

SECRET

Approved For Release 2005/01/06 : CIA-RDP83B01027R000200050001-0

20 September 1978

Mr. Chairman,

The DCI has asked me to represent him today and to respond for him to the Committee's expressed concerns about warning. He has also asked me to apologize for his delay in responding. This, as yesterday's and today's hearings have shown, is an exceedingly complex problem. It involves many elements of the Intelligence Community and many knotty issues for which there never has been any fully satisfactory solution.

He also wishes to express to the Committee his appreciation for the perception and professionalism that went into its report. The report identified for him a number of weaknesses in the warning structure.

The Committee states that there should be a single focus for the DCI's warning responsibilities. The DCI agrees, and what I have to say this afternoon will be largely devoted to that topic. He has

Approved For Release 2005/01/06 : CIA-RDP83B01027R000200050001-0

discussed his decision with the Director of DIA. I think it can be taken as firm, with the reservation that experience and the writing of the fine print may lead us to make some adjustments. He has dealt so far only with the national organizational and management structure, not with the harder questions of improving the warning product. What we are doing is building the structure whereby real improvement may be brought about.

This planned structure is as yet only bare bones, but I will attempt to flesh it out a bit as I proceed. X

In the first instance, we are returning to the traditional role of the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence as the DCI's overseer of warning. The DDCI will chair a committee under the National Foreign Intelligence Board on which all the NFIB members who have a major interest in the warning problem will be represented at a senior level. We are not, however, reinventing the old Watch Committee. The mission of the new committee -- it does not yet have a name -- will not, repeat not, be to reach substantive judgments.

SECRET

Approved For Release 2005/01/06 : CIA-RDP83B01027R000200050001-0

In other words, it will not itself warn. Rather, it will be the DCI's body for oversight and coordination of Community warning systems. In other words, it will deal at a senior level with what Admiral Robertson refers to as the process. The committee will probably concern itself on one end of the scale with large problems such as the evaluation of overhead systems from a warning point of view and on the other with a myriad of small fixes that serve to make the system more efficient, such as procedures on the National Operations and Intelligence Watch Officers Net.

At the next level down, the DCI will appoint a senior officer of the National Foreign Assessment Center as his focal point for warning. (He has tentatively decided that I should have this responsibility.) This officer -- he does not yet have a title, but I will call him the DCI's senior warning officer -- will have warning as his primary responsibility. On the management and coordination side of warning, he will serve as Executive Secretary of the NFIB committee previously mentioned. In addition, DIA, INR, and perhaps

Approved For Release 2005/01/06 : CIA-RDP83B01027R000200050001-0

SECRET

some other agencies will be asked to name senior representatives to a working group, chaired by the senior warning officer, that will support the DDCI's committee. The working group will also not be a substantive committee and will not issue warning, but it will provide a forum for the exchange of views and a means by which the substantive concerns of one agency can be communicated to the others at a senior level.

Substantive responsibilities for producing warning at the national level will center in the senior warning officer. In this capacity he will replace the Special Assistant for Warning arrangement which, as the Committee has noted, is in disarray. I should add here that this decision does not indicate any lack of confidence in either General Faurer or Admiral Robertson, who have done the job most effectively. Rather, it is simply a recognition that with the restructuring of the Community and increased responsibilities of the DCI, he needed not only to give more attention to warning problems but also to have supporting him an officer whose organizational position would permit him to concentrate his efforts on the DCI's needs. X

The Strategic Warning Staff will remain in its present relationship to the NMIC, but will now answer to the senior warning officer. Once the new management structure is in place, we will review all aspects of the SWS. We hope to link it more closely with the other agencies of the Community as well in order to make it more effective in its strategic warning role.

For the broader aspects of warning, the senior warning officer will work through the National Intelligence Officers. Each of them has an informal "sub-Community" or working group of the senior officers in each agency working on his area of responsibility. He will be expected to convene his working group, probably monthly, to address specifically the question of possible upcoming troublesome developments in his area and issue appropriate warning. Through this system, the senior warning officer and the NIOs will endeavor to keep the Community sensitized to its warning responsibilities, to challenge conventional analysis and interpretation, and to ensure the bringing forward of alternate hypotheses. These three things are fundamental requirements of any warning system.

SECRET


Approved For Release 2005/01/06 : CIA-RDP83B01027R000200050001-0

As critical situations emerge -- to illustrate, as the possibility of US-Soviet confrontation emerges from a relatively minor crisis in the third world -- it will be the responsibility of the senior warning officer to see that appropriate warning is issued and to ensure that the Community is mobilized to meet the intelligence challenge. This will mean among other things the triggering of the much more highly structured systems for strategic warning, such as those discussed by Admiral Robertson, and for which the SWS is the central node at the national level.

I believe that these arrangements are workable. Admiral Robertson and I will meet next week to put some flesh on the bones.

Let me close by saying that the Director of Central Intelligence and the Central Intelligence Agency were created to a very considerable extent because of Pearl Harbor. The DCI views strategic warning -- and warning in its broader sense -- as his most important single responsibility. If the arrangements I have laid do not prove adequate, we will change them or strengthen them, and we will, of course, welcome the Committee's suggestions.

# NATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR WARNING



-----> Flow of warning

SECRET