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25X1

NSC REVIEW COMPLETED, 7/2/03.

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. John N. McMahon  
Associate Deputy to the DCI for the  
Intelligence Community

FROM :

25X1

SUBJECT : Comprehensive Test Ban Verification

o You are scheduled to meet with Major General Edward B. Giller, USAF (Ret.), Deputy Assistant Administrator for National Security and Senior Intelligence Officer of ERDA, at 1030 hours on Tuesday, 24 May 1977, to discuss Comprehensive Test Ban Verification (CTB). General Giller raised CTB questions in a letter to the DCI dated 5 May and before the NFIB on 17 May. Expected participants at the meeting include:

- [Redacted]
- [Redacted]
- [Redacted]
- [Redacted]
- [Redacted]
- John LaBarre, Assistant Director for Intelligence, ISA/ERDA
- Bob Duff, Assistant Director for Arms Control, ISA/ERDA

What follows are background information and some points you may wish to raise in your discussion.

o Highlights of ERDA (Giller) letter dated 5 May 1977 (Tab A)

- New CTB would expand and increase technical dimensions of verification problem to all nuc and many non-nuc weapon states.
- New CTB would change fundamental verification issue from determination of location of nuc explosion (atmosphere, space or underwater vice underground) to determine nature of explosion (nuc vice non-nuc).

DOE review completed

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58(1), (2) (5) or (6) (if 1 to 4 or more) *Exempt*

- Pol/mil implications of undetected violations of a CTB (whether by NWS or NNWS) might be more significant than for a LTBT.
- CTB raises 2 basically political issues:
  - Release of info to other nations without jeopardizing sensitive sources
  - On-site inspection by U.S. must be acceptable to the foreign countries involved.
- In view of above, Giller feels it essential for NFIB to undertake an in-depth review of the issue asap believing it useful for NFIB to address fundamental Community intelligence responsibilities to support the interactional verification of a CTB.

o Summary of D/DCI/IC response to Giller letter

- Memo to Bowie dated 23 May asking that his staff develop an assessment in response to ERDA's request and stating plans to schedule CTB verification for NFIB in June.
- Note to Giller dated 23 May relaying intentions (as specified above re memo to Bowie).
- [redacted] memo dated 23 May to [redacted] citing inherent relationship of nuclear proliferation issues to the proposed CTB and the need for close collaboration between the NIO/SP and the NIO/NP.

o Related Treaties: LTBT, NPT, TTBT, and PNET (See Tab B).

o PRM/NSC-16 Nuc Testing requirement for initial review (25 June 1977) addressed to: V. President, Sec State, Sec Def, DCI, CJCS, DACDA, AERDA

- Essential elements of PRM 16:
  - A preliminary analysis of the major problems of verifying a complete ban on all testing weapons as well as peaceful nuclear explosions by the US and the USSR, and other nuclear powers.
  - The effect of such a ban on US weapons testing programs as well as the likely effect on Soviet programs.

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--Alternative diplomatic scenarios that might be adopted to move towards this goal, including the advantages and disadvantages of several alternatives: a unilateral US moratorium; a bilateral US/Soviet moratorium; and approaches to other nuclear powers to join such a moratorium. Consideration should also be given to a more permanent arrangement; for example, amending the Limited Test Ban Treaty. There should also be an examination of the advantages and disadvantages of moving ahead with or holding the Threshold Test Ban Treaty and PNE Agreement already before the Congress.

o Principal PRM/NSC 16 Actors:

- SCC Test Ban Working Group, chaired by John Marcum, NSC Staff.
- Exec Summary drafted by group chaired by NSC staff member with one representative from: State, ERDA, JCS, OSD, ACDA, CIA
- Principal intelligence subjects are U.S. verification capabilities and the impact of a CTB on
  - foreign nuclear capabilities (ERDA, CIA)
  - US allies (State, ACDA)
  - proliferation (State, ACDA)

Input on all these elements coordinated within CIA but not formally coordinated with other intelligence agencies. Verification section prepared by CIA with major technical inputs from the Air Force Technical Applications Center.

