

**EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT**

**Routing Slip**

TO:		ACTION	INFO	DATE	INITIAL
1	DCI		✓		
2	DDCI		✓		
3	D/ICS				
4	DD/NFA				
5	DD/A				
6	DD/O		✓		
7	DD/S&T				
8	Chm/NIC				
9	GC				
10	IG				
11	Compt				
12	D/EEO				
13	D/Pers				
14	D/OPP				
15	C/EAS/OPP				
16	C/IAS/OPP				
17	AO/DCI				
18	EXDIR		✓		
19	DDI		✓		
20	CIACIS		✓		
21					
22					

SUSPENSE \_\_\_\_\_

Date \_\_\_\_\_

Remarks:

[Large empty rectangular box for handwritten remarks]

*[Signature]*  
 Executive Secretary  
 2/5/52  
 Date

3-537 (10-51)


State Dept. review completed.

**International  
Communication  
Agency**

United States of America

Washington, D. C. 20547

Office of the Director

CONFIDENTIAL

February 4, 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable  
William P. Clark  
Assistant to the President  
for National Security Affairs  
The White House

FROM: Gilbert A. Robinson *GAR*  
Acting Director

SUBJECT: The U.S. Response to the Soviet Chemical  
Warfare Buildup

The revised factsheet and "Q and As" represent in our estimation a solid advance over preliminary versions, and have the makings of a useful public affairs treatment. Your staff has been highly professional in dealing with us in this difficult matter.

However, final review of USG plans is needed to achieve the most effective public presentation. Our position is still somewhat defensive. We should seek to focus world attention on the continuing desire of the United States to achieve a verifiable treaty on chemical warfare, while being prepared for production of replacement munitions if necessary. We offer the following recommendations:

A brief introductory statement such as prepared by USICA (copy attached) should be drawn on by the State Department press spokesman to announce the broad U.S. policy response to the Soviet chemical warfare buildup. State would refer additional questions to DoD and ACDA.

Following the State announcement, DoD and ACDA briefings should be held which reiterate the Department's policy announcement and add evidence for our view of the Soviet buildup and of our careful and considered approach. The DoD spokesman would respond to press queries about binary weapons along lines in the factsheet and Q and A's, keeping the stress on:

- The buildup of Soviet chemical forces.
- The use by the USSR of chemical agents in Asia.
- The U.S. search for peace.

CONFIDENTIALClassified by Gilbert A. Robinson  
GDS 2/4/88

State Dept. review completed.

L265

CONFIDENTIAL

- 2 -

- The deterrent intent and nature of any foreseeable U.S. chemical munitions.
- The binaries as replacements for older systems.
- The plans to phase down outmoded munitions and arrive at a smaller effective deterrent.
- The U.S. view that we do not need to match the Soviets and therefore perceive no "chemical arms race."

ACDA should explain some of the past difficulties in negotiations and some possible new approaches. ACDA would include mention that the U.S. is considering steps to resume negotiations.

Together the press statements and additional background briefings should be perceived by the press as a USG effort to prod the Soviets to negotiate a verifiable treaty. It would be seen that the U.S. is leaving time for negotiation while preparing to produce replacements for existing outmoded munitions if necessary.

We also recommend that the principal officials involved in the decision and its public presentation meet as soon as possible to discuss these suggestions, review the factsheet and Q and A's, and map out additional briefings and steps recommended in our proposed scenario (copy attached).

With careful and total coordination aimed at the fundamental impression we wish to create, it should be possible to deflect at least some of the opposition. FBIS and other reports of media coverage abroad as well as reports from our Embassies (recent cables from Bonn and London are attached) show that the Soviets are poised to mount a significant propaganda campaign against the U.S. decision, and that they will have receptive audiences in Europe. Independent of whatever mischief the USSR might attempt, recent coverage in the American press attests to ready condemnation here and abroad unless we construct a policy that takes the high ground and directs attention to U.S. peace efforts in this instance.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

- 3 -

cc: The Honorable  
Caspar W. Weinberger  
Secretary of Defense

The Honorable  
William J. Casey  
Director of Central Intelligence

The Honorable  
Walter J. Stoessel  
Deputy Secretary-Designate  
Department of State

