factions—wherein the game is perpetually influenced by the DC and its involvement in all segments of national life. Governments have changed, but men and policies have remained monotonously similar. When a major shift has occurred, such as the Socialists' entry into the government in 1963, the change was contemplated well in advance and was

**Legend:**

- Political region boundary
- Province boundary
- Political region capital
- Province capital

**Scale:**

- 0 100 Kilometers
- 0 100 Miles

**Names and boundary representation are not necessarily authoritative.**

**Map Labels:**


- Countries:** France, Switzerland, West Germany, Austria, Czech, Yugoslavia, Algeria, Tunisia.
- Regions:** Aosta, Piemonte, Liguria, Lombardia, Veneto, Friuli Venezia Giulia, Trentino-Alto Adige, Trentino, Pordenone, Gorizia, Trieste, Veneto, Padua, Verona, Mantua, Cremona, Pavia, Bergamo, Sondrio, Varese, Novara, Vercelli, Aosta, Turin (Torino), Cuneo, Liguria, Genova, Savona, Imperia, Monaco, Liguria, Toscana, Emilia-Romagna, Marche, Umbria, Lazio, Abruzzi, Molise, Campania, Puglia, Basilicata, Calabria, Sicilia, Sardinia, Corsica.
- Cities:** Bern, Liechtenstein, Bolzano, Trento, Belluno, Udine, Trieste, Gorizia, Pordenone, Treviso, Vicenza, Verona, Padua, Ravenna, Ferrara, Modena, Bologna, Reggio Emilia, Parma, Piacenza, Alessandria, Asti, Cuneo, Genova, Savona, Imperia, La Spezia, Massa Carrara, Pisa, Lucca, Pistoia, Florence (Firenze), Arezzo, Siena, Grosseto, Viterbo, Terni, Perugia, Macerata, Ancona, Pesaro, Forlì, San Marino, Ascoli Piceno, Foggia, Benevento, Caserta, Naples (Napoli), Salerno, Avellino, Potenza, Matera, Taranto, Brindisi, Lecce, Cosenza, Catanzaro, Reggio di Calabria, Messina, Catania, Syracuse (Siracusa), Ragusa, Agrigento, Enna, Caltanissetta, Palermo, Trapani, Sassari, Nuoro, Oristano, Cagliari.
- Islands:** Corsica, Sardinia, Sicily.
- Other:** Ligurian Sea, Tyrrhenian Sea, Adriatic Sea, Ionian Sea, Strait of Sicily, Strait of Messina, Strait of Otranto, Strait of Gibraltar.

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Figure 2

## Structure of Government, 1981




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Figure 3

## The Governments of the Republic of Italy



<sup>a</sup>Governments are said to be "in crisis" from the time an incumbent cabinet resigns until its successor takes office. In the crisis period, the outgoing government serves in caretaker capacity.

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accepted virtually as a necessity even by those originally opposed to it. Viewed in broad perspective, this and other shifts are examples of how Italian politics tend to move more in the context of geologic time than in conventional political frames.

The characteristic torpor of Italian politics may, however, be coming to an end, albeit in slow motion. Analysis of regional and national elections as well as returns on referendums demonstrates that something is changing. In the midst of such protracted change, what might ultimately emerge is more difficult to ascertain than elements in the transition process. Terrorism and the Italian public's response to it, for example, are symptomatic of exasperated impatience and frustration. The years of dramatic terrorist acts would seem to imply an eventual and unavoidable backlash or public outburst. Yet the passage of so many years of flamboyant incidents without decisive public outcry has become a particularly Italianate phenomenon. Terrorism in this instance must be regarded with caution, however, for it is a symptom of something more profoundly alarming in Italian life. Whether or not the Red Brigades and other terrorists, left or right, are aided from abroad is not the critical aspect of the situation. Instead, these assaults on the system are violent warnings of a profound dislocation which continues to feed lawlessness and which in turn can be exploited from outside.

The Christian Democrats, and to varying extents their occasional coalition allies, carry great responsibility for the immobilism and unfulfilled promises that have frustrated the Italian people, driving some to the point of murder and mayhem. The roots of this violence and the seedbed in which it flourishes are widely viewed by Italians as deriving from years of failure by the government to resolve persistent problems and provide an effective response to national expectations. Blaming the Christian Democrats alone for this state of affairs is simplistic, but as the only constant stewards of national affairs for 35 years they become a facile scapegoat. No objective analysis of contemporary Italian affairs can thus avoid careful assessment of DC leadership and the party's role in guiding the nation, as well as a look at what can be expected of Italian Christian Democracy in the future.

### **The Church versus State Antecedent**

The image of the DC in Italian minds can be fully comprehended only through an awareness of the role of Catholics in the last century of national life. Unusual as the longevity of this phenomenon may seem to outsiders, Catholics and Catholicism—the question of Church and state—is the oldest continuing theme in Italian politics. Christian Democracy's rule is but the central manifestation of the phenomenon since 1945. In addition, one must remember that if political conduct in Italy is Byzantine, it derives from centuries of foreign domination when duplicity, subterfuge, corruption, and myriad devious devices were justified as necessary for survival until they became a way of life.

Italy's unification process was shot through with conflict between the papacy and the secular forces seeking to create a nation state. Church opposition to national unification hardened in 1870 when the Kingdom of Italy seized the city of Rome, ending papal temporal authority. Pius IX then forbade Catholics under pain of excommunication to participate in the affairs of what he regarded as a usurper state. Only in 1904, and then in limited and oblique fashion, was that prohibition lifted to permit Catholics to throw their weight into any electoral district where leftist or anticlerical elements might otherwise win a seat in Parliament. Again in the national election of 1913 restrictions were further relaxed to allow Catholic candidates for the first time to run against leftists. Finally, with Benedict XV's grudging acquiescence in 1919, all constraints on Catholic involvement in Italian politics were lifted. A Sicilian priest, Don Luigi Sturzo, then founded the Italian Popular Party (PPI), Italy's first confessional party and the forerunner of today's DC. As in previous Catholic political initiatives the PPI was directed largely against Marxist elements in national politics. Until January 1921, when the Communist Party (PCI) was founded, the principal vehicle of Marxism in Italy was the Socialist Party (PSI). Whether in opposition initially to the Socialists or subsequently also to the Communists, anti-Marxism was as important in the founding of the PPI as it was in the establishment of the DC in the final years of World War II.

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If the hostility of the Vatican toward the Italian state is comprehensible, the Church's opposition to later Catholic initiatives in politics is harder to grasp. The first man to be elected to the Italian Parliament as a Catholic, the priest Romolo Murri in 1909, was defrocked and excommunicated. That incident and others illustrate ongoing tensions within the Catholic community itself. Catholic political activity in Italy developed and still continues to work either in spite of the Vatican or as a weapon used by the Church to oppose certain initiatives within the Italian political arena. Thus, one cannot assume that the DC is always and automatically subservient to the Vatican's wishes. On occasion each has done the other's bidding, but instances of divergence are not at all uncommon.

Anti-Marxism remains the fundamental tenet not only of the Church but also for the DC, and it cannot be overemphasized as a central force in 20th century Italian Catholic political organizations. To a large segment of the Italian public, however, this appears as a negative initiative when directed against social and economic reform. Of equal significance in many Italian minds is the onus of Church accommodation with Mussolini in the Lateran Pacts of 1929. In short, a whole fabric of opposition to Italy or of complicity with the fascist dictatorship remains even today in the minds of many Italians when they think of Church involvement in national life—that of an occasional and unwelcome intruder whose interests are not fundamentally Italian. This is the record which the DC, as a party of Catholics, has had to contend with since its founding. Not even the active and well-known participation in the resistance to fascism by some members of the DC sufficed to remove the wariness Italians feel for the Church in politics.

If the DC has achieved a relatively favorable record in light of such obstacles, explanations are not hard to find. First, Italy is a nation of Catholics (as opposed to a Catholic nation) where reconciliation of State and Church opened the door to political activity for a massive group of previously alienated citizens, the largest single political bloc in the country. Second, in the aftermath of World War II and the simultaneous civil conflict which swept the country, the DC offered a healing alternative, an outlet for Catholic social

aspirations favoring interclass cooperation, free enterprise, and personal rights. While Stalin's Russia cast an ominous shadow over Europe, the DC stood for alliance with the West. In addition, with the removal of the monarchy by referendum in 1946, the DC, as representative of the Church, the other principal traditional institution in Italy, stood in an extremely favorable position to fill the resultant power vacuum. Still, as these factors recede in importance, the DC's lack of a well-defined political credo inevitably leaves it without the appeal of some of the other parties.

Today's Christian Democratic Party was born in the summer of 1943 in semiclandestine circumstances after the fall of Mussolini but before the country was freed by Allied armies. The party dates its origins from several statements of principles and aspirations published by Alcide De Gasperi writing under the pseudonym of Demofilo. The first of these, *Reconstructive Ideas of Christian Democracy*, called for a party that was more a mutation than a continuation of the old PPI which Mussolini had suppressed. The two parties had in common the goal of promoting Christian principles in the political world plus a direct political link to the Vatican. De Gasperi's program, however, was an odd blend of corporativism with a call for social reforms, individual freedom, the sanctity of private property, and the fostering of moral values, notably of the family. His first program merits mention primarily to underscore the degree to which the DC varies its aims, seemingly for advantages of the moment, a mode of conduct which opens the party to charges of opportunism. To call for any corporativism in the aftermath of fascism and to speak of phasing out the proletariat—two major points in the early program—struck many at the time as odd. The first program has long since been abandoned and now seems even antithetical to programs the DC has fostered since. Nevertheless, the implied paternalism of the early program is in linear descent from the PPI and, before it, from the landmark encyclicals of Leo XIII, *Rerum novarum* (1891) and *Graves de' communi re* (1901), which mark papal endorsement of Christian Democracy and the Catholic labor movement.

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Despite the views it expressed, Christian Democracy attracted an unusually heterogeneous following in the wasteland of immediate postwar politics. Laymen and clerics, as well as progressives and conservatives, fell in behind De Gasperi. The disparate groups and individuals which joined at the outset were precursors of internal factions whose constant struggles are the hallmark of the party today. Individuals who stand out in the early DC represent a broad spectrum of political experience, some even tainted by association with the fascist regime, as in the case of Amintore Fanfani.

The DC benefited from several organizations whose existence Mussolini tolerated even though he and the fascists did not wholly control them. Hence the early DC profited from having in place some Catholic groups made up of individuals who had not been in hiding or in exile. The Vatican itself, of course, provided a haven of sorts for future DC leaders to escape Mussolini and still remain physically in Italy, significant among them being De Gasperi himself. Catholic Action, the lay group promoting Church interests, as well as the Federation of Catholic University Students,<sup>1</sup> out of which Giulio Andreotti and others came, provided the first organizational springboards for the DC. If such men and organizations proved useful for the party's launching, the legal and institutional carryovers from the fascist regime that they sanctioned are another matter. The DC not infrequently has been faulted for this, and it has proved a source of embarrassment as well as an obstacle to realization of various democratic reforms.

Some aspects of the immediate postwar years have special relevance to the contemporary scene. Specifically, the DC's occasional staunch stand against Marxist parties is *not* a phenomenon of the years immediately after 1945. The makeup of the Constituent Assembly, as well as the constitution it produced, demonstrate the strength of both the PCI and the PSI (see figure 8). As a consequence, despite its opposition to Marxism, the DC was not initially strong enough to practice ideological purity. Its collaboration with both Socialists and Communists was a matter of necessity until in 1947 in his fourth ministry De Gasperi was able to exclude them from government. Also the DC

did not consolidate its power in 1948 merely because of its accomplishments or US backing. Heavyhanded actions of the Soviet Union, particularly in Czechoslovakia, were as great an assist to the DC as any tactical error or shortcoming on the part of the PCI or PSI. Thus, the habit of DC predominance dates from April 1948, with the first election for a Parliament under the new Constitution.

The essence of the Italian Christian Democrats, to say the least, is not easily understood abroad. No other Italian or European party is analogous, and the nearest valid comparison—that of an American party—is misleading. Further complicating matters, the DC has become nearly indistinguishable from the Italian Government itself, an unusual situation in a parliamentary democracy. As a movement appealing to a vast number of interests, it is more an umbrella over a series of differing political viewpoints, a coalition of factions, some of which seem diametrically opposed. Its continued existence and dominance are as easily explained by historical circumstances as by its record of achievements. And its longevity of power is as easily explained by the unifying link of the Church as it is by any recognition of mutual self-interest and enjoyment of power shared by its component groups and leaders. Not the least of the vital elements in its survival is Italy's so-called imperfect two-party system, an allusion to the lack of a loyal opposition because of continuing doubts about the PCI's true allegiance. While Italy ranks in the top 10 of the world's powers by many criteria, the country still has one foot in the Third World in terms of political development, further clouding an already confusing impression. If Italian politics seem almost frozen in the past, the country's social and economic development have nevertheless progressed dramatically since World War II.

As a result of these factors, an assessment of the Christian Democrats virtually approximates a review of contemporary Italy. This paper seeks to ascertain the status of Christian Democracy—its strengths, leadership, and relations with other parties and organizations—as well as some indications of what the future may hold for the party and, unavoidably, for Italy. The central theme of this analysis is that a

<sup>1</sup> See below, page 28

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fundamental change is slowly taking shape in Italy, a shift that appears to pivot on the returns of national consultations at the polls between 1974 and 1976 and which implies the erosion of Christian Democratic strength. Although nothing currently suggests that the party might disappear, many factors imply that its nature and success will be affected and doubtless altered in the relatively near future. The nature of the Italian electorate for some years is such that the DC, or a near likeness of it, will long remain among the nation's top three political parties.

### Party Structure

For a party of such long-lived electoral success, the DC is surprisingly short on functioning organization and discipline in the conventional sense. Also, its membership fluctuates dramatically, with occasional temporary declines in some areas of as much as 50 percent (see following section on party membership). In all these aspects, the DC contrasts strikingly with its major rival, the PCI. Occasionally there have been serious attempts to correct this problem, the first and most effective being when Amintore Fanfani was party secretary in the 1950s. But today it remains only erratically well organized despite efforts in the mid- and late 1970s to achieve a *rinnovamento* (renewal) following its electoral shocks of the middle of that decade.

The DC's organization and daily functioning are best understood if viewed on two distinct levels: the formal structure and the actual working elements. In theory the party has a precise and elaborate organization ranging from thousands of local sections nationwide through the National Council, Central Directorate, Party Secretary, and President (see figure 4). However, this system functions rather sporadically, usually in weeks prior to either a national party congress or elections. In practice, the DC is an amalgam of factions—something the Italians call *correnti* (currents)—and a vast network of support organizations (on the latter, see the following section).

### The Formal Organization

Today's DC organization is based on the new party statute drafted over a four-year period and published in 1979. The document purports to be the foundation of the party's renewal process. Despite the time spent on its preparation, careful reading shows that even

when it took effect such important sectors as the youth and women's movements still remained to be completed. DC setbacks and losses from 1974 through 1976 forced many of the changes. For example, such innovations as direct election of the party secretary by the national congress rather than by the National Council sought to create "a wide open party." Although the changes attempted to make the party more genuinely democratic, the effort is a typically DC approach to problem solving: a *reaction* to conditions rather than a spontaneous *initiative* for revitalization. Many of the changes in party organization, it was said, were necessary because of fundamental innovations in the structure of the nation such as the enactment of the administrative regions. However, five regions had been in existence for years and the remaining 15 were put in place in 1970, nine years before the DC got around to adopting a statute reflecting this most important of Italian postwar administrative reforms.


The 128 articles of the DC statute consider, in great detail, all aspects of party operation from individual membership requirements through the duties and functions of the top hierarchical organs and officials. Nevertheless the ongoing activity of the party suggests that the statute serves more as a statement of ideals or aspirations than as a binding constitution. As an example, it lays down specific requirements of moral and political conduct which in practice are made a mockery by the party's continuing production of scandals.

What is new in party organization is the more precise outline for its structure as well as the election of functionaries in a manner parallel to the various levels of government where the party competes for office: communes, provinces, regions, and the nation as a whole. Provision is also made to favor those administrative areas where DC election successes most frequently occur, presumably giving an incentive to the ambitious rank and file to work more actively for party candidates. On the other hand, although the regions are now second only to the nation in importance, DC regional officials have yet to gain the influence still enjoyed by provincial leaders, notably the provincial political secretary who remains a leading power broker for those seeking to launch political careers.

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**Confidential****Figure 4****Structure of the Christian Democratic Party**

— Line of election  
 — Line of appointment or coordination

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### National Congresses of the Christian Democratic Party

1. Rome, 24-28 April 1946	8. Naples, 27-30 June 1962
2. Naples, 16-20 November 1947	9. Rome, 12-16 September 1964
3. Venice, 2-5 June 1949	10. Milan, 23-28 November 1967
4. Rome, 21-26 November 1952	11. Rome, 27-30 June 1969
5. Naples, 26-29 June 1954	12. Rome, 6-10 June 1973
6. Trento, 14-18 October 1956	13. Rome, 18-24 March 1976
7. Florence, 23-28 October 1959	14. Rome, 15-21 February 1980
	15. Tentatively scheduled for late April 1982

At the top of the party pyramid is the national congress, an assembly of delegates elected by local sections and regional congresses and including the DC members of Parliament. The Congress—in theory—meets every two years unless summoned into special session by the political secretary or a two-thirds majority of the National Council. It deliberates on general party policy and elects the national political secretary by secret ballot from a field of at least 30 candidates from 10 or more regions.

The political secretary is, in effect, the party's chief executive officer with responsibility for coordinating and promoting the DC's activities according to the wishes of the National Council and Central Directorate (see tables 1 and 2). As a matter of practical politics, the political secretary is normally a figure acceptable to the party's major factions.

The party president is elected by the National Council, and the job tends to go to the head of the most influential faction. In practice the presidency has become as powerful as an incumbent can make it. While Aldo Moro was party president, he greatly overshadowed Benigno Zaccagnini, the political secretary. Today's incumbent, Arnaldo Forlani, creates the impression of being—at best and only on occasion—the equal of Flaminio Piccoli, the political secretary.

### Christian Democratic Party Political Secretaries

1. Alcide de Gasperi	April 1946–September 1947
2. Attilio Piccioni	September 1947–May 1948
3. Giuseppe Cappi	May 1948–April 1950
4. Paolo Emilio Taviani	April 1950–September 1953
5. Alcide De Gasperi	September 1953–July 1954
6. Amintore Fanfani	July 1954–February 1959
7. Aldo Moro	February 1959–September 1964
8. Mariano Rumor	September 1964–January 1969
9. Flaminio Piccoli	January–November 1969
10. Arnaldo Forlani	November 1969–June 1973
11. Amintore Fanfani	June 1973–July 1975
12. Benigno Zaccagnini	July 1975–January 1980
13. Arnaldo Forlani	January–November 1980
14. Flaminio Piccoli	November 1980–

The National Council is the party's deliberative body and theoretically must meet at least once every three months, although this rule is not carefully observed. Its membership is composed of 160 people elected by the national congress, 80 from Parliament and 80 nonparliamentary. In addition, seats are held by the prime minister, most current and past DC cabinet ministers, plus the chairmen of the DC parliamentary delegations, and regional secretaries. Ex officio members include under secretaries, editors of the party's national publications, and other party functionaries.

The true inner sanctum of DC power is the Central Directorate. Using the proportional method, to reflect the strength and importance of party factions, the National Council elects the Central Directorate, largely from its own membership; the Directorate determines party political programs and even deliberates on the resolution of cabinet crises. In practice this is the forum where party factions work out their differences and make deals. The Directorate is summoned and chaired by the political secretary, who is usually the leader of the party's most powerful faction or is a figure acceptable to it and the other major factions. To carry out the daily business of the party, the secretary is assisted by deputy secretaries and the heads of various party offices who are frequently

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Table 1

**Parliamentary Members of the  
Christian Democratic National Council,  
by Faction, February 1980**

<b>Dorotei</b>	Bodrato, Deputy Guido	<b>Andreottiani</b>	Scalfaro, Deputy Oscar Luigi
Abis, Senator Lucio	Bonalumi, Deputy Gilberto	Andreotti, Deputy Giulio, Faction Leader	<b>Forze Nuove</b>
Bisaglia, Senator Antonio	Cabras, Deputy Paolo	Bisagno, Deputy Tommaso	Andreoni, Deputy Giovanni
Campagnoli, Deputy Mario	Cossiga, Deputy Francesco	Carenini, Deputy Egidio	Colombo, Senator Vittorino
Castelli, Senator Angelo	Dell' Andro, Deputy Renato	Cristofori, Deputy Adolfo Nino	Donat Cattin, Senator Carlo, Faction Leader
Danesi, Deputy Emo	De Mita, Deputy Ciriaco	Drago, Deputy Antonino	Faraguti, Deputy Luciano
Degan, Deputy Costante	Fracanzani, Deputy Carlo	Evangelisti, Deputy Franco	Leccisi, Deputy Pino
Ferrari-Agradi, Senator Mario	Galloni, Deputy Giovanni	Quattrone, Deputy Franco	Mannino, Deputy Calogero
Gaspari, Deputy Remo	Giglia, Deputy Luigi	Scotti, Deputy Vincenzo	Mazzarino, Deputy Mario
Gava, Deputy Antonio	Granelli, Senator Luigi	Signorello, Senator Nicola	Morazzoni, Deputy Gaetano
Lattanzio, Deputy Vito	Grippo, Deputy Ugo	Tantalo, Deputy Michele	Russo, Deputy Vincenzo
Mazzola, Deputy Franco	Gui, Deputy Luigi	<b>Fanfaniani</b>	Sinesio, Deputy Giuseppe
Micheli, Deputy Filippo	Gullotti, Deputy Antonino	Arnaud, Deputy Gian Aldo	Spitella, Senator Giorgio
Petrucchi, Deputy Amerigo	Kessler, Deputy Bruno	Bartolomei, Senator Giuseppe	Tiriolo, Senator Elio
Piccoli, Deputy Flaminio, Faction Leader	Ligato, Deputy Lodovico	Bosco, Deputy Manfredi	Toros, Senator Mario
Pucci, Deputy Ernesto	Marcora, Deputy Giovanni	d'Arezzo, Senator Bernardo	Valiante, Senator Mario
Ruffini, Deputy Attilio	Martinazzoli, Senator Mino	Darida, Deputy Clelio	<b>Proposta</b>
Scarlato, Deputy Vincenzo	Martini, Deputy Maria Eletta	Fanfani, Senator Amintore, Faction Leader	Bonferroni, Deputy Franco
Sedati, Deputy Giacomo	Misasi, Deputy Riccardo	Forlani, Deputy Arnaldo	Mazzotta, Deputy Roberto
Tesini, Deputy Giancarlo	Pisanu, Deputy Giuseppe	Gioia, Deputy Giovanni Giuseppe	Prandini, Deputy Gianni
<b>Area Zac ("Base")</b>	Salvi, Deputy Franco	Malfatti, Deputy Franco Maria	Segni, Deputy Mario
Anselmi, Deputy Tina	Zaccagnini, Deputy Beniamino, Faction Leader		

members of parliament and representative of the factions. This staff in some ways resembles a shadow government, but it also mirrors the factional divisions and power relationships in the DC. Fundamental to the successful management of the party and its national office is a modicum of harmony among these elements, something which depends greatly on the skill of the political secretary.

#### The Factions

Difficult though they are to define, the factions of the DC are the essence of the party, the fundamental practical dimension which does not appear on any formal organization chart.

Factionalism has been a prominent feature of Italian political life since the country's unification, and to a degree not found in other countries. Most Italian parties have factions, but only those of the DC have become veritable miniparties. The phenomenon also is typical of the Catholic political movement in Italy and predates the founding of the DC; the factions are an unfortunate reflection of the experience of the old PPI. Because the DC is a large party appealing to all classes of society, some such divisions are inevitable. It is their degree of institutionalization, though, which is unique. Their relations with each other and to the party as a whole largely determine the DC's conduct. The number of factions at any time may vary, but the divergence of their views is wide enough to ensure that almost any act of one will contravene the interests of at least one other. Thus it is difficult to move the

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Table 2

**Central Directorate of Christian Democracy  
(As of 5 March 1980 Election)**

President <sup>a</sup>	Arnaldo Forlani (Fanfaniano)			
Political Secretary	Flaminio Piccoli (Doroteo)			
Deputy Political Secretaries	Ciriaco de Mita (Area Zac) Vittorino Colombo (Forze Nuove)			
Editor of <i>Il Popolo</i>	Franco Maria Malfatti (Fanfaniano)			
Editor of <i>La Discussione</i>	Corrado Belci (Area Zac)			
	Number of Representatives	Percent of Membership	Number of Representatives	Percent of Membership
<b>Dorotei</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>22</b>	Franco Evangelisti	
Emo Danesi			Salvatore Lima	
Mario Ferrari Aggradi			Nicola Quarta	
Remo Gaspari			<b>Fanfaniani</b>	<b>4</b>
Antonio Gava			Gian Aldo Arnaud	<b>12.5</b>
Vito Lattanzio			Angelo Becciu	
Corrado Montemaggiori			Manfredi Bosco	
Vincenzo Scarlato			Giovanni Gioia	
<b>Area Zac (Base)</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>28</b>	<b>Forze Nuove</b>	<b>6</b>
Corrado Belci			Emilio Colombo	<b>19</b>
Guido Bodrato			Carlo Donat Cattin	
Ciriaco De Mita			Luciano Faraguti	
Giovanni Galloni			Sandro Fontana	
Luigi Gui			Mario Mazzarino	
Nino Gullotti			Vincenzo Russo	
Riccardo Misasi			<b>Proposta</b>	<b>2</b>
Rosario Nicoletti			Roberto Mazzotta	<b>6</b>
Franco Salvi			Gianni Prandini	
<b>Andreottiani</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>12.5</b>		
Giulio Andreotti				
<b>Total</b>			<b>32</b>	<b>100</b>

<sup>a</sup> Also included as members with right to vote: the Prime Minister, the heads of the DC delegations of the Chamber and the Senate, Gerardo Bianco and Giorgio Di Giuseppe; ex party secretaries Fanfani, Gonella, Rumor, Taviani, and Zaccagnini, the delegate of the Women's Movement, Gabriella Ceccatelli, and the delegate of the Youth Movement, Marco Follini.

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party because consensus is difficult to reach. The worst aspect of factionalization is the uncertainty it creates for the party, because defection by even one group can threaten the life of DC-led governments. No doubt a majority of the government crises since World War II has been caused by factional disputes within the DC. This phenomenon also underscores another unfortunate aspect of factionalization—the virtual merger of party and government under the DC's dominance. In effect, factional competition for control of the party has become practically synonymous with control of the national government, and this in no small degree has heightened public cynicism about the DC and the governing process.

Factionalism is not, however, wholly without virtue. Factions provide outlets for the party's diverse constituency because almost any interest group can find a "current" with which to identify. Also, endless competition among the groups fosters, willy-nilly, continuing policy debate as well as a system through which more than one set of leaders can rise to the top, thus providing leadership options at all times. Factions also provide an easy mechanism for semiofficial contact with other parties where similar views can be found, thus creating the bridges crucial to the formation of government coalitions. Conversely, this can and does dull the distinctions between government and opposition. Because the Italian parliamentary system does not have politically "acceptable" or numerically viable alternative parties strong enough to form a government, the interplay of factions seems to have been rationalized into filling the role of "loyal" opposition. As a constraint on the party in power, this arrangement is far from ideal.

No statement about a faction remains valid for any significant length of time. Not only does factional composition often vary, but the faction itself may move back and forth across the political spectrum. Since the war some factional labels have remained constant, and a few individuals have not varied their ideological stands. Nevertheless, the ideological content and orientation associated with a given faction can be quite fluid. If one were to trace this phenomenon in the career of an individual, that of Amintore Fanfani probably would be the most illuminating. In the course of his 35 years in Parliament, Fanfani has

at one time or another been associated with several factions and been labeled as leftist, rightist, and occasionally in the center.

Although the composition and ideology of factions change constantly, these features may be caught momentarily, like a snapshot, at national party congresses. The voting at the most recent congress in February 1980 shows six factions in the DC (tables 1 and 2 show factional alignments). At that time ideological positions were somewhat more clear than normal because the congress voted on a "preamble," a broad statement of principle rejecting collaboration with the PCI (see text in box). In the summer of 1981 this preamble's principle was rejected by the National Council, indicating that factional alignments had once again shifted.<sup>2</sup> Even so, at more normal congresses, it is the votes for the lists of candidates for election to the National Council presented by the various currents that show a faction's strength. The next such opportunity to catch a snapshot will be at the National Congress scheduled for April 1982.

While Alcide De Gasperi lived, factionalism existed only on the edges of the party because he enjoyed such widespread support in the center as to mute the impulse to division. Despite his personal resistance to factionalism, De Gasperi and his *Centristi* (Centrists) group acquired a distinction within the DC commensurate with their political position.<sup>3</sup> Although some other DC leaders of De Gasperi's time tried to promote their views and create a personal following, the welter of groups whose names are the key to internal party evolution began to appear in the early 1950s. The first significant attempt at forming a group was the left-leaning *Politica Sociale* (Social Policy) faction in the late 1940s led by Giovanni Gronchi, formerly a Catholic labor leader and later

<sup>2</sup> Factional changes at the Council meeting of 31 July to 2 August 1981 were too fluid to indicate a clear new alignment. All accounts agree, however, that the center-right "Preamblist" majority no longer exists and that the new orientation appears to be moving center left. It is currently referred to as the "management majority." See below page 17.

<sup>3</sup> In this instance the name of the current is self-explanatory, but often such is not the case. Normally, a faction's label is derived from its relative political position within the party, a place where it meets, a leader's name, or the title of the faction's paper or journal.

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## Preamble

The fourteenth national congress of Christian Democracy: In the face of the country's grave problems, as well as those in the international sphere, burdened by tension which Soviet expansionism has accentuated with its passage to direct aggression and with the threat to the energy resources of the economy of the industrialized world;

Expresses the conviction that a course out of these difficulties can be successfully followed so long as the Party is oriented, now and henceforth, by the principles and values of its popular and democratic tradition which have given it strength in the past to assemble a broad and lasting consensus and in the role of guide for the founding of the Republic, developing freedom, promoting civil, social, and economic progress, with the extraordinary transformation of the country within the guaranteed framework of democratic institutions;

It is aware that the Italian people today demand a more efficacious and intense struggle against the terrorist threat to the state and a firm and intelligent effort to coordinate the active will with which the great majority of its citizens are working to overcome economic difficulties;

Confirms the unflagging pledge of Christian Democracy to uphold Western solidarity and that of the Atlantic Community as the fundamental instruments of defense and the essential means of discouraging the system of aggression and to hasten formation of balances which constitute the indispensable foundation for the resumption of detente;

Confirms as well that Christian Democracy will develop a line of economic policy capable of promoting the maintenance of income levels which have already been achieved, their expansion and, in

addition, a better territorial and social distribution of these benefits, notable in the South, by means of planning, reinforcing the system's free economy characteristics, both of market and enterprise, in a manner that will insert the nation more and more into the European Community as well as into the competition between free, industrialized economies.

The fourteenth congress of Christian Democracy expresses confidence in and approval of the Cossiga government with loyal recognition to the parties which collaborate with it, support it, and permit it to work toward a more broadly based political equilibrium.

The congress, while noting the evolution achieved to date by the Italian Communist Party, perceives that the contrasting positions still existing on clearly indicated problems do not permit Christian Democracy's assumption of any leadership coresponsibility with that party. The Congress entrusts the National Council of Christian Democracy with the task of promoting a political policy initiative which, with prior and open verification between the constitutional parties at the appropriate time and place, seeks to make the nation's government more safe and stable, in the spirit of national solidarity and of the recognition of equal dignity between the political forces which intend to collaborate.

The fourteenth congress asks all organs of Christian Democracy, which—with their pledge—renew themselves, to work with diligent commitment to give the Party organizational force and a presence in society; directs to the voters an ardent and confident call to confirm and broaden their assent for the Party, also in the regional and administrative elections in the spring, in the assurance that Christian Democracy holds firmly in its hands and which will never permit the flag of liberty to be lowered for the Italian people.

Rome, 21 February 1980

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President of the Republic. Some would argue, however, that *Cronache Sociali* (Social Chronicles), the leftist current founded by Giuseppe Dossetti in the same period, was the most important early faction because of the continuity of its rather intellectual viewpoint in subsequent groups. On the right, *Vespa* (The Wasp) developed in the mid-1950s, taking its name from a club where its membership gathered. This broad prototype of left, center, and right factions was present in the first legislature of 1948-53 and has remained more or less constant over the years, with an occasional proliferation to as many as nine or 10 simultaneously identifiable currents.

The father of more recent DC factional organization is Amintore Fanfani who, following De Gasperi's death in 1954, organized *Iniziativa Democratica*

(Democratic Initiative) from remnants of both Dossetti's and De Gasperi's followers; this was the majority faction through most of the 1950s. On the left two other groups formed: *Forze Sociali* (Social Forces), from the labor elements of the party, and *La Base* (The Base or Grass Roots), a more ideologically leftist force. To the right at that time was *Primavera* (Spring) headed by Giulio Andreotti.

In 1959 *Iniziativa Democratica* split. Led by Mariano Rumor, its largest remnant formed the *Dorotei*, a center-right faction named for the Rome monastery where it gathered. This current remains the largest group in the party even if its leaders, membership, and political orientation have fluctuated. The *Dorotei* owe their long dominance in the party to a fairly consistent community of action with the followers of Aldo Moro, known as the *Morotei*, a current formed

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during Moro's time as Prime Minister in the 1960s. While the latter tended to keep faith with the views of their leader after his death in 1978, members of this faction have slowly dispersed into other groups, primarily *La Base*.

The *Fanfaniani*, those elements who went with Fanfani in the *Iniziativa Democratica* breakup, were also known by the name of their journal, *Nuove Cronache* (New Chronicles), and originally were center left. They, together with the more leftist labor union faction of Carlo Donat Cattin, *Rinnovamento Democratico* (Democratic Renewal), and a somewhat smaller *Primavera* on the right led by Andreotti, completed the major groupings of the first half of the 1960s.

By 1980-81, the two strongest factions were the *Dorotei* and *La Base*. The latter is the largest component of the *Area Zac* (the Zaccagnini group); *Dorotei* holds 38 of the elective seats of the National Council (19 each from the parliamentary and nonparliamentary membership of the party) and *Area Zac* has 46. The *Dorotei*, whose followers possibly exceed those of *Area Zac* in number at the moment, is today's center current. The Zaccagnini group together with the *Andreottiani* (20 seats) are on their left. The group farthest to the right and the largest of that side of the spectrum is Donat Cattin's *Forze Nuove* (New Forces) (28 seats) which has been increasingly associated with the *Fanfaniani* (20 seats). The smallest group (8 seats), known as *Proposta* (Proposal), must be regarded as something of an unknown quantity whose most prominent members, Mario Segni and Roberto Mazzotta, are identified with conservative viewpoints. The occasional gravitation of Andrea Borruco and Massimo de Carolis toward *Proposta* also adds a certain quasi-clerical element. In any event, the so-called *preambolista* majority is a combination of *Dorotei*, *Forze Nuove*, and *Fanfaniani*, with support from parts of *Proposta*.

Because governments have been controlled so long by the DC, it is hardly surprising to note that the choice of prime minister and the political orientation of his cabinet are reflections of factional relationships existing when a government is formed. Not only does the most powerful current dominate the cabinet, but other factions share seats either as ministers or under

secretaries in rough relation to their influence. Thus the party's internal system of proportional power sharing appears in governments. Understanding this phenomenon is central to comprehending how internal DC conflict can bring down a government and to recognizing the degree to which party and government have merged.

To attach any lasting or specific political ideology to any faction is ultimately risky. Until the summer of 1981 traditional party principles, often stronger among rightist factions, prevailed in the DC due to the strength of the Preamble majority. Pragmatic considerations—some would call it opportunism—have more commonly flourished on the left. The basic unifying element for all is maintenance of DC integrity (more factually accurate is mutual interest in holding on to power); even anti-Marxism is attenuated when leftist factions control the party. Except on issues involving religious principles—divorce and abortion, for example—Church interests and allegiance to Catholic beliefs appear to follow all else. Reduced to bedrock, the pragmatic maintenance of power even more than the old belief that the party has a mandate to rule dominates DC conduct whoever the politician, whatever his faction. In practical terms, the DC is an oligarchy emanating from the various currents which in turn approximate miniparties under one umbrella that protects the power of all.

Illustrative of the shared power motivation is the so-called management majority which replaced the Preamble group in August 1981. As the name implies, there is no dominant ideological current in the DC. This would indicate that Preamble principles are out and new factional jockeying is in progress which, according to who wins, will yield the new orientation and determine which DC figures enter the next governing combination.

#### Party Finances

The financing of political parties was long one of the better kept secrets in Italy. To an extent this changed in 1974 with the passage of legislation providing public funding for parties and an annual publication of a financial report. Nevertheless, it is commonly assumed that major sources of income remain hidden and that published information is doctored.

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If expenses and expenditures for the DC cannot be determined with any precision, the nature of the party's income is reasonably well known. Essentially it derives from five sources: the state apparatus and the parastate industrial complex, contributions, party dues, subsidies under the 1974 law, and foreign subventions.

In the first instance, the virtual merger of the DC and the Italian state provides numerous opportunities for the party to exploit its dominant position. The examples are endless, but such practices as payment of extra commissions on public contracts, an additional sum on building licenses, acceptance of "gratuities" for the granting of special privileges or favors, or utilization of the so-called secret funds, a sort of slush fund that prime ministers have had at their disposal for almost a century, suggest a few of the available devices. The vast parastate industrial establishment (see section on Auxiliary Support Organizations) with its multibillion-dollar activities brought in enormous "contributions" until theoretically ended by the 1974 law. Contributions of a more conventional and less tainted nature come to the party from various interests, but these are said to go almost exclusively to the individual factions, usually for support of a group whose political stance can promote the interests of wealthy backers. Doubtless the sums are occasionally quite large, but this is the least known of party income sources. There are also the dues paid by each DC member, but the fee is small enough (about \$5 per head) to meet only a negligible part of the party's overall needs. The public law for party funding provided that both election expenses and normal party operating expenses be subsidized in proportion to the party's demonstrated electoral strength. In 1978, for example, the DC thus received a total of almost 16 billion lire (approximately \$18 million at the time), some 3 billion more than the PCI, the next largest recipient. Finally, as confirmed by the Pike and Church reports to the US Congress in the mid-1970s, various anti-Communist parties of Western Europe, including the DC, received considerable amounts of money from the United States after 1948.

In some instances the handling of these matters has led to scandal. More than a few figures have had their careers terminated or put in eclipse by their involvement in such questionable activities.

The public funding law's requirement that parties publish annual accounts of their income, public and private, has been obeyed; but few people take the reports at face value despite safeguards in the law for checking their accuracy. The DC's original obstructionism to the legislation also caused various sectors to assume the party was reluctant to have its coffers inspected by the public, particularly since the new bill forbade parastate groups to pay any funds to political parties. When the law was submitted to a national referendum in 1978 and was approved by the public, the DC favored keeping it. Ethically, however, it could do no less.

Beyond these general statements about party financing, nothing more can be said with certainty. The DC appears to have adequate financing for its activities, but its efficiency in using funds is simply not known. DC financial scandals have been so numerous and frequent for so many years as to make them appear endemic to the Italian political scene. Even if some cases may have been exaggerated, the conventional wisdom has long assumed that corruption is a major element in the party's way of life. Ultimately, though, the party's political future may be determined more by its casual and ineffectual organization than by its finances. To give substance to the word "democratic" in its name and to be the mass interclass party of its claims, the DC would have to put real flesh on the complex organizational skeleton described in its statute. Were it not flanked by so many support groups, its failure to be effectively dynamic and self-renewing in and of itself would have altered its role in government well before now.

#### **Party Membership**


The size of a political party's membership has long been regarded in Italy as an index of the group's organizing ability, particularly of its success in establishing solid roots within its natural constituency as

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Figure 5

## Comparative Growth of DC and PCI Membership, 1946-77



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well as for the creation of lasting links among its followers. From a modest numerical start in the 1940s, making an exception for the election year of 1948, the DC's period of greatest growth was in the decade of the 1950s. Until 1973 the party continued to gain members on a gradually rising curve. Surges and lapses exist in that timespan with upswings appearing in the years of elections or national party congresses. The consistent growth of the party was based on the organizational efforts and expertise of Amintore Fanfani in his years as party secretary in the 1950s.

In the early 1960s DC membership reached and passed that of the PCI for the first time (see figure 5). There is, however, little correlation between the parties' formal membership and their records at the polls. Similarities in the two parties' organizations and membership are few, but a comparison highlights some aspects of the DC today. For a party of such long-lived electoral success, the DC, unlike the PCI, is significantly lacking in internal discipline and does not boast many visible and active local cadres. In fact,

much of the DC rank-and-file membership exists more on paper than in fact. Also there is relatively little contact between local sections and the party hierarchy, the reverse of which is true in the PCI. The DC membership in many ways is an amorphous and elusive mass. Unlike the PCI, DC members are not easily studied. Both parties publish annuals on their activities, but the DC publication lacks the extensive figures, tables, and charts of its counterpart. In short, the party has extensive records on its members and makes them available to researchers who ask for them; it does not give them the broad dissemination the PCI does. Learning about the DC membership is therefore not simple and conclusions cannot be wholly satisfactory.

Another problem is that the DC's membership rolls are often said to be inflated, and DC leaders themselves have questioned their accuracy. These statistics frequently have been the subject of charges and countercharges, as years of transcripts of national congress debates show. Inflation occurs because of

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competition between the various factions, which rig the figures to exploit the party's system of internal proportional representation. In the past (the practice may or may not be continuing) the factions have been accused of registering the dead, fictitious persons, and relatives, as well as actual persons—but without their permission or knowledge. Use of this tactic suggests that the hard core of party membership is in fact smaller than indicated by “official” figures.

The procedure for becoming a DC member has never been difficult, although it has changed over the years. In its first 15 years or so, the DC had many members who joined largely because they were in the personal following of local or regional leaders known as *notabili* (notables). By 1960, as a younger and different breed of party men began to develop factions geared to particular political points of view and organized for more efficient political action, a number of the old *notabili* were quickly shoved aside. In either case, however, membership in the party often was through sponsorship by one or the other of these groups, the result being a controlled membership. In the 1970s, particularly with the new statute of 1979 and the emphasis on *rinnovamento*, the goal now is an open party. Any citizen 16 years old or over may simply register as a DC member. The only requirements are that he/she be of irreproachable moral and political conduct and declare adherence to the party's values. While sponsorship has not been wholly eliminated (an applicant needs the signature of two members in good standing for two years), it has become perfunctory. Also, anyone age 14 to 16 is similarly eligible for the DC's youth organization.

It is too soon to determine whether this new enrollment method is a success or a failure. However, its goal is the attraction of higher quality and more actively committed members. Still nothing has occurred to stop an ambitious provincial secretary from pushing for members to flesh out his own following or from refusing to conduct an enrollment campaign because it might bring in recruits whom he could not manipulate. The reform does show that the party

recognizes a need to modernize and alter its image. With the scandals that have plagued its entire history, the DC can only benefit by getting members of “irreproachable” conduct.

Even though the DC has long been the largest party in this open democratic system, it is difficult to get a clear social picture of its membership. Here one must underline the distinction between a party's electorate, which has been studied in detail in Italy, and its enrolled members. Data on the DC members are not lacking. The party has extensive records, but they have to be deflated and other information has to be weighed against other sources when possible. But some general observations can be made about DC growth and decline as well as the socioeconomic characteristics of its members.

Data from 1978, the most recent available, indicate that membership was about 1.3 million. (The Provinces of Caserta and Catania did not report that year, however. See figure 6 and table 3). As with a number of other years, a national total may not cover the whole country because local groups appear to be rather casual, and not all get around to reporting every year. Still, this is a decline of approximately 35 percent from the 1.9 million reported only five years earlier. The drop suggests that the old pattern of increases at the time of elections and congresses, which kept the curve consistently high in the past, is no longer operative. Not only does that slump put the numbers back to something comparable to the late 1950s, but a look at the figures in a broader context reveals ironically that the timespan when the DC went from a small initial membership to a peak in 1973 is inversely proportional to the party's election record. During the same time, it moved from the enormous success of 1948 to the checks and defeats of the mid-1970s. Thus the evidence suggests that the DC passed some milestone or watershed in the 1970s. Various explanations or rationales have been offered for this shift, and the consensus does not center on political bad luck but on the profound changes that seem to be going on in the attitudes and composition of party membership as well as in Italian society generally.

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Table 3

**Christian Democratic Party Membership by Region, 1968-78**

	1968	1973	1978
Piedmont	80,536	89,226	51,453
Valle d'Aosta	3,372	2,646	1,456
Liguria	37,819	42,816	26,416
Lombardy	193,654	201,750	139,887
Trentino-Alto Adige	29,749	30,666	14,307
Venetia	151,436	178,731	113,986
Friuli-Venezia Giulia	29,554	33,368	23,035
Emilia-Romagna	74,830	80,507	57,819
<b>Subtotal North</b>	<b>600,950</b>	<b>659,710</b>	<b>428,359</b>
Tuscany	61,076	68,727	54,245
Umbria	19,499	20,341	12,504
Marche	48,524	53,158	36,813
Lazio	152,884	(159,324) <sup>a</sup>	144,259
<b>Subtotal Center</b>	<b>281,983</b>	<b>(301,550) <sup>a</sup></b>	<b>247,821</b>
Abruzzo	77,858	88,316	46,429
Molise	20,273	28,790	15,262
Campania	195,993	209,299	112,812
Puglia	134,681	162,829	134,932
Basilicata	29,432	38,258	23,711
Calabria	85,573	(89,152) <sup>b</sup>	66,174
<b>Subtotal South</b>	<b>543,810</b>	<b>(616,644) <sup>b</sup></b>	<b>399,320</b>
Sicily	202,910	(212,644) <sup>c</sup>	(199,977) <sup>d</sup>
Sardinia	66,758	82,744	42,823
<b>Subtotal Islands</b>	<b>269,659</b>	<b>(295,388) <sup>c</sup></b>	<b>(242,800) <sup>d</sup></b>
<b>Total Italy</b>	<b>1,696,402</b>	<b>(1,873,292) <sup>c</sup></b>	<b>(1,327,300) <sup>e</sup></b>

<sup>a</sup> Figures are lacking for the Roman Committee's membership in 1973. Based on figures for years before and after, the arbitrary sum of 75,000 is included here.

<sup>b</sup> To fill the gap for figures missing from Catanzaro in 1973, a membership of 30,000 has been added on the basis of statistics for other years.

<sup>c</sup> 21,000 has been added for Agrigento, missing in 1973.

<sup>d</sup> 35,000 has been added for Catania, missing in 1978.

<sup>e</sup> Final totals have been altered in keeping with figures added. See notes a to d.

Socioeconomic analysis of DC membership (as distinguished from the DC electorate) presents special problems. Official party information is not only unreliable but general and inconsistent. Fundamentally it seeks to demonstrate the party's claim to represent all classes in society. This is not borne out, however, by data collected by polling groups. And the contrast is greater still if the composition of membership and electorate are measured together.

Tables 4 and 5 serve as an example of problems inherent in identifying the strata making up DC membership, although comparability of the data is hardly satisfactory due to the lack of poll information for the 1950s as well as changed categorization. If the party records are assumed to be self-fulfilling perceptions based on inflated figures, the poll data are drawn not only from a smaller sampling but one which tends to be based on urban interviewing. Nevertheless, if utilized as broad guidelines together with other sources on the DC, a fairly reliable picture of the party emerges. To some extent stereotypes and conventional wisdom are substantiated, but in other instances unusual differences appear. When considered alongside DC electoral returns (and known characteristics of the electorate), a reasonably accurate knowledge of the party's real socioeconomic backing can be reached. Following the administrative elections of 1980, when some 85 percent of the electorate went to the polls, the polling group Demoskopea conducted an analysis of the voters (see table 6) which, when coupled with the foregoing tables, provides the most accurate and up-to-date single-frame picture available on the party.

Of the stereotypes long attached to the party, none has survived so well or so long as the belief that the party is strongest in rural and traditionalist areas and that women—encouraged by parish priests—constitute an important part of its support. Both views have some basis in fact but with important refinements.


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**Confidential****Figure 6****Christian Democratic Party Membership by Region, 1968-78**

Key

1968  
1973  
1978



<sup>a</sup> Figures are lacking for the Roman Committee's membership in 1973. Based on figures for years before and after, the arbitrary sum of 75,000 is included here.

<sup>b</sup> To fill the gap for figures missing from Catanzaro in 1973, a membership of 30,000 has been added on to the basis of statistics for other years.

<sup>c</sup> 21,000 has been added for Agrigento, missing in 1973.

<sup>d</sup> 35,000 has been added for Catania, missing in 1978.

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Table 4

Percent

**Party Membership, by Sector  
(DC Records)**

Economic Sector	1959	1977
Agriculture	24.9	12.4
Industry	17.7	18.4
Business and banking	6.0	7.7
Artisans	5.8	5.2
Professions	2.1	2.8
Public employees	8.9	15.8
Students	2.5	5.4
Pensioners	3.8	5.7
Housewives	25.5	20.6
Unemployed and others	2.8	6.0
Total	100.0	100.0
Membership	1,602,742	1,077,388

The rural traditionalist areas of Italy are concentrated in the center and south (including the two major islands), and the north-south distinction has been clear for many years. The *meridionalizzazione* (southernizing) of the party began in the 1950s and dovetails with the importance of the notables whose classic region of dominance is the south. In fact this is still true although signs are present implying that change—which means modernization in this case—is coming in the south at last. Party membership is dropping more there than in any other region. But if one looks at DC electoral returns in those areas, clearly the party still enjoys considerable strength (see figures 14 and 15). The signs of change are as yet confined more to certain provinces and cities than to regions, with the possible exception of Puglia which has long had some elements in common with the advanced north.

The other region of great DC strength, the northeast, is very different in character. If the party still enjoys a hold on some southern regions like Molise, Calabria, or Sicily, it is due to the persistence of older social customs and hierarchies. The northeast, particularly Venetia, is strongly DC because of more conscious

Table 5

Percent

**Party Membership, by Sector  
(DOXA Poll Organization)**

Economic Sector	1977
Workers	14.3
Agriculture	4.9
Artisans, shopowners	10.3
Professionals, teachers	8.6
White collar	23.2
Students	1.1
Housewives	18.6
Pensioners	15.9
Unemployed and others	3.1
Total	100.0

religious conviction. Although the south may change through economic expansion, the northeast is more affected by new winds within Catholicism.

The role of women in the DC as party members and/or electors is more significant than in other Italian parties, but they do not function simply as mothers and wives who support the party for its espousal of traditional moral values and the family. Indeed women are enrolled in the DC in greater numbers in the south, but their level of participation in party activities is quite limited. The region's Catholic subculture has few organizations to bring them out, and there is no women's liberation movement of any significance there. In much of the south party membership of women is passive and associational, supportive of a male family member active in DC politics. Overall national figures for women reveal that their enrollment is higher in urban areas than in rural. Quite possibly city life does not make the demands on an urban woman's time as those experienced by farm women. Interestingly, in the PCI, which has long encouraged women into political activism, female membership has run between 23 percent and 25 percent from 1960 to the mid-1970s. In the same period for the DC, the percentage of women in the membership went from a minimum of 34 percent in 1960 to a maximum of 38 percent in 1974. Since

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Table 6

Social Background of Electorate by Party <sup>a</sup>

	Sex		Age						Education		
	Male	Female	18-24	25-34	35-44	45-54	55-64	Over 65	High School/ College	Junior High	Elementary/ None
DC	39.5	60.5	14.0	16.8	16.9	18.1	14.5	19.7	17.5	22.6	59.9
PCI	54.8	45.2	21.4	23.1	19.5	14.2	9.6	12.2	20.2	25.7	54.1
PSI	58.3	41.7	14.6	17.5	20.3	18.7	13.9	15.0	20.7	27.3	52.0
PRI	56.3	43.7	17.6	18.5	21.0	21.9	9.2	11.8	37.4	28.6	34.0
PSDI	53.9	46.1	11.8	12.9	23.9	19.8	10.7	20.9	20.4	30.1	49.5
PLI	50.0	50.0	17.7	14.9	14.9	14.9	15.6	22.0	51.6	21.9	26.5
MSI/DN	64.3	35.7	23.8	21.4	16.7	6.0	15.4	16.7	22.6	34.5	42.9
PDUP/DP	52.4	47.6	42.9	42.8	5.9	NEGL	5.9	2.5	45.2	40.5	14.3

<sup>a</sup> This analysis of the Italian electorate was compiled by the Demoskopia polling organization on those who voted in the elections of 8 June 1980. It was published in *Panorama*, 23 June 1980.

then the percentage has been declining. As table 6 shows, the ratio of women who vote for the DC is far larger than those who become party members.

Another assumption about the DC is that its membership tends to be among older groups but the last few years have seen an encouraging increase in the numbers of youth, particularly those in the college years and immediately after. Recent indications are that more DC members and electors are in the older segments of the population, while the youth element is not so large as some believed and possibly hoped. There is in reality only a modest increase among youth from the small numbers of a few years ago.

Notwithstanding the lack of comparability mentioned earlier in relation to official party records vis-a-vis polling information and the DC membership, the DOXA (another polling group) data may be nearer to current reality as Italy grows ever more urban. With such a caveat, what summary observations can be made about the DC's members? If the DC believes itself to be an interclass party, data on the membership do not now bear this out, but information on the DC electorate does show quite diverse class character.

More and more party electors are middle class and mildly conservative, and their economic activity is particularly interesting. Although considerable differences exist from one geographical region to another, basic trends are present in consolidated national figures. Here the DC's rural base potential is suffering something more than erosion since those members whose income is from agriculture have declined more than 50 percent in the last 20 years (see also figure 11) showing shrinkage of the agricultural sector in general. A slight rise has occurred in the industrial sector, notably among blue-collar workers. The only significant increase by economic activity is in the tertiary sector of service and public employees, and the general group of *impiegati* (salaried white-collar employees) is the party's largest: 23.2 percent. Housewives and pensioners make up the next largest categories, followed by workers and artisans.

In all the statistics and diagnostic dissections of the DC membership, the most important information concerns the verification of fundamental changes in party membership which relate to and derive from

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Table 6 (continued)

Percent

Profession								
Professional/ Manager Independent Business	Clerical/ Secretarial/ Salaried Employees	Businessmen/ Artisans	Farmers	Teachers/ Students	Workers	Housewives (Upper, Middle Class)	Housewives (Lower Class)	Pensioners/ Others
1.5	9.2	6.7	4.2	8.9	15.8	17.6	11.6	24.5
0.8	9.2	6.8	1.6	10.7	35.3	8.3	11.5	15.8
1.6	12.7	9.3	3.0	11.1	23.4	11.4	6.4	21.1
1.7	26.1	9.0	1.7	12.6	14.0	13.3	7.6	14.0
4.3	8.6	8.6	2.2	10.2	19.4	14.0	9.7	23.0
7.8	14.1	12.5	NEGL	12.5	4.7	18.8	1.6	28.0
1.2	9.5	10.7	2.4	16.7	19.0	6.0	7.1	27.4
2.4	7.1	4.8	NEGL	45.2	23.8	2.4	2.4	11.9

recent pontificates and ideas emanating from the Vatican Council of the 1960s. Simply stated, Church developments in the last two decades have had a profound effect on the Catholic subculture. On the one hand, large-scale secularization of national life has occurred, and on the other faithful practicing Catholics are less numerous but stand out as a more committed element. The DC in turn has also probably lost its faint-hearted members, and those who remain are more active in party or Catholic organizations just as they are more faithful in attendance at Mass. Theoretically the party ought to benefit from improved quality in membership if not in increased numbers; but faithful Catholics in Italy are not so numerous as foreigners assume, and the change has probably cut into party strength.

The party is aware of this trend to an extent, and the *rinnovamento* and the new statute show the desire to be more open. Other tactics have been the *Feste dell'Amicizia* (Friendship Festivals), carnival-like celebrations with arcades, games, food, and political rallies designed to heighten the party's social presence. The gatherings are an aping of PCI *Feste dell'Unita* (Unity Festivals) which apparently are somewhat more successful.

Benigno Zaccagnini, while he was party secretary in the 1970s, also launched the GIP movement, the *Gruppi di Impegno Politico* (Political Commitment Groups). Their goal is to carry the party's presence into factories, offices, and schools. In 1978 there were 2,100 such groups, but again it is not clear what success they may be having.

If indeed the smaller numbers mean a more committed and more manageable party membership, the DC ought to benefit. Nevertheless, there are persistent indications that actual participation in party activity by members is extremely low. If renewal and revitalization are to be achieved, the DC is making little progress when at least 50 percent of the members never participate in party activities and only 5 to 10 percent work for the party with any regularity. In contrast with the PCI's comparable publications, *L'Unita* and *Rinascita*, DC interest level is extremely low when only a tiny percentage admits to reading the DC daily newspaper, *Il Popolo*, and even fewer read the weekly journal, *La Discussione*. It is little wonder, however, that a committed DC member is not inclined to read the party press. Both major publications are characterized by stodgy and turgid prose.

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The DC is, then, more and more a party of Catholics; that is, of those people who practice their religion regularly, more and more the middle class and middle-aged segment of the Italian population, the solidly conservative elements. And as the country becomes more secularized and demographically younger, the so-called *diaspora dei cattolici a sinistra* (the flight of the Catholics to the left) will continue. Indications are that the party is slipping away from the broad-based membership and wide appeal it once had and that its place is being increasingly filled by other parties, particularly the PCI, which is becoming less class oriented.

If the assessment of DC membership suggests something less than optimism for the future strength of the party, this is only part of the problem. The party's support has never come solely from within its own ranks. From the time of its founding it has relied heavily on the auxiliary support it receives from an enormous number of Catholic lay organizations. Because of the existence of such groups, the DC will doubtless continue to practice a certain amount of benign neglect of its own party structure, no matter how much renewal may be trumpeted. In effect, the DC has been able to permit itself to have an erratic and creaky membership so long as these support groups existed. The party seems to take little or no note that recent pontificates and events in Italian life have altered and loosened ties to the Church and the nature of its organizations. Nevertheless, this support network seems likely to hold up well for a time and, ironically, is the closest link remaining between party and Church.

