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**The Red Brigades:
A Primer**

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A Research Paper

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*GI 82-10083
April 1982*

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The Red Brigades: A Primer

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A Research Paper

*Information available as of 15 April 1982
has been used in the preparation of this report.*

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 Comments and
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Chief, Terrorism Branch, Instability and Insurgency
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Confidential**The Red Brigades:
A Primer**

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Summary

The Red Brigades, founded in 1969 by a group of young Marxists disillusioned with the Italian Communist Party, have evolved into Italy's most formidable terrorist organization. Their primary goal is to separate Italy from the rest of Europe, ultimately creating a true Marxist state. The Brigades have traditionally focused their terrorism on domestic targets and issues; the kidnaping of General Dozier was a departure.

Prior to the Dozier operation, there were only 100 to 150 full-time Brigade members; and probably not more than a dozen key leaders. The Brigades were geared to conduct a few, well-orchestrated campaigns each year, normally in the fall and spring. Operations were designed to appeal to certain constituencies, inspire adherents, and gain recruits. At the time of the Dozier kidnaping, the Brigades were attracting only a few dozen recruits each year. The quality of recruits was progressively deteriorating as students and intellectuals were replaced by dropouts and criminals.

The Red Brigades actively maintain and appear to seek foreign connections, but these have been of modest importance. There is no convincing evidence that the Brigades respond to orders from abroad. West German and Palestinian terrorists have provided weapons, but the Brigades do not require extensive or advanced arsenals. Training consists primarily of target practice.

Nor is there hard evidence of any external financial support for the Brigades. In the past, finances came largely through bank robberies and ransoms and, perhaps, through connections with organized crime and narcotics traffic. Italian officials say the Brigades are now hard pressed and that members have had to resort to jewelry thefts—a less preferred method since the need to fence the goods raises the risk of apprehension.

While the Red Brigades will probably survive the Dozier episode, they could evolve into a different sort of organization. Continued arrests by police have taken a toll. Recruiting may replace the losses in terms of numbers, but the origins and quality of the recruits will undoubtedly change. The entrance of more factory workers and common criminals with less ideological commitment and narrower goals—already on the upswing prior to the recent crackdown—could ultimately transform the group. It

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might evolve into a militant union gang expressing worker grievances through assassinations and sabotage. Alternatively, the Red Brigades could gradually lose their political veneer altogether and turn into another Mafia.

The direction the Brigades take in the immediate future will depend on the outcome of internal disputes. A victory by the militarist wing that kidnapped Dozier could bring further actions against foreign targets in Italy and renewed attempts to strengthen connections with other terrorist groups in Europe. The rescue of Dozier and the losses suffered in the process, however, could discredit this line of strategy and bring the Red Brigades back to the domestic path followed prior to the Dozier kidnapping. At the moment, the Red Brigades are on the defensive, but Italian officials cautiously avoid declaring that they have been destroyed. Officials talk instead of a long struggle, and they are probably right.



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Preface

This primer is a compilation of baseline information about the Red Brigades. To ensure broad distribution, it is being circulated at the lowest level of classification consistent with presenting an accurate picture of the group's goals, members, and activities. The primary source material for this study comes from:

- The operational activities of the Red Brigades, which reflect the issues that most concern them, the institutions they regard as enemies, the people they consider their constituents, and their sensitivity to public opinion.
- Prolific writings by group members; Red Brigade Strategic Resolutions are lengthy (number 18 for instance has 300 pages), offering rich analytical insights into the organization and its members.



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Much of the information and analysis in this primer predates the rescue of Gen. James Dozier. This event and related Italian police efforts are certain to affect the Brigades in ways that are obscure at this juncture. Nevertheless, the primer examines the innards, the external characteristics, and the objectives of the organization in which the post-Dozier Red Brigades—in whatever mutation—will be rooted.



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The Red Brigades: A Primer

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Introduction

The formation of the Red Brigades in 1969 coincided with a time of ferment and violence in Italy. Student marches had failed, the barricades had come down, and the large Italian Communist Party—which usually reaped the harvests of political discontent—had turned its back on the “movement,” by negotiating “historic compromise” with the Christian Democrats in a bid to share government power. The leader of the neofascist party declared that a civil war had begun. Left-wing militants prepared to leave their homes and go underground to avoid the massive arrests that would come if the fascists returned to power. Some dropped out of sight to plan campaigns of terrorism.

In this setting, Renato Curcio, Margherita Cagol, Mario Moretti, and Albert Franceschini joined to create a radical terrorist organization to challenge the Italian Government. Their organization, the Red Brigades, has become Italy's most formidable terrorist group.

The kidnaping of General Dozier in 1981 brought the Red Brigades international prominence. The abduction of the General increased speculation about the possibility of a foreign hand directing Red Brigades' operations, particularly among Italian politicians, whose motives probably were self-serving. No one has been able to find even a single piece of convincing evidence that the Red Brigades receive orders from abroad. The kidnaping of General Dozier was not inconsistent with the ideology and strategy of the Red Brigades; it was only a departure from their previous modus operandi.

Ideology

The Red Brigades are true Marxists. Their ideology is heavily influenced by the writings of Mao Zedong, Lin Biao, Che Guevara, Carlos Marighella, and Abraham Guillen. These later writers differ from

Founders of the Red Brigades

Renato Curcio, the illegitimate son of a maid and her employer, grew up revering an uncle who had fought as a partisan during the German occupation. Although the uncle was killed in an ambush by fascist gunmen in 1945 when Curcio was not quite four years old, he remained an important figure for Curcio. From prison, Curcio would later write to his mother that he had picked up his uncle's rifle to continue the struggle against the fascists. A voracious reader of Marx, Lenin, and Mao, Curcio had participated in student protests at Trento University.

Margherita Cagol was the daughter of a middle class family. She loved music and Renato Curcio. They worked hand in hand in the student struggle. Both Catholic, they were married in 1969 and spent their honeymoon in Cuba. When her husband was later imprisoned, she led a daring raid to rescue him. In 1975, she died in a gun battle with police.

Mario Moretti had been a student in Milan. Upon graduation, he worked as an electronics technician in a factory where he became involved in union affairs and leftist politics. He eventually went underground, leaving behind his wife and son.

Albert Franceschini came from a militant Communist family. His grandmother had led a peasant league in a farm labor struggle in 1922. His grandfather had fought the fascists, spent time in jail when they ruled, fled to France, and returned to Italy as a partisan. Franceschini's father was sent to a labor camp under the Germans and ended up in Auschwitz, from which he escaped in 1942. Franceschini himself joined the Communist Youth Federation, then broke with it because it was too conservative.

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Carlos Marighella's Blueprint for Terrorists

Marighella, in his Mini-Manual of Urban Guerrilla Warfare, adapted concepts of rural guerrilla warfare described in the writings of Mao and Che and applied them to the city. The Mini-Manual exhorts its readers to wage warfare in the cities and suggests tactics and techniques. Marighella, however, does not spell out a broad concept of urban guerrilla warfare, nor does he explain how terrorist tactics will ultimately lead to the seizure of political power.

Most of Marighella's readers, particularly those outside the Third World, miss his point that urban guerrilla warfare is a means of diverting government forces while rural guerrillas establish themselves in the countryside. Those readers include the Red Brigades, who see armed struggle in the cities as the way to revolution. The Red Brigades carry out no actions in rural areas, nor do they seek rural support.

[Redacted]

traditional Leninists in that they called for armed struggle, and they developed theories of guerrilla warfare that would enable militarily inferior groups to defeat the armed forces of the state. [Redacted]

The Brigades believe that social and political change are the products of historical forces; developments are natural, evolutionary, inevitable, and irreversible. In their view, the Brigades themselves represent a natural emergence. And they believe that their group will eventually triumph because it is correctly aligned with political, economic, and social forces that are now becoming dominant. [Redacted]

The Brigades claim no responsibility for creating this wave. History determines events, and history is impersonal. Individuals do not shape events after their own design. Significant human action can occur only through roles within movements, not through individual actions. Individuals require identity and meaning only by association with movements, and the movement is everything. Red Brigade leaders place a high

premium on central planning, and while commitment is valued, suggestions from below are not welcome. There is no place for heroes. [Redacted]

Even though Red Brigade members see themselves astride inexorable forces of history, they feel that it is necessary to show the state as impotent in order to confirm their beliefs and demonstrate the righteousness of their cause. They delight in exposing what they see as the hypocrisy of their opponents. An offer by one corporation to make concessions to save the life of a kidnaped executive was sarcastically noted as evidence that capitalists are not true to their own principles:

- If profit is the primary objective of corporations, why offer concessions out of humanitarian concern?
- If humanitarian concerns are paramount, why exploit workers in the name of profit?
- Or do only executives' lives count?