The Honorable  
David R. Gergen  
Assistant to the President  
for Communications

The Honorable  
Richard R. Burt  
Director of Politico-Military Affairs  
Department of State

Mr. Horace Russell  
Staff Member  
National Security Council

The Honorable  
Robert C. McFarlane  
The White House

The Honorable  
Frank C. Carlucci  
Deputy Secretary of Defense

The Honorable  
Fred Ikle  
Under Secretary for Policy  
Department of Defense

The Honorable  
Henry Catto  
Assistant Secretary of Defense  
for Public Affairs

CONFIDENTIAL

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

Statement on the U.S. Response to the Buildup by  
the Soviet Union of Chemical Weapons

Statement: Replacement of Old Chemical Munitions

As a deterrent to discourage Soviet use of their massive chemical warfare capacities and in the absence of a verifiable treaty banning such weapons the United States has concluded that it is regrettably necessary to undertake preparation in the coming year for production two years hence of replacement chemical munitions for those currently in the U.S. deterrent stocks. These would, if produced, REPLACE — NOT SUPPLEMENT — older types that are less safe to store and handle. These are not new and they are not biological. They are a retaliatory deterrent. The United States has already renounced first use of such munitions. No deployment is planned. Deployment could only occur after consultations with and approval of our Allies. Such consultations have not occurred.

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

-2-

Background: The Growth of Soviet Chemical Warfare Capabilities

For the past thirteen years the Soviet Union has steadily produced massive amounts of chemical weapons, and developed large-scale chemical warfare capacities, including equipment, special decontamination vehicles, and extensive experimentation. At present the Soviets have stockpiled several hundred thousand tons of chemical weapons. Some 50- to 100,000 Soviet soldiers have been trained in the use of and defense against chemical weapons. The USSR has spent large sums of money to equip and protect its forces against chemical war. The Soviet CW capacity is not limited to one region, but could affect any country.

U.S. Restraint

The Soviets have no reason for such build-up. The United States in 1969 renounced the first use of chemical and biological weapons and toxins, and unconditionally renounced all methods of biological warfare.

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

-3-

President Nixon in that year ordered the destruction of all existing stocks of biological agents and weapons. The United States closed research and production facilities, reducing its research and development to a strict study of how to defend against attack by an adversary.

Soviet Use of Mycotoxins

The world community is now aware that the Soviets have been responsible for the use of new weapons, the mycotoxins — commonly known as "Yellow Rain" — against helpless peoples in Laos, Kampuchea and Afghanistan. The testimony of those who have suffered, the chemical analyses, the pattern of use by the Soviets or proxy forces, amount to undeniable proof of Soviet involvement in odious acts. (See attached Department of State report.)

U.S. Efforts to Ban Chemical Weapons

Between 1977 and 1980 the United States conducted bilateral negotiations with the Soviet Union toward a comprehensive, verifiable

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

-4-

agreement to ban and eliminate chemical weapons. The talks were suspended in 1980 because the Soviets could not agree to adequate verification of both parties' compliance.

The United States stands ready to resume negotiations with the USSR and try once again to achieve an agreement that is clear, equitable and provides for adequate verification.

We hope the decision announced today will prove an incentive to the Soviet Union to negotiate a verifiable ban on chemical weapons, an achievement that will serve the best interests of all nations.

Attachment





SECRET ATTACHMENTS

NOTE :

The attached documents were inadvertently omitted from the memo from Gilbert A. Robinson to Judge William P. Clark dated February 4, 1982, subject: The U.S. Response to the Soviet Chemical Warfare Buildup.

SECRET ATTACHMENTS

*International Communication Agency United States of America*

Scenario

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

Public Announcement of U.S. Response to the Soviet Buildup  
of Chemical Weapons

Assuming that the FY 1983 budget request, including items for chemical munitions, will be sent to the Congress in early February and thus be a matter of public record, the following scenario for public affairs treatment is proposed. The scenario calls for a coordinated series of U.S. public affairs initiatives in Washington and overseas that seek to direct public attention overseas to the actions of the Soviet Union.

