


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ARMS CONTROL BULLETIN

U.S. ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY, WASHINGTON, D.C., 20451

STATEMENT BY

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IN THE FIRST COMMITTEE OF THE 36TH GENERAL ASSEMBLY

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Mr. Chairman:

The United States Delegation and I, personally, are pleased to see you, Ambassador and Secretary Golob, as Chairman of this important committee and we warmly congratulate you on your selection. Your career attests to your distinguished qualifications for this high and delicate mission and we are gratified that your selection is also a tribute to Yugoslavia -- a staunch symbol of national independence throughout the world. Yugoslavia has mastered the important secret of achieving harmony among the peoples who are its citizens. The United States Delegation is earnestly committed to providing you with full support and assistance in the discharge of your important tasks.

It is a privilege for me to address the First Committee of the General Assembly, in order to present the views of my Government on arms control and disarmament, both the major items on the arms control agenda of the United Nations, and some related problems as well. If you will permit me a personal note, I have long been involved in United Nations affairs. I served in the Secretariat years ago, and look back to that experience with pride. And a considerable part of my scholarly work has been devoted to the study of the United Nations as a peacekeeping institution.

The people and government of the United States have always viewed the Charter and the institutions of the United Nations as critically important elements of the world political system. The American people know that the United Nations is part

of the skeleton and the central nervous system of world politics. And they look to it with hope. The Charter embodies an agreed code of values which define the necessary terms of international cooperation -- the rules which should guide and animate the behavior of states, and unite the members of the United Nations, for all their differences, into a single society and polity. The code of the Charter has grown out of nearly two hundred years of trial and error in the long struggle of the enlightenment to conquer or at least tame the aggressive instincts of man. If the Charter rules -- and especially its rules dealing with the international use of force -- should finally disappear as an influence on the behavior of states, world public order would collapse into anarchy, and general war would inevitably ensue.

The First Committee is the designated forum for discussions of arms control, disarmament and international security issues. Its authority derives not only from its mandate but from the distinction of its past achievements. It is, surely, the premier forum in which the nations can consider what they should do to lift the crushing burden of arms and the threat of war from the backs and minds of their people.

The United States approaches the problems of arms control not as isolated abstractions but as components of the larger problem of international security and stability. After all, arms control initiatives are meaningless unless they are viewed as aspects of a comprehensive strategy to achieve and to maintain peace.

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The traditional discussion of many hardy perennials on the UN arms control agenda often has an air of unreality, to say the least. The reason for this tone of unworldliness at the UN is that it has become a habit among us not to talk about the central issues in any examination of the problem of peace -- the declining influence of Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter on the behavior of states. The Charter says, and I quote, "All members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations."

The last two decades have witnessed a rising tide of threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and aggressions -- actions which involved the use or the threat of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of states. Far too often, in the UN and elsewhere, we write and talk as if peace could be secured through the adoption of an aseptic formula for limiting or abolishing nuclear tests, or controlling international arms transfers, or declaring our undying faith in the principles of universal disarmament. We make such speeches and draft such resolutions while the manufacture of arms sets new records every year as the leading growth industry throughout the world; while state after state around the world is under threat or under attack; while unprovoked invasions occur without even the pretense of the excuse of self-defense; and while armed bands and terrorists cross international frontiers to assault the political independence of states.

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As the fever of aggression spreads, the world community does less and less to vindicate the basic principle of Article 2(4), the principle of the equality and integrity of all states, the rock on which the Charter and the state system rest. As a distinguished American scholar has commented, the world community now treats such events with a "normative silence" which is "deafening" and ominous. As a result, more and more states live in fear and trembling. They turn to arms, even to nuclear arms, to assure their survival. Somehow or other they find arms, despite our rules.

Unless we confront these facts and restore general and reciprocal respect for the principles of Article 2(4) of the Charter, the slide towards anarchy will engulf us all. Achieving peace is not a simple matter, to be settled on the cheap, and without tears. Peace requires more than the drafting of treaties and resolutions, however worthy. Until we take effective steps to see to it that the Charter, the arms control treaties and the legally binding decisions of the Security Council are obeyed; until we can verify and assure compliance with their terms, much of what passes for arms control will be a sterile exercise at best and often, alas, no more than a charade.

