

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

Routing Slip

TO:		ACTION	INFO	DATE	INITIAL
1	DCI		X		
2	DDCI		X		
3	EXDIR				
4	D/ICS				
5	DDI				
6	DDA				
7	DDO				
8	DDS&T				
9	Chm/NIC				
10	GC				
11	IG				
12	Compt				
13	D/EEO				
14	D/Pers				
15	D/OEA				
16	C/PAD/OEA				
17	SA/IA				
18	AO/DCI				
19	C/IPD/OIS				
20	C/ACIS	X	(EYES ONLY Envelope)		
21					
22					

SUSPENSE

Date

Remarks:

To (20) Please brief the DDI and NIO/SP as appropriate.

25X1

Executive Secretary
1 November 1982

Date

2437 (10-81)

State Dept. review completed

OCT 31 9 58 AM '82

ER



DEPARTMENT OF STATE


Washington, D.C. 20520

Executive Registry
82-12802
~~NO BASIS~~

SECRET

October 29, 1982

25X1



CIA -

1. This whole thing is for you; I was just a carrier.
2. I may be again in future; this is a way to ensure secrecy.

Per our conversation, attached is the Rostow report. Please note its highly restricted distribution.

3. I have no copy; you should handle appropriately.

4. I would ask that all copies be handled as "eyes only" & sent in sealed envelopes.

Clay E. McManaway
Deputy Executive Secretary

5. And I would ask that you file it accordingly; and that distribution be solely on DCI/DOCI (or C/ACCS) approval, as you see fit.

Attachment:
8233142

SECRET
DECL: OADR

Thanks
EG.



L266

UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY
WASHINGTONOFFICE OF
THE DIRECTOR

October 27, 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT AND THE SECRETARY OF STATE

Subject: Observations on Talks in Europe about
the Kvitsinskiy/Nitze Initiative

These are the highlights of the conversations I had in Europe, following my briefings of the Prime Ministers, Foreign Ministers, and Defense Ministers of the Allies who have agreed to deploy Pershing IIs and GLCMs (October 11-23). The briefings were of course based on my talking points, which I left behind in each case.

(1) My interlocutors were uniformly grateful for the fact that we sent someone to inform them about the Kvitsinskiy/Nitze trial balloon and the Soviet response. They were equally pleased by our assurance that the Allies would be consulted about possible compromise plans when, as, and if there is anything concrete enough to consult about.

(2) They heartily, even enthusiastically approved our handling of the sounding and the President's decision to keep the channel of communications open. One of their major political and public relations problems is still an uneasy feeling that the USG is "not serious" about arms control, but is pretending to negotiate with the Soviet Union while building up its forces for a confrontation, perhaps even a limited nuclear war in Europe. Therefore evidence that we are serious, determined, alert to possible opportunities and positive in our response to them, is manna from heaven for them politically.

(3) I was very struck in these talks by the tone of determination all my interlocutors displayed about going through with the deployments on schedule unless there were a prior agreement. Nobody suggested a delay. All said it would be disastrous to yield or seem to

SECRET - SENSITIVE.

SECRET

2.

yield to Soviet bluster, propaganda, or threats. Several asked me to emphasize to you and to the Soviets the strength of Allied determination to stick to the deployment schedule.

(4) There is an element of paradox in their attitude on the substance of the negotiations. They want us to be firm in pressing the zero/zero solution and yet flexible in our approach to the negotiating problem. Since this is our own position, too, I had no trouble in reconciling firmness and flexibility. The Allies seemed satisfied with the situation so far. At a press conference in Germany, Ambassador Fred Ruth, who had been with Kohl and Genscher during my conversations with them, told the assembled press that the Government of the Federal Republic is convinced that the United States is negotiating seriously and in good faith; strongly supports the zero-solution in INF; and is energetic, flexible, and imaginative in its approach to the problems, and alert to the possibility of progress. I did not object to his statement.

(5) Everyone with whom I spoke emphasized that if the negotiations fail to produce a satisfactory agreement it must be manifest that the failure is the fault of the Soviet Union, and similarly that if we settle in the end for anything less than the zero solution, it should be clear that we do so only because the Soviets adamantly refuse to accept the zero/zero outcome. In that context, they all recognized that we are in a favorable tactical position for the moment. It was equally apparent to everyone, however, that the Soviets will probably soon try to reverse our present tactical advantage by making a plausible proposition we will have to reject.

(6) I explained our policy of extreme secrecy for everything associated with this venture as based on our desire to keep the channel available in the event the Soviets decide to use it. My interlocutors were impressed by the fact that we had kept the story out of the papers for three months, although several noted the Murray Marder article, and wondered why the journalists had not followed up on its hints. Several were particularly impressed by our policy of secrecy because they realized the story would have a favorable response in

SECRET

SECRET


3.

Western public opinion and politics. They all promised full cooperation in keeping the entire subject secret despite the desire expressed by some to be able to use it politically. I asked them not to use regular cables if they wanted to communicate with us on the matter, but to do so by sending (or receiving) travellers.

(7) Of course they all undertook to keep us informed about any approaches the Soviets might make to them, or any rumors that came their way.

(8) There was a good deal of interesting, if inconclusive, talk about what light the episode sheds on Soviet attitudes and tactics. Everyone agreed that Kvitsinskiy is an able, ambitious, and cynical careerist who was not operating on his own. The following questions were asked and discussed but not answered: (i) Is Kvitsinskiy's position evidence of a division in the Politburo? (ii) Are the Soviets simply trying to smoke out our fall-back position? (iii) Can any hard decision be made during the transition period? There was general agreement that we must conduct ourselves on the assumption that there is in the Soviet hierarchy a considerable and highly placed group willing at the right time to conclude a mutually acceptable agreement, although we can have no idea now whether that group will prevail.

Full memoranda of conversation are on file.

SECRET - SENSITIVE