

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

NFAC-2970-77

10 November 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

FROM: Robert R. Bowie
Deputy to the DCI for National Intelligence

[REDACTED]
Deputy to the DCI for Collection Tasking

SUBJECT: Current Intelligence and Crisis Management

1. Action Requested: None; for information only.

2. Background: This is in response to your query concerning the papers attached (Tab A). Actually, the paper on a National Current Intelligence Center is the prospectus for a study later issued by the Center for Intelligence Studies (Tab B).

-- The CIS paper recommends against such a national center (pp. 29-32), and we agree with its findings. Such a Center would be torn between national and departmental needs, and no departmental agency would be willing to give its best analysts to such an organization, especially in crisis when it would need them most for its own purposes; your analytic support in crisis must come from the substantive analysts in NFAC (see Paragraph 3).

-- On the other hand, the reorganization last year that eliminated the Office of Current Intelligence, in order to strengthen our capabilities for political analysis, did make it important to assure that our capabilities for quick and flexible response in crisis are maintained. But we should do so without reinventing OCI: dedication of 200-300 positions for current intelligence is too high a price.


3. The National Intelligence Tasking Center provides one key element in our crisis capabilities; without it, we have had a period of improvisation in the first few days of every major crisis. When NITC is in business,

there will be a mechanism to handle the coordination of collection in crisis, both to support you directly and to respond to analytic requirements as they develop. But we do not think NITC should get into production. That would badly confuse functional lines of authority and result in serious duplication. Analysis and production cover a continuum stretching from the current intelligence spot report through the analytic current item in the PDB, the careful response to Presidential questions, the NIE, to the long-range study. Looked at either way, the job is to treat the same issues for the same customers using the same kinds of raw information; it makes sense to use the same analysts as well. Moreover, the range from "normal" times to crisis is also a continuum. In short, we should not divide the substantive or analytic responsibility in any way, but rather devise procedures to move smoothly from our normal mode to crisis arrangements. This may mean that we should form an NFAC task force if the situation requires it, and that such a task force should work closely with the NITC.

4. What then should we do on the NFAC side? The short history of OCI points out some of the qualities of that organization that made it responsive: high-level attention and access, a trained cadre of analysts, established and generally understood procedures for crisis support to the DCI, responsive supporting and logistic elements. These all are latent in NFAC today. The analysts in ORPA, OER, and OSR are no less experienced than before. The Operations Center is stronger than it ever was. Under our reorganization, Dick Lehman's duties regarding current intelligence will provide the needed leadership. It will be his responsibility to ensure that our crisis procedures are in working order, and to work out arrangements with NITC.

5. In short, we believe we have a sound organization that can meet your needs on the production side. When the NITC is established, we will have the same on the collection side. The important thing is to link them together properly. We are working together to see that is done.

6. This memorandum was prepared before our breakfast on Wednesday. It does not treat the question you raised there. We will be getting our ideas on this together in the next few days.



Robert R. Bowie

Attachments:
As Stated

10 November 1977

MEMO FOR: DCI

FROM : D/DCI/NI
D/DCI/CT

SUBJECT : Current Intelligence & Crisis Management

Distribution:

Original - Addressee

1 - D/DCI/CT w/atts

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1 - C/Collection Liaison Staff w/o atts

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

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-- The CIS paper recommends against such a national center (pp. 29-32), and I agree with its findings. Such a Center would be torn between national and departmental needs, and no departmental agency would be willing to give its best analysts to such an organization, especially in crisis when it would need them most for its own purposes; your analytic support in crisis must come from the substantive analysts in NFAC (see Paragraph 3).

-- On the other hand, the reorganization last year that eliminated the Office of Current Intelligence, in order to strengthen our capabilities for political analysis, did make it important to assure that our capabilities for quick and flexible response in crisis are maintained. But we should do so without reinventing OCI: dedication of 200-300 positions for current intelligence is too high a price.