My first point today, therefore, is to assure you that in this forum and in all other fora my government will urge that we examine the problems of arms control and disarmament on our agenda in the full light of reality. To that end, we shall propose and support a series of initiatives designed to focus attention systematically on the principal problems of establishing peace.

II

The underlying cause of the declining influence of Article 2(4) in world affairs, and the corresponding eclipse of arms control, is the expansionist policy of the Soviet Union, and the extraordinary military buildup on which it is based. The Soviet Union does not initiate all the turbulence in the world. A great deal occurs because of other factors. What the Soviet Union does is to exploit and manipulate regional turbulence in the interest of enlarging its own sphere of dominance.

I make this comment not to engage in idle polemics, but simply to state a self-evident fact known to everyone in this room. It is a fact of critical importance, which is fundamental to the decisions which my government has had to take and which other governments are taking as well -- decisions to restore the balance of power, to deepen the solidarity of our alliances and other friendly relations of security cooperation, and to allow the community of nations to live in peace. In our relations with the Soviet Union, we must insist on the only possible rule of true detente, that of scrupulous and reciprocal respect for the provisions of the United Nations Charter regarding the international use of force.

Over the past decade, the world has endured the shock of the Soviet Union's accelerating drive for dominance, based upon an extraordinary allocation of its resources for military purpose. That drive is a clear and present danger to world peace and human freedom.

The goal of the Soviet Union's military buildup is to attain military superiority, superiority in both the destructive power of its nuclear forces and in the global reach of its conventional forces. As the British and American governments pointed out some years ago, and as all the independent studies of the subject agree, the Soviet buildup cannot be explained solely in terms of defense, however broadly the concept of defense is interpreted. The record speaks for itself, as Ambassador Adelman pointed out yesterday.

Soviet expansionism is aimed at destroying the world balance of forces on which the survival of freedom depends. This drive is being carried on by methods openly in violation of the principles of the UN Charter. The instabilities thus created have impelled many developing nations to seek and acquire weapons with which to protect their perceived national interests.

Thus far, I have recalled for you only the visible manifestations of the Soviet drive for power in the Third World -- its quest for client states and strategic positions, and its

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tendency to take advantage of every opportunity to enlarge its domain by the use of proxy forces, military assistance, subversion, or terrorism.

I should now say a few words about the issue of nuclear arms and nuclear arms control which are at the center of Soviet strategic doctrine. The United States views the effort to bring the nuclear weapon under international control as the most important task of those who seek to realize the promise of peace. Without success in this effort, no other success in the field of arms control will be possible.

A basic dilemma has haunted nuclear arms control negotiations from their beginning. For many years the United States assumed that the Soviet Union shared its view that the objective of arms control negotiations should be to allow each side the same right to maintain deterrence, a retaliatory capacity, and stability.

There have been occasions where East and West have had the same approach to an arms control problem; for example, on the question of nuclear weapons proliferation. The Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1968 demonstrated how real gains in security can result

when the Soviet Union recognizes its fundamental national interest in the stability of the state system. It is no longer possible to assume a mutuality of interest. The United States and the Soviet Union have different policies with regard to nuclear and conventional weapons. Therefore they have different objectives in negotiating to limit the spiral of nuclear and conventional arms accumulation.

SALT is a case in point. United States nuclear doctrine is clear. Our goals are deterrence and stability. Our nuclear arsenal exists to make certain that neither the Soviet Union nor any other country can use or threaten to use nuclear weapons for aggressive purposes, or threaten the ultimate interests of the United States by any other means. Our purpose is to maintain a credible second-strike nuclear capability so that the United States, its allies, and its other interests are protected at all times. Facing an assured American second-strike capability, no potential nuclear aggressor will feel free to use military force against the United States, our NATO allies, the nations of the western hemisphere, Japan, or any other strategically critical nation, and we could not be deterred from using conventional force in defense of our interests if it became necessary to do so. This is and must remain the goal of our nuclear arsenal and, therefore, our minimal goal in nuclear arms control negotiations.

The Soviet Union has not yet adopted a parallel position. On the contrary, the mission of its nuclear forces is intimidation and coercion -- and, if necessary, victory in nuclear war. I need not recite the list of the new weapons deployed by the Soviets in the last ten years. The Soviet Union has been and is still adding ICBMs, large medium-range missiles, nuclear weapons submarines and bombers to its arsenal in an obvious effort to create and maintain a nuclear advantage.