Significant support also is offered by the *sottogoverno* (literally subgovernment, with the implied meaning of patronage), those who owe their livelihood to the DC's continued rule. The party has "colonized" a vast area of state-dependent organizations far out of proportion to its actual electoral strength, and this clientele will continue for some time to be another important source of party members, notably in the south.

Therefore, as of 1981, the DC retains a sizable membership which is undergoing erosion, albeit in slow motion. Nothing implies its imminent collapse or even precipitate decline, but there is nothing to suggest that true renewal and growth can be expected.

The issue becomes whether the confessional can compete effectively with the dynamism of late-20th-century consumer capitalism.

#### **Auxiliary Support Organizations**

As the DC's organization has long been weak and fragmented and its membership amorphous, the party has from its beginnings relied heavily on outside support groups. These organizations are closely related to the Church on the one hand and to the so-called parastate organizations on the other. In a sense the DC can be viewed as an uneasy, tenuous union of religious, industrial, agricultural, and worker interest groups. The cement of the components is in part religion, in part the enjoyment of the fruits of power. DC politicians have to balance among these not-always-harmonious interests and, without frequent success, attempt to formulate governmental policies.

All elements combine to produce a situation characterized by one author as "the DC iceberg." Several observers say candidly that the DC simply "occupies power" and that party and state have now become indistinguishable. The DC has become the state and the state the DC, with the transgressions of one being identical with those of the other. Such a relationship is not unknown in other countries, but the degree to which the DC utilizes outside support groups is unusual in a democracy. The result and implications are best summarized in a statement of Gianni Agnelli, head of the FIAT corporation: "With 40 percent of the votes, the DC controls 80 percent of the power." Cynical Italians say of the DC that absolute power has corrupted absolutely.

#### **Church-Related Support Groups**

As a party of Catholics, the DC naturally has close links with the enormous network of Church-related organizations, recently estimated to be at least 8,000 in number. Since John XXIII's reign and the changes of Vatican Council II, when the Church began distancing itself from Italian politics, the DC's most substantive and consistent association with Catholicism has been through the lay organizations. This relationship varies greatly, however, with issues and groups at any given moment. In the mid- and late 1940s, Church organizations and the DC were virtually indistinguishable. Relatively undisturbed by the

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fascist government, they provided the structure and arena for political activity that gave the DC its initial thrust onto the national political scene. Although the roles are in some senses now reversed with a party that is theoretically able to stand alone, the DC can and does fall back on the Church's lay organizations to supplement its own insufficiencies.

No study exists to substantiate the assertion, but it is doubtless safe to assume that in many instances membership in the Church organizations replicates the DC's lists. This is certainly the case in the "white" or Catholic northeast. And if relationships vary from good to bad, that, too, is a reflection of the general loosening of ties—or the secularization—which has occurred in Italian life since about 1960. Despite this, the Church's lay organizations remain the matrix from which DC leadership comes. None of today's party leaders has made it to the top of the hierarchy without some years of active apprenticeship in at least one of the following organizations.

**Azione Cattolica Italiana, ACI (Catholic Action).** This is the oldest, largest, most prestigious, and most powerful Catholic lay organization in Italy. Most simply defined, it is an apostolate of the laity under the guidance of the ecclesiastical hierarchy. ACI's responsibility is to coordinate in the secular world the work of priests and other religious leaders or, as specified by Vatican II, to evangelize and educate humanity to Christian values.

ACI is more than a century old and grew out of a youth movement in the "white" area of Venetia. Its present name came into use around World War I. The connection it has had with the Catholic political movement in Italy is an intimate one as suggested by the fact that Don Luigi Sturzo, before he founded the PPI in 1919, had already been secretary general of ACI for four years. Pope Pius XI, who frowned upon direct Catholic political activity, favored ACI to the extent that he is known as the "Pope of Catholic Action." While he tolerated the suppression of the PPI, he protected and favored ACI in various clashes with Mussolini's government. During his pontificate the movement was greatly expanded and largely given the organizational form it has today. ACI's conservative

character was firmly established under Pius XI and Pius XII, although subsequent reformers like John XXIII have altered it to some extent.

ACI's membership has fluctuated, reaching a high of about 3 million in the decade after the war. Although down to 700,000 members today, it remains the most overtly political arm of the Church and can always provide a nationwide body of political workers at election time. No one has equaled the power of Luigi Gedda as president of ACI in the 1950s, but the Red Brigades regarded one of its former presidents, Vittorio Bachelet, as worthy of assassination in February 1980. Dr. Alberto Monticone, professor of Modern History in the University of Rome, became president of ACI in early 1981, succeeding Prof. Mario Agnes. Monticone was formerly president of the *Movimento Laureati*. He, like all other ACI officers, is flanked by a cleric with the title of Assistant. Often this assistant is from the top of the Church hierarchy, most recently the Patriarch of Venice, Marco Cardinal Ce.

ACI is a federation of related organizations each of which has other groups within it and beneath it. When all are considered, no segment of life or professional activity is unrepresented. Size may have little to do with the influence of a particular group, but ACI is not generous in publishing its enrollment figures. The overall membership has slipped considerably in the last 10 to 20 years, but presumably those who remain can be considered as faithful and committed followers.

Technically ACI is a federation with the heads of the four major groups being vice presidents of the parent organization and president of their own division:

*Unione Uomini di AC*, UUAC (Men's Union of Catholic Action). President Prof. Livio Crepaldi. UUAC is for all married men and single men 30 or over.

*Unione delle Donne di ACI*, UDACI (Women's Union of Catholic Action). President Paola Bignardi. UDACI enrolls married women and unmarried women over 30.

*Gioventu Italiana di AC*, GIAC (Italian Youth of Catholic Action). President Dr. Paolo Nepi. Single men 30 or under.

*Gioventu Femminile di AC*, GF (Young Women of Catholic Action). President Maria Teresa Vacari. For single women under 30.

*Federazione Universitaria Cattolica Italiana*, FUCI (Federation of Italian Catholic University Students). FUCI enrolls only undergraduates in separate sections for men and women. National presidents are Giuseppino Monni and Laura Rozza.

*Movimento ecclesiale di impegno culturale* (Ecclesial Movement of Cultural Commitment). President, Franco Cavasola. This organization is still known better by its former name, *Movimento Laureati di Azione Cattolica* (University Graduates' Movement). The name change occurred in 1980 to coincide with a move for the organization's revitalization.

*Movimento Maestri di AC*, (Teachers' Movement, known only by its name). For elementary school teachers, this group is presided over by Prof. Tomaso Seu.

An outgrowth of the Teachers' Movement and closely related to it is the *Associazione Italiana di Maestri Cattolici*, AIMC (Association of Italian Catholic Teachers), which represents all public school teachers. Its founder and first president, Maria Badaloni, was Under Secretary for Public Instruction in eight consecutive governments beginning in 1960 and was succeeded in that position for three more governments by the current president, Senator Carlo Buzzi. Both were elected to Parliament on the DC ticket. AIMC, in contrast to the *Movimento Maestri*, places emphasis on professionalism but also expects religious commitment.

Generally women's organizations have the larger numbers, and the men's groups are more visibly active. Of the more specially oriented groups for students, graduates, and teachers, records show that despite their influence, they have never enrolled more than 3 to 7 percent of eligible individuals in their sectors. The value of these organizations to the DC is immediately evident in the biographies of members of

Parliament. Two of many leading examples of men whose careers began in FUCI are Giulio Andreotti and Aldo Moro.

Once closely related to ACI and one of its most powerful arms is the *Associazioni Cristiane Lavoratori Italiani*, ACLI (Christian Associations of Italian Workers). Formed by ACI immediately after World War II to bring the Church presence to the working classes and to compete with Marxist activities, ACLI soon became an important part of the labor scene. It began blazing its own independent course under the presidency of Livio Labor in the 1960s when it came into open opposition with ACI and the DC. In the elections of the early 1970s, it refused to support DC candidates and openly endorsed leftist candidates, including some Communists. Labor himself left the movement, joined the PSI, and was elected senator on their ticket in 1976. ACLI remains important today although its 380,000 members in some 5,000 clubs put it far below its peak enrollment in the past. Relations between the DC and ACLI have improved, but ACLI remains proudly independent. A candidate supported by it in an election is virtually assured of victory. Part of ACLI's strength derives from its strong parallel patrons' organization which handles pensions and reputedly has taken in as much as \$150 million a year.

Zaccagnini's founding of the GIP in the 1970s and the formation of the *Movimento Cristiano Lavoratori*, MCL (Christian Laborers' Movement) were intended, although not admittedly so, to offset the hostile influence of ACLI. The MCL's stated purpose is that of being a moderate alternative to ACLI, and it currently has some 180,000 members.

Some measure of the pervasive Catholic influence is reflected in the following partial list of the ACLI's other related organizations:

- Hospital assistants (ACOS), 16,000 nurses and paramedics.
- Artisans (ACAI).
- Physicians (AMCI), 6,000 members in more than 100 sections.
- TV and radio station owners (AIART) and listeners who monitor TV and radiobroadcasts (ALIAS).
- Catholic parents of schoolchildren (AGESC), 50,000 members.

- Boy and girl scouts (ASGI and AGI).
- The press (USCI) (Flaminio Piccoli, currently DC secretary general, was once president of this organization).
- Businessmen (UCIC).
- Entrepreneurs and managers (UCID).
- Publishers (UECI).

The list could continue at some length and show prominent DC figures in key positions in virtually all of them. Each organization extends its influence and maintains cohesion through journals, newsletters, and newspapers. The potential for reaching the public and for supporting DC causes is obvious. However, in a nation where the Vatican is located and where cynicism is a national character trait, the public can be staunchly independent and deaf to blandishments on religious viewpoints with which it is all too familiar.

Several other Catholic-related organizations merit mention either for their continuing strength or for their unusual nature. In the former group is the *Confederazione Nazionale dei Coltivatori Diretti, Coldiretti* (The National Small Farmers Confederation), perhaps the most powerful single interest group in the country. Although Italy has become rapidly more urban and industrial since the war, this coalition of rural and traditionally Catholic landowners maintains unduly large influence in parliament and within the DC. It is ardently in favor of private property and hence vehemently anti-Communist, and its members in parliament sometimes align themselves with right or center-right factions of the DC or, on occasion, with even more conservative parties. Because of its mode of organization in "families" or "associations" *Coldiretti's* size is difficult to ascertain. However, it is far smaller now than at its peak in the 1950s when claims to 6 to 7 million members were made. If its present claim to represent 90 percent of the farmers is accurate, its membership would be roughly between 2 million and 2.6 million. A somewhat smaller figure is, however, more credible.

Reminiscent of ACI, the *Coldiretti* has in its ranks prelates with the title of "assistant," and it is generally regarded as a group of Catholic inspiration. But the organization has increasingly taken independent positions and now assumes attitudes critical of the DC,

which it has accused of being too "popular" and "insufficiently Christian." Beginning in February 1980 *Coldiretti* went through a period of virtually leaderless drifting when its longtime president, Dr. Paolo Bonomi, was hospitalized with Parkinson's disease. Although allowed to remain as honorary president, Bonomi was replaced in October 1980 by Arcangelo Lobianco. In his maiden address to the *Coldiretti* national assembly, Lobianco sternly threatened the DC that his organization would not necessarily continue its long relationship with the party. He frequently refers to *Coldiretti* as a union, and, in an unprecedented move in April 1981, the farmers' organization leadership met with officials of the three major trade unions as well as of *Confcoltivatori*, the small leftist association of small farmers, to map a concerted effort to improve farm conditions.

An illustration of the depth of the DC-*Coldiretti* relationship and of the implications of possible loss of its support is found in the career of Paolo Bonomi. He founded the organization in 1944 and remained its president for 36 years, a period when he also served as deputy in the Constituent Assembly of 1946 and all legislatures to the present. He has never held a cabinet position, but he has long been a member of the influential Chamber Commission on Agriculture and Forests. The years of conservative legislation favoring farmers are evidence of his influence and that of *Coldiretti*. Until 1954 he was the "grey eminence" of the DC due to his role in extending its influence throughout rural areas via *Coldiretti*. Briefly Bonomi also headed the powerful *Federconsorzi*, Federation of Cooperatives. His enormous power was challenged when Fanfani became party secretary in 1954, but Bonomi was long considered as much a party leader as was possible for someone without high party office. Election posters for 15 years after the war often referred to him variously as "savior of the peasants' birthright" and "the anti-Bolshevik bulwark in the countryside." His replacement by Lobianco, a disciple who has now broken with the master's policy if not with the man himself, is of profound importance for the DC's main link to its biggest constituency, the rural electorate.

Beyond this degree of *Coldiretti* involvement in the DC, four of the DC's senators and 28 of its deputies are directors of various levels of the organization. A number of other members of Parliament mention *Coldiretti* membership in their biographical sketches. Nevertheless, despite the organization's preeminent role as a DC support group, increasing industrialization and the concomitant decline of citizens in the agrarian sector (see figure 11) are making its influence somewhat disproportionate to the element it represents. Even so, *Coldiretti* maintains an active program of organizations for women and youth as well as regional and provincial offices throughout the country. Under its new president it is also said to be showing signs of revitalization, but as yet one cannot determine if the DC will benefit or not from the change. Some conservative facets clearly remain in *Coldiretti*, but other evidence implies that it well may go an independent way in the future.

A similar organization with Catholic influence is the *Confcooperativi* (Confederation of Cooperatives), which competes in an area—farm co-ops—first staked out by the PSI some years ago. The movement is notably important in the Catholic northeast. Still, as the agrarian sector continues to shrink, vote potential for the DC in rural areas also declines.

Although big industry and large business have never felt comfortable with the DC, a segment of that sector has long supported the DC. The Church-related organization of this group is the *Confederazione Italiana dei Dirigenti d'Azienda* (Italian Managers' Confederation), which embraces store managers up through factory and bank administrators. In some senses, this group is an urban parallel of *Coldiretti*. Its influence is not to be underestimated but unlike its rural counterpart, the body includes only a part of the business community. Nevertheless, several DC members of Parliament emphasize their membership in it.

Still in the realm of Catholic-related organizations but with a newer and somewhat different character is the organization *Comunione e Liberazione* (Communion and Liberation), founded in November 1969 at the Sacred Heart University in Milan as an outgrowth of student and labor upheavals of that time. CL stands as probably the leading symbol of younger elements in

the Catholic political movement (as distinguished from precise connection with the DC itself) who seek to renew their religious commitment to a society based on Christian principles. The name of the movement is a case in point: *communione* as an instrument of the *liberation* of man from sin. CL borders on mysticism in its affinity to religious orders and semi-clandestinity that it equates with organizational modesty. The structure of CL is pyramidal with a small controlling body at the top that includes both clerics and laymen, all in their thirties and forties. Membership in directly related organizations and associated groups is said to run perhaps as high as 300,000 to 400,000. Viewed with some suspicion by parts of the Italian clerical hierarchy, CL is nevertheless closely associated with the former Archbishop of Milan, Giovanni Cardinal Colombo. The publishing house, Jaca Book of Milan, is the font of numerous CL publications.

Beginning with the election of 1976, CL was influential in promoting the successful candidacies of several DC deputies, notable among them Andrea Borruso, one of CL's founders. The organization's strength is greater in the north as its backing of others such as Costante Portatadino (Varese), Vittorino Colombo (Milan), Antonio Marzotto Caotorta (Milan), and Roberto Mazzotta (Milan) indicates. Their success in the elections of 1979 was somewhat more restricted, however. CL has organized branches in both university and working-class sectors and promoted the launching of *Movimento Popolare*, MP (Popular Movement), a more openly political body promoting conservative Catholic candidates for office. Borruso, the principle political figure in CL, believes the movement must be more than a simple obstacle blocking the road to the PCI; it must find a renewed commitment to carry Catholics a step ahead in offering alternatives to the public.

The MILLE (*Movimento per l'Italia Libera nella Libera Europa*, Movement for a Free Italy in a Free Europe), promoted by DC deputy Massimo de Carolis, is a movement of similar political inspiration and is also associated with young conservative Catholic leaders of Lombardy, but it has less clerical influence. MILLE is difficult to define beyond noting that it is a movement of small industrialists, merchants, and

professionals devoted to public renewal of conservative and Christian principles. In fact, it appears to overlap considerably with CL and MP. Whether the allusion to the expedition of the Mille (The Thousand of Garibaldi of 1860) and the liberation of Sicily in the Risorgimento is deliberate or not is unclear, but the implication is not missed by the public. The MILLE has been important in backing candidates for the Chamber to the extent that the biographical manual published privately after the election of each new legislature lists in its most recent edition the names of those deputies whose candidacies the group supported. The list of 88 names significantly did not include the major DC leaders.

What has been more significant in recent elections, particularly in those of 1976 and 1979, has been the progressive decline of *official* Catholic support for DC lists, particularly since the election of John Paul II. CL and MILLE, with their heavy religious overtones, are exceptions. This does not signify withdrawal of ACI and other specifically Church-related groups, nor does it mean they have denied the DC their support. Rather the tactic has been consistent with the "open party" and the goal of attracting new candidates and creating a new image which is somewhat less obviously confessional. It appears that the result of these tactical changes and new organizations has, at best, allowed the DC only to hold its own for the time being. The nature of these organizations and the rapidly changing character of Italian society suggest that the trend is to divergence, not a promising prospect for the party. "Catholic" in this instance seems less than universal.

#### ***Sottogoverno and Clientelismo***

Church-related groups may maintain the DC's link to its philosophical roots, but Italy's parastate organizations and other governmental agencies provide the party with its sweeping hold on power. The two terms *clientelismo* and *sottogoverno* (patronage, or literally, "undergovernment") are nearly interchangeable in street-corner parlance and summarize succinctly how the system works. The use of jobs, favors, and money by a ruling political party occurs worldwide and is a prerogative of power. However, the mode of using these privileges distinguishes practical politics from corruption and abuses. Time and again it has been

said that the DC in ruling uninterruptedly for 35 years has become indistinguishable from the state and that the party has promoted this identification. No one doubts that the DC has taken care of its supporters by giving them government jobs and that as it moved away from the Church its strength came more and more from "colonizing" organs of the state with its own people. Some observers also argue that by making itself part and parcel of the system, the DC satisfies its anti-Communist mission. Whether true or not, the practice has made the DC vulnerable to criticism, and some Italians even say the situation has the feel of a "35-year Watergate."

Any verification of the number of DC members and backers in government-controlled jobs is impossible. Popular wisdom holds that three of every four government jobs are filled by such people, and this proportion does not seem unreasonable. Compared with the party's consistent showing of an average of about 40-percent voter support, the ratio is excessive. Even in Molise, where the party consistently racks up its largest victory margins, the DC share rarely has exceeded 60 percent of the vote. By any standards, the DC's manner and degree of patronage use becomes gross occupation of power in a democratic state. However, since the mid-1970s the party has been forced more and more to share these spoils with other parties.

Clientelism and patronage are more than mere pork-barrel tactics. Clientelism suggests people who are or can be obligated to the party rather than individuals whose livelihood depends directly on it. The distinction is admittedly subtle and fuzzy, but the DC client is more likely to be someone like a builder who receives a government contract. Also, to utilize the Italian expression *clientela/parentela* (client/relative), clients are also the families of state employees who support the party on the assumption that failure to do so would cost a father, brother, or other relative his job. Ironically, as the DC completed this pervasive web of dependence, it displaced or made subservient many of the old notables, particularly in the south and the islands. The result was a sort of democratization of the access to power, but it was done more to assure the party's control than to promote values and goals.

Indeed, clientelism is more commonly associated with the south in the Italian mind. Its practice may or may not entail corruption, but many studies of the region concur in their negative judgment of the results.

Without question the DC has aided the south and islands, but it has demanded their support in return. The area's underdevelopment has thus promoted its dependence on the party in power. One authority calls it "pragmatism without ideas."

"Undergovernment" is the more important and also more insidious area where political strong-arm tactics can be used. The word cannot be fully comprehended unless one keeps in mind the breadth of its implications. It refers to all those positions or power centers which in Italy are assigned by the central government executive. For example, this includes big banks, steel mills, and a host of enormous organizations, several of which have balance sheets of billions of dollars. In Italy, State participation in the so-called parastate organizations is one of the largest and oldest such practices in the world. The executives who head these organizations do so at the pleasure of the DC. Their power, prestige, and wealth are best understood as being fully comparable to those of a cabinet minister.

A directory of the parastate corporations is as extensive as that of Church-related organizations. The great state holding companies are all under the control of the Ministry of Government Holdings (or State Participations), established in December 1956, long after the creation of the largest companies it controls. The position of minister has constantly remained in the hands of powerful DC men and, by the admission of one of them, Ciriaco de Mita, regularly provided patronage to party supporters (see pages 122-123 and foldout chart, figure A-5). Until the Cossiga government yielded this portfolio to PSI deputy Gianni de Michelis in 1979 it had been out of DC hands only for a six-month period in 1958; never has the ministry been without at least a DC under secretary; and never have the major corporations it controls been without a majority of DC faithful at their helms. The potential influence of the state-controlled corporations can be imagined just by noting

the number of their employees: approximately 800,000 in 1979. The only larger employment area under the government is education with some 865,000 employees in the 1978-79 school year.

The most powerful and famous of the Italian parastate entities is IRI, *Istituto per la Ricostruzione Industriale* (Institute for Industrial Reconstruction), founded by Mussolini in the Depression as a temporary device to save banks and industries threatened with failure. In 1937, when it was clear that these institutions could not return to the private sector and survive, IRI was made a permanent agency to manage the government's shares in joint-stock companies. At the end of World War II IRI was the mechanism for reconstructing Italian industry. Since that time it has grown steadily and has always been headed by a DC figure. Its current president, Pietro Sette, has spent his entire career in state-related organizations.

The companies owned and operated by IRI include FINMARE, operator of Italy's worldwide fleet of passenger ships; FINSIDER, the largest complex of steel mills on the Mediterranean; FINMECCANICA, producer of industrial machinery and nuclear equipment; FINCANTIERI, the largest network of shipyards in the Mediterranean; the Alfa Romeo auto works; the national airline, Alitalia; the biggest banks of the country, Banca Commerciale, Credito Italiano, and Banco di Roma; and a host of other companies and industries.

No better example of the link between IRI and the DC can be found than the career of Giuseppe Petrilli, who was president of the company from 1960 until he was succeeded by Sette in 1979. Not only was he a deputy in the Constituent Assembly and the First Legislature, but he was Under Secretary of the Treasury in several De Gasperi governments and for 10 years a member of the DC Central Directorate. Since leaving IRI in 1979 he has been a DC senator from Tuscany.

The other well-known parastate organization is ENI, the National Hydrocarbons Agency (*Ente Nazionale degli Idrocarburi*), founded in 1953 to develop national policy on energy as well as national resources for hydrocarbon products. As a public holding company with shares in more than 180 subsidiaries in Italy and abroad, it operates not only in the petroleum industry but also in chemicals, nuclear products, manufacturing and engineering services, restaurants, hotels, tourist facilities, and elsewhere. Its better known subsidiaries include the petroleum distribution network of AGIP, (recognized by tourists for its logo of the six-legged dog) the textile mills of Lanerossi, and the industrial machinery plants of Nuovo Pignone. Recently ENI and its subsidiaries have been the arm of the Italian Government involved in bringing natural gas to Italy from North Africa and in developing plans for the natural gas pipeline projected from the Soviet Union. Italy's poverty in energy resources places ENI in an extremely responsible and sensitive position for national security and international politics. Its current director, another loyal DC backer, is Alberto Grandi. No one, however, is ever likely to rise to the power and fame of ENI's first director, Enrico Mattei, who was killed in a mysterious plane crash near Milan in 1962. Mattei broke the practice of American, British, and Dutch oil companies of dividing oil revenues 50-50 with the producing country by giving 75 percent to the home country and taking 25 percent for ENI, an arrangement rumored to have made him the victim of sabotage.

Alongside these colossi are other major state-participation organizations: EFIM (*Ente Partecipazione e Finanziamento Industria Manifatturiera*, Participation and Financing Agency for the Manufacturing Industry); EGAM (*Ente Autonomo di Gestione per le Aziende Minerarie Metallurgiche*, Autonomous Agency for Management of Metallurgical and Mining Enterprises); and EAGC (*Ente Autonomo per la Gestione Cinematografia*, Autonomous Agency for Management of the Film Industry).

EFIM, founded in 1962, is in charge of intervening in and developing the industrial sector and is involved in industrial machinery, railroad rolling stock, helicopters, aluminum, paper, glass, tires, food processing, products, and distribution as well as promoting new initiatives in the south in both industry and tourism. Included in EFIM's holdings is *Breda Ferroviaria* which is under contract to provide subway cars for the Washington Metro. For some years before he went to IRI, Pietro Sette headed EFIM; currently the president is Dr. Corrado Fiaccavento.

EGAM, established in 1958, did not really start operations until 1971 and is now the country's leader in mining as well as mineral exploration. EGAM is somewhat smaller than other state-participation agencies, but it is branching into new areas such as textiles and seems headed for continued growth.

EAGC, which derived from institutions in the cinema sector left over from Mussolini's regime, was founded in 1958 with added impetus from the postwar movie-making boom in Italy. Of the companies within EAGC, the *Istituto Luce* (Light Institute) is the oldest, established in 1925 by the fascists to produce newsreels and documentaries for propaganda purposes. There is also the massive complex of film studios on the outskirts of Rome, Cinecitta, started in the Mussolini years. Finally, *Italnoleggio* (Italian Distribution) works in film management and distribution. For a state-run operation, EAGC is a bit contrived for a democratic country, but its justification lies in providing direction for an important sector of Italy's economy and in promoting cultural development. Least important of the organizations of state participation, EAGC nevertheless is an information forum of obvious potential influence and has consistently been headed by a loyal backer of the DC, such as present Director General, Dr. Pasquale Lancia.

In the last year or so, two noteworthy cases of the state's withdrawing from participation in industry have occurred: the giant chemical and electrical conglomerate headquartered in Milan, Montedison, of

which the government owned about 10 percent, returned wholly to private hands, as did the EAGAT (*Ente Autonomo per la Gestione delle Aziende Termali*, Autonomous Agency for the Management of Thermal Resorts) group of enterprises in thermal spas.

Because of the magnitude of the parastate sector in Italy, only the parent holding companies are mentioned here. Their hundreds of subsidiaries, however, cannot be forgotten as providers of jobs and/or favors for people who are willing to accept DC hegemony. These concerns, in turn, are not without influence in ancillary sectors of the economy when it comes to subcontracting and the like. Still, in the midst of this soft patronage atmosphere, it would be erroneous to assume that political litmus tests are more important than professional, technical, and administrative competency. The nature of the work of most of the parastate organizations is highly sophisticated and, given Italy's position in the world, must be competitive. Hence, most of the higher echelons of these companies are competent even if the fact remains that in a majority of cases, when party affiliation or preference is known, the men at the top are either DC-connected or apolitical. Useful as this sector has been for the DC, the public is increasingly resentful of and openly hostile to this relationship. As the younger generation of university-trained specialists grows, many of them both unemployed and anti-DC, political discrimination will be forced to yield—aided by other parties whose long exclusion from these fruits has intensified their criticism and public irritation.

#### Other Support Elements

The groups which can be considered as offering support potential for the DC also include direct government employment areas and the labor movement. As in most European countries, Italy has a series of state monopolies such as railroads, post and telegraph, tobacco, and other services, not to mention the civil service, which are wholly government-run. To say that these have been "colonized" like the parastate corporations is to impugn the integrity of the

civil service. Nevertheless, as any resident of Italy would know from conversations with postal employees, railroad conductors, and other state employees, the DC sympathizer usually gets the nod when there is more than one applicant for a civil service vacancy.

Italy has only one nationalized industry, ENEL (*Ente Nazionale per l'Elettrica*, National Electric Energy Agency), and it has been utilized for placing party backers. ENEL's development projects also tend to be in areas chosen by companies known for their support of DC governments. The press on occasion has aired controversies about some projects, citing manipulation of rates and development of new electric service in areas to be industrialized, as well as questions of opportunities favoring one region over another. While some of the criticisms appear to have little validity, the ultimate effect is the addition of one more irritant to a public all too willing to believe that it is being treated unfairly. Rarely if ever has the DC, not merely ENEL, been effective in rebutting any of these accusations.

Like virtually everything else in Italy, the labor movement is highly politicized (in terms of party relationships). The DC's arm amongst organized workers is the CISL (*Confederazione Italiana dei Sindacati Lavoratori*, Italian Confederation of Workers' Unions). This organization was formed in 1950 by Catholic unionists who seceded from the CGIL (*Confederazione Generale Italiana del Lavoro*) because of its increasing domination by Communist elements. Initially CISL attempted to be politically nonpartisan and lay its primary emphasis on enrolling workers who were Catholics. Nevertheless the founding of CISL was symptomatic of the polarization of the labor movement within a society which was lining up in Catholic and Communist sectors. Promoting DC ideals, CISL tried to appeal beyond classes, thus rejecting class conflict and seeking to unionize various levels of Italian life. Members grew to regard this approach as potentially subordinating their interests to Catholic or DC goals, and the outlook soon became typically working class, primarily blue-collar oriented.

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Table 7

## Union Membership, 1976-80

	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980
<b>CISL</b>					
Workers	2,536,787	2,489,613	2,490,967	2,510,230	2,610,072
Pensioners	286,948	320,289	377,770	396,000	447,648
Total	2,823,735	2,809,902	2,868,737	2,906,230	3,057,720
<b>CGIL</b>					
Workers	3,544,123	3,612,342	3,544,597	3,527,331	3,439,331
Pensioners	762,528	872,718	983,365	1,056,143	1,104,143
Total	4,306,651	4,485,060	4,527,962	4,583,474	4,543,474
<b>UIL</b>					
Workers	1,086,630	1,129,400	1,210,000	1,243,700	1,250,498
Pensioners	50,000	61,500	74,000	82,500	90,000
Total	1,136,630	1,190,900	1,284,000	1,326,200	1,340,498

Across the years, particularly since the 1960s, CISL members have gone from being Catholic workers allied with the DC to being workers who are anti-Marxist first and Catholic second. By 1969 or 1970, CISL, followed by CGIL,<sup>4</sup> evolved into greater independence of the DC, and from 1974 until 1980 CISL sought common cause as much or more with CGIL than with the DC. Other unions in this same period increasingly became more independent in their alignments with other parties. Even the CISL has on occasion favored general strikes and pursued a policy of confrontation with DC leaders despite continuing contact with and sympathy for the DC left wing. In any event Luigi Macario, the secretary general of CISL, was elected senator on the DC ticket in Piedmont in 1979, when he took shelter in the DC to escape CISL elements who favored more leftist or

worker-oriented policies. Macario's resignation to run for the Senate opened the way for election of Pierre Carniti as secretary general, a gruff and lifelong product of the labor movement whose sentiments are quite leftist.

Even though the old bonds are much loosened, CISL is still regarded as linked to the DC. Realistically, however, the union has retained its strength not so much because of its connection with the party as its role as a non-Marxist alternative for workers and its recent promotion of worker share purchases in industrial management. Carniti, like Macario before him, has demonstrated a noteworthy independence characterized by primary interest in rank-and-file labor benefits. He is, however, much more forceful and respected as a leader, and CISL membership, unlike CGIL's, is growing under his guidance (see table 7). But two other significant developments will inevitably test Carniti and affect the future relationship between the DC and CISL. One is the aging of the work force,

<sup>4</sup> CGIL (*Confederazione Generale Italiana del Lavoro*, General Confederation of Italian Labor) is the Communist Union and UIL (*Unione Italiana dei Lavoratori*, Italian Union of Workers) is aligned with the PSI, PSDI, and PRI.

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which is leading to greater increase in union pensioners than in active members. The other factor is the growth in the number of autonomous unions and ad hoc "struggle committees" (*comitati di lotta*). In short, numerous signs point to increasing grass-roots dissatisfaction with the conventional unions and their methods, and CISL is not immune.

In retrospect, all the DC's support organizations have been undergoing a slow but perhaps decisive change for as much as 10 years and the process is gradually accelerating. Church-related groups, while altering their mode of backing the party, are slimmed down and more coherent, even though they are showing signs of less involvement in the mainstream of secularized national life. These groups remain, however, the area of greatest support and slowest erosion.

The complex of state-related corporations is under increasing attack from the public, particularly as the Italian economy continues to face ever greater problems without significant responses from the government. A complaint about DC monopolization of the parastate sector was formally inscribed in the Programmatic Accord of 1977 (see pages 99-101), but the DC has only recently begun to yield its influence in any degree. Demands for the breakup of vast holdings such as IRI and ENI, particularly from the labor world, are increasing and cannot long be ignored. DC immobilism in this area results in backsliding which affects the national economy. Again, the era of DC monopoly cannot last much longer, but the implications of changes are so sweeping for the economy that party considerations may soon have to be overridden for the general good.

In the area of labor, the entire national work force appears to be finding its own distinct identity independent of party. For all intents and purposes, the DC, PCI, and PSI have already lost the degree of control and support they once took for granted from their respective union subsidiaries. Essentially the DC is left with the intrinsically anti-Marxist segments of

labor, but the result is a metamorphosis of what was once a solid hold on a significant part of the work force. The Catholic link is now mainly ephemeral.

Although it could once be included as at least a partial support element for the DC's interests and also for the party, the enormously important *Confindustria* (*Confederazione dell' Industria Italiana*, Confederation of Italian Industry), Italy's National Association of Manufacturers, is less and less in sympathy with the party. *Confindustria* cannot be considered an opponent of the DC, but its more active support is now with other parties, either with the PSI, led by Bettino Craxi or, more naturally, with the Republicans or Liberals. If the DC is a party of business, the support comes mainly from professionals, small industry, shopkeepers, and clerks, the segment of society with a less complex concept of private property.

The main conclusion about the DC and its support groups may be that lacking effective renewal and refoundation within the party itself, the DC is already relying increasingly on the auxiliary support network, which itself is in the process of changing and shrinking. At the same time, the extent of secularization over the last 20 years has made the Catholic subculture only a part, and a minority one at that, of national life. The DC has not kept pace with the change in the Church, a process the Church describes as *aggiornamento* (updating, with the connotation of modernizing). Unless the DC experiences a much fuller *aggiornamento* of its own, it will continue to lose support from many of these organizations. In the parastate sector the top-level positions already are falling rapidly to other more relevant criteria than political loyalties.

#### **The DC's Electoral Record**

Beginning with the referendum on the monarchy and the election for the Constituent Assembly in 1946, the new democratic Italy embarked on what has become a

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myriad of consultations of the electorate. These elections fall into five categories: national, regional, provincial, communal, and referendums. For all of them the Italian Government has provided voluminous data.

Before assessing the data, several cautionary observations are essential:

- Italian elections over a relatively brief timespan are inconclusive for interpretative purposes.
- Conclusions drawn on the basis of the *political* regions or whole Chamber districts alone are inconclusive and possibly misleading; the smaller divisions such as provinces are more reliable indicators.
- Urban and rural voting patterns do not necessarily conform to conventional patterns.
- No generalizations can be made for the nation as a whole without risk of creating erroneous assumptions for large individual geographical areas.
- Failure to consider the enormous changes in occupational sectors and population shifts can skew the meaning of voting patterns.
- Similarity of party numerical returns from one election to another does not reflect the often significant changes among elected representatives.
- The complexities of the operation of Italy's proportional representation system subtly alter the makeup of elected bodies.

All of this relates directly to the Christian Democratic Party; hence, an assessment of its present and future status in the national body politic is a complex and inexact undertaking requiring constant consideration of the party's showing in many *relative* situations. Again this reflects the slow-motion factor in Italian politics where any assumptions must be drawn on a longer than usual perspective and predictions hazarded on the basis of relatively long-term possibilities rather than certainties.

Also, before specific statements can be made about any one party, some recognition must be accorded the broad concepts that have developed about the Italian

party system in general. Beyond the simplistic assertion that Italy has a multiparty system, three more sophisticated viewpoints can be stated:

- Italy has a pluralistic party arrangement in which centrifugal tendencies pull the electorate to extreme ideological poles.
- Italian parties offer such a spectrum of choice that fragmentation is inevitable; the voter finds and stays within his niche, and election results tend at first sight to show little change.
- The system is an imperfect two-party arrangement in which the DC and PCI share the majority of the votes and the other parties can never hope for more than junior partner status. Each view appears in postelection journalistic commentary and often confuses observers not intimately acquainted with the Italian political scene.

The characterization of Italian politics as an imperfect two-party system comes closest to reality, although there are useful aspects to the other views.

The system is imperfect because the opposition PCI is considered disloyal and hence has not had a chance for inclusion in the government. Alternation thus cannot occur and the small party partners become a crucial factor by holding the balance of power. These small groups provide the DC with internal support for coalitions or external tolerance necessary to permit one-party or *monocolore* governments. As the two major parties drew closer together in electoral strength, notably in 1976, the question became whether the DC could remain the larger party and thus continue to claim the right to form the government, or whether it would slip behind and be forced to deal with the PCI. The junior partners, some of whom are not averse to collaborating with the PCI, may begin to weigh which of the two large partners is more advantageous for them to support.

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The basic question which has to be considered in analysis of the DC's record at the polls is whether evidence is appearing to substantiate the hypothesis that the party's organization is not being renewed and that its support groups are showing signs of profound change and altered loyalties—in short, that the DC is eroding as a force in Italian politics.

Authorities on Italy take the elections of 1948 and 1974 as the high and low points of DC fortunes at the polls. The peak, achieved on 18 April 1948, occurred in the election for the first legislature, when the DC's candidates won more than 48 percent of the votes cast. On 12 May 1974, in a national referendum on the 1970 law permitting civil divorce, the DC committed itself wholeheartedly to repeal of that legislation and lost by a landslide with 59 percent favoring its retention. As is often the case with conveniently simplistic reference points such as these, conclusions can be misleading. The election in 1948 was held under unusual circumstances, and the referendum of 1974 was a black-and-white choice with possibly less meaning than the outcome of 1975 regional elections and the 1976 renewal of Parliament.

Today there are the increasingly important administrative regions whose elections since 1970 are producing another focal point of enhanced political power and changing voter patterns. Finally, lower level administrative elections at the provincial and communal strata break returns into small enough segments to permit identification of trend areas. What results from any analytical view in 1981 of the composite of these various election statistics is a picture of DC erosion which increases inversely to the level of the populace consulted. If there is no evidence that DC support will disappear, there is still much to suggest that it is shrinking and will continue to do so unless the party alters its strategies or eventually succeeds in its timeworn renewal aspirations.

### **National Legislative Elections**

Since World War II, Italy has had nine national legislative elections: one for the Constituent Assembly of 1946 and eight for the houses of Parliament from 1948 to 1979. Viewed as a whole, the returns of these elections, except for 1948, are unusually uniform, a political bas-relief of strikingly static character (see tables 8, 10 to 17, and figures 8-10). Only with an unconventionally long overview and careful comparison of parliamentary election returns from various geographic regions do meaningful patterns begin to emerge. In fact, assessments do not acquire a true third dimension unless information from regional, provincial, and communal elections is considered as well (see pages 72-81 and tables A-17-A-32). Because Italian politics move with glacial speed the basic shifts are found primarily in subsurface movements.

The first national vote after the war, on 2 June 1946, produced a political spectrum that has tended to repeat itself in the 35 subsequent years. This first election appears now as a harbinger of a certain stagnation in Italian voting patterns that belies in part the conventional belief that Italy is unstable. The election of 1946 is most remembered today for its verdict to abolish the monarchy of the House of Savoy and to make Italy a republic. At the same time, however, Italians voted for their first postwar legislative body, the unicameral *Costituente* (Constituent Assembly), a body of 556 members empowered to write a constitution for the new republic.

In both 1946 votes, the election results demonstrate the close division of viewpoints in the nation (see tables 8 and 9). In the referendum on the monarchy—the so-called institutional question—the electorate supported founding a republic by a margin of only 2 million voters (8.54 percent of the participating electorate). In the simultaneous election of the assembly the margin was even narrower ideologically, particularly if one recalls the affinity of the Communist

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Table 8

## Election for the Constituent Assembly, 2 June 1946

	Number of Votes	Percentage	Number of Seats	Percent of Membership
Christian Democrats	8,082,486	35.18	207	37.23
Socialists	4,765,665	20.74	115	20.68
Communists	4,358,243	18.97	104	18.70
National Democratic Union	1,560,037	6.79	41	7.37
Common Man Front	1,210,021	5.27	30	5.40
Republicans	1,003,086	4.37	23	4.14
National Freedom Bloc	636,330	2.77	16	2.88
Party of Action	334,877	1.46	7	1.26
Democratic Concentration of Labor			2	
Italian Unionist Movement	220,196	0.96	1	0.72
Social Christian Party			1	
Sicilian Independence Movement			4	
Sardinian Action Party			2	
Democratic Party of Labor	803,328	3.49	1	1.62
Peasants' Party			1	
Front of Progressive Democratic Republicans			1	
Total	22,974,269	100.00	556	100.00

Table 9


## National Institutional Referendum, 2 June 1946

	Number of Votes	Percentage
For the creation of an Italian Republic	12,719,641	54.27
For the retention of the monarchy of the House of Savoy	10,718,802	45.73
Total	23,437,269	100.00

and Socialist viewpoints at that time. The DC won 35.2 percent of the vote, and the two parties of the left 39.7 percent (PSI 20.7 percent; PCI 19.0 percent). This combined total for the three major parties, some 75 percent, is roughly the pattern which has prevailed ever since, save for 1948. Over the entire timespan, fluctuation has occurred among the DC, PSI, and PCI, but their combined total has remained much the same (see figure 7).


Italy's new Constitution went into effect on 1 January 1948, and the general election for the first legislature of the Parliament was held on 18 April. Such a consultation would have been significant in any circumstances as the first of a new regime, but circumstances elsewhere in Europe rendered it more dramatic. The Communist coup in Czechoslovakia in late

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**Confidential****Figure 7****Major Parties' Share of Vote, 1946-79**

Percent of votes for Christian Democrats, Communists and Socialists in elections for the Constituent Assembly of 1946 and the Chamber of Deputies, 1948-79. Figure on right is party majority in election for European Parliament, June 1979. (With a law of 1975, voting age was lowered to 18 years, increasing the electorate by some 3,000,000, effective in 1975.)

585807 2-82

**Figure 8****Composition of Constituent Assembly, 1946**

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February made the election in Italy, with the largest Communist party outside the Russian sphere of influence, all the more ominous. In an atmosphere of the beginning of the cold war, American interest in the Italian contest rose. Public statements by President Truman, urging Italo-Americans to write relatives in Italy to vote DC, and the pro-DC stance of the Catholic community in the United States rose to a crescendo by election day. As a result, the DC for some years had to cope with allegations that its victory was bought with US dollars and that it was an American puppet.

Other elements of more lasting import from both 1946 and 1948 need to be noted for the bearing they have on today's Italian political scene and on the DC in particular. First, neither of these early elections took place in normal times, given contemporary conditions in Italy and Europe. Italy had not had a free

election since 1921, when the electorate was restricted to males. If a normal election is defined as a free consultation in peacetime, then the last such vote in Italy was probably that of 1909 when the country had not yet instituted even universal male suffrage. Hence, at best the 1946 and 1948 elections were the first normal ones after two world wars, 20 years of dictatorship, and a depression. In any event, these elections were the first with universal male and female suffrage for all citizens age 21 and over. Furthermore, the electorate was roughly triple that of 1921. Catholics participated in an Italian election for the first time with full Vatican approval, and genuinely mass parties with mass support participated for the first time. Thus the overwhelming majority of the electorate in 1946 had no experience of a freely exercised franchise and representative democratic government.

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Table 10

**Italy's Eight Postwar National Elections**  
**(Voting for the Chamber of Deputies), 1948 and 1953**

	1948				1953			
	Number of Votes	Percentage	Number of Seats	Percent of Membership	Number of Votes	Percentage	Number of Seats	Percent of Membership
Christian Democrats (DC)	12,741,299	48.50	305	53.14	10,864,282	40.10	263	44.58
Communists (PCI) <sup>a</sup>	8,137,047	30.98	183	31.88	6,121,922	22.60	143	24.24
Socialists (PSI)					3,441,305	12.70	75	12.71
Social Democrats (PSDI) <sup>b</sup>	1,858,346	7.07	33	5.75	1,223,251	4.52	19	3.22
Liberals (PLI) <sup>c</sup>	1,004,889	3.83	19	3.31	816,267	3.00	13	2.20
Republicans (PRI) <sup>d</sup>	652,477	2.48	9	1.57	437,988	1.62	5	0.85
Neo-Fascists (MSI) <sup>e</sup>	526,670	2.00	6	1.04	1,582,567	5.84	29	4.91
PNM	729,174	2.78	14	2.44	1,855,842	6.85	40	6.78
PMP (Monarchists) <sup>f</sup>								
PDIUM								
Radicals (PRad)	0				0			
Others	619,010	2.36	5	0.87	749,319	2.77	3	0.51
Total	26,268,912	100.00	574	100.00	27,092,743	100.00	590	100.00
Voter Turnout	26,854,203	92.23			28,410,326	93.82		

<sup>a</sup> In 1948 *Fronte Democratico Popolare per la Libertà, la Pace, il Lavoro* (coalition of PCI and PSI). One hundred thirty-two deputies (23.00 percent of the Chamber) declared themselves PCI members; 51 (8.88 percent) PSI.

<sup>b</sup> *Unità Socialista* in 1948.

<sup>c</sup> In 1948 *Blocco Nazionale* with *Uomo Qualunque*.

<sup>d</sup> Coalition of PRI and PRad in 1958.

<sup>e</sup> From 1972, also MSI-DN, *Movimento Sociale Italiano* and *Destra Nazionale*.

<sup>f</sup> In 1948 and 1953, PNM; in 1958, PNM and PMP; in 1963 and 1968, PDIUM.

Whatever faults may be laid to the DC now, it was the pivotal political grouping that brought Italy into a new order against a backdrop of war, destruction, economic hardship, and inexperience. And this leap into sophisticated government occurred without violence.

In the election of 1948, the DC's margin of victory overshadows all else. Seen more than 30 years later, the size of its vote is still remarkable. The margin of victory then has since proved to be a mixed blessing, a performance for which there has been no encore. For years the DC touted the 1948 results as proof of its massive support in the population and often asserted

that it had won an absolute majority. Opposition groups have frequently argued against this, though, pointing out that the popular vote was *not* absolute even if the Italian proportional representation system did give the DC an absolute majority of seats in both houses of Parliament (see tables 10 and 14). Worse for the DC, the party was long accused of insinuating its 1948 victory into a greater mandate than appeared warranted to other groups. More than a few innuendos from other quarters suggested that only US intervention—"votes bought with dollars"—accounted for the DC's 48-percent share of the vote.

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Table 11

**Italy's Eight Postwar National Elections**  
**(Voting for the Chamber of Deputies), 1958 and 1963**

	1958				1963			
	Number of Votes	Percentage	Number of Seats	Percent of Membership	Number of Votes	Percentage	Number of Seats	Percent of Membership
Christian Democrats (DC)	12,522,279	42.36	273	45.80	11,775,970	38.29	260	41.27
Communists (PCI) <sup>a</sup>	6,704,706	22.68	140	23.49	7,768,228	25.26	166	26.35
Socialists (PSI) <sup>a</sup>	4,208,111	14.23	84	14.09	4,257,300	13.84	87	13.81
Social Democrats (PSDI) <sup>b</sup>	1,345,750	4.55	22	3.69	1,876,409	6.10	33	5.24
Liberals (PLI) <sup>c</sup>	1,046,939	3.54	17	2.85	2,143,954	6.97	39	6.19
Republicans (PRI) <sup>d</sup>	405,574	1.37	6	1.01	420,419	1.37	6	0.95
Neo-Fascists (MSI) <sup>e</sup>	1,407,913	4.76	24	4.03	1,571,187	5.10	27	4.28
PNM	659,865 <sup>f</sup>	2.23	11	1.85	536,991 <sup>f</sup>	1.75	8	1.27
PMP (Monarchists) <sup>f</sup>	776,942	2.63	14	2.35				
PDIUM								
Radicals (PRad)	0				0			
Others	485,554	1.64	5	0.84	407,999	1.32	4	0.64
Total	29,563,633	100.00	596	100.00	30,758,031	100.00	630	100.00
Voter Turnout	30,437,770	93.81			31,766,058	92.91		

<sup>a</sup> In 1948 *Fronte Democratico Popolare per la Libertà, la Pace, il Lavoro* (coalition of PCI and PSI). One hundred thirty-two deputies (23.00 percent of the Chamber) declared themselves PCI members; 51 (8.88 percent) PSI.

<sup>b</sup> *Unita Socialista* in 1948.

<sup>c</sup> In 1948 *Blocco Nazionale* with *Uomo Qualunque*.

<sup>d</sup> Coalition of PRI and PRad in 1958.

<sup>e</sup> From 1972, also MSI-DN, *Movimento Sociale Italiano* and *Destra Nazionale*.

<sup>f</sup> In 1948 and 1953, PNM; in 1958, PNM and PMP; in 1963 and 1968, PDIUM.

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Table 12

**Italy's Eight Postwar National Elections**  
**(Voting for the Chamber of Deputies), 1968 and 1972**

	1968				1972			
	Number of Votes	Percentage	Number of Seats	Percent of Membership	Number of Votes	Percentage	Number of Seats	Percent of Membership
Christian Democrats (DC)	12,441,553	39.12	266	42.22	12,919,270	38.66	266	42.22
Communists (PCI)	8,557,404	26.91	177	28.10	9,072,454	27.14	179	28.41
Socialists (PSI) <sup>a</sup>	4,605,832	14.48	91	14.45	3,210,427	9.62	61	9.68
Social Democrats (PSDI)					1,717,539	5.14	29	4.60
Liberals (PLI)	1,851,060	5.82	31	4.92	1,297,105	3.88	20	3.18
Republicans (PRI)	626,567	1.97	9	1.43	954,597	2.86	15	2.38
Neo-Fascists (MSI)	1,414,794	4.46	24	3.81	2,896,762 <sup>b</sup>	8.67	56	8.89
Monarchists (PNM)	414,423 <sup>c</sup>	1.30	6	0.95	0			
Radicals (PRad)	0				0			
Proletarian Unity (PSIUP) <sup>d</sup>	1,414,544	4.44	23	3.65	648,763	1.94	0	0.00
Others	477,076	1.50	3	0.47	697,862	2.09	4	0.64
Total	31,803,253	100.00	630	100.00	33,414,779	100.00	630	100.00
Voter Turnout	33,003,249	92.79			34,524,106	93.18		

<sup>a</sup> Temporary merger in 1968 of PSI and PSDI as *Partito Socialista Unificato*.

<sup>b</sup> From 1972, also MSI-DN, *Movimento Sociale Italiano* and *Destra Nazionale*.

<sup>c</sup> In 1948 and 1953, PNM in 1958, PNM and PMP; in 1963 and 1968, PDIUM.

<sup>d</sup> PSIUP in 1968 and 1972; *Democrazia Proletaria* in 1976.

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Table 13

**Italy's Eight Postwar National Elections**  
**(Voting for the Chamber of Deputies), 1976 and 1979**

	1976				1979			
	Number of Votes	Percentage	Number of Seats	Percent of Membership	Number of Votes	Percentage	Number of Seats	Percent of Membership
Christian Democrats (DC)	14,218,298	38.71	262	41.59	14,026,924	38.29	261	41.43
Communists (PCI)	12,622,728	34.37	227	36.03	11,129,298	30.38	201	31.91
Socialists (PSI) <sup>a</sup>	3,542,998	9.64	57	9.05	3,591,579	9.81	62	9.84
Social Democrats (PSDI) <sup>a</sup>	1,237,270	3.37	15	2.38	1,405,008	3.84	21	3.33
Liberals (PLI)	478,335	1.31	5	0.79	713,486	1.94	9	1.43
Republicans (PRI)	1,134,936	3.09	14	2.22	1,107,826	3.02	15	2.38
Neo-Fascists (MSI)	2,245,376 <sup>b</sup>	6.12	35	5.56	1,927,233 <sup>b</sup>	5.28	31	4.92
Monarchists (PNM)	0				0			
Radicals (PRad)	394,212	1.07	4	0.64	1,264,082	3.44	18	2.86
Proletarian Unity (PSIUP) <sup>c</sup>	582,770	1.58	6	0.95	601,036	1.65	6	0.95
Others	270,350	0.74	5	0.79	863,271	2.35	6	0.95
Total	36,727,273	100.00	630	100.00	36,629,743	100.00	630	100.00
Voter Turnout	37,760,520	93.41			38,150,395	90.35		

<sup>a</sup> Temporary merger in 1968 of PSI and PSDI as *Partito Socialista Unificato*.

<sup>b</sup> From 1972, also MSI-DN, *Movimento Sociale Italiano* and *Destra Nazionale*.

<sup>c</sup> *Unita Proletaria per il Comunismo*.

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**Table 14**

**Italy's Eight Postwar National Elections  
(Voting for the Senate), 1948 and 1953**

	1948				1953			
	Number of Votes	Percentage	Number of Seats	Percent of Membership	Number of Votes	Percentage	Number of Seats	Percent of Membership
Christian Democrats (DC)	10,899,640	48.11	131	55.26	9,692,584	39.87	113	47.68
Communists (PCI) <sup>a</sup>	6,969,122	30.76	72	30.38	4,912,093	20.21	51	21.52
Socialists (PSI)					2,893,148	11.91	26	10.97
Social Democrats (PSDI) <sup>b</sup>	943,219	4.16	8	3.38	1,046,659	4.34	4	1.69
Liberals (PLI) <sup>c</sup>	1,216,934	5.37	7	2.95	695,985	2.86	3	1.27
Republicans (PRI)	594,178	2.62	4	1.69	262,484	1.08	0	0.00
PRI-PSDI/PRI-DC	607,792 <sup>d</sup>	2.68	4	1.69	186,447 <sup>e</sup>	0.78	3	1.27
Neo-Fascists (MSI) <sup>f</sup>	164,092	0.73	0	0.00	1,473,596	6.07	9	3.78
PNM	393,510 <sup>g</sup>	1.74	3	1.27	1,562,653 <sup>g</sup>	6.44	14	5.91
PMP (Monarchists) <sup>g</sup>								
PDIUM								
Radicals (PRad)	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Others	868,803	3.83	8	3.38	1,563,702	6.44	14	5.91
Total	22,657,290	100.00	237	100.00	24,309,351	100.00	237	100.00
Voter Turnout	23,842,919	92.15			25,483,201	93.78		

<sup>a</sup> In 1948, *Fronte Democratico Popolare per la Libertà, la Pace, il Lavoro* (coalition of PCI and PSI).

<sup>b</sup> *Unita Socialista* in 1948.

<sup>c</sup> *Blocco Nazionale* in 1948 with *Uomo Qualunque*.

<sup>d</sup> In 1948, PRI-PSDI coalition in Lombardy, Venetia, Friuli-Venezia Giulia, and Liguria.

<sup>e</sup> In 1953 and 1963, PRI-DC coalition in Emilia-Romagna.

<sup>f</sup> From 1972, MSI was joined by *Destra Nazionale (DN)*.

<sup>g</sup> In 1948 and 1953, PNM; in 1958, PNM and PMP; in 1963 and 1968, PDIUM.



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Table 15

**Italy's Eight Postwar National Elections  
(Voting for the Senate), 1958 and 1963**

	1958				1963			
	Number of Votes	Percentage	Number of Seats	Percent of Membership	Number of Votes	Percentage	Number of Seats	Percent of Membership
Christian Democrats (DC)	10,782,262	41.23	123	50.00	10,032,458	36.52	129	40.95
Communists (PCI) <sup>a</sup>	5,701,019	21.80	59	23.98	6,933,842	25.24	84	26.67
Socialists (PSI) <sup>a</sup>	3,682,806	14.08	35	14.23	3,849,878	14.02	44	13.97
Social Democrats (PSDI) <sup>b</sup>	1,165,402	4.46	5	2.03	1,744,213	6.35	14	4.44
Liberals (PLI) <sup>c</sup>	1,008,830	3.86	4	1.63	2,028,379	7.38	18	5.72
Republicans (PRI)	363,461	1.39	0	0.00	223,107	0.81	0	0.00
PRI-PSDI/PRI-DC	0				185,889 <sup>d</sup>	0.68	4	1.27
Neo-Fascists (MSI) <sup>e</sup>	1,149,873	4.40	8	3.25	1,459,046	5.31	14	4.44
PNM	510,823 <sup>f</sup>	1.94	2	0.81	429,339 <sup>f</sup>	1.56	2	0.64
PMP (Monarchists) <sup>f</sup>								
PDIUM								
Radicals (PRad)	0				0			
Others	1,787,523	6.84	10	4.07	584,935	2.13	6	1.90
Total	26,151,999	100.00	246	100.00	27,471,086	100.00	315	100.00
Voter Turnout	27,391,239	93.89			28,831,008	93.04		

<sup>a</sup> In 1948, *Fronte Democratico Popolare per la Libertà, la Pace, il Lavoro* (coalition of PCI and PSI).

<sup>b</sup> *Unita Socialista* in 1948.

<sup>c</sup> *Blocco Nazionale* in 1948 with *Uomo Qualunque*.

<sup>d</sup> In 1953 and 1963, PRI-DC coalition in Emilia-Romagna.

<sup>e</sup> From 1972, MSI was joined by *Destra Nazionale* (DN).

<sup>f</sup> In 1948 and 1953, PNM; in 1958, PNM and PMP; in 1963 and 1968, PDIUM.