- 1) Any additional evidence or reports on the Soviet use of mycotoxins should be made available to the press prior to the submission of the budget to the Congress. However, the USG should not attempt artificially to generate attention to mycotoxins because it would be reported as a transparent effort to distract world attention from our impending decision on chemical weapons. Reports or statements from Congressional leaders, other private American sources, particularly scientists and leaders and experts from other countries, would be useful.
- 2) Shortly before release of the budget, a number of senior U.S. officials should have deep background briefings on an exclusive basis with a few leading columnists or editors, explaining the forthcoming decision with emphasis on our intent to use binaries as a deterrent and an incentive to the Soviets to attain a verifiable agreement.

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

- 2 -

- 3) The State Department Spokesman at the noon briefing on the day of release of the budget should make a brief, forceful statement on U.S. plans regarding chemical weapons (draft attached). He should of course be prepared for questions with a briefing paper drawing on the cables already prepared by State and DoD and talking points consolidated by USICA (drafts attached).
- 4) At the same time White House, NSC, DoD and State Department senior officials and briefers should brief the press corps including meetings at the Foreign Press Center and followup exclusives for leading foreign press. U.S. officials should have in hand the briefing papers that focus on Soviet buildups and actions, U.S. interest in negotiations and the deterrence intent of our weapons.
- 5) The Department should instruct Ambassadors in key countries to seek statements from foreign leaders that fix the onus for the buildup of chemical weapons on the USSR and support a US call for renewed negotiations. Similar statements from other public figures should also be sought.
- 6) A Presidential statement should be prepared either for delivery by the President personally before the press corps or as part of a press conference, in which the President:

-- Regrets the need for US preparations;

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

- 3 -

- Places the responsibility for our decision on Soviet actions;
  - Calls strongly for resumed negotiations;
  - Emphasizes that we have consciously built in time for negotiation before being forced to proceed to production;
  - Asks the Soviets to account to the world for their stocks and military preparation;
  - Seeks support from the international community for a treaty that is verifiable;
  - Stresses the deterrent and retaliatory nature of US weapons.
- 7) Coincident with the actions directly related to the U.S. decision, the USICA Wireless File or USINFO and Voice of America should carry stories on previous U.S. actions and agreements attempting to ban and eliminate biological and chemical weapons, and more general accounts of major U.S. arms reduction and peace initiatives, as well as analyses of Soviet chemical warfare strategy.

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

- 4 -

- 8) It will be valuable for the Voice of America and the File to cross-play to the field texts or summaries of any supportive media reaction and public statements from abroad and from the U.S.
- 9) At every opportunity senior U.S. officials should voice their commitment to search for ways to make progress in arms reduction and guarantee world peace and security.

SECRET

# INTERNATIONAL COMMUNICATION AGENCY

## TELEGRAM

031565 100112

PAGE 01 LONDON 01876 271346Z

031565 100112  
27/1350Z

LONDON 01876 271346Z

NAME IN RECENT WORKING AGAINST THE PEACE MOVEMENT  
BECAUSE OF THE FACTS CONCERNING THE BEGINNING OF THE  
BEGINNING OF THE TALKS, AND THE POLISH GOALS

INFO TCO-01 DSO-02 EU-03 PGMR-01 PGNP-04 VOA-05 /016 A3 3

INFO	OST-00	RDS-00	INR-10	SS-10	CIAC-00	H-01	10-15
	NSCE-00	NSAE-00	SSO-00	L-03	DOE-10	TRSE-00	PH-09
	PA-01	INHE-00	SAL-01	OES-09	ACDA-12	ICAE-00	SP-02
	DOEE-00	MCE-00	SPRS-02	/057 W			

-----106034 271351Z /46

0 271344Z JAN 82  
FM AMEMBASSY LONDON  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6019  
INFO SECDEF WASHDC  
NATO COLLECTIVE  
USMISSION GENEVA  
USCINCPAC VAININGEN GE  
CINCSACAFR WELDEBERG GE  
CINCSAFEP RAMSTEIN AB GE  
USNMR SHAPE EE

