


MEMORANDUM FOR: EA/DDCI

Note Copy Addressed to Exec Registry - forwarded
in case you have not seen. (Looks like orig trans note)



Thompson
DM

Date

TRANSMITTAL SLIP		DATE
TO: Exec Registry		
ROOM NO.	BUILDING	
REMARKS:		
FROM: DDI/PES		
ROOM NO.	BUILDING	EXTENSION
7F24	HQ	



Central Intelligence Agency
Office of the Deputy Director for Intelligence

Executive Registry
82-5515

DDI 5771-82
13 July 1982

NOTE FOR: DDCI

VIA: DDI *S*

SUBJECT: Seminar on Producer-Consumer Relations

Herewith, as requested, are the original and two copies of the summary and notes from our Office Director-level seminar on Producer-Consumer Relations. I have gone through them and made a few changes with an eye to ensuring that they are intelligible to PFIAB members, if you think they would find them of interest or use. We would, of course, be happy to discuss either the User Survey or the seminar itself in greater detail with the PFIAB members or staff if they desire.

Helene L. Boatner
Chief
Product Evaluation Staff

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Producer-Consumer Relations Seminar
Summary of Discussions

1. User Survey indicates need to educate policymakers about intelligence, clarify the work of NIOs in producer-consumer relations and improve timeliness and relevance. Should consider a similar survey of current administration.
2. Personal relationships with intelligence consumers are vital to getting our message thru.
 - Need frequent contact. Alerting consumers to important papers creates a moral commitment to read them. Confidence in people creates confidence in product.
 - Important to institutionalize contacts so they outlive changing individuals.
 - It was suggested that the DDI have a "circuit rider" to market the DDI product and stay in touch with consumer needs.
 - Assistant Secretaries and staff aides are the key people. The Assistant Secretary level is where people are trying to look ahead. Aides determine what gets thru.
3. For top customers, speed and brevity are the keys to being heard.
 - President Carter often took action as a result of PDB items; so does President Reagan.
 - PDB is by far the most important intelligence input to SecDef.
 - Shultz already getting PDB and reading it closely.
 - SecDef likes to get the news fast. NMCC and DIA call frequently with latest news; but not CIA. (We assume our representatives at NMCC are taking care of this.)
 - SecDef wants to know of alternative views and seldom gets them from papers.
 - The focus at senior levels of State is on hot issues. Top Defense people care about hot issues but also focus on longer range when military threat/capabilities are at issue.
 - For the top people everywhere, keep items short.

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- Raw reporting is most useful to highest level consumers if one or two sentences of analysis (no more) are added.
4. Longer papers are read mostly at lower levels and need different attributes.
- Short (one page), tight summaries are the key to utility of longer papers at all levels. A good table of contents, short paragraphs using bold-faced headings for new sections, good graphics, and detailed data relegated to annexes is the best prescription.
 - The more provocative the better.
 - Need to explain the basis of our judgments.
 - Keep papers at the lowest possible classification, allow foreign dissem if at all possible. More highly restricted intel is less widely used.
 - Kudos to OSWR paper proclaiming Japanese computers are coming. Very useful as early warning even though based largely on unclassified data. Without it, people who could take action wouldn't have known.
 - The best attribute of CIA publications is that they provide an intelligent, neutral approach using the best possible sources. Whether classified or not, whether already in the newspapers, the CIA view is valued by consumers.
5. The market for periodicals is wide and varied.
- The format and variety of the IEEW were praised. The apparent move of regional reviews in the direction of the IEEW style was encouraged.
 - Moving from weekly to biweekly on IEEW would be a mistake--the less current the info the less useful it is. The "Weekly Reader" for the Secretary of Treasury draws items from IEEW regularly.
 - Regional Reviews got strong endorsement from Treasury and Commerce. Particularly useful to readers who are not regional specialists. Fills gap between NIDs (too shallow) and IAs (not timely enough); serves as reference material and eliminates need for many short-fuzed requests. Timeliness often is the key to whether they are read and by whom.

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--Commerce and Treasury would like to get sanitized SOVA Reviews even if they can't get ORCON items.