The Soviet strategic buildup is aimed not at achieving and preserving strategic stability, but at creating and aggravating strategic instability. Soviet strategic programs are designed to threaten the survivability of our strategic forces. This emphasis in Soviet military doctrine and action is in itself a repudiation of the doctrine of mutual assured destruction resting on mutual vulnerability, which many Americans thought both sides had adopted in 1972. The Soviet lead in heavy and accurate ICBMs, capable of destroying a large part of our ICBM force in a first strike, undermines the basis for stability and reciprocal restraint in a crisis. Such a situation is a recipe for nuclear blackmail. We cannot emphasize too often that the principal danger facing the world is not nuclear war but political coercion based on the credible threat of nuclear war.

In this situation, what is the position of my government towards arms control negotiations with the Soviet Union? The profound changes in the strategic environment since 1972 have required the United States to review its arms control policies which have failed, and to devise new policies adapted to the world as it now is. That process of review is proceeding rapidly and at a high level.

Apart from these indispensable preparations and the intellectual effort they require, the United States has established no preconditions for arms control negotiations with the Soviet Union. We are not waiting for a military balance to be restored before we parlay with the Soviet Union. And we are setting no political condition, either, despite our deepest concern regarding the Soviet Union's invasion of Afghanistan and its expansionist activities in other parts of the world.

The United States is, of course, taking steps to restore its deterrent capability, both nuclear and conventional. These steps are indispensable in themselves from the point of view of security. In the world of reality, fair and balanced arms control agreements would be inconceivable without a firm American commitment to maintain a credible deterrent.

We shall be seeking arms reductions and arms control agreements which would ensure an equal deterrent capacity for both sides at lower levels of armament, and which would require both parties to cooperate in assuring compliance.

We have already begun the first phase of substantive talks on nuclear arms control issues with the Soviet Union. In August we proposed informal talks on problems of verifying compliance with arms control agreements, on the provision of data, and on certain other general subjects which would arise in arms control negotiations. We told the Soviet Union that we thought cooperative procedures would be necessary to supplement national technical means in a number of areas, and invited Soviet ideas about how best to proceed -- through diplomatic channels, through special meetings of experts, or through the negotiations themselves. We have not yet had a response to this proposal.

US-Soviet negotiations on intermediate range nuclear forces will begin in a few weeks -- on November 30. We welcome the commencement of these talks. We expect to be ready to propose that the companion talks on the reduction of strategic nuclear forces should begin early in 1982.

III

I should now like to turn to the specific subjects under discussion in this Committee and at the Committee on Disarmament. Let me state at the outset that the United States Government is strongly committed to the work of the CD. I intend, despite the demands of the nuclear arms problem, to take a sustained personal interest in the matters to be discussed here and in Geneva. I expect during the months ahead that the United States will propose a number of initiatives in the Committee on Disarmament, in order to take full advantage of the Committee's capacity for seriously considered and deliberate action.

One area in which we hope and expect this Committee and the Committee on Disarmament to take a strong lead is in addressing the questions of monitoring and verifying compliance with arms control agreements, new and old. New procedures are needed to make verification processes more thorough and more reliable. The cause of peace cannot be advanced if the nations have little confidence that arms control agreements are being complied with. In certain areas -- those concerned with nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons, for example -- compliance can be quite literally a matter of life and death. No nation can be expected to respect an arms control agreement unless it can be sure that other signatories are complying with it.

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In this perspective, I should mention the use of lethal and incapacitant chemical agents in Southeast Asia, Afghanistan, and elsewhere. This is a matter of deep and continuing concern to my Government. The use of chemical agents and toxins in Southeast Asia makes clear the need for concrete international action to restore confidence in the 1925 Geneva Protocol, the Biological Weapons Convention and associated rules of customary international law.

The U.S. supported UNGA Resolution 35/144C which initiated the ongoing experts investigation of reports on the use of chemical weapons. We regret that some nations felt obliged to oppose it. We do not understand such opposition. The new evidence concerning the use of toxins makes the work of the Experts Group all the more important. My Government looks forward to the findings of the Experts Group in light of all the evidence before it, including the new evidence.