3. The National Intelligence Tasking Center provides one key element in our crisis capabilities; without it, we have had a period of improvisation in the first few days of every major crisis. When is in business, there will be a mechanism to handle the coordination of collection in crisis, both to support you directly and to respond to analytic requirements as they develop. But I do not think NITC should get

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5. In short, I believe we have a sound organization that can meet your needs on the production side. When the NITC is established, we will have the same on the collection side. The important thing is to link them together properly.

6. Frank and I have talked over this problem in some detail. He has authorized me to say that he concurs in this memorandum.

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

FROM : Robert R. Bowie
Director, National Foreign Assessment Center

SUBJECT : Current Intelligence and Crisis Management

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-- The CIS paper recommends against such a national center (pp. 29-32), and I agree with its findings. Such a Center would be torn between national and departmental needs, and no departmental agency would be willing to give its best analysts to such an organization, especially in crisis when it would need them most for its own purposes; your analytic support in crisis must come from the substantive analysts in NFAC (see Paragraph 3).

-- On the other hand, the reorganization last year that eliminated the Office of Current Intelligence, while it achieved its purpose in greatly strengthening our capabilities for political analysis, did result in some weakening of our capabilities for quick and flexible response in crisis. To my mind, the problem now is to ensure that we are able so to respond without reinventing OCI; dedication of 200-300 positions for current intelligence is too high a price.

3. The National Intelligence Tasking Center provides one key element in our crisis capabilities; without it, we have had a period of improvisation in the first few days of every major crisis. When

AT

[redacted] is in business, there will be a mechanism to handle the coordination of collection in crisis, both to support you directly and to respond to analytic requirements as they develop. I believe, however, that we should keep functional lines of authority clear. We are dealing with a continuum stretching from "normal" times to the most intense crisis. Moreover, analysis and production is another sort of continuum stretching from the current intelligence spot report through the analytic current item in the PDB, the careful response to Presidential questions, the NIE, to the long-range study. Looked at either way, the job is to treat the same issues for the same customers using the same kinds of raw information; it makes sense to use the same analysts as well. In other words, we should not divide the substantive or analytic responsibility in any way, but rather devise procedures to move smoothly from our normal mode to crisis arrangements. This does not mean that we should not form an NFAC task force if the situation requires it, or that such a task force should not work closely with the NITC.

4. What then should we do on the NFAC side? The short history of OCI points out some of the qualities of that organization that made it responsive: high-level attention and access, a trained cadre of analysts, established and generally understood procedures for crisis support to the DCI, responsive supporting and logistic elements. The elimination of OCI removed the web that held these together, but it did not destroy them; they all are latent in NFAC today. The analysts in ORPA, OER, and OSR are no less experienced than before. The Operations Center is stronger than it ever was. Under our reorganization, the redefinition of Dick Lehman's duties to include current intelligence will provide the senior leadership. It will be his responsibility to ensure that our crisis procedures are in working order, and to work out arrangements with [redacted]. He has promised me some recommendations in a few weeks on how to get better current intelligence without major changes in organization or resource allocation.

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5. In short, I believe we have a sound organization that can meet your needs on the production side. When the NITC is established, we will have the same on the collection side. The important thing is to link them together properly, and I think both Frank and I understand this.

Robert R. Bowie

Attachments

Tab A
Tab B

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Bowie

As the Director has sent this both to you
and [redacted] I have arranged for [redacted] to get a
copy of my memo.

[redacted]

Richard Lehman
AD/NFAC/SS

Attachment

*I have removed the classified samples
of situation reports cited in Lehman's
history. R*

Date 13 October 1977

FORM 101 USE PREVIOUS
5-75 EDITIONS

SECRET

[Redacted]

25X

Attachment rendered "unclassified" by removal of attachments

SC 01901-77 Copy # 1
13 October 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: Robert R. Bowie
Director, National Foreign Assessment Center

FROM : Richard Lehman
Associate Director-Substantive Support, NFAC

SUBJECT : DCI's Interest in Current Intelligence Arrangements

Bsb -

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X1

1. You will remember that, in response to a DCI query, [Redacted] asked me to write a description of the Office of Current Intelligence. (I gave you a copy.) [Redacted] then gave this to the DCI as "something to think about," and packaged it with a paper he had been holding, on the origin of which he was unclear.

