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30 October 1974

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MEMORANDUM FOR: [Redacted]

SUBJECT: Product Review: The October Test Period

1. This memorandum does not reveal earthshaking insights on the substance of intelligence products reviewed during October. Rather it is an attempt to summarize thoughts which might be conducive to next month's efforts.

2. I reviewed NIB and DIN products on two geographic areas -- Latin America and Cyprus-Greece-Turkey -- and used a chart to get a general perspective of the coverage. The chart lists articles by objective categories -- according to country, source (NIB or DIN), subject (military, political, etc.), content (factual or analytical), and KIQ relationship (significant, peripheral, n.a.). There are also categories which reflect value judgments -- "filler," "incomplete," "worth reporting," "redundant." In general terms, the chart can reveal trends in coverage. And since articles from each publication were listed separately (by color), one can compare the two products. For ex-

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-- Subject Matter: While most of the coverage was not KIQ related, about half of the articles did contain information that could be useful to national consumers. That is, the subjects were worth reporting. These pieces covered internal political/security difficulties in Argentina (of IG/ARA interest) and Peruvian political and military happenings, particularly which might affect relations with Chile (of heightened community interest). However, more than one third of the Latin American coverage was only of passing interest or worse, of the filler category. A DIN, for example, described a non-event in Panama and drew no conclusions. The NIB ran an article on Soviet TU-95 flights from Cuba which left the reader with a "so what" shrug.

-- Content: There were few analytical pieces (probably to be expected in current publications), and all but one (of five) were from the NIB. But the NIB also contained more incomplete intelligence items than did the DIA publication. About one third of the total coverage

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was incomplete (7 NIB articles and 5 DINs). The NIB, for example, ran a piece on the political difficulties of the Lopez regime in Honduras and suggested that the president might soon be ousted, but it did not say by whom or suggest what, if any, relationship a coup in Honduras might have on U.S. interests. Not so incidentally, a WHSR, published on the subject, did contain those missing elements.

-- Comparison: The NIB and DIN published nearly the same number of articles on Latin America (19 for the former and 17 for the latter). Only four DIA articles dealt with military subjects; the rest were mainly political with an emphasis on analyzing terrorist/security issues. The military articles fell into the bean-counting category -- aircraft deliveries to El Salvador or Soviet flights to Cuba. The one truly significant military article during the month, which reported a delivery of Soviet military equipment to Peru, was published in the NIB. As noted previously, several NIB articles contained incomplete reporting, but DIN analysis of political events were often shallow compared to the Bulletin. DIN's describing internal political activities by the Argentine and Peruvian military were confusing. There were several articles (on Latin America and Cyprus-Greece-Turkey, as well) which appeared in both the NIB and DIN. Some were exactly the same, but several contained a slant not found in the counterpart item. If I were a consumer, I might find this aspect of community production confusing. The DIN usually beat the NIB in publishing on common subjects but, in one case at least, hurried and shallow analysis by DIA lead to an erroneous conclusion in the DIN.* There were, on the other hand, occasions when DIN analysis was more complete than that found in the NIB.

3. These observations lead to the following general, tentative conclusions about NIB and DIN current intelligence coverage:

- ✓ -- that current intelligence clearly has not focussed on the KIQs, but that might be as much a function of the wording of the KIQs themselves as it is a lack of emphasis by the community;
- ✓ -- that there is too much production for production sake;

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-- that analysts do not often tell the meaning of the facts they are reporting;

-- that DIA's production on Latin America is often on political subjects and inferior to NIB intelligence; and

-- that there appears to be a competitive relationship between the producers of the DIN and NIB, which on one occasion, at least, has led to faulty analysis, and which often leads to redundant production.

4. It is clear to me that under the right circumstances a systematic product review can help reshape community production into a more efficient form. I recommend that during the next month we increase our coverage to include the NID, the Weekly Review, and NIO products. This would have a two-fold benefit. It would round out the review to include the short, mid, and longer range intelligence products, and it would give us a better idea of the effort required to do a review of a range of products. It might also be useful if all PRD officers used a like summary chart, or other tool, to draw his end-of-the-month conclusions.

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Major, USA

