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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

National Intelligence Officers

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

VIA : Deputy Director for National Foreign Assessment
National Intelligence Officer for Warning

FROM :
Assistant National Intelligence Officer for
Western Europe

SUBJECT : Monthly Warning Assessment: Western Europe

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SPAIN

1. At first the attempted coup in Spain last month seemed to allow an optimistic assessment of the vigor of Spanish democracy in face of a threat to its survival. But accumulating evidence suggests that the event may portend more serious obstacles to the consolidation of Spain's new political order.

-- Military complicity in the coup planning was more widespread than originally apparent.

-- Many more key military leaders would apparently have supported the coup attempt had it not been crushed so quickly.

-- The "Turkish model" will continue to attract the military in Spain, especially if partisan political infighting becomes more severe.

-- Juan Carlos' clear rejection of the military's move has undermined his position among some of the officers, and he may alienate more of them if he fails to restrain either terrorism or the autonomy process in Spain.

-- The king has apparently promised the military that he will institute martial law in the Basque provinces if terrorism gets out of hand, and he may also have promised he will work to limit regional autonomy, which the military fears as destructive to the Spanish state.

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2. The likelihood of another coup attempt this year seems slim: the military are probably prepared to give the new government a period of grace in which to establish itself and demonstrate its effectiveness. But critical uncertainties remain.

-- Some military officers, due to retire this year, may decide to make another move against the government while they are still on active duty.

-- The government's ability to prove its effectiveness and to meet the concerns of the military is uncertain.

-- If martial law were instituted in the Basque provinces, new political tensions there could be severe.

-- Merely delaying the autonomy process might not satisfy the military, but attempting to reverse it would provoke widespread political turmoil.

3. The Calvo-Sotelo government has certain assets in the coming months, however. The move toward autonomy for the Basque provinces has met many of the grievances of the Basque moderates, who may now be willing to work with Madrid against the terrorists as long as Madrid's security forces are not expanded dramatically. The military in Spain may become more reconciled to regional autonomy as over time it proves compatible with Spanish national unity. In future, moreover, the military will not be able to take advantage of uncertainty about whether or not the king will support a move against the government, now that he has demonstrated his commitment to the constitution. Finally, Calvo-Sotelo intends to govern by majority in parliament, rather than by consensus with the opposition parties as well; prospects for his effectiveness are fairly good.

4. In this setting, the form of challenges to the Spanish government may change: rather than "coup plotting", assassination attempts may become more frequent, perhaps directed against the king himself or against high-level government officials as the military wing of ETA becomes more active; this could cause the military to apply increasing pressure on the king to take action against the government with the threat that they will otherwise make their own move.

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