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2. The folder that went to the DCI has returned with a brief instruction and is attached (Tab A). I recognize the second paper as the prospectus for a study by the Center for Intelligence Studies. The study was subsequently prepared, unknown to [Redacted] and is at Tab B. It recommends against the proposal for a National Current Intelligence Center. See pp. 29-32.

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3. I believe you should respond to the DCI as follows:

- The production of finished intelligence is a continuum reaching from crisis reporting to long-range research. It makes no sense to divide this responsibility, with one set of analysts (under one Deputy to the DCI) responsible for one kind of analysis and estimating and another (under a different Deputy) responsible for another.
- The concept of a national current intelligence organization hangs up, as the Tab B study concludes, on the difficulty any agency has in giving up to such a center control of its best analysts, the ones it will rely on most in a crisis, to do a variety of urgent jobs including current intelligence. And a center would not

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
[Redacted]

SECRET

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work without really good people. (This is the problem with forming a National Task Force in a real crisis.) The idea of centralization has got to mature a great deal more before this idea will march (and that kind of centralization implies some costs to analytic competition I doubt we want to take.)

- The strengths of the OCI organization still exist in the present DDI organization. The key is to restore high-level attention. I think (diffidently) that the new definition of my duties will provide that. After a few weeks of renewed experience, I plan to develop some (modest) proposals for building on these latent strengths. In addition, the NITC will help solve many of these problems. With an effective relationship between NFAC and NITC, I believe we can assure the DCI that he will be properly served in crisis.
- In general, fancy schemes won't work. What you need in crisis is the arrangements and the help that permit the responsible professionals to do the job they know how to do under much more difficult circumstances. You don't need a different set of people or a radically different set of working relationships.



Richard Lehman

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Attachments:

Tab A
Tab B

1. The Office of Current Intelligence was established in 1951 and disestablished in 1976. In the major reorganization carried out when General Smith became DCI, he created an office to handle the SIGINT activities of the Agency, then considered highly sensitive. To the SIGINT function was soon added that of producing a daily current intelligence bulletin. President Truman had specifically requested that such a bulletin be produced, and, when the Office of National Estimates resisted taking on this task, the SIGINT office was seen to be the unit most closely related to current intelligence.

2. As the Agency's SIGINT activities broadened, however, and as the mystique surrounding SIGINT -- a legacy from World War II -- was gradually dissipated, the need for a compartmented and self-contained inner organization to handle all aspects of SIGINT policy, collection, production, and dissemination was eliminated. OCI continued to produce all-source current intelligence, but its specific SIGINT responsibilities were gradually reduced to those of overall SIGINT policy and relations with NSA. These were finally transferred out of OCI in the early 1960's, but the original concept of a self-contained organization gave OCI significant operational strengths that carried over into its current intelligence mission. (See Paragraph 12).

Mission

3. OCI had four primary functions, although there was considerable variation over time in the way these were handled. In addition, there were a number of major responsibilities that were derivative from these primary ones.

5. Second, the Office was responsible for the synthesis of CIA's current reporting. This responsibility derived from the central role of political analysis in assessing the intentions of foreign countries. Thus, OER and its predecessor organization supplied current economic analysis to OCI. Until the formation of OSR in 1967, OCI had a small military division through which current military reporting was obtained from the Defense intelligence agencies. OSR absorbed this unit and took over the responsibility for current reporting, including that of DDS&T.