6. Some useful comments on other product forms:

--Papers on visiting dignitaries need to be delivered to State 6-10 days ahead of the visit to be effective.

--A NID piece that runs the morning of a high-level visit is too late to reach Sec/Treasury (and presumably others).

--But there are real trade-offs between these needs and the desire for timeliness.

--Fold-out maps with text and pictures are very helpful; praise for recent one on Israel/Lebanon.

--Biographic material on foreign leaders is widely used and often provides the entre to senior USG officials for other intelligence. But everyone gives it low priority for collection/reporting.

--Task forces at State are administered by their Ops Center but the Ops Center has no substantive control. They have a huge SOP notebook which everyone ignores--and a short checklist that is useful. They will gladly share this with us.

--INR Morning Summary items are not coordinated with policy bureaus.

7. As to the view from Capitol Hill:

--CIA's greatest impact on Members of Congress comes through briefings.

--Papers are more useful to staffers--forces them to look at the broader picture.

--It's a low cost operation to send an extra copy of a paper to the Hill.

--CIA would have more impact if it was more in tune with the schedule for Congressional hearings and committee activity.

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--Personal contact is the best way to gain entre and establish credibility with Congress.

--Congressmen and senior staffers would probably be willing to be debriefed after foreign travel or visits with foreign diplomats in the US--apparently we seldom ask.

8. And some miscellany:

--The best time to establish contacts with policymakers is early in a new term, before the new Administration is immersed in implementation of already-set policies.

--Defense attaches might be available for a week or so to share their experiences after an overseas tour. Also we could use some military intelligence detailees to help us on 3rd world until we get up to strength; after that it could be an exchange program. General Smith will pursue.

--NITs are not a useful vehicle for expressing consumer needs.

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Seminar on the Producer-Consumer Relationship
Conference Notes

Wednesday, 30 June 1982

I. Opening Remarks

Robert Gates, Deputy Director for Intelligence

A. Primacy of Personal Relationship.

1. Product does not sell itself.
2. Know consumer personally.
3. Develop personal relations and keep up continuing dialogue (emphasize our objectivity, integrity; solicit feedback).
4. Perception of intelligence can be as important as the substance.
5. Need for more frequent contact for long-term servicing of accounts.
6. Gates said his article in Studies gives more specifics.

II. User Survey

Chairman, IPC Working Group on User Survey

25X1

A. Survey relates to questions of the quality of intelligence as perceived by high-level consumers during the Carter Administration.

1. Patterns in use of intelligence.
 - a. 50% spent 1/2 hour on intelligence each day.
 - b. 70% said intelligence influenced policy.
 - c. 80% were influenced by intelligence.
2. Producer-Consumer communications.
 - a. Staffs provided intelligence to principals.

- b. Less than 30% used NIO system for tasking.
 - c. Desired more contact with intelligence analysts.
 - 3. Quantity and Quality, by type.
 - a. Military and S&T intelligence get high marks.
 - b. Political and economic intelligence get somewhat lower marks.
 - 4. Evaluation by type.
 - a. High satisfaction with intelligence overall.
 - b. Problem areas:
 - (1) Timeliness.
 - (2) Relevance.
 - (3) Ambiguity--evidence needs to be cited in papers.
 - (4) Filtering--how to get around agency filters (i.e., staffs).
 - c. Problems with consumers.
 - (1) Know little about intelligence process or how to use it.
 - (2) Passive--expect intelligence will come to them.
 - (3) Change in relationship of policymaker (Congress part of the process now).
- B. Recommendations.
- 1. Educate policymakers about intelligence.
 - 2. Clarify role of NIOs in producer-consumer relationship.
 - 3. Improve timeliness, relevance.

