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# **The OAU: Prospects Under Qadhafi's Chairmanship**



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**An Intelligence Assessment**

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# **The OAU: Prospects Under Qadhafi's Chairmanship**




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**An Intelligence Assessment**

This assessment was prepared by   
the Office of African and Latin American Analysis.  
Comments and queries are welcome and may be  
directed to the Chief, West-East Africa Division,  
ALA, 

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**The OAU: Prospects Under  
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**Key Judgments**

Libyan leader Qadhafi seems certain to become chairman of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) at its summit in Tripoli in August despite the fact that he is widely distrusted by his fellow African leaders. Qadhafi is eager to host a successful summit and gain the chairmanship, and he probably will react strongly to anything he sees as an attempt, by other Africans or the United States, to deny him this goal.

Some African moderates, disturbed by the prospect of Qadhafi's chairmanship and by the recent admission of Western Sahara to the OAU, are considering a boycott of the summit to deny Qadhafi a quorum needed to conduct business. We believe they will fail. Statements by other African leaders suggest that their dislike of Qadhafi and opposition to his chairmanship are outweighed by concern for preserving OAU integrity and the facade of African unity.

Contentious debate at the summit over such issues as Western Sahara is likely to intensify a traditional split between OAU radicals and moderates that in our view has the potential to jeopardize the OAU's future. Beyond this, we project that increased radicalization of the OAU under Qadhafi's chairmanship will further erode the organization's already limited effectiveness as a constructive regional institution. With these difficulties in prospect, we believe that the OAU's moderate members are likely to minimize the importance of the summit in August and defer discussions on many sensitive issues to other forums, such as the Franco-African summit scheduled to be held in Kinshasa, Zaire, in September.

Despite the limits of the OAU's regional power, Qadhafi's chairmanship will adversely affect US interests in Africa. Qadhafi's past behavior leads us to believe that he will be a more active chairman than his predecessors, seeking opportunities to use the OAU to advance his highly personalized Islamic ideology, meddle in the affairs of other African states, enhance his own prestige and influence as a Third World leader, and attack US policy in Africa and the Middle East.

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*Information available as of 12 July 1982 has been used in  
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Soviet interests in Africa will be served by Qadhafi's exploitation of the OAU to denounce the West, especially the United States, as the source of Africa's problems. Qadhafi's suspicions about Soviet intentions in Africa, however, preclude Moscow's ability to manipulate him.

Qadhafi's dominance of the OAU could kill the faltering OAU efforts to settle the conflict in Western Sahara. In the absence of a settlement, we believe Morocco's King Hassan will continue to seek increased US military assistance.

In Chad, Qadhafi is likely to undermine any possible future OAU efforts to achieve a reconciliation in the civil war by trying to further Libyan influence there. He will seek opportunities to blame prolongation of both the Chad and Western Sahara conflicts on the West.

Qadhafi probably will try during the summit to manipulate scheduled elections of senior officials in the OAU Secretariat. He would like to guarantee the placement of supporters of his policies after he turns over the chairmanship to Guinean President Toure in 1983.

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**The OAU: Prospects Under Qadhafi's Chairmanship** [Redacted]

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**Introduction**

The 19th annual summit of the 51-member Organization of African Unity (OAU) is scheduled to take place in Tripoli in August 1982. According to custom, the meeting's host, in this case Libyan leader Mu'ammarr Qadhafi, will become chairman until the next summit in mid-1983. Despite apprehension among Africans that Qadhafi will attempt to use his new job to pursue Libyan subversion in Africa, we believe that OAU members, concerned primarily about OAU unity, are unlikely to deny him the chairmanship. [Redacted]

Reports from US embassies throughout Africa indicate that Qadhafi has been vigorously pursuing the OAU chairmanship. The position will give him an opportunity to speak for Africa on a wide variety of issues and will provide another mechanism for meddling in regional affairs and for advancing his pan-Arab, pan-Islamic ideology. We believe Qadhafi hopes that the prestige attached to the office will give him the opportunity he craves to end his isolation and enhance his credibility as an international leader. [Redacted]

There is no direct precedent by which to predict Qadhafi's performance as head of a large international organization. Qadhafi's past behavior indicates that he is erratic, aggressive, and rash, pursuing his goals with zealous determination and little regard for conventional diplomacy. Qadhafi, however, is also aware of OAU members' hostility toward his chairmanship and has taken steps in the past year to demonstrate a spirit of cooperation. He complied with a Chadian request to withdraw Libyan troops from that country late last year, and he agreed to halt Libyan aid to the Polisario guerrillas in Western Sahara. But rather than signaling a permanent swing toward tempered behavior, we believe such measures are merely a temporary shift in tactics intended to allay criticism. [Redacted]