6. Third, OCI was responsible for the issuance of current intelligence periodicals as a major means of conveying this integrated analysis to the policy levels. It issued a hierarchy of publications, increasing in sensitivity as the breadth of dissemination was reduced. The top of the pyramid was the President's Daily Brief, established for President Kennedy in 1961. The original Central Intelligence Bulletin continued through several metamorphoses until it was absorbed into the present National Intelligence Daily, first issued in January 1974. The Current Intelligence Weekly Review, established in 1954, has run continuously in various formats ever since. In addition, there were a number of more specialized daily and weekly publications including regional reviews,

-2-

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crisis situation reports, and periodicals providing intensive and detailed reporting on subjects of great and continuing national interest. For instance, such a report on Vietnam and the problems surrounding it was issued from about 1965 to the early 1970's, most of that period daily.

7. Fourth, the production of political intelligence was extended in 1962 to include a particular kind of longer-term political research, the drafting of the political and sociological sections of the National Intelligence Survey. Beyond this, the Office was given an amorphous mission to do longer-term policy-oriented "research." This was never clearly defined, however, and successive Directors of the Office had great difficulty in grappling with it. Moreover, it competed, as the NIS did not, for quality personnel who could not easily be spared from their current and policy support responsibilities. In 1973-74 the NIS program was terminated and the "research" mission was assigned to the Office of Political Research, newly created to deal with these problems.

8. OCI's secondary responsibilities sometimes loomed larger than its fundamental ones. They included:

-- Indications and warning, including the chairmanship of the USIB Watch Committee, now defunct, and the staffing of its 24-hour secretariat, the National Indications Center. (The present Strategic Warning Staff is the lineal descendant of this operation.)

-- Development, and management as an integral part of its own organization, of the CIA Operations Center.

creasingly Agency-wide role, it became independent of OCI.)

-- Substantive support of the DCI in crisis.

These activities are described in more detail below.

-- Preparation, based on contributions from all appropriate Agency elements, of the DCI's substantive briefings of the NSC and of Congress.

-- Substantive support to DDO stations overseas, both through the provision of periodical cables and through the assignment of OCI officers to certain major stations.

Organization

9. The Office's organizational position was unique. While it was a subordinate element of the DDI, the Director of Current Intelligence worked under the direct supervision of the DCI as much as he did under the DDI. He was executive agent for the DCI's Operations Center, he was the officer responsible for preparation of the DCI's briefings, and he was editor and publisher of the PDB and other publications for the DCI's personal customers. In recognition of this key role, the D/OCI was a regular member of the DCI's Morning Meeting, which he customarily opened with a short current intelligence briefing.

10. These arrangements provided two great strengths for the Agency's overall current intelligence effort: The D/OCI's presence at the Morning Meeting and his relationship with the Director enabled him to be fully aware of high-level policy concerns and sensitivities and to shape the

final product accordingly; at the same time, his position gave him the
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clout to extract from other elements of the Agency the support he needed
to do the job. In the view of many, however, this led to an over-emphasis
on current intelligence at the expense of longer-range work.

11. Internally, OCI analysts were organized in country desks, providing worldwide coverage. Several analysts might be assigned to specific aspects of a major topic such as Soviet foreign policy, while a single analyst would be responsible for half a dozen small African countries. Inter alia, each was responsible for reading, hour-to-hour, all the substantive electrical traffic on his area of responsibility. Country analysts were grouped in conventional regional branches and divisions. Their number ranged between 100 and 150 as the mission, particularly with regard to research, was changed.

12. OCI's overhead was considerably larger than that of other production offices. In addition to the Operations Center and the editorial element necessary for the production of periodicals, it initially contained a virtually self-sufficient support apparatus. Thus it at one time had its own security, communications, printing, graphics, and courier elements. Over time, these were reassigned to the appropriate Agency organization, although a number of them remained dedicated to the support of OCI.