4. Survey current Administration.
5. Institutionalize contacts.
6. More rotational assignments in policy agencies.

III. The White House and JCS as a Consumer
Col. Les Denend, White House Staff

- A. Different uses of intelligence by Presidents.
 1. Carter used intelligence in relation to his policy concerns on nuclear nonproliferation, conventional arms transfer, and human rights.
 2. Reagan.
 - a. PDB--only intelligence seen which is not adulterated by staff.
 - b. Summaries and cables are read.
 - c. Copies of wire stories are read.
 - d. The written word is very important at Presidential level.
 - e. Reagan wants and gives instructions as a result of his morning reading.
- B. Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff.
 1. Needs: Advises President on the execution of SIOP.
 - a. Current intelligence on threat issues and developments.
 - b. Requires excellent communications and large staff.
 2. Briefing is preferred to the written word.

- a. DIA briefs are given for 15-20 minutes daily. On Tuesdays the SecDef joins. The style is highly polished; parallels the NID in substance. The briefs are quite detailed, emphasizing military or broad politico-military developments, depending upon needs; followed by an operations brief.
 - b. DIA Commentary is two-three items, much like NID; prepared for a few military consumers.
- C. White House Situation Room vs. NMCC.
- 1. WHSR.
 - a. 24-hour/day, staffed by three people who are in touch with the President and the National Security Advisor at all times.
 - b. More effective than the NMCC because of communications tie-ins.
 - c. Ability to keep in touch with world events without White House pressure.
 - d. Able to contact when they have to and are known for ability to keep principals informed.
 - 2. NMCC.
 - a. More bureaucratic barriers.
 - b. Watch sections alert everyone in chain of command enroute to the Secretary and the Chairman.
 - 3. NSC.
 - a. Concerned with political implications.
 - b. Concerned with which side of issue each agency has lined up on and why.

- c. In the final analysis many principals judge by gut feelings as well as "facts."

D. Recommendations/Comments.

1. Much CIA material filtered by DIA; this creates one more layer between CIA and DoD consumers.
2. Paul Gorman has own links with CIA, and he continues to get direct support. More CIA product now getting through to JCS.
3. Need for frequent contacts. NITs too cumbersome. Need first-hand knowledge.
4. Need to sensitize people as to basis for our judgments.
5. Adequate warning--alert ahead of time that important papers are enroute (i.e., Global Economics which led to review of military strategy).
6. Products.
 - a. National Intelligence Estimates on Warsaw Pact forces and Soviet strategic forces very helpful.
 - b. Fold-out maps with text and pictures are also very helpful (i.e., Israel/Lebanon).
 - c. Graphic presentations are well received.
 - d. "On the one hand--on the other hand" type conclusions are not useful to the Chairman.
 - e. Chairman likes some analytical risk/speculation (Morocco and Sudan papers were not found to be very useful because they said situation unlikely to change drastically.)

IV. Defense Department as Consumer

Major General Carl L. Smith, Senior Military Assistant to
Secretary of Defense

- A. Secretary of Defense.

1. Reads PDB every morning. Considers this the most useful product he gets because of quality of the product and availability of briefer for discussion. Will postpone meetings to finish reading the PDB.
 2. Reads DIA morning summary in his car. If no news, it says so.
 3. Sees only a few cables.
 4. Receives:
 - a. State Morning Summary.
 - b. Alerts from NMCC.
 - c. NOIWON traffic.
 - d. Press ticker.
 - e. Biographic information on foreign visitors.
 - f. Special briefings on selected subjects.
 5. Weekly breakfast with DCI/DDCI on Friday.
 6. Supported by DIA staff group which selects and filters his material.
- B. Most important information needs.
1. Threat assessments--for US force structure and sizing.
 2. Crisis management.
 3. Intelligence relevant to decision points and trips.
 4. Speed--he wants to get things fast (so long as it is clear that it is raw intelligence--e.g., NSA products).
 5. International situation.
- C. In the case of Weinberger.
1. Rather read than be briefed; he looks for convenience and speed.