**Table 16**

**Italy's Eight Postwar National Elections  
(Voting for the Senate), 1968 and 1972**

	1968				1972			
	Number of Votes	Percentage	Number of Seats	Percent of Membership	Number of Votes	Percentage	Number of Seats	Percent of Membership
Christian Democrats (DC)	10,965,790	38.34	135	42.86	11,466,701	38.08	135	42.86
Communists (PCI)	8,583,285 <sup>a</sup>	30.01	101	32.06	8,475,141 <sup>a</sup>	28.14	94	29.84
Socialists (PSI) <sup>b</sup>	4,355,506	15.23	46	14.59	3,225,804	10.71	33	10.48
Social Democrats (PSDI)					1,613,603	5.36	11	3.49
Liberals (PLI)	1,936,943	6.77	16	5.08	1,316,058	4.36	8	2.54
Republicans (PRI)	620,658	2.17	2	0.64	917,989	3.04	5	1.59
PRI-PSDI/PRI-DC	0				0			
Neo-Fascists (MSI)	1,380,452	4.83	11	3.49	2,737,695	9.09	26	8.25
PNM	308,916 <sup>c</sup>	1.08	2	0.64	0			
PMP (Monarchists)								
PDIUM								
Radicals (PRad)	0				0			
Others	499,697	1.57	2	0.64	361,915	1.20	3	0.95
Total	28,601,247	100.00	315	100.00	30,114,906	100.00	315	100.00
Voter Turnout	30,212,701	92.88			31,454,873	92.72		

<sup>a</sup> Coalition of PCI and PSIUP in 1968 and 1972.

<sup>b</sup> Temporary merger in 1968 of PSI and PSDI as *Partito Socialista Unificato*.

<sup>c</sup> In 1948 and 1953, PNM; in 1958, PNM and PMP; in 1963 and 1968, PDIUM.



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Table 17


**Italy's Eight Postwar National Elections**  
**(Voting for the Senate), 1976 and 1979**

	1976				1979			
	Number of Votes	Percentage	Number of Seats	Percent of Membership	Number of Votes	Percentage	Number of Seats	Percent of Membership
Christian Democrats (DC)	12,226,768	38.88	135	42.86	12,010,716	38.34	138	43.81
Communists (PCI)	10,640,471	33.84	116	36.83	9,855,951	31.46	109	34.60
Socialists (PSI)	3,209,987	10.21	29	9.21	3,252,410	10.38	32	10.16
Social Democrats (PSDI)	966,771	3.07	6	1.90	1,320,729	4.21	9	2.86
Liberals (PLI)	436,751	1.39	2	0.64	691,718	2.21	2	0.64
Republicans (PRI)	846,505	2.69	6	1.90	1,053,251	3.36	6	1.90
PRI-PSDI/PRI-DC	0				0			
Neo-Fascists (MSI)	2,090,635	6.65	15	4.76	1,780,950	5.68	13	4.12
PNM	0				0			
PMP (Monarchists)								
PDIUM								
Radicals (PRad)	265,397	0.84	0	0.00	413,444	1.32	2	0.64
Others	768,896	2.43	6	1.90	951,626	3.04	4	1.27
Total	31,448,181	100.00	315	100.00	31,330,795	100.00	315	100.00
Voter Turnout	32,557,373	93.27			32,968,054	90.73		

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**Figure 9**

**Composition of Chamber of Deputies, 1948-79**



<sup>a</sup>In 1948 Fronte Democratico Popolare per la Libertà, la Pace, il Lavoro, coalition of PCI and PSI.

<sup>b</sup>Unita Socialista in 1948.

<sup>c</sup>In 1948 Blocco Nazionale with Uomo Qualunque.

<sup>d</sup>Coalition of PRI and PRad in 1958.

<sup>e</sup>From 1972, also MSI-DN, Movimento Sociale Italiano and Destra Nazionale.

<sup>f</sup>In 1948 and 1953, PNM; in 1958, PNM and PMP; in 1963 and 1968, PDIUM.


<sup>g</sup>PSIUP in 1968 and 1972; Democrazia Proletaria in 1976; Proletarian Unity for Communism.

<sup>h</sup>Temporary merger in 1968 of PSI and PSDI as Partito Socialista Unificato.

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Figure 10

## Composition of Senate, 1948-79

<sup>a</sup>In 1948, Fronte Democratico Popolare per la Libertà, la Pace, il Lavoro (coalition of PCI and PSI).<sup>b</sup>Coalition of PCI and PSIUP in 1968 and 1972.<sup>c</sup>Unita Socialista in 1948.<sup>d</sup>Temporary merger in 1968 or PSI and PSDI as Partito Socialista Unificato.<sup>e</sup>Blocco Nazionale in 1948 with Uomo Qualunque.<sup>f</sup>In 1948, PRI-PSDI coalition in Lombardy, Venetia, Friuli-Julian Venetia and Liguria.<sup>g</sup>In 1953 and 1963, PRI-DC coalition in Emilia-Romagna.<sup>h</sup>From 1972, MSI was joined by DN, Destra Nazionale.<sup>i</sup>In 1948 and 1953, PNM; in 1958, PNM and PMP; in 1963 and 1968, PDIUM.


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**Figure 11**

**Labor Force by Economic Sector, 1951-80**



<sup>a</sup>Includes commerce, transportation, communications, hotels, banking, public administration, social services, and so forth.


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Two other sets of data for a comparable time period demonstrate, paradoxically, how much Italy has changed. The most striking are data on employment sectors (see figure 11). In 1951, 43.87 percent of Italians engaged in agricultural pursuits, the largest single sector. By 1980 that sector had dropped to the smallest, with only 14.14 percent still deriving their living from the land. The smallest sector in 1951— independent businessmen, professionals, and service occupations, with only 26.66 percent—grew to 48.27 percent by 1980. Industry, the other major area of work, rose in the same years from 29.47 percent to 37.59 percent. Recalling that the DC's most important support was said to come from the rural voter, the DC's share of the vote from these areas has declined, surprisingly, less steeply.

The second area of comparison, population growth and change, also yields important information. From 1951 to 1979, Italy's overall population increased 20.35 percent (see table 18). During that time, the growth of both the northwest and center increased

**Figure 12**

**Urbanization and Support for the Christian Democrats, 1953-79**



Each point in this figure represents one of thirty electoral districts in the Chamber of Deputies. The rate of urbanization is measured as the percentage change in total population in each district between 1953 and 1979. The change in the vote share of the Christian Democrats is measured also as a percentage change over the same period. Two districts (Valle d'Aosta and Trieste) were excluded from the analysis because they were not comparable to the other districts.

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much more rapidly. The northeast, south, and islands, traditionally DC strongholds, fell behind the nation as a whole in growth. Paradoxically the party base in these areas, measured in numbers of voters, has eroded only in certain areas—Sardinia, the city of Naples, and the Provinces of Taranto and Ragusa, for example.

If election results are contrasted with the employment sectors and population, a curious phenomenon appears: politics do not seem to reflect these other facets of national life. In a broader sense, keeping in mind the great changes in social and economic realities, the variance seems even greater. When applied to the DC specifically (and perhaps to some other parties), the implication is that the party is not coping well with economic, social, and demographic change.

The situation described here is best summed up in the title of a book on the national election of 1979, *Mobility Without Movement*, a phrase highlighting the paradox of contemporary Italy. The country is by

Table 18

## Population by Geographical Region, 1951 and 1979

	1951	1979	Change, 1951-79	Percentage Change
Northwest <sup>a</sup>	11,745,432	15,435,163	3,689,731	+31.41
Northeast <sup>b</sup>	5,575,781 <sup>c</sup>	6,457,898	882,117	+15.82
Center <sup>c</sup>	7,507,069	9,772,932	2,265,863	+30.18
South <sup>d</sup>	16,627,480	18,598,959	1,971,479	+11.86
Islands <sup>e</sup>	5,762,772	6,563,559	800,787	+13.90
Italy	47,218,534 <sup>f</sup>	56,828,511	9,609,977	+20.35

<sup>a</sup> Northwest: Piedmont, Valle d'Aosta, Lombardy, and Liguria.

<sup>b</sup> Northeast: Trentino-Alto Adige, Venetia, and Friuli-Venezia Giulia.

<sup>c</sup> Center: Emilia-Romagna, Tuscany, Umbria, and Marche.

<sup>d</sup> South: Lazio, Abruzzi, Molise, Campania, Puglia, Basilicata, and Calabria.

<sup>e</sup> Islands: Sicily and Sardinia.

<sup>f</sup> Trieste, which became part of Italy in October 1954, is not included. Its estimated population in 1954 was 297,003.

most measures among the leading nations in the world in many spheres. In politics, however, it often appears more exemplary of the Third World. As the largest political party and a participant in every government from 1945 to 1981, the DC must bear a large portion of the blame for this, even if other parties also share responsibility. The word Italians use most in describing the DC is *immobilismo* (immobilism) in reference to the party's characteristic failure to act on many major issues and thus leave the country somewhat anachronistic politically.

If exception is made for the anomaly of 1948, the stability of the DC's ranks in the Chamber is striking in terms of numbers. For the seven other legislatures beginning in 1953, the party's share of the vote ranged from 42.36 percent to 38.29 percent (1958 and 1963). But if 1958 is also excluded, the range narrows to a mere 1.81 percent (from 40.10 percent in 1953 to 38.29 percent) over a 25-year period (see tables 10 to 13). Nearly the same phenomenon appears with the

Table 19

## Population and Voting by Sex, 1948 and 1979

	1948		1979	
	Males	Females	Males	Females
Total	22,868,008	23,953,962	27,767,759	29,060,752
Percentage of population	48.84	51.16	48.86	51.14
Eligible to vote				
Total	13,908,860	15,208,694	20,237,003	21,986,810
Percentage of population	47.77	52.23	47.93	52.07
Actual voters				
Total	12,855,102	13,999,101	18,400,272	19,750,123
Percentage of population	92.42	92.05	90.92	89.83

DC Senate delegation, despite the difference in its electorate caused by the age qualification for voting eligibility <sup>5</sup> (see tables 14 to 17). With this evidence over a period of roughly 30 years, how can the erosion hypothesis be sustained?

Here the significance of district-by-district analysis becomes clear. If on the surface the DC's vote percentages and the number of its deputies and senators remain so similar across the years, geographic shifts in its strength and changes in delegation personnel are masked but quite real. For example, the election of 1979 was widely hailed—particularly in the press—as a great success for the party compared to 1976. True, the DC doubled its distance from the PCI, but this resulted primarily from Communist losses. The DC, on the other hand, lost 0.42 percent of the votes in 1979 relative to 1976. More telling was its decline in 22 of the 32 districts for the Chamber (see figure 14) In the 20 Senate districts, the party fell below its 1976 level in 13 (see figure 15) Also among the 261 DC deputies elected in 1979, one less than in 1976, there were 59 new people,

<sup>5</sup> To be eligible to vote in Senate elections, a citizen must be at least 25 years old.


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**Figure 13**  
**Population Change (1951-79) in Relation to DC Representation Change**  
**(1948-79) in the Chamber of Deputies; shown by Political Region.**

Percent Change

Key

- Percent of Population Change 1951-79  
 □ 1979 DC Representation Change Relative to 1948  
 □ 1979 DC Representation Change Relative to 1953



<sup>a</sup>A few deviations from traditional regional boundaries are made in the formation of the thirty-two electoral districts of the Chamber. Population and representation figures have been adjusted accordingly here. In the case of the Veneto, the province of Belluno is not included in the region's statistics.

<sup>b</sup>Figures include the province of Belluno (see note a). The province of Trieste was added to Italy in October 1954. Thus the population and representation statistics utilized here for years prior to that date do not include Trieste. Addition of the 300,000 citizens of that area thus after statistics given for the region. If Trieste is excluded, the area had a slight decline in population as well as in its number of allocated seats.

<sup>c</sup>Figures include the province of Rieti (see note a).

<sup>d</sup>The province of Rieti is not included (see note a).

Note: Italy's first reliable postwar census was taken in September 1951. Figures from that report form the basis of comparison in this table together with population statistics reported for the compilation of electoral roles for the general elections of 1979. There is thus a slight variation implied in calculating the percentages of delegation representation in both 1948 and 1953. In addition, the Italian Government's mode of reporting 1948 and 1953 election returns (to include those deputies elected through the Single National College) make a precise percentage calculation impossible. With each of these exceptions, no significant alteration of the results occurs.

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
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Figure 14

## Christian Democratic Share of Electoral District Delegations, 1948-79




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Figure 14

## Christian Democratic Share of Electoral District Delegations, 1948-79



<sup>a</sup>No DC list presented in the elections of this year. The average and median are thus for 5 elections.

<sup>b</sup>The city and province of Trieste were not a part of this region until the elections of 1958. The 8 year average and median are also shown without Trieste.

<sup>c</sup>The DC and PRI presented a unified list in these elections.

<sup>d</sup>In the elections of 1953, 1958, and 1963 Abruzzi and Molise constituted one region and hence one senatorial electoral district. Statistics shown here are official breakdowns for returns in those years for each of the two parts.

<sup>e</sup>DC and PSDI presented a unified list.

<sup>f</sup>Unified list of DC and PLI.

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Figure 15

## Distribution of Seats by Electoral District (Region)

## Key

Number below years in light type shows number of seats won by Christian Democrats.  
Number below years in bold type shows total number of seats in a particular electoral district.

## Chamber of Deputies

Electoral District	1948	1953	1958	1963	1968	1972	1976	1979
Torino-Novara-Vercelli	13/26	11/26	11/26	11/33	11/32	12/34	13/38	12/39
Cuneo-Alessandria-Asti	9/16	8/16	8/14	7/14	7/15	7/14	7/16	7/15
Genova-Imperia-La Spezia-Savona	9/19	8/17	9/21	8/23	8/22	8/22	8/22	7/23
Milano-Pavia	18/36	16/36	15/39	15/45	17/47	16/45	19/52	18/52
Como-Sondrio-Varese	9/14	9/15	8/14	9/17	9/17	9/17	9/19	9/20
Brescia-Bergamo	14/19	12/18	12/19	12/19	12/20	12/20	12/21	12/23
Mantova-Cremona	5/10	5/10	5/10	4/9	4/9	4/8	4/8	4/8
Trento-Bolzano	5/9	5/8	5/10	5/10	4/9	5/10	4/9	4/10
Verona-Padova-Vicenza-Rovigo	19/28	17/28	16/29	17/29	17/28	17/28	16/28	16/29
Venezia-Treviso	10/16	10/16	9/16	9/17	9/18	9/18	8/16	8/17
Udine-Belluno-Gorizia-Pordenone	9/14	9/15	8/14	7/14	7/15	7/14	6/13	6/11
Bologna-Ferrara-Ravenna-Furli	7/24	7/22	7/27	6/27	6/25	7/27	7/27	7/27
Parma-Molena-Piacenza-Reggio Emilia	7/19	7/19	7/19	6/19	6/20	6/20	6/19	6/19
Firenze-Pistoia	6/13	5/13	5/13	5/16	5/16	5/16	5/15	5/14
Pisa-Livorno-Lucca-Massa Carrara	7/14	6/13	6/15	5/15	5/15	6/16	6/14	5/14
Siena-Arezzo-Grosseto	3/9	3/10	3/9	3/10	3/9	3/9	3/9	3/9
Ancona-Pesaro-Macerata-Anzani Piceno	9/17	8/15	8/19	7/19	7/17	7/17	7/16	7/17
Perugia-Terri-Rieti	5/11	4/11	5/13	4/12	4/13	4/11	4/12	4/10
Roma-Latina-Viterbo-Frosinone	20/34	15/38	16/39	16/48	17/47	17/48	19/55	20/54
L'Aquila-Pescara-Chieti-Teramo	9/16	7/14	8/17	7/16	8/15	8/15	7/14	7/14
Campobasso-Isernia	3/4	3/5	4/6	3/4	3/5	3/4	3/4	3/4
Napoli-Caserta	17/31	12/31	14/34	15/38	15/38	14/38	15/39	16/38
Benevento-Avellino-Salerno	11/18	8/20	10/21	10/21	10/21	11/23	9/18	10/18
Bari-Foggia	12/22	9/22	10/22	10/23	11/23	10/24	10/23	10/23
Lecco-Brindisi-Taranto	9/16	8/16	9/18	9/18	9/19	9/18	8/18	9/18
Potenza-Matera	4/6	4/7	4/8	4/8	5/8	5/8	4/8	4/7
Catanzaro-Cosenza-Reggio Calabria	13/24	11/25	13/26	12/26	11/26	10/24	10/23	10/23
Catania-Messina-Siracusa-Ragusa-Enna	15/26	11/25	13/29	12/29	13/29	12/30	12/29	12/27
Palermo-Trapani-Agrigento-Caltanissetta	13/25	11/25	13/29	12/29	12/29	13/30	12/25	12/26
Cagliari-Sassari-Nuoro-Oristano	9/14	7/14	8/15	8/18	8/19	8/17	7/16	7/17
Valle d'Aosta	1/1	1/1	0/1	0/1	1/1	0/1	0/1	0/1
Trieste	—	—	2/4	2/3	2/3	2/4	2/3	1/3
Totals	305/574	263/590	273/596	260/630	266/630	266/630	262/630	261/630

## Senate

Electoral District	1948	1953	1958	1963	1968	1972	1976	1979
Piemonte	8/17	8/17	9/18	9/24	10/24	9/24	10/25	9/25
Valle d'Aosta	1/1	0/1	0/1	0/1	1/1	0/1	0/1	0/1
Lombardia	18/31	16/32	16/33	19/45	20/45	20/45	21/48	21/48
Trentino-Alto Adige	4/6	4/6	4/6	4/7	4/7	5/7	3/7	3/7
Veneto	14/19	12/19	13/20	14/23	13/23	14/23	14/23	14/23
Friuli-Venezia Giulia	4/6	4/6	4/6	4/7	4/7	4/7	4/7	4/7
Liguria	4/8	4/8	4/8	4/11	4/11	5/11	4/10	4/10
Emilia-Romagna	6/17	5/17	6/18	3/22	6/22	6/22	7/22	6/22
Toscana	7/15	6/15	7/16	6/20	7/20	7/20	7/20	7/20
Umbria	3/6	2/6	2/6	3/7	2/7	3/7	2/7	2/7
Marche	4/7	4/7	4/7	4/8	4/8	4/8	4/8	4/8
Lazio	10/16	8/16	8/17	8/24	9/24	8/24	10/27	11/27
Abruzzi	4/6	4/6	4/6	4/7	4/7	4/7	4/7	4/7
Molise	2/2	2/2	2/2	2/2	2/2	2/2	1/2	2/2
Campania	11/21	8/21	10/22	11/29	11/29	11/29	12/29	13/29
Puglia	8/15	7/15	8/16	10/21	9/21	9/21	9/20	9/20
Basilicata	3/6	3/6	4/6	4/7	4/7	4/7	3/7	4/7
Calabria	5/10	5/10	5/10	5/12	5/12	5/12	5/11	5/11
Sicilia	12/22	8/22	10/22	11/29	11/29	11/29	11/26	12/26
Sardegna	3/6	4/6	4/6	5/9	5/9	4/9	4/8	4/8
Totals	131/237	113/237	123/246	129/315	135/315	135/315	135/315	138/315

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**Table 20**

**Eligible Voters by District, 1948 and 1979**

Region and District	Eligible Voters, Chamber			Eligible Voters, Senate			Population in 1951	Population in 1979	Percentage Change
	1948	1979	Percentage Change	1948	1979	Percentage Change			
Piedmont									
1	1,602,276	2,503,112	+ 56.22						
2	952,798	979,024	+ 2.75	2,345,808	3,067,601	+ 30.77			
Total	2,555,075	3,482,136	+ 36.28				3,518,177	4,538,020	+ 28.99
Liguria									
3	1,108,119	1,477,501	+ 33.33	1,018,535	1,321,860	+ 29.78	1,566,961	1,852,903	+ 18.25
Lombardy									
4	2,033,439	3,388,216	+ 66.62						
5	783,004	1,271,566	+ 62.40						
6	912,835	1,372,897	+ 50.40						
7	533,328	548,522	+ 2.85	3,855,332	5,724,503	+ 48.48			
Total	4,262,606	6,581,201	+ 54.39				6,566,154	8,929,703	+ 36.00
Trentino–Alto Adige									
8	440,591	636,264	+ 44.41	390,539	541,766	+ 38.72	728,604	873,995	+ 19.95
Venetia <sup>a</sup>									
9	1,420,031	1,883,682	+ 32.65						
10	821,168	1,152,485	+ 40.35	2,099,256	2,751,182	+ 31.06			
Total	2,241,199	3,036,167	+ 35.47				3,918,059	4,338,292	+ 10.73
Friuli–Venezia Giulia <sup>b</sup>									
11	772,341	946,337	+ 22.53						
32	<sup>c</sup>	239,456		543,693 <sup>c</sup>	871,346	+ 60.26			
Total	772,341	1,185,793	+ 53.53				929,118	1,245,611	+ 34.06
Emilia-Romagna									
12	1,285,313	1,777,675	+ 38.31						
13	1,064,093	1,333,688	+ 25.32	2,094,830	2,751,273	+ 31.34			
Total	2,349,406	3,111,363	+ 32.43				3,544,340	3,963,151	+ 11.82
Tuscany									
14	785,447	1,133,129	+ 44.27						
15	800,524	1,035,617	+ 29.37						
16	542,487	627,602	+ 15.69	1,917,572	2,482,823	+ 29.48			
Total	2,128,458	2,796,348	+ 31.38				3,158,811	3,594,607	+ 13.80

Note: Since March 1975, voting eligibility in Italy, except for the Senate, is 18 years of age. Prior to that it was 21. To vote for the Senate, one must be 25.

<sup>a</sup> For elections to the Chamber of Deputies, the Province of Belluno is incorporated into District 11 with Friuli-Venezia Giulia. Figures given here for Chamber voters thus exclude Belluno. For elections to the Senate, Belluno Province is included in the Veneto. These figures therefore include Belluno for the Senate as well as for the 1951 and 1979 populations.

<sup>b</sup> District 11 includes the Province of Belluno for Chamber elections (see preceding note). Senate elections in Friuli-Venezia Giulia do not include Belluno which instead returns to Veneto.

<sup>c</sup> The city and Province of Trieste became a part of Italy in October 1954 and were then formed into Chamber District 32. Therefore, figures for 1951 population and 1948 Senate elections do not include Trieste. Estimated population of Trieste in 1954 was 297,003 and in 1979 was 294,062, or a decline of 0.99 percent. If figures for 1979 are adjusted to show growth in Friuli-Venezia Giulia excluding Trieste, the region gained only 2.41 percent in population over 1951.

Table 20 (continued)

Region and District	Eligible Voters, Chamber			Eligible Voters, Senate			Population in 1951	Population in 1979	Percentage Change
	1948	1979	Percentage Change	1948	1979	Percentage Change			
<b>Marche</b>									
17	860,897	1,102,747	+28.09	756,935	964,248	+27.39	1,364,030	1,409,845	+3.36
<b>Umbria <sup>d</sup></b>									
18	619,572	743,491	+20.00	444,743	559,154	+25.73	803,918	805,329	+0.18
<b>Lazio <sup>e</sup></b>									
19	1,868,802	3,584,800	+91.82	1,758,543	3,178,384	+80.74	3,340,798	5,037,255	+50.78
<b>Abruzzi</b>									
20	765,621	996,896	+30.21	667,291	864,162	+29.50	1,277,207	1,233,397	-3.43
<b>Molise</b>									
21	241,338	285,372	+18.25	210,085	247,295	+17.71	406,823	332,914	-18.17
<b>Campania</b>									
22	1,496,077	2,437,809	+62.95						
23	912,735	1,288,593	+41.18	2,095,718	3,082,703	+47.10			
<b>Total</b>	<b>2,408,812</b>	<b>3,726,402</b>	<b>+54.70</b>				<b>4,346,264</b>	<b>5,420,390</b>	<b>+24.71</b>
<b>Puglia</b>									
24	984,816	1,474,834	+49.76						
25	731,391	1,202,198	+64.37	1,500,302	2,226,952	+48.43			
<b>Total</b>	<b>1,716,207</b>	<b>2,677,032</b>	<b>+55.99</b>				<b>3,220,485</b>	<b>3,889,422</b>	<b>+20.77</b>
<b>Basilicata</b>									
26	334,700	447,636	+33.74	289,824	374,762	+29.31	627,586	618,312	-1.48
<b>Calabria</b>									
27	1,093,613	1,508,930	+37.98	946,577	1,257,160	+32.81	2,044,287	2,067,269	+1.12
<b>Sicily</b>									
28	1,340,804	1,870,890	+39.53						
29	1,249,969	1,783,366	+42.67	2,282,832	3,074,663	+34.69			
<b>Total</b>	<b>2,590,773</b>	<b>3,654,256</b>	<b>+41.05</b>				<b>4,486,749</b>	<b>4,970,595</b>	<b>+10.78</b>
<b>Sardinia</b>									
30	687,388	1,101,657	+60.27	603,771	917,284	+51.93	1,276,023	1,592,964	+24.84
<b>Valle d'Aosta</b>									
31	61,130	87,821	+43.66	56,402	77,066	+36.64	94,140	114,537	+21.67
<b>Italy</b>	<b>29,106,647 <sup>f</sup></b>	<b>42,223,813</b>	<b>+45.07 <sup>g</sup></b>	<b>25,878,588 <sup>f</sup></b>	<b>36,336,187</b>	<b>+40.41 <sup>g</sup></b>	<b>47,218,534</b>	<b>56,828,511</b>	<b>+20.35</b>

<sup>d</sup> For Chamber elections, the Province of Rieti is detached from its region of Lazio and added to District 18. Chamber figures here thus include Rieti while Senate and population figures show Umbria and District 18 without Rieti.

<sup>e</sup> Chamber figures exclude Rieti Province; Senate and population include Rieti. See preceding note.

<sup>f</sup> Trieste not included.

<sup>g</sup> The following changes occur if figures are adjusted to show growth without Trieste: Eligible voters for the Chamber, 1979: 41,984,357 (+44.24 percent); eligible voters for the Senate, 1979: 36,139,293 (+39.65 percent); population, 1979: 56,631,617 (+19.73 percent).

**Table 21**

**Population by Administrative Region,  
Voting for the Chamber of Deputies, 1951 and 1979 <sup>a</sup>**

	1951	1979
Piedmont	3,518,177	4,538,020
Valle d'Aosta	94,140	114,537
Lombardy	6,566,154	8,929,703
Trentino-Alto Adige	728,604	873,995
Venetia <sup>b</sup>	3,679,790	4,137,327
Friuli-Venezia Giulia <sup>c</sup>	1,167,387	1,446,576
Liguria	1,566,961	1,852,903
Emilia-Romagna	3,544,340	3,963,151
Tuscany	3,158,811	3,594,607
Umbria <sup>d</sup>	983,075	949,252
Marche	1,364,030	1,409,845
Lazio <sup>e</sup>	3,161,641	4,893,332
Abruzzi	1,277,207	1,233,397
Molise	406,823	332,914
Campania	4,346,264	5,420,390
Puglia	3,220,485	3,889,422
Basilicata	627,586	618,312
Calabria	2,044,287	2,067,269
Sicily	4,486,749	4,970,595
Sardinia	1,276,023	1,592,964
<b>Italy</b>	<b>47,218,534</b>	<b>56,828,511</b>

<sup>a</sup> See more detailed chart in appendix, tables A-15 and A-16 for figures on the number of eligible voters, Chambers of Deputies and Senate.

<sup>b</sup> Province of Belluno not included.

<sup>c</sup> Belluno included in 1951 but not Trieste; 1979 includes Belluno and Trieste. The population of Trieste in 1979 was 294,062.

<sup>d</sup> Figures include Province of Rieti.

<sup>e</sup> Rieti not included.

a 22.61-percent turnover in a group reduced numerically by only 0.38 percent. In the Senate the situation was similar. The party's vote fell by only 0.54 percent, but it actually gained 3 seats. The increase was only 2.22 percent in the delegation size, but with 35 new faces (25.36 percent).

The irony of these statistics is compounded, in fact, if the same comparisons are made for the election of 1972. Although 1976 was considered a near disaster for the party, the DC's showing that year revealed a decline over 1972 in only 14 of the Chamber districts and seven for the Senate. Also, its share of the raw vote for both Chamber and Senate was actually slightly *higher* than in 1972. Indeed, had there not been the interim defeat on the divorce referendum (1974) and large setbacks in regional, provincial, and communal votes (1975), 1976 might not have appeared so gloomy, even considering the PCI's large share of the returns. If the DC had anything with which to flatter itself in 1979, it was in having a relatively smaller loss than the PCI. Otherwise the record of that year had elements of the same erosion occurring since 1974.

Not only do these selected instances suggest that Italian political movement occurs below the surface, they also imply that election analysis risks becoming a numbers game. Reliance on statistics is unavoidable, but in Italy quantification has to be abandoned at some point to make way for elements which do not fit finite systems. For example, the northeastern regions of Friuli-Venezia Giulia and Venetia are known as "white" Italy because of their fidelity to the Church. Yet other regions have large Catholic majorities, even if they do not carry their religion to the ballot box so obviously. Both the Valle d'Aosta and the Trentino-Alto Adige are known for their religiosity, but their French and German ethnicity tend to color their voting behavior more than does their faith.

In the light of so many qualifications, what can be said of the DC's record in national legislative elections? First of all, using 1948 data for assessing subsequent DC electoral performance warps the record. A more realistic measure can be achieved by starting with 1953 because that and subsequent elections took place in essentially normal times.

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In the Chamber of Deputies, one piece of conventional wisdom about the DC seems to be borne out: highly urbanized areas, particularly in the northwest, are not centers of party numerical strength (see figure 16). In districts including Turin, Milan, and Genoa (numbers 1, 3, and 4) where the party came close to achieving a 45- to 50-percent share of the votes in 1948, the decline has been steady in later years. The DC's delegation size there and in other urban areas such as Rome and Naples has remained stable, but simultaneously population shifts and seat reallocation under proportional representation have increased the number of deputies elected. The result is a drop in the DC's share of parliamentary seats. District 4 with Milan has gone from 36 deputies in 1948 to 52 in 1979, a period during which the DC fell as low as 15 seats and peaked at 19 seats in the supposedly bad elections of 1976. The district including Rome is quite similar. In a country which is urbanizing so rapidly, this is not an optimistic sign.

The assumption that the DC is also strong in rural areas is borne out in some instances, the most striking being district 21 in Molise. However, this area, small to begin with, is losing population faster than any other. But the DC's strength and appeal in rural areas is difficult to discern in Chamber district breakdowns. Instead, provincial and communal figures have to be consulted, since the districting for the Chamber, with only rare exceptions, today includes more and more urban components.

A clearer understanding of the DC record is achieved by comparing annual percentages of the party vote in each district rather than noting the number of party deputies in relation to size of district delegation. Figure 16 demonstrates on a national basis not only the steady decline of party fortunes but the slow swing from north to south. A line could almost be drawn across the peninsula from Rome to Pescara below which the party's averages have either held or declined more slowly than in the north. Some unusual exceptions do exist in the south, though, such as Sardinia (number 30) which has the most consistent record of DC shrinkage. Curiously, too, DC leader

Emilio Colombo's district 26 in Basilicata shows a rather notable decline. Not to be overlooked are districts like 19 and 22 with Rome and Naples. Even if there is apparently more encouragement there for the DC in national elections, the provincial and communal returns put clouds on the horizon since both cities have reported increasing PCI votes and have had leftist city administrations for some five years now. Still in the comparative percentages of several years, there is a persistent decline in DC strength in its "safe" northeastern areas of districts 6, 8, 9, 10, and 11, encompassing parts or all of Venetia, Trentino-Alto Adige, and Friuli-Venezia Giulia. District 8, the home of De Gasperi, is no longer a DC stronghold, even if its SVP<sup>6</sup> party quite often sides with the DC in Parliament. Taken together the northeast is still a strong area for the party, but the consistency of decline there is striking as a pattern. Figure 16 shows a comparable pattern in Senate election returns.


Nowhere does the complexity of analysis of party performance appear so clearly as in contrasting voting results for both Chamber and Senate with the actual representation achieved (compare figures 9 and 10). If there is in most instances a clear and progressive decline in the DC's share of votes, the regional distribution of the party's delegation members is almost static. At the same time the DC share of the overall delegation from any area has shrunk consistently since 1948. If any element appears here to substantiate the erosion hypothesis, it is the size of the DC Chamber delegation. That, however, has remained static since 1963.

<sup>6</sup> *Suedtiroler Volkspartei.*

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Figure 16

## Change in DC Delegation Size by Geographic Region, 1948-79



<sup>a</sup>Regions:  
 Northwest: Piemonte, Valle d'Aosta, Lombardia, Liguria  
 Northeast: Trentino-Alto Adige, Veneto, Friuli-Venezia Giulia  
 Center: Emilia-Romagna, Toscana, Umbria, Marche  
 South: Lazio, Abruzzi, Molise, Campania, Puglia, Basilicata, and Calabria; Islands: Sicilia, Sardegna

<sup>b</sup>Districts:  
 Northwest: 1-5, 7, and 31  
 Northeast: 6, 8-11, and 32  
 Center: 12-16, and 18  
 South: 17 and 19  
 Islands: 28-30

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Table 22

## Chamber of Deputies: Percentage of Eligible Voter Turnout in Eight National Parliamentary Elections

	1948	1953	1958	1963	1968	1972	1976	1979	Eight-Year Average
1. Turin-Novara-Vercelli	93.29	94.16	95.83	95.69	95.39	95.70	94.96	93.47	94.81
2. Cuneo-Alessandria-Asti	92.74	94.51	94.99	95.25	95.49	96.01	95.74	93.97	94.84
3. Genoa-Imperia-La Spezia-Savona	91.53	93.97	94.25	94.02	93.87	94.72	95.10	92.13	93.70
4. Milan-Pavia	93.82	95.83	96.24	96.14	96.49	96.79	95.93	94.39	95.70
5. Como-Sondrio-Varese	93.61	94.81	95.71	95.60	96.18	96.54	95.47	94.11	95.25
6. Brescia-Bergamo	93.75	94.75	94.72	94.69	95.85	96.45	95.96	94.67	95.11
7. Mantua-Cremona	96.56	97.06	97.25	97.17	97.88	97.96	97.53	96.61	97.25
8. Trento-Bolzano	93.40	96.59	96.46	97.00	94.95	95.08	95.67	93.33	95.31
9. Verona-Padua-Vicenza-Rovigo	94.40	95.02	95.16	95.97	96.83	97.10	97.12	94.69	95.79
10. Venice-Treviso	93.00	93.73	93.85	94.35	95.32	95.76	96.21	93.43	94.46
11. Udine-Belluno-Gorizia-Pordenone	91.38	90.39	89.76	91.48	90.45	91.66	94.31	90.54	91.25
12. Bologna-Ferrara-Ravenna-Forli	95.52	96.88	97.42	97.15	97.51	97.86	97.78	96.41	97.07
13. Parma-Modena-Piacenza-Reggio Emilia	95.01	95.39	95.56	95.63	96.36	96.80	96.85	95.05	95.83
14. Florence-Pistoia	96.21	97.12	97.16	97.19	97.03	97.51	97.20	95.71	96.89
15. Pisa-Livorno-Lucca-Massa Carrara	92.99	94.85	95.04	95.27	95.59	96.04	96.40	94.25	95.05
16. Siena-Arezzo-Grosseto	94.92	96.86	96.78	96.68	97.06	97.52	97.54	96.07	96.68
17. Ancona-Pesaro-Macerata-Ascoli Piceno	94.27	95.76	94.78	94.19	94.73	95.29	95.79	92.79	94.70
18. Perugia-Terni-Rieti	93.61	95.58	94.97	93.86	94.68	95.73	95.93	93.67	94.75
19. Rome-Latina-Viterbo-Frosinone	90.17	94.33	94.72	94.15	93.90	94.19	94.64	91.37	93.43
20. L'Aquila-Pescara-Chieti-Teramo	90.79	90.36	87.41	86.50	86.33	86.80	89.51	82.90	87.58
21. Campobasso-Isernia	92.05	90.14	85.85	79.47	82.04	82.14	85.40	74.66	83.97
22. Naples-Caserta	88.05	92.75	93.40	91.63	90.61	91.19	90.34	87.44	90.68
23. Benevento-Avellino-Salerno	90.17	91.36	89.33	85.77	85.02	84.86	86.26	84.23	87.13
24. Bari-Foggia	93.54	94.80	94.05	91.70	91.36	90.94	91.70	87.09	91.90
25. Lecce-Brindisi-Taranto	93.78	94.83	93.97	91.82	91.39	90.73	91.59	88.94	92.13
26. Potenza-Matera	91.73	92.01	91.43	88.44	87.92	87.89	88.71	84.55	89.09
27. Catanzaro-Cosenza-Reggio Calabria	88.21	89.21	87.67	85.10	84.33	83.63	84.65	77.46	85.03
28. Catania-Messina-Siracusa-Ragusa-Enna	87.86	89.56	90.67	87.30	86.08	86.96	87.98	82.72	87.39
29. Palermo-Trapani-Agrigento-Caltanissetta	88.18	90.13	89.53	84.59	82.06	82.76	83.88	77.85	84.87
30. Cagliari-Sassari-Nuoro-Oristano	90.06	91.69	91.94	88.75	89.20	90.19	91.09	86.70	89.95
31. Valle d'Aosta	85.46	86.69	92.45	93.53	92.30	91.74	92.58	91.83	90.82
32. Trieste	... <sup>a</sup>	...	96.35	95.59	94.60	95.22	96.07	93.85	95.28
<b>Italy</b>	<b>92.23</b>	<b>93.82</b>	<b>93.81</b>	<b>92.89</b>	<b>92.79</b>	<b>93.18</b>	<b>93.41</b>	<b>90.35</b>	<b>92.81</b>

<sup>a</sup> Trieste became a part of Italy in 1954.

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Table 23

Senate: Percentage of Eligible Voter Turnout in  
Eight National Parliamentary Elections

	1948	1953	1958	1963	1968	1972	1976	1979	Eight-Year Average
Piedmont	92.64	93.92	95.18	95.30	95.22	95.15	94.86	93.44	94.46
Valle d'Aosta	82.97	86.22	91.67	92.83	91.66	91.49	91.50	91.12	89.93
Lombardy	93.83	95.60	96.12	96.18	96.44	96.16	95.99	95.07	95.67
Trentino-Alto Adige	92.65	94.73	95.27	94.85	94.42	94.12	94.57	92.88	94.19
Venetia	93.44	93.97	94.21	94.56	95.43	95.06	96.02	94.23	94.62
Friuli-Venezia Giulia	90.48	89.84	86.83	90.67	91.44	92.02	92.89	92.42	90.82
Liguria	90.94	93.48	94.07	93.79	93.70	94.07	94.54	92.14	93.34
Emilia-Romagna	95.15	96.22	96.62	96.67	97.01	96.65	97.33	95.90	96.44
Tuscany	94.47	95.96	96.27	96.26	96.43	96.29	96.73	95.06	95.93
Umbria	94.17	95.60	95.30	94.25	94.62	95.06	95.88	93.76	94.83
Marche	94.61	95.71	95.24	94.55	94.71	94.59	95.66	92.73	94.73
Lazio	89.52	93.90	94.55	93.92	93.68	93.29	94.02	91.86	93.09
Abruzzi	91.53	91.20	88.53	87.30	86.91	86.70	89.22	82.44	87.98
Molise	92.78	91.26	87.54	81.00	83.08	82.42	85.68	74.98	84.84
Campania	89.32	92.24	92.03	89.83	88.90	88.91	89.04	86.38	89.58
Puglia	93.72	94.71	94.31	92.29	91.76	90.81	91.74	88.71	92.26
Basilicata	92.29	93.19	92.46	89.60	88.76	88.30	89.46	85.90	90.00
Calabria	88.75	89.96	88.72	86.24	85.26	84.09	85.14	78.05	85.78
Sicily	88.32	90.16	90.46	86.75	84.53	84.92	85.78	81.10	86.50
Sardinia	90.41	92.11	92.39	89.40	89.55	90.04	91.10	87.25	90.28
Italy	92.15	93.78	93.89	93.04	92.88	92.72	93.27	90.73	92.81

In a nation that utilizes proportional representation, particular attention has to be given population change and growth of the eligible voting public (see tables 22 and 23 and tabulations 3 to 6). Also, since the introduction of suffrage for 18-year-olds in 1975, the orientation of the youth vote is important. The degree to which youth may be leftist in Italy has been disputed, but the success of leftist parties since 1975 probably depended significantly on younger voters. On the other hand, given the increase of abstentions in both 1976 and 1979, youth may have been less concerned about voting. Italians have tended to argue that abstentions and spoiled ballots are protests of disillusioned citizens, whereas the indifference of youth may be an equally valid explanation. With the secrecy of the ballot, the question cannot be answered with any certainty. (See appendix for further information on this question.)

As the population grows and becomes more mobile, and as eligible voters increase, the shift is subtle; but the growth is greater in areas where the DC is sliding, particularly in districts 1 and 4 in Piedmont and Lombardy. This may be offset a bit by high growth in districts 6, 22, and 25 where the DC can be guardedly optimistic on some counts. Basically, it remains a break-even phenomenon, though, which gives the DC no accrued advantage. From a negative viewpoint, however, the growth rate of population and eligible voters in areas of traditional DC strength such as Sicily, Venetia, Molise, and others are below the national average.

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### Ranking of Chamber Districts, by Average Voter Turnout, 1948-79

1.	97.25	7	Mantua-Cremona
2.	97.07	12	Bologna-Ferrara-Ravenna-Forli
3.	96.89	14	Florence-Pistoia
4.	96.68	16	Siena-Arezzo-Grosseto
5.	95.83	13	Parma-Modena-Piacenza-Reggio Emilia
6.	95.79	9	Verona-Padua-Vicenza-Rovigo
7.	95.70	4	Milan-Pavia
8.	95.31	8	Trento-Bolzano
9.	95.28	32	Trieste (on the basis of six elections, 1958-79)
10.	95.25	5	Como-Sondrio-Varese
11.	95.11	6	Brescia-Bergamo
12.	95.05	15	Pisa-Livorno-Lucca-Massa Carrara
13.	94.84	2	Cuneo-Alessandria-Asti
14.	94.81	1	Turin-Novara-Vercelli
15.	94.75	18	Perugia-Terni-Rieti
16.	94.70	17	Ancona-Pesaro-Macerata-Ascoli Piceno
17.	94.46	10	Venice-Treviso
18.	93.70	3	Genoa-Imperia-La Spezia-Savona
19.	93.43	19	Rome-Latina-Viterbo-Frosinone
	<b>92.81</b>		<b>National Average</b>
20.	92.13	25	Lecce-Brindisi-Taranto
21.	91.90	24	Bari-Foggia
22.	91.25	11	Udine-Belluno-Gorizia-Pordenone
23.	90.82	31	Valle d'Aosta
24.	90.68	22	Naples-Caserta
	<b>90.61</b>		<b>Median</b>
25.	89.95	30	Cagliari-Sassari-Nuoro-Oristano
26.	89.09	26	Potenza-Matera
27.	87.58	20	L'Aquila-Pescara-Chieti-Teramo
28.	87.39	28	Catania-Messina-Siracusa-Ragusa-Enna
29.	87.13	23	Benevento-Avellino-Salerno
30.	85.03	27	Catanzaro-Cosenza-Reggio Calabria
31.	84.87	29	Palermo-Trapani-Agrigento-Caltanissetta
32.	83.97	21	Campobasso-Isernia

### Ranking of Chamber Districts by Rate of Eligible Voter Increase, 1948-79

	Percentage Increase	District Number		Percentage Increase	District Number
1.	91.82	19	17.	38.31	12
2.	66.62	4	18.	37.98	27
3.	64.37	25	19.	33.74	26
4.	62.95	22	20.	33.33	3
5.	62.40	5	21.	32.65	9
6.	60.27	30	22.	30.21	20
7.	56.22	1	23.	29.37	15
8.	50.40	6	24.	28.09	17
9.	49.76	24	25.	25.34	13
	<b>45.07 (or 44.24) <sup>a</sup></b>		<b>Average</b>		
	<b>44.54</b>		<b>Median</b>		
10.	44.41	8	26.	22.53	11
11.	44.27	14	27.	20.00	18
12.	43.66	31	28.	18.25	21
13.	42.67	29	29.	15.69	16
14.	41.18	23	30.	4.53	32 <sup>a</sup>
15.	40.35	10	31.	2.85	7
16.	39.53	28	32.	2.75	2

<sup>a</sup> The city and Province of Trieste, incorporated into Italy in October 1954, were formed into District 32 and first voted in national elections in 1958 when the area had 229,071 eligible voters. The increase in voters shown here is for the period 1958-79. All other districts are calculated on the 1948-79 timespan. If the figures for Trieste are subtracted, the rate of growth of eligible voters in Italy since the elections of 1948 is 44.54 percent; the median does not change.

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**Ranking of Senate Districts,  
by Average Voter Turnout, 1948-79**

Percent

1.	96.44	Emilia-Romagna
2.	95.93	Tuscany
3.	95.67	Lombardy
4.	94.83	Umbria
5.	94.73	Marche
6.	94.62	Venetia
7.	94.46	Piedmont
8.	94.19	Trentino-Alto Adige
9.	93.34	Liguria
10.	93.09	Lazio
	<b>92.81</b>	<b>National average</b>
11.	93.26	Puglia
12.	90.82	Friuli-Venezia Giulia
	<b>90.64</b>	<b>Median</b>
13.	90.28	Sardinia
14.	90.00	Basilicata
15.	89.93	Valle d'Aosta
16.	89.58	Campania
17.	87.98	Abruzzi
18.	86.50	Sicily
19.	85.78	Calabria
20.	84.84	Molise

**Ranking of Senate Districts by  
Rate of Eligible Voter Increase, 1948-79**

	Percentage Increase	District
1.	80.74	Lazio
2.	60.26	Friuli-Venezia Giulia <sup>a</sup>
3.	51.93	Sardinia
4.	48.48	Lombardy
5.	48.43	Puglia
6.	47.10	Campania
	<b>40.41 (or 39.65) <sup>a</sup></b>	<b>Average</b>
7.	38.72	Trentino-Alto Adige
8.	36.64	Valle d'Aosta
9.	34.69	Sicily
10.	32.81	Calabria
	<b>31.52</b>	<b>Median</b>
11.	31.34	Emilia-Romagna
12.	31.06	Venetia
13.	30.77	Piedmont
14.	29.78	Liguria
15.	29.50	Abruzzi
16.	29.40	Tuscany
17.	29.31	Basilicata
18.	27.39	Marche
19.	25.73	Umbria
20.	17.71	Molise

<sup>a</sup> The figure for Friuli-Venezia Giulia is calculated with the city of Trieste which was incorporated into Italy in October 1954. Trieste first voted in the region's senatorial elections in 1963 when it had 193,882 eligible voters. In 1979 the number was 196,894, an increase of 1.55 percent. Natural growth of the eligible voter group, without Trieste, would place the region in 19th place with an increase of 24.05 percent. Adjustment of the national average would bring it to +39.65 percent.

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A partial projection can be made about DC prospects in future elections, particularly following seat redistribution due after the 1981 census. (The Chamber and Senate seats are reallocated following each decennial census.) Chamber representation, while determined largely on population per district, has remained fixed at 630 members since 1963. An initial assignment is made for each area, but it can be altered by party performance. The system is complex, but it allows for addition or subtraction of seats from districts according to the relationship between a party's showing nationally and in the given constituency. Generally the north has been favored with additional seats since it is more civic minded and produces better voter turnouts. With DC strength sliding in the north, this is a negative adjustment. However, even if a projection based on 1979 population figures could be accurately done now, it would be altered by the returns in the next election. But the numbers-game factor in a reallocation is evident already because the northwest would lose four to six seats, the northeast would remain the same, the center would decline by perhaps five, and the beneficiary in any instance would be the south with a rise of at least five. This would occur despite the fact that the south as a whole is losing population. Even after adjustments for the election record itself, the DC probably can expect more or less to hold its own nationally, thanks to the added southern seats.

On the other hand, if one considers DC representation by geographical region (see figure 16) the old pattern is replicated. But again, when translated into percentages, the growth of DC strength in the south and, modestly, in the center, together with decline in the northwest and, surprisingly, also in the northeast, has been going on roughly since 1968. Except for the northwest, though, change is so slight that once again Italian politics appear to be stagnant. In conclusion, as regards the Chamber, there is no sign that the DC is improving its situation nationally. But its weakening is coming in the areas considered most dynamic and vital, those of the north and center. Strength in the south may ensure some future numerical stability for the DC, but in the nonquantifiable area of human perceptions the question arises as to how long Milan and Turin will continue to submit to a majority party whose strength is increasingly in Palermo or the Mezzogiorno more generally.

**Confidential****Table 24****Ranking of Chamber of Deputies Districts by Eligible Voters, 1979**

	District Number	Number of Voters	Current Seats	Projected Change <sup>a</sup>
1.	19	3,482,136	54	NONE
2.	4	3,388,216	52	-1
3.	1	2,503,112	39	-3
4.	22	2,437,809	38	+3
5.	9	1,883,682	29	-1
6.	28	1,870,890	27	+1
7.	29	1,783,366	26	+1
8.	12	1,777,675	27	-2
9.	27	1,508,930	23	NONE
10.	3	1,477,501	23	-3
11.	24	1,474,834	23	+1
12.	6	1,372,897	23	-2
13.	13	1,333,688	19	-1
14.	23	1,288,593	18	+1
15.	5	1,271,566	20	NONE
16.	25	1,202,198	18	+1
17.	10	1,152,485	17	+1
18.	14	1,133,129	14	+2
19.	17	1,102,747	17	-1
20.	30	1,101,657	17	+1
21.	15	1,035,617	14	+1
22.	20	996,896	14	NONE
23.	2	979,024	15	-1
24.	11	946,337	11	+2
25.	18	743,491	10	+1
26.	8	636,264	10	NONE
27.	16	627,602	9	NONE
28.	7	548,522	8	NONE
29.	26	447,636	7	NONE
30.	21	285,372	4	NONE
31.	32	239,456	4	-1
32.	31	87,821	1	NONE

<sup>a</sup> Estimated variation resultant from 1981 census and consequent redistribution of seats.



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The DC's record in the Senate, even though the body is elected by a smaller and presumably more "mature" electorate, differs only slightly from that in the Chamber. Again there are the same declining ratios between the size of a DC group and a region's number of seats. And once more the areas of DC stability or growth are below the line beginning with Lazio and the Abruzzi, although for 1979 Marche can be included. Again Sardinia and Basilicata demonstrate behavior comparable to the Chamber returns. The DC share of geographic regions' portion of the delegations is still small with a bit more strength in the south and islands and less slippage in the northeast and northwest.

Projection of Senate seats in a reapportionment can be done with certainty because no election pattern alters it. Even if population figures are only for 1979, there seems little likelihood the 1981 census will change them much. Three regions from the northeast and center, Piedmont, Emilia-Romagna, and Tuscany, lose seats; one southern region, Puglia, and the islands of Sicily and Sardinia each pick up a seat. Given the patterns of recent elections, the DC might have a chance here of a small gain simply because of the role of the southern base. This could be offset, however, by the strength of the leftist parties in the center regions where their chance of holding their present share is excellent. With one less seat to contest in those areas, the DC could be hard pressed to hold its present numbers.

Data are plentiful to suggest that the DC has been slowly but steadily going downhill for a long time and that events of the mid-1970s should not have been as surprising as they were. Conversely, when the idiosyncracies of the proportional representation system and its distribution of seats come into play, the DC's future looks less bleak, even if signs of growth are virtually nonexistent. Still, the deep feelings of prejudice in Italy between north and south are important. To go one more step, the impression remains that so long as Italy experienced some measure of economic prosperity and growth the country was willing—perhaps reluctantly—to muddle along with its political representation and governing system. With increasingly high inflation, trade deficits, and unemployment, as well as persistent terrorism, the DC's stewardship of the nation may look less tolerable.

Table 25

### Ranking of Senate Districts by Eligible Voters, 1979 Elections

Province	Number of Voters	Current Seats	Projected Change <sup>a</sup>
1. Lombardy	5,724,503	48	NONE
2. Lazio	3,178,384	27	NONE
3. Campania	3,082,703	29	NONE
4. Sicily	3,074,663	26	+1
5. Piedmont	3,067,301	25	-1
6. Emilia-Romagna	2,751,273	22	-1
7. Venetia	2,751,182	23	NONE
8. Tuscany	2,482,823	20	-1
9. Puglia	2,226,952	20	+1
10. Liguria	1,321,860	10	NONE
11. Calabria	1,257,160	11	NONE
12. Marche	964,248	8	NONE
13. Sardinia	917,284	8	+1
14. Friuli-Venezia Giulia	871,346	7	NONE
15. Abruzzi	864,162	7	NONE
16. Umbria	559,154	7	NONE
17. Trentino-Alto Adige	541,766	7	NONE
18. Basilicata	374,762	7	NONE
19. Molise	247,295	2	NONE
20. Valle d'Aosta	77,066	1	NONE

<sup>a</sup> Estimated variation resultant from 1981 census and consequent redistribution of seats.

Although the evidence is not conclusive, extensive study of Italy's postwar legislative elections leaves the unavoidable impression of slow Christian Democratic decline. The party is not likely to disappear, but its capacity to merge itself with the government is nearing an end. Furthermore, the day may come when the DC will not be the largest group emerging from a national election. Even more importantly, the party may ultimately slip enough that it cannot hold either a majority of the Cabinet posts or those which are most important. Because the DC is more than ever a coalition of factions for power sharing, that kind of loss of access to the spoils could cause elements of the party to break away. Again, this is not likely in the next few years, but loss of the premiership in 1981 is

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another significant chip at the party's power structure. Finally, if the prognosis for the party on the national level is unclear, further unsettling clues as to its health and viability appear in regional, provincial, and communal elections, where distinctions that are merged and lost in Chamber and Senate races often show up.

#### **Administrative Elections: The Regions**

**Evolution of the Regions.** The region is Italy's largest administrative subdivision and represents a profound innovation in the country's governmental structure. These units did not, however, come into existence easily or rapidly, and a word of background clarifies not only their evolution but the DC's role in the process.

Basically, the region is a contemporary revival of sovereign political divisions existing in Italy before national unification. More than one plan for "stitching the boot" in the 19th century envisioned a federation of these states as semiautonomous regions in a larger political entity. Such schemes acknowledged that Italians traditionally identified more with their home locale than with a national state.<sup>7</sup> That old loyalty remains a sort of mystique or historic identity felt by most Italians and is an obvious counterattraction to the sense of nationality. When Italian unity was achieved under the leadership of the Kingdom of Piedmont-Sardinia, its governing institutions were extended to the whole nation. The system was a close copy of the French centralized state instituted by Napoleon. Although there were provincial councils, all power was concentrated in the national government, and the various provinces, the basic administrative unit, were ruled through prefects appointed by the central government. The regions ceased to exist in any formal sense.

Although the idea of regions never died, plans to institute them which came up on several occasions never reached fruition. When the fascists came to power, most remaining vestiges of local autonomy were either rapidly eliminated or wholly appropriated by the regime. The heavyhanded central authority

exercised by Mussolini's government exasperated the populace and made the desire for more local power a principal aspiration of the groups that rebuilt Italy after the war. Centralization, in fact, was identified in the popular mind with the fascists, their misgovernment and corruption, as well as ultimate national defeat. Hence, the dream of local self-government and democratization of political life below the national level captivated many sectors of the Constituent Assembly. Of the major sponsors of regionalism immediately after the war, the Christian Democrats were preeminent, notably in opposition to the Socialists and Communists who wanted no reduction in the powers of the national parliament. But, as in virtually all significant issues faced by the Assembly, the debate over regionalism resulted in a compromise solution providing only partial decentralization. Hence, the regions were given fewer powers than desired by the Christian Democratic representatives.

Ironically, in the years of building the new republican state the DC became the most determined obstructor of regionalism. Once rooted firmly in power, the party became reluctant to implement the regions, particularly when it became obvious that in so doing DC power would be limited and, in the Red Belt, might be completely excluded. Moreover, the fear was quite common that semiautonomous regions, particularly those dominated by the PCI, might be exploited by alien elements—in this case the Soviet Union.

Nevertheless, centrifugal political forces were so strong in some areas that local initiatives for new government preceded even the election of the Constituent Assembly. Sicily, always prone to separatism, entertained the idea of trying to become part of the United States, but the island settled for a statute of local government which stopped just short of independence. The first De Gasperi government, faced with this *fait accompli*, had little alternative but to endorse it officially in May 1946, an act later sanctioned by the Constituent Assembly in February 1948.

<sup>7</sup> The untranslatable word *campanilismo*, alluding to the bell tower, symbol of a town, refers to this attitude.

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**Administrative Regions  
Ranked by Population  
as of 1979**

1.	Lombardy	8,929,703
2.	Campania	5,420,390
3.	Lazio	5,037,255
4.	Sicily	4,970,595
5.	Piedmont	4,538,020
6.	Venetia	4,338,292
7.	Emilia-Romagna	3,963,151
8.	Puglia	3,889,422
9.	Tuscany	3,594,607
10.	Calabria	2,067,269
11.	Liguria	1,852,903
12.	Sardinia	1,592,964
13.	Marche	1,409,845
14.	Friuli-Venezia Giulia	1,245,611
15.	Abruzzi	1,233,397
16.	Trentino-Alto Adige	873,995
17.	Umbria	805,329
18.	Basilicata	618,312
19.	Molise	332,914
20.	Valle d'Aosta	114,537

Meanwhile, the draft constitution made specific provision for the establishment of regions, giving them a certain autonomy in some spheres. The Assembly specifically recognized Sicily and three other regions which had also written statutes for themselves: Sardinia, Trentino-Alto Adige, and Valle d'Aosta. These, with Sicily, were classified as areas of "special" statute because of their status as border regions and because of their particular ethnic and linguistic differences. Subsequently, in 1963 the one remaining area with such characteristics, Friuli-Venezia Giulia, was also made a special statute region.