Commitment to principles allows no compromise. There is a religious quality to the Red Brigade commitment; they need to demonstrate the superiority of their beliefs. Their actions must reveal the false doctrines and false idols of their foes. [Redacted]

Strategy

The Red Brigades follow a variety of strategies, with terror as the essential element. They have a better picture of their opponents than most other left-wing terrorist groups, and they are more attentive to developing a genuine constituency within their own country. The Brigades are also patient. They are prepared for a struggle lasting many years. [Redacted]

The Red Brigades, like most terrorist groups, are self-conscious about their image. They want to appear legal, and they use the language of government to describe their actions. Hostages are not "killed," they are "executed"—and only after they are "tried" and "condemned" in a people's court. The Brigades do not claim credit for some crimes because they do not want to appear to be ordinary criminals. Initiation and training operations carried out by new recruits are not claimed, because the risk of failure and of tainting the group's credibility is too high. [Redacted]

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Many contemporary left-wing terrorist groups view local struggles as part of a global war of liberation from imperialism. The class enemy of the proletariat is not the "national bourgeoisie," but the international "imperialist bourgeoisie." Thus, a connection is provided between an urban guerrilla struggle in Latin America, a rural guerrilla struggle in southern Africa, the Palestinian struggle in the Middle East, and terrorist actions in Western Europe. This connection broadens the range of targets and has been used to justify terrorist attacks against Western diplomats, executives of foreign corporations, and American military personnel in Brazil, West Germany, and, most recently, Italy. The mainstream of the Red Brigades have viewed the international connection as solely rhetorical. [redacted]

In the Red Brigade view, multinational corporations are the operative arm of the imperialist bourgeoisie. These outgrowths of capitalist society move freely across national borders, while the state provides the support system. The Red Brigades are committed to overthrowing both the state and the multinational corporations. [redacted]

The Red Brigades believe that their capitalist enemy is entering an irreversible process of deterioration that will end with civil war and the inevitable triumph of the proletariat. Efforts to restructure the economy can only create new crises, particularly in Italy, which the Red Brigades see as the weak link among Western countries. Thus, Italy must be economically and politically separated from the rest of Europe. It must not, however, become part of the "socialist-imperialist" area. The Red Brigades do not see Poland as the model for the new society. [redacted]

Italian Communist Party (PCI) compromises with Italy's Christian Democrats are seen by the Brigades as revisionist. Because the PCI has defaulted in its task of establishing a Communist society, the Red Brigades feel they must forge a new Communist Party through armed action. This "Fighting Communist Party" (Partito Comunista Combatante) will represent the proletariat and complete the task of overthrowing the imperialist bourgeoisie in Italy. [redacted]

The Red Brigade vision of their final takeover of power remains hazy. There is no clear indication of whether they see a single battle between the forces of "good" and "evil" or a long civil war. Renato Curcio, the founder of the Red Brigades, wrote in 1969:

This is not the revolutionary movement in which the takeover is an immediate problem to be considered, but rather it is a period of organization of political power. It is adventurism to make people believe that the takeover of power and the attainment of an egalitarian society is something easy and rapidly obtained. We must on the other hand continuously underscore that it will be difficult and long. It is not the Cuban example but the Chinese example that faces us. That is, it is not possible to realize the "happy island" with two years of struggle. But it is possible across 40 years of struggle. [redacted]

Organization

The lowest unit of the Red Brigade organization is the cell, which consists of three to five part-time terrorists. Several (usually two) cells comprise a brigade. A brigade may have as many as 15 members. Each brigade reports to a column which consists of regular and part-time terrorists. Each column has responsibility for a specific geographic area, and each reflects different tendencies. We know of active columns in Rome, Milan, Venice, and Naples; there are other columns in Turin and Genoa, and there is a column inside Italy's prison system referred to as the Prison Front. Areas without columns are managed by Regional Revolutionary Committees, the seeds of future columns. In 1980, there were Regional Revolutionary Committees in Bologna and Florence. [redacted]

Red Brigade columns try to generate subcolumns that could become independent columns. For example, the Naples Column, itself an offshoot of the Rome Column, may have spawned new subcolumns in Barletta, Brindisi, and Sicily. The Genoa Column has created subcolumns in Savona and in the Imperia and La

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Confidential**Table 1****Major Red Brigade Columns**

	Size ^a /Characteristics	Origins	Targets	Principle Operations
Rome	20/Survived government offensive in 1980; unsuccessfully sought more autonomy for local columns in 1979	Universities/intellectuals	Political figures	Kidnaped/murdered Aldo Moro in 1978
Naples	25/Exploit local issues—labor agitation “corruption” in earthquake relief	Created from split in Rome Column	Political figures	Kidnaped Ciro Cirillo, the political boss of Naples, in 1981
Milan—The Walter Alasia Column	30/Attempts to exploit grievances of factory workers	Blue-collar workers	Industrial managers; union leaders; journalists	Kidnaped Alfa Romeo executive in 1981 and demanded the rehiring of 500 laid-off workers
Venice	Currently defunct/Focuses on economic issues	Proletariat and students from northern universities	Industrial managers; government bureaucrats	Kidnaped and murdered Montedison executive in 1981; kidnaped General Dozier
Prison Front	25/Column located inside Italian prison system	Imprisoned Brigades' members	Magistrates; prison officials, wardens and doctors	Recruiting, vetting prospective members

^a Circa mid-February; full-time members.

Spezia areas. Italian authorities believe that the Red Brigades also tried to build a column on the island of Sardinia; several of the Dozier kidnapers had been active there. [redacted]

The Red Brigades have two support units called “fronts”:

- The Front of the Masses provides intelligence and research. It consists of three special interest units that investigate operational opportunities; the Factory Brigades focus on the industrial area; the Political Party Brigades provide information on the political arena; and the Triple Brigades concentrate on police, judicial, and prison affairs.
- The Logistics Front supports all of the columns. It provides weapons, ammunition, documents, communication equipment, and has charge of codes. It also disburses salaries and provides medical treatment. In addition, the Logistics Front identifies possible

targets for theft. Some operations (arsenal thefts and armed robberies) may be carried out jointly by members of the Logistics Front and members of the local column. [redacted]

Columns and fronts report to the Executive Committee. [redacted] two representatives

from each column belong to the Executive Committee. The Executive Committee:

- Approves all operational plans submitted by the columns.
- In large operations, assumes direct operational control.
- Is in charge of finances; each column submits a quarterly budget to the Executive Committee, which then directs the Logistics Front to make disbursements.
- Is in charge of liaison with other terrorist groups in Italy and elsewhere. [redacted]

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At the top of the Red Brigade organization is the Strategic Directorate. It meets only a few times a year to set policy and strategy, which it communicates in its lengthy Strategic Resolutions. Members of the Executive Committee, columns, and fronts are all theoretically represented. Italian officials estimate that the Strategic Directorate has at least 10 members, but actual control of the organization may be in the hands of no more than five of the most experienced and able managers. [redacted]

The role played by the imprisoned members of the "historic nucleus," the founders of the Red Brigades, is not clear. In the late 1970s, the Red Brigades considered that any member who had been captured was considered demobilized. Red Brigade members in prison reportedly lose their decisionmaking power. Most observers, however, believe that the founding fathers still play an important leadership role. Several are believed to still hold membership in the Strategic Directorate, and the members of the historic nucleus imprisoned at Asinara (a maximum security prison located on a small island off the coast of Sardinia) prevailed in the 1979 dispute with leaders of the Rome Column. Forty-one Red Brigade members now imprisoned at Palmi are known to have voted on another factional dispute shortly before the Dozier kidnaping. [redacted]