SECRET LONDON 01876  
GENEVA ALSO FOR INF

E.O. 12065: RDS-1 01/27/12 (STREATOR, EDWARD J.)  
TAGS: MPOL, UK, NATO  
SUBJECT: MANAGING THE CW ISSUE IN EUROPE

REF: BONN 1671 (NOTAL)

1. S-ENTIRE TEXT

2. WE CONCUR IN EMBASSY BONN'S INSIGHTFUL ANALYSIS OF THE DANGERS POSED TO OUR FOREIGN AND DEFENSE POLICY GOALS BY THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS ISSUE.

3. THERE HAS BEEN A STEADY DRUMBEAT OF CRITICAL MEDIA ATTENTION TO THE CW ISSUE HERE SINCE THE ANORETTA HOEBER INTERVIEW WITH --UTR'S, WHICH RAISED THE

POSSIBILITY OF CW DEPLOYMENTS IN BRITAIN. WE EXPECT MEDIA INTEREST TO MULTIPLY FOLLOWING JANUARY 25 EDITION OF BBC'S WEEKLY NEWS DOCUMENTARY "PANORAMA," WHICH FOCUSED ON CW ISSUES. PROGRAM REHEARSED HOEBER CONTROVERSY, LAID HEAVY EMPHASIS ON THE POSSIBILITY OF CIVILIAN CASUALTIES IN ANY CW EXCHANGE, CAST DOUBT ON U.S. ASSUMPTIONS OF A SOVIET CW BUILDUP, SPOKE DARKLY OF NEW CW WEAPONS TO FOLLOW BINARIES, AND FEATURED 2-MINUTE SEGMENT (APPARENTLY FROM OLD MILITARY TRAINING FILM WITH U.S. VOICEOVER) OF RABBIT DYING FROM CW EXPOSURE. THERE WAS ALSO A STATEMENT THAT PANORAMA HAD "INDEPENDENTLY CONFIRMED" THAT HIGH-LEVEL DOD OFFICIALS DID, IN FACT, WANT TO DEPLOY NEW BINARY WEAPONS IN EUROPE.

4. BECAUSE OF RECENT PUBLICITY, THE MOD HAS ALREADY RECEIVED A LARGE NUMBER OF QUERIES ON CW AND IS EXPECTING A DELUGE FOLLOWING LAST EVENING'S "PANORAMA" PROGRAM. IN RESPONDING, THE MOD WILL DRAW FROM WASHINGTON'S GUIDANCE (STATE 11311 AND 13243).

5. OUR CONTACTS AT THE FCO AND THE MOD HAVE BEEN EXPRESSING INCREASING CONCERN THAT A CW CONTROVERSY IS THE WRONG ISSUE AT THE WRONG TIME. THIS IS NOT JUST THE SENTIMENT OF FCO DOWES. A SENIOR MOD OFFICIAL, FOR EXAMPLE, WHILE SAYING THAT HE PERSONALLY CONSIDERS CW DEPLOYMENT TO EUROPE "A GOOD IDEA", CAUTIONED THAT "IF THERE IS A CW DEPLOYMENT PLANS COULD BESETTLE THE INSTABILITY PROBLEMS WE HAVE

6. THE POINT IS WELL TAKEN. THE CAMPAIGN FOR NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT THRIVES ON DISTRUST OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE PERCEPTION THAT THERE ARE FEW CONTROLS ON THE DEPLOYMENT OF EVER MORE FRIGHTENING U.S. WEAPONS TO USE ON A EUROPEAN BATTLEFIELD. A CW CONTROVERSY COULD WELL FUEL THIS SENTIMENT AND REVIVE A FLAGGING CND--INCREASING OPPOSITION TO OUR DEFENSE POLICIES ACROSS THE BOARD AND PARTICULARLY TO THE DEPLOYMENTS.