As chairman, Qadhafi will become a leading participant in OAU efforts to resolve inter-African disputes. We believe Qadhafi will inject his own pan-Islamic and anti-Western policies into OAU involvement in

the conflict in Western Sahara. He will try to undermine the newly installed, anti-Libyan Habre government in Chad. He is likely to attempt to turn to his benefit a renewal of OAU debate of African-Israeli relations prompted by Zaire's recent restoration of diplomatic ties with Israel. [Redacted]

**The OAU and African Disputes**

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In our view, the OAU has over the years achieved firm solutions to relatively few inter-African disputes. Generally, the OAU is content with trying to avert open conflicts by encouraging negotiations among disputants, sometimes under the auspices of OAU-appointed mediators. In some cases this formula works, as in the 1978 reconciliations between Angola and Zaire and among Guinea, Ivory Coast, and Senegal. Other mediation attempts, however, have been less successful, as, for example, in the efforts to settle the Chad and Western Sahara conflicts and the 1978 peace initiatives in the Ethiopia-Somalia and Ethiopia-Sudan disputes. [Redacted]

The OAU's preoccupation with preserving the facade of African unity makes it reluctant to intervene formally in disputes which threaten to aggravate political cleavages among members, as in the brief war between Libya and Egypt in 1977. The heterogeneity and competing interests of OAU states increase the difficulty of reaching a consensus on controversial issues. According to academic studies, coalitions have been fluid over the 19 years of the OAU's existence, forming in response to a particular issue and reforming as the issues, country or regional interests, or national political orientations change. [Redacted]

At the time of the OAU's formation, Africa was divided in two main political camps: the so-called Casablanca group of radical states, which subscribed to nonalignment and opposition to neocolonialism, and the Monrovia group, largely composed of former French colonies, which generally favored close association with the West. This division, modified by two

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**OAU Membership, June 1982**

Member <sup>a</sup>	Year of Admission	Member <sup>a</sup>	Year of Admission	Member <sup>a</sup>	Year of Admission
Algeria	1963	Guinea	1963	Saharan Democratic Arab Republic	1982
Angola	1976	Guinea-Bissau	1973	Sao Tome and Principe	1975
Benin	1963	Ivory Coast	1963	Senegal	1963
Botswana	1966	Kenya	1963	Seychelles	1976
Burundi	1963	Lesotho	1966	Sierra Leone	1963
Cameroon	1963	Liberia	1963	Somalia	1963
Cape Verde	1975	Libya	1963	Sudan	1963
Central African Republic	1963	Madagascar	1963	Swaziland	1968
Chad	1963	Malawi	1965	Tanzania	1963
Comoros	1975	Mali	1963	Togo	1963
Congo	1963	Mauritania	1963	Tunisia	1963
Djibouti	1977	Mauritius	1968	Uganda	1963
Egypt	1963	Morocco	1963	Upper Volta	1963
Equatorial Guinea	1969	Mozambique	1975	Zaire	1963
Ethiopia	1963	Niger	1963	Zambia	1964
Gabon	1963	Nigeria	1963	Zimbabwe	1980
Gambia, The	1965	Rwanda	1963		
Ghana	1963				

<sup>a</sup> There are 51 members.

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decades of political change, has evolved into the current radical/moderate split, reflecting broad differences in members' political ideologies and international alliances. This split is complicated by other divisive forces that impede cooperation and consensus and affect voting patterns: Arab versus non-Arab, ethnic rivalries, geographic separation, competing economic interests, linguistic differences, and colonial heritage. [redacted]

Institutional factors also have limited the OAU's ability to deal with African problems. The OAU has no authority to impose its collective will on disputants. Resolutions are not binding, and there is no mechanism for enforcing sanctions against recalcitrant members. According to a report by the secretary general at the Council of Ministers meeting in February 1982, the OAU also is in financial straits—the result of an increasing budget and the failure of many

members to pay their dues. This constraint has made it impossible to finance certain operations, such as the peacekeeping force in Chad, without outside support and has helped prevent the OAU from establishing a permanent defense force charged with protecting the territorial integrity of members. [redacted]

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The OAU Charter's guiding principle of noninterference in the internal affairs of member states further limits the group's effectiveness, in our judgment. This provision was used, for example, to justify OAU refusal to intervene in the Shaba rebellion in Zaire in 1977. It also has allowed Africa's more notorious leaders—Uganda's Amin, Central Africa's Bokassa, and Equatorial Guinea's Masie—to escape condemnation despite general African antipathy toward them. [redacted]

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### *OAU Purpose and Structure*

*The OAU was established in 1963 in Addis Ababa by 31 charter members after several years of attempts to create an inter-African organization. Its purposes, as stated in the Charter, are:*