The organization evolved by the Red Brigades has certain advantages. By allowing two persons to represent each unit at the next higher echelon, the organization can recover more rapidly from individual arrests. The hierarchy of cells, brigades, and columns permits growth. The structure creates many small group leaders and allows a degree of local autonomy. It keeps new recruits at the fringe but allows for the promotion of the most dedicated. Its top management is comprised of men who have direct operational responsibilities. [redacted]

The organization of the Red Brigades implies a more formal hierarchy than may exist. Column leaders, front leaders, members of the Executive Committee, and members of the Strategic Directorate are often the same people. Although theoretically there are 25 to 30 management positions, there probably are not

Red Brigade Decisionmaking

Decisionmaking begins with discussions within the Strategic Directorate regarding the future direction of Red Brigade operations. On the basis of these discussions, the Directorate issues a major document, usually a numbered Strategic Resolution. In these Resolutions, the leadership assesses current conditions in Marxist terms, describes the situation of the Red Brigades, and provides the political line for the next offensive. Targets are identified, but only in a general way. Strategic Resolution No. 17 issued in the summer of 1981, for example, identified NATO as a future target. These documents are descriptive and interpretative; they do not provide specific operational guidance or enjoin Red Brigade members to act. Translation of Strategic Resolutions into marching orders requires an additional step, probably at the level of the Executive Committee.

In accordance with the line laid down in the Strategic Resolutions, the Front of the Masses identifies possible targets. Then the columns select the target and plan the actual operation. The operational plan is submitted to the Executive Committee for approval. If the Executive Committee approves the plan, it mobilizes the necessary resources, augmenting the column with support from the Logistic Front and, if required, from the Executive Committee itself. The Fronts, under the direction of the Executive Committee, are the principal coordinating bodies of the Red Brigades.

The entire Executive Committee may remain in permanent session during a major operation. It did so during the Moro kidnaping and probably also during the Dozier kidnaping. A decision to kill a captive almost certainly involves consulting the Executive Committee or polling the columns.

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
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Organization of the Red Brigades



^aA typical revolutionary committee or column has a brigade and two cells.

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more than a dozen key leaders in the entire organization. Moreover, careful analysis of the linguistic style of Red Brigades documents suggests that decisions are made by a few dominant individuals. [redacted]

Operations

Red Brigade activity follows a seasonal pattern, with peaks in the spring and fall corresponding to the group's announced spring and autumn campaigns. Each campaign has a theme which is described in a Strategic Resolution that precedes the campaign. The theme of the spring 1978 campaign was attacking the "heart of the state." The Red Brigades kidnaped Aldo Moro in March of that year. Strategic Resolution No. 17 pronounced NATO to be the target of the autumn 1981 campaign; Dozier was kidnaped in December. [redacted]

The Red Brigades operate within a limited tactical repertoire. Assassinations, kidnappings, and leg shootings account for about three-fourths of their operations. Arson, thefts, and a few bombings account for the rest. The Red Brigades have not carried out any hijackings, nor have they barricaded themselves with hostages. They are sensitive to public opinion, and they select their targets carefully. During an operation, the leader carries the automatic weapon and grenades, not simply because of the firepower they provide him, but because he is responsible for avoiding fatalities among bystanders. If an operation seems likely to imperil people other than the intended target, it is abandoned. On the other hand, when a Brigade operation results in multiple fatalities, as when Aldo Moro's five bodyguards were killed, it is because the terrorists specifically want to use maximum violence. Moro could easily have been kidnaped at another time when he was not protected. [redacted]

Of the 439 actions credited to the Red Brigades during the 1970s, about 30 percent were directed against people, the rest against other targets. The group decided to concentrate its attacks on people in 1976. During the last five years (1977-81), approximately three-fourths of the Red Brigade attacks were directed against persons rather than property. While this does not include the many bank robberies and other thefts for which the Red Brigades may be

responsible but do not claim credit, the percentage of Red Brigade actions directed against human targets is high. [redacted]

Kidnapings are a major tool of the group. In most of their early kidnappings, the Brigades released their hostages within a day or two. With the kidnaping of Mario Sossi, an Assistant State Attorney, in 1974, Red Brigade kidnappings entered a new, more serious phase. Their hostage incidents have averaged 55 days in duration. In recent kidnappings, hostages have been subjected to "trials" and exploited for propaganda purposes. Invariably, the hostage is judged guilty and condemned. Only then do the Red Brigades announce their decision—to release the hostage if concessions are made or to kill him. [redacted]

In contrast to other terrorist groups, the Red Brigades carry out few bombings. Bombings do not suit their strategy or philosophy. The group has passed through the "armed propaganda" stage, and it now emphasizes such "quality" operations as the kidnappings of prominent persons. Bombs are indiscriminate weapons; they kill bystanders. They are, in the words of the group's founder, a "fascist trademark." [redacted]

On occasion, however, the Red Brigades have tried to use bombs or other less discriminate weapons to kill large numbers of carabinieri or police, but without much success. In January 1980, members of the Red Brigades bombed a carabinieri barracks in Rome, but there were no deaths. In May of the same year, the terrorists fired a 3.5-inch rocket at a carabinieri headquarters in Milan, again without great effect. The group also has carried out bombings as diversionary actions or to support other operations. When the Red Brigades have used bombs, the devices have generally been small and technically unsophisticated. The Red Brigades have employed arson as a mode of economic warfare. Between 1975 and 1979, the group claimed responsibility for 11 fires at Fiat plants. [redacted]

[redacted] a high percentage of Red Brigade attacks were directed against Italy's largest private corporations; this includes attacks on persons,

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facilities, and bank robberies carried out for logistical, not political, purposes. Of the 184 persons attacked by the Red Brigades, law-enforcement personnel—police and carabinieri—have been the most frequent targets, followed by judges, factory managers, prison officials, political figures, blue-collar workers (often low-ranking union officials), and journalists. The Red Brigades have never killed a woman, although they did kidnap and humiliate a Christian Democrat Councilwoman.

[redacted]

The assassinations, kidnappings, leg shootings, and the other major terrorist operations for which the Red Brigades claim credit represent the tip of the iceberg. Italy is also subject to the initiation rites and training missions the Red Brigades carry out, the many “mini-kidnapings” in which terrorists abduct a factory manager, photograph him with a Red Brigade sign around his neck, then let him go; the firebombings of managers’ cars; the office break-ins to gain intelligence or simply to demonstrate the group’s capability to strike; the many small acts of sabotage; the beatings; the telephoned threats; the propaganda operations in the factories; the distribution of leaflets; the posting of huge banners expressing support for the Red Brigades; or the murders of informants in prison that are often covered by prison riots instigated by the Red Brigades.

[redacted]

All these actions contribute to a pervasive atmosphere of fear. Frightened factory managers distance themselves from corporate decisions. Good workers are warned to work more slowly and to think more about the safety of their families. Of the hundreds of men on a shift, not one sees who puts up a 20-foot Brigade banner. Union men are scared; the unions are infiltrated. Judges are fearful, and lawyers are reluctant to take cases. Informants stop talking. Journalists are afraid to write too critically about the Red Brigades.

[redacted]

The Red Brigades speak of eventual civil war. To seriously challenge the state, they must first inspire, militarize, and organize their potential followers, and they must discipline those followers to the dictates of the armed party they want to create. The Red Brigades direct each offensive toward that goal. Every

major operation is calculated to appeal to some potential constituency in Italy, to inspire adherents, to gain a few recruits, and to purchase political space. They kidnap, maim, and kill to build a political movement.

[redacted]

Recruiting and Membership

The Red Brigades draw their recruits from a deep reservoir of disaffected Italians. From the many thousands of sympathizers—several thousand of whom are willing to provide support—the Red Brigades enlist a few dozen. The recruiting process is slow and cautious. It begins with a careful selection of potential new members in the universities, the factories, and the prisons. The terrorists review the candidate’s political beliefs, his determination, and his activism. If the candidate looks good, the local column authorizes an approach.