Thus, with only four regional governments in place when it took office in April 1948, the first Italian Government under the new constitution became responsible for completing these units in the remainder of the country. In practice, though, every government for more than 20 years fell far short of fulfilling that

**Ranking of Administrative Regions  
by Rate of Population Change, 1951-79**

	Percentage Change	District
1.	+ 50.78	Lazio
2.	+ 36.00	Lombardy
	<b>+34.48</b>	<b>Median</b>
3.	+ 34.06	Friuli-Venezia Giulia <sup>a</sup>
4.	+ 28.99	Piedmont
5.	+ 24.84	Sardinia
6.	+ 24.71	Campania
7.	+ 21.67	Valle d'Aosta
8.	+ 20.77	Puglia
	<b>+20.35 (or +19.73) <sup>a</sup></b>	<b>Average</b>
9.	+ 19.95	Trentino-Alto Adige
10.	+ 18.25	Liguria
11.	+ 13.80	Tuscany
12.	+ 11.82	Emilia-Romagna
13.	+ 10.78	Sicily
14.	+ 10.73	Venetia
15.	+ 3.36	Marche
16.	+ 1.12	Calabria
17.	+ 0.18	Umbria
18.	- 1.48	Basilicata
19.	- 3.43	Abruzzi
20.	- 18.17	Molise

<sup>a</sup> The city and province of Trieste were incorporated into Italy in October 1954, adding at that time 297,003 inhabitants to Friuli-Venezia Giulia. Ranked at number 3, the region's growth reflects the addition of Trieste. Subtracting the 1979 population of Trieste (294,062) in order to determine natural growth of the region would place it at 15, a growth rate of +2.41 percent. The national average, if adjusted without Trieste, would be +19.73 percent.

requirement, except for the case of Friuli-Venezia Giulia. Not until 1976 did the law pass that specified the powers that were granted to the 15 regions of "regular" statute, and even today major questions remain unsolved as to their finances. Still, a basic framework was in place by 1970, and on 7 June of that year the first elections for the regular regions took place.

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Through all the labored years of creating the regions, the DC's conduct gave many Italians the impression of deliberate delay and bad faith. Such a feeling has not been dispelled by the party's political maneuvering within the regional governments once they came into existence. The DC's attitude and conduct toward its rivals, particularly the PCI, has often appeared to be obstructionist and a mirror reflection of the political wheeling and dealing that goes on in Rome. Although the party's view is that actions taken in regional affairs could become precedents for unwanted national events, critics see the DC attitude as one of perfidy and arrogance, or even as outright proof of a willingness to use any device to hang on to power. Because this touches individual voters closer to home the DC has created more problems for itself with the electorate. Not surprisingly, then, the party's share of the vote at the regional level falls below what it gets nationally.

Although the parallel is poor, an Italian region might roughly be compared with an American state. The regions vary among themselves in terms of their power. This is notably true of those in the "special" statute group. All, however, are basically administrative units interposed between the central government and the provinces, but they are more subject to Rome's control than states are to Washington. The old provincial structure, as well as the office of prefect, still exists but in altered importance. Prefects, in fact, although once presumed to be destined for elimination, continue to function in the provincial organization, but regional commissioners now replace them as the principal link to the national government. These new officials, however, are essentially invested with coordination functions between Rome and the regions.

The 15 regular regional governments consist of a Council (legislative assembly) elected by universal suffrage, a Junta chosen by the Council from among its own members, and a president of the Junta, elected by that body from among its own ranks. The Council sits as the legislative body while the Junta serves as the executive organ—a kind of cabinet, where each member (*assessore*) is responsible for such sectors as finance, agriculture, planning, and so forth. The

president is the head of the executive branch and represents the region in outside relations as well as promulgating laws and directing the administrative functions of the regional government.

Regional councils are elected every five years, but some of the special statute areas are not yet in synchronization with the others. The size of councils varies according to population. Areas with more than 6 million inhabitants elect a Council of 80 members; smaller regions have proportionately smaller councils down to a minimum of 30 for areas of fewer than 1 million. Sicily, with 90 members, is the sole exception to this pattern. This basic structure for the assembly exists in all 15 regular regions, but the five special statute arrangements are each somewhat different, the most unusual being Trentino-Alto Adige. There the two provincial councils sit as a single body on the regional level. The true significance of the overall system today is that in the 10 years since it became almost wholly operational there has been a major shift of many governmental activities from Rome to the various regional administrations. Consequently, much of the political leverage once exercised in Rome is now dispersed to the 20 regional capitals. There has been a resultant loss of power for the DC which illustrates the reasons for its opposition to implementation of the system. The spoils that go with any governing body and that once were controlled from Rome have been dispersed in part to the new regional capitals. If the DC was once able to control more patronage as the majority party when spoils were dispensed from Rome, the new situation quite simply means that some regions where the DC is not dominant are slipping under the control of other parties (see table 26). The potential for power struggles is extremely important at the regional level, and the tenacity of some parties in their determination to be part of those governments illustrates their significance. If the political makeup of Italy appears to have changed in the 1970s, the regions have been an important element in that process. Indeed, it should be emphasized that the years when the regions have been fully operational are coincident with the period when Italian national politics began to change.

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Table 26

## Party Composition of Regular Statute Region Governments

	1970	1975	1980
DC controlled	Venetia Lazio Molise Basilicata	None	Venetia
Coalitions including DC	Piedmont: DC, PSI, PSU, PRI Lombardy: DC, PSI, PSU, PRI Liguria: DC, PSI, PSU, PRI Marche: DC, PSI, PSU, PRI Abruzzi: DC, PSI, PSU, PRI Campania: DC, PSI, PSU, PRI Puglia: DC, PSI, PSU, PRI Calabria: DC, PSI, PSU	Lombardy: DC, PSI, PSDI, PRI Venetia: DC, PRI Marche: DC, PSI, PSDI, PRI Abruzzi: DC, PSI, PSDI, PRI Molise: DC, PSDI, PRI Campania: DC, PSI, PSDI, PRI Puglia: DC, PSI, PRI Basilicata: DC, PSI, PSDI Calabria: DC, PSI, PSDI, PRI	<b>Regions With Giunta</b> Lombardy: DC, PSI, PSDI, PRI (no change) Campania: DC, PSI, PSDI, PRI (same plus PLI) Basilicata: DC, PSI, PSDI (no change) Abruzzi: DC, PSDI, PRI (same plus PSI) Molise: DC, PSDI (no change) <b>Regions Without Giunta</b> (situation at election) Puglia: DC, PSI, PSDI, PRI Calabria: DC, PSI, PSDI, PRI Marche: PSI, PSDI, PRI (DC external support)
Coalitions without DC	Emilia-Romagna: PCI, PSIUP Tuscany: PCI, PSI, PSIUP Umbria: PCI, PSI, PSIUP	Piedmont: PCI, PSI Liguria: PCI, PSI Emilia-Romagna: PCI, PSI Tuscany: PCI, PSI Umbria: PCI, PSI Lazio: PSI, PSDI, PRI	Piedmont: PCI, PSI (same plus PSDI) Emilia-Romagna: PCI, PSI PCI controlled Tuscany: PCI, PSI (no change) Umbria: PCI, PSI (no change) <b>Regions Without Giunta</b> (situation at election) Liguria: PCI, PSI Lazio: PCI, PSI, PSDI (PRI external support)
PCI controlled	None	None	Emilia-Romagna (effective following 1980 election)

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Table 27

Regional Council Election Results in 15 Regular Statute Regions, 1970-80 <sup>a</sup>

	1970 <sup>b</sup>			1975 <sup>c</sup>			1980 <sup>d</sup>		
	Number of Votes	Percentage	Number of Seats	Number of Votes	Percentage	Number of Seats	Number of Votes	Percentage	Number of Seats
DC	10,305,258	37.85	287	10,707,682	35.29	277	11,153,439	36.77	290
PCI	7,584,439	27.86	201	10,149,135	33.45	247	9,555,767	31.50	233
PSI	2,838,276	10.43	67	3,636,647	11.98	82	3,851,722	12.70	86
PSU	1,897,092	6.97	41	NONE	0	NONE	NONE	0	NONE
PSDI	NONE	0	NONE	1,700,983	5.61	36	1,505,607	4.96	31
PRI	785,238	2.88	18	961,016	3.17	19	922,970	3.04	18
PLI	1,290,890	4.74	27	749,749	2.47	11	816,418	2.69	15
PSIUP	877,285	3.22	16	NONE	0	NONE	NONE	0	NONE
PdUP	NONE	0	NONE	417,725	1.37	8	372,102	1.23	8
DP	NONE	0	NONE	NONE	0	NONE	274,100	0.90	2
MSI-DN	1,424,411	5.23	32	1,951,011	6.43	40	1,785,750	5.89	37
Other	222,643	0.82	1	70,789	0.23	NONE	95,491	0.32	NONE
Total	27,225,532	100.00	690	30,344,737	100.00	720	30,333,366	100.00	720

<sup>a</sup> These returns are for the 15 regions of regular statute category which includes the 75 provinces that according to the 1971 census had a population of 45,817,864.

<sup>b</sup> 92.32-percent turnout of eligible voters; 4.50 percent of ballots cast were invalid.

<sup>c</sup> 92.79-percent eligible voter turnout; 3.96 percent of ballots were invalid.

<sup>d</sup> 89.59-percent eligible voter turnout; 6.21 percent of ballots were invalid.

See tables A-17-A-24 in appendix.

**The Regional Elections.** To an extent, comparison of election returns on the regional level is complicated by the fact that the five special regions vote at different times as a result of their earlier beginnings. Originally each of the special areas elected its council at four-year intervals, a divergence recently eliminated. In any event, the 15 regulars that vote simultaneously include some 80 percent of the national population and are regarded as more homogeneous. Still, the two groups are more easily analyzed in separate sets of statistics (see tables 27 to 30).

Regional elections were not ignored prior to 1970, but when the majority of the nation voted simultaneously for the first time that year the significance attached to the new assemblies was almost as great as for national legislative consultations. And the regional council elections of 1975, called the "earthquake of 15 June," were those which gave the DC more cause for alarm than any other vote since World War II. Aside from the DC's great slide in power that year, the critical new element of 1975 was that the 18- to 20-year-old age groups voted for the first time in Italy.

Because of the secret ballot it is difficult to ascertain how the youngest group voted. However, the electorate was increased by approximately 2 to 3 million, roughly 6 percent of eligible voters. Also the highest turnout of eligible voters to participate in regional elections on a national basis cast ballots that year (92.79 percent; see appendix for detailed regional statistics.) An increase of only 6 percent is not great in relation to the entire electorate, but it is more than sufficient to alter the outcome. Certainly the DC could find little encouragement for the future in a poll published in August 1974 by the widely respected Demoskopea organization. Newly enfranchised youth were asked to express their party preferences and responded thus: PCI, 38 percent; DC, 16 percent; MSI, 12 percent; PSI, 10 percent; PSDI and PLI, 4 percent each; and the remainder scattered among splinter groups, a noteworthy segment of which went to the extreme left. The significant increase for the PCI and other left parties was probably owed to those who could vote for the first time in 1975.

In general, regional elections since 1970 show progressively how close the political contest between the two major parties has become. Mathematically the DC can still claim to be the largest national party in regional voting results, but whether the party continues to be the largest nationally is less important at this level. For example, the 1980 returns from the 15 regular regions gave the DC a smaller percentage of the vote and of the total number of Council seats by only one point or so below that of 1970. However, the makeup of regional juntas was slipping more and more out of DC control as shown in table 26. The PCI for its part showed an improvement in 1980 over 1970, but it was not able to equal its 1975 showing. Again, though, the evidence of rising Communist power is found in the composition of regional governments. More noteworthy, perhaps, is how the parties' regional totals add up nationally. In that context, the PCI made a major leap in 1975. While it fell back in 1980, the loss may be only temporary. In any event, the PCI's gain of 2.6 million votes in 1975 translated into a plurality of seats in the councils of Piedmont,

Liguria, Emilia-Romagna, Tuscany, Umbria, and Lazio. Although the PCI remained farther behind the DC in the southern regions, its rate of growth there was approximately the same as in the north and center. Of greatest importance for 1975, however, is the DC's achievement of a majority of council seats in only two regions, Venetia and Molise.

In sum, if party dominance on a regional basis truly counts for influence and shoring up a party electorate—its *clientela* and *parentela*—then 1975 was indeed a bad year for the DC which, at best, had to contemplate coalition arrangements, some of which resulted in its exclusion. And since the PSI has been willing to collaborate with the PCI on the regional level, the mathematics of party representation in various regions theoretically—and in some real instances—permits coalitions without the DC.

Special note can be made for another phenomenon developing on the regional level in the special areas. With the sole exception of Sicily, regional parties are progressively cutting farther into the DC's dominant position there. In some instances the political orientation of local groups is not too far from the DC—as in the case of the *Suedtiroler Volkspartei* in Trentino-Alto Adige, but the DC nevertheless is facing a challenge to its patronage potential. And while there is great fragmentation of voting in the specials, a trend to the left is evident.

Concerning the 1980 regional elections, many pundits made the same error in evaluating them as they did in 1979 for the national parliament, erroneously proclaiming a DC comeback from its slump in the middle of the decade. Total votes and percentages do, it is true, suggest a modest recovery as well as an increase in the DC's lead over its principal competitor, the PCI; but the reality of returns on the regional basis does not substantiate this optimism. Broken down by region, the DC's greater rebound in southern areas was just enough higher than in the remainder of the country as to create a misleading impression for the

Table 28

## Regional Council Election Results by Geographical Region, 1970-80

North <sup>a</sup>									
	1970 <sup>b</sup>			1975 <sup>c</sup>			1980 <sup>d</sup>		
	Number of Votes	Percentage	Number of Seats	Number of Votes	Percentage	Number of Seats	Number of Votes	Percentage	Number of Seats
DC	5,522,649	38.48	112	5,613,979	35.55	109	5,687,829	36.51	112
PCI	3,887,639	27.09	78	5,303,710	33.58	103	4,970,942	31.91	97
PSI	1,553,980	10.83	26	2,036,476	12.89	36	2,049,353	13.16	36
PSU	1,086,630	7.57	18	...	...	...	...	...	...
PSDI	...	...	...	918,334	5.81	14	776,449	4.98	13
PRI	400,239	2.79	7	513,036	3.25	8	485,614	3.12	8
PLI	828,952	5.78	14	483,637	3.06	7	561,281	3.60	9
PSIUP	497,255	3.46	7	...	...	...	...	...	...
PdUP	...	...	...	229,938	1.46	3	197,787	1.27	4
DP	...	...	...	...	...	...	162,334	1.04	1
MSI-DN	493,431	3.44	8	664,150	4.21	10	613,156	3.94	10
Others	82,008	0.57	...	30,249	0.19	...	73,331	0.47	...
Total	14,352,783	100.00	270	15,793,509	100.00	290	15,578,076	100.00	290
Center <sup>e</sup>									
	1970 <sup>f</sup>			1975 <sup>g</sup>			1980 <sup>h</sup>		
	Number of Votes	Percentage	Number of Seats	Number of Votes	Percentage	Number of Seats	Number of Votes	Percentage	Number of Seats
DC	2,088,698	32.73	61	2,197,747	30.81	60	2,285,076	32.11	62
PCI	2,182,463	34.20	64	2,819,152	39.52	75	2,719,994	38.22	73
PSI	560,116	8.78	13	743,827	10.43	18	799,729	11.24	19
PSU	430,215	6.74	9	...	...	...	...	...	...
PSDI	...	...	...	351,674	4.93	8	299,828	4.21	6
PRI	198,052	3.10	5	227,139	3.19	5	237,994	3.34	5
PLI	250,333	3.92	5	126,516	1.77	1	134,301	1.89	3
PSIUP	201,200	3.15	4	...	...	...	...	...	...
PdUP	...	...	...	123,528	1.73	3	86,033	1.21	3
DP	...	...	...	...	...	...	63,377	0.89	...
MSI-DN	424,259	6.65	9	532,306	7.46	10	478,265	6.72	9
Others	46,515	0.73	...	11,532	0.16	...	12,724	0.17	...
Total	6,381,851	100.00	170	7,133,421	100.00	180	7,117,321	100.00	180

Table 28 (continued)

South <sup>i</sup>	1970 <sup>j</sup>			1975 <sup>k</sup>			1980 <sup>l</sup>		
	Number of Votes	Percentage	Number of Seats	Number of Votes	Percentage	Number of Seats	Number of Votes	Percentage	Number of Seats
DC	2,693,911	41.50	114	2,895,956	39.04	108	3,180,534	41.64	116
PCI	1,514,337	23.33	59	2,026,273	27.32	69	1,864,831	24.42	63
PSI	724,180	11.16	28	856,344	11.54	28	1,002,640	13.13	31
PSU	380,247	5.86	14	...	...	...	...	...	...
PSDI	...	...	...	430,975	5.81	14	429,330	5.62	12
PRI	186,947	2.88	6	220,841	2.98	6	199,362	2.61	5
PLI	211,605	3.26	8	139,596	1.88	3	120,836	1.58	3
PSIUP	178,830	2.76	5	...	...	...	...	...	...
PdUP	...	...	...	64,159	0.87	2	88,282	1.16	1
DP	...	...	...	...	...	...	48,389	0.63	1
MSI-DN	506,721	7.81	15	754,555	10.17	20	694,329	9.09	18
Others	94,120 <sup>m</sup>	1.46	1	29,008	0.39	...	9,436	0.12	...
Total	6,490,898	100.00	250	7,417,807	100.00	250	7,637,969	100.00	250

Ellipsis indicates the party presented no candidates.

<sup>a</sup> Regular statute regions of Piedmont, Lombardy, Venetia, Liguria, and Emilia-Romagna (34 provinces, 22,799,444 population by 1971 census).

<sup>b</sup> 94.87-percent turnout of eligible voters; 4.18 percent of ballots were invalid.

<sup>c</sup> 94.95-percent turnout of eligible voters; 3.76 percent of ballots were invalid.

<sup>d</sup> 92.25-percent turnout of eligible voters; 6.24 percent of ballots were invalid.

<sup>e</sup> Tuscany, Umbria, Marche, and Lazio (20 provinces, 10,298,269 population by 1971 census).

<sup>f</sup> 93.68-percent turnout of eligible voters; 4.13 percent of ballots were invalid.

<sup>g</sup> 93.99-percent turnout of eligible voters; 3.21 percent of ballots were invalid.

<sup>h</sup> 91.01-percent turnout of eligible voters; 5.89 percent of ballots were invalid.

<sup>i</sup> Regular statute regions of Abruzzi, Molise, Campania, Puglia, Basilicata, and Calabria (21 provinces, 12,720,151 population by 1971 census).

<sup>j</sup> 86.08-percent turnout of eligible voters; 5.55 percent of ballots were invalid.

<sup>k</sup> 84.90-percent turnout of eligible voters; 4.25 percent of ballots were invalid.

<sup>l</sup> 83.48-percent turnout of eligible voters; 6.44 percent of ballots were invalid.

<sup>m</sup> In Campania the monarchists of PDIUM won one seat.

Table 29

## Regional Election Results in Five Special Statute Regions, 1968-81

	1968-71 <sup>a</sup>			1973-76 <sup>b</sup>			1978-81 <sup>c</sup>		
	Number of Votes	Percentage	Number of Seats	Number of Votes	Percentage	Number of Seats	Number of Votes	Percentage	Number of Seats
DC	1,669,358	37.68	127	1,962,810	39.47	130	1,967,054	38.98	125
PCI <sup>d</sup>	969,835	21.89	70	1,187,160	23.87	71	1,037,139	20.55	70
PSI <sup>e</sup>	629,961	14.22	40	526,678	10.59	36	602,242	11.93	33
PSDI	NONE	0	NONE	233,730	4.70	13	180,342	3.57	12
PRI	160,834	3.63	6	147,988	2.98	7	180,559	3.58	11
PLI	179,719	4.06	13	121,342	2.44	6	94,327	1.87	6
Local parties <sup>f</sup>	203,603	4.60	29	203,783	4.10	36	281,876	5.59	44
DP	NONE	0	NONE	15,163	0.30	NONE	44,879	0.89	3
PdUP	NONE	0	NONE	NONE	0	NONE	19,740	0.39	1
MSI-DN	522,330	11.79	23	445,337	8.96	22	334,446	6.63	14
Others <sup>g</sup>	94,974	2.14	4	128,667	2.59	9	303,740	6.02	17
Total	4,430,614	100.00	312	4,972,658	100.00	331	5,046,344	100.00	336

<sup>a</sup> 84.21-percent turnout of eligible voters; 4.21 percent of ballots were invalid.

<sup>b</sup> 87.18-percent turnout of eligible voters; 3.43 percent of ballots were invalid.

<sup>c</sup> 88.55-percent turnout of eligible voters; 3.28 percent of ballots were invalid. Figures do not include Sicily for which the 1981 statistics are not available.

<sup>d</sup> In 1968 includes PSIUP in all five regions. For breakdown, see separate regional tables.

<sup>e</sup> In 1968, PSI and PSDI were united as PSU, *Partito Socialista Unificato*. Figures also include PSDI in Sicily in 1971.

<sup>f</sup> Included are PPTT, SVP, and *Nuova Sinistra* in Trentino-Alto Adige; *Union Valdotaïne*, *Rassemblement Valdotaïn* and *Democrazia Popolare* in Valle d'Aosta; and *Partito Sardo d'Azione* in Sardinia.

<sup>g</sup> For groups included, see individual regional tables.

nation as a whole. Only in four regions—Lombardy, Lazio, Abruzzi, and Campania—did the party gain more than one Council seat. Although this is not negligible, because the three largest regions of the country are included, the gain was not enough to alter the fundamental situation. Furthermore, attention

should be paid to the composite vote for the leftist parties, as well as to their seat count in councils. The result is not quite an approximation of the PCI's 1975 highwater mark, but the left as a whole remains extremely close to the DC. Conversion of the 1980 raw vote into actual seats in the various regions left

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the DC in virtually the same position as 1975 in that the combined forces of other parties could force its hand and in some cases exclude it altogether. In fact, the evidence of static or reduced DC power is found in the party combinations in various regional governments.

The regional government situation as of 1980 also demonstrates the DC's drift toward becoming a sectional party of the south with a remaining stronghold elsewhere only in Venetia. The situation is no better in the special regions. Sardinia's government has been in crisis since late 1980 with every hint that the PCI will enter the coalition or have sufficient strength to cause a stalemate. The regional election in Sicily earlier this year suggests imminent difficulties for the DC there. Although the party gained 0.6 percent of the popular vote—with fewer voters participating—it lost one Council seat because of proportional representation. In Sicily the party can comfort itself that the PCI slumped significantly, but this does not convert into ultimate advantage for the DC. And the three remaining special regions, because of their ethnic and linguistic differences as well as local issues, may be unknown quantities for the future.

If the regions continue to grow in importance as they have in their first decade of full operation, and even if the DC can hold its own in their governments, the fact remains that its part of the vote is not sufficient to ensure it freedom of action except in a backwater like Molise. The new access of other parties to the spoils of power at the regional level is of maximum significance for building bases of support which doubtless will enhance their national strength. The detailed information provided here on the regions' voting patterns may be the best data for assessing and projecting the potential for change in national politics in the future. The DC's hold on power is tenuous at best in the regions, and scandal or any excess of factional strife could seriously, perhaps permanently, erode the party's position.

**Administrative Elections: Provinces and Communes**  
**Provincial Elections.** The province, once the principal administrative element of the Kingdom of Italy, is now reduced to a second-echelon unit of relatively small importance. At the end of World War II the country was divided into 92 provinces, to which three have been added under the Republic: Pordenone (Friuli-Venezia Giulia), Isernia (Molise), and Oristano (Sardinia). The once powerful figure of provincial prefect has been demoted to a position of liaison between the province and the regional government.

In their structure provincial governments mirror those of the regions. The Council is elected by universal suffrage, and its size is determined by the province's population. From its ranks a Junta is elected—again reflecting party strengths—and the Junta then elects the president. The latter's responsibilities are to preside over Council and Junta meetings and perform general executive duties.

In practice, the provincial government is relatively unimportant, except for the favors or spoils its leaders can dispense. Essentially, the province manages affairs of a technical and business character concerning public works. Reduced in importance as they may be, the larger provinces clearly still have some significance for political parties. From an analytical point of view, provinces and communes have the advantage of giving a small enough sector of voting information to show the diversity that is lost when amalgamated into regional and national figures.

Table 30

Percent

Regional Election Returns, 1968-81 <sup>a</sup>

Region	1970	1975	1980	Region	1970	1975	1980
<b>Regular Statute Group</b>							
<b>Abruzzi</b>				<b>Marche</b>			
DC	48.3	42.5	45.8	DC	38.6	36.5	37.1
PCI	22.8	30.3	27.5	PCI	31.8	36.9	37.2
PSI	9.0	10.2	10.8	PSI	8.5	9.8	10.1
<b>Basilicata</b>				<b>Molise</b>			
DC	42.5	41.9	45.2	DC	52.1	50.6	55.4
PCI	24.0	27.1	24.9	PCI	15.0	17.9	15.8
PSI	12.7	13.2	13.7	PSI	9.5	10.0	9.4
<b>Calabria</b>				<b>Piedmont</b>			
DC	39.7	39.5	41.2	DC	36.7	32.1	32.5
PCI	23.3	25.2	24.2	PCI	25.9	33.9	31.6
PSI	14.1	14.7	16.6	PSI	10.6	12.9	14.2
<b>Campania</b>				<b>Puglia</b>			
DC	39.7	36.7	39.0	DC	41.3	39.3	42.1
PCI	21.8	27.1	24.1	PCI	26.3	28.5	24.6
PSI	11.0	10.4	12.6	PSI	10.7	11.9	13.3
<b>Emilia-Romagna</b>				<b>Tuscany</b>			
DC	25.8	25.3	25.6	DC	30.6	28.5	28.7
PCI	44.0	48.3	48.2	PCI	42.3	46.5	46.4
PSI	8.1	10.2	10.3	PSI	8.7	10.7	11.8
<b>Lazio</b>				<b>Umbria</b>			
DC	33.2	31.5	34.1	DC	30.2	27.6	27.6
PCI	26.5	33.5	30.7	PCI	41.8	46.2	45.2
PSI	8.8	9.8	10.6	PSI	9.5	13.9	14.3
<b>Liguria</b>				<b>Venetia</b>			
DC	32.1	30.4	30.7	DC	51.9	48.1	47.6
PCI	31.3	38.4	36.1	PCI	16.8	22.8	21.8
PSI	11.3	13.5	13.4	PSI	10.5	12.8	12.1
<b>Lombardy</b>							
DC	40.9	37.5	38.9				
PCI	23.1	30.4	28.1				
PSI	12.4	14.1	14.5				

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Table 30 (continued)

Percent

Region	1970	1975	1980	Region	1970	1975	1980
<b>Special Statute Group</b>							
	1968	1973	1978		1969	1974	1979
<b>Friuli-Venezia Giulia</b>				<b>Sardinia</b>			
DC	44.9	39.7	39.6	DC	44.6	38.3	37.7
PCI	20.1	20.9	21.8	PCI	19.8	26.8	26.3
PSI <sup>b</sup>	10.1	12.3	9.5	PSI	11.9	11.7	11.2
	1971	1976	1981		1968	1973	1978
<b>Sicily</b>				<b>Trentino-Alto Adige</b>			
DC	33.3	40.9	41.5	DC	37.1	35.6	30.4
PCI	20.8	26.8	20.6	PCI <sup>c</sup>	7.9	7.5	8.9
PSI	11.3	10.3	14.4	PSI <sup>b</sup>	11.4	8.4	6.3
	1968	1973	1978				
<b>Valle d'Aosta</b>							
DC	37.8	21.4	21.2				
PCI	20.4	19.5	19.5				
PSI <sup>b</sup>	10.3	8.5	3.6				

<sup>a</sup> For detailed data on each region's elections with returns for all parties, see appendix, pages 129-143.

<sup>b</sup> PSI and PSDI as PSU in 1968.

<sup>c</sup> PCI with PSIUP and independents in 1968.



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Table 31

Provincial Council Results by Party in 91 Provinces <sup>a</sup>

	1970		1975		1980	
	Number of Votes	Percentage	Number of Votes	Percentage	Number of Votes	Percentage
DC	11,392,741	36.73	11,794,271	34.24	12,239,062	35.60
PCI	8,383,976	27.03	11,389,053	33.07	10,780,232	31.35
PSIUP	1,056,521	3.41	...	...	...	...
PSI	3,351,159	10.80	4,345,017	12.62	4,531,850	13.18
PSDI	2,254,976	7.27	2,002,567	5.81	1,842,351	5.36
PRI	975,407	3.15	1,187,693	3.45	1,201,527	3.49
PLI	1,533,285	4.94	935,425	2.72	1,005,254	2.92
MSI-DN	1,995,686	6.43	2,468,856	7.17	2,233,693	6.50
Others	74,651	0.24	318,320	0.92	547,925	1.60
<b>Total</b>	<b>31,018,402</b>	<b>100.00</b>	<b>34,441,202</b>	<b>100.00</b>	<b>34,381,804</b>	<b>100.00</b>

<sup>a</sup> Footnote to be provided later.

The provinces hold elections every five years, and at least 75 of them normally vote simultaneously. Thus only 20 are out of phase, and some of those can be integrated easily into composite figures for an overview (see table 31 and figure 17).


At the provincial level the DC's fate at the hands of the electors appears to sound real danger warnings. In fact, taking the figures in table 32, the DC record is not even good at the national level. The distance between DC and PCI in 1975 was the smallest of any election, and even its presumed "recovery" in 1980 did not put it as far ahead of the Communists as on other electoral levels. Conversely, the number of votes for the parties shows a greater difference. But the test of the fate of the parties is in the seats they won and the councils they were able to dominate. Figures 18 and 19 present the provincial council votes and party seats on a national basis and by geographical regions. Beyond the regional and national tables, the evidence in tables 24 and 25 permits a view of where each party

stands in the various provinces. This table shows, for example, that if Piedmont reports national and regional electoral strength for the PCI, the breakdown by province reveals pockets of otherwise hidden DC strength and at least one case of decline (Cuneo). This type of analysis also illustrates that the DC has some beachheads even in the Red Belt which disappear in composite figures for larger areas. In Tuscany, for example, Lucca stands out as a party stronghold. On the other hand, entering wedges of PCI strength in the DC's preserve of the south can be found, areas which bear watching in the future to ascertain the degree to which that area might be altering its political orientation. Puglia and Sicily are consistently faithful to the DC at higher level elections, but areas of PCI strength appear in lesser elections in places like Taranto and Ragusa. Taken overall, however, the evidence again shows the DC to be rural and southern but without a large number of growth areas even in that sphere.

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**Figure 17**  
**Provincial Council Election Results**  
**by Party in 91 Provinces, 1960-80<sup>a</sup>**



<sup>a</sup>Not included are the provinces which did not hold provincial elections in the years 1960, 1964 and 1970: Aosta, Trent, Bolzano, Pavia, Ravenna, Rome, Viterbo, Avellino and Foggia. For the years 1975 and 1980 statistics were not available for the province of Gorizia, but Avellino, which conducted provincial elections in 1974 and in 1980, is included.

<sup>b</sup>Sicilian provincial elections held in 1959 and 1963 are included in figures for 1960 and 1964.

<sup>c</sup>In 1964 and 1970 PSIUP won, respectively, 2.75 percent and 3.46 percent of the total. Ideologically close to the PCI, figures for the two parties could be combined for more complete interpretation of ballots cast for the extreme left.

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Here, though, decline in agrarian activity as well as urbanization cannot be forgotten as regards traditional DC electoral support (see figures 11 and 12). The makeup of provincial councils is particularly revealing for the hypothesis of DC erosion. Using the office of provincial president as an indicator of party strength, the DC record in 1974 was 68 presidencies out of 94 (Oristano Province had not yet been created). Four years later in 1978, the DC had lost so much that it held only 34 of 95 provincial presidencies—17 of those lost went to the PSI and 11 to the PCI. Of note

are locations where the DC had to surrender the office: in the south to the PSI in Bari, Brindisi, Catanzaro, Naples, and Reggio Calabria; also in the south or islands in Cagliari, Foggia, Matera, and Sassari to the PCI. The erosion, then, must be said to have made a significant incursion into the traditional DC south. Even in Venetia the DC lost Belluno to the PSDI and Rovigo to the PCI.

Despite the relative unimportance today of the province, it remains at a level where the individual voter can be influenced by the perception he gets of party activity affecting him. The rising strength of other parties and the serious decline of the DC in provincial executives is therefore to be watched carefully.

**Communal Elections.** The commune, the smallest of Italian administrative subdivisions, encompasses a city or town and its immediate hinterland. It varies some from the municipal structure in the United States, but the largest communes—Milan, Turin, Rome, and Naples—might be compared to American urban areas with regional organs that attempt to coordinate a metropolis and its suburbs. There are 8,081 communes in Italy, and they range in population from the millions of the big cities to a few hundred in rural areas. The importance of some communes stems from their being larger than several of the regions.

Good electoral data are readily available only for those communes that are also provincial capitals. Not all communes vote at the same time, but the councils are renewed at five-year intervals. In communes of more than 5,000 inhabitants the council is elected by proportional representation; in the smaller ones, a so-called limited vote is used where the elector picks a given number of names from a list. The larger communes are more likely to register significant political change.

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Table 32

**Provincial Council Election Returns by Party  
in 86 Provinces, 1975 and 1980 <sup>a</sup>**

	1975			1980		
	Number of Votes	Percentage	Number of Seats	Number of Votes	Percentage	Number of Seats
DC	10,747,421	34.73	949	11,116,374	35.96	981
PCI	10,105,682	32.65	860	9,603,214	31.06	816
PSI	3,949,176	12.76	333	4,119,964	13.33	343
PSDI	1,816,471	5.87	143	1,673,324	5.41	129
PRI	1,050,755	3.40	72	1,062,303	3.44	78
PLI	847,850	2.74	42	911,445	2.95	52
MSI-DN	2,110,815	6.82	162	1,923,005	6.22	144
Others	320,661 <sup>b</sup>	1.03	10	505,480 <sup>d</sup>	1.63	28
Total	30,948,831 <sup>c</sup>	100.00	2,571	30,915,109 <sup>e</sup>	100.00	2,571

<sup>a</sup> The official 1971 census gave the population of these provinces as 47,760,090.

<sup>b</sup> Includes 9,993 (0.03 percent, one seat) for center-left groups; 205,133 (0.66 percent, four seats) for extreme left groups; and 46,449 (0.15 percent, five seats) for local parties.

<sup>c</sup> 91.6 percent of eligible voters.

<sup>d</sup> Includes 268,118 (0.87 percent) for extreme left parties.


<sup>e</sup> 88.3 percent of eligible voters.

See table A-32 in appendix.

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
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**Figure 18**  
**Christian Democratic, Communist, and Socialist Parties Showing in Provincial Elections of 1975\***



\*The total number of Italian provinces is 95. Those not included are Aosta, Trent, Bolzano, Gorizia, Pavia, Ravenna, Rome, Viterbo, and Foggia. Aosta does not have a true provincial council. In Trent and Bolzano, the regional councillors elected in their respective territories sit separately for provincial councils. The remaining provinces voted at other times: Pavia and Viterbo in 1977; Rome and Foggia in 1976; and Ravenna in 1978.  
\*Avellino election data from 1974.

**Figure 19**  
**Christian Democratic, Communist, and Socialist Parties Showing in Provincial Elections of 1980\***



\*The total number of Italian provinces is 95. Those not included are Aosta, Trent, Bolzano, Gorizia, Pavia, Ravenna, Rome, Viterbo, and Foggia. Aosta does not have a true provincial council. In Trent and Bolzano, the regional councillors elected in their respective territories sit separately for provincial councils. The remaining provinces voted at other times: Pavia and Viterbo in 1977; Rome and Foggia in 1976; and Ravenna in 1978.  
\*Avellino election data from 1979.

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Table 33

**City Council Election Results Shown  
With and Without Eight Major Cities, 1975 and 1980 <sup>a</sup>**

	1975				1980			
	Total With Cities		Total Without Cities		Total With Cities		Total Without Cities	
	Percent of Vote	Number of Seats	Percent of Vote	Number of Seats	Percent of Vote	Number of Seats	Percent of Vote	Number of Seats
DC	32.06	1,434	35.35	1,260	33.13	1,515	37.00	1,333
PCI	30.90	1,110	28.88	922	28.91	1,038	26.95	860
PSI	12.44	500	13.23	439	13.59	527	13.53	453
PSDI	6.31	229	6.19	194	5.51	207	5.62	177
PRI	4.54	145	4.26	120	4.40	157	4.51	134
PLI	3.40	86	3.04	70	3.86	98	3.37	79
MSI-DN	8.16	272	7.18	220	7.23	213	5.68	166
Others	2.19	54	1.87	45	3.38	75	3.34	68
<b>Total</b>	<b>100.00</b>	<b>3,830</b>	<b>100.00</b>	<b>3,270</b>	<b>100.00</b>	<b>3,830</b>	<b>100.00</b>	<b>3,270</b>

<sup>a</sup> The figures given are for 82 provincial capitals with a total population of 13,459,722 in 1971. Percentages in parentheses show the change that occurs if the eight major cities (Turin, Milan, Venice, Bologna, Florence, Naples, Catania, and Palermo) with 6,480,817 population are eliminated. The cities of Bolzano, Trento, Frosinone, and Isernia are included in these statistics although they voted out of phase (on 17 November 1974) until 1980.

Communes are structured like regions and provinces with a Communal Council which in turn elects a Junta or Municipal Council as well as the Mayor. Table 33 and figures 20 and 21 illustrate the political composition of the communal electorates in a number of cities; the largest communes in the area are shown separately. This picture is one of rapidly increasing gloom for the DC, because by 1981 it had lost the position of mayor in all the largest cities except Palermo. It is also in communal elections where the DC has had the largest losses relative even to the 1975 or 1976 elections. The few cases of DC improvement in recent elections have not come in the largest cities, suggesting that urbanization has promoted the fortunes of the left and seriously damaged the DC. Even the commune of Venice, largest city in the Catholic northeast, kept the PCI as the plurality party in 1980; and in Rome and Naples, once considered DC


strongholds, the party's share of the vote dropped by 3 percent in the 1980 and 1981 elections. Noteworthy as the PCI's slippage was in the communal election of 1981, this still seems to be an administrative level where the DC has now truly lost its hegemony. In 1974 it held the mayoralty in 67 of 94 provincial capitals; in 1978 that had fallen to 51 of 95. The drop is neither slow nor small, and nothing short of a miracle or cataclysm seems likely to reverse the trend. In some communes, the DC may soon have to concentrate its efforts so as not to fall into third place among the three major parties. While Italy becomes rapidly more urban, nowhere is party erosion so visible as in the communal elections, although it is moving at varying rates from area to area.

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**Figure 20**  
**City Council Election Results by City and Geographic Region—1975**




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**Figure 21**  
**City Council Election Results by City and Geographic Region—1980**



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Table 34

**Comparative Communal Election Returns, 1975 and 1981:  
A Composite of 98 Communes With More Than 5,000 Inhabitants**

Party	1975-80 <sup>a</sup>			1981		
	Number of Votes	Percentage	Number of Seats	Number of Votes	Percentage	Number of Seats
DC	1,202,763	33.49	1,007	1,031,012	30.83	997
PCI	1,242,694	34.60	858	1,099,327	32.88	801
PSI	361,085	10.06	333	458,474	13.71	418
PSDI	160,712	4.48	127	194,792	5.83	163
PRI	139,778	3.89	61	126,269	3.78	71
PLI	58,274	1.62	9	91,964	2.75	20
Dem. Prol.	48,834	1.36	10	30,689	0.92	9
MSI-DN	302,239	8.42	117	218,155	6.52	83
Others	74,711	2.08	78	92,971	2.78	58
<b>Total</b>	<b>3,591,090</b>	<b>100.00</b>	<b>2,600</b>	<b>3,343,653</b>	<b>100.00</b>	<b>2,620</b>

<sup>a</sup> These 98 communes voted over this entire timespan until 1981 when they were brought into synchronization.

Composite national figures for the 1975-80 period do not seem to indicate DC erosion, but the reports from the largest cities in that group do show overall party decline. The data provided in table 34 encompass a broader cross section of communes—towns and cities that range in population from 5,000 to nearly 3 million, some provincial capitals and other simple communes—and illustrate the hypothesis more clearly. When the five largest cities are separated out, the DC decline again appears, underscoring the future prospects with on-going urbanization (see table 35). Admittedly, these two sets of statistics derive from different bases and suggest the opportunity for multiple interpretation. The most objective analytical judgment is probably that they indicate a process which is in a relatively early stage. If the critical and pivotal change for the party occurred in 1974-75, both tables portray the beginning of this shift. Also, because this level permits the closest scrutiny of voter behavior, it bears continuing observation to identify movement that is lost in national and regional returns.

Another curious aspect of voting patterns appears when they are simultaneously examined at the provincial and communal levels. Political science assumes that urban areas are more liberal, progressive, or leftist, and that rural areas tend to be traditionalist and conservative. Separating out the returns from the provincial capitals in provincial and communal elections—in effect, dividing the urban from the rural vote—shows this belief not infrequently to be erroneous in the Italian case. In fact, the city or provincial capital may give more conservative returns than its surrounding province. One such example from the elections in June 1981 is Foggia where the DC won 47.8 percent of the vote in the communal election (up from 41.1 percent in 1976) and the PCI dropped from 22.9 percent to 15.4 percent. However, the election held the same day in Foggia Province produced 33.2 percent for the DC (1976, 35.6 percent) and a very close 32.3 percent for the PCI (1976, 37.6 percent).

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Table 35

**Comparative Communal Election Returns, 1976 and 1981,  
in Five Provincial Capitals <sup>a</sup>**

Party	1976			1981		
	Number of Votes	Percentage	Number of Seats	Number of Votes	Percentage	Number of Seats
DC	932,770	32.93	116	748,785	29.28	106
PCI	1,001,264	35.35	103	871,121	34.06	92
PSI	258,902	9.14	33	326,609	12.77	50
PSDI	115,788	4.09	16	139,017	5.44	23
PRI	116,786	4.12	10	101,050	3.95	10
PLI	53,406	1.89	4	84,624	3.31	9
Dem. Prol.	41,256	1.46	1	26,730	1.05	-
MSI-DN	262,716	9.27	25	185,872	7.27	18
Others	49,922	1.75	2	73,548	2.87	2
<b>Total</b>	<b>2,832,810</b>	<b>100.00</b>	<b>310</b>	<b>2,557,356</b>	<b>100.00</b>	<b>310</b>

<sup>a</sup> Rome, Genoa, Bari, Foggia, Ascoli Piceno.

Whether this peculiar rural-urban phenomenon indicates a broad national trend is difficult to say. If so, the implications for the DC are more negative since it has long been assumed that the party's strength lay in its hold on rural areas. Again, urbanization means the decline of a traditional DC preserve. There is, though, another side of this coin. If the DC's vote-drawing power in some urban areas is indeed improving, perhaps another base is coming into existence. However, the earlier admonition is still valid; Italian election returns must be handled with care if they are not to become a mere numbers game and skew analytical judgment.

Finally, the law regulating the structure and functioning of provinces and communes also has implications for the DC. Unlike the regions, legislation governing these lowest units was already on the books at the institution of the Republic. Legal arguments not yet settled arose in connection with the 1946 referendum which abolished the monarchy, specifically as to whether that vote also implied abolition of laws passed under the Kingdom. That discussion is largely academic today, but the fact remains that no action was

taken by the Constituent Assembly to abolish old legislation. Therefore, a certain part of the legal framework regulating today's provinces and communes is still that instituted by Mussolini's law of 1934. Modifications were introduced with legislation in 1951 and 1960, but citizens are often annoyed when regulations dating to the fascist era still affect them. The DC is held responsible for this failure to make a clean break with the dictatorship, even if the reason was political expediency at a time when the alternative of starting over meant doing so in an assembly where the far left's influence seemed dangerously large. This element combined with the progressively worsening position of the DC, in elections as well as in council offices, places the party in the least promising perspective yet surveyed. Trends on these levels closest to the grass roots are the clearest and most ominous of all for the DC in the future. The trend is subtle, though, and is identifiable most clearly now in the largest communes but in varying degree as one moves down in size. Both provincial and communal elections may prove to be the most reliable barometer for predicting any changes in national voting patterns.

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**DC Policy, the Other Parties, and Prognosis**

For many years the Christian Democrats, as they so often claim, represented a broad interclass cross section which reflected the sentiments of a significant share of the nation. Also, the party has pursued a pragmatic policy, often devoid of ideas and scant on ideology, which accommodated the changing aspirations of at least some of the Italian people. This ease of adaptation not infrequently brings charges of opportunism. In foreign policy, the DC has been somewhat more consistent in its support of—or conformity to—the goals of the Western alliance, taking an independent line only on the colonels' government in Greece and in certain facets of Middle Eastern affairs. But events of the last decade have increasingly raised the question of whether the party continues to be effective in comprehending and promoting the public's aspirations. Perhaps more ominous or even hazardous is the expediency practiced by the DC. In a dramatically changed nation, it is questionable whether the party has grasped the new ethos or whether pragmatism may not have led to excessive compromise of what it claims to stand for. More germane for US interests is whether the DC continues to serve as a valid and valued ally. Does it even become a liability? Answers and analyses for any of these questions or observations are extremely important and potentially far reaching in their implications. Aside from Italy's pivotal geographic location, the country's internal political spectrum, simultaneously fragile and rigid, permits only minimal maneuvering space among a few coalition alternatives, all of which seem to include a powerful and previously unacceptable PCI or an unrealistically small PSI.

In foreign policy, the DC's support of NATO, the European Community, theater nuclear forces, and most facets of US policy has made Italy an ally so taken for granted as, in effect, virtually to discount any need for involving her in great power consultations, a tactic that has greatly annoyed her leaders of late. Despite irritants in the relationship or minor deviations Italy may have attempted internationally, any basic change in national political orientation that would alter foreign policy could create a serious need for reevaluation of US calculations. Backing comparable to that of the DC has come only from tiny

parties such as the PRI, PLI, and to an extent PSDI, with some erratic PSI support. The formulation and successful implementation of any foreign policy, however, is dependent on the relative internal political strengths and alignments of a nation's parties. Hence, the DC's continuing prosperity has been considered as *sine qua non* for the nation's foreign policy and its role in the Western alliance.

Clearly the DC is slowly becoming less representative of majority opinion. Even if conclusive evidence is lacking, more than a few signs give cause for apprehension. Various elements suggest, for example, that a changing Italian public is not aligning with a DC which has been unable—its many expressions of desire for “renewal” notwithstanding—to maintain more than a tenuous hold on its already weakened position. Erratic as the work of strengthening the party's hold on the public may be, what has been attempted is insufficient and cause for pessimism. First, contrary to wide belief—the DC has *not* won back its old positions lost in the early 1970s. The PCI may have appeared to suffer a slippage greater than that of the DC, but this may not be symptomatic of a continuing trend. Any assumption that the threat from the left is declining defies facts. Second, the DC has maintained its ratio of the vote in legislative elections by siphoning support from smaller parties largely to its right. How long can that type of transfusion give life to the party when it has so often been forced to rely on those very groups to govern in coalition?

Where, then, does the party seem to be moving? What may be its future in the overall Italian political spectrum?

**Has the DC Lost the Way?**

The DC gives more than a little evidence of having lost its way, except for its inveterate reliance on pragmatism. This is the least damning mode of describing the party's flirtation in recent years with “historic compromise,” a euphemism for an alliance or some kind of *modus vivendi* with the PCI. The process has been tortuous, reminiscent of the twists and turns of the early 1960s that led to the *apertura a*

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*sinistra* (opening to the left) with the PSI, an arrangement causing no little alarm even before it was concluded. In some sense a repeat of that process might be considered as an attempt on the DC's part to arrive at a more modern or responsive approach to the nation's demands. In practice, though, it comes across overwhelmingly as an implicit negation of the party's anti-Communism, a fundamental and unchanging tenet from its founding and, to many now, a crass device to ensure DC retention of power.

In terms of domestic policy demands and what they signify for the party and the electorate, the DC did at least acquiesce in the Programmatic Accord of 29 July 1977, a document the PSI, PSDI, PRI, PLI, and PCI adhered to as well. No more comprehensive document exists outlining the critical issues in Italian life which cried for action. DC underwriting of this, commendable as it is, still approximated signature of a list of its own unfulfilled promises. Be that as it may, the accord was a collective commitment by the six parties to address and resolve these issues. Had it not become a dead letter, as much as anything because of the DC and its internal differences, the program might have been a turning point for solving many nagging national problems, some at least two decades old. Although the program did threaten some DC areas of influence, there is no reason to believe that even its partial fulfillment would have constituted the kind of renewal the DC was seeking in the eyes of the voting public. That the PCI would have had an important role in this, doubtless more than desired in Washington, was also evident. Events altered all this, but the fatal flaw of the Programmatic Accord was that it was contingent on the initiative and direction of Aldo Moro. Moro's sudden and violent death left the DC, for all intents and purposes, without gifted leadership. As a result, the party's failure to provide the support necessary to revitalize the nation—and itself—through these reforms has placed it in the same or worse position than before the initiative was undertaken. In its own terms, perhaps it was guilty of a sin of omission.

As of 1981, the perspective on the decade of the 1970s is not as great as might be desired, yet some tentative conclusions may prove valid. First is the impression

that despite its continuation as Italy's largest party in the last decade, the DC appears to have been wandering in a wasteland, one somewhat of its own creation either by inaction or erroneous judgment. Whether in its faulty assessments that allowed the divorce referendum fiasco in 1974 or its lack of response to student and worker upheavals in 1968 and 1969, the party showed its inability to determine a clear and consistent course for itself. Its attitudes toward the "historic compromise" and the Programmatic Accord are evidence of this loss of direction. The DC's first steps in seeking renewal, under Moro and after Zaccagnini became party secretary, do allow the assumption that things might have been different.

The DC's major electoral setbacks between 1974 and 1976 not only prompted the calls for renewal, they also forced an awareness of the party's growing inability to govern without some acknowledgment of the PCI's vastly enhanced strength. In various quarters at that juncture, questions were also being raised for the first time about the DC's ultimate ability to survive. To an extent, the DC leadership of that moment saw a pragmatic escape hatch in the flirtations of Italy's Marxist left with Eurocommunism, a phenomenon that altered thinking in various quarters about the PCI. And Eurocommunism, at least hypothetically, deserved consideration if only because the arguments advanced against it were self-serving, if not downright specious. During the time it captivated Italian political thinking, Eurocommunism served to make "historic compromise" more palatable. Indeed, such a deal could be rationalized into yet one more example of transformism, a practice characteristic of years of government in Italy.<sup>8</sup>

<sup>8</sup> Historically, transformism is dated even to preunification political tactics used by Cavour in the 1850s and utilized by several famous politicians after him, notably Giolitti early in this century. Most simply described, this is the practice whereby one party or faction, usually the majority of the moment, co-opts the principles and practices of its opposition, ostensibly for the general good. Implicit in the concept, however, is an unprincipled desire to retain power even at the cost of a major sellout. At best it has always been viewed as amoral opportunism.

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Whatever the justification offered, the very entertainment of such a compromise with the PCI was not only antithetical to the DC's past but was also a tacit admission that the party was considerably less autonomous than before. The 1976 parliamentary election, in fact, verified this. Even in coalition with its small allies of the past, the DC could hardly proceed to govern thereafter without some acknowledgment of the growth of Communist power. In the judgment of many at the time, the DC was reaching the inevitable moment of truth deriving from its unfulfilled promises, and the voters were penalizing it for its years of immobilism. On regional, provincial, and communal levels, notably since the 1975 administrative election, the reality of PCI power was forced on the DC. It was at this juncture that the PCI's momentum contributed to reaching the Programmatic Accord, in all likelihood the pivotal tactic in Moro's game plan for beating the PCI on its own grounds.

Moro's leadership, convoluted even for Italians accustomed to Byzantine maneuverers, was remarkably effective as a moderating force which muted factional frictions quietly behind the scene. Although the conservative *correnti* in the party opposed any move toward the PCI, Moro was slowly and determinedly moving the DC his way. The tactic first met heavy weather when the United States spoke out in January 1978 against any PCI involvement in the Italian Government. The Red Brigades, the force least interested in promoting US interests, inadvertently aided these and altered the political landscape by kidnapping Moro in March. Although it was not evident even in May when Moro's corpse was found in downtown Rome, there already was a premonition that not only the DC but perhaps Italian politics had reached a critical juncture. Certainly the Communists soon understood the implications of a newly emerging political world.

The largest majority ever to vote confidence in an Italian cabinet hastily approved the government of "national solidarity" on the day Moro was kidnapped. In some senses, this ministry presided over by Giulio Andreotti was a realization of historic compromise because of PCI backing. Nevertheless, in the suspicion, innuendo, and recrimination that typified the

political scene in the weeks of limbo until Moro's body was found, the always latent makings of political division soon reappeared. Without the master manipulator, the grand coalition fell apart almost immediately, and for its part the DC went back to its earlier positions, those more coherent with its traditional opposition to the PCI, and to a tense relationship with its erstwhile ally, the PSI. Whether hidden or visible, the DC's division between Moro's flagbearers and the more conservative anti-PCI elements effectively re-established the party's old immobilism.

Against this backdrop, Italy went to the polls in 1979. Whether mistakenly or with self-induced optimism, the DC persuaded itself that the response of the electorate that year was rejection of the PCI, even if the DC's own showing was far from an overwhelming endorsement by the voters. Detailed analysis of that election in this report points out that the old fissures were not only still present but even growing. Notwithstanding this failure to make a leap forward, factionalism continued to paralyze the party until the conservatives succeeded at the party congress in February 1980 in establishing as DC policy opposition to any understanding with the PCI. The majority at that meeting approved a preamble to the party's general reaffirmation of principle which encompassed this stand, thus labeling its backers as the *preambolisti* (backers of the preamble) (see above pages 15-17). The stresses and strains remained, eventually reappearing at the fall of Cossiga's second government and forcing party secretary Piccoli to demand again at the December 1980 National Council meeting that factions be disbanded—a demand still unmet almost a year later. Finally, in late July 1981, after the party's loss of the premiership, the Council abandoned the preamble and reopened the way for alternative possibilities envisioned by Moro.

Tiresome as is the narrative of the DC policy flip-flop, it illustrates the party's continuing crisis, what the Italian press has occasionally called "the Christian Democratic question." Without doubt this reflects an erosion of leadership and a resultant indecisiveness on basic policy. Simultaneously, however, it is an inadvertent recognition by the DC that it must respond to

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a different political orientation but that it feels its very foundation threatened. The party's future thus seems to become a question of whether the price that must be paid for continued primacy is indeed compromise with the traditional enemy, the PCI.

The composite described here demands to be placed in the broader context of Italian affairs. If not, it becomes readily evident that crucial issues in Italy are increasingly lost in this morass of political jockeying. Another phrasing would pose the question of whether Italy can long afford this public internal thrashing about by the DC while national problems worsen. Terrorism continues to be a major issue in Italy, and even the public's reactions to it—persistent criticism of government ineffectuality in dealing with terrorism and its causes—are taken as examples of disgust with the DC. Inflation persistently rises with only the most ephemeral moments of respite. Unemployment remains high, and old labor problems continue unresolved. Reforms in the judicial, penal, economic, welfare, educational, and other sectors are constantly delayed. Ironically, these are all major aspects of the Programmatic Accord, almost all still far from realization.

#### Leadership Vacuum?

If DC domestic policy vacillates, is there any evidence of a will in the leadership for a change which might reestablish stability? As so common in the past, the number of names that rise above the party rank and file is small. Although there are nearly 400 DC members of Parliament, the only ones who might fill the bill are the same figures who have been on the scene for years. Superstars like Andreotti and Fanfani now get attention primarily as candidates to succeed Alessandro Pertini at the Quirinale Palace. Even if Fanfani, perennially available, has less than subtly expressed his willingness to form an "institutional" government, his popularity is quite limited, and to some he is totally unacceptable. Fanfani, for all his boundless ambition, has no youth following. Furthermore, he was party secretary when the DC wallowed into the trough of its mid-1970s losses. Andreotti, on the other hand, still enjoys high esteem as revealed in a January 1981 Demoskopiea poll, but he reputedly has no desire to be premier again. Zaccagnini, as

much because of his poor health as his age, is no alternative. Since his departure from the party secretaryship two years ago, the DC has had only second-rate leadership either in its own administration with Piccoli or with Cossiga and Forlani as Prime Ministers. Discussion of these most obvious men must take note, too, of the fact that they are older figures; and, whether in years or events, they are associated with party fatigue, scandal, and inactivity. New and younger blood is what the DC leadership desperately needs, but little on the horizon augurs the arrival of a savior. When Zaccagnini was chosen as political secretary in 1975 at age 63, the DC probably missed its most critical opportunity for rejuvenating itself. What chances there have been of late among younger men appeared well over a year ago and came from the right, but the *capi storici* (historic leaders) viewed the major individuals in question as mavericks and too rebellious. A name often mentioned from this group was Massimo de Carolis of Milan, but he was already jeopardizing himself within the party before his name was included on lists of members reputed to belong to the P-2 Masonic Lodge.<sup>9</sup> Another Milanese political figure, Andrea Borruso, for all the backing he enjoys from the *Comunione e Liberazione* movement (see section on auxiliary support organizations), gives no evidence of drawing the mass support essential for a broad-based party.

<sup>9</sup> The "Propaganda-2" Masonic Lodge scandal began attracting public attention in Italy in the early spring of 1981 and became a major issue in mid-May when Prime Minister Forlani felt it necessary to release the names of purported members of the group, a total of nearly 1,000. The list included numerous high-ranking figures from government, political parties, banking, the media, security agencies, and other important sectors of public life. Aside from historic attitudes in Italy toward Masonry—which regard the organization as antithetical to Catholicism—the P-2 Lodge was alleged to have sinister implications for government stability, democratic institutions, and national security. Italy's regular Freemasons denounced P-2 as "illegal" and disavowed any connection with it. Numerous figures named as P-2 members denied any involvement with the group, and various statements caused skepticism as to the actual role of some individuals who appeared on the list. Regardless of these and other doubts, this renegade lodge was believed to have sinister and semitreasonous goals, and the reputations of all who were said to be involved with it were seriously compromised. P-2 was most frequently referred to as "a covert center of power." Since the Constitution explicitly bans all secret organizations, anyone proved to be associated with P-2 could be liable for criminal prosecution.

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The truly ominous nature of the DC leadership situation appears on the party's left. While a large number of DC rank-and-file youth are moving left, as documented studies show, there are no party leaders of that ideological persuasion with any stature, much less any charisma. And, based on even the most judicious assessment of the laicization of Italian society, it seems that only the realm of fantasy could conjure a rightist DC leader who might attract to the party those thousands of voters who no longer accept the religious tenets important to the conservatives of the party. And if some compromise figure, a man of the center with moderate tendencies either right or left, is the final alternative, names are still lacking since none has a sufficient track record to permit predictions. One of several figures who could be cited in such a category would be Roberto Mazzotta, the 40-year-old deputy from Milan. Even if ideas and a formulated policy might be achieved by a party group, the dynamic leadership to carry it forward cannot be so easily devised and is currently nowhere in sight.

