25 May 1978

Meeting of the I & W Working Group, 24 May 78, 2-4 P.M.

- 1. Purpose of the meeting, to review the draft by Dick Lehman of the paper, The Role of the DCI in Warning and and Crisis Management. To solicit the views of the members of the panel on the paper: do we have problems with this approach, and is the proposed organization going in the right direction?
- 2. Polled informally, the various members expressed the following general views, by and large favoring the general approach -- with exceptions as noted specifically below.

NITC does not yet have a coordinated position. Preliminary view that this is not yet a neat enough package for the DCI. The proposal may be just a Band-aid for the SWS.

Presented the main criticism of the proposal. Basically he does not favor setting up this new mechanism. He feels that the DCI already has an established line of command which will effectively function, through his two deputies -- Mr. Bowie for analysis and for collection. He does not like the idea of the top Steering Group because it is too high level and would not be able to function effectively. Mainly, however, he is critical of the role of the Senior Assistant whom he sees as being superfluous and inserted between the major NFAC and NITC roles. Principal flaw in his the Senior Assistant is just an adviser with no managerial clout or apparatus with which to activate the necessary assets in a developing crisis. One needs to organize support in crises "at the point where the NFAC and NITC lines intersect." One does not need a separate DCI apparatus, as is proposed with the Senior Assistant. Whatever authority you give the Senior Assistant, you are and Bowie. (The crux of the argutaking away from ment.) I & W needs a coordinator who has the ability to co-opt all assets, including the collection and analysis assets of DoD; he must demonstrate that the DCI is in charge, or the DoD will take over. "Below the elephants," the community comes together at the NIO level; the Production and the Collection elements must serve him. Another point: although it would be good to make changes in SWS, it is better not to do this now. The DIA is extremely sensitive to change, and the sort of proposal we

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are making will just create "hate and discontent" there, as well as with the NIOs. In short, the DCI wants a clear managerial line -- "two buttons to push: " this proposal does not give him that. 25X1 Generally favorable, and has few problems. Principally, he favors dropping the Committee (Stegring Group). Sees useful role for the Senior Assistant; especially can help as referee between NITC and NFAC. He also still has difficulty with the whole concept that strategic warning is all that different that it needs the separate approach, or that we need stroke DIA that much. 25X1 Had not been able to review the paper. Ditto. 25X1 25X1 Relays the comments of who had chance to review the paper: 1. Liked the general discussion of warning at the beginning of the paper, and felt that it should have been carried over more into the sections (PP 13 ff) on managerial arrangements. 2. Does not feel that the proposed arrangements sufficiently meet the Scowcroft criticism calling for a single crisis approach. 25X1 Feels that this is a very good approach particularly the stress on the Senior Assistant. Also would see the Stegring Group as meeting quite infrequently and not in a substantive role but one of helping manage assets efficiently. Likes the stress on the NIOs playing this sort of enlarged role, which means that there would be no need for a more complex "Staff B" handling part of the warning role. 25X1 Also likes the proposal. Believes that the Senior Assistant would need a staff. There should be more community stress in the paper. The idea of a "national sitrep" put out by NFAC will be fought. 25X1 The proposal is good. He does have a problem with the idea of the "NIO for Warning" being the head of SWS; it should rather be the Senior Assistant. 25X1 He feels this is very good and very workable --

especially as seen from the working level looking up. Questions the idea of NIO for Warning. Wonders about the

role of the committee.

3. Dick Lehman reviewed some of the questions raised about the chain of command. Placing the authority with the DDCI has the advantage of putting the authority at the top and at the same time at a place where there is clout with the community as well as CIA assets. The DDCI should exert control through some body, and this is the Stering Group's role. The committee is an overseer, not substantive. It might have small working groups for different issues. It needs an Executive Secretary (the Senior Assistant), who also advises the DDCI, and listens to problems and advises on issues of managing (not substantive). We need a good, bright, CIA man to handle this, and he could function with relatively little staff.

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returned to the argument that this is just a "dummy in the window," only an adviser and not the needed coordinator with managerial clout. The NIO (and NFAC) must do the analysis. One needs a coordinator (unspecified exactly where) to see that all flows to the NIO in the proper manner.

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who missed the earlier part of the meeting, then made some comments on the proposal and on the criticism of it. He first of all questioned point that these matters can be handled by the regular mechanisms. One needs a separate line for warning, and a single focal point for this special topic. There must be some organism to which an NIO must report on warning matters. He could see the NIO's monthly (periodic) meeting on warning as a good, workable, systematic review. But the NIO's report should not go through Director, NFAC; it makes more sense to send it to a person specially designated to worry about these matters (the Senior Assistant). He would welcome this person as a "jabber" who harassed him and kept him thinking and questioning.

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charted the two basic concepts -- the new changes centered around the role of the Senior Assistant reporting to the DDCI, and the approach to have the matter handled directly in existing NFAC and NITC command channels.

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7. Dick Lehman concluded the meeting by saying that he would plan to do the next draft of the paper offering the general proposals of the 23 May draft, but offering alternate proposals if this is desired by the NITC members of the group.

- 8. There will be another meeting on 25 May, concentrating on:
 - a. the distinction between the two kinds of warning, and

b.	the	role	of	the	SWS.	25×	(1