[redacted]

The Red Brigades have demonstrated an impressive ability to replace their losses. Brigade strength at the time of the Dozier kidnaping—100 to 150 full-time combatants living underground, plus about 500 part-time members who are workers by day and terrorists by night—represent a remarkable comeback for the group, which suffered serious losses in 1980 when police arrested nearly 2,000 terrorists from a variety of groups.

[redacted]

The increased recruitment of factory workers and common criminals whose political commitment may be weak poses a problem. Because the ideological dedication of such people is low, the Red Brigades fear that if they are captured they will readily join the ranks of the so-called repentants and will provide information to the police. Thus, new recruits are not brought into the inner circle that provides political direction for the group, but are used to perform low-level duties.

[redacted]

A new recruit may be asked to commit a crime as a test of his bona fides. He thereby becomes a criminal. This practice screens infiltrators, since Italian law grants no immunity to undercover agents or informants working for the government.

[redacted]

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Table 2

Red Brigade Fractions

Faction	Organization Affiliation	Strategic/Tactical Characteristics	Status
"Justicialists"	Naples Column Prison Front	Politically oriented. Views aligned with "historic nucleus." Criticized operations against economic targets as unrevolutionary.	Have upper hand in disputes with Venice and Milan Columns because of support of "historic nucleus" and strong financial position.
"Economicists"	Milan-Walter Alasia Column	Later generation Brigades members. Tough, but stupid. Focus on economic targets to enhance positions of workers.	
"Militarists"	Executive Committee Venice Column Rome Column Remnants of Genoa Column	Later generation. Tough, but stupid. Claim to be true Marxists-Leninists; rigid in ideology. Believe in centralized struggle. Value links with other terrorist groups.	Asserted leadership with Dozier kidnaping.
"Movementists"	Members of Rome and Venice Columns	Believe in decentralized struggle that permits Red Brigades to exploit problems in specific sectors such as factories and persons.	Smallest faction.

[Redacted]

Dissent and Discipline

Like many other terrorist organizations, the Red Brigades suffer from internal divisions and dissent. There are continuing tensions between the columns and the national leadership. Members often disagree on strategy. As noted, divisions also occur along generational lines. [Redacted]

In 1979, when members of the Rome Column attempted to overthrow the original leaders, the dissenters wanted the leadership to dissolve itself in a broader revolutionary movement. The division was essentially an argument between generations. The dissenters were second-generation recruits whose leaders had served for several years in the Front Line. They wanted more freedom of action for the local columns, and they rejected big terrorist operations. Instead, they wanted many low-level actions related to local issues that people could easily understand. The dissenting faction also wanted to associate the terrorist group with other causes, including the feminist movement. It rejected the elitism of the older

generation. It wanted to build a grass-roots organization, encouraging participants to carry out individual acts of sabotage. It consisted of populists or "movementists" typical of the 1970s. [Redacted]

The historic leadership—the "justicialists"—represented the committed revolutionaries of the 1960s; they were, and are, the Stalinists of the organization. Their political grounding and powers of reasoning are superior to those of the dissenting faction. Class struggle, not other causes, is for them the central theater of combat. They branded the dissenters as "economicists," a pejorative term in Marxist-Leninist jargon for those who attribute primary importance to economic order rather than political issues. A Communist society, in the historic leadership's view, is constructed from the top down, not the bottom up. The party leads the proletariat, it does not meld with it. Strategic planning, not spontaneity, makes it possible to strike at the heart of the state, and strategic planning is possible only through central management. [Redacted]

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The historic leadership won the debate, but tension remained. The spring offensive of 1981 showed that some of the columns were concentrating on practical economic issues. The Venice and Milan columns—the militarists—kidnaped corporate executives to further develop a constituency among factory workers in the northern part of Italy. The Naples and Rome columns concentrated on political targets. The Red Brigades warned of an autumn offensive, but by late fall it had carried out no major operations, and observers theorized that the group was in another period of discussion and debate. [redacted]

While organizational discipline is difficult to maintain, Red Brigades' leaders manage to retain control by a variety of means. The opinions of the imprisoned historic leadership still carry weight, and their superior political grounding and intellect make them formidable opponents in a debate. The organization's careful recruiting process ensures that only those who totally accept Red Brigade principles and demonstrate a willingness to obey orders can gain admittance to inner circles of organization. Careful selection for promotion probably further guarantees that those who gain leadership positions think alike. [redacted]

The Red Brigade leaders are also frontline commanders; this gives them credibility that is important to lower echelon leaders and followers. It also means that national leaders command men, guns, and other resources of their own; they are not without real power in an internal dispute. The fronts, particularly the Logistics Front, are important levers of internal discipline—all columns depend on the Logistics Front for money and other kinds of support. And money does figure in internal disputes. The Naples Column refused to share a \$1.2 million ransom it received with other columns. [redacted]

When other measures to bring the dissidents into line fail, the leadership may try to eliminate them by informing on them. Italian officials claim that they received tips that enabled them to arrest a number of dissenters during the debate of 1979. The arrest of a dissenter not only eliminates him from the field, but brings him into the prison system where the historic leaders and the Prison Front exercise more direct

power. We do not know if dissidents are ever murdered in prison; repentants who cooperate with police are. Members of repentants' families may be threatened or killed as well. [redacted]

Funding

Salary and support for a full-time Red Brigade member probably totaled \$1,000 to \$1,250 per month in 1980. An annual budget for a regular strength of 100 to 150 would be between \$1.2 and \$2.2 million, plus the cost of supporting several hundred part-time terrorists. [redacted]

The Red Brigades get funds primarily through bank robberies and ransoms collected for kidnap victims. In 1981 they reportedly robbed the telephone company in Rome of \$600,000, and they received a ransom of about 1.45 billion lire (about \$1.2 million) for Ciro Cirillo, the political boss of Naples. Terrorists have used links with organized crime for ransom negotiations and to launder money. The terrorists may also obtain funds through their organized crime connections, and [redacted] they may be engaged in narcotics traffic. [redacted]

[redacted] In their early years the Red Brigades and similar groups may have received financial backing from left-wing sympathizers such as Giangiacomo Feltrinelli, a wealthy Italian publisher who was killed while attempting to plant explosives on an electrical pylon. [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted] the Red Brigades now are financially hard pressed. They have been forced to undertake jewelry thefts as well as bank robberies. These thefts entail much greater risks, since stolen jewelry must be fenced, and fencing requires further contacts with the criminal underworld. [redacted]

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Observers have speculated about the possibility of external economic support—the USSR is frequently mentioned—but there is no solid evidence of outside financial support. [redacted]

[redacted] if the Red Brigades had financial patrons, they would not be running the risks of bank robberies and jewel heists. [redacted]

The bank robberies provide most of the Red Brigade funding, and Brigadists may be responsible for more bank robberies than the Italian police credit them with. It is impossible to know how many armed robberies they have declined to claim responsibility for out of a desire to avoid sullyng the Red Brigade banner with common criminal activity. [redacted]

Sympathy and Support

Red Brigade operations are calculated to appeal to several specific groups of potential supporters:

- Marginal or uncertified workers who constitute the clandestine labor force.
- University students who face poor job prospects.
- The street people.
- PCI members discontented with the moderate turn of the PCI.
- Italy's prison population. [redacted]

The Red Brigades draw their main support from the industrial cities of the north, principally Venice, Padua, Milan, Turin, and Genoa. At Porto Marghera, a large industrial zone adjacent to Venice and considered by many to be the ideological headquarters of Italian terrorism, approximately 3,000 workers—about 15 percent of the work force—are involved in the radical workers' movements that operate outside of the unions. They even echo the slogans of the Red Brigades in their own leaflets. Approximately 6 percent of the job applicants at an Alfa Romeo plant in the north are rejected on grounds of suspected involvement with terrorist activity. In another company, 1 to 2 percent of the workers are considered likely to participate in pro-Red Brigade activities. Thus, among factory workers, the Red Brigades have a sympathetic constituency of 15 percent, of whom up to 2 percent might provide some degree of support. [redacted]