Another facet of Italian politics that must be weighed is scandal, particularly as it has so often concerned either the DC or its leading figures.<sup>10</sup> If the DC has or has not had a monopoly on government and political scandal in postwar Italy, the party still seems guilty in many eyes. Even if the most skeptical view is taken, the sheer number and occasional magnitude of DC scandals is nothing short of appalling. One book on the subject, muckraking and sensational as it may be, makes it impossible to reject the fact that malfeasance is an old strain in the DC that has been associated with the party even before 1946. In only the most recent years, Giovanni Leone's forced resignation from the Presidency of the Republic for various

misdeeds, the \$2 billion petroleum scandal of 1980, presumed incompetence in earthquake relief in and around Naples in 1980, and the recent P-2 Masonic Lodge scandal all deeply involved the party.

These examples also make one wonder when and how Italy, or the DC, will contrive to produce the ultimate scandal. Almost any natural disaster in Italy automatically produces a scandalous tale on the DC. The press points out in such instances that the DC first presented a bill to provide relief mechanisms for such disasters in 1951. The bill is still to be approved 30 years later, just another example of DC immobilism.

Why does the Italian voter continue to cast his ballot for the DC when, as has occasionally been said, it represents a 35-year Watergate? Progressive accumulation of public disapproval undoubtedly does account in some degree for the party's failure to improve at the polls. In reality, what Italians consider the lack of a good alternative has given them no place else to go except to the spoiled ballot or abstention (see appendix, pages 125-128). The Italian voting public, though, is certainly sophisticated enough to weigh the relative merits of a corrupt incumbent DC and the potentially duplicitous nature of the PCI, or just protest by abstention or spoiled ballot. Nevertheless, it is safe to assume that sooner or later the Italian voter will reject the offenders; what the catalyst will be is impossible to guess.

A last element, one always nominally central to the DC as a party of Catholics, concerns the Vatican and its role in the party's future. The shrinkage of the Catholic segment of the electorate and its significance must be juxtaposed to the occupancy of the Holy See by a non-Italian pope. The presence of the first foreign pontiff in well over four centuries is in many ways almost as important for Italy as for the Church. On the other hand, John Paul II assumed his mantle well after fundamental changes had begun in Italy between Church and state. Indeed, since the reign of John XXIII the Vatican has not only been declining, relatively speaking, as a factor in Italian affairs, but

<sup>10</sup> Here, however, a brief comment is necessary. The Italian public does not simply assume corruption, and hence scandal, is inherent in government; nor do they indifferently tolerate it. The man in the street may seem more cynical or acquiescent than, say, an American, but this does not make it axiomatic that he, even as a Latin, accepts unprincipled government as a way of life. Italians do tend to dismiss scandal a bit more rapidly as evidence of human frailty, but political sociologists find this reaction the norm in societies—such as Italy—with a long-accumulated public consciousness of the governing experience. Therefore, the Italians perhaps respond a bit differently, but their sense of ethical outrage in the face of a scandal is very real.

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the entire relationship has also undergone a continuing metamorphosis. Except for issues such as divorce and abortion, pronouncements by the pope or members of the Curia have progressively been more intermittent, one reason being that the Church found—sooner than the DC—that interjecting religion into Italian politics can be counterproductive. But even prior to the death of Pius XII, in the final days of the traditional Church, Italian attitudes toward intervention in state matters were changing. Outsiders again have to note that Italians, and particularly Romans, have lived so closely with the passage of popes over the centuries that they long ago developed a certain nonchalance about the Church and its leaders. Never has the average Italian, devout practicing Catholics included, been as subservient or uncritical of his Church as many other nationalities. And today, with the immensely changed and modernized institution—by its own term, the Church is *aggiornata* (updated)—Italians and the Vatican have a profoundly different view of religion as it relates to politics. If the separation of Church and state in Italy has not yet been legally sanctioned, the practice approaches something comparable. Political activism of Catholic figures in Italy may now, in fact, be leftist and distinctly non-DC, quite often in social spheres.

During the long pontificate of Paul VI the Church fitfully but generally drew back from Italian politics, albeit with a few noteworthy exceptions. Still the attitude increasingly was one of benign tolerance or indifference, neither of which militated much to the DC's benefit. When Polish Cardinal Karol Wojtyla became the first non-Italian pope in centuries, the change meant somewhat less for Italy than for the Vatican. In other words, he was merely one more step in the detachment of the Church from Italian politics. Although John Paul II reiterated the papal view on abortion in the 1981 referendum, not even the attempt on his life four days before the voting had any influence on its outcome.

The present Pope certainly is more conservative or traditional than parts of the post-Council Church would like. Still, his experiences in Poland have made him a realist. He may make his views known in terms that are not widely acceptable in Italy, but he has

given no indication of any desire to reverse the trend of 20 years of Church-state developments. Nothing suggests that he will do other than accept reality there, albeit with occasional attempts to influence public opinion. In any event, the Roman Catholic Church is no longer an avenue open or willing to place heavy pressure on Italian governments, even in the event of a consummated DC-PCI compromise.

Finally, what prognosis may be tendered for the Italian Christian Democrats in 1981? What might reasonably be foreseen for the party if Italy, as increasingly more often is mentioned, were to have an election in the near future?

The thrust of this report has sought to indicate less the DC's imminent demise than its fundamentally altered position in the national political spectrum. The party, to state the obvious, is less in control of the nation, as for the first time neither the President nor Prime Minister belongs to the DC. Party leadership is tarnished, aging, and fatigued; its policy orientation and electoral position are shaky. Practicing Catholics committed to the DC are declining in numbers; Catholic youth is moving left; and Church-related support organizations long crucial to party success are slipping into independent courses of their own.

Nominally this panorama calls for pessimism. But, be that as it may, Christian Democracy is not in imminent danger of rolling over and dying. The party is, and may remain through one or more elections, the largest in Italy. Loss of the premiership is undoubtedly only temporary, and the Spadolini Cabinet's makeup is a monument to the continuing importance of the DC in government. Its role in and manner of governing cannot, however, be the same again. The sacred images have been shattered; the DC's control of the premiership is no longer invulnerable. Even if the party has other prime ministers, their performance and that of the DC must now produce concrete results or risk another expulsion from the top. Fundamentally the party is master of its own fate, but whether its continuing importance derives from the continued size of its following or from revitalized response to the needs of government will depend on events of the next

two or three years. If it fails to shake itself from being a coalition of factions primarily intent on enjoying power, it can never again presume to govern alone, even with benevolent abstentions from other parties. In short, its record will be scrutinized more critically from now on.

To what extent might the DC, so as to assure its survival in power, accept some accommodation with the PCI? The potential for variables here is too large to answer with any certainty, but the possibility or even likelihood of a DC-PCI "historic compromise" cannot be ruled out. On levels beneath the national, some such arrangement even seems probable in the not too distant future, now that the Preamble has been dropped. The precedent would certainly have more validity in such a domestic case than would the recent inclusion of Communists in the Mitterrand government of France.

The dangers that are presumably implicit in a DC-PCI accommodation are of a far different nature than popularly perceived. Leaving aside the vulnerability of the DC to charges of perfidious betrayal of its heritage, the PCI might well risk even more. The very least either party would have to answer for would be responsibility for inevitably unpopular decisions and possible failure of programs. In short, such an experiment might well fall of its own weight on the national or any other level.

Another possibility for the Christian Democrats is the intensification of ever-present centrifugal forces at work in the party. This may seem remote, but so did the party's loss of the premiership only a few years ago. In the case of a prolonged absence from the prime ministry or that of a DC-PCI coalition, splintering even appears likely. If the prime ministry has now been lost, a key ministry with access to *sotto-governo* spoils will also perhaps be lost in the future. The resultant reduction of access to power and patronage could cause some elements to split off or simply wither out of existence for lack of their clientelistic bases. A compromise with the PCI, on the other hand, quite probably would drive factions of the DC right into the independence they have always

threatened when hints of such a deal have been dropped. Implications of any splintering have to be viewed in light of what they would do to the DC's strength relative to all other parties. The DC could become less than the nation's largest party with the loss of only a small segment of the electorate.

In a similar vein, note must be taken of some general characteristics of Italian voting as they relate to the DC and public opinion. First is the clear evidence in almost all Italian elections since the war of a broader segment of voters casting ballots for parties of the left than those of the right. Exceptions do exist, particularly in smaller constituencies such as provinces or communes, but ever since the Constituent Assembly election of 1946 a majority of the nation has voted to the left. This ideological tendency has persisted until the present even if votes continue to be scattered among several groups. Despite this longstanding pattern, the consistently right or center-right orientation brought by the DC—notwithstanding the years of presumed "opening to the left" with the PSI—marks a distinction between the majority desire of citizens and the governments that have ruled them.

Second, there is a striking constancy of the Italian electorate in giving 75 percent of the vote to DC, PCI, and PSI in almost every election at any level for 35 years. The configuration for potential coalitions has thus been and may yet long remain determined largely by these three parties and the combinations they can devise. Were the PCI to emerge as a truly legitimate alternative, the PSI would become even more pivotal than now; and the small parties' future might become very uncertain. Speculation on possible coalition combinations in such an event suggests interesting turns. In a more finite sense of the present, the size of the vote segment accruing to the major groupings suggests that Italy is primarily a three-party system where only political circumstances have unduly enhanced the role of small parties to make the country exemplary of the dominant party system by default.

### Implications for US Policy

What in all this are the implications policymakers might glean for the future? Fundamentally, the picture is relatively clear, and the options are rather few, some perhaps less than palatable.

In light of the probable persistence of conditions that require government by coalition, what political allies will the United States have to contemplate as DC partners? The most obviously viable party is the PSI under Bettino Craxi. Here, however, any assumption that future US hopes can be pinned to the PSI, with or without the DC, are probably foolhardy. No matter how optimistic the view—or how fortuitous the events—the PSI has little hope of sustaining the growth essential to making it a real alternative, except as a coalition member. Neither the recent French nor Greek elections of socialist governments seem to augur victory for the PSI. The influence of those events may indeed reflect in Italy, but differences peculiar to Italian politics seem to preclude a socialist victory in the foreseeable future. The PSI has shown vigor and seemingly unusual growth since Craxi became party secretary. However, as the DC discovers almost daily, socialist strength depends very much on the whims of this one politician. Without Craxi—whose dominance of the PSI has tolerated no obvious successor—the party's chance of increasing significantly its current 10-percent share of the national electorate is problematical. Assuming, hypothetically, that Craxi survives the political wars and leads his party to as much as 20 percent of a national vote, his ambitions as well as his abrasive and brittle personality will make him a difficult ally. Nothing precludes

also that Craxi might turn to a coalition with the PCI—excluding the DC—if this would make him prime minister. The PSI rank and file certainly has more in common with PCI views than with those of the DC.

Speculation on any other combinations—except for the PCI which has been considered above—must include the miniparties and, hence, coalitions with built-in vulnerability. While useful to the DC in the past, such an arrangement at best now promises a fragile and temporary viability.

If the DC can be counted on to muddle through and live a while yet as the plurality party (dropping even to 30 to 32 percent), the overall trend of the mass of data presented here for all levels suggests that alternative possibilities must at least be contemplated in the not-too-distant future. There is no clear evidence to indicate that Italy will depart from its normal pace of politics which has been described in this paper in metaphors of geological time. Thus, the stolidity of the election returns does seem to give a certain temporal margin, should the DC take advantage of it. One cannot avoid recognizing, however, how delicately poised the political balance has become, and it can not be ignored that one-third of the voters (the PCI electorate) is knocking harder at the door to power.

Recapitulating, the evidence concerning failed efforts at DC renewal and the erosion of support from auxiliary groups, the party's surrogate for its own organization, are showing more and more that a divergence has developed between the public's political tendencies and the response it has found from the DC. Most telling, perhaps, is the rapid rise of powers in the regional governments and the simultaneous near collapse of traditional DC control of the nation at the grass roots. Fast capture of provincial governments and particularly the largest communal councils by other parties augurs little but ill for the patronage central to DC power. The challenge to the party,

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which it has not met to date, is broad and deep. If meeting it is not impossible, the record of the last decade nevertheless indicates that the party has not made the necessary changes either with sufficient alacrity or appropriate appeal. Even if it did accomplish a turnaround of its fortunes, the price would be rejection of at least some of the fundamental tenets which have determined its nature to date.

The myriad peculiarities of Italian politics seem to add up to some kind of Third World sum in today's international scene. The same nation that is placed by all international norms among the leading seven or eight industrial powers of the world is stereotypically conceived of as constantly unstable and thus somewhat unreliable. The DC almost certainly must bear responsibility for this image of backwardness despite the contribution it made to national reconstruction after 1945. One can only wonder how long the Italian populace will wait until it forces the DC to answer for its failures. Increasingly critical economic problems in Italy, worsened, if not created, by political shortcomings, seem closer than ever to forcing basic changes. The DC squandered Italy's potential for international strength commensurate with its industrial power, a price not easily paid by the country. As the gravity of politically derived problems threatens the domestic scene more directly, the DC will unavoidably be called to account. If and when the electorate decides "to throw the rascals out," it should be no surprise. Some political manifestation of the sentiments of the DC's old following will long be significant in the national political spectrum, but its form and the success it can expect will depend on its leaders' capacity to get back in step with the party's own constituency.

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## Appendix

### National Referendums and Elections for the European Parliament

The provision for popular referendums, like the creation of regions, was designed to achieve greater democratization of Italian political life. Article 75 of the Constitution permits a referendum for repeal of any law (with a few excepted categories) upon the demand of either 500,000 voters or five regional councils. The first use of this provision did not occur until some 25 years after adoption of the Constitution, but the outcome of the referendum on divorce in 1974 has become the landmark event of postwar Italian politics. (The one previous referendum, that of June 1946 which abolished the monarchy, predated the Constitution.)

After long and acrimonious debate, Parliament voted a law in 1970 that for the first time permitted civil divorce. Passage of the law did not quiet opposition to what Catholics believed was an intolerable interference with their faith and a challenge to the marriage sacrament. The DC, which had opposed passage of the bill, permitted itself to be drawn into this controversy. When enough signatures assured that there would be a referendum on the issue, the party, in effect, submitted itself to a vote of public confidence.

If the national election of 1948 is viewed as the high water mark of the DC, the divorce referendum of 12 May 1974 is—to date—its nadir.<sup>11</sup> To an extent the vote can also be interpreted as a public rejection of the Church in public affairs. The initiative tying the DC to the antidivorce position was primarily the responsibility of party elder statesman, Amintore Fanfani, who also made it an anti-Communist issue. Shortly before the vote, the Church lined up behind the DC when Pope Paul VI expressed his desire to see the law repealed. Both party and Church, then, submitted themselves to a vote of confidence. The results, an

<sup>11</sup> Some authorities regard the 1975 administrative elections as the DC's postwar low mark because of the party's loss of seats in regional, provincial, and communal councils.

overwhelming expression of a desire to maintain the law, became the greatest postwar rebuff by the Italian public of the country's traditional establishment.

As voting day drew near in the spring of 1974, indications were that the prodivorce position would win, but the actual three-fifths majority it achieved was a major surprise. Analyzed by region (see figure A-1), the voting results demonstrate where Catholic and/or DC influence still held some sway. Seven of the 20 regions voted to abolish divorce, including two of the three in the "white" northeast and five in the south. In some of these, however, the margin was paper thin. No region favoring repeal came close to the two-thirds majority scored by the prodivorce forces in six regions of the center and north. But the chinks in the DC's power structure appear even worse than immediately meet the eye when areas long known for their loyalty to the Church are reviewed. For example, even in Catholic Venetia, despite its regional plurality favoring repeal, a majority of its provinces expressed approval of divorce. In Tuscany, the Catholic enclave of Lucca in the Red Belt also favored retention of the law (see table A-1).


With this referendum, a clear distinction still shows between traditionalist areas in the south and independent regions of the center and north. There are important exceptions, however; both Sicily and Sardinia voted against the DC stand. Rome itself, by more than two-thirds, indicated its approval of divorce. Only 10 of the 95 provincial capitals voted to abolish divorce, all of them south of Naples.

If the DC hypothetically could comfort itself with the loyalty of a few of its old centers of strength in 1974, such was not the case in 1981. The referendum on 12 May 1981 seeking to abolish a 1978 law permitting abortion came close to producing a nationwide sweep of regions voting against the DC position. The lesson

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**Figure A-1**  
**Results of Divorce Referendum**  
**by Province, 1974**

Percent Voting in Favor of Divorce<sup>a</sup>



Divorce Referendum Results in Selected Provincial Capitals

More than 75% in favor:	More than 50% in favor:	Less than 50% (opposed)
79.8 Turin	73.7 Milan	49.9 Foggia
79.7 Ravenna	73.2 Bologna	49.8 Campobosso
79.5 Savona	72.5 Trieste	49.3 Macerata
78.3 Livorno	72.4 Bolzano	49.0 Messina
75.9 Alessandria	71.2 Florence	48.5 Potenza
75.7 Ferrara	70.8 Venice	47.4 Avellino
75.6 Genoa	68.1 Rome	44.3 Caserta
75.6 Imperia	66.8 Siracusa	43.7 Isernia
75.1 Terni	64.6 Cagliari	41.6 Benevento
75.1 Modena	63.0 Catania	40.6 Reggio Calabria
75.0 Aosta	61.8 Brescia	

<sup>a</sup>Please note that a vote in favor of divorce was a vote against the position of the DC and the church.

of 1974 was at least partially learned by the DC, which did not tie itself so adamantly to the issue as before. The Church, specifically the Pope, did make a strong stand against abortion, but it kept enough distance to avoid the degree of embarrassment in losing that befell it earlier. For DC interests, this was fortunate because the 1981 vote was to an extent a surprise similar to that of 1974. While preelection opinion polls favored the proabortion forces, their victory margin was not predicted to be large. However, when the vote was tallied, 19 of the 20 regions opted to retain abortion (see figure A-2). Only Trentino-Alto Adige, by the infinitesimal margin of 0.4 percent, voted for repeal. Victory in one region was scant consolation when juxtaposed to the solid proabortion vote of the entire south and the islands. In fact, for the first time in Italian history both north and south voted alike. Regions in the north and center repeated their prodivorce vote with a general increase of some 4 percent in 1981; the south, in changing its position, added 20 percent to its vote on divorce. Even Molise, with 60.3 percent, joined in to make the vote of the whole of the traditionalist south and islands three-fifths or more against positions well known to be held by DC and Church.

Whether these two referendums should be taken as evidence of DC erosion across the board is open to question. But they clearly indicate a loss of the party's ability to discipline its supporters in traditionalist regions. Even if the party can still maintain a majority position in many parts of the south, the voters of the area nevertheless have indicated an independence of thought and action unknown heretofore. In short, the results showed continued dramatic decline of the Catholic subculture. Consequently, the DC can no longer assume that its position in traditionalist areas is firm.

If the emotionally charged divorce and abortion issues went against the DC, the results on other issues submitted to referendum could possibly be taken as guardedly positive. To be sure, these issues enjoyed enough support in most other parties so that indicators for any one party are difficult to distinguish. But since most of the initiatives which were approved had

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Table A-1

**Results of May 1974 Divorce Referendum in Provincial Capitals <sup>a</sup>  
Ranked in Order of Vote Favoring Retention of Divorce Bill <sup>b</sup>**

Percentage	Capital	Percentage	Capital	Percentage	Capital
79.84	<b>Turin</b>	68.91	<b>Perugia</b>	55.24	<b>Catanzaro</b>
79.73	Ravenna	68.87	Piacenza	54.90	Verona
79.54	Savona	68.32	Pisa	54.76	Taranto
78.33	Livorno	68.14	<b>Rome</b>	54.66	Rovigo
75.99	Alessandria	67.48	<b>Ancona</b>	54.52	Cosenza
75.79	Ferrara	66.89	Siracusa	53.99	Matera
75.67	<b>Genoa</b>	66.74	Udine	53.95	Ascoli Piceno
75.65	Imperia	65.50	Pordenone	53.75	Lecce
75.13	Terni	65.37	Cremona	53.58	Caltanissetta
75.10	Modena	65.21	Arezzo	53.48	Vicenza
75.05	<b>Aosta</b>	64.63	<b>Cagliari</b>	53.24	Teramo
74.26	Vercelli	64.36	Sassari	53.02	Latina
73.81	La Spezia	64.04	Gorizia	52.93	Lucca
73.73	<b>Milan</b>	63.33	Sondrio	52.68	<b>L'Aquila</b>
73.57	Forli	63.23	Rieti	52.33	Frosinone
73.22	<b>Bologna</b>	63.08	Catania	52.31	Trapani
72.53	<b>Trieste</b>	62.06	Varese	52.06	Ragusa
72.48	Bolzano	61.82	Belluno	52.06	Enna
72.38	Novara	61.81	Brescia	51.40	Chieti
72.18	Mantua	61.75	Pescara	50.97	Salerno
72.07	Asti	60.66	Nuoro	50.02	Bergamo
72.03	Reggio Emilia	60.35	<b>Naples</b>	49.43	Foggia
71.97	Grosseto	59.88	Cuneo	49.86	<b>Campobasso</b>
71.60	Parma	59.82	Treviso	49.33	Macerata
71.23	<b>Florence</b>	59.65	<b>Bari</b>	49.08	Messina
70.89	<b>Venice</b>	59.02	Brindisi	48.56	<b>Potenza</b>
70.58	Pistoia	58.53	<b>Trento</b>	47.49	Avellino
69.72	Siena	57.67	Como	44.59	Agriiento
69.38	Massa Carrara	57.10	Padua	44.31	Caserta
69.34	Pesaro	56.80	Viterbo	43.79	Isernia
68.97	Pavia	56.21	<b>Palermo</b>	41.69	Benevento
				40.66	Reggio Calabria

<sup>a</sup> In 1974 Italy had 94 provinces. Regional capitals are shown in boldface.

<sup>b</sup> The wording of the proposition stated, in effect, "I favor repeal of the law permitting divorce." Hence a negative vote favored divorce, and the percentages given in this table are for that negative vote.




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**Figure A-2**  
**Results of Abortion Referendum**  
**by Province, 1981**

Percent Voting in Favor of Abortion



The proposition was phrased as follows:

- YES: I agree to limit abortion to cases of danger to the life and physical health of the woman.  
 NO: I want the present law to be maintained (which permits, among the reasons for an abortion, that it be done within the first 90 days of pregnancy for the psychological health of the woman relative to her social and family condition).

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**Table A-2**

**Returns of Election in Italy for the European Parliament, June 1979**

	Number of Votes	Percentage	Number of Seats
DC: Christian Democrats	12,753,708	36.45	29
PCI: Communists	10,345,284	29.57	24
PSI: Socialists	3,858,295	11.03	9
PSDI: Social Democrats	1,515,425	4.32	4
PRI: Republicans	895,558	2.56	2
PLI: Liberals	1,270,152	3.63	3
PRad: Radicals	1,283,512	3.67	3
PdUP: Proletarian Unity	406,007	1.16	1
DP: Proletarian Democracy	251,927	0.72	1
MSI-DN: Neo-Fascists and National Right	2,050,234	5.86	4
DN-CD: National Right and Constituent of the Right			
SVP: South Tyrolean People's Party	196,277	0.56	1
Others	166,194	0.47	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>34,989,573</b>	<b>100.00</b>	<b>81</b>
Voter Turnout	36,170,620	(85.73)	


been supported originally by the DC, the votes show at least some public approval of the party's stand. Laws tested by referendum in 1978 concerned provision of financial subsidies to political parties and greater government power to maintain public order. In 1981, life imprisonment, the right to bear arms, and broader powers to combat terrorism were all upheld against repeal by a respectable margin.

Another major national election in June 1979—for Italy's delegation to the European Parliament—provides additional opportunity to scrutinize DC strength. This vote, the first of its kind, was held one week after the national election for Legislature VIII of Parliament, prompting many observers to express skepticism on voter reaction to a second call to the polls in so short a time. Although the returns of the two elections have a few points of contrast, there is little to suggest that the electorate was reluctant to vote again. In any event, the two elections bear consideration side by side (see table A-2, figure A-3,

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**Figure A-3**  
**Election Results\* for the Italian National Delegation**  
**to the European Parliament by Political Region-1979**



\*These figures do not include votes from Italian residents abroad which is 0.35 percent or 126,630 of the total number of ballots cast.

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Table A-3

Percent

**European Parliamentary Election Vote Restructured by  
Chamber of Deputies Districts**

	DC	PCI	PSI	Difference <sup>a</sup>
1. Turin-Novara-Vercelli	28.16	31.52	11.56	-2.81
2. Cuneo-Alessandria-Asti	39.19	23.56	10.25	-2.16
3. Genoa-Imperia-La Spezia-Savona	29.23	33.87	12.64	-2.93
4. Milan-Pavia	30.52	30.70	13.95	-2.85
5. Como-Sondrio-Varese	41.27	22.17	13.26	-2.33
6. Brescia-Bergamo	50.53	20.67	10.86	-0.53
7. Mantua-Cremona	36.23	33.98	13.59	-1.52
8. Trento-Bolzano	30.80	9.71	7.96	-0.23
9. Verona-Padua-Vicenza-Rovigo	52.68	18.42	10.46	-1.27
10. Venice-Treviso	43.67	23.62	13.59	-0.97
11. Udine-Belluno-Gorizia-Pordenone	41.60	21.63	12.42	-0.07
12. Bologna-Ferrara-Ravenna-Forli	22.97	47.46	9.87	-1.78
13. Parma-Modena-Piacenza-Reggio Emilia	28.92	45.71	10.44	-1.77
14. Florence-Pistoia	26.60	47.07	10.58	-2.51
15. Pisa-Livorno-Lucca-Massa Carrara	30.47	39.76	11.68	-1.96
16. Siena-Arezzo-Grosseto	26.80	47.26	10.99	-1.26
17. Ancona-Pesaro-Macerata-Ascoli-Picena	36.90	35.90	8.97	-0.98
18. Perugia-Terni-Rieti	29.46	41.19	11.55	-1.67
19. Rome-Latina-Viterbo-Frosinone	33.61	28.86	10.10	-2.89
20. L'Aquila-Pescara-Chieti-Teramo	45.78	29.18	8.50	+0.13
21. Campobasso-Isernia	52.58	19.38	8.18	-2.15
22. Naples-Caserta	36.74	26.84	10.19	-2.28
23. Benevento-Avellino-Salerno	46.18	19.65	9.98	-2.39
24. Bari-Foggia	40.11	26.80	9.77	-2.03
25. Lecce-Brindisi-Taranto	43.67	25.67	10.61	-0.05
26. Potenza-Matera	47.70	25.94	10.13	+4.08
27. Catanzaro-Cosenza-Reggio Calabria	40.39	26.63	13.60	-2.33
28. Catania-Messina-Siracusa-Ragusa-Enna	40.99	22.13	10.91	-1.41
29. Palermo-Trapani-Agrigento-Caltanissetta	41.28	22.28	11.09	-3.96
30. Cagliari-Sassari-Nuoro-Oristana	39.41	32.71	8.15	+1.30
31. Valle d'Aosta	17.67	25.00	4.12	
32. Trieste	23.21	22.19	5.67	-0.10

<sup>a</sup> Percent of change in DC vote as compared with that for Chamber election one week earlier.

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and tables 13 and 17), and for that reason, the vote for the European Parliament has been recast here as though it were for either the Chamber or Senate in Italy.

Total figures for the European parliamentary election show a bit smaller voter turnout than for the Italian Parliament, but the margin between the two leading parties, DC and PCI, varies only slightly. The DC vote was about 2 percent smaller and the PCI 1 percent less than their respective showings one week earlier, with a relatively larger increase for the PSI; the small parties alone showed any noteworthy variation. Changes of significance appear, however, if the vote is structured as though it were a repeat of the Chamber election (see table A-3). While the DC fell in 22 of 32 districts in 1979 compared with 1976, in the second election of June 1979 it fell in 28 districts relative to the vote achieved only a week earlier. However, the decline in eight districts was less than 1 percent. Only districts 26 and 29 (Basilicata and western Sicily), normally areas of DC strength, deviated from the general pattern of modest loss. The former, already a party bastion, increased its share to the DC by slightly more than 4 percent, and the latter, also a party stronghold, dropped by a bit less than 4 percent.

By restructuring the figures as though they were returns in a Senate election, the DC slump appears once again (see table A-4). Fourteen regions gave the party's candidates less than they had the preceding week. Only in Liguria did the loss exceed 4 percent, and five areas of the south increased their share for the DC. (In neither case can the Valle d' Aosta be compared since no DC list was presented in the national elections of 3 June.)

If any knowledge derives from these figures, it possibly appears in the relationship of DC returns to voter turnout. In the national parliamentary balloting of 3 June, 90.4 percent of the electorate turned out, 4.7 percent more than voted for the European body. On a

Table A-4

Percent

### Returns of Elections for the European Parliament, June 1979 if Presented as a Senate Election

Region	DC	PCI	PSI	Difference <sup>a</sup>
1. Piedmont	31.26	29.28	11.19	-3.75
2. Valle d'Aosta	17.67	25.00	4.18	...
3. Lombardy	37.24	27.27	13.14	-3.41
4. Trentino-Alto Adige	30.80	9.71	7.96	-2.62
5. Venetia	49.08	20.26	11.68	-2.26
6. Friuli-Venezia Giulia	36.66	22.33	10.75	-1.76
7. Liguria	29.23	33.87	12.64	-4.12
8. Emilia-Romagna	25.48	46.72	10.11	-2.40
9. Tuscany	28.06	44.43	11.08	-2.97
10. Umbria	27.68	43.63	11.57	-2.78
11. Marche	36.90	35.90	8.97	-2.53
12. Lazio	33.80	28.80	10.14	-2.99
13. Abruzzi	45.78	29.18	8.50	-0.57
14. Molise	52.58	19.38	8.13	-0.80
15. Campania	39.97	24.38	10.12	+0.76
16. Puglia	41.72	26.29	10.15	+0.23
17. Basilicata	47.70	25.94	10.18	+3.08
18. Calabria	40.39	26.63	13.60	+0.05
19. Sicily	41.10	22.20	10.99	+0.82
20. Sardinia	39.41	32.71	8.15	-0.22

Note: These figures do not include votes from Italians resident abroad. That total, however, was only 126,630 or 0.35 percent of the total number of ballots cast.

<sup>a</sup> Percent of change in DC vote as compared with that for Senate election one week earlier.

national basis, this may suggest that lower participation is more harmful to the DC than others. But, as in the case of all other Italian voting, what significance might derive from this would have to be found in careful comparison of statistics from each district.

The validity of treating the European Parliament vote in this way is open to question for several reasons. First, the recasting of votes as though they were a Senate contest is artificial in view of the age factor in a normal election for the upper house,<sup>12</sup> whereas this restriction did not apply in the European vote and cannot be calculated. Second, although it cannot be conclusive, this restructuring without the age differential allows some speculation on the voting preferences of the youngest citizens. Using the Senate data, it would appear that younger voters in the north are less disposed to vote for the DC and those in the south more sympathetic to the party. (To make the comparison, one must take the European vote as restructured for the Senate—where the 18- to 20-year-olds are included—and note that the DC decline is greater than in the true Senate election. This is most easily done with Senate districts such as Liguria, Umbria, Basilicata, and Sardinia which are identical to those of the Chamber, numbers 3, 18, 26, and 30.)

Finally, since these were the first elections for the European parliament there is no comparable reference point. In short, this device should be used with caution. On the other hand, the DC from its founding has identified itself firmly with European integration, and this election can be considered as a test of the Italian public's view of the party in that context. If the experiment has some validity, it once again suggests DC erosion and provides little reason for optimism about the party's future.

#### **DC Parliamentary Delegations and the Party's Hold on Power**

Basically, Christian Democracy's hold on government—its so-called occupation of power—derives from its representation in the two houses of Parliament. Close examination of the men and women who make up these delegations and of their records provides some interesting insights. First, the senior leadership, those who could be classified as DC superstars, are relatively few and are distributed between Chamber and Senate. The upper house, it should be emphasized, is constitutionally equal to the lower, despite the negligible importance sometimes attributed to it.

Nevertheless, in some instances it is a sort of haven for elder statesmen past their prime but far from eclipse. Second, turnover in the makeup of DC parliamentary delegations is significant although often overlooked because of the monotonous consistency of their size over many years. A third and less evident development is a slow erosion of DC influence in the various parliamentary commissions, less in number of seats and chairmanships than in the extent to which the DC controls the commissions' activities. None of these other factors alters, though, what is probably the most important of all features of the DC parliamentary delegations: the permanence of party figures in certain ministries and under-secretaryships. This is a key factor in the DC's control of government, but its nature is elusive.


In terms of DC leadership generally, but particularly in the Chamber, there appear to be two echelons distinguishable to an extent by age and/or length of service—a two-tiered phenomenon of a limited number of superstars and a larger group of lesser stars. At the apex are perhaps 10 to 15 deputies who have served in at least six legislatures. Seven DC deputies, however, have served in every legislature as well as in the Constituent Assembly (see table A-5). Four of these are 65 or older. Only one, Paolo Bonomi, has never been a Cabinet member, but his strength as head of Coldiretti for more than 35 years once gave him more influence than many Cabinet members, particularly in the 1950s when his power rivaled even that of De Gasperi. The other three, Andreotti, Colombo, and Scalfari, held a combined total of 42 Cabinet portfolios over the years, not counting Andreotti's five times as Prime Minister and the one such term of Colombo. All held assorted appointments also as under secretaries early in their careers. This degree of experience in wielding power distinguishes them from literally hundreds of other DC legislators who on occasion have held Cabinet offices. Comparable figures for the Senate's DC elder statesmen, such as Scelba, Rumor, and Fanfani, show an overwhelming power role for a relatively few figures. In any event, the composite of a few such elite careers again belies the argument that Italy is unstable.

<sup>12</sup> See footnote 5, page 52.

Table A-5

Seniority of Christian Democratic Deputies, VIII Legislature

	Names	Number of DC Members	Number of All Deputies Who Have Served in All Legislatures
Constituent Assembly and eight Legislatures	Andreotti, Bonomi, Caiati, Colombo, Gui, Scalfaro, Zaccagnini	7	14
Eight Legislatures	Micheli, Sedati	2	7
Seven Legislatures	L. M. Galli, Gaspari, Giglia	3	7
Six Legislatures	Cavaliere, Cossiga, Forlani, Fusaro, Gioia, Gullotti, Lattanzio, La Penna, Malfatti, Misasi, Pennacchini, F. Piccoli, Pucci, Radi, V. Russo, Scalia, Scarlato, Sinesio, Tantalo	19	25
Five Legislatures	Armato, Arnaud, Azzaro, Bassi, Bianchi, Bova, Bressani, Degan, Dell'Andro, De Mita, Evangelisti, Laforgia, Lettieri, M. E. Martini, Piccinelli, Ruffini, Salvi, G. Urso	18	34



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Beneath this august level of DC *capi storici* (historic leaders) is another group, both younger and more numerous, which constitutes an entrenched echelon on its own. Two of these who have recently been Prime Minister and seem headed into the top tier are Cossiga and Forlani. But more characteristic of the group are figures like Gullotti, Lattanzio, Malfatti, Evangelisti, and even Tina Anselmi and Maria Eletta Martini. In all instances they are people who have served in the Chamber continuously since at least 1963, individuals who not infrequently give the impression of greater concern for party interests and tenure of power than for national or constituent concerns. Significant as this group is to the party, its presence and longevity in office have caused many ambitious younger DC deputies to feel that access to the highest tiers is blocked for them.

In effect, then, this next part of the hierarchy, made up of perhaps 35 to 50 people, appears as the next-to-the-top layer of a pyramid. The base level consists of a much larger group of deputies that rotates into and out of the Chamber for one or two terms. While this revolving mass is often granted a portion of the spoils of office holding—an under secretary's post or appointment to one of the lesser ministries—the likelihood for advancement and thus of leadership renewal in the higher circles is rather limited. The avenues of entry into the top two layers are a combination of long service on lower levels of the DC or in its auxiliary support groups, plus a considerable degree of subservience or conformity to the views of the elite and loyal adherence to one's own faction. One example of success appears to be Angelo Lobianco, now in his

fourth term as deputy and the newly elected head of the major rural support force of the party, *Coldiretti*. On the other hand, Milanese deputy Massimo de Carolis, seems to epitomize the promising future star who suddenly burned out. As the top votegetter for the DC in northern Italy in 1976, de Carolis seemed to presage a new and younger generation rising in the party, but in 1979 his preference votes dropped dramatically. De Carolis consistently refuses to play by the rules and has not followed any faction, and his individual initiatives, which smack of great personal ambition, make him less attractive as a good ally for the old guard. The recent inclusion of his name on the membership lists of the P-2 Masonic Lodge has probably completed his exclusion from future power in the party.

In general, regarding deputies who might rise in the party, the younger group is essentially rightist in orientation but not well in step with the old hierarchy. At present renewal possibilities for the leadership are not immediately evident. The view toward the left wing of the party is more grim with no leadership figure of any seeming promise. After at least seven years of party commitments to renewal, therefore, the outlook is bleak.

Younger leaders and women in particular are factors that could appeal to the contemporary Italian electorate and the DC should consider them for party renewal as well as continued delegation strength. And in both areas the DC's position is not entirely negative. As regards young and new blood, particularly with the lowered voting age, widely heard criticism about the aging of the DC does not hold up as far as delegation age is considered (see figure A-4). Conventional wisdom in Italy in the last few years has asserted that the DC has an older group in Parliament than, say, the PCI. The attached chart shows that in Legislature VIII this is not the case. Although the PCI has a slight edge in the group under 35, there is almost no difference between the two delegations for those aged 35 to 54. And as far as the preferences of younger voters are concerned, the positions a deputy takes on issues are doubtless more important than his age.

Table A-6

## Women in Parliament

	1948	1953	1958	1963	1968	1972	1976	1979
Elected to the Senate								
DC	0	0	0	1	2	2	2	3
PCI	2	0	1	2	7	2	8	8
PSI	2	1	2	2	0	0	0	0
PLI	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0
SI <sup>a</sup>	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1
Elected to the Chamber of Deputies								
DC	18	12	11	11	8	8	9	9
PCI	21	16	11	15	9	17	39	37
PSI	3	3	3	1	0	1	1	1

<sup>a</sup> *Sinistra Indipendente*.


In the matter of women, certainly quite important for the DC when the female population makes up so much of its electorate, the record is rather different. Although the DC has supported some women as candidates for the Chamber and Senate, the party's roster of elected women is far smaller than that of the PCI (see table A-6). In fact, from an alltime high of 18 DC women elected to the Chamber in 1948, the number has fallen to 9 in the present legislature and its predecessor. Meanwhile the PCI as of mid-1981 is only two short of its alltime high of 39. The extent to which women's candidacies influence the electorate is perhaps exaggerated by some Italian observers, although Italian women have recently become far more independent and articulate, particularly for a Latin and Mediterranean nation.

Another element of significance for a deputy, particularly in Italy's form of proportional representation, is the preference vote he achieves (see tables A-7 and A-8). To an extent this vote indicates the party's degree of support for individual candidates, but also it can be a measure of the public's feelings for them. The importance of these performances is, however,

**Figure A-4**

**Relative Ages of Parliamentary Delegations: DC, PCI, and PSI, 1948-79**

Number of Persons in a Delegation by Age Group, Percent of Total Delegation, and Party



Notes: 1. A candidate must be 25 years of age or older on the date of elections to be eligible to become a member of the Chamber of Deputies.  
 2. In the 1968 elections, PSI and PSDI presented a common ticket under the label PSU (United Socialist Party).

3. Figures in this chart are based on a study published by the Italian parliament's Office of Statistical and Documentary Services. Each deputy's age is determined by how old he/she was on the day when the first meeting of the new legislature to which he/she was elected occurred.

Because of certification practices used in Italian electoral procedures, the total number of deputies in a party's delegation can change in the first weeks of a session. Hence the size of each party group may vary slightly from figures given elsewhere in this report.

Table A-7

**Preference Votes for Leading Christian Democratic Deputies<sup>a</sup>**

	1968	1972	1976	1979
Giulio Andreotti	252,369	367,235	191,573	302,745
Vincenzo Scotti	61,339	80,164	68,923	210,911
Luigi Ciriaco de Mita	65,231	127,876	112,792	169,431
Vito Lattanzio	120,857	134,911	101,627	151,361
Attilio Ruffini	46,385	93,032	109,555	144,614
Francesco Cossiga	102,814	94,855	178,124	136,383
Antonio Gava	...	96,676	100,877	134,053
Antonino Gullotti	91,308	126,231	127,713	128,580
Remo Gaspari	141,927	136,022	91,168	120,452
Gerardo Bianco	57,117	83,188	90,425	117,112
Vincenzo Russo	69,072	104,410	78,764	110,294
Antonino Drago	113,070	78,656	91,087	110,151
Giuseppe Caroli	48,216	76,232	79,743	108,629
Paolo Cirino Pomicino	...	...	79,546	105,856
Giuseppe Gargani	...	54,867	76,511	105,735
Arcangelo Lobianco	74,342	97,561	113,380	105,351
Giuseppe Sinesio	73,135	121,961	107,674	104,706
Arnaldo Forlani	77,333	156,949	177,905	102,969
Giovanni Amabile	...	...	58,929	101,092
Calogero Mannino	...	...	83,006	100,060

Ellipsis indicates that the individual was not a candidate.

<sup>a</sup> These 20 deputies are ranked according to their showing in the general elections of 1979 and are all the DC candidates receiving more than 100,000 preference votes.

questionable because no pattern seems to fit a significant number of individual careers. On the other hand, a steadily declining preference vote must be regarded as ominous, a portent of possible impending defeat. One of the charts shown here gives the record of the 20 highest DC preference votegetters in 1979 and their levels in three preceding elections. Table A-9 demonstrates the same figures for that group of DC deputies that appears generally to constitute the party's "establishment" today, the stars and super-stars. From the latter, such figures as Gerardo Bianco, Luigi Ciriaco de Mita, Filippo Maria Pandolfi, Vincenzo Scotti, and others would appear to be

Table A-8

**DC Chamber of Deputies Delegation by Preference Vote, 1979<sup>a</sup>**

More than 100,000	20
90,000-99,999	10 (first election to Chamber: 2)
80,000-89,999	16 (first election to Chamber: 4)
70,000-79,999	17 (first election to Chamber: 5)
60,000-69,999	31 (first election to Chamber: 7)
50,000-59,999	28 (first election to Chamber: 3)
40,000-49,999	38 (first election to Chamber: 9)
30,000-39,999	59 (first election to Chamber: 17)
20,000-29,999	36 (first election to Chamber: 11)
Fewer than 20,000	3

<sup>a</sup> Of the newly elected deputies in 1979, 10 were last on their party list, nine were next to last; only one (Casini in District 14, Florence-Pistoia) led his ticket.

rising in importance. Others such as Gian Aldo Arnaud, Emilio Colombo, Andrea Borruso, and Franco Salvi, seem to be declining, a conclusion which may not be valid. In essence, while these votes can be exploited for influence, a deputy's power—once he is established—is not necessarily critically measured by them. A number of improved preference vote standings would seem to validate a certain resuscitation of the DC in 1979 compared to 1976. Again, though, no evidence exists to demonstrate that this is of any great significance.

Finally, a point must be made concerning the DC delegation's changes of personnel in 1976 and 1979. If the party managed to hold almost exactly the same number of seats in both elections, the earlier case was curious in that, poor though the overall party record may have been, 74 new deputies were elected. In short, if the electorate in 1976 was, on the one hand, not demonstrating disapproval by the number of DC deputies it elected, it was at least willing to return a number of new faces, in a sense to permit a kind of renewal. The return of 60 new people in 1979 apparently confirms a continuation of this feeling. Behind the general picture, however, seems to lie a deeper malaise: that deputies may be renewed but the party

Table A-9

## Preference Votes for Selected DC Deputies, 1968-79

	1968	1972	1976	1979		1968	1972	1976	1979
Giulio Andreotti	252,369	367,235	191,593	302,745	Antonio Gava	...	96,676	100,877	134,053
Tina Anselmi	40,467	38,389	74,403	77,944	Giovanni Gioia <sup>b</sup>	77,869	123,381	111,037	90,939
Gian Aldo Arnaud	60,608	77,916	54,211	29,538	Luigi Gui	58,768	61,327	<sup>c</sup>	46,999
Gerardo Bianchi	57,117	83,188	90,425	117,112	Antonino Gullotti	91,308	126,231	127,713	128,580
Guido Bodrato	30,326	39,935	43,890	46,101	Vito Lattanzio	120,857	134,911	101,627	151,361
Paolino Bonomi	145,875	154,966	119,653	89,160	Franco Maria Malfatti	59,638	70,746	49,110	46,458
Andrea Borruso	...	...	107,829	33,249	Vincenzo Mancini	56,536	74,204	67,553	91,990
Manfredi Bosco	98,312	117,977	86,379	95,777	Filippo Maria Pandolfi	41,439	49,476	67,448	85,864
Bartolomeo Ciccardini	48,476	64,599	96,749	55,774	Flaminio Piccoli	54,256	84,378	37,402	41,800
Emilio Colombo	103,322	118,118	90,420	90,818	Virginio Rognoni	24,918	40,380	30,903	89,313
Francesco Cossiga	102,814	94,855	178,124	136,383	Liugi Rossi di Montelera	...	...	142,227	81,236
Clelio Darida	57,446	<sup>a</sup>	74,855	59,468	Attilio Ruffini	46,385	93,032	109,555	144,614
Massimo De Carolis	...	...	151,555	86,219	Vincenzo Russo	69,072	104,410	78,764	110,194
Costante Degan	34,122	42,325	56,533	52,450	Franco Salvi	44,453	40,626	52,983	39,401
Luigi Ciriaco De Mita	65,231	127,876	112,792	169,431	Oscar Luigi Scalfaro	92,979	114,187	87,459	56,815
Franco Evangelisti	52,216	89,731	63,805	93,206	Vito Scalia	115,336	<sup>d</sup>	96,608	70,142
Arnaldo Forlani	77,333	156,949	177,905	102,969	Vincenzo Scarlato	82,632	113,407	95,138	89,390
Franco Foschi	50,651	58,843	60,396	57,063	Vincenzo Scotti	61,339	80,164	68,923	210,911
Carlo Fracanzani	38,689	57,623	51,623	38,761	Giuseppe Sinesio	73,135	121,961	107,674	104,706
Giovanni Galloni	66,303	75,805	74,029	74,386	Benigno Zaccagnini	37,866	39,444	101,911	67,673
Remo Gaspari	141,927	136,022	91,168	120,452	Giuseppe Zamberletti	47,523	38,233	68,637	65,257

Ellipsis indicates that the individual was not a candidate.

<sup>a</sup> Darida resigned his Chamber seat in 1969 to become mayor of Rome, a post he held until 1976.

<sup>b</sup> Gioia died 27 November 1981.

<sup>c</sup> In 1976 Gui ran for and was elected to the Senate.

<sup>d</sup> Scalia resigned from the Chamber in 1969 to devote himself to activities in CISL. He did not run again for the Chamber until 1976.

consistently fails to create the comparable revitalization of ideals and actions necessary for it to hold its own. This is the *rinascimento* which has now eluded the DC for seven years.

As concerns the Senate—where the size of the DC delegation increased in 1979 for the first time since 1968, despite a smaller share of the raw vote—the delegation is distinguished by the presence of such ex-greats as Mario Scelba and Mariano Rumor, not to mention the party's one senator-for-life, Amintore

Fanfani, who has been president of the Senate since 1968. Certainly this delegation, if perhaps more distinguished because of the accomplishments of its members, is slightly less influential than that in the Chamber. Carlo Donat Cattin, who moved up to the Senate from the Chamber in 1979, is one of today's principal faction leaders. Other DC leaders who are also Senators are Giovanni Marcora, Vittorino Colombo, and Luigi Granelli. But one former DC premier and president of the Republic, Giovanni Leone,

Table A-10

Leading Christian Democratic Senators by Numerical Vote <sup>a</sup>

	1968	1972	1976	1979
Marino Carboni (Lazio: Rome 6) <sup>b</sup> (percent of turnout)	...	...	65,294 50.10	146,713 33.25
Giovanni Marcora (Lombardy: Vimercate) (percent of turnout)	97,299 46.39	100,723 44.13	103,528 41.91	105,341 40.55
Vittorino Colombo (Lombardy: Monza) <sup>c</sup> (percent of turnout)	(70,676)	(81,923)	100,876 40.00	99,680 38.38
Enzo Berlanca (Lombardy: Clusone) (percent of turnout)	...	...	...	96,773 59.34
Luigi Carraro (Venetia: Cittadella) <sup>d</sup> (percent of turnout)	84,877 64.12	91,119 64.74	96,368 63.76	96,715 61.55
Gian Pietro Rossi (Lombardy: Busto Arsizio) (percent of turnout)	...	...	99,497 42.61	96,580 40.38
Vittorino Colombo (Venetia: Verona I) (percent of turnout)	...	...	95,127 47.03	95,619 46.33
Fermo Mino Martinazzoli (Lombardy: Brescia) (percent of turnout)	...	84,749 43.43	90,708 44.44	90,137 43.27
Vincenzo Bombardieri (Lombardy: Treviglio) (percent of turnout)	...	...	88,801 55.38	89,487 53.25
Mariano Rumor (Venetia: Vicenza) (percent of turnout)	(168,828)	(266,710)	(73,279)	88,028 53.73
Carlo Donat Cattin (Piedmont: Pinerolo) <sup>e</sup> (percent of turnout)	(43,660)	(72,024)	(50,357)	86,311 35.51
Angelo Castelli (Lombardy: Bergamo) (percent of turnout)	(33,246)	(38,838)	90,812 57.58	85,947 53.62
Aristide Marchetti (Lombardy: Varese) (percent of turnout)	(45,685)	(30,948)	88,457 39.42	85,085 37.09
Delio Giacometti (Venetia: Schio) (percent of turnout)	...	...	84,941 60.24	84,919 58.80
Pietro Schiano (Venetia: Padua) (percent of turnout)	...	...	88,574 48.68	84,643 45.77
Luigi Granelli (Lombardy: Cantu) (percent of turnout)	(47,047)	(50,929)	(35,965)	83,930 45.18
Guido Gonella (Venetia: Verona Collina) (percent of turnout)	(55,992)	77,958 59.97	82,949 59.99	83,130 58.36
Alessandro Codazzi (Venetia: Treviso) (percent of turnout)	...	...	82,619 55.61	81,657 53.47
Mario Costa (Lazio: Latina) (percent of turnout)	...	70,192 38.40	77,444 38.13	81,554 38.38

Ellipsis indicates individual was not a candidate.

NOTE: Senators nominally represent a region, but they are elected in districts within the region. Each party may present a minimum of three candidates in a region but no more than the equivalent number of regional districts. Each voter may vote for only one candidate. The tally is made by counting votes for each candidate and, in turn, calculating that figure as a percentage of the total valid votes cast, thus determining personal preference. According to seats assigned to the district, the victors are determined on their percentage of the total. For example, in Rome 6 in 1979, 441,194 valid votes were cast, 146,713 (33.25 percent) of which were for Marino Carboni, the highest single total in the district.

<sup>a</sup> This table shows the 19 DC senators who received more than 80,000 votes in 1979. Numbers in parentheses are for an individual's vote when elected to the Chamber of Deputies in preceding legislatures.

<sup>b</sup> Senator Carboni died 29 December 1979. In 1976 he was elected to the Senate from Puglia.

<sup>c</sup> In 1976 Colombo opted for a seat in the Senate although he was simultaneously elected to the Chamber from District 4 (Milan-Pavia) with 59,122 votes.

<sup>d</sup> Carraro died 8 November 1980.

<sup>e</sup> In 1979 Donat Cattin was elected to the Chamber from District 1 (Turin-Novara-Vercelli) with 41,619 votes but opted for the Senate.

**Table A-11**

Percent  
(except where indicated)

**Leading Christian Democratic Senators  
by Personal Preference Vote <sup>a</sup>**

	1968	1972	1976	1979
Antonio Bisaglia (Venetia: Bassano del Grappa)	(74,577)	(138,241)	(103,819)	62.27
Luigi Carraro (Venetia: Cittadella) <sup>b</sup>	64.12	64.74	63.76	61.55
Enzo Berlanca (Lombardy: Clusone)	...	...	...	59.34
Tarcisio Salvaterra (Trentino-Alto Adige: Mezzolombardo)	...	...	60.58	58.07
Delio Giacometti (Venetia: Schio)	...	...	60.24	58.80
Guido Gonella (Venetia: Verona Collina)	(55,992)	59.97	59.99	58.36
Mario Pedini (Lombardy: Chiari)	(55,467)	(76,339)	55.40	54.43
Mariano Rumor (Venetia: Vicenza)	(168,828)	(266,710)	(73,729)	53.73
Angelo Castelli (Lombardy: Bergamo)	(33,246)	(38,838)	57.58	53.62
Alessandra Codazzi (Venetia: Treviso)	...	...	55.61	53.47
Vincenzo Bombardieri (Lombardy: Treviglio)	...	...	55.38	53.25
Angelo Pavan (Venetia: Vittorio Veneto-Montebelluna)	...	...	...	53.05
Domenico Raffaello Lombardi (Molise: Campobasso-Isernia)	...	...	51.79	52.46
Luciano Dal Falco (Venetia: Verona Pianura)	45.10	47.59	52.31	52.07
Onorio Cengarle (Venetia: Este)	66.68 <sup>c</sup>	70.42 <sup>c</sup>	65.77 <sup>c</sup>	51.62
Giacomo Mazzoli (Lombardy: Breno)	55.09	66.68 <sup>c</sup>	53.21	51.61
Errico D'Amico (Abruzzi: Lanciano Vasto)	...	...	49.49	51.20
Adolfo Sarti (Piedmont: Alba)	(63,422)	51.90	54.18	50.62
Osvaldo Di Lembo (Molise: Larino)	...	...	...	50.14
Adriano Bompiani (Abruzzi: Chieti)	...	...	46.53	50.11

Ellipsis indicates individual was not a candidate.

NOTE: See explanatory note on table of Leading Christian Democratic Senators by Numerical Vote for key to determining a candidate's preferential vote. In this table, for example, the district of Bassano del Grappa had 124,343 valid votes cast in 1979, of which 77,435 (62.27 percent) went to Antonio Bisaglia.

<sup>a</sup> This table shows the 20 DC senators, in order of preference, who achieved more than 50 percent of the vote cast in their districts. Numbers in parentheses are for an individual's vote when elected to the Chamber of Deputies in preceding elections.

<sup>b</sup> Senator Carraro died 8 November 1980.

<sup>c</sup> When a candidate achieves 65 percent or more of the vote in his district, he is proclaimed as elected by *quorum*. No other candidates can be elected in any district where this occurs.



now styles himself as an "independent." In fact, having been driven from the Quirinale by scandals prior to the end of his term, Leone is hardly a figure from whom the DC wants support, nor is he likely to give it after being sacrificed—he feels—by men who were no cleaner than he. In any event, from the party's viewpoint Leone is now a nonperson.

As in the case of the Chamber, the Senate's elections help measure the strength of DC candidates (see tables A-10 to A-12). Senate elections are more complex. But given the different modes of Chamber and Senate districting and election, large personal preference votes tend to produce winners in those areas where the population is largest. For the Senate

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Table A-12

## DC Senate Delegation by Preference Vote, 1979

More than 100,000	2
90,000 to 99,999	6
80,000 to 89,999	11 (first election to Senate: 3)
70,000 to 79,999	8 (first election to Senate: 2)
60,000 to 69,999	13 (first election to Senate: 2)
50,000 to 59,999	30 (first election to Senate: 9) <sup>a</sup>
40,000 to 49,999	39 (first election to Senate: 9)
30,000 to 39,999	23 (first election to Senate: 7)
20,000 to 29,999	7 (first election to Senate: 4)
Less than 20,000	1

## Personal Preference Vote

More than 60 percent	2 (first election to Senate: 1)
50.0 to 59.9 percent	19 (first election to Senate: 4) <sup>a</sup>
40.0 to 49.9 percent	55 (first election to Senate: 9) <sup>a</sup>
30.0 to 39.9 percent	61 (first election to Senate: 21)
Less than 30.0 percent	3 (first election to Senate: 1)

<sup>a</sup> Includes senators replacing deceased members.

delegation, however, comparative records cannot be compiled for even as many as four legislatures because only about half of the top votegetters have been in the Senate that long. As in the case of the Chamber, though, these statistics do not necessarily reflect any apparent position of power or influence on the part of the individual DC Senators. Between the two lists, on the other hand, there is with the Senate a slightly greater likelihood that figures of known political clout, such as Antonio Bisaglia or Giovanni Marcora, will be found. Mixed in with them are other DC Senators whose stature is not outstanding.

These statistics, for the Chamber or the Senate, have at best only a relative value. They indicate the rise or fall of various DC office seekers in the eyes of the electorate, and politicians like to attach importance to good showings; but their value for establishing a candidate's power in the party is limited.

Ultimately, the question has to be raised of where or what is the true base of the DC's hold on government. The answer appears to be almost deceptively simple and potentially easy to overlook: the DC's longstanding ability to maintain key ministries (see figure A-5). This has been achieved—unbroken in a few instances since 1945—by the endless grip of the DC on the office of minister or under secretary. The fruits in the lush patronage vineyards of *sottogoverno* thus assure a lasting bounty of influence.

The full significance of continued DC control in certain ministries is not always obvious. Cases in point are the Ministries of Public Instruction, Post and Telecommunications, and State Participations. In the first instance, with extensive control over schools from elementary to university level, the Minister has a potential monopoly or predominant influence over curriculum content as well as the teacher corps and, in one way or another, is able to inject political criteria into the educational establishment. Erosion of DC power in this area is a bit less evident than in some others, but as regional governments have come into operation and assumed some functions in the school system, the party has experienced a decline in influence because its role in several of the regions has been, at best, peripheral. And in the case of long and noisy demands for school reforms, such as occurred between 1968 and 1970, the DC's ability to remain immobile has worked to obstruct publicly desired changes the party thought detrimental to its views.

