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WORKING PAPER

29 July 1980

NRO REVIEW COMPLETED

MEMORANDUM FOR: PAO Staff

FROM: [REDACTED]

EA/PAO

SUBJECT: PAO Study Program for FY 1981 (U)

REFERENCE: EA Note, dated 22 July 1980; Subject: PAO Staff Meeting, 22 July 1980

1. As of Monday, I had received 83 different suggestions for the PAO FY 1981 Study Program. As a result of the recommendations received so far, the distribution of the proposed studies looks something like this:

<u>Category</u>	<u>Number</u>
Production	30*
Collection	22
Crisis/STOF Spt	12
Processing	9
Other	<u>10</u>
Total	83

(U)

* The total number of production studies is skewed somewhat by Willie White's list of 19 possible topics.

2. Attached find several listings which provide a brief description of each study and identify the proponent for each study. Also attached are Art's and [REDACTED] comments on methods of study selection, a resource allocation problem for PAO. (U)

3. For your information, I have also attached three sheets which try to summarize what was proposed as a study program last year; what [REDACTED] wanted included in the program; and the status of what we actually attempted last year. (U)

4. Please bring this memorandum to the meetings which Art intends to have to discuss the proposals. (U)



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Attachments: (5)

1. Proposed Studies (5)
2. PAO Resource Allocation Criteria
3. D/PAO Suggested Study Program for FY 1980
4. D/DCI/RM Suggested Study Program for FY 1980
5. PAO Study Program for FY 1980

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TALENT-KEYHOLE

CONTROL SYSTEMS JOINTLY

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Proposed Processing Studies

<u>No.</u>	<u>Title</u>	<u>Purpose/Scope/Objective</u>	<u>Proponent</u>
1	<u>Duplication^{db} Imagery Exploitation Effort</u>	Is there unwarranted duplication of imagery exploitation in the Intelligence Community? Examine 1 week's National Imagery (including search) and compare it for exploitation organization: the initial exploitation, follow-up exploitation, reports, data base entries and briefings that result from the imagery. From this data base develop measures of timeliness, redundancy, and unique exploitation in order to estimate the resource implications and intelligence impact of combining/deleting/expanding various exploitation functions. (U)	<div style="border: 1px solid black; height: 300px; width: 100%;"></div>
2	<u>Imagery Exploitation-Collection Flexibility</u>	How can exploitation take advantage of collection sampling strategies? Is topical reporting a step in this direction. Shouldn't exploitation requirements reflect collection requirements/strategies? (U)	
3	<u>Softcopy Utility Study</u>	What is the incremental value of softcopy vs. hardcopy. When, where, how often is it more effective--and how much more effective? Provide tests of significance that include relative frequency of exploitation functions. (U)	
4	<u>Telemetry Processing</u>	<div style="border: 1px solid black; height: 40px; width: 100%;"></div> <p>What about our ability to analyze and absorb this information in a manner useful to decision makers.</p>	
5	<u>Photointerpreters Needed</u> 1N1455	How do the various organizations involved in photointerpretation estimate their future needs for photointerpreters? If exploitation were distributed differently or if photointerpretation organizations were consolidated, would the needs for additional photointerpreters be reduced? Is the distribution of interpreters between national and department organizations adequate? Is the distribution of their work between national and department requirements adequate?	

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<u>No.</u>	<u>Title</u>	<u>Purpose/Scope/Objective</u>	<u>Proponent</u>
6	<u>Increasing the Supply and Productivity of Linguists</u>	The supply and productivity of linguists at NSA and in other intelligence agencies constitutes a fundamental constraint on intelligence production. This study would review past studies of the linguist supply and compensation problem, but would also review machine translation and productivity assisting devices, and attempt to develop estimates of the cost/effectiveness of various alternatives for enhancing the supply and productivity of linguists. (U)	<div></div>
7	<u>Linguist Review</u>	Characterize the distribution of languages spoken in different geographic regions to assess the adequacy of linguists for Third World coverage. (Possibly a guidance item; need for this review is contingent upon a meeting this week, 28 July 1980, with NSA and OSD language experts.) (u)	
8	<u>Ocean Surveillance (Surface)</u>	A follow-on to Navy STOF, maritime data, and that will focus on estimating the capability to produce and disseminate such data, identify deficiencies, examine trends and programmed systems, and develop resource implications. Key element here is to attempt to define and develop measures of effectiveness. (U)	
9	<u>Ocean Surveillance (Subsurface)</u>	As above but focused on subsurface surveillance. Study must examine all sources but focus on NFIP sources. (U)	