7. WE CANNOT MORE ENTIRELY TO DEFUSE THE CW ISSUE HERE. BUT WE CAN HELP CONTAIN IT. SOME ACTIVITY IN THE CD CONTEXT WOULD BE HELPFUL, AS WOULD MORE EVIDENCE OF THE EXTENT OF SOVIET PROGRAMS. FOR THE REST, THE MORE SAID ABOUT DETERRENCE AND THE LESS ABOUT DEPLOYMENT THE BETTER. REGARDING DETERRENCE, DEPARTMENT SHOULD NOTE PREVALENT PERCEPTION HERE THAT HITLER WAS DETERRED FROM USING CW AGENTS ONLY BY HIS BELIEF THAT ALLIES HAD CAPACITY TO RETALIATE. LOUIS

POL

SECRET

~~SECRET~~  
INTERNATIONAL  
COMMUNICATION AGENCY

INTEGRITY  
TELEGRAM

PAGE 01 BONH 01671 01 OF 02 251755Z 079164 ICC216  
ACTION EUR-12 25/1803Z

BONH 01671 01 OF 02 251755Z

B29164 ICC216

INFO TCO-01 DCO-02 EU-03 PGHR-01 PGMP-04 VOA-05 /D16 A2 2

INFO OCT-00 ADS-00 INR-10 SS-10 CIAE-00 ED-03 H-01  
10-15 NSCE-00 NSAE-00 SSO-00 L-03 DOE-10 TRSE-00  
PH-09 PA-01 INRE-00 SAL-01 OES-09 ACDA-12 ICAE-00  
SP-02 HCE-00 NRC-02 SPRS-02 /107 W  
-----024402 251809Z /41

O 251727Z JAN 82  
FM AMEMBASSY BONH  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3463  
SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE  
NATO COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE  
USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE IMMEDIATE  
CINCUSAREUR HEIDELBERG GE IMMEDIATE  
CIRCUSAFE RAMSTEIN AD CE IMMEDIATE  
USNHR SHAPE IMMEDIATE

SECRET SECTION 01 OF 02 BONH 01671

E.O. 12865: RDS-1 1/25/82 (WOESSNER, M.H.) OR-H  
TAGS: NPOL, GE  
SUBJECT: MANAGING THE CW ISSUE IN EUROPE

1. (S- ENTIRE TEXT).

2. ALTHOUGH WE WELL UNDERSTAND THE DEFENSE RATIONALE BEHIND THE DECISION TO PRODUCE BINARY MUNITIONS, WE ARE FEARFUL THAT WE MAY WELL BE HEADING INTO A RED-HOT POLITICAL CONTROVERSY, SIMILAR TO THE ONE THAT SURROUNDED ERW, SHOULD THAT DECISION BE FOLLOWED BY ONE TO FORWARD DEPLOY THE MUNITION IN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC. WITH THE EXCEPTION NOTED IN PARA 4 BELOW, CHEMICAL WEAPONS HAVE NOT YET BECOME A PUBLIC OR MEDIA ISSUE HERE, BUT WE ARE CONVINCED THAT IT IS ONLY A MATTER OF TIME BEFORE THE "PEACE MOVEMENT", WHICH IS BADLY IN NEED OF NEW SLOGANS, AND OTHER GROUPS

CONCERNED ABOUT THE MILITARY BUILD-UP IN EUROPE SEIZE THE ISSUE. INDEED, STORIES SUCH AS THE RECENT PIRCUS ARTICLE LINKING CW AND GLCH NOT ONLY SERVE TO DRAW PUBLIC ATTENTION TO THE PROBLEM BUT MAY WELL BE USED BY ANTI-INF ADVOCATES TO PRESSURE BOTH THE CHANCELLOR AND THE SPD/FDP COALITION TO REASSESS THEIR PRESENTLY FIRM SUPPORT FOR THE DUAL-TRACK DECISION. EVEN WITH THE BEST OF MANAGEMENT, WE BELIEVE WE CANNOT AVOID SERIOUS POLITICAL STRAINS.