Post and Telecommunications not only controls the mails and telephone and telegraph systems but, more importantly, manages information such as the state radio and television networks, RAI (*Radiotelevisione Italiana*). Until a very few years ago, radio and TV were a government monopoly, and ever since removal of that control, specific networks or channels are known as party mouthpieces, either DC or leftist (PCI and PSI). RAI-TV's first channel and radio's second program are still known as DC preserves. The breaking of that state monopoly—tantamount to breaking what was regarded as a DC hammerlock—knocked another stone out of the wall of the party's power structure.

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With its overseer's role for the vast network of state-managed industries and holding companies, State Participations clearly is a cornucopia of spoils as well as a potential and frequently exploited source of financial contributions to the DC itself. The virtually constant DC tenure of these three Ministries is shown on figure A-5 for the full span of the party's governments.

If these three portfolios have a vital and not too subtle meaning in domestic affairs, other major ministries such as Interior, Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Agriculture also have been almost permanent preserves of the party. The triad of economic ministries, Treasury, Finance, and Budget, has also been managed in such fashion as to assure permanent DC "occupation of power."

Particular note ought to be paid to the tenure of DC figures in first-echelon ministries. Examples of prominent DC figures who have starred in various ministries include Taviani and Andreotti (Defense), Emilio Colombo (12 times at the Treasury), Marcora (Agriculture), Bo and Bisaglia (State Participations), Gui and Malfatti (Public Instruction), and Rognoni (Interior). Also not to be overlooked are the longtime DC under secretaries, some of whom have held office as many as eight consecutive terms. Indeed, the trade of a ministerial post to a coalition ally has rarely cost the DC its control of that portfolio when the under secretary(ies) stayed through one government after another.

These phenomena, while describing a certain stagnation in government, are supplemented by yet another element suggesting stability in Italy comparable to that in the United States. Since de Gasperi's first government in 1945, when Truman had been President less than a year, Italy had only 10 prime ministers until the summer of 1981 when the first postwar non-DC premier took office. In the same period, eight men were President of the United States. American chief executives, however, came from two parties; all the Italian heads of government were from only one, the DC. Furthermore, two of them (Segni and Leone) became head of state as well. If the

systems of government are sufficiently different to raise questions on the validity of this comparison, the fact remains that some of the premiers of Italy have had a greater composite time in office than some US presidents since the war.

In conclusion, the impression is almost overwhelming that DC control of the Italian Government has been extensive, intensive, and pervasive for more than a third of a century. Not only did the practice develop—broken only a few months ago—that the DC should always hold either the premiership or the presidency, but the party also has consistently maintained a large bloc of members in both houses of Parliament. On the other hand, the influence and relative importance of particular DC figures has been diverse, and a notably small number has occupied a majority of the most powerful and influential posts of government for years on end. Even if this may be viewed as the prerogative of the majority party in a democracy, the practice has appeared frequently to large segments of public opinion as the flouting of representative principles. Without doubt the DC's exercise of power as expressed in tenure of the ministries seems quite out of line with the proportion of votes it received. Its occupation of power lamented by other parties, occasionally in strident tones, has been the target of DC figures themselves who felt they were being excluded. Hence, DC rule of Italy has by any definition been that of an oligarchy—even within the party itself.

If oligarchy has been a typically Italianate form of government for centuries, there remains the assumption common to many Italians that their republican regime was supposed to be something different. Even if there were not seemingly endemic scandal associated with DC rule, it should be no surprise if large parts of the Italian public are today cynical about their national government. The earlier credit an idealist might say was due the DC for its achievement of a new policy in Italy after World War II has, by 1981, been largely offset by cynicism. Such feelings, which derive unavoidably from DC conduct, benefit neither nation nor party.

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Table A-13

**Chamber of Deputies: Percentage of Valid Ballots Cast  
in Eight National Parliamentary Elections**

	1948	1953	1958	1963	1968	1972	1976	1979	Eight-Year Average
1. Turin-Novara-Vercelli	98.19	95.21	96.34	95.98	95.33	95.64	96.78	94.87	96.04
2. Cuneo-Alessandria-Asti	97.60	93.91	96.01	95.59	95.38	95.53	95.97	93.96	95.49
3. Genoa-Imperia-La Spezia-Savona	98.20	96.07	96.92	96.78	96.12	96.95	97.55	95.76	96.79
4. Milan-Pavia	98.50	96.88	97.41	97.17	96.84	97.11	97.73	96.97	97.33
5. Como-Sondrio-Varese	97.75	94.95	97.12	96.96	96.47	96.25	96.95	95.49	96.49
6. Brescia-Bergamo	97.90	95.19	97.27	96.88	96.69	96.99	97.40	96.17	96.81
7. Mantua-Cremona	97.83	95.52	97.45	97.15	96.71	97.00	97.50	96.24	96.93
8. Trento-Bolzano	98.32	96.82	98.02	97.10	97.25	96.52	97.32	96.26	97.20
9. Verona-Padua-Vicenza-Rovigo	98.13	96.12	97.32	97.14	97.07	97.09	97.44	96.33	97.09
10. Venice-Treviso	97.85	94.89	96.85	96.94	96.78	96.97	97.52	96.57	96.80
11. Udine-Belluno-Gorizia-Pordenone	97.52	94.09	97.01	96.94	96.64	96.92	97.24	96.22	96.57
12. Bologna-Ferrara-Ravenna-Forli	98.28	96.66	97.28	97.32	96.97	97.69	98.11	97.53	97.48
13. Parma-Modena-Piacenza-Reggio Emilia	97.96	95.14	96.79	96.73	96.67	97.08	97.58	98.68	96.83
14. Florence-Pistoia	97.78	96.51	97.06	96.97	96.72	97.05	97.91	96.49	97.06
15. Pisa-Livorno-Lucca-Massa Carrara	97.64	94.78	96.85	96.72	96.01	96.82	97.47	95.91	96.53
16. Siena-Arezzo-Grosseto	97.76	95.04	96.94	97.21	96.83	98.46	97.94	97.06	97.16
17. Ancona-Pesaro-Macerata-Ascoli Piceno	97.94	95.19	97.14	96.93	96.32	96.69	97.23	95.73	96.65
18. Perugia-Terni-Rieti	97.04	94.37	96.80	96.58	96.27	97.13	97.64	96.66	96.56
19. Rome-Latina-Viterbo-Frosinone	98.58	96.44	97.78	97.70	97.06	97.59	97.92	97.46	97.57
20. L'Aquila-Pescara-Chieti - Teramo	97.82	95.57	96.99	96.82	96.65	97.16	97.31	95.79	96.76
21. Campobasso-Isernia	97.18	93.92	96.17	94.94	95.01	96.16	96.31	95.18	95.61
22. Naples-Caserta	97.69	95.15	97.27	97.16	96.87	97.00	97.36	96.40	96.86
23. Benevento-Avellino-Salerno	97.27	94.05	96.85	95.98	96.31	96.63	96.80	94.42	96.04
24. Bari-Foggia	97.97	95.34	97.81	97.45	97.05	97.03	96.99	96.33	97.00
25. Lecce-Brindisi-Taranto	97.30	93.26	97.37	97.02	96.73	96.76	97.01	96.09	96.44
26. Potenza-Matera	96.14	94.24	96.60	95.31	95.55	96.42	96.27	94.79	95.67
27. Catanzaro-Cosenza-Reggio Calabria	96.99	93.06	96.68	95.98	95.54	96.22	96.31	95.30	95.76
28. Catania-Messina-Siracusa-Ragusa-Enna	97.37	95.12	97.26	96.34	95.22	95.88	96.21	92.49	95.74
29. Palermo-Trapani-Agrigento-Caltanissetta	97.14	94.66	97.10	96.25	93.67	95.82	95.92	94.70	95.66
30. Cagliari-Sassari-Nuoro-Oristano	97.64	96.31	97.63	97.77	96.58	96.90	97.75	95.89	97.06
31. Valle d'Aosta	93.40	93.97	96.05	94.96	94.78	91.70	94.61	91.14	93.83
32. Trieste	a	a	98.29	97.90	95.96	97.21	97.96	97.06	97.40
<b>Italy</b>	<b>97.82</b>	<b>95.36</b>	<b>97.13</b>	<b>96.83</b>	<b>96.36</b>	<b>96.79</b>	<b>97.26</b>	<b>96.01</b>	<b>96.70</b>

<sup>a</sup> Trieste became a part of Italy in October 1954.

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**The DC and the Italian Electorate**

In most representative political systems it is standard practice to measure public protest sentiments by the ratio of eligible voters who turn out for elections and the number who deliberately cast invalid ballots. In Italy the attention devoted to these phenomena is considerable, more than factual evidence seems to justify. Still, no election occurs in Italy without floods of journalistic post mortems which consistently find that abstentions or spoiled ballots appear in such quantity as to indicate public discontent with government and, inferentially, varying degrees of annoyance with the DC. Italian electoral behavior is sufficiently atypical as to complicate analysis of this pattern, but the repeated attention given to it requires that it be examined.

Among industrialized Western democracies Italy has set an unparalleled record of high voter participation. More than 90 percent of eligible voters have participated in each of the eight national elections since 1948, and the overall average turnout for all elections to both Chamber and Senate is 92.81 percent (see tables 22 and 23). The ratio of valid ballots has never fallen below 95.36 percent for the Chamber and 94.67 percent for the Senate (see tables A-13 to A-16). In the times that elections have been held for the 15 regular statute regions the record is almost as high. Provincial and communal elections demonstrate a similar pattern. The only feature distinguishing the various levels of voting is a small but steady rise in abstention and spoiled ballots as one moves to lower levels of representation. In all instances, the ratio of voter turnout and invalidated ballots is so small as to make distinctions seem negligible. Nevertheless, Italian commentators regard the fluctuations as significant.

When compared with other nations' voting habits, the Italian record is admittedly remarkable. In those instances where eligible voter turnout has fallen below 85 percent, the press has taken it as reprehensible, even scandalous, and made it the subject of extensive editorial comment. To foreign observers, though, the examples of voter protest are so small numerically as to seem inconsequential despite the interest they

Table A-14

Percent

**Ranking of Chamber Districts,  
by Percentage of Valid Ballots  
in Eight Parliamentary Elections**

97.57	19	Rome-Latina-Viterbo-Frosinone
97.48	12	Bologna-Ferrara-Ravenna-Forli
97.40	32	Trieste (six elections, 1958-79)
97.33	4	Milan-Pavia
97.20	8	Trento-Bolzano
97.16	16	Siena-Arezzo-Grosseto
97.09	9	Verona-Padua-Vicenza-Rovigo
97.06	14	Florence-Pistoia
	30	Cagliari-Sassari-Nuoro-Oristano
97.00	24	Bari-Foggia
96.93	7	Mantua-Cremona
96.86	22	Naples-Caserta
96.84	5	Como-Sondrio-Varese
96.83	13	Parma-Modena-Piacenza-Reggio Emilia
96.81	6	Brescia-Bergamo
96.80	10	Venice-Treviso
96.79	3	Genoa-Imperia-La Spezia-Savona
96.76	20	L'Aquila-Pescara-Chieti-Teramo
96.70		Average
96.65	17	Ancona-Pesaro-Macerata-Ascoli Piceno
96.57	11	Udine-Belluno-Gorizia-Pordenone
96.56	18	Perugia-Terni-Rieti
96.53	15	Pisa-Livorno-Lucca-Massa Carrara
96.44	25	Lecce-Brindisi-Taranto
96.04	1	Turin-Novara-Vercelli
	23	Benevento-Avellino-Salerno
95.76	27	Catanzaro-Cosenza-Reggio Calabria
95.74	28	Catania-Messina-Siracusa-Ragusa-Enna
95.70		Median
95.67	26	Potenza-Matera
95.66	29	Palermo-Trapani-Agrigento-Caltanissetta
95.61	22	Campobasso-Isernia
95.49	2	Cuneo-Alessandria-Asti
93.83	31	Valle d'Aosta

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**Confidential****Table A-15****Senate: Percentage of Valid Ballots Cast by Eligible Voters  
in Eight National Parliamentary Elections**

	1948	1953	1958	1963	1968	1972	1976	1979	Eight-Year Average
1. Piedmont	94.98	94.78	94.67	93.73	93.58	94.78	96.04	93.60	94.52
2. Valle d'Aosta	93.56	94.21	95.28	94.28	94.71	91.59	94.26	88.57	93.31
3. Lombardy	95.17	96.04	95.95	96.11	95.26	96.16	97.13	95.73	95.94
4. Trentino-Alto Adige	94.56	95.25	93.16	94.98	95.10	95.14	96.22	95.52	94.99
5. Venetia	94.98	95.29	95.87	95.60	95.24	96.17	97.03	95.58	95.72
6. Friuli-Venezia Giulia	95.07	95.16	96.00	95.99	95.51	96.74	96.99	96.12	95.95
7. Liguria	95.92	95.50	95.49	95.07	94.45	95.99	96.52	94.96	95.49
8. Emilia-Romagna	95.30	96.01	95.26	95.82	95.70	96.76	97.59	96.72	96.15
9. Tuscany	94.01	95.78	95.40	95.49	94.87	96.07	96.77	95.87	95.53
10. Umbria	93.15	94.84	94.47	93.68	94.68	96.27	97.31	96.07	95.06
11. Marche	94.17	94.83	95.55	95.27	94.33	95.56	96.59	94.86	95.15
12. Lazio	95.65	95.90	95.59	95.55	95.09	96.39	97.22	95.76	95.89
13. Abruzzi	95.02	93.44	94.78	94.33	94.10	95.32	96.39	94.68	94.76
14. Molise	94.16	93.40	93.75	93.40	94.43	94.98	94.72	92.79	93.95
15. Campania	93.94	94.39	95.04	94.80	94.69	95.24	96.15	94.34	94.82
16. Puglia	94.88	95.57	95.68	95.35	95.11	95.86	96.19	94.70	95.42
17. Basilicata	93.78	93.94	94.13	93.58	93.88	95.29	95.13	93.18	94.11
18. Calabria	94.39	93.63	94.25	93.50	93.42	94.42	95.01	93.12	93.97
19. Sicily	94.94	95.41	95.56	94.50	95.53	94.41	95.32	93.07	94.84
20. Sardinia	94.53	95.61	95.05	95.40	94.99	95.44	96.75	94.98	95.34
<b>Italy</b>	<b>95.03</b>	<b>95.39</b>	<b>95.48</b>	<b>95.28</b>	<b>94.67</b>	<b>95.74</b>	<b>96.59</b>	<b>95.03</b>	<b>95.40</b>

rouse. Recently, however, a few more significant elements have appeared. In any event, given the national penchant for observation of these protests, what do they say about the DC?

In regard to any party's electoral showing and to the national voting record, three factors must be cited. First, qualification for voting is automatic since each citizen is registered by his commune on his/her 18th birthday. When an election occurs, each voter has merely to pick up his/her registration certificate at a municipal office and go to the polls. Second, Italian legislation provides mild civil sanctions for failure to vote, and social pressure is heavy on everyone for electoral participation. Everyone is given time off from work to vote, and rail fares are greatly reduced

to get voters back to their home districts (until recently Italy had no absentee voting). Finally, continuing memories of fascist dictatorship stimulate citizen participation as a safeguard against any return to authoritarian government.

Evaluation of the overall record of voter participation and ballot box protest, given the record in the attached tables, is almost statistical hairsplitting. Observers in Italy argue extensively nevertheless over meanings of the figures. One common assertion is that low voter turnout benefits the DC and high participation assists parties of the left. Comparison of statistics does not, however, bear this out either for the Chamber or the Senate. In the cases of Veneto and Molise,

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**Table A-16** Percent**Ranking of Senate Districts  
by Average Valid Ballots, 1948-79**

1.	96.15	Emilia-Romagna
2.	95.95	Friuli-Venezia Giulia
3.	95.94	Lombardy
4.	95.89	Lazio
5.	95.72	Venetia
6.	95.53	Tuscany
7.	95.49	Liguria
8.	95.42	Puglia
	<b>95.40</b>	<b>Average</b>
9.	95.34	Sardinia
10.	95.15	Marche
11.	95.06	Umbria
12.	94.99	Trentino-Alto Adige
13.	94.84	Sicily
14.	94.82	Campania
15.	94.76	Abruzzi
	<b>94.73</b>	<b>Median</b>
16.	94.52	Piedmont
17.	94.11	Basilicata
18.	93.97	Calabria
19.	93.95	Molise
20.	93.31	Valle d'Aosta

both bastions of DC strength, the former ranks among the highest areas in voter participation and the latter is nearly always the lowest. To a small degree better correlation of the view can be found for high voting ratios favoring the left, but exceptions are not wanting here. In short, attempts to read partisan interpretations into the number of people going to the polls seems pointless. Voting for Parliament in 1979 appears to be the single possible exception. In that year every district for both Chamber and Senate had a smaller voter participation. Most observers interpreted this as public discontent with the national government. Some went so far as to say that the larger abstentions indicated dissatisfaction with the DC because of its being the majority party in government and thus most responsible for failed aspirations and programs. Until other evidence in later elections substantiates this view, its validity is questionable.

A bit more of a pattern seems to be indicated by the record of invalidated ballots. In this case Italian voters use two methods of registering protest: handing in a blank ballot, or deliberate spoiling of the ballot, often by writing derogatory comments on it. Ironically, the highest number of spoiled ballots appeared in the elections of 1953. In 24 of 31 Chamber districts an alltime high of invalidated ballots was cast. Presumably that indicated dissatisfaction with the so-called "swindle law" the DC had sponsored for the elections, a gimmick which would have ensured it of an absolute majority of Chamber seats if it had achieved a given vote plurality. Curiously, though, there is no discernible similar pattern in Senate elections of the same year. Thus, at a distance of three decades, the 1953 case is little more than a historical oddity.

The only other manifestation of electoral protest through the ballot was an alltime high of blank ballots reported in 24 of 32<sup>13</sup> Chamber districts in 1979. Although the number of such ballots was significantly higher in a few districts than for previous elections, the number rarely exceeded 3 percent of the total number cast. However, there does not appear even here sufficient evidence of voter discontent that could be regarded as directed specifically or exclusively at the DC.

Generally the indications are that manifestations of protest at the ballot box are no guide to DC popularity. If there is any validity in the claims about voter protest, the more significant aspect is apparently the fluctuation of valid votes given to the parties, not the spoiled or blank ballot. In this vein, voter desire for change seems to have turned to parties of the extremes such as the MSI in 1968 and the Radicals in 1979. If 1976 was indeed a disastrous year for the DC, the evidence is not in absenteeism from the polls or blank ballots cast. In 1979 the unusual number of blank ballots cast might be interpreted by some as dissatisfaction with the government and hence the

<sup>13</sup> In the national legislative elections of 1948 and 1953, Italy had 31 electoral districts for the Chamber of Deputies. The city and Province of Trieste became a part of the country in 1954 and were constituted as district 32 for the 1958 and subsequent elections.

DC. Still, if 1976, clearly a critical year for the DC, was not unusual in protests manifest at the polls, then 1979 is also quite suspect.

If there is utility in analyzing voter turnout and invalidated ballots, it is more appropriately to be considered as evidence of civic responsibility. The participation of voters differentiates Italy into two distinct sections: the responsible north and the lackadaisical south. There is, however, the argument that lower southern voter turnout is the result of bureaucratic inefficiency and not some sign of backwardness. In other words, communal administrations in areas of major migration have failed to remove citizens from the voting rolls when they moved away. The accuracy of such assertions is quite dubious, though, since voter absenteeism does not appear when the largest migrations occurred. Also in the south DC control of government offices and the presumed political preferences of the areas is such as to say that the party's interests would be served by full and accurate registration.

For regional elections little can be said about the distinction between blank and spoiled ballots, since figures reported do not categorize them. Also the elections have occurred for only 10 years and provide less perspective for analytical accuracy. Again, though, the broad patterns delineated in national elections seem to be similar on the regional level (see figures on the individual regional tables).

The one possible major indicator of voting protest of noteworthy size seems to have occurred in June 1981. Regional, provincial, and communal elections were held then in areas containing approximately 9 million voters, one-fourth of the electorate. Final figures are not available for these elections, but reports from reliable newspapers give information on genuinely large voter abstention in places like Sicily and Rome, drops of 10 to 20 percent. However, in some other areas equally large increases in voter turnout occurred, all of which suggests that guidelines of any uniformity are difficult or impossible to establish. In these elections, the press has begun using a new phrase in referring to large-scale absenteeism. In those

instances where the number of nonparticipating voters was high it was cited as "*il partito invisibile*." In instances such as Rome where the absentees added up to a figure that would have come in just behind the DC's returns, the invisible party was thus the third-largest numerical element in the election.

Finally, if outside opinion finds the issue of blank and spoiled ballots rather exaggerated, the interest it arouses in Italy cannot be ignored. With the seeming likelihood of widespread electoral change in Italy now, the data provided here may serve as useful background information in the future. To date, the utility of any of it as directly explaining DC positions is obscure at best.



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## Regular Statute Group

**Table A-17**

### Regional Council Election Results

#### Piedmont

	7 June 1970 <sup>a</sup>			15 June 1975 <sup>b</sup>			8 June 1980 <sup>c</sup>		
	Number of Votes	Percentage	Number of Seats	Number of Votes	Percentage	Number of Seats	Number of Votes	Percentage	Number of Seats
DC	1,030,606	36.70	20	976,817	32.06	20	956,867	32.45	20
PCI	728,455	25.94	13	1,032,842	33.90	22	933,179	31.64	20
PSI	296,687	10.57	5	394,241	12.94	8	418,228	14.18	9
PSU	231,273	8.24	4	NONE	NONE	NONE	NONE	0	NONE
PSDI	NONE	0	NONE	224,153	7.36	4	176,413	5.98	3
PRI	86,760	3.09	1	109,156	3.58	2	98,210	3.33	2
PLI	226,197	8.06	4	152,834	5.02	2	174,743	5.93	3
PSIUP	87,554	3.12	1	NONE	0	NONE	NONE	0	NONE
PdUP	NONE	0	NONE	NONE	0	NONE	29,652	1.01	1
DP	NONE	0	NONE	NONE	0	NONE	24,925	0.85	NONE
MSI-DN	92,796	3.30	2	130,753	4.29	2	117,839	4.00	2
Others	27,717	0.99	NONE	25,645	0.84	NONE	18,973	0.64	NONE
<b>Total</b>	<b>2,808,045</b>	<b>100.00</b>	<b>50</b>	<b>3,046,441</b>	<b>100.00</b>	<b>60</b>	<b>2,949,029</b>	<b>100.00</b>	<b>60</b>

#### Lombardy

	7 June 1970 <sup>d</sup>			15 June 1975 <sup>e</sup>			8 June 1980 <sup>f</sup>		
	Number of Votes	Percentage	Number of Seats	Number of Votes	Percentage	Number of Seats	Number of Votes	Percentage	Number of Seats
DC	2,137,409	40.90	36	2,186,378	37.50	32	2,241,568	38.87	34
PCI	1,208,968	23.14	19	1,770,540	30.37	25	1,623,256	28.14	23
PSI	648,679	12.41	9	819,964	14.07	11	834,231	14.46	11
PSU	376,463	7.20	5	NONE	0	NONE	NONE	0	NONE
PSDI	NONE	0	NONE	301,145	5.17	3	260,632	4.52	3
PRI	125,563	2.40	2	179,605	3.08	2	152,638	2.65	2
PLI	310,463	5.94	4	163,465	2.80	2	197,207	3.42	2
PSIUP	188,955	3.48	2	NONE	0	NONE	NONE	0	NONE
PdUP	NONE	0	NONE	143,400	2.46	2	86,554	1.50	1
DP	NONE	0	NONE	NONE	0	NONE	96,650	1.68	1
MSI-DN	195,583	3.74	3	263,849	4.53	3	251,897	4.37	3
Others	33,371	0.64	NONE	1,331	0.02	NONE	22,858	0.40	NONE
<b>Total</b>	<b>5,225,454</b>	<b>100.00</b>	<b>80</b>	<b>5,829,677</b>	<b>100.00</b>	<b>80</b>	<b>5,767,491</b>	<b>100.00</b>	<b>80</b>

<sup>a</sup> 93.56-percent turnout of eligible voters; 5.32 percent of ballots were invalid.

<sup>b</sup> 94.12-percent turnout of eligible voters; 5.53 percent of ballots were invalid.

<sup>c</sup> 91.52-percent turnout of eligible voters; 7.89 percent of ballots were invalid.

<sup>d</sup> 95.41-percent turnout of eligible voters; 4.11 percent of ballots were invalid.

<sup>e</sup> 95.05-percent turnout of eligible voters; 3.45 percent of ballots were invalid.

<sup>f</sup> 92.47-percent turnout of eligible voters; 6.17 percent of ballots were invalid.

Table A-18

## Regional Council Election Results

## Venetia

	7 June 1970 <sup>a</sup>			15 June 1975 <sup>b</sup>			8 June 1980 <sup>c</sup>		
	Number of Votes	Percentage	Number of Seats	Number of Votes	Percentage	Number of Seats	Number of Votes	Percentage	Number of Seats
DC	1,287,713	51.91	28	1,339,940	48.06	31	1,337,703	47.63	32
PCI	417,291	16.82	9	636,251	22.82	14	610,788	21.75	13
PSI	259,211	10.45	5	357,384	12.82	8	340,527	12.12	7
PSU	189,266	7.63	3	NONE	0	NONE	NONE	0	NONE
PSDI	NONE	0	NONE	175,377	6.29	3	150,696	5.37	3
PRI	46,684	1.88	1	69,231	2.48	1	73,173	2.61	1
PLI	104,730	4.22	2	63,498	2.28	1	73,933	2.63	1
PSIUP	85,954	3.47	1	NONE	0	NONE	NONE	0	NONE
PdUP	NONE	0	NONE	41,183	1.48	NONE	29,789	1.06	1
DP	NONE	0	NONE	NONE	0	NONE	26,829	0.96	NONE
MSI-DN	81,237	3.28	1	105,240	3.77	2	101,941	3.63	2
Others	8,410	0.34	NONE	NONE	0	NONE	13,249	0.47	NONE
<b>Total</b>	<b>2,480,496</b>	<b>100.00</b>	<b>50</b>	<b>2,788,104</b>	<b>100.00</b>	<b>60</b>	<b>2,808,628</b>	<b>100.00</b>	<b>60</b>

## Liguria

	7 June 1970 <sup>d</sup>			15 June 1975 <sup>e</sup>			8 June 1980 <sup>f</sup>		
	Number of Votes	Percentage	Number of Seats	Number of Votes	Percentage	Number of Seats	Number of Votes	Percentage	Number of Seats
DC	393,893	32.10	14	396,787	30.41	13	378,673	30.74	13
PCI	383,753	31.28	13	500,483	38.36	16	444,329	36.07	15
PSI	138,754	11.31	4	175,714	13.47	5	165,250	13.42	5
PSU	93,620	7.63	3	NONE	0	NONE	NONE	0	NONE
PSDI	NONE	0	NONE	71,409	5.47	2	55,595	4.51	2
PRI	37,737	3.08	1	45,094	3.46	1	38,731	3.14	1
PLI	90,125	7.35	3	51,598	3.95	1	55,768	4.53	2
PSIUP	35,198	2.87	1	NONE	0	NONE	NONE	0	NONE
PdUP	NONE	0	NONE	NONE	0	NONE	11,819	0.96	NONE
DP	NONE	0	NONE	NONE	0	NONE	13,930	1.13	NONE
MSI-DN	46,334	3.78	1	60,373	4.63	2	51,785	4.20	2
Others	7,533	0.61	NONE	3,273	0.25	NONE	15,896	1.29	NONE
<b>Total</b>	<b>1,226,947</b>	<b>100.00</b>	<b>40</b>	<b>1,304,731</b>	<b>100.00</b>	<b>40</b>	<b>1,231,776</b>	<b>100.00</b>	<b>40</b>

<sup>a</sup> 94.57-percent turnout of eligible voters; 4.09 percent of ballots were invalid.

<sup>b</sup> 95.10-percent turnout of eligible voters; 3.59 percent of ballots were invalid.

<sup>c</sup> 91.93-percent turnout of eligible voters; 6.18 percent of ballots were invalid

<sup>d</sup> 92.83-percent turnout of eligible voters; 4.26 percent of ballots were invalid

<sup>e</sup> 93.03-percent turnout of eligible voters; 3.56 percent of ballots were invalid.

<sup>f</sup> 88.92-percent turnout of eligible voters; 6.36 percent of ballots were invalid.

Table A-19

## Regional Council Election Results

## Emilia-Romagna

	7 June 1970 <sup>a</sup>			15 June 1975 <sup>b</sup>			8 June 1980 <sup>c</sup>		
	Number of Votes	Percentage	Number of Seats	Number of Votes	Percentage	Number of Seats	Number of Votes	Percentage	Number of Seats
DC	673,028	25.77	14	714,057	25.28	13	723,018	25.63	13
PCI	1,149,172	44.00	24	1,363,594	48.28	26	1,359,390	48.19	26
PSI	210,649	8.07	3	289,173	10.24	4	291,117	10.32	4
PSU	196,008	7.50	3	NONE	0	NONE	NONE	0	NONE
PSDI	NONE	0	NONE	146,250	5.18	2	133,113	4.72	2
PRI	103,495	3.96	2	109,950	3.89	2	122,862	4.36	2
PLI	97,437	3.73	1	52,242	1.85	1	59,630	2.11	1
PSIUP	99,594	3.81	2	NONE	0	NONE	NONE	0	NONE
PdUP	NONE	0	NONE	45,355	1.61	1	39,973	1.42	1
DP	NONE	0	NONE	NONE	0	NONE	NONE	0	NONE
MSI-DN	77,481	2.97	1	103,935	3.68	1	89,694	3.18	1
Others	4,977	0.19	NONE	NONE	0	NONE	2,355	0.08	NONE
<b>Total</b>	<b>2,611,841</b>	<b>100.00</b>	<b>50</b>	<b>2,824,556</b>	<b>100.00</b>	<b>50</b>	<b>2,821,152</b>	<b>100.00</b>	<b>50</b>

## Tuscany

	7 June 1970 <sup>d</sup>			15 June 1975 <sup>e</sup>			8 June 1980 <sup>f</sup>		
	Number of Votes	Percentage	Number of Seats	Number of Votes	Percentage	Number of Seats	Number of Votes	Percentage	Number of Seats
DC	711,140	30.57	17	716,539	28.48	15	713,323	28.72	15
PCI	984,227	42.31	23	1,169,616	46.49	25	1,152,696	46.41	25
PSI	203,441	8.74	3	269,406	10.71	4	292,426	11.77	5
PSU	148,640	6.39	3	NONE	0	NONE	NONE	0	NONE
PSDI	NONE	0	NONE	97,372	3.87	2	77,369	3.12	1
PRI	51,726	2.22	1	66,678	2.65	1	70,606	2.84	1
PLI	61,178	2.63	1	29,869	1.19	NONE	31,817	1.28	1
PSIUP				NONE	0	NONE	NONE	0	NONE
PdUP	NONE	0	NONE	51,587	2.05	1	26,672	1.08	1
DP	NONE	0	NONE	NONE	0	NONE	26,533	1.07	NONE
MSI-DN	88,798	3.82	1	106,543	4.23	2	92,016	3.70	1
Others	3,308	0.14	NONE	8,342	0.33	NONE	221	0.01	NONE
<b>Total</b>	<b>2,326,353</b>	<b>100.00</b>	<b>50</b>	<b>2,515,952</b>	<b>100.00</b>	<b>50</b>	<b>2,483,679</b>	<b>100.00</b>	<b>50</b>

<sup>a</sup> 96.54-percent turnout of eligible voters; 3.11 percent of ballots were invalid.

<sup>b</sup> 96.47-percent turnout of eligible voters; 2.72 percent of ballots were invalid.

<sup>c</sup> 94.48-percent turnout of eligible voters; 4.62 percent of ballots were invalid.

<sup>d</sup> 95.87-percent turnout of eligible voters; 3.79 percent of ballots were invalid.

<sup>e</sup> 95.84-percent turnout of eligible voters; 3.42 percent of ballots were invalid.

<sup>f</sup> 93.10-percent turnout of eligible voters; 5.19 percent of ballots were invalid.

Table A-20

## Regional Council Election Results

## Umbria

	7 June 1970 <sup>a</sup>			15 June 1975 <sup>b</sup>			8 June 1980 <sup>c</sup>		
	Number of Votes	Percentage	Number of Seats	Number of Votes	Percentage	Number of Seats	Number of Votes	Percentage	Number of Seats
DC	155,207	30.15	9	154,288	27.61	9	155,098	27.58	9
PCI	215,044	41.78	13	257,881	46.15	14	254,024	45.17	14
PSI	48,842	9.49	3	77,489	13.87	4	80,188	14.26	4
PSU	22,851	4.39	1	NONE	0	NONE	NONE	0	NONE
PSDI	NONE	0	NONE	13,610	2.44	1	14,530	2.58	1
PRI	12,015	2.34	1	13,466	2.41	1	14,887	2.65	1
PLI	9,386	1.82	NONE	4,377	0.78	NONE	5,838	1.04	NONE
PSIUP	23,669	4.60	1	NONE	0	NONE	NONE	0	NONE
PdUP	NONE	0	NONE	6,210	1.11	NONE	7,228	1.29	NONE
DP	NONE	0	NONE	NONE	0	NONE	NONE	0	NONE
MSI-DN	27,960	5.43	2	31,517	5.64	1	30,628	5.45	1
Others	NONE	0	NONE	NONE	0	NONE	NONE	0	NONE
<b>Total</b>	<b>514,704</b>	<b>100.00</b>	<b>30</b>	<b>558,838</b>	<b>100.00</b>	<b>30</b>	<b>562,421</b>	<b>100.00</b>	<b>30</b>

## Marche

	7 June 1970 <sup>d</sup>			15 June 1975 <sup>e</sup>			8 June 1980 <sup>f</sup>		
	Number of Votes	Percentage	Number of Seats	Number of Votes	Percentage	Number of Seats	Number of Votes	Percentage	Number of Seats
DC	333,453	38.56	17	346,099	36.46	16	354,464	37.11	16
PCI	275,110	31.81	14	349,962	36.87	15	355,646	37.24	15
PSI	73,086	8.45	3	93,002	9.80	4	96,060	10.06	4
PSU	54,455	6.30	2	NONE	0	NONE	NONE	0	NONE
PSDI	NONE	0	NONE	50,660	5.34	2	42,790	4.48	1
PRI	36,076	4.17	1	32,587	3.43	1	36,289	3.80	1
PLI	23,510	2.72	1	14,591	1.54	NONE	13,668	1.43	1
PSIUP	33,644	3.89	1						
PdUP	NONE	0	NONE	20,119	2.12	1	14,555	1.52	1
DP	NONE	0	NONE	NONE	0	NONE	NONE	0	NONE
MSI-DN	34,312	3.97	1	42,127	4.44	1	41,121	4.31	1
Others	1,162	0.13	NONE	NONE	0	NONE	531	0.06	NONE
<b>Total</b>	<b>864,808</b>	<b>100.00</b>	<b>40</b>	<b>949,147</b>	<b>100.00</b>	<b>40</b>	<b>955,124</b>	<b>100.00</b>	<b>40</b>

<sup>a</sup> 94.01-percent turnout of eligible voters; 3.78 percent of ballots were invalid.

<sup>b</sup> 95.01-percent turnout of eligible voters; 3.15 percent of ballots were invalid.

<sup>c</sup> 92.63-percent turnout of eligible voters; 4.81 percent of ballots were invalid.

<sup>d</sup> 94.07-percent turnout of eligible voters; 4.57 percent of ballots were invalid.

<sup>e</sup> 94.81-percent turnout of eligible voters; 3.94 percent of ballots were invalid.

<sup>f</sup> 91.53-percent turnout of eligible voters; 6.12 percent of ballots were invalid.

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Table A-21

## Regional Council Election Results

Lazio									
	7 June 1970 <sup>a</sup>			15 June 1975 <sup>b</sup>			8 June 1980 <sup>c</sup>		
	Number of Votes	Percentage	Number of Seats	Number of Votes	Percentage	Number of Seats	Number of Votes	Percentage	Number of Seats
DC	888,898	33.22	18	980,821	31.54	20	1,062,191	34.09	22
PCI	708,082	26.46	14	1,041,693	33.50	21	957,628	30.73	19
PSI	234,747	8.77	4	303,930	9.77	6	331,055	10.62	6
PSU	204,539	7.64	3	NONE	0	NONE	NONE	0	NONE
PSDI	NONE	0	NONE	190,032	6.11	3	165,139	5.30	3
PRI	98,235	3.67	2	114,408	3.68	2	116,212	3.73	2
PLI	156,259	5.84	3	77,679	2.50	1	82,978	2.66	1
PSIUP	69,992	2.62	1	NONE	0	NONE	NONE	0	NONE
PdUP	NONE	0	NONE	45,612	1.47	1	37,578	1.21	1
DP	NONE	0	NONE	NONE	0	NONE	36,844	1.18	NONE
MSI-DN	273,189	10.21	5	352,119	11.32	6	314,500	10.09	6
Others	42,045	1.57	NONE	3,190	0.10	NONE	11,972	0.38	NONE
<b>Total</b>	<b>2,675,986</b>	<b>100.00</b>	<b>50</b>	<b>3,109,484</b>	<b>100.00</b>	<b>60</b>	<b>3,116,097</b>		<b>60</b>

Abruzzi									
	7 June 1970 <sup>d</sup>			15 June 1975 <sup>e</sup>			8 June 1980 <sup>f</sup>		
	Number of Votes	Percentage	Number of Seats	Number of Votes	Percentage	Number of Seats	Number of Votes	Percentage	Number of Seats
DC	326,091	48.28	20	323,152	42.50	18	355,934	45.83	20
PCI	153,813	22.78	10	230,501	30.32	13	213,726	27.52	12
PSI	60,512	8.96	3	77,478	10.19	4	84,111	10.83	4
PSU	36,799	5.45	2	NONE	0	NONE	NONE	0	NONE
PSDI	NONE	0	NONE	46,993	6.18	2	35,660	4.59	2
PRI	16,983	2.52	1	19,701	2.59	1	18,966	2.44	1
PLI	19,386	2.87	1	13,417	1.76	NONE	11,317	1.46	NONE
PSIUP	21,572	3.19	1	NONE	0	NONE	NONE	0	NONE
PdUP	NONE	0	NONE	NONE	0	NONE	9,899	1.27	NONE
DP	NONE	0	NONE	NONE	0	NONE	NONE	0	NONE
MSI-DN	38,885	5.76	2	49,076	6.45	2	45,693	5.88	1
Others	1,314	0.19	NONE	NONE	0	NONE	1,266	0.16	NONE
<b>Total</b>	<b>675,355</b>	<b>100.00</b>	<b>40</b>	<b>760,318</b>	<b>100.00</b>	<b>40</b>	<b>776,572</b>	<b>100.00</b>	<b>40</b>

<sup>a</sup> 91.69-percent turnout of eligible voters; 4.35 percent of ballots were invalid.

<sup>b</sup> 92.11-percent turnout of eligible voters; 2.83 percent of ballots were invalid.

<sup>c</sup> 89.01-percent turnout of eligible voters; 6.56 percent of ballots were invalid.

<sup>d</sup> 85.01-percent turnout of eligible voters; 4.87 percent of ballots were invalid.

<sup>e</sup> 87.67-percent turnout of eligible voters; 4.13 percent of ballots were invalid.

<sup>f</sup> 82.35-percent turnout of eligible voters; 6.27 percent of ballots were invalid.

Table A-22

## Regional Council Election Results

## Molise

	7 June 1970 <sup>a</sup>			15 June 1975 <sup>b</sup>			8 June 1980 <sup>c</sup>		
	Number of Votes	Percentage	Number of Seats	Number of Votes	Percentage	Number of Seats	Number of Votes	Percentage	Number of Seats
DC	92,805	52.05	16	100,740	50.64	16	112,769	55.35	17
PCI	26,710	14.98	5	35,621	17.90	6	32,151	15.78	5
PSI	16,922	9.49	3	19,969	10.04	3	19,105	9.38	3
PSU	13,582	7.62	2	NONE	0	NONE	NONE	0	NONE
PSDI	NONE	0	NONE	12,355	6.21	2	9,804	4.81	2
PRI	5,300	2.97		8,996	4.52	1	7,583	3.72	1
PLI	10,879	6.10	2	8,928	4.49	1	8,331	4.09	1
PSIUP	4,087	2.29	NONE	NONE	0	NONE	NONE	0	NONE
PdUP	NONE	0	NONE	2,383	1.20	NONE	1,557	0.76	NONE
DP	NONE	0	NONE	NONE	0	NONE	NONE	0	NONE
MSI-DN	8,018	4.50	1	9,954	5.00	1	8,287	4.07	1
Others	NONE	0	NONE	NONE	0	NONE	4,144	2.03	NONE
<b>Total</b>	<b>178,303</b>	<b>100.00</b>	<b>30</b>	<b>198,946</b>	<b>100.00</b>	<b>30</b>	<b>203,731</b>	<b>100.00</b>	<b>30</b>

## Campania

	7 June 1970 <sup>d</sup>			15 June 1975 <sup>e</sup>			8 June 1980 <sup>f</sup>		
	Number of Votes	Percentage	Number of Seats	Number of Votes	Percentage	Number of Seats	Number of Votes	Percentage	Number of Seats
DC	1,004,437	39.66	25	1,068,364	36.69	23	1,175,672	39.03	25
PCI	551,800	21.79	13	788,874	27.09	16	725,978	24.10	15
PSI	277,205	10.95	7	302,344	10.38	6	378,018	12.55	7
PSU	178,314	7.04	4	NONE	0	NONE	NONE	0	NONE
PSDI	NONE	0	NONE	191,362	6.57	4	187,355	6.22	3
PRI	77,899	3.08	2	105,465	3.62	2	89,877	2.98	1
PLI	90,376	3.57	2	60,225	2.07	1	51,140	1.70	1
PSIUP	64,045	2.53	1	NONE	0	NONE	NONE	0	NONE
PdUP	NONE	0	NONE	32,486	1.12	1	30,552	1.01	NONE
DP	NONE	0	NONE	NONE	0	NONE	32,909	1.09	1
MSI-DN	223,222	8.81	5	354,870	12.17	7	339,262	11.26	7
Others	65,183 <sup>g</sup>	2.57	1	7,830	0.27	NONE	1,662	0.06	NONE
<b>Total</b>	<b>2,532,481</b>	<b>100.00</b>	<b>60</b>	<b>2,911,820</b>	<b>100.00</b>	<b>60</b>	<b>3,012,425</b>	<b>100.00</b>	<b>60</b>

<sup>a</sup> 80.05-percent turnout of eligible voters; 5.55 percent of ballots were invalid.

<sup>b</sup> 84.41-percent turnout of eligible voters; 5.08 percent of ballots were invalid.

<sup>c</sup> 75.37-percent turnout of eligible voters; 5.82 percent of ballots were invalid.

<sup>d</sup> 86.77-percent turnout of eligible voters; 5.77 percent of ballots were invalid.

<sup>e</sup> 88.32-percent turnout of eligible voters; 5.70 percent of ballots were invalid.

<sup>f</sup> 84.97-percent turnout of eligible voters; 6.37 percent of ballots were invalid.

<sup>g</sup> One seat won by monarchists (PDIUM).

Table A-23

Regional Council Election Results

Puglia									
	7 June 1970 <sup>a</sup>			15 June 1975 <sup>b</sup>			8 June 1980 <sup>c</sup>		
	Number of Votes	Percentage	Number of Seats	Number of Votes	Percentage	Number of Seats	Number of Votes	Percentage	Number of Seats
DC	766,153	41.27	22	835,086	39.26	21	924,437	42.10	22
PCI	488,654	26.32	14	607,175	28.54	15	539,894	24.59	13
PSI	197,690	10.65	5	252,739	11.88	5	291,606	13.28	6
PSU	76,178	4.11	2	NONE	0	NONE	NONE	0	NONE
PSDI	NONE	0	NONE	100,067	4.70	2	114,545	5.22	2
PRI	43,475	2.34	1	48,843	2.30	1	54,400	2.48	1
PLI	56,210	3.03	1	36,030	1.69	1	35,604	1.62	1
PSIUP	45,001	2.42	1	NONE	0	NONE	NONE	0	NONE
PdUP	NONE	0	NONE	NONE	0	NONE	28,652	1.30	1
DP	NONE	0	NONE	NONE	0	NONE	NONE	0	NONE
MSI-DN	162,078	8.73	4	229,060	10.77	5	204,137	9.30	4
Others	20,930	1.13	NONE	18,263	0.86	NONE	2,364	0.11	NONE
<b>Total</b>	<b>1,856,369</b>	<b>100.00</b>	<b>50</b>	<b>2,127,263</b>	<b>100.00</b>	<b>50</b>	<b>2,195,689</b>	<b>100.00</b>	<b>50</b>

Basilicata									
	7 June 1970 <sup>d</sup>			15 June 1975 <sup>e</sup>			8 June 1980 <sup>f</sup>		
	Number of Votes	Percentage	Number of Seats	Number of Votes	Percentage	Number of Seats	Number of Votes	Percentage	Number of Seats
DC	131,865	42.45	14	144,416	41.87	13	161,638	45.17	14
PCI	74,675	24.04	7	93,625	27.14	9	89,190	24.92	8
PSI	39,306	12.65	4	45,655	13.24	4	49,073	13.71	4
PSU	27,311	8.79	2	NONE	0	NONE	NONE	0	NONE
PSDI	NONE	0	NONE	23,704	6.87	2	18,666	5.22	2
PRI	5,227	1.68	NONE	5,515	1.60	NONE	5,627	1.57	NONE
PLI	9,600	3.09	1	7,077	2.05	NONE	6,118	1.71	NONE
PSIUP	7,675	2.47	1	NONE	0	NONE	NONE	0	NONE
PdUP	NONE	0	NONE	NONE	0	NONE	4,612	1.29	NONE
DP	NONE	0	NONE	NONE	0	NONE	3,238	0.90	NONE
MSI-DN	14,985	4.82	1	22,024	6.39	2	19,711	5.51	2
Others	NONE	0	NONE	2,915	0.85	NONE	NONE	0	NONE
<b>Total</b>	<b>310,644</b>	<b>100.00</b>	<b>30</b>	<b>344,931</b>	<b>100.00</b>	<b>30</b>	<b>357,873</b>	<b>100.00</b>	<b>30</b>

<sup>a</sup> 88.67-percent turnout of eligible voters; 4.66 percent of ballots were invalid.

<sup>b</sup> 89.43-percent turnout of eligible voters; 5.70 percent of ballots were invalid.

<sup>c</sup> 86.35-percent turnout of eligible voters; 6.44 percent of ballots were invalid.

<sup>d</sup> 85.51-percent turnout of eligible voters; 5.94 percent of ballots were invalid.

<sup>e</sup> 87.40-percent turnout of eligible voters; 6.31 percent of ballots were invalid.

<sup>f</sup> 84.56-percent turnout of eligible voters; 6.40 percent of ballots were invalid.

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Table A-24

## Regional Council Election Results

## Calabria

	7 June 1970 <sup>a</sup>			15 June 1975 <sup>b</sup>			8 June 1980 <sup>c</sup>		
	Number of Votes	Percentage	Number of Seats	Number of Votes	Percentage	Number of Seats	Number of Votes	Percentage	Number of Seats
DC	372,560	39.73	17	424,198	39.48	17	450,034	41.22	18
PCI	218,685	23.32	10	270,477	25.17	10	263,892	24.17	10
PSI	132,545	14.13	6	158,159	14.72	6	180,727	16.55	7
PSU	48,063	5.13	2	NONE	0	NONE	NONE	0	NONE
PSDI	NONE	0	NONE	56,494	5.26	2	63,300	5.80	2
PRI	38,063	4.06	1	32,321	3.01	1	22,909	2.10	1
PLI	25,154	2.68	1	13,919	1.30	NONE	8,326	0.76	NONE
PSIUP	36,450	3.89	1	NONE	0	NONE	NONE	0	NONE
PdUP	NONE	0	NONE	29,390	2.74	1	13,010	1.19	NONE
DP	NONE	0	NONE	NONE	0	NONE	12,242	1.12	NONE
MSI-DN	59,533	6.35	2	89,571	8.34	3	77,239	7.08	2
Others	6,693	0.71	NONE	NONE	0	NONE	NONE	0	NONE
<b>Total</b>	<b>937,746</b>	<b>100.00</b>	<b>40</b>	<b>1,074,529</b>	<b>100.00</b>	<b>40</b>	<b>1,091,679</b>	<b>100.00</b>	<b>40</b>

<sup>a</sup> 81.83-percent turnout of eligible voters; 7.04 percent of ballots were invalid.

<sup>b</sup> 82.73-percent turnout of eligible voters; 4.95 percent of ballots were invalid.

<sup>c</sup> 76.66-percent turnout of eligible voters; 6.87 percent of ballots were invalid.

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Confidential

## Special Statute Group

Table A-25

### Regional Council Election Results

#### Friuli-Venezia Giulia

	26 May 1968 <sup>a</sup>			17 June 1973 <sup>b</sup>			25 June 1978 <sup>c</sup>		
	Number of Votes	Percentage	Number of Seats	Number of Votes	Percentage	Number of Seats	Number of Votes	Percentage	Number of Seats
DC	344,039	44.93	29	315,198	39.71	26	332,684	39.60	26
PCI	153,923	20.10	12	166,018	20.91	13	182,845	21.76	14
PSI	76,964	10.05	4 <sup>d</sup>	97,259	12.25	8	79,656	9.48	5
PSDI			6	64,959	8.18	4	41,979	5.00	3
PRI	19,138	2.50	1	21,306	2.68	1	19,716	2.35	1
PLI	37,092	4.84	3	28,883	3.64	2	10,575	1.26	1
PSIUP	35,677	4.66	3	NONE	0	NONE	NONE	0	NONE
PdUP	NONE	0	NONE	NONE	0	NONE	11,228	1.34	1
DP	NONE	0	NONE	NONE	0	NONE	11,184	1.33	1
MSI-DN	39,197	5.12	3	59,585	7.51	4	35,084	4.18	2
Others	59,642 <sup>e</sup>	7.79	4	40,585 <sup>f</sup>	5.11	3	115,175 <sup>g</sup>	13.71	7
<b>Total</b>	<b>765,672</b>	<b>100.00</b>	<b>61</b>	<b>793,793</b>	<b>100.00</b>	<b>61</b>	<b>840,126</b>	<b>100.00</b>	<b>61</b>

<sup>a</sup> 87.92-percent turnout of eligible voters; 2.85 percent of ballots were invalid.

<sup>b</sup> 89.67-percent turnout of eligible voters; 3.75 percent of ballots were invalid.

<sup>c</sup> 90.60-percent turnout of eligible voters; 4.14 percent of ballots were invalid.

<sup>d</sup> *Partito Socialista Unificato*. During the council's term in office, PSI and PSDI split. Four members pronounced themselves as members of PSI and two of PSDI.

<sup>e</sup> Figures for four local parties and a monarchist ticket. Two local parties gained seats: *Unione Slovena* (one seat) and *Movimento Friuli* (three seats). Vote figures are not available.

<sup>f</sup> *Unione Slovena* (one seat); *Movimento Friuli* (two seats). Voting statistics not available.

<sup>g</sup> "*Per Trieste*" (four seats); *Movimento Friuli* (three seats). Voting statistics are not available.

Note: Previous regional election: 10 May 1964.

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Table A-26

## Regional Council Election Results

## Sardinia

	15 June 1969 <sup>a</sup>			16 June 1974 <sup>b</sup>			17 June 1979 <sup>c</sup>		
	Number of Votes	Percentage	Number of Seats	Number of Votes	Percentage	Number of Seats	Number of Votes	Percentage	Number of Seats
DC	329,835	44.59	36	305,071	38.33	32	343,020	37.74	32
PCI	146,155	19.76	15	213,300	26.80	22	238,751	26.28	22
PSI <sup>d</sup>	87,650	11.85	9	93,007	11.69	9	101,461	11.17	9
PSDI	NONE	0	NONE	46,906	5.89	3	42,274	4.65	4
PRI <sup>e</sup>	22,187	3.00	1	20,570	2.58	1	29,660	3.26	3
PLI	33,484	4.53	3	22,159	2.78	1	18,066	1.99	1
PSIUP	32,810	4.44	3	NONE	0	NONE	NONE	0	NONE
PdUP	NONE	0	NONE	NONE	0	NONE	8,512	0.94	NONE
Partito Sardo d'Azione	395	38	3	24,829	3.12	1	30,220	3.33	3
MSI-DN	49,291	6.67	4	62,294	7.83	6	57,618	6.34	4
Others	5,845	0.79	NONE	7,668	0.96	NONE	39,038 <sup>f</sup>	4.30	2
<b>Total</b>	<b>739,652</b>	<b>100.00</b>	<b>74</b>	<b>795,804</b>	<b>100.00</b>	<b>75</b>	<b>908,620</b>	<b>100.00</b>	<b>80</b>

<sup>a</sup> 86.43-percent turnout of eligible voters; 4.62 percent of ballots were invalid.

<sup>b</sup> 87.05-percent turnout of eligible voters; 2.65 percent of ballots were invalid.

<sup>c</sup> 84.46-percent turnout of eligible voters; 2.30 percent of ballots were invalid.

<sup>d</sup> In 1969 and 1974 PSI ran a combined list including other socialists of the PSU. Although a remnant of the PSU was still active in 1974, PSDI had assumed its own identity again.

<sup>e</sup> In 1969 PRI ran a combined ticket with MSA, *Movimento Sardo d'Azione*.

<sup>f</sup> Includes 28,068 votes (3.09 percent) for *Partito Radicale Sardo* which won two seats.

Note: Previous regional council elections: 8 May 1949, 14 June 1953, 16 June 1957, 18 June 1961, and 13 June 1965.

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**Table A-27**

**Regional Council Election Results**

<b>Sicily</b>									
	<b>13 June 1971 <sup>a</sup></b>			<b>20 June 1976 <sup>b</sup></b>			<b>21 June 1981 <sup>c</sup></b>		
	Number of Votes	Percentage	Number of Seats	Number of Votes	Percentage	Number of Seats	Number of Votes	Percentage	Number of Seats
DC	794,414	33.32	29	1,153,109	40.85	39	1,108,975	41.45	38
PCI	495,579 <sup>d</sup>	20.78	23	757,247	26.82	24	552,292	20.64	20
PSI	269,515	11.30	11	289,437	10.25	10	383,887	14.35	14
PSDI	135,118	5.67	4	97,254	3.45	2	79,941	2.99	2
PRI	110,238	4.62	3	92,052	3.26	4	117,162	4.38	5
PLI	88,083	3.69	3	59,839	2.12	2	57,669	2.16	3
PSIUP	52,980	2.22	2	NONE	0	NONE	NONE	0	NONE
DP	NONE	0	NONE	15,163	0.54	NONE	25,675	0.96	NONE
MSI-DN	418,258	17.54	15	306,720	10.86	9	227,988	8.52	6
Others	20,190	0.85	NONE	52,193	1.85	NONE	122,031 <sup>e</sup>	4.56	2
<b>Total</b>	<b>2,384,375</b>	<b>100.00</b>	<b>90</b>	<b>2,823,014</b>	<b>100.00</b>	<b>90</b>	<b>2,675,620</b>	<b>100.00</b>	<b>90</b>

<sup>a</sup> 81.36-percent turnout of eligible voters; 5.25 percent of ballots were invalid.

<sup>b</sup> 85.64-percent turnout of eligible voters; 3.68 percent of ballots were invalid.

<sup>c</sup> 76.2-percent turnout of eligible voters; reported by press; other figures not available to date.

<sup>d</sup> In several provinces a combined PCI-PSIUP list was presented. Separated by parties, the results are PCI 251,168 votes (10.53; 11 seats) and PCI-PSIUP (10.25; 12 seats).

<sup>e</sup> A coalition list of PRI-PLI-PSDI ran in several provinces and won 79,990 votes (2.99; two seats).

Note: Previous regional council elections: 20 April 1947, 3 June 1951, 5 June 1955, 7 June 1959, 9 June 1963, and 11 June 1967.

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Table A-28

## Regional Council Election Results

## Valle d'Aosta

	21 April 1968 <sup>a</sup>			10 June 1973 <sup>b</sup>			25 June 1978 <sup>c</sup>		
	Number of Votes	Percentage	Number of Seats	Number of Votes	Percentage	Number of Seats	Number of Votes	Percentage	Number of Seats
DC	25,467	37.78	13	14,980	21.40	7	15,723	21.24	7
PCI	13,742	20.39	7	13,638	19.49	7	14,442	19.51	7
PSI	6,954	10.32	4	5,975	8.54	3	2,648	3.58	1
PSDI <sup>d</sup>				1,409	2.01	1	1,543	2.08	1
PRI	525	0.78	NONE	904	1.29	NONE	1,395	1.88	1
PLI	3,765	5.59	2	2,052	2.93	1	NONE	0	NONE
PSIUP	1,560	2.31	1	NONE	0	NONE	NONE	0	NONE
UV <sup>e</sup>	11,237	16.67	6	8,081	11.55	4	18,344	24.78	9
DP	NONE	0	NONE	NONE	0	NONE	1,454	1.96	1
MSI-DN	533	0.79	NONE	1,452	2.07	1	944	1.28	NONE
RV <sup>f</sup>	3,627	5.38	2	NONE	0	NONE	NONE	0	NONE
DP	NONE	0	NONE	15,643	22.35	8	8,700	11.75	4
Others	NONE	0	NONE	5,856 <sup>g</sup>	8.37	3	8,822 <sup>h</sup>	11.92	4
<b>Total</b>	<b>67,410</b>	<b>100.00</b>	<b>35</b>	<b>69,990</b>	<b>100.00</b>	<b>35</b>	<b>74,015</b>	<b>100.00</b>	<b>35</b>

<sup>a</sup> 92.64-percent turnout of eligible voters; 8.71 percent of ballots were invalid.

<sup>b</sup> 91.77-percent turnout of eligible voters; 4.22 percent of ballots were invalid.

<sup>c</sup> 89.60-percent turnout of eligible voters; 4.94 percent of ballots were invalid.

