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DAVONA	
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY	
National Foreign Assessment Center	

The Dozier Kidnapping

The Red Brigades is responsible for the kidnapping of General James Dozier on 17 December. The Brigades, who reportedly have expanded their target list to include senior US military officers, have never before kidnapped an American citizen. Based on previous Brigades' kidnappings of senior Italian officials, the Brigades can be expected to try to exploit General Dozier's knowledge of NATO operations in Italy, and to issue demands calling for Italy to quit NATO or restrict its role The kidnapping probably will be protracted. in the Alliance. Some recent Brigades kidnappings have been resolved through negotiations, although not in all cases have the Red Brigades released their prisoners after milking the incidents for all possible propaganda value. Therefore, the possibility exists that after exploiting General Dozier, the Brigades will have him killed. If past Brigades activities are indicators, another spectacular incident may take place soon. We have no evidence either way concerning Libyan involvement in the incident.

This memorandum was prepared for the Office for Combatti Terrorism, State Department by of the International Terrorism Center, Office of Global Issues. It contains information received by 1200, 18 December 1981. Questions and comments should be directed to the Chief,	ng
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The Kidnapping

The kidnappers, dressed as plumbers, talked their way into Dozier's apartment in Verona on the evening of 17 December. Some press accounts state Dozier resisted and was wounded during the attack. Reportedly, the apartment was ransacked before Dozier was placed in the trunk of the getaway vehicle. In a call to the Italian news service ANSA in Milan, an anonymous caller claimed credit for the incident in the name of the Red Brigades. a characteristic tactic of the Brigades.

Details of the attack suggest classic Red Brigade tactics:

- -- Some previous Brigades' kidnappings have involved the use of disquises.
- -- Although breaking into a residence to effect a kidnapping is an unusual tactic for the Brigades, many of their kidnappings have been carried out near the residence of the intended victim.
- -- The Brigades like to obtain documentary evidence of the "misdeeds" of their victims. The ransacking of General Doziers's residence was almost certainly done in the hopes of finding NATO documents that could be used to embarrass the Alliance in Red Brigades propaganda communiques.

The Dozier kidnapping almost certainly resulted from a careful surveillence of the General's daily pattern since the Brigades do not normally engage in spontaneous acts of terrorism. Most terrorist groups eschew forceful entry into private residences because they are uncertain regarding availability of weapons to the intended victim, presence of a fortified "safe room", and other security measures. The group

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may have had prior knowledge of the interior of the Dozier residence in this case. The Red Brigades: A Brief Primer
Originally formed in Milan in the late 1960's by radicals trying to polarize the local labor scene, the Brigades initially engaged in leftist political activity but soon adopted terrorism as a primary weapon against the Italian government and the capitalist system. Since then, Brigades' targetting has been expanded to include a wide range of individuals representing institutions and classes that have thwarted the formation of a "peoples' democracy." The Brigades have sought to undermine Italian institutions by conducting a relatively low-intensity terrorist campaign designed to provoke repressive government actions that would prompt armed popular responses. Brigade motives, if not methods, have struck a responsive chord in some elements of Italian society disenchanted with the government's unfulfilled
promises.
The Brigades operate out of six major cities, but probably have bases and/or supporters in other urban areas. Each of the major cities-Rome, Milan, Venice, Turin, Naples, and Genoahas its own column, as Brigades formations are known. The columns consist of a number of small cells that function autonomously but under the loose direction of the "colonel" of each column. This decentralized arrangement makes it difficult to disrupt completely the activities of the column.
At the top of the Brigades pyramid is the Strategic Directorate, which is the highest operational authority in the Brigades structure. Activities of the various columns are coordinated at this level, although each column appears to have considerable leeway in the conduct of its day-to-day operations. Brigade Tactics
Brigade tactics have consisted mainly of kidnappings, assassinations and efforts to maim police and security officers, prison guards, members such as university professors and labor leaders. Most of these activities are designed to "punish" those members of the system who have somehow obstructed the formation of the "peoples' democracy." Generally speaking, the Brigades

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have avoided protected installations, preferring the safe tactic of ambush assassinations. The group has avoided such operations as airliner hijackings.