2. Likes to know about conflict and differences of opinion (Tuesday briefers usually inform him).
 3. Reads NIEs (at least key judgments), SNIEs, and keeps 11-3/8 in vault; gets NID and State Morning Summary each AM (although Smith doesn't know how much/often Secretary reads them).
 4. Close relationship between Weinberger and Mr. Casey; phone calls are frequent.
- D. Relationship between NSA and CIA.
1. Better than in the past.
 2. This is helped by analyst training programs and rotational assignments between the two agencies.
 3. NSA failure to distinguish clearly between evidence and analysis is still a problem.
- E. Points raised:
1. We (DDI) are not seeing enough raw NSA intercepts, only reports extracted therefrom.
 2. "Exclusive for" now goes to Director, DIA, but not to DIRNSA.
 3. We (DDI) do not know what DIA is telling SecDef--e.g., casualty figures in Lebanon when they differ from ours; it is useful to know what DIA briefers are saying. Our relations with DIA are closer in the technical areas.
 4. NODIS--a problem for all. Control is too tight and/or capricious.
 5. How to facilitate exchanges of people, especially military analysts. DDI needs more active-duty people on loan.
 6. Let us spend more time with returning military attaches (Smith said he could look into).

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Thursday, 1 July 1982

V. The State Department as a Consumer

John Stempel, Director, State Operations Center

A. Senior-level officials:

1. Focus is almost wholly on current intelligence. Hot issues are main concern.
2. Raw reporting is most useful if one-two sentences of analysis are added.
3. Items should be short, snappy, current for the senior level; more background okay at lower levels.
4. Timeliness--we're not doing badly, but pieces on visiting heads of state need to arrive six-ten days ahead instead of evening before.
5. Problem: how to get analysis through to senior level in a way that is helpful.
6. Written products should be used during a crisis--they take less time to absorb and provide a record; briefings are okay for a discussion of problems, but they are hard to work into people's schedules.
7. "Hot item cables" usually need some explanation (e.g., sense of urgency, perspective; what does the Secretary need to know to make sense out of the item?)
8. Intelligence which can be shared with third parties is especially useful at State.
9. State officials don't want to tip their hands on an impending decision, so it is hard to ascertain their real intelligence needs.
10. Policy relevance is vital. Give policymaker your analysis in time for him to be able to take it into account.

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B. Secretary versus Assistant Secretary level.

1. Intelligence needs vary.
2. With key people at State, staff aides are important. There are two or three for every key official. Some have never been to Langley and know next to nothing about the Community.

C. Operations Center.

1. Operations Center and INR often are cut off from the information flow in the Secretary's office. Much stays in the Secretary's suite.
2. Intelligence which arrives early enough for the US to take action is most useful (Iranian troops moving to Lebanon) but we need to reduce the number of false alarms--"cry wolf."
3. During crises, the Operations Center is responsible for Task Force administration, not substance.
4. In setting up a Task Force, everyone ignores the detailed SOP notebook in favor of two-page checklist (Stempel will gladly share this with CIA).
5. Operations Center gets involved in operational decisions (e.g., evacuation) because of its expertise in such areas.
6. When Secretary travels, his phone calls are usually to Executive Secretary, Eagleburger, or Stoessel.
7. Stempel tries to get his Operations people out to Langley.
8. Everything for the Secretary flows through Jerry Bremer (Executive Secretary); codeword material goes thru INR first.
9. Again the suggestion--build and use personal contacts to get access to NODIS and telephonic exchanges.

D. INR (Intelligence and Research) Morning Book

1. Focuses on Secretary of State, whereas NID serves the whole policy community.

2. Useful, accurate, and timely product; INR's proximity to policymakers gives it a leg up.
3. Circulation: Secretary, Deputy Secretary, D/INR, and Watch Office; Assistant Secretaries get selective briefings; copies also go to White House, Clark, President, DoD, DCI.
4. Content: three pages--never more--for cable highlights, jointly produced by Operations Center and INR, plus three pages for longer analytic pieces by INR.
5. Secretary also gets one-page cable summary in afternoon.