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Proposed Production Studies

<u>No.</u>	<u>Title</u>	<u>Purpose/Scope/Objective</u>	<u>Proponent</u>
1	<u>Analyst Recruitment: Characteristics and Qualifications of Production Analysts</u>	Assemble Community-wide inventory of analyst professional traits. Contrast current analyst population with past populations; other government professionals; professionals in kindred research fields (Descriptive)	
2	<u>Analyst Recruitment: Community's Competitive Position re New Graduates</u>	Analyze Community's ability to attract highly qualified graduates. Develop and cost proposals for enhancing recruitment practices if applicable. (Prescriptive)	
3	<u>Analyst Training and Support: Programs to Enhance Analyst Training and Support</u>	Draw a profile of the non-ADP programs, planned and underway, to promote analyst skills, expertise, morale and motivation. (Descriptive)	
4	<u>Analyst Training and Support: Value of Alternative Support Measures</u>	Present programs include a wide range (sabbaticals, rotational assignments, incentive awards, etc.) of intuitively plausible techniques for promoting analyst performance. What is missing is any set of standards for gauging how much would be invested in each. In the absence of this kind of understanding, a little bit of everything get tried. Somewhere out there, there must be a body of literature (hopefully including empirical studies) that addresses the relationship between such measures, including the physical working environment, and average levels of professional performance. The suggestion here is to search for that information, identify it, and summarize the findings applicable to supporting intelligence analysts. (Perspective)	
5	<u>Use of External Contractors: Level of Usage</u>	Document the Community's current use of external contract support; contrast with past levels. Identify motives for using contractors (no in-house capability, desire for independent perspective, etc.). (Descriptive)	
6	<u>Use of External Contractors: Guidelines for Employing External Support</u>	Formulate general principals governing the choice between internal and external analysis. (Definitional)	

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No.	Title	Purpose/Scope/Objective	Proponent
7	<u>Analytical Capacity:</u> Measurement Methodology	Is there any reasonable way to quantify and compare the Community's capacity to produce intelligence on various subjects, in various geographic areas of interest. Existing management information systems can provide approximate data on the dollars and manpower that is being put into a particular subject/region sector of the production organizations, but can we implicitly assume that this relates in some homogenous way to our capacity to make things come out of that sector? Are there sectors inherently less efficient at transforming resource inputs to production capacity than others? If so, this should be recognized and accommodated in the resource allocation decision process. (Definitional)	
8	<u>Production Management:</u> Topic Selection Mechanisms and Procedures	Document geneses of various analytical products. Discuss pros and cons of self-initiated studies. Describe Community-mechanisms for coordinating production activities (necessary to assure that parallel analytical efforts proceed only as a result of deliberate choice). (Descriptive)	
9	<u>Production Management:</u> Collector Interactions	Identify major lines of communication between production sectors and their principal sources of information in the collection sphere. Survey producers for insights concerning bottlenecks to the timely flow of information and how they might be alleviated. (Descriptive/Prescriptive)	
10	<u>Production Management:</u> Resource Allocation Methodology	Endeavor to set down a rigorous, truly cogent rationale for telling good redundant analysis from bad redundant analysis. Convert this conceptual foundation into plain English rules-of-thumb for guiding production managers in their decisions concerning commitment to the scarce analytical resources they control. (Definitional)	
11	<u>The Supply of Intelligence:</u> National Intelligence Product Line	Survey national intelligence producers for up-to-date data on their output: names and types of publications, distribution lists, release frequency, and the like. This study would be patterned on the PAIR projects of previous years, with certain methodological improvements and, optimally, expanded to include the full range of trans-departmental products, not simply periodicals. (Descriptive)	

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<u>No.</u>	<u>Title</u>	<u>Purpose/Scope/Objective</u>	<u>Proponent</u>
12	<u>Marketing and Product Evaluation: Supply-Demand Correlations</u>	Document and compare ten-year trends in the subject-regional demand for intelligence products, as reflected in changing patterns of DCID 1/2 priorities, and the allocation of production resources, as recorded in CIRIS. (Descriptive)	
13	<u>Marketing and Product Evaluation: Practical Applications of Formal Priority Statements</u>	Evaluate compatibility of subject emphases in the different (DCID 1/2, NITS, KIR) priority statements (i.e., demand proxies) now in existence. Survey procedures to ascertain impact of these documents in resource commitment decisions. Seek suggestions for improving their applicability to this purpose. If there appear to be inherent major limitations with formal priority statements, what alternative methods might be employed to effectively communicate consumer interests to intelligence producers? Explore the suitability of incorporating expressions of the demand for intelligence in the program guidance, and in the budget deliberations. (Descriptive/Definitional)	
14	<u>Marketing and Product Evaluation: Mechanisms for Procedures for Product Evaluation</u>	Ascertain how the Community now goes about evaluating the quality of its product, and the satisfaction of various consumers with it. Evaluate the desirability and feasibility of establishing mechanisms for effecting product evaluation and providing consumer feedback on a sustained basis. What standards would be applied? Are there intrinsic qualities to an analytical product, separate and distinct from the pleasure with which it is greeted by the consumer, which make it good or bad? (Definitional)	
15	<u>Distribution of Collected Information: Influence of Impediments to the Distribution of Collected Information on the Quality of Analysis</u>	Congressional committees have raised the compartmentation issue often. Additionally, there seems to be some sentiment among analysts that agencies tend to favor their own production components with preferential access to the information their collection components have acquired. How real is the perennial compartmentation issue (i.e., do the analysts themselves feel it is an impediment? Are informal channels available that mitigate its influence in denying information?), are the competitive institutional obstacles important? What, if any, changes might facilitate the productive flow of inter-producer information? (Descriptive/Definitional)	