- CIA/DDI (OSI/NED) has the action on behalf of the DCI.

o ACDA and ERDA expressed belief there are serious risks in attempting to accommodate "peaceful nuclear explosions" within a CTB. Draft PD/NSC \_\_, 11 May 1977, states US negotiating position should be the prohibition of PNEs as well as nuc weapons tests.

o Draft PD/NSC dated 11 May 1977 (See Tab C)

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o Points and/or questions to be raised

- You should agree to listen to proposals.
- Cite D/DCI/IC response to Giller
  - Memo to Bowie calling for assessment of Giller recommendations and
  - Plan to schedule CTB verification topic at NFIB in June
- Note apparent close relation of NIO/SP and NIO/NP functions as they relate to CTB
- Raise question of the need for an ad hoc committee to deal with the issues raised by Giller
- Query Giller on the expected role ERDA ought to play in the development of an in-depth review of CTB verification

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TAB A

UNITED STATES  
ENERGY RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT ADMINISTRATION  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20545TS-77012  
Copy #

MAY 5 1977

AUTHENTICATED May 5, 1977  
U.S. ENERGY RESEARCH & DEVELOPMENT ADMINISTRATION  
BY: *[Signature]*  
DOCUMENT NO. CLXXVIII-235-1AAdmiral Stansfield Turner, US Navy  
Director of Central Intelligence  
Washington, DC 20505

## COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN VERIFICATION

As I mentioned to you a few days ago, I am becoming increasingly concerned with certain aspects regarding verification of international compliance with the multilateral Comprehensive Test Ban (CTB) under consideration by the Administration. Although the PRM 16 review addresses many aspects of verification, I feel additional consideration by the NFIB is warranted. The purpose of this letter is to outline my concerns and to recommend two NFIB actions.

As you will recall, Safeguard (d) of the Treaty Banning Nuclear Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Underwater (referred to as the LTBT) represents one of four conditions imposed by the U.S. Senate to the ratification of the treaty in August 1963. Its provisions require "The improvement of our capability, within feasible and practical limits, to monitor the terms of the treaty, to detect violations, and maintain our knowledge of Sino-Soviet nuclear activity, capabilities, and achievements."

On 29 February 1964, the Secretary of Defense recommended that "the monitoring of actions taken in furtherance of Safeguard (d)...is basically an intelligence function and falls properly as a responsibility of the United States Intelligence Board. The USIB should coordinate all intelligence activities to maintain Safeguard (d)." The USIB subsequently accepted this responsibility and approved the recommendation that "the Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee be designated as the action agency to monitor the Safeguard (d) problem." The JAEIC prepared, and USIB subsequently approved national-level intelligence guidance applicable to Safeguard (d). The NFIB subsequently assumed all USIB responsibilities with respect to Safeguard (d) and approved the most recent Safeguard (d) report in February 1977.

The successful negotiation and implementation of a multilateral CTB would increase the technical dimension of verification over that required for monitoring the LTBT in at least three ways. First, whereas the LTBT requires monitoring only of Soviet and Chinese nuclear tests, a CTB would necessitate monitoring tests of other nuclear weapon states as well as many non-nuclear weapon states. Second, a CTB would change the fundamental verification issue from determining the location of nuclear explosions (atmosphere,

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AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED ON IMPDET  
Ray E. Chapman


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outer space, or underwater vice underground) to determining the nature of explosions (nuclear vice non-nuclear). Third, the military and political implication of undetected violations of a CTB (whether by a NWS or NNWS) might be more significant than for a LTBT.

Verification of a CTB raises two additional issues which are basically political in nature. First, U.S. statements concerning possible violations of the CTB must be based on information which can be revealed to other nations without jeopardizing sensitive sources and methods and which is politically acceptable to those nations lacking comparable national technical means of verification. Second, the assignment of verification and monitoring responsibilities to U.S. departments and agencies, especially where in-country activities such as on-site inspection are included, must be politically acceptable to the foreign governments involved.

In light of this expanded dimension associated with the verification of a multilateral CTB, I feel it is essential for the NFIB to undertake an in-depth review of this issue at an early date. It would also be useful for NFIB to address the fundamental intelligence responsibilities the Community must assume in support of the international verification of a CTB. In this regard I would be happy to provide a short background paper and lead the NFIB discussion. As an outcome I would expect NFIB to provide guidance to the IC staff and perhaps the JAEIC which would facilitate timely action and preparation in support of the Administration's initiatives in this area.

I would be pleased to discuss these issues with you and with the NFIB at an appropriate time.

  
Edward B. Giller

Senior Intelligence Officer

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*TAB B*



Background Information

Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT)

The LTBT, signed in 1963, prohibits nuclear weapons tests ("or any other nuclear explosion") in the atmosphere, in outer space, under water, or in any other environment if the explosion would cause radioactive debris to extend beyond the borders of the state conducting the explosion. The Treaty is of unlimited duration. More than 100 nations are parties; but France and the PRC have not signed.

Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)

The NPT, signed in 1968 and effective in 1970, is designed to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and provide assurances that peaceful nuclear activities of nonnuclear weapon states (NNWS) not be diverted to making such weapons. Article V states that potential benefits from any PNEs will be made available to NNWS party to the Treaty on a nondiscriminating basis. France and the PRC are not parties.

Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT)

The TTBT was signed in 1974 and, with its companion PNET, is now before the Congress for ratification. The terms of the Treaty limit all nuclear weapons tests conducted after 31 March 1976 to less than 150 KT. Weapons tests are to be conducted at declared sites and held to a minimum.

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A protocol provides for provision of detailed technical information to aid in teleseismic verification. The US and the Soviet Union have agreed not to take any actions incompatible with the Treaty pending ratification.

Treaty on Underground Nuclear Explosions for Peaceful Purposes (PNET)

The TTBT specifically excluded PNEs, which were to be covered by a separate, companion treaty. This treaty was signed on 13 May 1976 and limits individual PNEs to the 150 KT TTBT threshold. Group PNE explosions are allowed up to an aggregate yield of 1500 KT, providing no individual explosion in the group exceeds 150 KT. A detailed protocol is included which provides for the presence of observers for group explosions above 150 KT (and by mutual agreement in the 100-150 KT range) with specific rights to carry out measurements confirming the yield of each explosion in the group. Provision is also made for detailed information exchange on all PNEs.

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*TAB C*

SECRET - GDS

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20500

May 11, 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Paul Warnke  
Frank Press  
Reginald Bartholomew  
Walter Slocombe  
Gen. William Y. Smith  
Robert Bowie  
Gen. Alfred Starbird

SUBJECT:

Draft Presidential Directive on CTB  
Negotiations

Attached, as agreed in last week's SCC senior working group meeting, is a draft Presidential directive concerning our initial position for CTB negotiations with the Soviets. The Directive reflects interagency agreement on most of the key issues as expressed at the meeting, with the exception of the timing of a cessation of testing. It is recognized that this issue will probably require further SCC discussion and eventual decision by the President.

Please provide your comments on the Directive by Friday, May 13.

  
John M. Marcum

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## MEMORANDUM

## NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

May 11, 1977

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Presidential Directive / NSC

TO: The Vice President  
The Secretary of State  
The Secretary of Defense

ALSO: The Director, Office of Management and Budget  
The Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs  
The Director, Office of Science and Technology Policy  
The Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency  
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff  
The Director of Central Intelligence  
The Administrator, Energy Research and Development Administration

SUBJECT: Negotiations with the Soviets on Termination of Nuclear Explosions

Having reviewed the response to Presidential Review Memorandum NSC-16, I would like to initiate negotiation of a multilateral treaty to ban nuclear explosions. The US delegation for these negotiations will be chaired by the Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, with representatives from State, Defense, the Energy Research and Development Administration, and other agencies as appropriate, under the general supervision of the NSC Special Coordinating Committee.

As the first step in these negotiations, the US should seek agreement with the Soviet Union on the key elements of a multilateral treaty that would embody a comprehensive prohibition on nuclear explosions in all environments. With Soviet concurrence, the United Kingdom should

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be invited to participate in these negotiations as early as feasible. The US position should include the following points:

- The treaty's entry into force should not require the adherence of France or the People's Republic of China.
- In addition to a "supreme interests" withdrawal clause, there should be provision for a review conference with the option to withdraw from the treaty after a period of about five years.
- The treaty should prohibit nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes as well as for nuclear weapon tests.

*DCS recommended*  
With regard to verification of the agreement, the US position should be that the treaty should provide for monitoring of compliance through national technical means of verification augmented by international exchange of seismic data. In addition, the initial US position should include ~~consideration of measures~~ <sup>to</sup> ~~which might~~ supplement these provisions, such as:

- is proposed for*
- Installation of unmanned, tamper-detecting seismometers on US and Soviet territory; and
  - On-site inspections at the location of questionable events, which could be requested by any party or by a fact-finding consultative committee of treaty parties.

The US Delegation should propose that once agreement is reached on key elements of a multilateral treaty, the USSR, US and UK should refer these elements to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament for negotiation of an appropriate treaty text, and jointly announce that each would refrain from conducting any nuclear explosions during the period of negotiation of this multilateral treaty.