This issue is a matter of critical importance in many dimensions. It requires the full attention of this Committee and of the General Assembly, both because of the implications for the relevant international prohibitions on the possession and use of such weapons, and because of the broader issues raised by their use. People are dying. This is not an East-West issue, nor is it a North-South issue. Rather, it is an issue which concerns the security -- present and future -- of

all nations alike. Once more such weapons are being used -- weapons regarded with loathing and revulsion throughout the world. These weapons are not being used on animals but on human beings in small defenseless countries. If the nations are not willing or able to take concrete and effective actions to deal with this problem and enforce compliance with the 1925 Geneva Protocol and the Biological Weapons Conventions, then the prospects for any arms control initiative will be seriously undermined.

I wish to emphasize two of the principles which will guide our thinking on problems of verification in both bilateral and multilateral agreements. First, we shall not confine ourselves to negotiating only about those aspects of a problem which can be resolved by resorting to national technical means. In the case of the negotiations with the Soviet Union, we shall begin by offering substantial limitations that are strategically significant, and then construct the set of measures necessary to ensure verifiability. These may well include cooperative procedures between the United States and the Soviet Union, such as detailed data exchanges and provisions to enhance the confidence of each side in data obtained by national technical means.

Second, we shall seek verification provisions which not only ensure that actual threats to our security resulting from possible violations can be detected in a timely manner, but also limit the likelihood of ambiguous situations developing. Ambiguity can never be eliminated entirely from documents drafted by men, but we shall do our best to keep it to a minimum. Ambiguous provisions result in compliance questions and compliance questions lead to compliance complaints which, even if ultimately resolved, strain the atmosphere for arms control negotiations.

Given the importance of verification for the viability of arms control across the board, Soviet acceptance of cooperative measures to improve the verifiability of specific limitations may be the best test of its commitment to serious arms limitations on both a bilateral and multilateral basis.

Let me now turn to the important issue of nuclear non-proliferation. The position of the United States is clear. President Reagan has identified this problem as one of the most critical challenges faced by the world community. It is the premise of the Non-Proliferation Treaty that a halt to the proliferation of nuclear weapons serves the interests of all countries, nuclear and non-nuclear alike.

It is manifest that, in a world where many nations have nuclear weapons, international politics would be nearly unpredictable and volatile to the point of explosiveness. President Reagan has recognized that political instability can be a cause as well as a consequence of nuclear proliferation. He has pointed out that global and regional stabilization are necessary -- but not sufficient -- conditions for success in the effort to carry out the policies of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. In addition, both supplier and consumer nations must work together to ensure that peaceful nuclear cooperation, an essential factor in meeting global energy needs, is not misused.

In the context of regional approaches to non-proliferation, I am pleased to announce that the Senate Foreign Relations Committee has favorably reported Protocol 1 of the Treaty of Tlatelolco and the Senate is expected shortly to give its advice and consent for ratification. President Reagan will, I am sure, move promptly to deposit our instrument of ratification. This treaty was a farsighted initiative of Latin American countries that has contributed significantly to hemispheric security. While the regime envisaged by the treaty is not yet complete, we hope all nations in the region will make every effort to ensure the full success of this important achievement.

Committee 1 has on its agenda items relating to establishing other nuclear-free zones. The United States Government has taken a keen interest in supporting the Egyptian initiative to establish

a Middle Eastern Nuclear Weapons Free Zone. The proposal has great promise, which can be realized only if the states of the region work together to fulfill it. Many problems will have to be solved by those states before the dream of the Middle East as a nuclear weapons free zone can become a reality. The United States stands ready to assist the states of the region, if they wish such assistance, in studying these thorny issues, and in resolving them. We hope that this General Assembly will encourage the project and give it further impetus.

The United States is prepared to participate constructively in the work of the Committee on Disarmament with a view to concluding successfully the negotiation of a convention prohibiting radiological weapons. We also believe that the important work of that body in the area of chemical weapons should be continued.