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No.	Title	Purpose/Scope/Objective	Proponent
16	Process-Wide: Identification of Resource Bottlenecks (via case studies)	This effort, or series of efforts, would examine recent instances of particularly acute criticism of Community performance in search of examples of where the availability of more or different resources might have had a significantly beneficial effect. Delays in detecting a Soviet combat presence in Cuba, and North Korea's build-up of its ground forces, are two prime candidates for such analyses, which need not start from scratch (as in the traditional sense of a "post mortem"), but would rather draw heavily upon already completed investigations and reviews. The emphasis would be on specific resource solutions to what went wrong, and the general applicability of those solutions elsewhere in the production Community. (Prescriptive)	
17	Process-Wide: Economic Model of the Intelligence Production Process	Studies such as the search for specific resource bottlenecks, above, presume some prior understanding of the sequential functions which constitute the production (in the broad, economic sense) process. While the existence of such a model is implicit in this and other topical issues, such as the balance between collection, (data) processing, and production (in the less broad, intelligence usage), the understanding has never been made explicit. Achieving a rigorous comprehensive representation of the intelligence process would be no mean undertaking, but basic research along this line could, if successful, provide a fundamentally useful and enduring tool to successive generations of Community and program managers, not to mention production/analysis analysts. (Definitional)	
18	Process-Wide: Functional Structure for the NFIP	Consumers tend to rate the Community's performance in a functional context on a case-by-case basis: How well did we do in providing indications and warning of some military gesture, or change in political status? What assurances can we make about our ability to confirm treaty compliance? What contributions to the operating forces can be expected in time of war? Can we provide the essential information they need in contingency operations? And so forth. Yet we have no ready means of associating the resources we consume, or plan to consume, with the missions at which we seek to excel. Collection operations are organized according to the form the data take (i.e., the IMTs), production operations are organized by subject	

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		disciplines. The budget is organized on the first tiers by organization, and by major collection system. In a nutshell, all of this makes it very hard to relate resource inputs to product inputs, to mission capabilities, to national security benefits (which are, after all, what we presume to be buying when we spend money on intelligence). Is there a better, more functional way to organize our classification of resource distributions? Maybe not. Whatever the logical appeal of the PPRS-like structure, inputs may simply not be practically divisible in such a manner. But it might be worth some research to find out. (Definitional)	
19	<u>Process-Wide: The Roles and Requirements of Producers of S&T Intelligence</u>	A study of alternatives for improving the production capabilities of S&T centers was proposed in the D/DCI/RM memo of 13 November 1979. Agreement to defer such an effort was subsequently reached yet a better understanding of how these producers function--the collection sources they draw upon, the kinds of products they distribute, and the market for those products (few seem to surface as entities at the national level, but many national products, particularly military ones, may incorporate S&T "intermediate goods")--could be of interest to Community management, which now reports that one-quarter (via CIPIS) to one-half (ZBR via the CIR) of the Community's total production budget is devoted to S&T subjects. (Description/Prescriptive)	
20	<u>Analysis Centers</u>	Where are the analysis centers within the Intelligence Community? RMS must be aware of studies and evaluations within the Community, who is performing them, how well are they done, and how they may be applicable to RMS issues.	
21	<u>Policy Rejection Due to Intelligence Deficiencies</u>	Identify perceived deficiencies in national intelligence systems which have contributed to the rejection of attractive foreign political, economic or military policy options.	
22	<u>Energy Theme</u>	To expand analysis of foreign energy potential, policy, etc. DDF wants to add bodies (22) claiming CIA is not doing it well enough. A study could determine. What is Community doing at present? How valuable is present effort? What are shortfalls? Does shortfall correction require more resources or redirection? Which programs should do what?	