Sixty percent of the university and technical school students face unemployment. No estimates are available on how many of these sympathize with or might

support the Red Brigades. *Autonomia Operaia*, a radical leftwing movement whose members include workers, students, and unemployed young people, however, provides an indirect indicator of possible Red Brigade support, primarily among urban youth. Its membership is estimated to be somewhere between 4,500 and 10,000. [redacted]

According to a poll conducted by the PCI in Turin in 1979, 4 percent of the people were so alienated from Italian society that they were willing to support any kind of violent assault on the state. A poll conducted by *L'Espresso* magazine just after the kidnaping of General Dozier indicated that nearly 10 percent of the respondents thought the Red Brigades fought for a better society; 30 percent thought that the terrorists pursued just ends, disagreeing only with their tactics. Among the 20- to 24-year-olds polled (the age bracket of the Red Brigade rank and file), there was even more sympathy: 21 percent thought the Red Brigades fought for a better society, and 35 percent thought they pursued just ends with the wrong tactics. One knowledgeable observer [redacted]

[redacted] has estimated that as many as 300,000 persons sympathize with the terrorists and under certain circumstances could decide to participate in some form of violence themselves. Another close observer, [redacted] [redacted] has estimated direct or indirect consensus with the terrorists' violent line to range between 0.5 and 1.5 percent of the electorate (200,000 to 600,000 individuals). [redacted]

The Red Brigades are clearly not without sympathy and support in Italy. They have demonstrated this in their ability to survive for 12 years, and some observers think support for the group had grown, not declined, in the year prior to the Dozier kidnaping. While the Red Brigades do not have enough support to initiate the revolution to which they aspire, they have thousands of potential supporters; and these, along with the million or so potential sympathizers throughout Italy, are well able to sustain the organization. [redacted]

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
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Table 3

Evolution of the Red Brigades

	Date Joined	Social/Intellectual Background	Operational Attributes	Present Status
First Generation	1969	Students, trained in political science and sociology; thinkers. Well-grounded in Marxism; some former PCI members. Many strong Catholics; taste for martyrdom.	"Historic nucleus," created Brigades. Strong political commitment. Few have cooperated with authorities.	Most in midthirties, dead or imprisoned. Remain part of strategic leadership. Remain committed to Brigade cause.
Second Generation	After 1969 (entered universities under relaxed entrance requirements).	Mixture of university students, factory workers, and low-level government employees. Catholics, but of looser persuasion than first generation.	Politicized, angry and aggressive. Psychologically prepared for violence and technically proficient.	Late twenties. Replaced dead or imprisoned first-generation figures as operations leaders. Some "repentants."
Third Generation	Mid-1970s	Origins much lower on social scale than first two generations. Dropouts, students of little academic achievement and low cultural levels. Significant percentage of workers and lower ranking union officials. Some drug addicts.	Hard, but stupid. Few political pretensions. Repeat slogans but have little understanding of Marxism-Leninism.	Went underground following Aldo Moro operation. Have not held up well in prison; several "repentants."
Fourth Generation	Since 1979	Greater number of workers and those with criminal background than any preceding generation. Survivors of "Front Line" terrorist group wiped out by the Italian police in 1980.	Share same attributes as third generation. Angry members of the antiboss proletariat.	Youngest of Brigades.



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Foreign Connections

The Red Brigades maintain contacts with terrorist groups in other countries, some of which date back to the early 1970s. In the mid-1970s, the Brigades had hopes of creating a Third International, an alliance of terrorist groups in Europe that would exchange arms, information, and advice. To further this objective, the Red Brigades reportedly participated in a 1977 meeting in Spain that was attended by delegates from the Revolutionary Cells in Germany, *Action Directe* in France, the Provisional Irish Republican Army (IRA),

the Basque separatists (ETA), and the Breton separatists. Although no agreement was reached, ambitions for some kind of a coordinated struggle remained.

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In a 1978 Strategic Resolution, the Red Brigade leadership noted "the necessity to develop to the fullest extent historically possible operational cooperation, reciprocal support, and solidarity" with other elements of "proletarian internationalism." The resolution specifically mentioned West Germany's Red

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Army Faction (RAF) and France's Armed Nucleus for Popular Autonomy (Noyau Arme pour l'Autonomie Populaire, NAPAP). It also mentioned "autonomous movements possessing a socialist nature," including the IRA and the ETA. [redacted]

The Red Brigades maintained contact with French terrorists and are believed to have participated with NAPAP in several bank robberies in France. They may also have shared with the IRA and the ETA some of the weapons and explosives provided them by Palestinians, but this does not appear to have been a regular supply channel. [redacted]

[redacted]

The Red Brigades have also had contacts with Palestinian terrorists. Ideological links are not considered important in these contacts, however, as the Brigades were primarily interested in the Palestinians as a source of weapons. The Palestinians have provided weapons and explosives to the Red Brigades [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

Links between the Red Brigades and other terrorist groups seem to have been of only modest importance. The Third International never came to much, and interest dwindled. The Red Brigades are cautious and conceited. Red Brigade leaders generally have a condescending attitude toward other terrorist groups, and on occasion even toward groups within the Red Brigades. The Brigades regard themselves as the only true Marxist revolutionaries and look down on most others as having a lower political education. [redacted]

In the first communique issued by General Dozier's kidnapers, the Red Brigades called for cooperation with other "European revolutionary forces (ETA, RAF, IRA)." There is no firm evidence, however, to link the Dozier kidnaping with any foreign terrorists or governments. The value of cooperating with foreign terrorists may be part of an internal debate within the Red Brigades. The "militarist" wing of the Brigades, which probably held Dozier, is international in its outlook and interested in links with terrorists abroad. The "movementist" wing, with which the "militarists" are apparently at odds, focuses more on social problems within Italy. The willingness of the Red Brigades to engage in further international operations and to cooperate with foreign terrorist groups may depend on the outcome of this internal debate. [redacted]

The leader of Dozier's captors claimed links with Bulgaria at his trial. We have no other evidence of such a Red Brigade connection, or of an active Bulgarian role in supporting international terrorism. [redacted]

The Red Brigades have received some assistance from Czechoslovakia. Ties between Italian Communists and Czechoslovakia go back at least to the late 1940s when the Italian Communist Party exiled its own

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hardliners—ex-partisans who refused to collaborate with the new Italian Republic—to Czechoslovakia. Some of the founding fathers of the Red Brigades made trips to Czechoslovakia in the early 1970s, and further visits occurred during the decade.

[Redacted]

The evidence, however, does not support the more dramatic assertions: that Czechoslovakia directs the operations of the Red Brigades; that Czechoslovakia or the Soviet Union finances the Red Brigades; or that Aldo Moro was concealed in the Czechoslovakian Embassy while police searched for the kidnapers' hideout. [Redacted]

In December 1980, the President of Italy, while vacationing in France, complained to French reporters that Italian terrorists were living in France, unmolested by French authorities. A common border, the existence of elements in France sympathetic to Communist or fascist causes, and the French Government's adherence to the historic principle of providing asylum to foreign dissidents made France an attractive refuge for Italian terrorists. French courts have not always been cooperative in extraditing those they see charged with primarily political offenses. The President's remarks angered French officials. To soothe French feelings, he later publicly stated that the "brain center of the Red Brigades is abroad," pointing his finger at the Soviet Union. [Redacted]

[Redacted]

While there is no question that foreign connections are actively maintained, there is no evidence of external financing for the Red Brigades. German and

Palestinian terrorists have helped out with weapons, but the preferred tactics of the Red Brigades do not require extensive or advanced arsenals, and most of the guns they use appear to have been stolen from Italian military or police arsenals, or purchased from gun dealers in Switzerland, Austria, and Liechtenstein. The Palestinians may have provided some training. Some members of the group were trained to shoot while serving in the Italian Army, and [Redacted] the training that takes place in Italy consists primarily of target practice. [Redacted]

Outlook

The Red Brigades have been fighting for over 12 years, insulated only by the network of movements, organizations, and armed groups that make up Italy's revolutionary left. The rescue of General Dozier, the arrests, and the discovery of numerous hideouts which have attended the rescue and its aftermath have badly wounded the Red Brigades physically and psychologically. The terrorist group must for the moment be on the defensive; its image of invulnerability has been destroyed, its internal disputes intensified. But while Italian officials speak of having "turned the corner," they cautiously avoid declaring that the Red Brigades have been destroyed. Observers have talked about their support drying up, but the fundamental economic, social, and political problems that spawned the Red Brigades and that have contributed to their strength remain unchanged. Italian authorities foresee no imminent victory. Instead, they talk of a struggle lasting 10 to 15 years. [Redacted]

The direction the Red Brigades take in the immediate future will depend on the outcome of internal disputes. A victory by the militarist wing that kidnaped Dozier could bring further actions against foreign targets in Italy and renewed attempts to strengthen connections with other terrorist groups in West Germany, and possibly elsewhere, and could also inspire new groups. However, the rescue of Dozier—the Red Brigades' first major defeat—and the losses suffered by the Venice Column in the process, could discredit this line of strategy. A victory by the "movementists" could bring the Red Brigades back to the domestic

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path followed prior to the Dozier kidnaping. Or the Red Brigades could divide, with each faction pursuing its own strategic line, perhaps under different names.