VI. Commerce Department and Treasury as Consumers

Robert Gallagher, Office of Intelligence Liaison, Department of Commerce

Art Long, National Intelligence Advisor, Treasury Department

A. Treasury

1. Daily Report for Secretary and his principal assistants: presents lots of financial data; foreign, domestic reporting only up to confidential. Special annex contains more highly classified material.
2. Little time available for reading.
3. Weekly Reader contains selections from IEEW (e.g., perspective article on Japan); Secretary likes current information that Weekly provides.
4. Biographic reports: Regan likes bios (wants them up front in briefing books); features on foreign leaders (e.g., NID) helpful if sent well ahead of visit so they can be folded in with other material.
5. Self-initiated vs. requested studies: summaries of self-initiated studies are used, especially if they provide early warning. Premonitory paper on Japanese computer industry was a great triumph, even though it was based largely on open source material; NIE on Mexico also well received. Customs very interested in Soviet technology transfer; Secret Service interested in counterintelligence.

6. There is a handling problem with codeword papers; they have to be read in staff space (same true in other Departments).

B. Commerce

1. Much the same story.
2. Liaison officers often use articles from Regional Reviews rather than request special typescripts and/or briefings. Political items in the Regional Reviews often constitute the only good political reporting they get on back burner areas.
3. Regional Reviews also good vehicles for getting people downtown in touch with analysts.
4. Monthly Reviews (like Soviet Monthly) usually are too big and not timely enough.

C. Shared concerns:

1. Need short, snappy summaries to get papers past staff assistants.
2. One-page summary best with good table of contents.
3. Need more copies of IEEWs.
4. Like our graphics; NID maps very useful.
5. Technical information should be relegated to Appendices for the lower-level readers.
6. NID doesn't get to enough people. Reviews are Commerce and Treasury's only regular political analysis.
7. IAs aren't timely enough.
8. Biweekly regional reviews would not be timely enough.
9. Release of ORCON material sometimes a problem. (Would rather have sanitized product than nothing at all.)
10. Biographic material is heavily used.

11. Concern with maintaining high quality of economic analysis since the reorganization. Believe integration of political and economic is good, though product doesn't really seem much more interdisciplinary.
12. Face-to-face briefings are extremely valuable.
13. Regional reviews are useful in covering non-NID readership. Fills the gap between NID and IA.
14. Loss of downtown DDI circuit-rider has hurt.
15. Gallagher provided good description of role of staff aide (e.g., for Casey at State); four large stacks of material each day, two which contained action items. Intelligence is mixed in with the rest. Problem is to keep principal on schedule and condense reading to a minimum.
16. Don't avoid controversy; CIA is expected to call it like it is, without policy bias. Policymakers want and expect our neutral views.
17. Do Office Directors need to get around? Yes, especially during the first months of a new administration, to talk relevant substance and establish entre for selves and others in the office.

VII. Congress as a Consumer

William J. Barnds, Staff Director, Asian and Pacific Affairs
Subcommittee, House Foreign Affairs Committee

- A. Congress is more powerful than before but is less effective in using its power due to:
 1. Weakened leadership structure and control.
 2. Members more dependent upon their staffs for support.
 3. No systematic flow of information--an opportunity for intelligence.
 4. Spread too thin.
- B. What is most useful to Congress:
 1. Virtually no interest in current intelligence (Glenn and Percy are the only regular readers of the NID he knows of on the Hill, aside from a few staffers).

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2. More concerned with trends, estimates.
3. Beyond specific requests, written reports are rarely asked for (Glenn is an exception on Verification).
4. Only staffers use written transcripts after a briefing.
5. Briefings have much more impact on Members than written products.
6. Biographic information useful for Members in their travels, but classified material is a problem when traveling. Basic geographic intelligence is of little use.
7. Agency looks best in military and S&T areas where intelligence can provide unique information/insights.
8. Separate briefings by CIA, DIA, State are better, but there seldom is enough time.

C. Concerns.

1. Would like to see more speculation.
2. CIA could be more in tune with Congressional concerns.
3. Need for wider distribution of CIA products.
4. Many staffers and/or Congressmen probably are willing to be debriefed after foreign trips, but they apparently are seldom asked.

D. Comments.

1. Congressional opinion on quality of intelligence is not worth much because Congressmen aren't frequent users of products.
2. Attitude common that CIA gets A- or B+ on quality; main complaint is that Agency is not speculative enough.

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