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IC 76-2444
30 November 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR:

[Redacted]
Deputy to the DCI for the Intelligence
Community

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FROM:

[Redacted]
Director of Performance Evaluation
and Improvement

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SUBJECT:

Nuclear Proliferation Intelligence

DOE review
completed.

1. At the December 2 NFIB meeting, General Giller will present ERDA's views on needed improvements in the area of national intelligence on nuclear proliferation. This memorandum summarizes ongoing IC Staff efforts on this matter.

2. On November 29, Howard Stoertz and I hosted a meeting of Community personnel involved in the collection and production of nuclear proliferation intelligence. A summary of the meeting is attached. There was general consensus about the validity of recent criticisms of Community performance in this area (e.g., the Deutch report, IC Staff semiannual review) and there are actions under way to correct some of these problems, principally actions associated with the reorganization of CIA's Intelligence Directorate. More needs to be done, however, especially in the following three areas:

--Formation of a senior-level users group, to provide more coherent guidance to the Community on nuclear proliferation intelligence requirements. ERDA is pressing for formation of a Proliferation Users Group and President-Elect Carter has shown interest in a Cabinet-level committee on proliferation. We should work with staff-level users to set up a users' working group, but obviously the initiative for a Cabinet-level group must come from the White House.

--Provision of a single focal point within the Community for all aspects of proliferation intelligence. Right now, the efforts are split among CIA, DIA, ERDA, and JAEIC, with no full-time coordinator. In the NIO structure, proliferation is assigned to

NSC review(s)
completed.

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Howard Stoertz; JAEIC concentrates primarily on technical aspects of proliferation intelligence. The NIO/SP is exploring ways to provide this single focal point and we will work with him on this important matter.

--Development of improved data bases on proliferation (e. g., worldwide tracking of special nuclear materials and people with the technological skills needed to produce nuclear weapons). Current data bases are clearly inadequate, but we need some careful analysis to determine (a) what additional data can feasibly be collected and (b) to what level of detail it is sufficient to develop the data bases (measured in terms of the end use of the data).

3. I and my staff are following up on the November 29 meeting in three ways. First, we are planning a meeting in the near future with users of proliferation intelligence to hear their views on requirements. Second, we are developing a checklist of ongoing and proposed Community improvements in proliferation intelligence so we can systematically monitor what's going on and take action to stimulate Community elements as necessary to maintain movement. Third, we will in the near future form a Community working group to examine in detail the feasibility, requirements for, and costs of developing new or improved proliferation data bases, and to initiate those data base improvements which will indeed contribute to improving proliferation intelligence.

4. It is my understanding that ERDA wants to discuss proliferation at NFIB on Thursday more to keep the pot boiling than to force immediate decisions. That discussion should prove fruitful, but we should guard ^{25X1} against derailing the reforms we are already working on.

Attachment a/s



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30 November 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Summary of Intelligence Community Meeting Concerning
Nuclear Proliferation

1. On 29 November 1976, the Director of Performance Evaluation and Improvement, ICS, and the NIO for Strategic Programs jointly sponsored a meeting of collection and production elements of the Community responsible for nuclear proliferation intelligence. The participants included more than 30 analysts and high-level management representatives from the DCI collection committees, JAEIC, relevant production and collection elements, the IC Staff, and NIOs. Three major themes were explored during the two-hour session: 1) what does the Intelligence Community view as the needs of users of proliferation intelligence, 2) what is the Intelligence Community doing to meet these needs, and 3) in light of the increasing emphasis being placed on nuclear proliferation intelligence, what additional or different things should the Community be doing? The meeting left participants with a clearer perception of the importance currently placed on nuclear proliferation by the executive and legislative branches, the various collection and analysis activities under way and planned by members of the Intelligence Community, and the more comprehensive type of proliferation intelligence that undoubtedly will be needed by a variety of users in the years to come.

