


- A. Questions which may arise in hearing 6 November from Don Gregg
- B. Role of the Office of Security in CIA
- C. DDA Almanac - prepared 26 September 1975 by PPG



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MEMORANDUM FOR: RECORD

The attached material was used by Director of Security to brief the House Select Committee on Intelligence on 6 November 1975.

Relda

Date 3/30/79

FORM 5-75 101 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

A

Questions which may arise in
hearing 6 Nov from Don Gregg

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Role of the Office of Security
in CIA

B

THE ROLE OF THE OFFICE OF SECURITY
IN THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

An intelligence organization must function in accordance with strict security standards in order to effectively fulfill its mission and must establish and maintain such standards at a maximum compatible with effective and efficient operating procedures. In order to maintain such security standards, therefore, it is necessary that responsible authorities be informed of security weaknesses, violations of security regulations, and other breaches of security in order that remedial measures can be taken. Conversely, however, remedial actions taken by the Office of Security must be tempered with understanding and fairness so that individuals are not unduly punished. The entire thrust of the security programs of the Agency which involve the Agency's staff employees is to create an atmosphere of trust and a willingness to assist Security Officers in the performance of their missions.

As you are aware, hostile intelligence services place overriding priorities on the penetration of the Central Intelligence Agency by identifying and exploiting personal vulnerabilities and weaknesses of the Agency's personnel. CIA personnel are not only an attractive target for opposition services, but

in the case of individuals currently employed by the Agency, often represent a particularly accessible one. Unlike members of most governmental organizations, Agency personnel often carry out their demanding assignments completely alone and some times in hostile areas. They are often far removed from immediate supervision or even observation by friendly colleagues. In these circumstances any latent vulnerabilities and instabilities in their character or loyalty may come to the surface and be detected or exploited by an alert opposition. Additionally, in many instances, employees of the Agency receive little or no personal or peer recognition for their efforts, and may operate throughout their career in what is, in effect, a vocational vacuum with people "on the outside" having no knowledge of his or her area of expertise.

The first line of defense for the Agency against the aforementioned hazards is a careful and thorough assessment of the individual to ensure the selection of the right man for the job. The second line of defense is to ensure, in an unobtrusive and benign way, that employees of the Agency, once selected, do not become embroiled in situations that would open them to undue pressures perhaps leading to unfortunate personal consequences as well as to serious security damage to the Agency and the Government of the United States.

With respect to what I have referred to as the first line of defense, the processing of applicants for Agency employment is accomplished through a system of checks and balances within the Office of Security. These checks and balances are designed to benefit both the applicant for CIA employment and the interests of the Agency and the United States Government. In a sense, we might compare such a program to the thorough assessments employed in the selection of jet pilots and astronauts in that too much is at stake to take chances with avoidable human error or weakness. An individual applying for employment with the Agency must submit a lengthy Personal History Statement designed to furnish us maximum information regarding his or her background. The individual is then investigated by a trained investigator or investigators from the Office of Security. These investigators are trained to establish the bona fides of the applicant from the time of his birth until the date of the investigation, as well as to establish without a doubt his character, integrity, and ILLEGIB loyalty to the United States. In this way, we can be assured that we are obtaining the services of an individual who is who he says he is and whose character is beyond reproach. Security Office investigators do not make individual judgements in terms of the applicants value to the Agency but rather, like Sgt. Joe Friday, only report the facts.

Upon completion of an investigation, the results of this investigation are reviewed or "appraised," as we define the process by an experienced Security Officer known as a desk supervisor. Security Officers who review security cases have usually had experience as a field investigator and have had extensive experience in the security field. Upon completion of the desk supervisor's review, if the investigation is entirely favorable, the case is again reviewed at the next higher level and a security clearance issued. However, this clearance is contingent upon the completion of a polygraph examination by the Agency. If the field investigation has developed derogatory information, the desk supervisor reviews the case, writes a memorandum recommending whatever action he deems to be appropriate, and forwards the case to the next higher level. In the case of relatively minor derogatory information as, for example, an arrest some years before, wherein security approval is recommended, the case must be reviewed by two (2) or more senior Security Officers. The third officer may then grant the approval. If the case contains extensive derogatory information, it may be reviewed by as many as nine (9) security officials, with a final decision being made by the Director of Security. In any case where a security disapproval is recommended, only the Director of

Security can make this determination. Every effort is made to ensure that the applicant, as well as the Agency, receives fair and just treatment.