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No.	Title	Purpose/Scope/Objective	Proponent
23	<u>CIAP Third World Theme</u>	Basically intended to upgrade Third World analysis--relates to "Contingency" and "Intelligence Crises SIGINT Support." A study could determine: what is Community doing at present? How valuable is present effort? What are shortfalls? Does shortfall correction require more resources or redirection? Which programs should do what? (U)	
24	<u>Delegated Production Program</u>	The Defense Department has distributed responsibility for the maintenance of certain orders of battle or organizations outside the Washington area through DIA's Delegated Production Program. How well is the program working? Do the organizations with new responsibilities have adequate support? Are they truly the main producer of intelligence on their designated topics? Could this same kind of broadened distribution of responsibility be applied to other topics? Could it be applied to other organizations in the Community? What would be the net effect on the resources required? On the distribution of these resources? (S)	
25	<u>Science and Technology Centers</u>	Concern has recently been expressed about a decline in the production of long-term S&T research products. What role does S&T intelligence play in the Community? How are resources distributed through the Community for support of S&T intelligence collection, processing, analysis and production? Could specific aspects of this support be consolidated to free additional resources to increase analysis and production? (C)	
26	<u>ELINT Applications Study</u>	An examination of the intelligence problems to which ELINT contributes in order to improve RMS decisionmaking about ELINT collection and processing initiatives. (U) The analog to the PAO efforts on imagery tasking, exploitation of ANP. Should do this jointly with IRO and build on IFM's ELINT data flow study. (U)	
27	<u>Intelligence on Soviet Space Systems</u>	Follow-up to current MIF to focus on: key intelligence gaps and significance; current key sources and production agencies; trends in environment, etc.; prospects for future production; and resource implications. NOTE: This would be conducted with CI and the inter-agency group that prepared MIF. Thus, a great deal of the effort could be completed in a short time and with minimal RMS investment. I view this as a pilot. This kind of assessment could be done e.g., MIF II-3/R. (U)	

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<u>No.</u>	<u>Title</u>	<u>Purpose/Scope/Objective</u>	<u>Proponent</u>
28	<u>Political and Economic Intelligence</u>	A follow-on to the SAI study that will focus on the quality and quantity of product, deficiencies in product, prospects based on environment changes and new collection systems, and conclude with resource implications. (U)	
29	<u>Resource/Production Data Base</u>	A follow-up to suggestion by SRP in Cuban Brigade post mortem. (This is a current RMS action).	
30	<u>Minimum Essential Data Base</u>	Identify the minimum elements of information needed to support different types of contingency planning/operations (e.g., hostage rescue, show of force, etc.). Compare these needs with current basic intelligence holdings. Estimate the costs of maintaining this minimum data on "X" countries with updates every "Y" months. (DIA is working on something like this now; maybe we can participate or, at least, reinforce via guidance).	

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Proposed Collection Studies

<u>No.</u>	<u>Title</u>	<u>Purpose/Scope/Objective</u>	<u>Proponent</u>
1	<u>Open Source Collection</u>	How much are we spending throughout the Community on open source collection and processing? How are those resources distributed? What use is made of the information derived from open sources? Are there categories of sources we do not tap? Are there areas of the world where open sources are particularly important? Not so important? Does the resource distribution reflect this pattern? (U)	<div></div>
2	<u>Collection Requirements for Imagery and Signal Intelligence</u>	Collection requirements for imagery and signal intelligence are submitted to the Community through entirely separate mechanisms. A means for closing the gap between the two types of sensors in order to increase substantive intelligence return should be investigated. The methods by which requirements are developed should be examined, and the unique as well as similar features of SIGINT and imagery should be identified. The entire requirements process for both types of sensors should be reviewed with the objective of establishing closer cooperation and better resources utilization. (U)	
3	<u>Structure for Analysis</u>	<div></div>	
4	<u>Broad-Area Search Exploitation Methodologies</u>	What are the resource/timeliness/intelligence impacts of various broad-area search methods and accounting procedures? We still do not fully understand the implications of small pieces of imagery versus large contiguous areas. (U)	
5	<u>Collection Requirements</u>	How sensitive is "intelligence gain" to collection frequency requirements, i.e., what happens if two-month, four-month, and six-month search requirements are slipped to three-month, five-month and eight-month requirements? The quantity of imagery decreases but, what is the effect on intelligence? (U)	

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No.	Title	25X1A	TOP SECRET	Purpose/Scope/Objective	Proponent
6					
7	<u>DOE Technology for Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty</u>				
8	<u>Third World HUMINT Study</u>			A study of the productivity of human source collection against the Third World, and the benefits/costs of alternatives for expansion and enhancing the productivity of human source collection against Third World targets. (U)	
9	<u>Fast European Targets</u>			A study of the productivity of [redacted] against A-group targets and of alternatives for enhancing the productivity of these sites. (S/CCO)	
10	<u>Benefit/Cost Study of NRO Ground Support Operations, Contractor Technical Support and Sustaining Engineering Activities</u>			With the growth in cost of NRP hardware and manpower, it is important that cost reductions that cut into Contractor Technical Support and sustaining engineering be vigorously opposed because the value of these activities far outweigh their costs. (The funding allocations to these support activities tend to be "level of effort" allocations and are often difficult to justify). This study would develop quantitative estimates of the benefits accruing from these activities and show that the costs are well worthwhile. (S/TK)	
11	<u>NRO Cost Comparisons</u>			Cost comparisons between Programs A, B and C of the NRO, specifically survivability options, etc. (S/TK)	
12	<u>Survivability</u>			Identify possible cross-program architectures for providing [redacted] capabilities for NRP systems. (S/TK)	
13	<u>Follow-On Point Source IR</u>			Depending upon results of current studies, fill-in gaps and provide more rigorous determination of utility. (U)	

