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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

National Intelligence Council

NIC #9716-82

30 November 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

FROM : [REDACTED]
National Intelligence Officer for Warning

SUBJECT : NIO Monthly Warning Assessments: November

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1. The reports on the NIO warning meetings are attached.
2. Comments on warning situations.

a. USSR

(1) Early moves by the Andropov leadership may signal a shift to a more assertive policy in countering the Reagan Administration's foreign and defense policies. Two weeks after Andropov's "unanimous" election as general secretary, Pravda issued a personal attack on the President, condemned his arms control policy as aimed at achieving military superiority, and denounced the MX decision as a violation of the SALT treaties. TASS's chief military analyst later charged that the MX decision means that the U.S. no longer intends to observe SALT II restrictions, and the Novosti news agency warned that the deployment of "Euromissiles" next year would create a new strategic situation that would oblige the Soviet Union to adopt a launch-on-warning strategy.

(2) Novosti's warning that Soviet retaliatory strikes would be aimed at U.S. military facilities located in "densely populated areas" of Western Europe probably foreshadows a vigorous propaganda offensive in the next three months aimed in part

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at influencing the outcome of the West German elections in early March. As part of this campaign, the Soviets may threaten to end their moratorium on SS-20 deployment if preparations for NATO's INF modernization proceed.

b. Pakistan/India/Israel

(1) While the possibility of an Indian or Israeli preemptive attack must be viewed as a realistic threat, intelligence analysts recognize that both countries would incur serious political costs and risks in undertaking such an attack.

c. Iran-Iraq

(1) Reinforcement of Iranian units on the Iraqi border west of Dezful points to an intensification or Iranian attacks on the central front in the next few weeks. The Iranians probably will attempt to outflank Iraqi defenses and seize positions that would enable them to interdict the main highway between Baghdad and Al Basrah.

(2) Although President Saddam Hussein's control of Iraqi security forces appears firm, his hold on power could be threatened by an Iranian disruption of road communications between Baghdad and the south or by a major defeat of Iraqi forces on the central front and a disorganized retreat. His position has been weakened by the growing reluctance of the Gulf states to fund Iraq's war effort and by their failure to respond to Iraq's invocation of the Joint Arab Defense Treaty in October.

d. Mozambique

(1) The struggle between the Machel regime and South African-supported insurgents may reach a flashpoint in the next 60 to 90 days. The regime's inability to contain the expansion of the insurgency may impel Machel to call for Cuban troop assistance. Such a move would trigger a rapid escalation in view of South Africa's warning that Cuban military intervention would be resisted by South African forces. An escalation could also involve Zimbabwe which has deployed troops into Mozambique to protect vital rail and pipe lines.

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e. Sudan

(1) President Nimieri's hold on power may be jeopardized in the next few weeks by a severe economic crisis. A sharp rise in prices resulting from a 45 percent devaluation coupled with low petroleum stockpiles could precipitate serious disorders. Saudi Arabia appears unwilling to finance a massive bailout.

f. El Salvador

(1) The guerrilla offensive in the northeast has demonstrated an undiminished capability to maintain pressure on government forces. If the leftists continue to score gains in this area, they may declare a "liberated" zone and conceivably proclaim a rival revolutionary government as a means of pressing their demand for negotiations.

g. Nicaragua

(1) The movement of Nicaraguan tanks to the border with Honduras and warnings that Nicaragua will launch counterattacks if the anti-Sandinista threat intensifies have increased the chances of military escalation. Limited cross-border operations by Sandinista forces cannot be ruled out. A military response by Honduras might prompt the Nicaraguans to call for greater Cuban and Soviet military assistance.

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Attachments:

NIO/AF
NIO/LA
NIO/WE
NIO/NARC
NIO/NESA
NIO/EA
NIO/USSR-EE
NIO/NP

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