

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

National Intelligence Council

DDI 1609-82

3 March 1982

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MEMORANDUM FOR: [redacted]
Chairman, National Intelligence Council

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FROM : [redacted]
National Intelligence Officer for Warning

SUBJECT : Marketing of Intelligence: Product and Services


1. You asked for some comments on the marketing of intelligence products and services by the intelligence elements of CIA. I did a cursory check of written material and memories to cover the past decade. The results of that survey and my impressions and comments are offered as the basis for further discussion of how the NIOs might assist the overall marketing responsibility of the DCI, the CIA, and the Intelligence Community.

2. There have been several surveys and studies in the past ten years to determine customer satisfaction with the intelligence product. Some efforts have been clearly labeled as such but others have been less than obvious. An example of the former is the attached three part monograph--The Impact of Intelligence on the Policy Review and Decision Process--published in 1980. A less obvious survey of customer satisfaction was Andy Marshal's stint in the Old Executive Office Building in the early 1970's where he, among other tasks, evaluated intelligence support to selected policy issues and offered guidance to the producers. The Arthur D. Little, Inc. report to the DDI in 1976 contained specific suggestions on marketing products and services. Although there is no particular survey to cite as reference, I know that a perceived need for systematic marketing was one of the major reasons for establishing the National Intelligence Officers in 1973.

3. Some of the background to the formation of the NIOs is relevant to your current interest in marketing. James Schlesinger had done an extensive study of the Intelligence Community while he was at the OMB and brought with him to the job of DCI a comprehensive plan for reform and management initiatives. His OMB study led to conclusions that the intelligence production elements were out of touch with the policy problems, the product lacked quality, and that there was a pronounced bias to the political and socio-economic analysis as a result of the academic orientation of the analysts and their managers.

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4. By the time he arrived as DCI, Schlesinger had acquired additional views on marketing from [] and his endeavors mentioned earlier, he had some defense oriented views from Lew Allen and [] and he brought with him [] as an executive assistant. [] experience as a CIA officer, both in the Office of Current Intelligence and on detail to Kissenger's staff, left him with some strongly held views on the quality and relevance of the CIA product. The sum of this incomplete listing of factors was a Schlesinger conviction that something was wrong and that adjustments in marketing procedures offered the possibility of immediate pay-off. The agency was not doing any marketing. The assumption was that "the customer will call if he needs something, if he doesn't call he is satisfied." There were frequent contacts between DO officers and consumers but little feed-back. The contacts by DI officers were not wide-spread and were not systematic. By contrast, the DIA had two officers out everyday marketing products and services to the NSC Staff, the WHSR, Director/OMB, and to the budget, foreign relations, and armed services committees on the Hill.

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5. Several activities and preconceptions converged in the early months of 1973. [] and Schlesinger saw the organization of the Special Assistant for Vietnamese Affairs (SAVA) under George Carver as a successful model for focusing the intelligence product on policy problems. There were, of course, other functions of SAVA relevant to coordination of intelligence and operations, geographic organization for production, etc. that were subjects of both agreement and sharp disagreement at the same time. Bill Colby, as Executive Director, was unsuccessfully urging Schlesinger to reorganize the Directorate of Intelligence on a geographical basis; partly to address the marketing and relevance issues. More or less independently, Lew Allen asked the IC Staff (newly formed under his leadership) to develop a model organization, process, and publications to meet the same set of needs perceived by people mentioned earlier.

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6. Two of us on Lew Allen's staff developed a proposal for community production, marketing of DCI and Community product, coordination of collection and production, etc. that drew upon the SAVA model as well as the Andy Marshall criticisms and the []/Schlesinger perceptions. By the time we had the proposal ready, Colby had become DDO, Schlesinger knew he was going to Defense, and the process of extensive changes was shortened to get an immediate pay-off in marketing in order to improve relevance and to replace what was seen as "a burned-out Office of National Estimates." To make a short story of what was about 4-5 months of refinements and deliberation, DCI Colby accepted our proposal for National Intelligence Officers in late summer of 1973.

7. Colby accepted our concept (perhaps he already held the same view) that the NIOs would be his personal staff officers, his personal representatives, who would work at the Assistant Secretary level to do what the DCI would do if he had the time to pursue all the policy issues. The primary duty of the NIO was to determine what intelligence support was needed, inform the DCI and act for him to order up what was required. This was a responsibility across the intelligence spectrum of collection, processing, current intelligence, estimates, and special support. An example of special support was a set of specific policy proposals for an Arab-Israeli cease-fire and truce monitoring operation developed by me that became the framework for the post-October War arrangements that are still in place.

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8. The original concept did not call for the NIOs to spend much of their time writing, editing, and chairing the estimates process. The NIO was to have responsibility for estimates in his area but was not to become a slave to the estimates process. Much of the detail work you see some NIOs doing today was done by chairmen and drafters detailed from the Community for the project. It was recognized that research of the market place and the marketing of products and services across the spectrum of the DCI capabilities would occupy well over one-half of the NIO's time.


9. The concept was adapted by individuals to fit their personalities, interests, and their market. Colby prodded the NIOs to stay involved in the policy process and to report frequently to him. He held one hour sessions with the NIOs every week or ten days for oral exchanges that served to focus attention on his priorities. The DDO and the DDI usually attended those sessions. This policy was continued under Bush but other forces gradually shaped a more passive role for the NIOs. Estimates occupied more of their time, a more academic approach to estimates was sought, and the NIOs began to be selected accordingly.