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<u>No.</u>	<u>Title</u>	<u>Purpose/Scope/Objective</u>	<u>Proponent</u>
14	<u>Denial Studies</u>	<div></div>	
15	<u>Future Adequacy of National SIGINT Systems</u>	<div></div>	<div>s</div> <div>in</div>
16	<u>Soviet COMINT</u> <div></div>	Gary currently working for fall, but there is likely to be follow-up.	
17	<div></div>		

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<u>No.</u>	<u>Title</u>	<u>Purpose/Scope/Objective</u>	<u>Proponent</u>
18	<u>Imagery in Agricultural Forecasting</u>	A study to quantify the contribution of the various imaging systems in their support to [redacted] [redacted] (Follow-up to recent NFAC qualitative report. Might be able to task this out). (S/TK)	[redacted]
19	<u>Imagery in Support of SALT and ARM Treaty Monitoring</u>	A study that will quantify the contribution of the various imaging systems in terms of changes in monitoring confidence for variations in the imagery mix and tasking/exploitation. Special emphasis here should be on the role of search imagery. (U)	[redacted]
20	<u>Emplaced Sensors</u>	A review of past programs in this area to determine their success, reasons for failure, and prospects for the future. Especially interested in applications to LASINT, telemetry, and contingency support.	[redacted]
21	<u>Third World COMINT</u>	Follow-up to [redacted] and NDC studies. (Potential contractor support)	[redacted]
22	<u>Satellite Peplacement Strategy</u>		[redacted]

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Proposed Crisis/STOF Support Studies

<u>No.</u>	<u>Title</u>	<u>Purpose/Scope/Objective</u>	<u>Proponent</u>
1	<u>Post Mortems</u>	Post mortems on recent crises: what collectors contributed, timeliness, value, role of analysis vis-a-vis raw data, etc. (Nicaragua, Afghanistan). (U)	<div></div>
2	<u>Post-Mortems on Recent Key Events</u>	Recent key events (e.g., Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, etc.) need to be analyzed with emphasis on the performance and contribution of collection systems and production organizations, significant trends, and potential resource implications. This is another good candidate for an interagency group approach. (U)	
3	<u>Third World Crisis Coverage</u>	How could overhead be used as a backup for Third World Crisis coverage if current access denied [redacted] (FRI, etc.)? Orbits, processing, analysis? What would it cost to provide a useful increment of this kind of backup? (S)	
4	<u>Intelligence Crises and SIGINT Support</u>	A few questions were posed to NSA in late spring 1980 on this subject. It is worth pursuing. (U)	
5	<u>NFAC Crisis Prediction Center</u>	There are approaches to crisis prediction that not been tried. I have a proposal for an NFAC Crisis Prediction Center that should be fleshed out with NFAC's cooperation. If it flies and is successful, it could be extremely cost effective. (U)	
6	<u>Crisis Anticipation</u>	A mechanism and responsible MFIP organization is required to focus basic intelligence production on Third World areas where contingency operations are considered most likely. Lead times would be longer than for traditional I&W, and, as a result, less accurate predictions would be expected. A review is required to assess whether current I&W organizations could assume this responsibility (e.g., the NIN/Warning DoD I&W system) or whether a separate group should be established. In addition, the review should recommend how the predictions of such a group could best be reflected in IC priority documents (i.e., the NITS, DCIB 1/2, RISS, JPSP).	

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No.	Title	Purpose/Scope/Objective	Proponent
7	<u>Third World Data Bases</u>	When the Seventh Fleet was sent to patrol off the coast of Iran during the hostage crisis, the intelligence officers charged with briefing the crews found that their data bases did not contain adequate information. This complaint about data bases in Third World countries echoed those heard last year at [redacted] What resources are being devoted to building up information files on Third World areas? Are those resources being directed toward areas of the world where conflicts are most likely? Are the files being filled with the kinds of information likely to be needed for the types of contingency operations possible in these areas? Who has access to these data bases? Are they the people most likely to need the information? (S)	
8	<u>Indications and Warning</u>	In the decisions on the procurement of technical collection systems over the past few years, the emphasis has been to obtain near-real-time information. I&W Watch Centers have been established in many locations throughout the Community to take advantage of the timeliness of this information. How much is the Community spending on these centers? Are they doing an adequate job? How might they be improved? Do we need as many (at least 23) as have been established? Are they located in the right places? Might they be consolidated--at least those in the Washington area? How well do they respond in crisis? Are they prepared to respond equally well to crises in every part of the world? (S)	
9	<u>National Contributions to Carrier Protection</u>	Building from [redacted] examine the capability of national systems to assist in the overall carrier defense problem. (U)	
10	<u>Battlefield Exploitation and Target Acquisition (BETA) System</u>	In its markup of the FY 1981 NFIP budget (p. 82), the HPSCI expressed its concern regarding BETA system cost growth and development problems. Since the HPSCI has made the joint BETA program an item of special interest, the PCI should be provided an independent IC Staff assessment of where the BETA program stands with respect to both cost growth and development problems. (ii)	