Halting nuclear tests has been an issue before this Committee, the CD, and its predecessors for many years. High hopes have been attached to the proposal, and no one can question the goal it is designed eventually to achieve. Of course, the United States Government supports that long term goal. But a test ban cannot of itself end the threat posed by nuclear weapons. We shall cooperate fully in appropriate procedures to examine the problems the proposal presents. However, international conditions have not been propitious and are not now propitious for immediate action on this worthy project.

As we consider the question of a nuclear test ban, we should keep in mind that in order for such a ban ultimately to be effective, it must be verifiable. And it must be concluded under conditions which ensure that it would enhance rather than diminish international security and stability.

The Committee is discussing the possibility of further arms control measures for outer space, a question which the CD might wish to discuss further. The U.S. has supported efforts to control arms in space in the past through such major international agreements as the Outer Space Treaty and the Limited Test Ban Treaty. Moreover, US military use of space has been non-aggressive in nature and has been conducted with great restraint. Further steps in space arms control are greatly complicated by the fact that the Soviet Union has for many years been testing an anti-satellite weapon -- a space system designed for the sole purpose of attacking other nations' satellites -- and maintains a continuing operational capacity to use this weapon.

As the First Committee conducts its work, it is important to keep in mind that pious rhetoric and vacuous resolutions do not constitute arms control. Moreover, the United States is firmly opposed to allowing arms control negotiations, which are the most serious issue any nation

can address, to be abused for purposes of political warfare. The serious effort to deal with matters of concern to this body or the specialized agencies of the UN must not become the victim of political disputes which can be considered on their merits in the appropriate United Nations bodies. I hope that members of this Committee will reject propaganda resolutions which tend so often to frustrate our deliberations about serious issues. This would provide a better atmosphere next year for the Second Special Session of the UNGA devoted to Disarmament. I want to emphasize the strong support of the U.S. Government for the Special Session and pledge our cooperation to ensure its success.

IV.

Let me conclude by returning to the theme with which I began: that arms control is not a magic formula through which differing views of the international scene can be reconciled. Without fundamental agreement on the basic premises which underlie the UN Charter, the prospects for substantial progress in arms control will be dim indeed. Limitations on nuclear arms will not have much chance of success until the Soviet Union accepts the view that it too must abide by Article 2 (4). This century, bloody as it has been, has, in most areas of the world, seen the rise of a state system in which self-determination and a tolerance of

different political and social systems has become the norm. Most dreams of militarism, empire, and expansionism have been abandoned. The great question which remains to be answered is whether the last remaining traditional colonial empire is prepared to join with the rest of us in seeking the newer and better world order anticipated by our charter.

In the nuclear age there can be no doubt that peace is indivisible. The world community cannot and will not long accept a double standard, as President Reagan has pointed out. We in the West have been patient, and we are slow to anger. But no one should take our patience for blindness or passivity. Secretary of State Haig summed up the position of the United States a few months ago in these terms:

"What do we want of the Soviet Union? We want greater Soviet restraint in the use of force. We want greater Soviet respect for the independence of others. And we want the Soviets to abide by their reciprocal obligations, such as those undertaken in the Helsinki Accords. These are no more than we demand of any State, and these are no less than are required by the UN Charter and international law. The rules of the Charter governing the international use of force will lose all of their influence on the behavior of nations if the Soviet Union continues its aggressive course."

The United States and the Soviet Union, possessing very large nuclear forces, are locked into an extraordinary relation. In a famous article, it was once characterized as the relation between two scorpions in a bottle. I prefer another metaphor.

There are marriages of love and marriages of convenience. There are also marriages of necessity. The Soviet policy of expansion, fueled by the extraordinary growth of the Soviet armed forces and particularly of its nuclear forces, has produced a situation of growing tension and instability in the world political system. The efforts of the Soviet Union to split the West and to prevent Western improvement of its defenses will surely fail. As a consequence, the Soviet Union should join the United States and its allies and accept the necessity of cooperation as the only way out of the dilemma both camps now confront. Only on that footing can they hope to achieve conditions of peaceful coexistence, as Secretary of State Haig defined the concept in the speech from which I have just quoted.

As President Reagan sees it, the bilateral nuclear arms control negotiations which have already begun, and which will soon enter their more formal stage in Geneva, should, if successful, be a long step towards the goal of restoring world public order. Our work here and in the Committee on Disarmament is equally important, and if conducted in a spirit of realism, can also contribute greatly to that end.