

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
Routing Slip

TO:		ACTION	INFO	DATE	INITIAL
1	DCI		✓ w/o att		
2	DDCI		✓ " "		
3	EXDIR				
4	D/ICS				
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9	Chm/NIC		✓ w/o att		
10	GC				
11	IG				
12	Compt				
13	D/EEO				
14	D/Pers				
15	D/OEA				
16	C/PAD/OEA				
17	SA/IA				
18	AG/DCI				
19	C/IPD/OIS				
20	ASST. DIR. FOR INTELL. ACQUISITION	✓	W/ATT		
21					
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		SUSPENSE	Date _____		

Remarks:

Executive Secretary
[Signature]
 Date: 9/2/82

3-557 (10-81)

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82-5444/1

2 July 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR: Acting National Intelligence Officer for USSR-EE

FROM: Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: NIE 11-4-82, Key Judgments

The only notes I made on the Key Judgments on NIE 11-4-82 are that on page 7 there might be a little more articulation on the range of insurgency support through proxies to include Ethiopia, Sudan, Somalia, Zaire, Western Sahara, Namibia, El Salvador, etc. You might also mention military sales activities as extending influence, bringing in military advisors and earning hard currency through military sales through Libya and Syria and the PLO as a form of recycling oil money to the Soviet Union from Saudi Arabia to the PLO and Syria to Moscow. Also, as part of this strategic equation there might be some reference to the value and cost to the Soviets arising from the weakness of its performance in assisting Third World economies and the impact of their carrying a heavy cost of empire in Cuba, Eastern Europe and Central America.


William J. Casey

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