

**EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT**

**Routing Slip**

TO:		ACTION	INFO	DATE	INITIAL
1	DCI		X (w/att)		
2	DDCI		X	"	
3	EXDIR		X	"	
4	D/ICS				
5	DDI		X	"	
6	DDA				
7	DDO	X (w/att)			
8	DDS&T				
9	Chm/NIC				
10	GC				
11	IG				
12	Compt				
13	D/EEO				
14	D/Pers				
15	D/OEA				
16	C/PAD/OEA				
17	SA/IA				
18	AO/DCI				
19	C/IPD/OIS				
20	ES		X (w/o att)		
21					
22					
		SUSPENSE	15 March		
			Date		

Remarks:

Please keep the DCI updated re: tasking

D/Executive Secretary

8 March 1982

Date

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The Socialist International's stance on developments in Poland has been guided by the obsessions of its president, Willy Brandt, with detente, disarmament and their partnership with the CPSU "in the interests of peace". The original Socialist International statement on the declaration of martial law in Poland was issued on 18 December after having been prepared by Brandt himself — not, as is normally the case, by SI General Secretary Bernt Carlsson for Brandt's approval.

Brandt's timid approach in the statement was based on one major consideration. Nothing emanating from the SI must interfere with the "success" of the visit to Moscow planned for the first few days of February 1982 by the SI's Advisory Group for Arms Control and Disarmament led by Finnish Social Democratic Party Chairman Kalevi Sorsa. (We have previously called attention to the activities of the group and its reactivation in July 1981 in response to the solicitations of the CPSU.) This explains the remarkably soft wording of Brandt's SI statement: "Unwanted advice or strongly worded declarations will not help the people of Poland. Only the restraint of Solidarity and the will for cooperation of those wanting peace [emphasis added] constitute effective help." It is noteworthy that the statement issued by the praesidium of Brandt's Social Democratic Party after the meeting of 16 December had included almost exactly the same wording, and that on 13 January the French Communist Party officially praised the SI's 18 December statement.

The hastily called SI meeting in Paris on 29 December to consider a revised SI statement on Poland was occasioned by the protests of the Italian Socialist Party Secretary, Bettino Craxi, Italian Social Democratic General Secretary Pietro Longo and French Socialist Party First Secretary Lionel Jospin, all three motivated in part by domestic political considerations against the statement issued by Brandt for the SI. (The Italian Communist Party, challenged by Craxi to make the final break with Moscow over Poland, has publicly replied that Craxi could not ask more of the PCI than it did of Brandt.)

True to his practice of avoiding disputes even in matters of basic principles in an organisation which is rooted in the international workers' movement, Brandt failed to appear at the Paris meeting because, according to his own statement, he was on a "working vacation". One of his foremost challengers with respect to the SI statement, Craxi, also failed to appear. He was on a "working vacation" in Africa. Foremost among those pleading during the Paris meeting that Brandt's original SI statement should be accepted unaltered, were the British Labour Party Leader Michael Foot, Austrian Socialist Party National Secretary Walter Hacker, whose close ties with Soviet Embassy in Vienna are no secret to officials in several SI member parties, Dutch Labour Party leader Joop den Uyl and Finnish Socialist Democratic Party International Secretary Paavo Lipponen, whose ties to the Soviet Embassy in Helsinki are similar to Hacker's. Pierre Schori, International Secretary of the Swedish Social Democratic Party, spoke of Solidarity's consisting of "social democratic resistance fighters". But this description of Solidarity was used by Schori in a context which sought to explain why martial law had become "necessary". (The Soviet explanation of the need for martial law in Poland would have been the same as Schori's with one exception: it would have used the term "counter-revolutionaries" instead of "social democratic resistance fighters".)

Jospin's efforts to include a specific reference to Soviet responsibility for developments in Poland found little support. with SPD Deputy Chairman, Hans Jürgen Wischnewski, representing Brandt, unalterably opposed. Spanish Socialist Workers Party General Secretary Felipe González, Chairman of the SI's Committee on the Revision of the Principles of the Organisation, proclaimed his sympathy for Approved For Release 2007/10/19 : CIA-RDP83M00914R001900220038-1 but he

supported the opposition to any specific reference to the Soviet role — an attitude which should occasion no surprise in view of his May 1981 public declaration on the "blooming of the relationship" between his party and the CPSU.

The communiqué finally issued after the Paris meeting, although more strongly worded than Brandt's original statement and more demanding with regard to the cessation of military repression in Poland and the release of the interned workers, not only failed to refer specifically to the Soviet Union's responsibility for martial law in Poland but called on "all parties concerned" with developments in Poland not to use the Polish crisis as an excuse for intervening in other parts of the world (translation: the United States should not so use the Polish crisis); or for weakening efforts towards détente and disarmament.

The Brandt spirit had prevailed without his physical presence and the hollowness of the SI's purpose as preached by Brandt and other SI leaders to provide the world with "moral impulses" was again revealed. In sharp contrast to the SI's revised declaration on Poland, the statement issued by the Italian Communist Party, albeit after 16 days of debate, made specific reference to the "negative influence" of the Soviet Union on developments in Poland. We have long contended that Moscow's most effective allies in Western Europe are not the Communist Parties but self-styled Social Democrats who have betrayed the original tenets of social democracy.

Footnote 1. In a published statement in mid January, Brandt expressed the view that the Polish developments proved the necessity of "deepening détente" — practically the same statement he had made in reacting to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

Footnote 2. A statement by Egon Bahr of the SPD — "peace is more important than Poland" — was to be expected from a politician whose statements on international affairs have for many years, paralleled Moscow's. Consistency of this parallelism is scarcely unintentional on Bahr's part (in an article co-authored for Pravda during the first week of January by Valentin Falin, Deputy Chief of the CPSU's International Information Department, it was emphasized that the measures taken in Poland were necessary not only for Poland but also "for peace" in Europe.