<sup>d</sup> United with PSDI in 1968 as PSU.

<sup>e</sup> *Union Valdotaïne*.

<sup>f</sup> *Raggruppamento Valdese*.

<sup>g</sup> Includes 4,707 votes (6.73 percent, two seats) for *Union Valdotaïne Populaire* and 1,149 (1.64 percent, one seat) for *Raggruppamento Valdese*.

<sup>h</sup> Includes 1,959 votes (2.65 percent, one seat) for *Autonomia Sociale*; 1,183 (1.78 percent, one seat) for *Associazione Liberta e Progresso*; 2,315 (3.13 percent, one seat) for *Union Valdotaïne Populaire*; and 1,118 (1.51 percent, one seat) for *Artigiani e Commercianti*.

Note: Previous regional council elections: 24 April 1949, 14 November 1954, 17 May 1959, and 27 October 1963.

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Table A-29

Regional Council Election Results, Trentino-Alto Adige <sup>a</sup>  
Part 1: Trento

	17 November 1968			18 November 1973			19 November 1978 <sup>b</sup>		
	Number of Votes	Percentage	Number of Seats	Number of Votes	Percentage	Number of Seats	Number of Votes	Percentage	Number of Seats
DC	142,882	58.05	16	141,463	55.28	21	137,847	49.04	18
PCI	16,140	6.56	2	23,614	9.23	3	30,028	10.68	4
PSI	37,483	15.23	4	27,786	10.86	4	25,645	9.12	3
PSDI <sup>c</sup>				15,166	5.93	2	8,473	3.01	1
PRI	6,017	2.44	1	9,922	3.88	1	9,742	3.47	1
PLI	11,404	4.63	1	5,603	2.19	1	5,092	1.81	1
PPTT <sup>d</sup>	18,182	7.39	2	23,045	9.01	3	36,811	13.10	5
PSIUP	7,721	3.14	1	NONE	0	NONE	NONE	0	NONE
DP	NONE	0	NONE	NONE	0	NONE	5,412	1.93	1
MSI-DN	4,046	1.64	NONE	5,865	2.29	1	5,028	1.79	1
NS <sup>e</sup>	NONE	0	NONE	NONE	0	NONE	12,315	4.38	1
Others	2,257	0.92	NONE	3,417	1.34	NONE	4,707	1.67	NONE
<b>Total</b>	<b>246,132</b>	<b>100.00</b>	<b>27</b>	<b>255,881</b>	<b>100.00</b>	<b>36</b>	<b>281,100</b>	<b>100.00</b>	<b>36</b>

<sup>a</sup> The regional council is made up of the provincial councils of the Provinces of Trento and Bolzano. In 1968, the provincial council of Trento had 27 members. Growth of the region increased the allotted council members, hence raising the number to 36 in 1973.

<sup>b</sup> 91.71-percent turnout of eligible voters; 3.99 percent of ballots cast were invalid. Comparable figures on the provincial level are not available for 1968 and 1973. See regional chart for totals in these years.

<sup>c</sup> In 1968, PSU, *Partito Socialista Unificato*.

<sup>d</sup> PPTT, *Partito Popolare Trentino Tirolese*.

<sup>e</sup> *Nuova Sinistra*.



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Table A-30

**Regional Council Election Results, Trentino-Alto Adige <sup>a</sup>**  
**Part 2: Bolzano (Bozen)**

	17 November 1968			18 November 1973			19 November 1978 <sup>b</sup>		
	Number of Votes	Percentage	Number of Seats	Number of Votes	Percentage	Number of Seats	Number of Votes	Percentage	Number of Seats
DC	32,721	14.39	4	32,989	14.09	5	28,805	10.79	4
PCI	13,548	5.96	1	13,343	5.70	2	18,781	7.04	3
PSIUP <sup>c</sup> Ind.									
PSI	16,277	7.16	2	13,214	5.64	2	8,945	3.35	1
PSDI	NONE	0	NONE	8,036	3.43	1	6,132	2.30	1
PRI	2,729	1.20	NONE	3,234	1.38	NONE	2,884	1.08	NONE
PLI	5,891	2.59	1	2,806	1.20	NONE	2,925	1.10	NONE
PPTT <sup>d</sup>	NONE	0	NONE	NONE	NONE	NONE	2,274	0.85	NONE
SVP <sup>e</sup>	138,162	60.76	16	132,185	56.45	20	163,458	61.25	21
DP	NONE	0	NONE	NONE	NONE	NONE	1,154	0.43	NONE
MSI-DN	11,005	4.84	1	9,421	4.02	1	7,784	2.92	1
NS <sup>f</sup>	NONE	0	NONE	NONE	NONE	NONE	9,754	3.66	1
Others	7,040	3.10	NONE	18,948 <sup>g</sup>	8.09	3	13,967 <sup>h</sup>	5.23	2
<b>Total</b>	<b>227,373</b>	<b>100.00</b>	<b>25</b>	<b>234,176</b>	<b>100.00</b>	<b>34</b>	<b>266,863</b>	<b>100.00</b>	<b>34</b>

<sup>a</sup> The regional council is made up of the provincial councils of Trento and Bolzano. In 1968 the provincial council of Bolzano had 25 members; increased to 34 in 1973 due to the region's growth.

<sup>b</sup> 93.38-percent turnout of eligible voters in 1978; 2.61 percent of ballots cast were invalid. Comparable figures are not available for the province in 1968 and 1973. For regional composite, see table A-31.

<sup>c</sup> In 1968, *Sinistra Unità*.

<sup>d</sup> *Partito Popolare Trentino Tirolese*.

<sup>e</sup> *Sudtiroler Volkspartei*. In Italian, PPST, *Partito Popolare Sud Tirolese*.

<sup>f</sup> *Nuova Sinistra*.

<sup>g</sup> Includes 12,056 votes (5.15 percent, 2 seats) for SPS, *Socialdemocratici sudtirolesi*; and 4,014 (1.71 percent, one seat) for SFP, *Socialprogressisti Sudtirolesi*.

<sup>h</sup> Includes 5,914 votes (2.22 percent, one seat) for SPS, *Socialdemocratici Sudtirolesi*; and 3,536 (1.33 percent, one seat) for PDU, *Partito Democratico Unitario*.



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Table A-31

**Regional Council Election Results, Trentino-Alto Adige <sup>a</sup>**  
**Part 3: Regional Composite**

Party	17 November 1968 <sup>b</sup>			18 November 1973 <sup>c</sup>			19 November 1978 <sup>d</sup>		
	Number of Votes	Percentage	Number of Seats	Number of Votes	Percentage	Number of Seats	Number of Votes	Percentage	Number of Seats
DC	175,603	37.09	20	174,452	35.60	26	166,652	30.41	22
PCI	37,409	7.90	4	36,957	7.54	5	48,809	8.91	7
PSIUP <sup>e</sup>									
Ind.									
PSI	53,760	11.35	6	41,000	8.37	6	34,590	6.31	4
PSDI <sup>f</sup>				23,202	4.73	3	14,605	2.67	2
PRI	8,746	1.85	1	13,156	2.68	1	12,626	2.30	1
PLI	17,295	3.65	2	8,409	1.72	1	8,017	1.46	1
PPTT <sup>g</sup>	18,182	3.84	2	23,045	4.70	3	39,085	7.13	5
SVP <sup>h</sup>	138,162	29.18	16	132,185	26.97	20	163,458	29.83	21
DP	NONE	0	NONE	NONE	0	NONE	6,566	1.20	1
MSI-DN	15,051	3.18	1	15,286	3.12	2	12,812	2.34	2
NS <sup>g</sup>	NONE	0	NONE	NONE	0	NONE	22,069	4.03	2
Others	9,297	1.96	NONE	22,365 <sup>h</sup>	4.56	3	18,674 <sup>h</sup>	3.41	2
<b>Total</b>	<b>473,505</b>	<b>100.00</b>	<b>52</b>	<b>490,057</b>	<b>100.00</b>	<b>70</b>	<b>547,963</b>	<b>100.00</b>	<b>70</b>

<sup>a</sup> The regional council is composed of the provincial councils of Trento and Bolzano. For breakdown by province, see appropriate chart.

<sup>b</sup> 89.55-percent turnout of eligible voters; 2.23 percent of ballots were invalid.

<sup>c</sup> 92.23-percent turnout of eligible voters; 2.63 percent of ballots were invalid.

<sup>d</sup> 92.51-percent turnout of eligible voters; 3.32 percent of ballots were invalid.

<sup>e</sup> In 1968, *Sinistra Unita* in Bolzano.

<sup>f</sup> PSU in 1968 in Trento.

<sup>g</sup> See chart for Trento.

<sup>h</sup> See chart for Bolzano.

Note: Previous regional council elections: 28 November 1948, 16 November 1952, 11 November 1956, 6 November 1960, and 15 November 1964.



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Table A-32

## Provincial Council Election Results by Party in Geographical Regions, 1975 and 1980

	1975			1980		
	Number of Votes	Percentage	Number of Seats	Number of Votes	Percentage	Number of Seats
<b>North <sup>a</sup></b>						
DC	5,596,299	35.38	411	5,639,732	36.21	416
PCI	5,255,642	33.23	366	4,955,006	31.82	347
PSI	2,097,453	13.26	145	2,057,335	13.21	141
PSDI	979,497	6.19	65	847,921	5.44	55
PRI	515,417	3.26	26	494,318	3.17	29
PLI	520,623	3.29	23	594,101	3.81	34
MSI-DN	698,871	4.42	40	640,079	4.11	38
Others	153,206 <sup>b</sup>	0.97	4	345,285 <sup>d</sup>	2.22	20
Total	15,817,008 <sup>c</sup>	100.00	1,080	15,573,777 <sup>e</sup>	100.00	1,080
<b>Center <sup>f</sup></b>						
DC	1,401,170	30.37	161	1,418,941	30.81	166
PCI	1,963,189	42.55	220	1,951,448	42.55	218
PSI	525,119	11.38	58	559,767	12.15	60
PSDI	218,120	4.73	22	189,952	4.13	20
PRI	148,612	3.22	15	155,586	3.38	15
PLI	60,428	1.31	1	68,478	1.49	1
MSI-DN	247,932	5.37	25	231,724	5.03	24
Others	49,634 <sup>g</sup>	1.07	2	29,464 <sup>i</sup>	0.64	0
Total	4,614,204 <sup>h</sup>	100.00	504	4,605,360 <sup>j</sup>	100.00	504

Table A-32 (continued)

	1975			1980		
	Number of Votes	Percentage	Number of Seats	Number of Votes	Percentage	Number of Seats
<b>South <sup>k</sup></b>						
DC	2,415,445	34.78	225	2,606,203	36.50	237
PCI	1,984,559	28.58	169	1,875,886	26.27	155
PSI	883,682	12.73	79	1,014,457	14.21	86
PSDI	422,606	6.21	34	443,338	6.21	34
PRI	227,385	3.27	14	237,472	3.33	16
PLI	159,898	2.30	10	143,476	2.01	7
MSI-DN	783,335	11.28	58	761,316	10.66	54
Others	67,498 <sup>l</sup>	0.97	2	58,162 <sup>n</sup>	0.81	2
Total	6,944,408 <sup>m</sup>	100.00	591	7,140,310 <sup>o</sup>	100.00	591
<b>Islands <sup>p</sup></b>						
DC	1,334,507	37.35	152	1,451,498	40.37	162
PCI	902,292	25.25	105	820,874	22.83	96
PSI	442,922	12.40	51	488,405	13.58	56
PSDI	196,248	5.49	22	192,113	5.34	20
PRI	159,341	4.46	17	174,927	4.86	18
PLI	106,901	2.99	8	105,390	2.93	10
MSI-DN	380,677	10.65	39	289,886	8.06	28
Others	50,323 <sup>q</sup>	1.41	2	72,569 <sup>s</sup>	2.03	6
Total	3,573,211 <sup>r</sup>	100.00	396	3,595,662 <sup>t</sup>	100.00	396

<sup>a</sup> The 35 provinces of Piedmont, Lombardy, Venetia, Friuli-Venezia Giulia, Liguria, and Emilia-Romagna; 22,992,299 population.

<sup>b</sup> Included are 2,170 (0.01 percent) votes for center-left groups, 123,124 (0.78 percent, one seat) for extreme left parties; and 24,222 (0.15 percent, three seats) for local parties.

<sup>c</sup> 94.6-percent turnout of eligible voters.

<sup>d</sup> Includes 184,468 (1.19 percent, five seats) for groups of the extreme left.

<sup>e</sup> 91.9-percent turnout of eligible voters.

<sup>f</sup> The 18 provinces of Tuscany, Umbria, Marche, and Lazio; population 6,550,817.

<sup>g</sup> Includes 49,283 votes (1.07 percent, two seats) for extreme left groups.

<sup>h</sup> 94.8-percent turnout of eligible voters.

<sup>i</sup> Total figures for extreme left groups.

<sup>j</sup> 91.0-percent turnout of eligible voters.

<sup>k</sup> The 20 provinces of Abruzzi Molise, Campania, Puglia, Basilicata, and Calabria; population 12,006,459.

<sup>l</sup> Includes 7,823 (0.11 percent, one seat) for center-left groups; 32,726 (0.47 percent, one seat) for extreme left parties.

<sup>m</sup> 87.0-percent turnout of eligible voters.

<sup>n</sup> Includes 42,019 (0.59 percent, one seat) for extreme left groups.

<sup>o</sup> 83.3-percent turnout of eligible voters.

<sup>p</sup> The 13 provinces in Sicily and Sardinia; population 6,154,515.

<sup>q</sup> Includes 12,877 (0.36 percent) for extreme left groups and 22,227 (0.62 percent, two seats) for local parties.

<sup>r</sup> 85.0-percent turnout of eligible voters.

<sup>s</sup> Includes 2,813 (0.08 percent) for center-left groups and 12,167 (0.34 percent) for extreme left elements. Local parties drew 44,795 (1.25 percent, five seats) votes.

<sup>t</sup> 80.7-percent turnout of eligible voters.


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**Figure A-6**  
**Showing of DC, PCI, and PSI in**  
**Regional Council Elections (Special Statue)**

Percent

Key

— DC  
 — PCI  
 — PSI



<sup>a</sup>In 1947 and 1951 PSI and PCI ran a common ticket, and in 1947 it also included PSIUP. In 1967, PSI and PSU ran a common list.

<sup>b</sup>In 1969, PSI figures include PSU.

<sup>c</sup>In 1949, the DC ran a common list with Union Valdostaine; in 1954 and 1959 the DC joined a combined list of centrist parties. PCI, PSI and PSIUP ran a common list in 1949, 1954 and 1959. In the last year it was joined also by the Union Valdostaine.

<sup>d</sup>In 1968 PCI and PSIUP ran a common list. In 1956 PSI figures include list partners, PSU and PSDI.

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
**Figure A-7**  
**Chamber of Deputies Districts**



25X1

**Confidential**

**Figure A-8**  
**Senate Districts**



25X1

## Chamber of Deputies

Table A-33

## 1 Torino-Novara-Vercelli

	1972	1976	1979
District population	2,684,677	3,190,079	3,233,393
Eligible voters in district	2,301,297	2,460,817	2,503,112
Actual votes (percent turnout)	2,201,444 (95.66)	2,338,532 (95.03)	2,339,699 (93.47)
Blank and invalid ballots (percent of total)	96,333 (4.38)	74,094 (3.17)	119,922 (5.13)
District percent national vote	6.38	6.21	6.13
Seats assigned district	33	37	37
Electoral quotient	60,146	58,062	56,917
Seats won by whole quotients in district	30	33	33
Seats won by residuals in national pool	4	5	6

1972				1976				1979			
	Party Total	Percent- age	Number of Seats		Party Total	Percent- age	Number of Seats		Party Total	Percent- age	Number of Seats
DC	704,911	33.49	11 + 1	DC	741,841	32.76	12 + 1	DC	687,440	30.97	12 -
PCI	601,773	28.59	10 -	PCI	865,252	38.21	14 + 1	PCI	729,210	32.85	12 + 1
PSI	228,932	10.87	3 + 1	PSI	231,557	10.22	3 + 1	PSI	234,037	10.54	4 -
PSDI	146,185	6.94	2 -	PSDI	99,971	4.41	1 -	PSDI	107,829	4.86	1 + 1
PSIUP	38,148	1.81	- -	DP	42,037	1.86	- + 1	PdUP	39,315	1.77	- 1
PLI	166,333	7.90	2 + 1	PRad	38,840	1.71	- + 1	PRad	111,839	5.04	1 + 1
PRI	71,310	3.39	1 -	PLI	61,488	2.72	1 -	PLI	89,986	4.05	1 + 1
MSI-DN	111,397	5.29	1 + 1	PRI	89,592	3.96	1 -	PRI	94,780	4.27	1 + 1
				MSI-DN	91,881	4.06	1 -	MSI-DN	87,066	3.92	1 -
Others	36,122	1.72	- -	Others	1,979	0.09	- -	Others	38,275	1.73	- -

25X1

Table A-34

## 2 Cuneo-Alessandria-Asti

	1972	1976	1979
District population	1,229,573	1,242,234	1,304,627
Eligible voters in district	926,475	969,499	979,024
Actual votes (percent turnout)	888,865 (95.94)	925,881 (95.50)	919,983 (93.97)
Blank and invalid ballots (percent of total)	29,194 (3.28)	36,181 (3.91)	55,589 (6.09)
District percent national vote	2.58	2.46	2.41
Seats assigned district	15	15	15
Electoral quotient	50,568	52,335	50,846
Seats won by whole quotients in district	13	12	12
Seats won by residuals in national pool	1	4	3

1972				1976				1979			
	Party Total	Percent- age	Number of Seats		Party Total	Percent- age	Number of Seats		Party Total	Percent- age	Number of Seats
DC	384,577	44.73	7 -	DC	384,340	43.20	7 -	DC	357,466	41.35	7 -
PCI	175,772	20.45	3 -	PCI	252,169	28.34	4 + 1	PCI	213,214	24.67	4 -
PSI	99,917	11.62	1 + 1	PSI	84,641	9.51	1 -	PSI	83,836	9.70	1 -
PSDI	59,914	6.97	1 -	PSDI	48,455	5.44	- + 1	PSDI	48,034	5.56	- + 1
PSIUP	14,150	1.65	- -	DP	15,638	1.76	- -	PdUP	12,125	1.40	- -
PLI	57,144	6.65	1 -	PRad	11,177	1.26	- -	PRad	29,969	3.47	- -
PRI	27,530	3.20	- -	PLI	32,996	3.71	- + 1	PLI	50,461	5.84	- + 1
MSI-DN	29,328	3.41	- -	PRI	34,398	3.87	- + 1	PRI	33,513	3.88	- + 1
				MSI-DN	25,886	2.91	- -	MSI-DN	23,720	2.74	- -
Others	11,339	1.32	- -	Others	0	0	- -	Others	12,056	1.39	- -

25X1

Table A-35

## 3 Genoa-Imperia-La Spezia-Savona

	1972	1976	1979
District population	1,735,349	1,853,578	1,852,903
Eligible voters in district	1,393,456	1,456,231	1,477,501
Actual votes (percent turnout)	1,319,522 (94.69)	1,382,651 (94.95)	1,361,158 (92.13)
Blank and invalid ballots (percent of total)	40,067 (3.04)	33,594 (2.43)	57,711 (4.24)
District percent national vote	3.83	3.67	3.57
Seats assigned district	22	22	22
Electoral quotient	53,310	56,210	54,310
Seats won by whole quotients in district	20	20	18
Seats won by residuals in national pool	2	2	5

1972				1976				1979			
	Party Total	Percent- age	Number of Seats		Party Total	Percent- age	Number of Seats		Party Total	Percent- age	Number of Seats
DC	428,681	33.51	8 -	DC	464,575	34.44	8 -	DC	419,195	32.16	7 -
PCI	404,477	31.61	7 -	PCI	527,236	39.08	9 -	PCI	462,943	35.52	8 -
PSI	143,557	11.22	2 + 1	PSI	147,571	10.94	2 -	PSI	150,260	11.53	2 + 1
PSDI	68,111	5.32	1 -	PSDI	39,972	2.96	- -	PSDI	43,144	3.31	- + 1
PSIUP	19,339	1.51	- -	DP	14,089	1.05	- -	PdUP	11,346	0.87	- -
PLI	74,925	5.86	1 -	PRad	20,484	1.52	- + 1	PRad	63,092	4.84	1 -
PRI	45,371	3.55	- + 1	PLI	24,064	1.78	- -	PLI	43,647	3.35	- + 1
MSI-DN	78,684	6.15	1 -	PRI	51,670	3.83	- + 1	PRI	44,821	3.44	- + 1
				MSI-DN	58,672	4.35	1 -	MSI-DN	48,794	3.74	- + 1
Others	16,310	1.27	- -	Others	724	0.05	- -	Others	16,205	1.24	- -

25X1

Table A-36

## 4 Milan-Pavia

	1972	1976	1979
District population	3,675,008	4,430,074	4,566,032
Eligible voters in district	3,050,397	3,315,036	3,388,216
Actual votes (percent turnout)	2,951,236 (96.75)	3,181,031 (95.96)	3,198,089 (94.39)
Blank and invalid ballots (percent of total)	84,974 (2.88)	73,384 (2.31)	96,962 (3.03)
District percent national vote	8.56	8.44	8.38
Seats assigned district	46	52	52
Electoral quotient	59,713	57,549	57,428
Seats won by whole quotients in district	42	49	50
Seats won by residuals in national pool	3	3	2

1972				1976				1979			
	Party Total	Percent- age	Number of Seats		Party Total	Percent- age	Number of Seats		Party Total	Percent- age	Number of Seats
DC	981,922	34.26	16 -	DC	1,092,254	35.15	18 + 1	DC	1,034,717	33.37	18 -
PCI	807,810	28.18	13 -	PCI	1,113,369	35.83	19 -	PCI	994,768	32.08	17 -
PSI	352,922	12.31	5 + 1	PSI	368,246	11.85	6 -	PSI	348,495	11.24	6 -
PSDI	140,150	4.89	2 -	PSDI	98,173	3.16	1 -	PSDI	125,090	4.03	2 -
PSIUP	51,218	1.79	- -	DP	79,933	2.57	1 -	PdUP	60,428	1.95	1 -
PLI	174,939	6.10	2 + 1	PRad	44,423	1.59	1 -	PRad	147,531	4.76	2 -
PRI	112,966	3.94	1 + 1	PLI	44,883	1.44	- + 1	PLI	94,834	3.06	1 + 1
MSI-DN	195,108	6.81	3 -	PRI	127,019	4.09	2 -	PRI	108,355	3.49	1 + 1
				MSI-DN	132,163	4.25	2 -	MSI-DN	124,661	4.02	2 -
Others	49,227	1.72	- -	Others	2,184	0.07	- -	Others	62,248	2.00	- -

25X1

Table A-37

## 5 Como-Sondrio-Varese

	1972	1976	1979
District population	1,365,110	1,615,435	1,785,746
Eligible voters in district	1,103,948	1,227,056	1,271,566
Actual votes (percent turnout)	1,064,884 (96.46)	1,169,633 (95.32)	1,196,683 (94.11)
Blank and invalid ballots (percent of total)	39,061 (3.68)	34,099 (2.92)	54,019 (4.51)
District percent national vote	3.09	3.10	3.14
Seats assigned district	19	19	19
Electoral quotient	53,990	54,073	54,412
Seats won by whole quotients in district	15	16	15
Seats won by residuals in national pool	2	3	5

1972	1976	1979
Party Total	Party Total	Party Total
Percent- age	Percent- age	Percent- age
Number of Seats	Number of Seats	Number of Seats
DC 471,005 45.92 8 + 1	DC 515,915 45.43 9 -	DC 498,173 43.60 9 -
PCI 182,220 17.76 3 -	PCI 308,481 27.17 5 -	PCI 267,419 23.40 4 + 1
PSI 130,761 12.75 2 -	PSI 134,459 11.84 2 -	PSI 143,174 12.53 2 -
PSDI 69,158 6.74 1 -	PSDI 42,539 3.75 - -	PSDI 49,798 4.36 - + 1
PSIUP 24,090 2.35 - -	DP 23,152 2.04 - + 1	PdUP 20,490 1.79 - -
PLI 55,290 5.39 1 -	PRad 11,886 1.05 - -	PRad 41,041 3.59 - + 1
PRI 26,576 2.59 - -	PLI 20,029 1.76 - -	PLI 32,807 2.87 - + 1
MSI-DN 51,826 5.05 - + 1	PRI 37,849 3.33 - + 1	PRI 33,440 2.93 - -
	MSI-DN 41,224 3.63 - + 1	MSI-DN 38,086 3.33 - + 1
Others 14,897 1.45 - -	Others 0 0 - -	Others 18,236 1.60 - -

25X1

Table A-38

## 6 Brescia-Bergamo

	1972	1976	1979
District population	1,627,619	1,786,705	1,863,439
Eligible voters in district	1,177,126	1,316,534	1,372,897
Actual votes (percent turnout)	1,138,935 (96.76)	1,261,235 (95.80)	1,299,783 (94.67)
Blank and invalid ballots (percent of total)	33,303 (2.92)	31,572 (2.50)	49,818 (3.83)
District percent national vote	3.30	3.35	3.41
Seats assigned district	20	21	21
Electoral quotient	50,256	53,463	54,346
Seats won by whole quotients in district	19	19	17
Seats won by residuals in national pool	1	2	6

1972				1976				1979			
	Party Total	Percent- age	Number of Seats		Party Total	Percent- age	Number of Seats		Party Total	Percent- age	Number of Seats
DC	613,071	55.45	12 -	DC	654,729	53.25	12 -	DC	638,294	51.07	11 + 1
PCI	169,043	15.29	3 -	PCI	283,537	23.06	5 -	PCI	269,755	21.58	4 + 1
PSI	106,568	9.64	2 -	PSI	125,910	10.24	2 -	PSI	124,305	9.94	2 -
PSDI	58,821	5.32	1 -	PSDI	40,977	3.33	- -	PSDI	44,758	3.58	- + 1
PSIUP	29,452	2.66	- -	DP	29,383	2.39	- + 1	PdUP	26,221	2.10	- + 1
PLI	41,432	3.75	- + 1	PRad	11,334	0.92	- -	PRad	34,544	2.76	- + 1
PRI	18,527	1.68	- -	PLI	16,900	1.37	- -	PLI	25,722	2.06	- -
MSI-DN	51,215	4.63	1 -	PRI	25,901	2.11	- -	PRI	24,659	1.97	- -
				MSI-DN	40,992	3.33	- + 1	MSI-DN	39,333	3.15	- + 1
Others	17,503	1.58	- -	Others	0	0	- -	Others	22,374	1.79	- -

**Table A-39**

**7 Mantua-Cremona**

	1972	1976	1979
District population	738,415	711,173	714,486
Eligible voters in district	512,354	541,284	548,522
Actual votes (percent turnout)	496,704 (96.95)	526,075 (97.19)	529,924 (96.61)
Blank and invalid ballots (percent of total)	9,835 (1.98)	11,991 (2.28)	19,948 (3.76)
District percent national vote	1.44	1.40	1.39
Seats assigned district	9	8	8
Electoral quotient	44,260	51,408	50,997
Seats won by whole quotients in district	8	7	7
Seats won by residuals in national pool	0	1	1

1972				1976				1979			
	Party Total	Percent- age	Number of Seats		Party Total	Percent- age	Number of Seats		Party Total	Percent- age	Number of Seats
DC	186,338	38.27	4 -	DC	197,938	38.50	3 + 1	DC	192,514	37.75	3 + 1
PCI	145,266	29.84	3 -	PCI	187,274	36.43	3 -	PCI	175,743	34.46	3 -
PSI	71,003	14.58	1 -	PSI	69,329	13.49	1 -	PSI	63,008	12.36	1 -
PSDI	18,579	3.82	- -	PSDI	15,328	2.98	- -	PSDI	16,434	3.23	- -
PSIUP	11,575	2.38	- -	DP	6,482	1.26	- -	PdUP	9,852	1.93	- -
PLI	14,968	3.07	- -	PRad	4,502	0.88	- -	PRad	12,590	2.47	- -
PRI	7,924	1.63	- -	PLI	4,169	0.81	- -	PLI	7,696	1.51	- -
MSI-DN	26,089	5.36	- -	PRI	9,577	1.86	- -	PRI	8,663	1.70	- -
				MSI-DN	19,485	3.79	- -	MSI-DN	18,038	3.54	- -
Others	5,127	1.05	- -	Others	0	0	- -	Others	5,438	1.07	- -

25X1

Confidential

Table A-40

## 8 Trento-Bolzano

	1972	1976	1979
District population	785,967	841,886	873,995
Eligible voters in district	556,374	610,064	636,264
Actual votes (percent turnout)	528,852 (95.05)	582,523 (95.49)	593,795 (93.33)
Blank and invalid ballots (percent of total)	18,720 (3.54)	15,141 (2.60)	22,231 (3.74)
District percent national vote	1.53	1.55	1.56
Seats assigned district	10	10	10
Electoral quotient	42,511	47,281	47,630
Seats won by whole quotients in district	7	7	8
Seats won by residuals in national pool	3	2	2

1972				1976				1979			
	Party Total	Percent- age	Number of Seats		Party Total	Percent- age	Number of Seats		Party Total	Percent- age	Number of Seats
DC	200,136	39.23	4 + 1	DC	186,190	32.81	3 + 1	DC	177,362	31.03	3 + 1
PCI	38,855	7.62	- + 1	PCI	74,822	13.19	1 -	PCI	63,374	11.09	1 -
PSI	35,846	7.03	- + 1	PSI	44,681	7.87	- + 1	PSI	37,876	6.63	- + 1
PSDI	25,215	4.94	- -	PSDI	14,062	2.48	- -	PSDI	15,326	2.68	- -
PSIUP	6,793	1.33	- -	DP	13,030	2.30	- -	PdUP	5,008	0.88	- -
PLI	14,826	2.91	- -	PRad	6,960	1.23	- -	PRad	24,270	4.25	- -
PRI	9,567	1.88	- -	PLI	5,618	0.99	- -	PLI	7,143	1.25	- -
MSI-DN	19,044	3.73	- -	PRI	15,319	2.70	- -	PRI	12,439	2.17	- -
SVPI	153,674	30.12	3 -	MSI-DN	14,661	2.58	- -	MSI-DN	13,453	2.35	- -
				SVP	184,375	32.50	3 -	SVP	205,007	35.87	4 -
Others	6,176	1.21	- -	Others	7,664	1.35	- -	Others	10,306	1.80	- -

25X1

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**Table A-41**

**9 Verona-Padua-Vicenza-Rovigo**

	1972	1976	1979
District population	2,254,852	2,426,385	2,540,043
Eligible voters in district	1,625,002	1,798,094	1,883,682
Actual votes (percent turnout)	1,574,667 (96.90)	1,743,454 (96.96)	1,783,667 (94.69)
Blank and invalid ballots (percent of total)	53,518 (3.40)	46,520 (2.67)	65,517 (3.67)
District percent national vote	4.57	4.63	4.68
Seats assigned district	28	28	28
Electoral quotient	50,704	56,564	57,271
Seats won by whole quotients in district	26	26	25
Seats won by residuals in national pool	2	2	4

1972				1976				1979			
	Party Total	Percent- age	Number of Seats		Party Total	Percent- age	Number of Seats		Party Total	Percent- age	Number of Seats
DC	867,645	57.04	17 -	DC	942,301	55.53	16 -	DC	926,990	53.95	16 -
PCI	238,681	15.69	4 + 1	PCI	362,442	21.36	6 -	PCI	336,693	19.60	5 + 1
PSI	128,984	8.48	2 -	PSI	162,179	9.55	2 + 1	PSI	150,745	8.77	2 -
PSDI	81,009	5.33	1 -	PSDI	62,073	3.66	1 -	PSDI	65,084	3.79	1 -
PSIUP	32,244	2.12	- -	DP	23,344	1.37	- -	PdUP	20,356	1.18	- -
PLI	54,850	3.61	1 -	PRad	17,789	1.05	- -	PRad	60,717	3.53	1 -
PRI	29,863	1.96	- + 1	PLI	19,343	1.14	- -	PLI	33,273	1.94	- + 1
MSI-DN	70,474	4.63	1 -	PRI	47,162	2.78	- + 1	PRI	45,107	2.63	- + 1
				MSI-DN	59,347	3.50	1 -	MSI-DN	57,057	3.32	- + 1
Others	17,399	1.14	- -	Others	954	0.06	- -	Others	22,128	1.29	- -

25X1

Confidential

Table A-42

## 10 Venice-Treviso

	1972	1976	1979
District population	1,356,789	1,475,871	1,597,284
Eligible voters in district	997,367	1,097,717	1,152,485
Actual votes (percent turnout)	955,319 (95.78)	1,054,432 (96.06)	1,076,716 (93.43)
Blank and invalid ballots (percent of total)	29,156 (3.05)	30,507 (2.89)	36,974 (3.43)
District percent national vote	2.77	2.80	2.82
Seats assigned district	17	17	17
Electoral quotient	48,745	53,890	54,723
Seats won by whole quotients in district	14	15	14
Seats won by residuals in national pool	4	1	3

1972				1976				1979			
	Party Total	Percent- age	Number of Seats		Party Total	Percent- age	Number of Seats		Party Total	Percent- age	Number of Seats
DC	438,488	47.34	8 + 1	DC	466,092	45.52	8 -	DC	464,157	44.64	8 -
PCI	188,742	20.38	3 + 1	PCI	284,076	27.74	5 -	PCI	263,046	25.30	4 + 1
PSI	102,686	11.09	2 -	PSI	118,756	11.60	2 -	PSI	111,713	10.74	2 -
PSDI	62,322	6.73	1 -	PSDI	47,434	4.63	- + 1	PSDI	47,155	4.54	- + 1
PSIUP	24,560	2.65	- -	DP	18,552	1.81	- -	PdUP	17,415	1.68	- -
PLI	33,707	3.64	- + 1	PRad	11,925	1.16	- -	PRad	41,300	3.97	- + 1
PRI	22,520	2.43	- -	PLI	10,709	1.05	- -	PLI	18,519	1.78	- -
MSI-DN	38,779	4.19	- + 1	PRI	35,107	3.43	- -	PRI	33,180	3.19	- -
				MSI-DN	30,778	3.01	- -	MSI-DN	29,474	2.83	- -
Others	14,359	1.55	- -	Others	496	0.05	- -	Others	13,783	1.33	- -

25X1

Confidential

Table A-43

11 Udine-Belluno-Gorizia-Pordenone

	1972	1976	1979
District population	1,140,574	1,134,383	1,152,514
Eligible voters in district	849,852	900,708	946,337
Actual votes (percent turnout)	778,027 (91.55)	846,083 (93.94)	856,815 (90.54)
Blank and invalid ballots (percent of total)	21,506 (2.76)	21,535 (2.55)	32,353 (3.78)
District percent national vote	2.26	2.24	2.25
Seats assigned district	14	13	13
Electoral quotient	47,282	54,969	54,964
Seats won by whole quotients in district	12	10	11
Seats won by residuals in national pool	2	3	0

1972				1976				1979			
	Party Total	Percent- age	Number of Seats		Party Total	Percent- age	Number of Seats		Party Total	Percent- age	Number of Seats
DC	347,284	45.91	7 -	DC	365,838	44.37	6 -	DC	343,654	41.68	6 -
PCI	133,866	17.70	2 + 1	PCI	209,269	25.38	3 + 1	PCI	192,591	23.36	3 -
PSI	96,331	12.73	2 -	PSI	106,703	12.94	1 + 1	PSI	74,561	9.04	1 -
PSDI	72,663	9.60	1 -	PSDI	54,864	6.65	- + 1	PSDI	62,610	7.60	1 -
PSIUP	16,253	2.15	- -	DP	14,609	1.77	- -	PdUP	10,677	1.30	- -
PLI	23,625	3.12	- -	PRad	0	0	- -	PRad	30,695	3.72	- -
PRI	16,545	2.19	- -	PLI	9,831	1.19	- -	PLI	12,975	1.57	- -
MSI-DN	42,049	5.56	- + 1	PRI	27,222	3.30	- -	PRI	22,881	2.78	- -
				MSI-DN	32,779	3.98	- -	MSI-DN	30,601	3.71	- -
Others	7,905	1.04	- -	Others	3,433	0.42	- -	Others	43,217	5.24	- -

25X1

Table A-44

## 12 Bologna-Ferrara-Ravenna-Forli

	1972	1976	1979
District population	2,095,379	2,219,829	2,283,731
Eligible voters in district	1,617,010	1,736,158	1,777,675
Actual votes (percent turnout)	1,580,906 (97.77)	1,691,887 (97.45)	1,713,852 (96.41)
Blank and invalid ballots (percent of total)	34,970 (2.21)	27,767 (1.64)	42,413 (2.47)
District percent national vote	4.58	4.49	4.49
Seats assigned district	26	26	26
Electoral quotient	55,212	59,432	59,694
Seats won by whole quotients in district	23	24	23
Seats won by residuals in national pool	4	3	4

1972				1976				1979			
	Party Total	Percent- age	Number of Seats		Party Total	Percent- age	Number of Seats		Party Total	Percent- age	Number of Seats
DC	379,542	24.55	6 + 1	DC	430,104	25.85	7 -	DC	413,764	24.76	6 + 1
PCI	693,342	44.85	12 -	PCI	819,224	49.23	13 + 1	PCI	802,158	47.99	13 -
PSI	119,636	7.74	2 -	PSI	147,273	8.85	2 -	PSI	138,005	8.26	2 -
PSDI	90,814	5.87	1 + 1	PSDI	63,054	3.79	1 -	PSDI	65,422	3.91	1 -
PSIUP	40,367	2.61	- -	DP	15,542	0.93	- -	PdUP	16,642	1.00	- -
PLI	54,730	3.54	- + 1	PRad	18,263	1.10	- -	PRad	49,385	2.95	- + 1
PRI	87,313	5.65	1 + 1	PLI	15,749	0.94	- -	PLI	24,086	1.44	- -
MSI-DN	65,043	4.21	1 -	PRI	99,783	6.00	1 + 1	PRI	100,111	5.99	1 + 1
				MSI-DN	52,331	3.14	- + 1	MSI-DN	45,539	2.72	- + 1
Others	15,149	0.98	- -	Others	2,797	0.17	- -	Others	16,327	0.98	- -

25X1

**Table A-45**

**13 Parma-Modena-Piacenza-Reggio Emilia**

	1972	1976	1979
District population	1,571,301	1,626,926	1,679,420
Eligible voters in district	1,211,340	1,292,359	1,333,688
Actual votes (percent turnout)	1,173,962 (96.91)	1,249,363 (96.67)	1,267,675 (95.05)
Blank and invalid ballots (percent of total)	35,583 (3.03)	29,409 (2.35)	42,045 (3.32)
District percent national vote	3.40	3.31	3.32
Seats assigned district	20	19	19
Electoral quotient	51,744	58,093	58,363
Seats won by whole quotients in district	17	16	16
Seats won by residuals in national pool	3	3	3

1972				1976				1979			
	Party Total	Percent- age	Number of Seats		Party Total	Percent- age	Number of Seats		Party Total	Percent- age	Number of Seats
DC	340,722	29.93	6 -	DC	390,179	31.98	6 -	DC	376,092	30.69	6 -
PCI	486,124	42.70	9 -	PCI	579,845	47.53	9 + 1	PCI	569,457	46.46	9 + 1
PSI	100,912	8.86	1 + 1	PSI	110,022	9.02	1 + 1	PSI	110,261	9.00	1 + 1
PSDI	70,098	6.16	1 -	PSDI	47,460	3.89	- + 1	PSDI	46,597	3.80	- + 1
PSIUP	32,780	2.88	- -	DP	13,139	1.08	- -	PdUP	13,612	1.11	- -
PLI	38,773	3.41	- + 1	PRad	10,684	0.88	- -	PRad	29,594	2.41	- -
PRI	15,988	1.40	- -	PLI	10,157	0.83	- -	PLI	16,121	1.32	- -
MSI-DN	43,916	3.86	- + 1	PRI	23,605	1.93	- -	PRI	22,908	1.87	- -
				MSI-DN	34,863	2.86	- -	MSI-DN	31,276	2.55	- -
Others	9,066	0.80	- -	Others	0	0	- -	Others	9,712	0.79	- -

25X1

Table A-46

## 14 Florence-Pistoia

	1972	1976	1979
District population	1,245,702	1,400,702	1,432,859
Eligible voters in district	1,027,377	1,106,146	1,133,129
Actual votes (percent turnout)	1,000,032 (97.34)	1,072,055 (96.92)	1,084,523 (95.71)
Blank and invalid ballots (percent of total)	27,765 (2.78)	20,883 (1.95)	38,077 (3.51)
District percent national vote	2.90	2.84	2.84
Seats assigned district	16	16	16
Electoral quotient	50,014	58,398	58,135
Seats won by whole quotients in district	14	15	14
Seats won by residuals in national pool	2	0	0

1972				1976				1979			
	Party Total	Percent- age	Number of Seats		Party Total	Percent- age	Number of Seats		Party Total	Percent- age	Number of Seats
DC	288,685	29.69	5 -	DC	319,031	30.35	5 -	DC	304,654	29.11	5 -
PCI	438,360	45.09	8 -	PCI	529,458	50.37	9 -	PCI	506,156	48.37	8 -
PSI	81,627	8.40	1 -	PSI	91,952	8.75	1 -	PSI	93,607	8.95	1 -
PSDI	43,382	4.46	- + 1	PSDI	23,929	2.28	- -	PSDI	23,290	2.23	- -
PSIUP	14,522	1.49	- -	DP	13,220	1.26	- -	PdUP	14,582	1.39	- -
PLI	26,197	2.69	- -	PRad	10,117	0.96	- -	PRad	28,382	2.71	- -
PRI	18,487	1.90	- -	PLI	6,011	0.57	- -	PLI	10,040	0.96	- -
MSI-DN	47,428	4.88	- + 1	PRI	25,142	2.39	- -	PRI	25,649	2.45	- -
				MSI-DN	32,312	3.07	- -	MSI-DN	28,222	2.70	- -
Others	13,579	1.40	- -	Others	0	0	- -	Others	11,864	1.13	- -

25X1

Table A-47

15 Pisa-Livorno-Lucca-Massa Carrara

	1972	1976	1979
District population	1,241,127	1,292,509	1,354,809
Eligible voters in district	949,894	1,011,541	1,035,617
Actual votes (percent turnout)	912,382 (96.05)	973,265 (96.22)	976,089 (94.25)
Blank and invalid ballots (percent of total)	29,390 (3.22)	23,663 (2.43)	39,947 (4.09)
District percent national vote	2.65	2.58	2.56
Seats assigned district	15	15	15
Electoral quotient	51,940	55,858	55,067
Seats won by whole quotients in district	13	13	12
Seats won by residuals in national pool	3	1	2

1972				1976				1979			
	Party Total	Percent- age	Number of Seats		Party Total	Percent- age	Number of Seats		Party Total	Percent- age	Number of Seats
DC	296,254	33.55	5 + 1	DC	321,240	33.83	5 + 1	DC	303,637	32.43	5 -
PCI	323,410	36.63	6 -	PCI	406,341	42.79	7 -	PCI	385,006	41.13	6 + 1
PSI	83,417	9.45	1 -	PSI	101,642	10.71	1 -	PSI	97,122	10.37	1 + 1
PSDI	46,743	5.29	- + 1	PSDI	24,803	2.61	- -	PSDI	27,807	2.97	- -
PSIUP	20,954	2.37	- -	DP	12,275	1.29	- -	PdUP	13,817	1.48	- -
PLI	18,821	2.13	- -	PRad	7,439	0.78	- -	PRad	23,945	2.56	- -
PRI	29,530	3.35	- + 1	PLI	5,652	0.60	- -	PLI	8,984	0.96	- -
MSI-DN	53,983	6.11	1 -	PRI	31,167	3.28	- -	PRI	30,498	3.26	- -
				MSI-DN	39,043	4.11	- -	MSI-DN	35,430	3.78	- -
Others	9,880	1.12	- -	Others	0	0	- -	Others	9,896	1.06	- -

25X1

Table A-48

## 16 Siena-Arezzo-Grosseto

	1972	1976	1979
District population	799,331	779,886	806,939
Eligible voters in district	578,703	614,949	627,602
Actual votes (percent turnout)	563,443 (97.36)	598,595 (97.34)	602,965 (96.07)
Blank and invalid ballots (percent of total)	13,599 (2.41)	11,523 (1.93)	17,717 (2.94)
District percent national vote	1.63	1.59	1.58
Seats assigned district	10	9	9
Electoral quotient	45,820	53,370	53,204
Seats won by whole quotients in district	9	9	9
Seats won by residuals in national pool	0	0	0

1972				1976				1979			
	Party Total	Percent- age	Number of Seats		Party Total	Percent- age	Number of Seats		Party Total	Percent- age	Number of Seats
DC	159,913	29.08	3 -	DC	172,999	29.47	3 -	DC	164,226	28.06	3 -
PCI	251,951	45.82	5 -	PCI	293,040	49.91	5 -	PCI	285,289	48.75	5 -
PSI	50,167	9.12	1 -	PSI	60,510	10.31	1 -	PSI	59,938	10.24	1 -
PSDI	21,142	3.85	- -	PSDI	11,675	1.99	- -	PSDI	12,896	2.20	- -
PSIUP	13,399	2.44	- -	DP	7,294	1.24	- -	PdUP	7,309	1.25	- -
PLI	10,299	1.87	- -	PRad	3,605	0.61	- -	PRad	10,997	1.88	- -
PR1	12,344	2.25	- -	PLI	2,874	0.49	- -	PLI	5,004	0.86	- -
MSI-DN	26,824	4.88	- -	PRI	14,896	2.54	- -	PRI	14,571	2.49	- -
				MSI-DN	20,179	3.44	- -	MSI-DN	19,680	3.36	- -
Others	3,805	0.69	- -	Others	0	0	- -	Others	5,338	0.91	- -

25X1

**Table A-49**

**17 Ancona-Pesaro-Macerata-Ascoli Piceno**

	1972	1976	1979
District population	1,347,489	1,359,907	1,409,845
Eligible voters in district	975,043	1,049,455	1,102,747
Actual votes (percent turnout)	928,921 (95.27)	1,003,303 (95.60)	1,023,232 (92.79)
Blank and invalid ballots (percent of total)	30,449 (3.28)	26,602 (2.65)	43,735 (4.27)
District percent national vote	2.69	2.66	2.68
Seats assigned district	17	16	16
Electoral quotient	47,288	54,261	54,416
Seats won by whole quotients in district	14	15	13
Seats won by residuals in national pool	3	1	4

1972				1976				1979			
	Party Total	Percent- age	Number of Seats		Party Total	Percent- age	Number of Seats		Party Total	Percent- age	Number of Seats
DC	354,708	39.48	7 -	DC	381,223	39.03	7 -	DC	371,036	37.88	6 + 1
PCI	295,156	32.85	6 -	PCI	389,556	39.89	7 -	PCI	373,016	38.08	6 + 1
PSI	70,808	7.88	1 -	PSI	80,877	8.28	1 -	PSI	77,604	7.92	1 -
PSDI	39,321	4.38	- + 1	PSDI	27,957	2.86	- -	PSDI	27,494	2.81	- -
PSIUP	22,721	2.53	- -	DP	10,826	1.11	- -	PdUP	15,212	1.55	- -
PLI	21,817	2.43	- -	PRad	7,035	0.72	- -	PRad	22,829	2.33	- -
PRI	33,525	3.73	- + 1	PLI	6,560	0.67	- -	PLI	9,772	1.00	- -
MSI-DN	47,109	5.24	- + 1	PRI	33,588	3.44	- -	PRI	34,627	3.54	- + 1
				MSI-DN	39,079	4.00	- + 1	MSI-DN	38,757	3.96	- + 1
Others	13,307	1.48	- -	Others	0	0	- -	Others	9,150	0.93	- -

25X1

Table A-50

## 18 Perugia-Terni-Rieti

	1972	1976	1979
District population	957,150	918,945	949,252
Eligible voters in district	672,740	718,739	743,491
Actual votes (percent turnout)	644,035 (95.73)	688,905 (95.85)	696,423 (93.67)
Blank and invalid ballots (percent of total)	18,533 (2.88)	16,068 (2.33)	23,277 (3.34)
District percent national vote	1.87	1.83	1.83
Seats assigned district	12	11	11
Electoral quotient	44,678	51,756	51,780
Seats won by whole quotients in district	10	10	10
Seats won by residuals in national pool	1	2	0

1972				1976				1979			
	Party Total	Percent- age	Number of Seats		Party Total	Percent- age	Number of Seats		Party Total	Percent- age	Number of Seats
DC	201,618	32.23	4 -	DC	215,618	32.05	4 -	DC	209,524	31.13	4 -
PCI	244,642	39.11	5 -	PCI	303,770	45.15	5 + 1	PCI	289,598	43.02	5 -
PSI	60,907	9.74	1 -	PSI	74,571	11.08	1 -	PSI	75,187	11.17	1 -
PSDI	24,117	3.86	- -	PSDI	11,008	1.64	- -	PSDI	12,792	1.90	- -
PSIUP	16,842	2.69	- -	DP	6,446	0.96	- -	PdUP	8,526	1.27	- -
PLI	10,414	1.67	- -	PRad	3,865	0.57	- -	PRad	13,671	2.03	- -
PRI	16,005	2.56	- -	PLI	3,054	0.45	- -	PLI	5,115	0.76	- -
MSI-DN	44,362	7.09	- + 1	PRI	17,046	2.53	- -	PRI	17,736	2.63	- -
				MSI-DN	37,182	5.53	- + 1	MSI-DN	34,447	5.12	- -
Others	6,595	1.05	- -	Others	277	0.04	- -	Others	6,550	0.97	- -

25X1

**Table A-51**

**19 Rome-Viterbo-Latina-Frosinone**

	1972	1976	1979
District population	3,796,552	4,546,320	4,893,332
Eligible voters in district	3,045,065	3,413,948	3,584,800
Actual votes (percent turnout)	2,868,464 (94.20)	3,220,885 (94.34)	3,275,483 (91.37)
Blank and invalid ballots (percent of total)	70,054 (2.44)	61,704 (1.91)	83,191 (2.54)
District percent national vote	8.32	8.55	8.59
Seats assigned district	47	53	53
Electoral quotient	57,110	57,439	58,041
Seats won by whole quotients in district	44	50	49
Seats won by residuals in national pool	4	5	5

1972				1976				1979			
	Party Total	Percent- age	Number of Seats		Party Total	Percent- age	Number of Seats		Party Total	Percent- age	Number of Seats
DC	963,134	34.42	16 + 1	DC	1,127,263	35.68	19 -	DC	1,164,944	36.49	20 -
PCI	761,554	27.21	13 -	PCI	1,138,531	36.04	19 + 1	PCI	965,403	30.24	16 -
PSI	212,354	7.59	3 + 1	PSI	240,205	7.60	4 -	PSI	274,332	8.59	4 + 1
PSDI	154,616	5.53	2 + 1	PSDI	105,134	3.33	1 + 1	PSDI	109,405	3.43	1 + 1
PSIUP	27,981	1.00	- -	DP	44,528	1.41	- + 1	PdUP	29,135	0.91	- + 1
PLI	115,268	4.12	2 -	PRad	57,709	1.83	1 -	PRad	166,628	5.22	2 + 1
PRI	96,232	3.44	1 + 1	PLI	38,581	1.22	- + 1	PLI	61,262	1.92	1 -
MSI-DN	413,437	14.77	7 -	PRI	104,961	3.32	1 + 1	PRI	106,133	3.33	1 + 1
				MSI-DN	298,643	9.45	5 -	MSI-DN	257,877	8.08	4 -
Others	53,834	1.92	- -	Others	3,626	0.12	- -	Others	57,173	1.79	- -

25X1

Table A-52

## 20 L'Aquila-Pescara-Chieti-Teramo

	1972	1976	1979
District population	1,206,266	1,166,694	1,233,397
Eligible voters in district	847,753	909,082	996,896
Actual votes (percent turnout)	735,237 (86.73)	811,500 (89.27)	826,424 (82.90)
Blank and invalid ballots (percent of total)	20,966 (2.85)	21,562 (2.66)	34,771 (4.21)
District percent national vote	2.13	2.15	2.17
Seats assigned district	15	14	14
Electoral quotient	42,015	49,371	49,478
Seats won by whole quotients in district	14	14	12
Seats won by residuals in national pool	1	0	2

1972				1976				1979			
	Party Total	Percent- age	Number of Seats		Party Total	Percent- age	Number of Seats		Party Total	Percent- age	Number of Seats
DC	344,061	48.17	8 -	DC	349,123	44.20	7 -	DC	361,367	45.65	7 -
PCI	192,601	26.96	4 -	PCI	275,536	34.88	5 -	PCI	246,080	31.08	4 + 1
PSI	49,004	6.86	1 -	PSI	61,325	7.76	1 -	PSI	59,751	7.55	1 -
PSDI	28,107	3.94	- + 1	PSDI	19,943	2.52	- -	PSDI	20,536	2.60	- -
PSIUP	9,791	1.37	- -	DP	10,308	1.31	- -	PdUP	8,372	1.06	- -
PLI	14,671	2.05	- -	PRad	4,865	0.62	- -	PRad	18,316	2.31	- -
PRI	11,467	1.61	- -	PLI	5,083	0.64	- -	PLI	6,829	0.86	- -
MSI-DN	54,646	7.65	1 -	PRI	13,744	1.74	- -	PRI	14,123	1.78	- -
				MSI-DN	50,011	6.33	1 -	MSI-DN	46,195	5.84	- + 1
Others	9,923	1.39	- -	Others	0	0	- -	Others	10,084	1.27	- -

25X1

**Table A-53**

**21 Campobasso-Isernia**

	1972	1976	1979
District population	358,052	319,807	332,914
Eligible voters in district	236,701	247,977	285,372
Actual votes (percent turnout)	194,373 (82.12)	211,452 (85.27)	213,070 (74.66)
Blank and invalid ballots (percent of total)	7,382 (3.80)	7,574 (3.58)	10,262 (4.82)
District percent national vote	0.56	0.56	0.56
Seats assigned district	4	4	4
Electoral quotient	31,165	33,979	33,801
Seats won by whole quotients in district	4	4	4
Seats won by residuals in national pool	0	0	0

1972				1976				1979			
	Party Total	Percent- age	Number of Seats		Party Total	Percent- age	Number of Seats		Party Total	Percent- age	Number of Seats
DC	102,959	55.06	3 -	DC	103,396	50.72	3 -	DC	110,990	54.73	3 -
PCI	32,430	17.34	1 -	PCI	52,956	25.97	1 -	PCI	43,658	21.53	1 -
PSI	9,484	5.07	- -	PSI	13,618	6.68	- -	PSI	14,927	7.36	- -
PSDI	13,455	7.19	- -	PSDI	7,349	3.60	- -	PSDI	5,614	2.77	- -
PSIUP	3,097	1.66	- -	DP	3,266	1.60	- -	PdUP	3,557	1.75	- -
PLI	5,383	2.88	- -	PRad	1,000	0.49	- -	PRad	3,915	1.93	- -
PRI	4,555	2.44	- -	PLI	3,885	1.91	- -	PLI	4,430	2.18	- -
MSI-DN	13,403	7.17	- -	PRI	6,220	3.05	- -	PRI	4,203	2.07	- -
				MSI-DN	12,188	5.98	- -	MSI-DN	10,535	5.20	- -
Others	2,225	1.19	- -	Others	0	0	- -	Others	979	0.48	- -

25X1

Table A-54

## 22 Naples-Caserta

	1972	1976	1979
District population	3,070,570	3,387,888	3,668,673
Eligible voters in district	2,042,059	2,319,555	2,437,809
Actual votes (percent turnout)	1,858,596 (91.02)	2,074,915 (89.45)	2,131,678 (87.44)
Blank and invalid ballots (percent of total)	53,833 (2.90)	37,365 (1.80)	76,790 (3.60)
District percent national vote	5.39	5.51	5.59
Seats assigned district	38	39	39
Electoral quotient	45,119	49,696	50,119
Seats won by whole quotients in district	36	36	36
Seats won by residuals in national pool	2	3	2

1972				1976				1979			
	Party Total	Percent- age	Number of Seats		Party Total	Percent- age	Number of Seats		Party Total	Percent- age	Number of Seats
DC	641,626	35.55	14 -	DC	739,177	36.28	14 + 1	DC	801,798	39.02	15 + 1
PCI	460,661	25.53	10 -	PCI	730,693	35.86	14 -	PCI	556,615	27.09	11 -
PSI	138,198	7.66	3 -	PSI	146,968	7.21	2 + 1	PSI	177,389	8.63	3 -
PSDI	82,918	4.59	1 + 1	PSDI	59,694	2.93	1 -	PSDI	83,805	4.08	1 -
PSIUP	21,526	1.19	- -	DP	32,127	1.58	- + 1	PdUP	25,571	1.24	- + 1
PLI	42,568	2.36	- + 1	PRad	16,429	0.81	- -	PRad	74,699	3.64	1 -
PRI	47,471	2.63	1 -	PLI	22,311	1.09	- -	PLI	24,362	1.19	- -
MSI-DN	335,104	18.57	7 -	PRI	53,408	2.62	1 -	PRI	60,240	2.93	1 -
				MSI-DN	233,566	11.46	4 -	MSI-DN	207,990	10.12	4 -
Others	34,691	1.92	- -	Others	3,177	0.16	- -	Others	42,419	2.06	- -

25X1

**Table A-55**

**23 Benevento-Avellino-Salerno**

	1972	1976	1979
District population	1,690,189	1,671,460	1,751,717
Eligible voters in district	1,117,057	1,220,406	1,288,593
Actual votes (percent turnout)	946,045 (84.69)	1,046,082 (85.72)	1,085,418 (84.23)
Blank and invalid ballots (percent of total)	30,095 (3.18)	28,122 (2.69)	60,530 (5.58)
District percent national vote	2.74	2.78	2.84
Seats assigned district	21	19	19
Electoral quotient	39,823	48,474	48,804
Seats won by whole quotients in district	19	17	17
Seats won by residuals in national pool	4	1	1