The Aldo Moro case attracted all the media attention the Brigades could wish for, but it also brought a massive increase in the security effort against the Brigades. While the Brigades may have considered the Moro operation a propaganda victory, the group probably decided that the police reaction to such incidents endangered the group's survival. The pattern of incidents after the Moro case suggests the Brigades have tried to undermine public confidence in the state by demonstrating that it is incapable of protecting its citizens. Recent kidnapping exercises represent a further development in the terrorists' strategic thinking aimed in part at gathering intelligence on certain government and industrial activities for the purposes of publicly exploiting those "misdeeds" and broadening the Red Brigades' popular appeal. The kidnapping of Neapolitan political figure Ciro Cirillo, who was involved in the inept earthquake relief, was a clear attempt to capture public sympathy been carried out to find out which companies and which members of government involved in the disaster relief embezzled money for the operation. Other operations such as the kidnap and murder of the brother of a repentent terrorist, were designed to weaken the government's anti-terrorist campaign by warning captured terrorists against cooperation with the police.

Prognosis

The Brigades have normally interrogated their prisoners over a lengthy period of time and then, after obtaining maximum publicity, have released them. There are exceptions to this pattern—the murder of Aldo Moro being the most famous example. The goal of a Brigades' kidnapping generally is to embarass the government, cause bickering among the various elements in the Italian parliament, enhance the Brigades image as a group capable of striking anywhere, and achieve the maximum publicity.

The Dozier kidnapping represents a new stage in Red Brigade strategy: they are trying to broaden their support beyond their traditional backers—the economically deprived and politically indifferent sectors of society—by tapping into anti-military sentiment they perceive to be behind popular support for the peace movement in Italy. Consequently, the Brigades will attempt to exploit Dozier's knowledge of NATO to embarrass the US and Italy. They will probably issue a series of communiques detailing the NATO's "exploitation of Italy" and the dangers of US forces being stationed in Italy.

If Dozier cooperates even minimally with his captors, his chances for a safe release will increase but not be guaranteed.

In the past, especially in the case of kidnapped magistrate Giovanni D'Urso, the Brigades attempted to make the point that D'Urso's cooperation with his captors had led to his safe release. The implicit message in that incident was that the Brigades would spare those who told the Brigades what they wanted to hear. However, in other cases, the Brigades have murdered their prisoners, even after apparent compliance with their demands. An additional factor of uncertainty in the Dozier case kidnapping. In the past, the so-called Strategic Directorate of the Brigades has accused the Milan column of being trigger-happy and overly prone to violence.

This is a new kind of operation for the Brigades. While they have extensive experience in the kidnapping of Italian prominent personalities and the ensuing manipulation of propaganda to sow discontent among political factions, the kidnapping of a senior US military officer is a new experience for them. It is certainly a more risky operation than the kidnapping of a judge or businessman; the pursuit of the perpetrators is likely to be much more vigorous, as vigorous as the pursuit of the Moro kidnappers. Additionally, the Brigades probably are not certain as to how the Dozier kidnapping will exploit the NATO issue. The initial communiques and demands are likely to be tentative until the Brigades see which way the political winds are blowing and how the public is responding.

The Libya Issue

We have no evidence that the Dozier kidnapping is anything other than a Red Brigades operation. There were several reports earlier this fall of an anticipated Red Brigades fall offensive that would include US military targets.

At this juncture we have no clear evidence either way concerning the issue of other terrorist group or patron state involvement in the operation. There have been conflicting reports about Libyan attempts to recruit the Brigades to carry out operations against US interests in Italy. The Brigades have prided themselves on their self-sufficiency

