

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Lehman

The DDCI is requesting a study outlining measures to improve warning and crisis management procedures. He would like the study coordinated with

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I have not sent a copy of this to any of the NFAC offices concerned with the subject. Please let me know who you would like to take the action.

The paper is due on 26 May.

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Date 28 Apr 78

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28 APR 1978

NFAC # 1245-28

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director, National Foreign Assessment Center
Deputy to the DCI for Collection Tasking

FROM : Frank C. Carlucci
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT : Warning and Crisis Management

REFERENCES : (a) Memo for DDCI from DD/NFAC dtd 21 April 78;
Subject, Crisis Management
(b) Memo for DDCI from D/NFAC dtd 6 February 78;
Subject, Crisis Management

1. In paragraph 5 of reference (a) above you requested my approval "...not to change the existing DCI-NIO-NFAC task force arrangement before the NITC is fully ready to take up its collection responsibilities." You have my approval, for the interim, to continue the existing arrangements.

2. Having had an opportunity to read your two memoranda to me, I am concerned that the existing arrangements and processes you describe are inadequate to meet our needs under present conditions. Not enough attention has been paid to the basic problem of converging intelligence across the community to cover all events, regardless of geographic origin, which might have an impact on major U.S. policy in critical situations.

3. I recognize that each potential warning and crisis situation is different, requiring different mixes of talent that exist in various community organizations, and for that very reason I would like you and [redacted] to prepare a coordinated study outlining options on how we are going to improve the warning and crisis management procedures. The study should also address the problems you raised in your memorandum to me and how you [redacted] plan to work together.

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4. The study and action plan should be to me within 30 days - 26 May 1978.

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[Redacted signature box]

Frank C. Carlucci

ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL USE ONLY
NATIONAL FOREIGN ASSESSMENT CENTER

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

21 April 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

FROM : Sayre Stevens, Deputy Director
National Foreign Assessment Center

SUBJECT : Crisis Management

1. Bob Bowie sent you a memorandum on 6 February asking for a review of the DCI's crisis management arrangements. While I understand the reasons for your wishing to defer such a review, there are two aspects of this subject on which I feel we are in danger of being caught short should we suddenly find ourselves again in the midst of a major crisis.

2. Under the arrangements that existed through the last major crisis, the 1973 War, and for a couple of years thereafter, we had an SOP for crisis support to the DCI that had been developed from long experience. It was well understood by all concerned, and it worked. It required the then DDI to create a task force, with support from the other Directorates, and to issue periodic situation reports. The NIO served as the DCI's principal staff officer and link to the task force. Our sitreps were highly regarded not only in the White House, but at senior levels in State and Defense. (Those Agencies nonetheless continued to issue their own departmental sitreps, a fact that occasionally caused confusion downtown.) We here at Langley still have the assets to follow the old SOP, but a number of the organizational changes that have taken place since 1975 have left us uncertain that we would still be free to adjust quickly and efficiently to crisis conditions.

3. In about 1975, Bill Colby acceded to pressure from Scowcroft and Hyland for the production of a single "national" situation report series in crisis, to be produced by a single "national" task force. Many of us thought that, however desirable this was in theory, it would be exceedingly difficult in practice and would result in the NSC apparatus receiving a less timely, less comprehensive, and less responsive product. Inter alia, agencies would simply be unwilling to give up their analysts when they needed them most. We hoped,

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therefore, to interpret this decision as meaning that the sitrep normally produced by CIA would simply be designated the "national" sitrep, with arrangements for contributions from and rudimentary coordination with the other agencies of the Community. DIA, the other major player in the game, informally concurred.

4. This arrangement has only been tested once, in the Korean tree-cutting episode (hardly a crisis). Unfortunately, George Bush at that time designated DIA -- for reasons still unclear -- as his executive agent to form a national task force and issue the National Situation Report. The effort was not a success. No one in NFAC would like to repeat it and there are suggestions that DIA feels the same way. It is inconceivable to us that in a real crisis a DCI, and especially this one, could do without the support of his own task force located here at Langley, or that he could permit a national report to be issued except under his own supervision. We are left, however, with a standing agreement and confusion in the Community as to its continuing validity. We would therefore like to give Colby's decision a quiet burial. This does not require any formal action, but merely an understanding on the part of all concerned that we in NFAC will be permitted to pick up this ball at the initiation of a crisis. We doubt that other agencies will fight for it. In each case we will invite State and DIA to send liaison officers and make contributions to give the product a national dimension. These features can be added without radically disturbing the basic arrangement as it existed prior to 1975.

5. Our second major concern is the role of the NITC. In the past, the coordination of both collection and production for the DCI in crisis has been carried out by the appropriate NIO. In our experience, this work has been perhaps 80% production and 20% or less collection, but we now see an emerging tendency to think of the NITC as the DCI's primary arm for crisis management. Especially under present conditions, when the NITC exists on paper but is not actually in business, this could lead to improvised and unworkable arrangements at the beginning of a flap that would not well serve the DCI. They might place the weight of responsibility in the wrong place, both literally and organizationally. Ideally, when an NITC exists, he and his organization should be expected to assist in the crisis effort by relieving the NIO of his responsibilities for coordination of collection. Until the NITC is in place and functioning, however, we run a substantial risk that the NITC will suddenly be called on in crisis to deliver services that it is not yet ready to provide or that in some cases NFAC can provide better. Here again we do not need formal action. Rather, all concerned should be aware of the need not to change the existing DCI-NIO-NFAC task force arrangement before the NITC is fully ready to take up its collection responsibilities.

[Redacted Signature]

Sayre Stevens

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NEAC-474-78

06 FEB 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR: Ambassador Carlucci
FROM : Robert R. Bowie
Director, National Foreign Assessment Center
SUBJECT : Crisis Management

1. Crisis management is a topic that needs to be addressed soon from the standpoint of intelligence support to the President and cabinet officers in crisis situations. There is some ambiguity about the specific role of the DCI in those situations as well as the support he requires from the Intelligence Community and the Agency.

2. The attached papers (Outline of Intelligence Community Actions During Crises, draft 6 October 1976, and Checklist of Intelligence Community Action During Crises, draft 6 October 1976) are the result of careful deliberations by an Agency committee. But, my concern is that no further action has taken place since these draft papers were sent to the DDCI a year and a half ago.

3. My personal knowledge of what has been done to study this problem is, of course, limited by the short time I have been here. I did note that the last chairman of a committee to study this issue was a Special Assistant to the DDCI. My judgment is that the subject deserves your attention.

4. Some of the issues requiring discussion, if not immediate resolution are:

- CIA task force arrangements to support DCI in crisis management situations
- Interagency or National Task Force procedures to marshal Community resources in support of DCI -- and conflicts with departmental responsibilities
- Role of National Intelligence Tasking Center
- CIA relationship with State and Defense in either single agency or interagency task force

Subject: Crisis Management

- CIA procedures to support DCI in PRC and SCC roles during crisis situations
- Procedures for moving from crisis management situations (Korea tree-cutting exercise, October War, evacuation from Beirut) to major emergency action procedures such as displacing intelligence support to follow President to alternate command sites.

5. We are reviewing our procedures in NFAC to follow the checklist of October, 1976, and I am confident that we can do a creditable job of providing support to you and the DCI in the event of a crisis. But, I will feel better about this after we have considered the roles of other elements of the Agency and the Community. My representative on this matter will be and he is available to provide you the background of the problem if you wish to discuss it.

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Robert R. Bowie

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Attachments:
as stated

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