[redacted]

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The creation of Front Line provides a precedent. Front Line was either created by Red Brigade dissidents or was a separate organization deliberately created by Red Brigade leaders to explore a new direction. Thus, if one policy of the Red Brigades dissatisfies a certain number of followers, another new group could be created to follow a different policy. Italian terrorism cannot be viewed in strict organizational terms. There are changing themes and shifting currents marked by a succession of acronyms.

[redacted]

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The struggle has continued for more than a decade without visibly moving beyond successive campaigns of terrorism. Some of those who joined the Red Brigades because they were disillusioned with society in the first place must now be again disillusioned with the lack of progress that has been made toward transforming society, and with the recent defeats suffered by the group. Italian authorities believe many terrorists would defect if there were some kind of amnesty program that allowed them to come back. Italian officials admit that political violence will undoubtedly continue to be a problem, but they claim that their arrests have eliminated the threat to the state. In their view, the Red Brigade leaders presently in the field do not possess the political or managerial skills to rock the Italian Government with another event like the Moro kidnaping, although these statements were made before the kidnaping of General Dozier.

[redacted]

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The authorities are certainly right in one respect: the Red Brigades do not constitute an imminent threat to the state. They are far from being able to launch a civil war, and their constituency is limited. They are, however, a continuing irritant on the Italian political scene. They create repeated crises for the Italian Government and thereby contribute to Italy's political instability. Perhaps most dangerous of all, they generate pressure for an authoritarian solution.

[redacted]

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Appendix

A Chronology of Significant Actions by the Red Brigades, 1972-81¹

1972

3 March

Milan—Idalgo Macchiarini, the personnel manager at Sit-Siemens, kidnaped and released the same day.

13 March

Milan—Bartolomeo di Mino, Deputy Secretary of the local section of the Italian Social Movement (MSI); the legal neo-Fascist Party, kidnaped.

1973

12 February

Turin—Bruno Labate, the Provincial Secretary of CISNAL Metal Workers, kidnaped and released the same day.

28 June

Milan—Michele Mincuzzi, a manager at Alfa Romeo, kidnaped and released the same day.

10 December

Turin—Ettore Amerio, the personnel manager at FIAT, kidnaped and held captive for eight days.

1974

18 April

Genoa—Mario Sossi, the Assistant State Attorney, kidnaped, held captive for 34 days, and then released.

17 June

Padua—Local MSI office raided and two MSI militants, Graziano Giralucci and Giuseppe Mazzola, killed.

14 October

Milan—Felice Maritano, a carabinieri noncommissioned officer NCO, killed in a gun battle.

¹ This appendix is based upon an excellent chronology compiled by Vittorio S. Pisano in "The Structure and Dynamics of Italian Terrorism," supplemented with additional information provided by Risks International (P.O. Box 115, Alexandria, Va., 22313), *Annual of Power and Conflict 1973-74* (Institute for the Study of Conflict, London), government sources, and newspaper reports.

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1975

16 April

Milan—Carlo Saronio who came from a wealthy family, kidnaped and murdered. Saronio was in fact a sympathizer of the leftwing terrorists, and before his own kidnaping had even discussed the abduction of various persons to raise money for the movement.

15 May

Milan—Christian Democrat Municipal Councilman Massimo de Carolis, wounded.

4 June

Turin—Vittorio Vallarino Gancia, a wealthy vermouth producer, kidnaped for ransom. Gancia was freed by the carabinieri.

5 June

Spiotta di Arzello (Acqui)—Carabinieri trooper Giovanni d'Alfonso killed and Lt. Umberto Rocca and NCO Rosario Cataffi wounded in gun battle.

4 September

Padua—Carabinieri patrolman Antonio Niedda, killed.

8 October

Genoa—Cassa di Risparmio branch bank, held up.

21 October

Rivoli (Turin)—Enrico Boffa, a plant manager at the Singer Company and a Christian Democrat Municipal Councilman, kidnaped and wounded. He was released the same day.

22 October

Genoa—Vincenzo Casabona, the personnel manager at Ansaldo Nucleare, kidnaped and released the same day.

17 December

Turin—Luigi Solera, the medical officer at the FIAT Mirafiori plant, attacked.

1976

2 March

Pisa, Genoa, Rome, Milan, Florence, and Naples—The Red Brigades and the Armed Proletarian Nuclei (NAP) claimed credit for a series of attacks on carabinieri barracks and vehicles.

8 June

Genoa—Francesco Coco, State Attorney, and two members of his escort, carabinieri trooper Antioco Deiana and driver Giuseppe Saponard, assassinated.

31 August

Biella—Deputy Police Commissioner Francesco Cusano, assassinated.

Confidential

1977

15 December

Milan—Deputy Police Commissioner Vittorio Padovani and Public Security NCO Sergio Bazzega, killed during an attempted arrest.

12 January

Genoa—Pietro Costa, a shipowner, kidnaped, and released 81 days later after the payment of 1.5 million lire in ransom. The kidnaping was directed by the executive committee with participants from the Rome, Genoa, and Turin columns. Proceeds were divided among the columns.

13 February

Rome—Valerio Traversi, the Inspector General of the prison system, wounded.

17 February

Turin—Mario Scoffone, personnel manager of the FIAT Rivalta Plan, wounded.

19 February

Milan—Lino Ghedini, a Public Security NCO, assassinated and Public Security patrolman Adriano Comizzoli, wounded.

12 March

Turin—Public Security NCO Giuseppe Ciotta, assassinated.

24 March

Frosinone—An act of sabotage at the FIAT plant carried out.

20 April

Turin—Dante Notaristefano, a Christian Democrat Municipal Councilman, attacked. The gun belonging to the terrorist assigned to kill Notaristefano misfired, and the backup gunman missed. Notaristefano escaped.

22 April

Turin—Antonio Munari, chief mechanic at the FIAT Mirafiori Plant, wounded.

28 April

Genoa—Fulvio Croce, president of the Turin Bar Association, assassinated. At first, the Turin column only wanted to lame him, but the imprisoned leadership of the Red Brigades wanted him killed, and the local column leaders agreed.

1 June

Genoa—Vittorio Bruno, editor of *Secolo XIX*, wounded.

2 June

Milan—Indro Montanelli, editor of *Il Giornale Nuovo*, wounded.

3 June

Rome—Emilio Rossi, editor of the TG1 newscast, wounded.

Confidential

9 June

Sesto San Giovanni (near Milan)—Fausto Silini, a supervisor at Breda, an engineering firm, wounded.

21 June

Rome—Remo Cacciafesta, Dean of the School of Economics, University of Rome, wounded.

28 June

Genoa—Sergio Prandi, a manager at Ansaldo, wounded.

30 June

Milan—Luciano Maraccani, a manager at FIAT-OM, wounded.

Turin—Franco Visca, chief of maintenance at the FIAT Mirafiori Plant, wounded.

11 July

Rome—Mario Peplini, an exponent of *Comunione e Liberazione*, a rightwing movement, wounded.