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<u>No.</u>	<u>Title</u>	<u>Purpose/Scope/Objective</u>	<u>Proponent</u>
11	<u>Intelligence Support for the Persian Gulf/ Indian Ocean</u>	In its markup of the FY 1981 NFIP budget, the SSCI recommended (p. 32) that the intelligence program should be strengthened to deal with the demands of the Persian Gulf/Indian ocean area. It <div data-bbox="615 1304 1239 1430"></div>	<div data-bbox="1247 1232 1417 1470"></div>
12	<u>Intelligence Support for the PNF</u>	As a follow-on to our study on NFIP Support to Contingency Forces, it might be useful to have an IC Staff assessment of what type of intelligence support is being provided the PNF. Study should not be undertaken until later in the year after the PNF has had an opportunity to organize its resources. (U)	

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Other Proposed Studies

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<u>No.</u>	<u>Title</u>	<u>Purpose/Scope/Objective</u>	<u>Proponent</u>
1	<u>Manpower and Training</u>	What resources are devoted to offering individuals the opportunity to receive training or serve rotational assignments in other organizations in the Community? Would not an analyst benefit from a few months spent as a photointerpreter? Or a photointerpreter for a tour in the Requirements Evaluation Staff? Should a program (similar to the DCI Exceptional Intelligence Analyst Program) be started to encourage and facilitate such exchanges? (C)	
2	<u>Research and Development</u>	How are the Community's resources distributed for R&D? Which organizations receive the bulk of money? What types of research are they doing? Are there areas of research that are being neglected? What kinds of problems could benefit from R&D. How readily does the R&D Community adapt to changing intelligence problems? (U)	
3	<u>[] Soviet Satellite PHOTINT</u>	[] has historically been counter-HUMINT (i.e., PHOTINT, SIGINT, etc.) as legitimate areas of concern for the CI people. Effective countering of Soviet satellite PHOTINT would be extremely expensive to government and industry. A study involving the DCI/CI Staff and RMS could attempt to find reasonable alternatives, answering questions such as: what could be done? What would it buy for us? What could it cost? (U)	
4	<u>Incremental Values</u>	A very difficult cross-program area which would be looked at is an attempt to understand incremental values. Starting with the present budget allocations, what is the added value per dollar (relative) for: SIGINT versus HUMINT; Collection versus Processing versus Production; any other combinations that made sense. The whole areas of contingency support and intelligence crises are very difficult because of the tremendous resources needed for data base acquisition and maintenance on a third worldwide basis. There is a possible alternative which could provide us with needed coverage at much less cost. (U)	

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No.	Title	Purpose/Scope/Objective	Proponent
5	<u>Funding of Intelligence Systems</u>	In its markup of the FY 1981 MFIP Budget (pp. 42-43), the HPSCI noted "with alarm the increasing trend toward relaying on DoD MFIP augmentation funding to provide needed tactical capabilities." Funding for needed tactical capabilities may soon be provided by anyone of five different sources: NFIP, joint funding arrangements outside of the NFIP, IRA, TCP or DRSP. Someone needs to stand back from the actual budget drill and look at the funding problem in an objective way (if it is possible). A comparative assessment of what is funded where and why; what might be funded where and why; and how this all relates to possible Congressional concern about the proliferation of funding mechanisms might provide some very interesting insights into where we might be headed in the late 1980's. (U)	
6.	<u>DCID 1/2 Priorities</u>	DCID 1/2 priorities are constantly being adjusted by users, producers and collectors of intelligence. PAO should undertake a study which focuses on some of the following questions: who proposes changes to the priorities and with what frequency; what causes someone to recommend changes in priorities; what, if any, impact is experienced when the priorities are in fact changed. In a recent letter, the Chairman of the SSCI asked the DCI to review "the DCID 1/2 priorities for the Caribbean and Central America as of 30 June 1979 and 15 July 1980, and what actions occurred in the interim." Changes in priorities for the period 1970-1980 could be the focus of the study. (U)	
7.	<u>Intelligence Community Support of the Congress, the Public and the Media</u>	The Center for the Study of Intelligence recently (May 1980) recommended that someone should undertake a study designed to explore at a minimum the following questions: Is the Intelligence Community best able to provide intelligence support to the Congress, or should the legislative branch have its own intelligence analysis system? What is the impact of disseminating unclassified analysis to the public? Is this the best way to provide intelligence or should there be less emphasis on public disclosure of analysis? How does the dissemination of information to the media affect the presently contentious relationship that seems to exist between CIA and the press? Since the impact of intelligence on each of these groups is recognized, the role of intelligence should be studied in a systematic matter. (U)	