1972				1976				1979			
	Party Total	Percent- age	Number of Seats		Party Total	Percent- age	Number of Seats		Party Total	Percent- age	Number of Seats
DC	425,374	46.44	10 + 1	DC	467,888	45.96	9 -	DC	497,813	48.57	10 -
PCI	157,698	17.22	3 + 1	PCI	257,129	25.26	5 -	PCI	211,147	20.60	4 -
PSI	82,553	9.01	2 -	PSI	90,058	8.85	1 -	PSI	111,973	10.93	2 -
PSDI	43,012	4.70	1 -	PSDI	43,459	4.27	- + 1	PSDI	44,958	4.39	- + 1
PSIUP	18,728	2.04	- -	DP	13,096	1.29	- -	PdUP	14,724	1.44	- -
PLI	29,554	3.23	- + 1	PRad	4,950	0.49	- -	PRad	18,677	1.82	- -
PRI	25,028	2.73	- + 1	PLI	17,054	1.67	- -	PLI	12,966	1.27	- -
MSI-DN	120,575	13.16	3 -	PRI	24,585	2.41	- -	PRI	19,479	1.90	- -
				MSI-DN	99,741	9.80	2 -	MSI-DN	74,446	7.26	1 -
Others	13,428	1.47	- -	Others	0	0	- -	Others	18,705	1.82	- -

25X1

Table A-56

## 24 Bari-Foggia

	1972	1976	1979
District population	1,928,531	2,008,580	2,197,950
Eligible voters in district	1,234,562	1,377,333	1,474,834
Actual votes (percent turnout)	1,121,789 (90.87)	1,258,487 (91.37)	1,284,387 (87.09)
Blank and invalid ballots (percent of total)	32,909 (2.93)	34,093 (2.71)	47,085 (3.67)
District percent national vote	3.25	3.34	3.37
Seats assigned district	24	23	23
Electoral quotient	41,880	48,975	49,492
Seats won by whole quotients in district	23	22	21
Seats won by residuals in national pool	1	1	2

1972				1976				1979			
	Party Total	Percent- age	Number of Seats		Party Total	Percent- age	Number of Seats		Party Total	Percent- age	Number of Seats
DC	435,694	40.01	10 -	DC	497,345	40.62	10 -	DC	521,409	42.14	10 -
PCI	301,295	27.67	7 -	PCI	398,490	32.55	8 -	PCI	335,671	27.13	6 + 1
PSI	111,373	10.23	2 + 1	PSI	110,597	9.03	2 -	PSI	126,313	10.21	2 -
PSDI	44,730	4.11	1 -	PSDI	41,317	3.37	- + 1	PSDI	51,469	4.16	1 -
PSIUP	14,110	1.30	- -	DP	12,729	1.04	- -	PdUP	12,131	0.98	- -
PLI	23,589	2.17	- -	PRad	8,781	0.72	- -	PRad	31,407	2.54	- + 1
PRI	15,691	1.44	- -	PLI	12,920	1.05	- -	PLI	18,874	1.52	- -
MSI-DN	133,305	12.24	3 -	PRI	22,352	1.83	- -	PRI	23,712	1.92	- -
				MSI-DN	119,863	9.79	2 -	MSI-DN	102,668	8.30	2 -
Others	9,093	0.83	- -	Others	0	0	- -	Others	13,648	1.10	- -

25X1

Table A-57

25 Lecce-Brindisi-Taranto

	1972	1976	1979
District population	1,492,686	1,574,207	1,691,472
Eligible voters in district	1,010,147	1,141,404	1,202,198
Actual votes (percent turnout)	914,691 (90.55)	1,043,626 (91.43)	1,069,197 (88.94)
Blank and invalid ballots (percent of total)	27,657 (3.02)	30,048 (2.88)	41,853 (3.91)
District percent national vote	2.65	2.77	2.80
Seats assigned district	19	18	18
Electoral quotient	42,239	50,678	51,367
Seats won by whole quotients in district	17	16	16
Seats won by residuals in national pool	1	2	2

1972				1976				1979			
	Party Total	Percent- age	Number of Seats		Party Total	Percent- age	Number of Seats		Party Total	Percent- age	Number of Seats
DC	386,808	43.61	9 -	DC	435,890	43.01	8 -	DC	448,165	43.62	8 + 1
PCI	206,149	23.24	4 + 1	PCI	310,484	30.63	6 -	PCI	269,743	26.26	5 -
PSI	87,013	9.81	2 -	PSI	94,200	9.29	1 + 1	PSI	104,474	10.17	2 -
PSDI	27,081	3.05	- -	PSDI	28,049	2.77	- -	PSDI	36,067	3.51	- -
PSIUP	5,861	0.66	- -	DP	12,881	1.27	- -	PdUP	13,643	1.33	- -
PLI	18,999	2.14	- -	PRad	5,786	0.57	- -	PRad	18,748	1.82	- -
PRI	22,404	2.53	- -	PLI	6,410	0.63	- -	PLI	11,178	1.09	- -
MSI-DN	114,225	12.88	2 -	PRI	21,339	2.11	- -	PRI	20,431	1.99	- -
				MSI-DN	97,558	9.63	1 + 1	MSI-DN	92,580	9.01	1 + 1
Others	18,494	2.08	- -	Others	981	0.09	- -	Others	12,315	1.20	- -

25X1

Table A-58

## 26 Potenza-Matera

	1972	1976	1979
District population	644,297	603,064	618,312
Eligible voters in district	387,536	423,726	447,636
Actual votes (percent turnout)	340,466 (87.85)	375,119 (88.53)	378,467 (84.55)
Blank and invalid ballots (percent of total)	11,992 (3.52)	14,164 (3.78)	19,728 (5.21)
District percent national vote	0.98	0.99	0.99
Seats assigned district	8	7	7
Electoral quotient	32,847	40,106	39,859
Seats won by whole quotients in district	6	7	5
Seats won by residuals in national pool	2	1	2

1972				1976				1979			
	Party Total	Percent- age	Number of Seats		Party Total	Percent- age	Number of Seats		Party Total	Percent- age	Number of Seats
DC	161,476	49.16	4 + 1	DC	160,491	44.46	4 -	DC	156,485	43.62	3 + 1
PCI	81,858	24.92	2 -	PCI	120,341	33.34	3 -	PCI	103,572	28.87	2 -
PSI	32,169	9.79	- + 1	PSI	37,065	10.27	- + 1	PSI	39,296	10.95	- + 1
PSDI	15,948	4.86	- -	PSDI	8,842	2.45	- -	PSDI	12,770	3.56	- -
PSIUP	5,856	1.78	- -	DP	4,317	1.20	- -	PdUP	7,104	1.98	- -
PLI	4,630	1.41	- -	PRad	1,572	0.44	- -	PRad	5,949	1.66	- -
PRI	2,850	0.87	- -	PLI	2,454	0.68	- -	PLI	3,293	0.92	- -
MSI-DN	22,531	6.86	- -	PRI	3,367	0.93	- -	PRI	4,410	1.23	- -
				MSI-DN	21,778	6.03	- -	MSI-DN	20,870	5.82	- -
Others	1,156	0.35	- -	Others	728	0.20	- -	Others	4,990	1.39	- -

25X1

**Table A-59**

**27 Catanzaro-Cosenza-Reggio Calabria**

	1972	1976	1979
District population	2,045,047	1,988,051	2,067,269
Eligible voters in district	1,247,229	1,377,466	1,508,930
Actual votes (percent turnout)	1,042,914 (83.62)	1,161,150 (84.30)	1,168,782 (77.46)
Blank and invalid ballots (percent of total)	-39,084 (3.75)	42,129 (3.63)	54,883 (4.70)
District percent national vote	3.02	3.08	3.06
Seats assigned district	25	23	23
Electoral quotient	37,178	44,760	44,555
Seats won by whole quotients in district	22	21	20
Seats won by residuals in national pool	2	2	3

1972				1976				1979			
	Party Total	Percent- age	Number of Seats		Party Total	Percent- age	Number of Seats		Party Total	Percent- age	Number of Seats
DC	392,790	39.13	10 -	DC	440,458	39.36	9 + 1	DC	475,879	42.72	10 -
PCI	260,038	25.91	6 + 1	PCI	368,406	32.92	8 -	PCI	297,384	26.70	6 -
PSI	124,553	12.41	3 -	PSI	128,732	11.50	2 + 1	PSI	142,640	12.81	3 -
PSDI	33,247	3.31	- + 1	PSDI	29,889	2.67	- -	PSDI	35,712	3.21	- + 1
PSIUP	20,564	2.05	- -	DP	16,773	1.50	- -	PdUP	19,526	1.75	- + 1
PLI	16,394	1.63	- -	PRad	5,538	0.50	- -	PRad	21,612	1.94	- -
PRI	20,271	2.02	- -	PLI	7,652	0.68	- -	PLI	7,364	0.66	- -
MSI-DN	122,381	12.19	3 -	PRI	23,602	2.11	- -	PRI	18,540	1.66	- -
				MSI-DN	97,971	8.76	2 -	MSI-DN	77,910	6.99	1 + 1
Others	13,592	1.35	- -	Others	0	0	- -	Others	17,332	1.56	- -

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25X1

Table A-60

## 28 Catania-Messina-Siracusa-Ragusa-Enna

	1972	1976	1979
District population	2,406,474	2,415,193	2,528,691
Eligible voters in district	1,599,371	1,758,700	1,870,890
Actual votes (percent turnout)	1,388,561 (86.82)	1,541,462 (87.65)	1,547,497 (82.71)
Blank and invalid ballots (percent of total)	54,906 (3.95)	54,749 (3.55)	116,235 (7.51)
District percent national vote	4.03	4.09	4.05
Seats assigned district	30	28	28
Electoral quotient	41,676	49,557	47,708
Seats won by whole quotients in district	27	25	24
Seats won by residuals in national pool	3	4	3

1972				1976				1979			
	Party Total	Percent- age	Number of Seats		Party Total	Percent- age	Number of Seats		Party Total	Percent- age	Number of Seats
DC	519,531	38.96	12 -	DC	612,595	41.20	12 -	DC	606,836	42.40	12 -
PCI	275,725	20.67	6 + 1	PCI	410,588	27.62	8 -	PCI	309,154	21.60	6 -
PSI	101,710	7.63	2 -	PSI	124,241	8.36	2 -	PSI	144,528	10.10	3 -
PSDI	44,527	3.34	1 -	PSDI	47,268	3.18	- + 1	PSDI	70,754	4.94	1 -
PSIUP	39,135	2.93	- -	DP	15,553	1.04	- -	PdUP	15,942	1.11	- -
PLI	50,663	3.80	1 -	PRad	12,948	0.87	- -	PRad	39,526	2.76	- + 1
PRI	36,704	2.75	- + 1	PLI	29,253	1.97	- + 1	PLI	26,883	1.88	- -
MSI-DN	243,661	18.27	5 + 1	PRI	43,220	2.91	- + 1	PRI	46,902	3.28	- + 1
				MSI-DN	189,080	12.72	3 + 1	MSI-DN	135,534	9.47	2 + 1
Others	21,999	1.65	- -	Others	1,967	0.13	- -	Others	35,203	2.46	- -

25X1

**Table A-61**

**29 Palermo-Trapani-Agrigento-Caltanissetta**

	1972	1976	1979
District population	2,314,527	2,265,522	2,441,904
Eligible voters in district	1,515,157	1,663,595	1,783,366
Actual votes (percent turnout)	1,253,286 (82.72)	1,393,628 (83.77)	1,388,416 (77.85)
Blank and invalid ballots (percent of total)	56,585 (4.51)	55,815 (4.01)	73,605 (5.30)
District percent national vote	3.63	3.70	3.64
Seats assigned district	29	26	26
Electoral quotient	38,603	47,779	46,957
Seats won by whole quotients in district	26	23	22
Seats won by residuals in national pool	4	2	4

1972				1976				1979			
	Party Total	Percent- age	Number of Seats		Party Total	Percent- age	Number of Seats		Party Total	Percent- age	Number of Seats
DC	487,342	40.72	12 + 1	DC	580,189	43.37	12 -	DC	594,800	45.24	12 -
PCI	262,524	21.94	6 + 1	PCI	366,743	27.41	7 -	PCI	267,999	20.38	5 + 1
PSI	115,565	9.66	2 + 1	PSI	130,116	9.72	2 -	PSI	131,539	10.01	2 + 1
PSDI	48,178	4.03	1 -	PSDI	43,830	3.28	- + 1	PSDI	57,089	4.34	1 -
PSIUP	27,059	2.26	- -	DP	15,633	1.17	- -	PdUP	16,025	1.22	- -
PLI	38,554	3.22	- + 1	PRad	12,790	0.96	- -	PRad	42,724	3.25	- + 1
PRI	40,357	3.37	1 -	PLI	19,634	1.47	- -	PLI	25,567	1.94	- -
MSI-DN	158,424	13.24	4 -	PRI	43,775	3.27	- + 1	PRI	60,212	4.58	1 -
				MSI-DN	122,691	9.17	2 -	MSI-DN	83,924	6.38	1 + 1
Others	18,698	1.56	- -	Others	2,412	0.18	- -	Others	34,932	2.66	- -

25X1

Table A-62

30 Cagliari-Sassari-Nuoro (Oristano) <sup>a</sup>

	1972	1976	1979
District population	1,419,362	1,473,800	1,592,964
Eligible voters in district	916,949	1,046,035	1,101,657
Actual votes (percent turnout)	826,143 (90.10)	945,508 (90.39)	955,134 (86.70)
Blank and invalid ballots (percent of total)	24,525 (2.97)	15,380 (1.63)	29,715 (3.11)
District percent national vote	2.40	2.51	2.50
Seats assigned district	18	17	17
Electoral quotient	40,080	48,954	48,706
Seats won by whole quotients in district	16	15	15
Seats won by residuals in national pool	1	1	2

1972				1976				1979			
	Party Total	Percent- age	Number of Seats		Party Total	Percent- age	Number of Seats		Party Total	Percent- age	Number of Seats
DC	327,901	40.91	8 -	DC	370,682	39.85	7 -	DC	352,689	38.11	7 -
PCI	202,593	25.27	5 -	PCI	330,585	35.54	6 + 1	PCI	293,535	31.72	6 -
PSI	65,289	8.14	1 -	PSI	86,529	9.30	1 -	PSI	82,345	8.90	1 + 1
PSDI	30,937	3.86	- + 1	PSDI	23,959	2.57	- -	PSDI	30,142	3.26	- -
PSIUP	22,626	2.82	- -	DP	14,584	1.57	- -	PdUP	12,236	1.32	- -
PLI	26,655	3.33	- -	PRad	7,792	0.84	- -	PRad	31,918	3.45	- + 1
PRI	19,993	2.49	- -	PLI	10,294	1.11	- -	PLI	12,100	1.31	- -
MSI-DN	90,547	11.30	2 -	PRI	18,573	2.00	- -	PRI	17,703	1.91	- -
				MSI-DN	67,130	7.22	1 -	MSI-DN	57,860	6.25	1 -
Others	15,077	1.88	- -	Others	0	0	- -	Others	34,891	3.77	- -

<sup>a</sup> The Province of Oristano was created in 1975.



25X1

Table A-63

31 Valle d'Aosta

	1972	1976	1979
District population	100,599	109,150	114,537
Eligible voters in district	79,053	86,031	87,821
Actual votes (percent turnout)	74,308 (94.00)	79,660 (92.59)	80,647 (91.83)
Blank and invalid ballots (percent of total)	5,402 (7.27)	4,369 (5.48)	7,145 (8.86)
District percent national vote	0.22	0.21	0.21
Seats assigned district	1	1	1
Electoral quotient	NONE	NONE	NONE
Seat won by simple majority	1	1	1

1972	Party Total	Percent- age	Number of Seats	1976	Party Total	Percent- age	Number of Seats	1979	Party Total	Percent- age	Number of Seats
DC	34,083	49.47	1 -	PCI	26,748	35.53	1 -	DC	13,442	18.29	- -
PCI	28,886	41.92	- -	PSI				PSDI			
PSI	0	0	- -	PDUP				PRI			
PSDI	0	0	- -	DC	24,091	32.00	- -	US <sup>a</sup>	23,909	32.53	- -
PSIUP	0	0	- -	PRI				UV <sup>b</sup>	33,250	42.24	1 -
PLI	3,462	5.02	- -	UV <sup>b</sup>				UVP <sup>c</sup>			
PRI	0	0	- -	UVP <sup>c</sup>				DP <sup>d</sup>			
MSI-DN	2,475	3.59	- -	RV				PLI			
				DP <sup>d</sup>	20,234	26.87	- -	MSI-DN	2,077	2.82	- -
				UVP-							
				MReg <sup>e</sup>							
				PRad	2,020	2.68	- -				
				MSI-DN	2,198	2.92	- -				
Others	0	0	- -					Others	824	1.12	- -

<sup>a</sup> *Unita Sinistra.*

<sup>b</sup> *Union Valdotaïne.*

<sup>c</sup> *Union Valdotaïne Progressiste.*

<sup>d</sup> *Democrazia Popolare.*

<sup>e</sup> *Union Valdotaïne Progressiste pour la Reunification des Mouvements Regionalistes.*



25X1

Table A-64

## 32 Trieste

	1972	1976	1979
District population	298,645	300,304	294,062
Eligible voters in district	235,375	241,074	239,456
Actual votes (percent turnout)	224,188 (95.25)	231,579 (96.06)	224,724 (93.85)
Blank and invalid ballots (percent of total)	6,303 (2.81)	4,771 (2.06)	6,604 (2.94)
District percent national vote	0.65	0.61	0.59
Seats assigned district	4	4	4
Electoral quotient	36,314	37,801	36,353
Seats won by whole quotients in district	3	3	3
Seats won by residuals in national pool	1	0	0

1972				1976				1979			
	Party Total	Percent- age	Number of Seats		Party Total	Percent- age	Number of Seats		Party Total	Percent- age	Number of Seats
DC	78,270	35.92	2 -	DC	82,615	36.42	2 -	DC	50,854	23.32	1 -
PCI	54,345	24.94	1 -	PCI	65,007	28.66	1 -	PCI	49,901	22.88	1 -
PSI	14,251	6.54	- -	PSI	15,776	6.95	- -	PSI	8,338	3.82	- -
PSDI	13,642	6.26	- -	PSDI	7,025	3.10	- -	PSDI	5,127	2.35	- -
PSIUP	2,850	1.31	- -	DP	2,239	0.99	- -	PdUP	1,490	0.68	- -
PLI	16,959	7.79	- -	PRad	6,931	3.06	- -	PRad	13,572	6.22	- -
PRI	9,443	4.33	- -	PLI	4,504	1.98	- -	PLI	2,193	1.01	- -
MSI-DN	27,350	12.55	- + 1	PRI	10,357	4.57	- -	PRI	3,800	1.74	- -
				MSI-DN	23,064	10.17	- -	MSI-DN	13,133	6.02	- -
								AT <sup>a</sup>	62,704	28.75	1 -
Others	775	0.36	- -	Others	9,290	4.10	- -	Others	7,008	3.21	- -

<sup>a</sup> Associazione Triestina.

25X1

## Senate

Table A-65

## 1 Piedmont

	1972	1976	1979
Region population	4,434,802	4,541,271	4,538,020
Eligible voters in region	2,987,409	3,029,886	3,067,601
Actual votes cast (percent of total)	2,842,430 (95.15)	2,874,220 (94.86)	2,866,334 (93.44)
Blank and invalid ballots (percent of total)	148,364 (5.22)	113,841 (3.96)	183,500 (6.40)
Regional percent of national vote	9.04	8.83	8.69
Seats assigned to region	24	25	25
Candidates winning by 65-percent quorum	0	0	0

1972					1976					1979				
	Party Total	Percent- age	Number of Seats	Highest Personal Preference Percent for Winning Candidates		Party Total	Percent- age	Number of Seats	Highest Personal Preference Percent for Winning Candidates		Party Total	Percent- age	Number of Seats	Highest Personal Preference Percent for Winning Candidates
DC	983,606	36.51	9	51.90	DC	1,004,108	36.38	10	54.17	DC	939,229	35.01	9	50.61
PCI- PSIUP	736,706	27.34	7	36.08	PCI	957,961	34.70	9	39.76	PCI	854,527	31.85	9	40.21
PSI	309,165	11.48	3	16.71	PSI	291,131	10.55	2	13.11	PSI	282,547	10.53	3	13.18
PSDI	206,620	7.67	2	10.52	PSDI	139,463	5.05	1	7.48	PSDI	152,946	5.70	1	7.52
PRI	96,267	3.57	0	0	PRI	124,986	4.53	1	8.23	PRI	124,819	4.65	1	8.07
PLI	230,796	8.57	2	18.51	PLI	99,920	3.62	1	8.51	PLI	140,307	5.23	1	15.69
MSI-DN	130,906	4.86	1	5.69	PRad	35,390	1.28	0	0	PRad	79,675	2.97	0	0
					MSI-DN	107,420	3.89	1	7.87	MSI-DN	94,424	3.52	1	6.31
Others	0	0	0	0	Others	0	0	0	0	Others	14,360	0.54	0	0

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Confidential

Confidential

25X1

Confidential

Table A-66

## 2 Valle d'Aosta

	1972	1976	1979
Region population	109,252	113,720	114,537
Eligible voters in region	72,743	75,473	77,066
Actual votes cast (percent of total)	66,555 (91.49)	69,059 (91.50)	70,226 (91.12)
Blank and invalid ballots (percent of total)	5,597 (8.41)	3,964 (5.74)	8,026 (11.43)
Regional percent of national vote	0.21	0.21	0.21
Seats assigned to region	1	1	1

1972	Party Total	Percent- age	Number of Seats	Highest Personal Preference Percent for Winning Candidate <sup>a</sup>	1976	Party Total	Percent- age	Number of Seats	Highest Personal Preference Percent for Winning Candidate <sup>a</sup>	1979	Party Total	Percent- age	Number of Seats	Highest Personal Preference Percent for Winning Candidate <sup>a</sup>
DC RV <sup>b</sup> UV <sup>c</sup> PSDI	30,296	49.70	1		DC RV <sup>b</sup> UV <sup>c</sup> UVP <sup>d</sup> PRI	22,917	35.21	1		UV <sup>c</sup> UVP <sup>d</sup> DP <sup>e</sup> PLI	37,082	59.62	1	
PLI	2,926	4.80	0		PCI PSI PdUP	21,072	32.37	0		US <sup>f</sup>	19,814	31.85	0	
MSI-DN	2,073	3.40	0		MSI-DN	1,806	2.77	0		MSI-DN	2,003	3.22	0	
DP <sup>e</sup>	25,663	42.10	0		DP <sup>e</sup> UVP MR <sup>g</sup>	17,699	27.19	0						
					PRad	1,601	2.46	0		Others	3,301	5.31	0	

<sup>a</sup> The region's one Senator is elected by majority vote.<sup>b</sup> Raggruppamento Valdese.<sup>c</sup> Union Valdotaïne.<sup>d</sup> Union Valdotaïne Progressiste.<sup>e</sup> Democrazia Popolare.<sup>f</sup> Union Sinistra.<sup>g</sup> Union Valdotaïne Progressiste pour la Reunification des Mouvements Regionalistes.

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Table A-67

## 3 Lombardy

	1972	1976	1979
Region population	8,526,718	8,837,656	8,929,703
Eligible voters in region	5,375,903	5,578,858	5,724,503
Actual votes cast (percent of total)	5,169,312 (96.16)	5,355,016 (95.99)	5,442,167 (95.06)
Blank and invalid ballots (percent of total)	198,653 (3.84)	153,955 (2.87)	232,198 (4.27)
Regional percent of national vote	16.44	16.45	16.51
Seats assigned to region	45	48	48
Candidates winning by 65-percent quorum	0	0	0

1972	Party Total	Percent- age	Number of Seats	Highest Personal Preference Percent for Winning Candidate	1976	Party Total	Percent- age	Number of Seats	Highest Personal Preference Percent for Winning Candidate	1979	Party Total	Percent- age	Number of Seats	Highest Personal Preference Percent for Winning Candidate
DC	2,072,677	41.70	20	64.24	DC	2,171,018	41.74	21	61.90	DC	2,117,789	40.65	21	59.34
PCI- PSIUP	1,219,216	24.53	12	39.63	PCI	1,598,078	30.73	16	43.38	PCI	1,530,781	29.38	15	41.21
PSI	644,706	12.97	6	17.38	PSI	613,429	11.79	6	14.70	PSI	620,900	11.92	6	16.19
PSDI	265,065	5.33	2	8.86	PSDI	183,398	3.53	1	5.62	PSDI	217,704	4.18	2	6.51
PRI	157,474	3.17	1	8.77	PRI	185,901	3.57	1	9.07	PRI	162,090	3.11	1	7.64
PLI	279,909	5.63	2	15.62	PLI	109,046	2.10	1	9.11	PLI	156,745	3.01	1	9.31
MSI-DN	303,817	6.11	2	14.37	PRad	48,679	0.94	0	0	PRad	154,257	2.96	1	5.73
					MSI-DN	213,343	4.10	2	8.75	MSI-DN	186,412	3.58	1	7.08
Others	27,795	0.56	0	0	Others	78,169	1.50	0	0	Others	63,291	1.21	0	0

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Table A-68

## 4 Trentino-Alto Adige

	1972	1976	1979
Region population	839,025	866,377	873,995
Eligible voters in region	508,058	522,012	541,766
Actual votes cast (percent of total)	478,185 (94.12)	493,660 (94.57)	503,218 (92.88)
Blank and invalid ballots (percent of total)	23,246 (4.86)	18,667 (3.78)	22,553 (4.48)
Regional percent of national vote	1.52	1.52	1.53
Seats assigned to region	7	7	7
Candidates winning by 65-percent quorum	0	1	1

1972					1976					1979				
	Party Total	Percent- age	Number of Seats	Highest Personal Preference Percent for Winning Candidate		Party Total	Percent- age	Number of Seats	Highest Personal Preference Percent for Winning Candidate		Party Total	Percent- age	Number of Seats	Highest Personal Preference Percent for Winning Candidate
DC	185,854	40.85	5	59.30	DC	168,375	35.45	3	60.58	DC	160,634	33.42	3	58.35
PCI- PSIUP	35,956	7.90	0	0	PCI	60,820	12.80	1	18.40	PCI	55,372	11.52	1	16.68
PSI	37,968	8.35	0	0	PSI	43,835	9.23	1	13.16	PSI	32,960	6.86	0	0
PSDI	20,604	4.53	0	0	PSDI	23,443	4.93	0	0	PSDI	14,281	2.97	0	0
PRI	7,210	1.59	0	0	PRI					PRI	9,115	1.90	0	0
PLI	8,229	1.81	0	0	PLI					PLI	6,581	1.37	0	0
										PRad	15,897	3.31	0	0
MSI-DN	16,937	3.72	0	0	MSI-DN	12,669	2.67	0	0	MSI-DN	11,706	2.43	0	0
SVP	102,018	22.42	2	60.26	SVP	165,851	34.92	2	80.73	SVP	172,582	35.90	3	86.99
Others	40,163	8.83	0	0	Others	0	0	0	0	Others	1,537	0.32	0	0

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Table A-69

## 5 Venetia

	1972	1976	1979
Region population	4,109,787	4,277,501	4,338,292
Eligible voters in region	2,558,972	2,643,515	2,751,182
Actual votes cast (percent of total)	2,432,578 (95.06)	2,538,380 (96.02)	2,592,521 (94.23)
Blank and invalid ballots (percent of total)	93,090 (3.83)	75,437 (2.97)	114,660 (4.42)
Regional Percent of national vote	7.73	7.80	7.86
Seats assigned to region	23	23	23
Candidates winning by 65-percent quorum	0	0	0

1972	Party Total	Percent- age	Number of Seats	Highest Personal Preference Percent for Winning Candidate	1976	Party Total	Percent- age	Number of Seats	Highest Personal Preference Percent for Winning Candidate	1979	Party Total	Percent- age	Number of Seats	Highest Personal Preference Percent for Winning Candidate
DC	1,245,737	53.25	14	64.74	DC	1,291,119	52.42	14	63.76	DC	1,272,142	51.34	14	62.27
PCI- PSIUP	434,839	18.59	4	33.10	PCI	572,425	23.24	6	38.39	PCI	559,446	22.58	6	36.72
PSI	253,899	10.85	2	15.39	PSI	261,355	10.61	2	13.82	PSI	246,369	9.94	2	12.55
PSDI	157,847	6.75	1	11.07	PSDI	113,270	4.60	1	9.35	PSDI	125,213	5.05	1	11.05
PRI	44,837	1.92	0	0	PRI	81,654	3.32	0	0	PRI	77,889	3.14	0	0
PLI	94,887	4.05	1	7.13	PLI	36,933	1.50	0	0	PLI	56,517	2.28	0	0
PRad					PRad	19,474	0.79	0	0	PRad, NSU <sup>a</sup>	53,637	2.17	0	0
MSI-DN	107,442	4.59	1	7.37	MSI-DN	85,741	3.48	0	0	MSI-DN	75,988	3.07	0	0
Others	0	0	0	0	Others	972	0.04	0	0	Others	10,660	0.43	0	0

<sup>a</sup> Nuova Sinistra Unità.

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Table A-70

## 6 Friuli-Venezia Giulia

	1972	1976	1979
Region population	1,209,810	1,244,553	1,245,611
Eligible voters in region	853,783	860,892	871,346
Actual votes cast (percent of total)	785,641 (92.02)	799,666 (92.89)	805,314 (92.42)
Blank and invalid ballots (percent of total)	25,626 (3.26)	24,046 (3.01)	31,275 (3.88)
Regional percent of national vote	2.50	2.46	2.44
Seats assigned to region	7	7	7
Candidates winning by 65-percent quorum	0	0	0

1972					1976					1979				
	Party Total	Percent- age	Number of Seats	Highest Personal Preference Percent for Winning Candidate		Party Total	Percent- age	Number of Seats	Highest Personal Preference Percent for Winning Candidate		Party Total	Percent- age	Number of Seats	Highest Personal Preference Percent for Winning Candidate
DC	336,358	44.26	4	48.08	DC	348,177	44.89	4	49.66	DC	297,399	38.42	4	44.33
PCI- PSIUP	161,177	21.21	2	31.10	PCI	198,864	25.64	2	33.31	PCI	184,582	23.85	2	30.23
PSI	85,574	11.26	1	19.12	PSI	105,476	13.60	1	21.13	PSI	64,872	8.38	1	13.05
PSDI	67,003	8.82	0	0	PSDI	57,538	7.42	0	0	PSDI	45,219	5.84	0	0
PRI	19,331	2.54	0	0	PRI					PRI	17,871	2.31	0	0
PLI	31,196	4.10	0	0	PLI					PLI	11,102	1.43	0	0
MSI-DN	59,376	7.81	0	0	PRad	11,025	1.42	0	0	PRad	23,596	3.05	0	0
					MSI-DN	45,483	5.86	0	0	MSI-DN	32,665	4.22	0	0
										Asso. Trieste	61,911	8.00	0	0
Others	0	0	0	0	Others	9,057	1.17	0	0	Others	34,822	4.50	0	0

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Table A-71

## 7 Liguria

	1972	1976	1979
Region population	1,848,539	1,867,383	1,852,903
Eligible voters in region	1,306,832	1,309,579	1,321,860
Actual votes cast (percent of total)	1,229,308 (94.07)	1,238,082 (94.54)	1,217,928 (92.14)
Blank and invalid ballots (percent of total)	49,266 (4.01)	43,135 (3.48)	61,422 (5.04)
Regional percent of national vote	3.91	3.80	3.70
Seats assigned to region	11	10	10
Candidates winning by 65-percent quorum	0	0	0

1972					1976					1979				
	Party Total	Percent- age	Number of Seats	Highest Personal Preference Percent for Winning Candidate		Party Total	Percent- age	Number of Seats	Highest Personal Preference Percent for Winning Candidate		Party Total	Percent- age	Number of Seats	Highest Personal Preference Percent for Winning Candidate
DC	396,182	33.57	5	41.66	DC	406,436	34.01	4	40.46	DC	385,723	33.35	4	38.20
PCI- PSIUP	384,235	32.56	5	42.19	PCI	464,506	38.87	4	47.79	PCI	418,257	36.17	5	44.49
PSI	141,798	12.02	1	13.43	PSI	149,102	12.48	1	13.97	PSI	136,492	11.80	1	12.88
PSDI	67,243	5.70	0	0	PSDI	103,406	8.65	1	18.90	PSDI	42,528	3.68	0	0
PRI	41,594	3.52	0	0	PRI					PRI	42,493	3.67	0	0
PLI	76,183	6.46	0	0	PLI					PLI	38,521	3.33	0	0
MSI-DN	72,807	6.17	0	0	PRad	16,581	1.39	0	0	PRad	44,624	3.86	0	0
					MSI-DN	54,916	4.60	0	0	MSI-DN	42,987	3.72	0	0
Others	0	0	0	0	Others	0	0	0	0	Others	4,881	0.42	0	0

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Table A-72

## 8 Emilia-Romagna

	1972	1976	1979
Region population	3,841,103	3,935,834	3,963,151
Eligible voters in region	2,634,221	2,687,822	2,751,273
Actual votes cast (percent of total)	2,545,924 (96.65)	2,615,948 (97.33)	2,638,597 (95.91)
Blank and invalid ballots (percent of total)	82,395 (3.24)	63,123 (2.41)	86,641 (3.28)
Regional percent of national vote	8.09	8.03	8.00
Seats assigned to region	22	22	22
Candidates winning by 65-percent quorum	0	0	0

1972					1976					1979				
	Party Total	Percent- age	Number of Seats	Highest Personal Preference Percent for Winning Candidate		Party Total	Percent- age	Number of Seats	Highest Personal Preference Percent for Winning Candidate		Party Total	Percent- age	Number of Seats	Highest Personal Preference Percent for Winning Candidate
DC	665,881	27.03	6	38.00	DC	740,426	29.00	7	38.92	DC	711,580	27.88	6	37.62
PCI- PSIUP	1,126,206	45.72	11	51.32	PCI	1,231,925	48.26	12	56.72	PCI	1,229,204	48.17	12	53.60
PSI	221,406	8.99	2	13.68	PSI	234,478	9.18	2	14.23	PSI	224,489	8.80	2	13.17
PSDI	153,400	6.23	1	11.54	PSDI	102,563	4.02	0	0	PSDI	110,544	4.33	1	9.39
PRI	98,261	3.99	1	15.14	PRI	114,306	4.48	1	14.44	PRI	114,278	4.48	1	14.35
PLI	95,470	3.86	0	0	PLI	26,157	1.03	0	0	PLI	39,583	1.55	0	0
MSI-DN	102,905	4.18	1	5.94	PRad	19,657	0.77	0	0	PRad, NSU <sup>a</sup>	44,150	1.73	0	0
					MSI-DN	80,247	3.14	0	0	MSI-DN	68,404	2.68	0	0
Others	0	0	0	0	Others	3,066	0.12	0	0	Others	9,724	0.38	0	0

<sup>a</sup> Nuova Sinistra Unità.

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Table A-73

## 9 Tuscany

	1972	1976	1979
Region population	3,470,915	3,566,763	3,594,607
Eligible voters in region	2,379,162	2,430,932	2,482,823
Actual votes cast (percent of total)	2,290,970 (96.29)	2,351,426 (96.73)	2,360,143 (95.06)
Blank and invalid ballots (percent of total)	90,120 (3.93)	75,580 (3.21)	97,541 (4.14)
Regional percent of national vote	7.28	7.22	7.16
Seats assigned to region	20	20	20
Candidates winning by 65-percent quorum	0	0	0

1972					1976					1979				
	Party Total	Percent- age	Number of Seats	Highest Personal Preference Percent for Winning Candidate		Party Total	Percent- age	Number of Seats	Highest Personal Preference Percent for Winning Candidate		Party Total	Percent- age	Number of Seats	Highest Personal Preference Percent for Winning Candidate
DC	692,880	31.48	7	47.73	DC	730,045	32.08	7	42.21	DC	702,170	31.03	7	47.76
PCI- PSIUP	960,586	43.65	9	50.68	PCI	1,077,969	47.37	10	54.17	PCI	1,055,528	46.65	11	55.02
PSI	215,436	9.79	2	12.27	PSI	250,384	11.00	2	14.14	PSI	234,679	10.37	2	14.22
PSDI	101,747	4.62	1	6.75	PSDI	114,591	5.03	1	11.06	PSDI	60,882	2.69	0	0
PRI	55,549	2.52	0	0	PRI					PRI	64,787	2.86	0	0
PLI	52,980	2.41	0	0	PLI					PLI	24,787	1.10	0	0
MSI-DN	121,609	5.53	1	9.09	PRad	16,635	0.73	0	0	PRad, NSU <sup>a</sup>	38,150	1.69	0	0
					MSI-DN	86,222	3.79	0	0	MSI-DN	75,575	3.34	0	0
Others	0	0	0	0	Others	0	0	0	0	Others	6,044	0.27	0	0

<sup>a</sup> Nuova Sinistra Unità.

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Table A-74

## 10 Umbria

	1972	1976	1979
Region population	772,601	795,218	805,329
Eligible voters in region	528,672	539,727	559,154
Actual votes cast (percent of total)	502,531 (95.06)	517,511 (95.88)	524,235 (93.76)
Blank and invalid ballots (percent of total)	18,728 (3.73)	13,935 (2.69)	20,620 (3.93)
Regional percent of national vote	3.73	1.59	1.59
Seats assigned to region	7	7	7
Candidates winning by 65-percent quorum	0	0	0

1972					1976					1979				
	Party Total	Percent- age	Number of Seats	Highest Personal Preference Percent for Winning Candidate		Party Total	Percent- age	Number of Seats	Highest Personal Preference Percent for Winning Candidate		Party Total	Percent- age	Number of Seats	Highest Personal Preference Percent for Winning Candidate
DC	159,378	32.94	3	45.92	DC	158,822	31.54	2	35.97	DC	153,413	30.46	2	34.30
PCI- PSIUP	210,205	43.45	3	41.30	PCI	237,588	47.18	4	52.00	PCI	233,211	46.31	4	51.79
PSI	53,283	11.01	1	9.71	PSI	58,687	11.66	1	12.81	PSI	59,134	11.74	1	13.44
PSDI	15,027	3.11	0	0	PSDI	7,698	1.53	0	0	PSDI	9,457	1.88	0	0
PRI	9,208	1.90	0	0	PRI	11,601	2.30	0	0	PRI	12,260	2.44	0	0
PLI	6,255	1.29	0	0	PLI	2,032	0.40	0	0	PLI	3,365	0.67	0	0
MSI-DN	30,447	6.30	0	0	PRad	2,323	0.46	0	0	PRad	6,752	1.34	0	0
					MSI-DN	24,825	4.93	0	0	MSI-DN	22,331	4.43	0	0
Others	0	0	0	0	Others	0	0	0	0	Others	3,692	0.73	0	0

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Table A-75

## 11 Marche

	1972	1976	1979
Region population	1,359,063	1,390,388	1,409,845
Eligible voters in region	902,352	917,237	964,248
Actual votes cast (percent of total)	853,516 (94.59)	877,399 (95.66)	894,129 (92.03)
Blank and invalid ballots (percent of total)	37,869 (4.44)	29,944 (3.41)	45,939 (5.14)
Regional percent of national vote	2.71	2.69	2.71
Seats assigned to region	8	8	8
Candidates winning by 65-percent quorum	0	0	0

1972					1976					1979				
	Party Total	Percent- age	Number of Seats	Highest Personal Preference Percent for Winning Candidate		Party Total	Percent- age	Number of Seats	Highest Personal Preference Percent for Winning Candidate		Party Total	Percent- age	Number of Seats	Highest Personal Preference Percent for Winning Candidate
DC	331,846	40.69	4	45.92	DC	345,519	40.77	4	46.74	DC	334,444	39.43	4	44.86
PCI- PSIUP	284,346	34.86	3	41.30	PCI	336,226	39.68	4	44.59	PCI	330,767	39.00	4	45.00
PSI	72,024	8.83	1	9.71	PSI	71,396	8.43	0	0	PSI	71,537	8.43	0	0
PSDI	35,547	4.36	0	0	PSDI	23,302	2.75	0	0	PSDI	25,164	2.96	0	0
PRI	29,554	3.62	0	0	PRI	28,171	3.32	0	0	PRI	29,932	3.53	0	0
PLI	18,714	2.29	0	0	PLI	5,254	0.62	0	0	PLI	8,294	0.98	0	0
MSI-DN	43,616	5.35	0	0	PRad	4,579	0.54	0	0	PRad	13,991	1.65	0	0
					MSI-DN	33,008	3.89	0	0	MSI-DN	31,609	3.73	0	0
Others	0	0	0	0	Others	0	0	0	0	Others	2,452	0.29	0	0

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Table A-76

## 12 Lazio

	1972	1976	1979
Region population	4,702,093	4,921,859	5,037,255
Eligible voters in region	2,886,332	3,037,859	3,178,384
Actual votes cast (percent of total)	2,692,720 (93.29)	2,856,273 (94.33)	2,919,780 (91.86)
Blank and invalid ballots (percent of total)	97,140 (3.60)	79,281 (2.78)	123,684 (4.24)
Regional percent of national vote	8.56	8.77	8.86
Seats assigned to region	24	27	27
Candidates winning by 65-percent quorum	0	0	0

1972					1976					1979				
	Party Total	Percent- age	Number of Seats	Highest Personal Preference Percent for Winning Candidate		Party Total	Percent- age	Number of Seats	Highest Personal Preference Percent for Winning Candidate		Party Total	Percent- age	Number of Seats	Highest Personal Preference Percent for Winning Candidate
DC	875,075	33.71	8	45.98	DC	1,006,180	36.23	10	44.10	DC	1,028,568	36.79	11	44.54
PCI- PSIUP	732,186	28.21	7	34.75	PCI	981,816	35.36	10	42.67	PCI	864,022	30.90	9	36.77
PSI	222,372	8.57	2	13.66	PSI	221,856	8.00	2	9.61	PSI	245,380	8.77	2	10.40
PSDI	143,909	5.54	1	11.47	PSDI	92,233	3.32	1	7.98	PSDI	104,739	3.75	1	8.96
PRI	97,077	3.74	1	5.28	PRI	100,675	3.63	1	5.89	PRI	101,452	3.63	1	5.54
PLI	118,363	4.56	1	12.27	PLI	44,232	1.59	0	0	PLI	62,538	2.24	0	0
MSI-DN	403,885	15.56	4	23.47	PRad	38,085	1.37	0	0	PRad	124,305	4.44	1	6.87
					MSI-DN	289,259	10.42	3	14.37	MSI-DN	250,056	8.94	2	11.39
Others	2,713	0.11	0	0	Others	2,656	0.08	0	0	Others	15,036	0.54	0	0

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Table A-77

## 13 Abruzzi

	1972	1976	1979
Region population	1,163,334	1,211,323	1,233,397
Eligible voters in region	777,156	784,278	864,162
Actual votes cast (percent of total)	673,788 (86.70)	699,723 (89.22)	712,450 (82.44)
Blank and invalid ballots (percent of total)	31,538 (4.68)	25,271 (3.61)	37,919 (5.32)
Regional percent of national vote	2.14	2.15	2.16
Seats assigned to region	7	7	7
Candidates winning by 65-percent quorum	0	0	0

1972					1976					1979				
	Party Total	Percent- age	Number of Seats	Highest Personal Preference Percent for Winning Candidate		Party Total	Percent- age	Number of Seats	Highest Personal Preference Percent for Winning Candidate		Party Total	Percent- age	Number of Seats	Highest Personal Preference Percent for Winning Candidate
DC	304,658	47.44	4	49.40	DC	305,807	45.34	4	49.49	DC	312,667	46.35	4	51.22
PCI- PSIUP	173,145	26.96	2	33.85	PCI	229,860	34.08	3	40.40	PCI	213,670	31.68	3	37.70
PSI	62,461	9.72	1	10.60	PSI	55,788	8.27	0	0	PSI	56,568	8.38	0	0
PSDI	23,416	3.65	0	0	PSDI	16,863	2.50	0	0	PSDI	15,695	2.33	0	0
PRI	9,510	1.48	0	0	PRI	11,061	1.64	0	0	PRI	13,577	2.01	0	0
PLI	13,351	2.08	0	0	PLI	4,513	0.67	0	0	PLI	6,599	0.98	0	0
MSI-DN	55,709	8.67	0	0	PRad	3,450	0.51	0	0	PRad	11,175	1.66	0	0
					MSI-DN	45,216	6.71	0	0	MSI-DN	39,773	5.90	0	0
Others	0	0	0	0	Others	1,894	0.28	0	0	Others	4,807	0.71	0	0

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Table A-78

## 14 Molise

	1972	1976	1979
Region population	319,629	329,705	332,914
Eligible voters in region	216,645	213,476	247,295
Actual votes cast (percent of total)	178,563 (82.42)	182,900 (85.68)	185,431 (74.98)
Blank and invalid ballots (percent of total)	8,960 (5.02)	9,654 (5.28)	13,371 (7.21)
Regional percent of national vote	0.57	0.56	0.56
Seats assigned to region	2	2	2
Candidates winning by 65-percent quorum	0	0	0

1972					1976					1979				
	Party Total	Percent- age	Number of Seats	Highest Personal Preference Percent for Winning Candidate		Party Total	Percent- age	Number of Seats	Highest Personal Preference Percent for Winning Candidate		Party Total	Percent- age	Number of Seats	Highest Personal Preference Percent for Winning Candidate
DC	99,043	58.40	2	56.57	DC	93,535	53.99	1	51.79	DC	95,295	55.38	2	52.46
PCI- PSIUP PSI	41,835	24.67	0	0	PCI	52,922	30.55	1	32.41	PCI	39,280	22.83	0	0
PSDI	10,523	6.20	0	0	PSDI	6,421	3.71	0	0	PSDI	4,311	2.51	0	0
PRI	3,409	2.01	0	0	PRI	4,548	2.63	0	0	PRI	3,876	2.25	0	0
PLI	4,519	2.66	0	0	PLI	4,447	2.56	0	0	PLI	3,512	2.04	0	0
MSI-DN	10,274	6.06	0	0	MSI-DN	11,373	6.56	0	0	PRad	2,430	1.41	0	0
Others	0	0	0	0	Others	0	0	0	0	MSI-DN	9,977	5.80	0	0
										Others	663	0.39	0	0

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Table A-79

## 15 Campania

	1972	1976	1979
Region population	5,054,822	5,280,268	5,420,390
Eligible voters in region	2,832,246	2,934,413	3,082,703
Actual votes cast (percent of total)	2,518,013 (88.91)	2,612,929 (89.04)	2,662,853 (86.38)
Blank and invalid ballots (percent of total)	119,770 (4.76)	100,518 (3.85)	150,682 (5.66)
Regional percent of national vote	8.01	8.03	8.08
Seats assigned to region	29	29	29
Candidates winning by 65-percent quorum	0	0	0

1972	Party Total	Percent- age	Number of Seats	Highest Personal Preference Percent for Winning Candidate	1976	Party Total	Percent- age	Number of Seats	Highest Personal Preference Percent for Winning Candidate	1979	Party Total	Percent- age	Number of Seats	Highest Personal Preference Percent for Winning Candidate
DC	858,429	35.79	11	46.82	DC	954,660	38.00	12	47.97	DC	984,934	39.21	13	48.89
PCI- PSIUP	567,873	23.68	7	34.32	PCI	798,191	31.77	10	45.92	PCI	657,744	26.18	8	37.60
PSI	221,223	9.23	3	12.15	PSI	209,753	8.35	2	12.37	PSI	255,731	10.18	3	21.46
PSDI	135,563	5.65	1	11.09	PSDI	97,165	3.87	1	11.36	PSDI	118,204	4.70	1	9.39
PRI	94,512	3.94	1	14.21	PRI	78,676	3.13	1	9.20	PRI	100,214	3.99	1	10.23
PLI	83,259	3.47	1	10.43	PLI	45,470	1.81	0	0	PLI	38,958	1.55	0	0
MSI-DN	422,128	17.60	5	33.66	PRad	15,216	0.60	0	0	PRad, NSU <sup>a</sup>	52,679	2.10	0	0
					MSI-DN	313,280	12.47	3	20.39	MSI-DN	270,900	10.78	3	19.92
Others	15,256	0.64	0	0	Others	0	0	0	0	Others	32,807	1.31	0	0

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Table A-80

## 16 Puglia

	1972	1976	1979
Region population	3,562,377	3,771,329	3,889,422
Eligible voters in region	2,006,880	2,099,810	2,226,952
Actual votes cast (percent of total)	1,822,400 (90.81)	1,926,457 (91.74)	1,975,617 (88.71)
Blank and invalid ballots (percent of total)	75,524 (4.14)	73,482 (3.81)	104,768 (5.30)
Regional percent of national vote	5.79	5.92	5.99
Seats assigned to region	21	20	20
Candidates winning by 65-percent quorum	0	0	0

1972					1976					1979				
	Party Total	Percent- age	Number of Seats	Highest Personal Preference Percent for Winning Candidate		Party Total	Percent- age	Number of Seats	Highest Personal Preference Percent for Winning Candidate		Party Total	Percent- age	Number of Seats	Highest Personal Preference Percent for Winning Candidate
DC	686,567	39.30	9	48.55	DC	761,560	41.10	9	50.10	DC	776,234	41.50	9	46.74
PCI- PSIUP	461,658	26.43	6	36.40	PCI	582,221	31.42	7	40.31	PCI	518,333	27.71	6	37.03
PSI	193,066	11.05	2	16.23	PSI	177,893	9.60	2	13.23	PSI	198,106	10.59	2	14.18
PSDI	75,167	4.30	1	9.19	PSDI	66,812	3.61	0	0	PSDI	87,805	4.69	1	11.42
PRI	33,809	1.94	0	0	PRI	45,840	2.47	0	0	PRI	41,991	2.24	0	0
PLI	53,451	3.06	0	0	PLI					PLI	24,485	1.31	0	0
MSI-DN	228,941	13.11	3	22.48	PRad	10,590	0.57	0	0	MSI-DN	186,761	9.98	2	13.05
					MSI-DN	208,059	11.23	2	15.13	PRad, NSU <sup>a</sup>	26,990	1.44	0	0
Others	14,217	0.81	0	0	Others	0	0	0	0	Others	10,144	0.54	0	0

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Table A-81

## 17 Basilicata

	1972	1976	1979
Region population	602,389	614,596	618,312
Eligible voters in region	349,688	354,873	374,762
Actual votes cast (percent of total)	308,762 (88.30)	317,475 (89.46)	321,919 (85.90)
Blank and invalid ballots (percent of total)	14,540 (4.71)	15,467 (4.87)	21,969 (6.82)
Regional percent of national vote	0.98	0.98	0.98
Seats assigned to region	7	7	7
Candidates winning by 65-percent quorum	0	0	0

1972	Party Total	Percent- age	Number of Seats	Highest Personal Preference Percent for Winning Candidate	1976	Party Total	Percent- age	Number of Seats	Highest Personal Preference Percent for Winning Candidate	1979	Party Total	Percent- age	Number of Seats	Highest Personal Preference Percent for Winning Candidate
DC	135,810	46.16	4	50.75	DC	130,673	43.27	3	45.48	DC	133,837	44.62	4	45.96
PCI- PSIUP	75,042	25.50	2	30.73	PCI	99,162	32.83	3	35.43	PCI	87,109	29.04	2	32.69
PSI	37,744	12.83	1	24.84	PSI	36,309	12.02	1	23.47	PSI	38,176	12.73	1	26.08
PSDI	14,543	4.94	0	0	PSDI	8,993	2.98	0	0	PSDI	12,007	4.00	0	0
PRI	2,223	0.76	0	0	PRI	5,509	1.83	0	0	PRI	3,306	1.10	0	0
PLI	5,968	2.03	0	0	PLI					PLI	3,179	1.06	0	0
MSI-DN	22,892	7.78	0	0	MSI-DN	20,113	6.66	0	0	PRad, NSU <sup>a</sup>	3,902	1.30	0	0
Others	0	0	0	0	Others	1,249	0.41	0	0	Others	0	0	0	0

<sup>a</sup> Nuova Sinistra Unità.

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Table A-82

## 18 Calabria

	1972	1976	1979
Region population	1,962,899	2,034,425	2,067,269
Eligible voters in region	1,115,585	1,140,525	1,257,160
Actual votes cast (percent of total)	938,132 (84.09)	971,072 (85.14)	981,243 (78.05)
Blank and invalid ballots (percent of total)	52,383 (5.58)	48,421 (4.99)	67,474 (6.88)
Regional percent of national vote	2.98	2.98	2.98
Seats assigned to region	12	11	11
Candidates winning by 65-percent quorum	0	0	0

1972					1976					1979				
	Party Total	Percent- age	Number of Seats	Highest Personal Preference Percent for Winning Candidate		Party Total	Percent- age	Number of Seats	Highest Personal Preference Percent for Winning Candidate		Party Total	Percent- age	Number of Seats	Highest Personal Preference Percent for Winning Candidate
DC	334,440	37.76	5	47.92	DC	365,414	38.63	5	44.79	DC	368,625	40.34	5	42.35
PCI- PSIUP	247,001	27.89	4	41.97	PCI	306,374	33.21	4	46.03	PCI	260,501	28.51	3	40.19
PSI	117,552	13.27	1	16.69	PSI	117,840	12.77	1	16.04	PSI	139,062	15.22	2	19.42
PSDI	27,493	3.10	0	0	PSDI	20,118	2.18	0	0	PSDI	22,865	2.50	0	0
PRI	15,346	1.73	0	0	PRI	12,269	2.18	0	0	PRI	12,633	1.38	0	0
PLI	8,777	0.99	0	0	PLI	5,300	1.33	0	0	PLI	6,152	0.67	0	0
MSI-DN	135,140	15.26	2	36.77	PRad	4,603	0.50	0	0	PRad, NSU <sup>a</sup>	12,444	1.36	0	0
					MSI-DN	99,733	10.81	1	21.49	MSI-DN	84,217	9.22	1	17.14
Others	0	0	0	0	Others	0	0	0	0	Others	7,270	0.80	0	0

<sup>a</sup> Nuova Sinistra Unità.

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Table A-83

## 19 Sicily

	1972	1976	1979
Region population	4,667,316	4,861,230	4,970,595
Eligible voters in region	2,809,466	2,882,528	3,074,663
Actual votes cast (percent of total)	2,385,671 (84.92)	2,472,648 (85.78)	2,493,620 (81.10)
Blank and invalid ballots (percent of total)	133,417 (5.59)	115,838 (4.68)	172,865 (6.93)
Regional percent of national vote	7.59	7.59	7.56
Seats assigned to region	29	26	26
Candidates winning by 65-percent quorum	0	0	0

1972	Party Total	Percent- age	Number of Seats	Highest Personal Preference Percent for Winning Candidate	1976	Party Total	Percent- age	Number of Seats	Highest Personal Preference Percent for Winning Candidate	1979	Party Total	Percent- age	Number of Seats	Highest Personal Preference Percent for Winning Candidate
DC	810,223	35.97	11	41.91	DC	940,198	30.89	11	44.59	DC	934,772	40.28	12	45.41
PCI- PSIUP	502,603	22.32	7	29.41	PCI	644,022	27.33	8	35.78	PCI	519,190	22.37	6	33.31
PSI	257,022	11.41	3	20.03	PSI	229,562	9.74	2	19.47	PSI	260,693	11.23	3	19.91
PSDI	92,886	4.12	1	8.55	PSDI	88,472	3.75	1	6.29	PSDI	127,759	5.51	1	9.41
PRI	102,818	4.57	1	9.03	PRI	92,657	3.93	1	11.13	PRI	116,287	5.01	1	11.34
PLI	108,236	4.81	1	11.58	PLI	53,447	2.27	0	0	PLI	49,415	2.13	0	0
MSI-DN	378,466	16.80	5	28.10	PRad	17,509	0.74	0	18.95	PRad, NSU <sup>a</sup>	54,327	2.34	0	0
					MSI-DN	289,883	12.30	3	0	MSI-DN	225,356	9.71	3	16.97
Others	0	0	0	0	Others	1,060	0.05	0	0	Others	32,956	1.42	0	0

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Table A-84

## 20 Sardinia

	1972	1976	1979
Region population	1,468,737	1,552,767	1,592,595
Eligible voters in region	821,790	864,424	917,284
Actual votes cast (percent of total)	739,937 (90.04)	787,529 (91.10)	800,329 (87.25)
Blank and invalid ballots (percent of total)	33,741 (4.56)	25,633 (3.25)	40,152 (5.02)
Regional percent of national vote	2.35	2.42	2.43
Seats assigned to region	9	8	8
Candidates winning by 65-percent quorum	0	0	0

1972					1976					1979				
	Party Total	Percent- age	Number of Seats	Highest Personal Preference Percent for Winning Candidates		Party Total	Percent- age	Number of Seats	Highest Personal Preference Percent for Winning Candidates		Party Total	Percent- age	Number of Seats	Highest Personal Preference Percent for Winning Candidates
DC	292,057	41.36	4	44.52	DC	313,696	41.17	4	45.59	DC	301,261	39.63	4	44.47
PCI- PSIUP	162,161	22.96	3	33.70	PCI	262,463	34.45	3	40.92	PCI	244,427	32.15	3	37.05
PSI	79,105	11.20	1	12.17	PSI	81,713	10.73	1	13.78	PSI	71,999	9.47	1	13.03
PSDI	31,931	4.523	0	0	PSDI	35,985	4.72	0	0	PSDI	23,406	3.08	0	0
PRI					PRI					PRI	13,496	1.78	0	0
PLI	25,515	3.61	0	0	PLI					PLI	11,078	1.46	0	0
MSI-DN	88,206	12.49	1	15.69	MSI-DN	68,039	8.93	0	0	PRad	16,417	2.16	0	0
Others	27,221	3.86	0	0	Others	0	0	0	0	MSI-DN	51,372	6.76	0	0
										Others	26,721	3.51	0	0

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**Tenure of Office for Christian Democratic Ministers and Undersecretaries, 1945-82**

Bold face type indicates Ministers; light face shows Undersecretaries. Christian Democratic Ministers and Undersecretaries are shown by name only. Ministers from other parties appear with their group's initials; Undersecretaries from other parties are indicated by initials only. Connections and lines connecting are drawn to match column titles.

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