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The foregoing then, represents, as I stated previously, our first line of defense, to ensure that Agency applicants, at the time of their entrance on duty are beyond reproach in terms of their character, integrity, and loyalty.

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Another key function of the Office of Security is its role in assisting those employees who have problems or who get into trouble. Even in a community as closely knit as that of the Agency, there will be individuals who have difficulties with local law enforcement bodies or have personal difficulties of one kind or another. A Security Duty Office staffed 24 hours a day and a staff of Security Officers ready to respond at any time fulfills this role in affording an immediate response capability for staff employees who need assistance. This whole program is designed not to punish an employee, but to establish a spirit of mutual trust and acceptance wherein an employee knows that he or she can come to the Office of Security and receive a helping hand and a sympathetic ear. This is not to say that employees of this Agency do not become embroiled in situations which reflect so heavily upon their discretion and character that they are no longer appropriately employed by the Agency. In any organization the possibility always exists that an individual will go "off the deep end" and it will be necessary to terminate the person. However, the "batting average" of the Agency in this regard is rather low.

Additionally, part of the aforementioned program is to furnish a sympathetic ear and advice, if possible, even in matters which are not directly security related. Security

Officers do not take it upon themselves to furnish medical or legal advice for example, but they always stand ready to refer an individual to people who can make proper determinations. Again, our philosophy in this matter is that if an individual knows he or she can come to a Security Officer on a minor matter, the door is left open for similar visits on matters which may involve the security of the Agency.

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In closing, let me state that the basic precepts of our security programs are that such programs cannot be dealt with as a separate entity but must be viewed in the total picture of the Agency. Security, employee morale, and the Agency image are inseparably bound together. The Agency does not and cannot strive for total security as this would impose impossible

limitations upon the efficiency of the organization and that of the employees. Instead, this Office attempts to create a sense of a security responsibility in the employee and it is this sense of responsibility or trust which allows our security program to be as effective as it is.

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C

DDA Almanac - prepared 9/26/75
by PPG

26 SEP 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: Assistant for Information, DDA
SUBJECT : "DDA Almanac"

Forwarded herewith is the Office of Security's
revised contribution to the second "DDA Almanac."

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Deputy Director of Security (P&M)

Attachment

Distribution

Orig & 1 - Adse
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OS/PPG/ [] :jsr

24 September 1975

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
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1 July 1975

OFFICE OF SECURITY



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Office of Security
Professional Employees

(30 June 1975)

<u>Grade</u>	<u>Supergrades</u>	<u>15</u>	<u>14</u>	<u>13</u>	<u>12</u>	<u>11</u>
Average age	48.9	50.3	47.7	45.5	37.1	36.5
Average time in grade	1.2	3.3	3.6	6.5	3.5	1.4
Average CIA service	22.2	22.2	20.0	17.2	10.9	11.6
Median age	48.0	49.5	48.0	45.0	35.0	35.5
Median time in grade	1.2	2.3	2.8	5.9	2.7	1
Median CIA service	23.1	23.0	19.5	18.0	8.0	11.0

The youngest professional OS employee is 23 years old.

The oldest professional OS employee is 59 years old.

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TRAINING

FY 1975

Courses Conducted by Office of Security

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			OS	Other
	<div style="border: 1px solid black; width: 100px; height: 15px;"></div>	4	17	2
	Industrial Security Officers Course	1	9	
	Physical Security	7	61	5
	Residential Security	7	47	218
	Safekeeping Equipment	2	8	8
	Safety	1	13	
	Security Surveys	2	28	
	Special Agents Training Course	2	27	
	Security Officers Training Course	1	15	
	Totals	27	225	233

Man-days expended in training by Office
of Security Personnel.