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<u>No.</u>	<u>Title</u>	<u>Purpose/Scope/Objective</u>	<u>Proponent</u>
8	<u>PAO Management Information System (MIS)</u>	An internal study to define the kinds of Community and management information that PAO needs to routinely obtain to carry out its missions. This study could support a more broadly based RMS/CTS effort and should also help define how we should manage our intern files in the light of the automated registry system. (U)	<div></div>
9	<u>RMS Budget Ranking Methodology</u>	An evaluation of how the budget ranking process has been carried out in the part of how it is planned for the fall, with special emphasis on the role of PAO. Options for improving the process (on a pilot basis) should be developed and evaluated. (U)	
10.	<div></div>	A review of the uses for these comms to determine how important they are to DDO operations and find out what particular requirements are most important to assure. (S)	

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~Attachment 2PAO Resource Allocation Criteria

PAO studies should be chosen to obtain the highest expected value for improving DCI decisionmaking on NFIP resource allocation issues. There are three components to this measure of effectiveness:

- the probability that the study will actually produce additional information or analytic insight;
- the probability that the information or insight will affect the decision; and
- the value of the decision to the NFIP in terms of intelligence payoff, cost (both in the long and short term), or political sensitivity (must do something now).

If quantifiable, these components could be multiplied to provide an estimate of expected value. These measures are highly subjective, however, and not always of equal importance to PAO. In particular, it may be necessary to ignore low values of the second component (likelihood that the analysis will be used) since PAO's role in some cases will be to "seek the truth," or "to find a better method," without regard to short term opportunities. (An additional consideration is that in many cases, this probability is affected by the way that the study is defined and carried out).

In selecting PAO studies:

- cross program issues are valued most highly;
- studies within a program area may be justified if the area is complex and poorly understood (e.g., HF Modernization) or being superficially treated (e.g., satellite replacement strategy, shuttle usage economics);
- but studies that take advantage of previous PAO work are also attractive.

Acceptable mechanisms for getting work done include various levels of PAO commitment, including:

- guidance to a program to do a study, but with phased outputs (don't repeat last year's mistake), perhaps even including an agreed-upon terms of reference;
- CT/RMS directed Community working groups;
- CT/RMS study teams with data call from Community;

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- PAO/IRO/PBO/DSG teams;
- Use of contractors either in support of a PAO study or as a full study defined and monitored by PAO.
- PAO study in its entirety.

The selection process is an iterative one in which John Koehler and the other offices will be involved. Of course, our own analytical strengths and Community relationships are factors to be considered.

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D/PAO Suggested Study Program for FY 80*

	<u>Subject</u>	<u>Disposition</u>
25X1A	NFIP Manpower Analysis	Not accepted
	Impact of Future Technologies on Intelligence	Not accepted
	[REDACTED]	Not accepted
	Cross-Program Assessment Methodologies	Not accepted
	DCI's Role in Crisis Management	Not accepted
	Non-NFIP Collection and Dissemination Centers	Not accepted
	Community Production Management	Not accepted
	Alternative COMINT Collection within the CCP	Not accepted
25X1A	Alternative Sources of Overt Collection	Not accepted
25X1A	[REDACTED] [REDACTED]	Not accepted
	[REDACTED]	NSA tasked to do this
25X1A	Low ELINT Options	Incorporated into FY 82 issue paper for Program Review
	Dissemination of ELINT from Advanced Systems	Not accepted
	[REDACTED] Modifications	Incorporated into FY 82 issue paper for Program Review

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*D/PAO Staff Note dated 8 Nov 79, subject: PAO Study Plan

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21 July 1980
P. A. Metress

D/DCI/RM Suggested Study Plan for FY 80*

Subject

Disposition

Science and Technology in our Centers
Training in Support of Production Analysts
COMINT Collection Against Less Developed Countries
Support to Contingency Forces
Potential/Economic Intelligence

Never begun
Never begun
Replaced by [REDACTED]
In progress with contractor support
In progress with contractor support
Evolved into an FY 82 issue paper for Program Review
Terminated
In progress with contractor support
In progress with contractor support
Evolved into FY 82 issue paper for Program Review

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Mean Mission Duration

Alternative Investment Strategies for Survivability Enhancements

Alternative Investment Strategies [REDACTED]

Interactive Tasking

*D/DCI/RM memo dated 13 Nov 1979; subject: Study Plan

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21 July 1980

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PAO Projected Study Program for FY 80