10. A pause in the narrative is appropriate to make some comments about Colby's views. He wanted to organize the Directorate of Intelligence on a geographic basis largely for reasons of internal effectiveness and efficiency. He believed that there would be some improvements in "marketing" flowing from such a change but he also saw that the managerial duties of a regional office director would limit the time available for the marketing function. His near term solution was to encourage the DDI's managers to become involved in marketing but to rely on the NIOs as his principal agents. Colby was uncertain of the long-term but he hoped to uncover broad-gauged people with sufficient vitality to enable some combination of NIOs and regional production offices.

11. My overall judgment of the NIOs in the 1973-76 period is that they were active in marketing and systematically fed back market research to the DCI and his production and collection elements. Colby and Bush recognized that an active marketing role for NIOs would introduce some strain into the relationships among Community elements. They accepted that as a price to be paid for the marketing service. The Intelligence Community at large adapted well and accepted the NIO activist role better than the Directorate of Intelligence. The loudest complaints and the most aggressive attacks upon the NIOs came from the DDI elements. The DDI attitude was not homogeneous but they opposed the NIOs as a symbol of executive direction intruding where heretofore the office directors largely decided what would be produced. There were other comments about diminished access and prestige for the production managers but I believe that the intrusion of the DCI was the principal cause for resentment. The culture in the DDI elements, even today, is best characterized as collegial. As the opportunities presented themselves in the 1977-80 period, the "old hands" reared in the Directorate of Intelligence successfully urged changes to the overall character of the NIO organization. I do not mean to imply that all changes of that period were initiated by reactionary elements of an old "DDI Mafia" because many of the changes were directed by DCI Turner. I do wish to emphasize that the preferences of the "old hands" are for a passive NIO role, minimizing the market-place, and maximizing time spent on the procedural aspects of producing estimates.

25X1 12. There is a new survey of the market-place nearing completion by the DDI. Bruce Clarke and [redacted] agreed last year that a survey of about 140 Carter administration officials should be made to determine consumer satisfaction with Community products and to elicit suggestions for improvement. That project is under [redacted] management and involves representatives from NSA, State, and DIA. Their report is expected in April. A questionnaire is attached. 25X1

13. I believe that the DCI should have a systematic marketing program and that the NIOs are the appropriate element to perform the principal effort. There is a need for each of the directorates to have a marketing effort and the NIOs should not be encouraged to view marketing as their exclusive charter. The Director should be encouraged to view the NIOs as an instrument for collecting an overview of the market and the effort to satisfy the interests of the consumer. If the DCI accepts that role for the NIOs he must meet with them as a group and reinforce their self-perception and encourage them in their efforts. 25X1



Attachments

- 25X1
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- A. Review of National Intelligence [redacted] Feb 75
 - B. Review of National Intelligence [redacted] Aug 76
 - C. Arthur D. Little, Inc. Report to the DCI Nov 76
 - D. The Impact of Intelligence on the Policy Review and Decision Process--Part One: Findings
 - E. " " --Part Two: A Framework for the Relationship Between Intelligence and Policy
 - F. " " --Part Three: Recommendations
 - G. Survey on Intelligence Community Production

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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

9 March 1982

National Intelligence Council

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, National Intelligence Council

25X1 FROM:

[Redacted]

NIO for Economics

25X1 SUBJECT:

[Redacted]

Memo on Marketing of Intelligence

25X1 1. Although [Redacted] brings up some useful points, I believe his memo is misleading in certain respects. My reactions no doubt are colored by the fact that I took an "old hand" DDI perspective for many years, but I believe the problem is not well understood and has been misinterpreted many times in the past.

2. In the first place, the term "marketing of intelligence" is inappropriate. What is needed is not marketing the CIA product but rather gaining a sufficient understanding of the actual and potential policy concerns of the US government, so that the CIA product may become more relevant. This is not just a semantic problem. DIA, for example, has been strong on "marketing," but has rarely been involved meaningfully in the policy process.

3. The allegation that CIA (NFAC, DDI) did not make much effort to deal with policymakers is greatly overdrawn. Since military, technical, and scientific analysis consisted mainly of basic research which took highly institutionalized forms--largely, contributions to elaborate national estimates--there was relatively little reason for many direct contacts with consumers. In economic intelligence, OER prided itself on developing and maintaining a wide network of contacts throughout the economic policy community. Indeed, OER took Schlesinger's criticisms very much to heart and shifted resources substantially in favor of what came to be called "policy support." In the political area, the record was a mixed one, with some division chiefs maintaining close relations with their counterparts at State and the NSC, while others stayed close to home. The main problem in political intelligence was, and to some extent still is that much of the product is driven by cables rather than by issues.

25X1 4. I agree with [Redacted] that NIOs have and can play a crucial role in developing a sophisticated understanding of US policy issues and processes. They can thereby help make DDI intelligence product more relevant, more timely, and generally more useful. DDI office and division

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chiefs, however, should be strongly encouraged to develop their own customer network. NIOs should help to stimulate this process and assure that the linkages are at a sufficiently high level so that we can be confident that requests for intelligence support are on issues of truly high priority and not just grist for the desk officer's mill. It is useful to support lower level requests as well, but not with the same resource commitment.


5. I am very skeptical about the notion of establishing a "systematic marketing program;" if by "systematic" means establishing a formalized system, including consumer surveys, etc. Surveys will give you any answer you want. The important thing is for the NIOs, the DDI line of command, and some senior analysts to understand that dealing with customers is an important part of their responsibility.

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