Internal	812
External	145
TOTAL	957

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- Limitations on Outside
Activities



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7. LIMITATIONS ON OUTSIDE ACTIVITIES. The security of CIA is dependent upon the conduct and activities of every employee who through his employment relationship with the Agency has access to classified information. To ensure that the security of CIA activities is adequately protected, it is necessary to place some limitations on the participation of personnel in unofficial outside activities.

a. **DEFINITION.** The terms employees and personnel mean staff employees, staff agents, career agents, temporary employees, contract employees with staff-like access to Agency installations or information, and personnel detailed to the Agency by another Government agency or department.

b. POLICY


- (1) Employees in the conduct of their private affairs will avoid discussing matters relating to intelligence or making any statement which might be construed as an official pronouncement of Agency policy.
- (2) Outside activities that might reasonably be construed to affect the security of the Agency, directly or indirectly, must be approved from the standpoint of security in accordance with subparagraph c below before such activities are undertaken by the employee. Within these limitations, there is ample latitude to permit employees to appear in public and to write for unofficial publication. Employees are encouraged to hold memberships in and attend meetings of academic, scientific, and professional associations. Employees are also encouraged to participate actively in discussions and to present and publish papers in their professional and academic fields.
- (3) Unofficial public appearances and writing for unofficial publications will be approved when consistent with security, and when the Agency is satisfied that adverse publicity will not result. The identification of employees with CIA will be permitted when it is in the interest of the Agency and is not in conflict with security or cover considerations.
- (4) Speeches (including impromptu speeches) and publications on subject matters clearly unrelated to foreign intelligence, national security, Agency activities, or matters that could not be construed as official Agency or United States Government policy, e.g., talks on gardening or conservation to civic associations, may be made without prior approval. However, the responsibility for adhering to the policy and principles governing unofficial public appearances and publications as outlined in this regulation lies with the employee.
- (5) For instruction regarding contacts with public information media, see

c. **APPROVAL REQUIRED.** To prevent inadvertent disclosure of information and to ensure compliance with Agency policy, approval must be obtained before participation by an employee in the following:

(1) UNOFFICIAL PUBLIC APPEARANCES AND PUBLICATIONS

- (a) **Subject Matter.** Except as stated in subparagraph b(4) above subject matter for unofficial public speeches or publications must be approved in advance. The subject matter must be unclassified and drawn from overt sources available to persons not affiliated with CIA.

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(b) **Procedures.** A request to appear in public or to write for an unofficial publication will be made by memorandum identifying the meeting or the publisher, and explaining the nature of the employee's participation. The memorandum should include information about the practice of the sponsor or publisher regarding the identification of the place of employment of its participants or authors. If the requester is or has ever been assigned cover (including cover for TDY travel) or knows he is being considered for assignment under cover, the memorandum must identify his cover or potential cover status without identifying the cover organization. The requesting memorandum will be forwarded with the original and one copy of the speech or manuscript to the responsible Deputy Director or Head of Independent Office through the following reviewing officials for their recommendation for approval or disapproval:

(1) The Chief, Cover and Commercial Staff, if the requester is or has ever been assigned cover (including cover for TDY travel) or knows he is being considered for assignment under cover;

(2) The Director of Security;

(3) The Assistant to the Director.

If the speech or manuscript is not available, the requesting memorandum will include an abstract or outline of the scheduled activity, and a statement as to when the completed text will be ready for review. The Deputy Director or Head of Independent Office concerned will approve or disapprove the request.

(c) **Consultants and Contractors.** Consultants and contractors employed by or associated with the Agency for personal services will be advised by contracting officers that they are prohibited from making public statements on the subject of intelligence or intelligence operations of the Agency or any other intelligence agency. This prohibition will be incorporated in the contract negotiated with all consultants and contractors.

(2) **AMATEUR RADIO STATIONS.** Agency employees are prohibited from operating amateur radio stations overseas regardless of the ownership or location of the station. An exception may be granted only where it is clearly demonstrated that a benefit to the Agency will be derived, and the joint approval of the Deputy Director for Operations, the Director of Communications, and the Director of Security is obtained.

(3) Reserved.

(4) Reserved.

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