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NIO #1378-77
3 June 1977

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Turner to Brzezinski Memo on Scientific Exchange
with the USSR (ER 77-133/4 of 21 April 1977)

1. Bob Kimmitt of the NSC called me to let me know that the attached memo from the DCI to Brzezinski has been the subject of discussions between NSC, OSTP, State and Defense and that Frank Press (the President's science adviser) is looking at this issue as part of a growing concern with the entire West to East technology transfer policy problem.
2. Kimmitt wanted us to know that NSC is not dropping the ball although they are not yet ready to provide any new guidance.
3. Kimmitt is now working on the creation of a new PRM exercise on technology transfer and export controls which will be handled through the SCC rather than the PRC mechanism. The PRM is to be chaired by Ben Huberman of Frank Press's office and cochaired by Jessica Tuchman. The scientific data exchange issue will presumably be folded into that exercise.
4. I doubt that Admiral Turner needs to be bothered with this procedural matter at this time. I am circulating this memo to [redacted] Executive Secretariat, IC Staff (McMahon), and Chairman, COMEX [redacted] for their info so that the loop on the attached memo is closed.

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25X1

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[redacted signature box]

National Intelligence Officer
for Economics

Attachment:
ER 77-133/4

OSD
REVIEW
COMPLETED

E-2 IMPDET
CL BY 088744

OSD REVIEW COMPLETED

Washington, D.C. 20505

Executive Registry
77-133/4

Defense

21 APR 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable Zbigniew Brzezinski
 Assistant to the President for
 National Security Affairs

SUBJECT: Exchange of U.S. Scientific and Technical Data
 with Communist Nations

1. Attached is a series of exchange correspondence between the DCI and the Deputy Secretary of Defense wherein the DCI expressed his concern about the expanding exchange of U.S. scientific and technical data with Communist nations and urged the Department of Defense to take certain actions which might aid in the protection of classified U.S. information.
2. At the same time the DCI stimulated several of the DCI committees to develop a plan of attack on the problem from an intelligence standpoint.
3. In early April Deputy Secretary Duncan indicated that he was directing certain elements of his staff to study several of the problems associated with exchange data with a view towards devising the necessary organizational arrangements to deal with them. He recommended that I call this problem to the attention of the National Security Council so that the Defense efforts could be addressed in concert with other departments, particularly the Departments of State and Commerce.
4. We would welcome the National Security Council's advice and guidance on this matter.

/s/ Stansfield Turner

STANSFIELD TURNER
 Admiral, U.S. Navy


Attachments:

1. Ltr DCI fr DepSecDef 6 Apr 77 (ER 77-133/3)
2. Ltr DepSecDef fr DCI 5 Apr 77 (ER 77-133/2A)
3. Ltr DCI fr DepSecDef 19 Mar 77 (ER 77-133/2)
4. Ltr SecDef fr DCI 12 Jan 77 (ER 77-133)

Defense

SECRET

Classified by 059687
Exempt from general
declassification schedule of E.O. 11652
except for category 3B, 3C, 3D
Automatic declassification
Date impossible to determine

THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

16 APR 1977

Admiral Stansfield Turner
Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D. C. 20505

Dear Admiral Turner:

(S) George Bush wrote to then Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld on 12 January concerning the expanding U.S. exchange of scientific and technical data with Communist nations through visits of delegations, development of cooperative joint projects and commercial agreements. Mr. Bush drew to our attention certain actions which the Department of Defense could take to assist in bringing into focus, and developing a plan of attack on, the problem of maintaining a relative balance in what the U.S. gains and loses through scientific and technical interchanges with Communist nations.

(C) As George noted in his letter, organizing the effort, even from just the intelligence standpoint, is an enormous task. It will be the more so within the Department of Defense, since military intelligence is but one of our functions. Moreover, DoD's involvement in the exercise of export controls by the Departments of State and Commerce is not managed from within the DoD intelligence community, nor is our relationship with ICIS or our security programs, particularly the Defense Industrial Security Program. The latter obviously would have to be involved in any system to alert cleared U.S. defense contractors about impending Communist visitors, as suggested by George. We have no mechanisms for Defense contractors who are not cleared for access to classified information.

(C) In conjunction with this reply, I am directing the pertinent elements of my staff to study the several problems involved with a view to devising the necessary organizational arrangements to deal with them. Inasmuch as export controls, which by law are administered by the Departments of State and Commerce and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, appear to be the primary legal means currently at hand to limit the flow of unclassified scientific and technical data out of the country, I recommend that you apprise the National Security Council of the problem so that our efforts within DoD can be concerted with other Departments, particularly the Departments of State and Commerce. In connection with any attempts to strengthen enforcement by the Interdepartmental Committee for Internal Security, it would be well to have the Departments of Justice and Treasury, as well as State, also aware and involved in the problem.