3. IN A RECENT CONVERSATION WITH EUR/CE DIRECTOR KORNBLUM, A SENIOR CHANCELLERY OFFICIAL WHO IS CLOSE TO THE CHANCELLOR (HOEYACK) SAID THAT UNLESS THE MATTER WERE CAREFULLY HANDLED, THE CW ISSUE COULD BE EVEN WORSE THAN THE ERW CONTROVERSY. OFFICIALS OF THE FOREIGN AND DEFENSE MINISTRIES HAVE EXPRESSED SIMILAR CONCERNS. HOEYACK VENTURED THE PERSONAL VIEW THAT WE WOULD HAVE TO TAKE A NEW AND SERIOUS ARMS CONTROL INITIATIVE REGARDING THE ELIMINATION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS IN ORDER TO CONTAIN THE ISSUE. (EMBASSY COMMENT: WHILE HOEYACK'S SUGGESTION FOR A TWO-TRACK APPROACH AKA INF WAS PERSONAL, WE WOULD NOT BE AT ALL SURPRISED IF SOMETHING ALONG THESE LINES BECOMES THE FRG POSITION. END COMMENT).

4. A FURTHER SIGN OF THE POLITICAL CLIMATE IN THE FRG CONCERNING CW TURNED UP IN THE NEWS LATE LAST YEAR.

IN PIRMASENS IN THE SOUTHWEST OF THE COUNTRY THE STATE (LAND) CHAIRMAN OF THE COMBINED LABOR UNIONS FILED SUIT AGAINST THE FEDERAL POLICY OF STORING CHEMICAL MUNITIONS IN THE AREA, PARTICULARLY AT FICCHBACH.

THIS WEEK AN EMBASSY SPD CONTACT REMINDED US OF THAT INCIDENT, AND POINTED OUT THE SIGNIFICANCE OF TRADE UNIONS TAKING THAT ACTION. HE, TOO, NOTED THAT THE RESISTANCE TO NEW OR ADDITIONAL CW STORAGE IN THE FRG WOULD BE ALMOST CERTAIN TO GROW.

5. AGAINST THIS BACKGROUND, WE WOULD SUGGEST THAT IN DISCUSSING BINARY MUNITIONS THE WORD "MODERNIZATION" BE AVOIDED IN ORDER TO AVOID THE INF PARALLEL BEING DRAWN AND THAT A WORD SUCH AS "REPLACEMENT", "RENEWAL" OR "EXCHANGE", BE SUBSTITUTED IN ORDER TO MAKE CLEAR THAT CW STOCKS ALREADY EXIST IN EUROPE. WE WOULD ALSO SUGGEST THAT RATHER THAN REFERRING TO PAST "NEGLECT" OF US CW CAPABILITY, WE SAY THAT THE US HAS EXERCISED RESTRAINT IN DECIDING SOME YEARS AGO NOT TO PROCEED WITH BINARY PRODUCTION IN THE HOPE THAT THE CW NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE USSR IN GENEVA WOULD BE FRUITFUL AND MAKE IT UNNECESSARY. IT WILL BE IMPORTANT TO LAY THE BLAME FOR LACK OF PROGRESS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS AT THE SOVIET DOOR. TONOFF OFFICIALS HAVE EXPRESSED THE HOPE THAT IN DISCUSSING THE GREATER SAFETY OF BINARY WEAPONS WE BE CAREFUL TO AVOID IMPLYING THAT THE WEAPONS NOW STORED IN THE FRG ARE UNSAFE. THEY ALSO SUGGESTED THAT THE FACT THAT DIMPRIES CAN, ONCE THEY ARE NO LONGER NEEDED, BE DESTROYED WITH MANY FEWER ENVIRONMENTAL RISKS WAS WORTH MENTIONING. WE ALSO SUGGEST PLACING EMPHASIS ON THE DETERRENT VALUE OF BINARY WEAPONS AND AVOIDING, INsofar AS POSSIBLE, COMMENTING ON POSSIBLE RETALIATORY USE. FINALLY, WE BELIEVE THAT FOCUSING ATTENTION ON THE FACT THAT THE LARGEST PORTION OF OUR EXPENDITURES