Crisis Activities

13. In crisis, OCI became the DCI's command post in his role as substantive adviser to the President and the NSC. A DDI task force, drawing together the analytic skills necessary for the subject at hand, was assembled in the Operations Center under the direction of the OCI

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area division primarily concerned. The and persons normally assigned to the problem were supplemented from other offices and divisions to provide 24-hour manning. One major mission of the task force was to produce all-source, comprehensive situation reports. These were designed to place the policymakers on a common information base by reducing the mass of confused and contradictory incoming traffic into a single, coherent and timely account of what was actually happening. Sitreps were usually produced at six-hour intervals. The operation was flexible, however, and reports were often timed to be available for NSC or WSAG meetings. Other agencies also produced such reports, but Cabinet and sub-Cabinet officers generally appeared to find the CIA product the most useful.

14. In addition to the situation reports, the task force responded with analytic or factual memoranda to needs identified by the DCI through his participation in policy deliberations. Sometimes these were prepared as briefings for him to give at the next meeting, sometimes as separate memoranda, and sometimes as attachments to the situation reports themselves. Some sample situation reports are attached.

15. Until the creation of the National Intelligence Officers, the task force chief was the DCI's senior staff officer for the crisis and often accompanied him to his meetings downtown. This responsibility was taken over by the NIOs, who then served as the link between the DCI and the task force.

16. The effectiveness of this system depended on:

-- The unique relationship of the D/OCI to the DCI.

-- Hi Control of the Operations Cent
consequent close integration of its activities with those of the OCI divisions.

-- A corps of analysts trained in and responsive to the demands of crisis work, again under D/OCI's control.

-- The availability of dedicated support resources.

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Next 31 Page(s) In Document Exempt

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MEMORANDUM FOR: D/DCI/NI
SUBJECT : Organization of the NITC

1. You asked for my reaction to Friday's discussion of the NITC. Two points particularly struck me. The first is the one you mentioned: Too much emphasis is being given to the ad hoc or crisis functions of the Tasking Center at the expenses of the less dramatic but more fundamental business of systematic collection over the long term. The former can be extremely important from time to time, but -- as was brought out -- ad hoc tasking is a small fraction of the whole. Moreover, the better the long-term task is done, the less adjustment is necessary in crisis. I cannot imagine a 24-hour watch office of the Tasking Center being a very busy place under normal conditions, however essential its existence.

2. It is true that when an analyst knows what picture he wants, he can ask and the system will provide. In that sense, the present system works. But it is not true that, because he states a less specific need for information about a situation, the system will be equally responsive. The analyst does not fully know comprehensively what sources are available or can be made available, or what sources he thinks are available and are in fact not. Nor can he judge whether the price in other information not collected is worth it. Nor can he do his analytic job and at the same time systematically monitor collection in his area or topic.

3. None of these tasks are now carried out on a systematic basis.

Because they are not, we are faced with a need to improvise when we must cope with something new. (We must not only improvise collection arrangements, we must improvise mechanisms to devise these arrangements and must use inexperienced people to man them, e.g. Because they are not, we do not follow up to see if anything is done about areas of priority interest after we identify them, e.g., South African nuclear. Because they are not, any systematic long-term attack on a priority subject requires special skills and arrangements not normally found in the Community, e.g., Soviet civil defense, where the success of our effort has to a considerable extent depended on the efforts of one uniquely qualified retiree.

4. What should be learned from this in organizational terms?

First, that the organization's emphasis must be on planning the long-term attack. If this is done well, the short term will be greatly simplified. Planning for the long-term, however, should not be allowed to hold up routine analyst-to-collector requests.

5. Second, that an NITC should be problem-oriented, not discipline-oriented. Obviously, its ultimate product will be tasks for the individual collection disciplines, but these must always be part of a coherent whole.

6. Third, that the organization must be producer-oriented. If it exists for any purpose other than to serve the producer then it will become a barrier to good intelligence rather than a gateway. The producer defines the problem; the NITC solves it. Since a solution required knowledge of both production and collection worlds, the NITC's key personnel should be drawn from a mix of collection and analytic disciplines.