	<u>Study</u>	<u>Requester</u>	<u>Responsibility</u>	<u>Date Assigned</u>	<u>Status</u>	<u>Disposition</u>
25X1A	Survivability Enhancements*			8 Aug 79	In progress	
	Implications of Changing U.S. Strategic Forces Employment Policy*			26 Sep 79	Terminated	
	NATO Intelligence Structure*			26 Sep 79	Never begun	
	NFIP Support to Contingency Forces*			26 Sep 79	Completed	
	Tactical Warning of an Air Attack on Naval Forces*			26 Sep 79	In progress	
	Value of Maritime Intelligence*			26 Sep 79	In progress	
NRO	Defense Attache System (DAS)			28 Mar 80	Never begun	
25X1				28 Mar 80	Never begun	
	Interactive Tasking			28 Mar 80	Terminated	
	OSG-Contingency Support			28 Mar 80	Incorporated into another study	No further action required
25X1A	Production			28 Mar 80	In progress	
	Satellite Replacement Strategy			28 Mar 80	Terminated	
				28 Mar 80	Completed	

*Contractor supported study

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	<u>Requester</u>	<u>Responsibility</u>	<u>Date Assigned</u>	<u>Status</u>	<u>Disposition</u>
FY 81 Program Review Papers:					
- Support to Contingency Operations	D/DCI/RM		17 Jun 80	Completed	No further action required
- Imagery Exploitation	D/DCI/RM		17 Jul 80	Completed	Sent to DCI Jul 80
- Imagery Tasking	D/DCI/RM		17 Jul 80	Completed	No further action required
- [Redacted]	D/DCI/RM		17 Jul 80	Completed	No further action required
- [Redacted]	D/DCI/RM		17 Jul 80	Completed	No further action required
- Mission Survivability	D/DCI/RM		17 Jul 80	Completed	Sent to DCI Jul 80
- [Redacted]	D/DCI/RM		17 Jul 80	Completed	Sent to DCI Jul 80
FY 81 Budget Review Papers:					
- (to be completed at a later date)					

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Approved For Release 2003/04/25 : CIA-RDP83M00171R002100090011-4

TRAINING COURSES ON OVERT COLLECTION CAPABILITIES

1. RECOMMENDATION: The HRC's Orientation Training Advisory Group (OTAG) should ensure the development of appropriate orientation and training courses on the various overt collectors, their capabilities and limitations, and the requirements and tasking mechanisms available for IC production organizations. These courses should be developed with, and for the use of, CIA, DIA, and State. Consideration should also be given to holding joint collector-producer training sessions so that both may develop a firsthand understanding of the other's professional capabilities. It is to be noted that the Department of Energy has taken steps along this line by establishing courses on nuclear proliferation for IC collectors.
2. RECOMMENDATION: CIA, DIA, and State training schools should be encouraged to develop and conduct S&T orientation courses for overt collectors and reporters who have only limited technical backgrounds, for example, defense attaches and economic officers who are to be assigned S&T responsibilities in the field.
3. RECOMMENDATION: The HRC's OTAG should work into its training courses the concept of the operational and reporting differences between overt and clandestine HUMINT collection operations, educating IC analysts regarding the construction of collection requirements for these two very different types of collection. CIA and DIA training schools should consider developments of specific short courses or portions of courses for this purpose.
4. RECOMMENDATION: DC/DIS CIA and DIA should develop training courses on foreign intelligence services for both collectors and analysts so that these sources of foreign S&T intelligence can be more fully exploited by the Intelligence Community on national security issues.

As a generalized comment to RECOMMENDATIONS 1 through 4, DIA is aware of no training course within the Military Intelligence structure which addresses overt collection as a separate entity. It is true that ideally joint collector-producer training sessions would provide the one with an appreciation of the other's professional capabilities and, more importantly, the task he faces. The Defense Intelligence School presently offers a two-week Scientific and Technical Intelligence Analyst's Introductory Course (STIAIC) which presents a comprehensive overview of the national foreign intelligence community with emphasis on the complete S&T cycle of requirements generation, collection and production, as well as technological developments in selected world areas. A considerable portion of this course would be of benefit to nontechnical collectors. Probably

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Approved For Release 2003/04/25 : CIA-RDP83M00171R002100090011-4

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the most beneficial practice over the years, on a considerable scale in the Air Force and to a lesser degree in the Army and Navy, has been the early assignment of technical officers to collection units in the field and subsequently as analysts in an S&T production element. This practice imparts an appreciation and mastery of the total S&R program which can be duplicated in no other way, and which encourages many officers to make it a full career.

As regards expanded overt S&T Collection, it is clear that priorities will determine availability of resources, which will in turn determine the thrust of training to be given, and this to individuals of varying background and primary assignment. As recommended in the cover memorandum, we feel a realistic approach is to launch a combined pilot collection effort in a specific area and to use the experience gained and the shortcomings revealed as a basis for remedial training, either in CONUS or by means of packaged instructional material to be forwarded to the individual on station. The essential theme must be that at all times the collector must know what he has been asked to do and why, and what constitutes an adequate and responsive intelligence report.

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