SECRET

ROUTING  
TELEGRAMINTERNATIONAL  
COMMUNICATION AGENCYPAGE 01  
ACTION EUR-12

BONN 01671 02 OF 02 251755Z

029165 ICC215  
25/1809Z-----  
INFO TCO-01 DSO-02 FU-03 PGMR-01 PGMP-04 VOA-05 /016 A1 1  
-----

INFO	OCT-00	ADS-00	INR-10	SS-10	CIAE-00	EB-08	H-01
	IO-15	NSCE-00	NSAE-00	SSO-00	L-03	DOE-10	TRSE-00
	PIA-09	PA-01	INRE-00	SAL-01	OES-09	ACDA-12	ICAE-00
	SP-02	MCE-00	NRC-02	SPRS-02	/107 W		

-----024414 251809Z /41

O 251727Z JAN 82  
FM AMEMBASSY BONN  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3464  
SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE  
NATO COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE  
USCINCEUR VAHINGEN GE IMMEDIATE  
CINCUSAREUR HEIDELBERG GE IMMEDIATE  
CINCUSAFE RAMSTEIN AB GE IMMEDIATE  
USNMR SHAPE IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T SECTION 02 OF 02 BONN 01671

~~ON CW WILL BE FOR DEFENSIVE EQUIPMENT NOT WEAPONS.~~  
~~WILL BE HELPFUL; INDEED, ONE OF OUR FMOD CONTACTS~~  
HAS TOLD US HE HAD ALREADY USED THIS ARGUMENT WITH  
SOME SUCCESS.

6. WASHINGTON SHOULD ALSO BE AWARE THAT A PROBLEM  
MAY ARISE OVER THE LINKAGE, OR NON-LINKAGE, OF  
CW WITH NUCLEAR WEAPONS. WHILE WE BELIEVE THAT  
ONE POSITIVE ARGUMENT FOR A CW CAPABILITY IS THAT IT  
GIVES US A NON-NUCLEAR DETERRENT TO SOVIET USE OF  
CW, WE HAVE RECENTLY HEARD A DIFFERENT ARGUMENT  
FROM ONE OF OUR FMOD CONTACTS. HIS ARGUMENT, WHICH  
SEEMS TO BE POLITICAL RATHER THAN MILITARY, IS THAT  
WE OUGHT TO AVOID ANY HINT THAT WE MIGHT RESPOND  
TO SOVIET CW USE WITH ONLY NON-NUCLEAR MEANS.  
THIS WOULD, HE ARGUED, BE DECOUPLING. OUR  
CONVERSATION WAS TOO BRIEF TO DEVELOP FULLY THIS

IDEA BUT WE WILL PURSUE IT WITH HIM AND WITH OTHER  
FRG OFFICIALS.

7. EVEN IF WE SUCCEED IN PUTTING THE BEST FACE ON  
THE BINARY ISSUE, HOWEVER, WE DO NOT SEE HOW WE CAN  
EASILY AVOID AGAIN PUTTING THE FRG GOVERNMENT, AND THE  
CHANCELLOR PERSONALLY, UNDER SERIOUS, PERHAPS UNACCEPTABLE,  
POLITICAL PRESSURE. UNFORTUNATELY, AS IN ERW, PUBLIC  
PASSIONS AND "ANTI-WAR" PROPAGANDISTS ARE NOT LIKELY  
TO BE SWAYED BY LOGIC ON THE CW ISSUE. IN THE FINAL  
ANALYSIS, OF COURSE, MUCH WILL DEPEND ON THE CHANCELLOR'S  
ABILITY TO TAKE ON AN EMOTIONAL BINARY PROBLEM ALONG  
WITH THE HEAVY POLITICAL BURDENS HE IS BEARING ON  
INF. WE FEAR THAT HOENYCK'S CONCERN (PARA 3 ABOVE)  
THAT "THE CW ISSUE COULD BE EVEN WORSE THAN THE ERW  
CONTROVERSY" MAY BE ONLY TOO ACCURATE, IN WHICH CASE OUR  
PROBLEMS HAVE NOT YET BEGUN. END COMMENT.  
BURNS

SECRET