7. Fourth, the NITC should be responsive. The analyst, production manager, or DCI himself should know where to take his problem and be able to go directly there. The officers in the decision process should be small in number but high in quality. They should be able to work informally, not hampered by cumbersome staff procedures or committee coordination (the Committees should be advisory only, not part of the operational process). Under no circumstances should the NITC incorporate any element with "plans and programs" in its title. Note that I am arguing for a small decisional element only. There is no reason why such and NITC cannot organizationally incorporate those elements of the Community that routinely process routine requirements and still keep its central operative mechanism small and informal. Responsiveness also demands, of course, that these central operations not impede the rapid processing of routine requirements.

8. Fifth and finally, the NITC should provide continuity over the full range from intense crisis to routine requirement. We cannot have one group of people responsible for crisis and ad hoc requirements, and another for routine and long-term. It is not only inefficient, it is confusing and even destructive to the overall effort. Continuity also requires that the DCI's overall national requirements continue to be expressed and considered in the tasking process when the Secretary of Defense is in charge of tasking.

9. My ²second concern is with Dan Murphy's remarks about crisis management; it bears not only on location of the NITC but also on its makeup. Dan cited four "crises": the Korean tree-cutting incident; the Mayaguez affair, the Son Tay operation, and the raids on Hanoi. In my

experience none of these, except possibly the Hanoi ~~_____~~s, qualify as crises. Rather, they were unique US military operations, and the logical place to follow them, I agree, was the NMCC. But by the time they were launched, the underlying intelligence job had largely been completed and the DCI was naturally a spectator rather than an actor.

10. Real crises are run out of the White House Situation Room. This has been true since there was a Situation Room, beginning with the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962. In recent years, the India-Pakistan War of '71, the Middle East War of '73 and the Cyprus affair of '74 have all found the action in the West Wing basement. Typically, there are one or two meetings a day of the principal players, including the DCI. Typically, also, the DCI comes out of these meetings with requirements for additional analysis, not additional collection. Once the initial adjustments of coverage are made when a crisis opens, the collection systems operate more intensely, but there is not much high-level decision-making ^{required} involved. The exception is the big operation that requires careful coordination. STA

anyway.

11. I see no reason why this administration would operate any differently under stress than its predecessors. Therefore:

- We should not expect that an NITC can provide a new dimension in crisis. It can make the initial adjustment more efficient, it can provide the DCI with more and more current infor-

information about what is going on, and it can help

him coordinate the big decisions in an orderly way. The new dimension is the careful, comprehensive collection strategy work done in the absence of or in anticipation of crisis. This is again an argument not to let the ad hoc tail wag the long-term dog.

-- In terms of location, I find Dan's argument tenuous. In the crises where intelligence still matters, the action is in the White House. This would seem to argue for F Street, but only if the DCI is hit with new collection requirements rather than analytic ones. To me, it argues for Langley, where the analysts are, and where the DCI can state his needs after an SCC meeting and have troops answerable to him ready to respond. If further collection is needed, the analysts must define it.

-- That said, there remains the obligation to turn the con over to SecDef on Presidential decision. If everything said so far calls for a small "watch element," it should not be difficult to duplicate its facilities, if not its people, at Langley, the Pentagon, and even, though I doubt the necessity, at F Street. This, plus secure phones, would provide maximum flexibility. But, whatever else, let

close to where the DCI is based and where the analysts are.

12. Bill Colby had the idea that his NIOs could deal with collection as well as production. His reach, however, was beyond his grasp. The NIOs had all they could do to ride the production horse without moving more than nominally into the collection field. This doesn't mean it wasn't a good idea, only that he asked too much of them. We could use a group (a small group) of National Collection Officers, working with the same informality of approach, breadth of charter, and individual drive and experience, of the NIOs. If you create these, establish underneath them a mechanism to get at the collection disciplines (with the sacred committees only advisory), and append to the whole a small watch element for crisis, you have what you need. With that established on the leanest possible basis, you can then hang on it all the routine processing elements in the Community moving them physically and without losing the essential benefits of smallness.