Genoa—Angelo Sibilla, a Christian Democrat Regional Secretary, wounded.

13 July

Turin—Maurizio Puddu, a Christian Democrat Regional Secretary, wounded.

23 September

Milan—Carlo Arienti, a Christian Democrat Councilman, wounded.

11 October

Turin—Rinaldo Camaioni, a labor relations officer at the FIAT Mirafiori Plant, wounded.

25 October

Turin—Christian Democrat Municipal Councilman Antonio Cocozzello, wounded.

2 November

Rome—Publio Fiori, a Christian Democrat Regional Councilman, wounded.

8 November

Milan—Aldo Grassini, an Alfa Romeo manager, wounded.

10 November

Turin—Piero Osella, a manager in the analysis office at the FIAT Mirafiori Plant, wounded.

Confidential

16 November

Turin—Carlo Casalegno, the Deputy Editor of *La Stampa*, assassinated. Casalegno was to have been lamed as part of the Red Brigades campaign against journalists in the spring of 1977, but the Red Brigades could not get at him, so the operation was postponed. In the meantime, his articles angered the Red Brigades even more, so they decided to kill him.

17 November

Genoa—Carlo Castellano, a manager at Ansaldo and a member of the PCI Regional Committee, wounded.

1978

10 January

Turin—Gustavo Ghirotto, foreman at the Mirafiori Plant of FIAT, wounded.

13 January

Rome—Lello de Rose, Chief of the Public Relations Office of the SIP (the Italian telephone company), wounded.

18 January

Genoa—Filippo Peschiera, a university professor and member of the Christian Democratic Provincial Committee, wounded.

24 January

Milan—Micola Toma, Chief of the Public Relations Office of Sit-Siemens, wounded.

14 February

Rome—Riccardo Palma, Supreme Court Judge detailed to the Ministry of Justice, assassinated.

21 February

Venice—The offices of *Il Gazzettino* bombed. Franco Battagliarin, a watchman, was killed in the blast.

10 March

Turin—Rosario Berardi, a Public Security NCO assigned to counterterrorism duties, assassinated.

16 March

Rome—Aldo Moro, President of the Christian Democrat Party, kidnaped. His five-man escort: Carabinieri NCO Oreste Leonardi and trooper Domenico Rizzi and Public Security patrolmen Raffaele Iozzino, Giulio Rivera, and Francesco Zizzi were killed. Fifty-five days later, Moro was killed. His body was left in the trunk of a car parked halfway between the Christian Democrat and Communist Party Headquarters in Rome.

Confidential

24 March

Turin—Giovanni Picco, Christian Democrat Regional Councilman and former mayor, wounded.

7 April

Genoa—Felice Schiavetti, President of the Industrial Association of the Province of Genoa, wounded.

11 April

Turin—Lorenzo Cotugno, a prison guard, assassinated.

20 April

Milan—Francesco de Cataldo, an NCO prison guard, assassinated.

26 April

Rome—Girolamo Mechelli, a Christian Democrat Regional Councilman, wounded.

27 April

Turin—Sergio Palmieri, manager of the Labor Analysis Office of the Mirafiori Plant of FIAT, wounded.

4 May

Milan—Umberto degli Innocenti, manager of the Castelletto Plant of Sit-Siemens, wounded.

5 May

Genoa—Alfredo Lamberti, manager of the Labor Relations Office of Italsider, wounded.

9 May

Rome—Aldo Moro assassinated.

12 May

Milan—Tito Berardini, Secretary of a local Christian Democrat section, wounded.

16 May

Bologna—Antonio Mazzotti, personnel manager of Menarini S.p.A., wounded.

6 June

Udine—Antonio Santoro, an NCO prison guard assassinated.

21 June

Genoa—Antonio Esposito, Public Security official and former chief of counterterrorist operations in Liguria, assassinated.

5 July

Milan—Gavino Manca, a manager at Pirelli, wounded.

Confidential

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6 July

Turin—Aldo Ravaioli, President of the Small Industry Association, wounded.

7 July

Genoa—Fausto Gasparino, manager of Intersind and former Christian Democrat Deputy Regional Secretary, wounded.

28 September

Turin—Piero Coggiola, foreman of the Paint Division of the Chiavasso Plant of Lancia, assassinated.

29 September

Milan—Ippolito Bestonso, manager of the Mechanical Works at Alfa Romeo, wounded.

1 October

Milan—Carabinieri NCO Carmelo Crisafulli wounded in a gun battle.

10 October

Rome—Girolamo Tartaglione, Supreme Court Judge detailed to Ministry of Justice as Director of Criminal Affairs, assassinated.

24 October

Rome—Vincenzo Garofalo, Public Security patrolman, wounded during an ambush on the patrol squad.

15 December

Turin—Public Security patrolmen Salvatore Porceddu and Salvatore Lanza assigned external surveillance duties in the proximity of the local prison, assassinated.

21 December

Rome—Public Security patrolmen Gaetano Pellegrino and Giuseppe Rainone assigned to escort Giovanni Galloni, then Christian Democrat floor leader in the Chamber of Deputies, wounded.

1979

19 January

Turin—Giuseppe lo Ruso, a prison officer, assassinated.

24 January

Genoa—Guido Rossa, CCIL labor union representative and a PCI member, who had testified against a Brigade "courier," assassinated.

29 January

Milan—Judge Emilio Alessandrini, assassinated.

2 February

Cremona—A police facility attacked.

Confidential

Confidential

5 February

Turin—Prison Warden Raffaella Napolitano, maimed.

9 February

Rome—Pier Luigi Camilli, a journalist with TGI newscast and a Christian Democratic activist, attacked.

13 February

Rome—A member of the media attacked.

14 February

Rome—A vehicle parked in a private garage in Rome, which belonged to Carabinieri Gen. Carlo Alberto dalla Chiesa, stolen.

3 March

Rome—Unsuccessful attempt to assassinate a member of the police.

9 March

Palermo—PDC official Michele Reina, assassinated.

Turin—A police facility attacked.

13 March

Milan—A police facility bombed.

14 March

Turin—Giuliano Farina, test inspector at the FIAT Mirafiori Plant, maimed.

15 March

Trapani—Carabinieri NCO Mario Martorano, maimed.

21 March

Cuneo—Entrepreneur Atillo Dutto, killed when his automobile was blown up.

27 March

Naples—Prison guard Giacomo Begliante, maimed.

29 March

Rome—Christian Democrat Provincial Councilman Italo Schettini, who was also an owner of low-income housing, assassinated.

31 March

Orvieto—A transportation facility attacked.

4 April

Milan—Andrea Campagna, a member of the police, assassinated.

Confidential

Confidential

24 April

Turin—Journalist Franco Piccinelli, with TGI newscast and Christian Democratic exponent, maimed.

Genoa—A political party member, Giancarlo Dagnino, maimed.

30 April

Genoa—Giuseppe Bonzani, manager of Grandi Turbine Ansaldo, maimed.

3 May

Rome—Christian Democratic committee offices in Piazza Nicosia raided. A Public Security patrol responding to an emergency call ambushed. NCO policeman Antonio Mea and patrolman Piero Ollanu killed, and patrolman Vincenzo Ammirata wounded. Explosives were detonated inside the offices.

4 May

Genoa—A government facility was bombed.

11 May

Rome—Giuseppe Merola, Christian Democrat city section representative, assaulted and handcuffed.

23 May

Genoa—Rosella Sborgi, Christian Democratic Municipal Councilwoman, assaulted and handcuffed.

29 May

Genoa—Enrico Ghio, Christian Democratic Regional councilman, injured.

Ancona—Christian Democratic regional offices, bombed.

31 May

Genoa—Fausto Cuocolo, Dean of the School of Political Science of the University of Genoa and Christian Democratic Regional Councilman, maimed.

8 June

Turin—A FIAT watchman, Giovanni Farina, maimed.

14 June

Genoa—Offices of Finanziaria Ligure, raided and attempt made to detonate explosives.

23 June

Rome—A railroad employee, Gaetano Edmondo Pecora, assaulted.