Sincerely,

CLASSIFIED BY: ASD(ISA)
SUBJECT TO GDS OF EO 11652
AUTOMATICALLY DOWNGRADED AT
TWO YEAR INTERVALS
DECLASSIFY ON DEC 31 1985

SECRET

Washington DC 20305

77-135/011

5 APR 1977

The Honorable Charles W. Duncan, Jr.
Deputy Secretary of Defense
Washington, D. C. 20301

Dear Charlie:

I appreciate your calling the DCI's 12 January 1977 letter to my attention. Technology transfer and the exchange of scientific and technical data well merit close scrutiny. Whatever the Department of Defense can do to strengthen its support to the procedures devised to monitor the exchange, I believe is highly desirable.

I endorse the 12 January letter and appreciate your attention.

Yours,

[Handwritten signature]

STANSFIELD TURNER
Admiral, U.S. Navy

Distribution:

- Orig. - Addressee
- 1 - DCI
- 1 - ER
- 1 - D/DCI/IC
- 1 - AD/DCI/IC
- 1 - IC Registry
- 1 - Chairman, COMEX
- 1 - Chairman, STIC
- 1 - Chairman, EIC

Dep COMEX: [redacted], Jr./2492
(28Mar77)

AD/DCI/IC: JNM McMahon: mob/5477

STATINTL

SECRET

Approved For Release 2008/03/03 : CIA-RDP83M00171R001200080003-3



THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

Executive Registry
77-152/2

19 MAR 1977

Admiral Stansfield Turner
Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505

Dear Stan:

Attached is a 12 January 77 memorandum from George Bush on the subject of U.S. exchange of scientific and technical data with Communist nations. Although we are prepared to respond in a positive fashion to George's suggestions I would like to have the benefit of your own thinking before we move further.

Sincerely yours,

[Handwritten Signature]
Charles W. Duncan, Jr.

Attachment
a/s

SECRET

Approved For Release 2008/03/03 : CIA-RDP83M00171R001200080003-3

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

12 January 1977

The Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld
The Secretary of Defense
Washington, D. C. 20301

Dear Don:

There is concern throughout the U.S. Government about the expanding U.S. exchange of scientific and technical data with Communist nations through the visits of delegations, development of cooperative joint projects, and commercial agreements. The Intelligence Community has only a limited role in assisting those who attempt to maintain a relative balance in what the U.S. gains and loses through these programs. Our efforts in recent years to perform this function, however, have been frustrated by the scope of the programs, lack of centralized U.S. management and the absence of any systematic record of the who-what-where of U.S. Communist contacts.

At the present time I have energized the DCI Committee on Exchanges, the Scientific and Technical Intelligence Committee, and the Economic Intelligence Committee to draw some focus and develop a plan of attack on this problem from an intelligence standpoint. This is an enormous task.

The Department of Defense plays a large role in U.S. Government mechanisms to administer and assess these programs through its involvements in export control, protection of classified U.S. defense information, and the DCI Committees mentioned. I would like to call to your attention some actions which the Department could take which would assist this process:

(a) Revision of DoD Directive No. C3115.5 of 11 February 1964:

DCID 2/6 issued 9 May 1975, authorized expanded IC programs in support of the State Department and other U.S. Government agencies which administer U.S. contacts with the Communist nations, but revised DoD instructions have not yet resulted; thus, DoD priorities have not been allocated to this effort.

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declassification schedule of E.O. 11652

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(b) Reconsideration of DoD support to the Interdepartmental Committee for Internal Security (ICIS).


ICIS develops internal security procedures for Communist nation visitors to the U.S. and establishes U.S. visa procedures for these visitors. ICIS regulations provide the only legal basis for the State Department's provision of alert information on these visitors to intelligence and security elements of the U.S. Government. Stronger ICIS enforcement of already approved procedures might be helpful.

(c) Reconsideration of DoD procedures to alert U.S. defense contractors about impending Communist visitors.

I understand that DoD currently relies on the State Department to communicate and enforce security opinions provided by DoD intelligence components to contractor facilities. State, however, lacks the authority and capability to do so.

I will appreciate your consideration of the points raised in this letter and would welcome your comments and advice.

Sincerely,



George Bush

SECRET

LOG NO: 1945

~~FE~~ FE

JOANNE MR

MK

Destroy

CY TO: PAID

SENT : 6/7

FILE : technology transfer

NNTC

NOTES:

Joanne -
I think we have all but
top memo in our technology
transfer file - if so
forward all this to PAID
with no need to recipy-
of ntr - please add to
our file.
Thanks.