2. The timeliness and relevance of the meeting were highlighted by the realization that the current and future Administrations place great stress on constraining nuclear proliferation. The recent Presidential policy statement concerning proliferation, Congressional initiatives on the subject that are sure to be explored in the coming months, and the public positions of President-Elect Carter on his international and domestic strategies to deal with the problem of nuclear proliferation--all presage an increased demand for high-quality intelligence products. The Intelligence Community perceives that the future demand will be for a more "issue-driven" product. A clearer definition of user requirements with respect to the major policy issues will allow the Community to address those issues directly and to reformat existing intelligence information to be more useful and germane.

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3. Historically, the Intelligence Community has attacked the nuclear proliferation problem in a fragmented manner. Regional responsibilities for proliferation intelligence lie with the different geographically oriented NIOs, the NIO/Strategic Programs coordinates generic proliferation problems, the Intelligence Community production elements are usually organized with responsibilities for political, economic, military and technical analyses located in different offices, and the JAEIC concentrates on the technical considerations of nuclear proliferation. This decentralization of effort on the nuclear proliferation problem has come about in some measure because of the disarray among US policymakers who focus on the problem. The departmental needs of the DOD, State, and ERDA determine for the most part the type of emphasis that their intelligence production elements place on proliferation intelligence. In CIA, the general demand for technical intelligence has shaped its intelligence product to meet that demand.

4. Representatives from ERDA stressed the need for a coordinated Intelligence Community approach to meet two major objectives; namely, to minimize the proliferation risks inherent in international nuclear commerce and to act to enhance regional stabilities. To achieve better definition of user requirements and an improved intelligence product in terms of timeliness, relevance, and quality, ERDA suggested a focal point for Community efforts reside in two committees: one, consisting of users (with producers represented on the committee), and two, a proliferation intelligence coordinating committee of producers. Such an arrangement could manage a proliferation intelligence program that in part consists of:

- analysis of current policy issues and initiatives to determine intelligence requirements,
- worldwide data base on plutonium stocks and flows,
- assessment of foreign nuclear weapon development capabilities,
- integration of technical capabilities with political/military intentions,
- national security implications of proliferation activities,

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- proliferation watch on specific countries,
- identification of additional intelligence requirements,
- program evaluation and revision.

5. The recognized need for current and more insightful intelligence has initiated general projects and organizational changes. For example, DIA is attempting to maintain a reasonably current (quarterly) review of the countries which are potential proliferators. CIA recently reorganized to put the scientific and weapons intelligence elements in the same directorate as the political, economic, and strategic offices. This move, and the creation of a special center for support of policy studies, will facilitate the production of multidisciplinary intelligence studies in CIA.

It is hoped that these efforts will serve as guides for future CIA studies and for other Community efforts.

6. The NIO/Strategic Programs drew several conclusions from the meeting's discussion. The Intelligence Community has a solid core of highly knowledgeable analysts and managers of collection and production who generally are supportive of a fresh interagency approach to improving the quality and utility to policymakers of intelligence on nuclear proliferation. There is clearly a need for an interdisciplinary, interagency working group on nuclear proliferation intelligence, to extend further the excellent work already performed by JAEIC. The interdisciplinary approach proposed within CIA/DDI is also highly desirable, in part to meet the need for short-fuse assessments of foreign political, economic and technical developments bearing on proliferation prospects. The nature and importance of the proliferation intelligence problem are such that it is deserving of the full-time attention of a senior substantive intelligence officer who would provide the Intelligence Community with a more effective focal point for consumers, producers, and collectors. In this regard, the NIO/SP recommends that the DCI should identify such an officer promptly so that he can form a new interagency working group and guide the Intelligence Community in preparing to meet the needs of the new Administration for intelligence on nuclear proliferation. In the interim, the NIO/SP will immediately develop terms of reference for a new SNIE on nuclear proliferation with a view toward having the SNIE available early in the new Administration.

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7. In order to be more responsive to the valid needs of policy-makers for nuclear proliferation intelligence, the Community must engage in an increased and continued dialogue with those users. It must keep current with the major policy issues.

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