13 July

Rome—Carabinieri Lt. Col. Antonio Varisco, commander of the unit in support of the Court House, assassinated.

Confidential

Confidential

18 July

Turin—A businessman, Carmine Civitate, assassinated.

17 September

Turin—Unsuccessful attempt to assassinate a member of the police.

21 September

Turin—FIAT executive, Carlo Ghiglieno, assassinated.

24 September

Rome—Public Security patrolman, Pippo Pranzo, assaulted and maimed during a fire call.

26 September

Padua—Angelo Ventura, a professor of modern history, maimed.

4 October

Turin—Cesare Varetto, manager of Mirafiori Plant of FIAT, maimed.

5 October

Turin—FIAT director Piercarlo Andreoletti, maimed.

17 October

Turin—A facility attacked.

18 October

Turin—A business facility attacked.

31 October

Rome—Michele Tedesco, a Public Security patrolman, maimed.

6 November

Florence—The University Medical Faculty Lecture Hall bombed.

9 November

Milan—A business facility attacked.

Rome—Public Security patrolman Michele Granato, assassinated.

16 November

Turin—An abortive attack with a grenade launcher launched against a carabinieri barracks.

21 November

Genoa—Carabinieri NCO Vittorio Battaglini and trooper Mario Tosa assassinated.

24 November

Turin—A bazooka-type bomb fired at a police armored car.

Confidential

27 November

Rome—Public Security NCO Domenico Taverna, assassinated.

30 November

Rome—Doctor of Medicine Giulio de Fabritiis, maimed.

1 December

Naples—A government facility attacked.

7 December

Rome—Public Security NCO Mariano Romiti, assassinated.

11 December

Turin—The School of Business attacked.

12 December

Tivoli (near Rome)—A business facility attacked.

14 December

Turin—Two business facilities attacked.

Turin—Adriano Albertino, a foreman at the FIAT plant, maimed.

15 December

Turin—Unsuccessful attack against a police facility.

19 December

Rome—A business facility attacked.

Turin—A business facility attacked.

21 December

Milan—Two male nurses, Lino Manfredini and Ferdinando Malaterra, maimed.

Turin—A businessman maimed.

Rome—A businessman maimed.

28 December

Bergamo—A police facility bombed.

1980

6 January

Palermo—Christian Democrat Pier Santi Mattarella, President of the region of Sicily, assassinated.

8 January

Milan—Public Security NCO Rocco Santoro and patrolmen Antonio Cestari and Michele Tatulli, murdered.

Confidential

9 January

Turin—A business facility attacked.

19 January

Rome—A police facility bombed, injuring 18.

25 January

Genoa—Carabinieri Lt. Col. Emanuele Tuttobene and trooper Antonio Casu, assassinated, and Army Lt. Col. Luigi Ramundo, wounded.

29 January

Venice—Silvio Gori, Deputy Manager, Petrolchimico (Mestre), assassinated.

5 February

Milan—A foreign businessman assassinated.

6 February

Rome—A policeman assassinated.

10 February

Milan—A businessman maimed.

12 February

Rome—Vittorio Bachelet, Professor of Administrative Law, Vice President of the Superior Council of the Judiciary, and former president of Catholic Action, assassinated.

21 February

Milan—Pietro dall'Era, manager, Alfa Romeo, maimed.

29 February

Genoa—Roberto della Rocca, manager, Italsider in Genoa, maimed.

Valenzo Po (Alessandria)—The Banco dei Preziosi, robbed.

16 March

Salerno—State Attorney Nicola Giacumbi, assassinated.

18 March

Rome—Girolamo Minervini, Supreme Court Judge, assassinated.

19 March

Milan—A member of the government assassinated.

24 March

Genoa—Giancarlo Moretti, Professor of Tax Law and Christian Democratic Municipal Councilman, maimed.

Turin—Three policemen on a bus assassinated.

Confidential

28 March

Genoa—Carabinieri NCO Rinaldo Bena, wounded while making an arrest.

29 March

Milan—Three business facilities bombed.

30 March

Padua—An army barracks raided, weapons stolen, and an NCO wounded.

1 April

Milan—Christian Democratic offices in via Mottarone raided, and party exponents Nadir Tedeschi, Eros Robbiani, Emilio de Buono, and Antonio Josa, shot in the legs.

25 April

Milan—Eight vehicles that were to be delivered to the carabinieri, firebombed.

2 May

Rome—A businessman assassinated.

7 May

Milan—Journalist Guido Passalacqua of *La Repubblica*, maimed.

Rome—Pericle Pirri, an official of the Labor Ministry, wounded.

12 May

Mestre—Alfredo Albanese, head of the local Public Security Intelligence Unit, assassinated.

16 May

Rome—Christian Democrat exponent, Savino di Giacomantonio, assaulted.

17 May

Rome—A political party member maimed.

19 May

Naples—Christian Democratic Regional Councilman Pino Amato, assassinated, and two bystanders, wounded.

20 May

Milan—A carabinieri barracks attacked with a grenade launcher.

28 May

Milan—Walter Tobagi, a journalist of *Corriere della Sera*, killed.

Rome—Public Security patrolman Franco Evangelista murdered, and two patrolmen Antonio Manfreda and Giovanni Loreface, wounded.

Confidential

19 June

Turin—Pasquale Viele, a prisoner who reportedly became a BR member in jail, and was accused of being a “spy,” murdered.

26 June

Turin—A transportation facility attacked.

10 November

An Italian businessman was assassinated by the Red Brigades in an unidentified city.

12 November

Milan—Renato Briano, an industrialist, assassinated.

28 November

Milan—Steel mill director, Manfredo Mazzanti, assassinated.

1 December

Rome—Giuseppe Furci, health director of Regina Coeli jail in Rome, assassinated.

13 December

Rome—Judge Giovanni d’Urso, kidnaped.

31 December

Rome—General Enrico Galvaligi, prison security chief, assassinated.

1981

4 February

Turin—A business facility unsuccessfully attacked.

5 February

Rome—A domestic business facility attacked.

17 February

Milan—Luigi Marangoni, director of Milan’s largest hospital, assassinated.

12 March

Milan—The foreman of the Alfa Romeo plant, kneecapped.

27 March

Rome—A bank robbed.

7 April

Rome—Raffaele Cinotti, prison warden, assassinated.

27 April

Naples—Ciro Cirillo, Christian Democrat politician, kidnaped and released 87 days later—the longest period of captivity for a Brigades prisoner.

Confidential

Confidential

5 May

Milan—A UK foreign business facility bombed.

15 May

Naples—An Italian Government worker maimed.

20 May

Venice—Giuseppe Talierco, managing director of Monedison Petrochimico, kidnaped and killed 47 days later.

29 May

Rome—A technical school principal maimed.

3 June

Arese—Renzo Sandrucci, Alfa Romeo executive, kidnaped and released 50 days later.

5 June

Naples—An Italian policeman assassinated in the suburbs.

10 June

Rome—An Italian domestic businessman maimed.

Rome—Roberto Peci, brother of the repentent Brigadist, Patrizio Peci, in San Benedetto del Tronto, kidnaped and found dead in Rome on 3 August 1981.

19 June

Rome—A deputy police superintendent assassinated.

Rome—Antonio de Vita, who was a defense attorney for Patrizio Peci, wounded.

Rome—Giuseppe Franconierei, manager of a book publishing company, wounded.

Rome—A police patrol fired upon.

23 June

Spezia—The Oto Melara armaments plant, bombed.

30 June

Naples—Police bombed in three different incidents.

31 July

Rome—An Italian Government facility attacked.

Rome—An Italian utility bombed unsuccessfully.

Rome—An Italian utility facility attacked.

Confidential

Confidential

13 November

Milan—A policeman assassinated.

17 December

Verona—Brig. Gen. James L. Dozier, highest ranking army officer in southern Europe and senior US Army officer at NATO, kidnaped. General Dozier was rescued on 28 January 1982 (42 days later) by an antiterrorist squad in a surprise raid on the hideout prison in an apartment in Padua.

1982

3 January

Four Red Brigade women terrorists escaped from Rovigo penitentiary for women.



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Confidential

Confidential

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