- *To promote African unity and solidarity.*
- *To coordinate and intensify efforts to achieve a better life for African peoples.*
- *To defend the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and independence of Africans.*
- *To eradicate colonialism.*
- *To promote international cooperation with due regard to the United Nations Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.*

*The OAU Charter provides for three principal bodies—the Assembly of Heads of State and Government, the Council of Ministers, and the General Secretariat—as well as a Commission of Mediation, Conciliation, and Arbitration, and other specialized commissions as needed.*

*The Assembly coordinates policy and reviews OAU structure and is the main organ of the OAU. Resolutions require a two-thirds majority of the membership, except for procedural questions which need only a simple majority. The annual meeting, referred to as the summit, is customarily held at midyear at a site selected during the preceding summit. In practice, the choice is made informally about two years in advance with an effort to rotate the site to reflect political, geographic, and linguistic differences among members. By custom, the head of the summit's host government serves as Assembly chairman and principal OAU spokesman until the next ordinary session. The summit venue and chairmanship are prestigious and keenly sought, partly because the summit attracts worldwide media attention. Extraordinary sessions are convened by the Secretariat at the request of two-thirds of the Assembly members.*

*The Council of Ministers, composed of the foreign minister or other designated minister of each member state, meets twice a year and is chaired by the foreign minister of the state whose head is the Assembly chairman. One meeting immediately precedes the summit and is concerned with preparing the summit agenda and drafts of proposals for consideration by the Assembly. The other session, usually held in February, is devoted primarily to budgetary and administrative matters.*

*The Secretariat, with headquarters in Addis Ababa, carries out the daily administrative activity of the OAU. It assists the Assembly and the Council in implementing their decisions, prepares the annual budget, and provides administrative and technical staff to all meetings. Its director, the secretary general, and five assistant secretaries general are elected to four-year terms by the Assembly. Candidates for these positions are proposed by their national governments; selections are made with careful attention to regional balance. The assistant secretary responsible for political affairs holds the most significant of the five portfolios and frequently acts as OAU spokesman before the press. Current staffing of senior Secretariat positions includes Secretary General Edem Kodjo of Togo and Assistant Secretaries General Peter Onu of Nigeria for political affairs (representing West Africa); A. N. Chimuka of Zambia for administration and conferences (southern Africa); Paul Etiang of Uganda for economic development and cooperation (East Africa); Noureddine Djoudi of Algeria for science, education, social, and cultural affairs (North Africa); and Sylvestre Nsanzimana of Rwanda for finance (Central Africa).*

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The conduct of OAU business is occasionally frustrated by the lack of a clear delineation of the responsibilities of the OAU Assembly and the Secretariat and conflicts of interest between the chairman and members of the Secretariat. According to State Department reporting, disharmony between current Chairman Moi and senior Secretariat officials, for example, has hampered OAU efforts to secure United Nations assistance for the OAU peacekeeping force in Chad. In addition, several OAU members have challenged current Secretary General Kodjo's authority to seat a delegation from the Saharan Democratic Arab Republic at an OAU meeting in February 1982 independently of a ruling by the Assembly. [redacted]

**Qadhafi as OAU Chairman**

The chairmanship of the OAU—despite the limits of the Organization's power—will give Qadhafi a more legitimate means of influencing the affairs of other African countries, a forum from which to spread his idiosyncratic political-religious ideology, better access to other African heads of state, and an opportunity to play the role of a world leader. We believe Qadhafi is likely to be a more active chairman than his predecessors as he exploits the OAU to achieve his own goals. [redacted]

In our judgment, Qadhafi will probably use the OAU as a vehicle for promoting his views on African relations, including his vision of a pan-Islamic state, Afro-Arab solidarity, opposition to Arab accommodation with Israel, and noninterference in African affairs by the United States and France. Qadhafi may try to concentrate summit discussion on southern Africa or Israel in an effort to draw attention away from the divisive issue of Western Sahara. Although the chairman has no authority to develop OAU policy independently of the Assembly, the history of the Organization suggests that the chairman's style and approach can influence OAU deliberations, and that a dynamic chairman can guide and influence execution of OAU decisions. Judging from his past behavior, we believe Qadhafi will use the United States as a scapegoat for African problems and will blame failure of OAU peace initiatives in Chad and Western Sahara on alleged US meddling. We believe that strident anti-Western bias in his rhetoric may embarrass some

moderates, and a pronounced emphasis on Arab affairs would draw criticism from black Africans. [redacted]

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The attention the OAU receives from the world media, non-African governments, and other international organizations will feed what we judge to be Qadhafi's psychological need to be in the international limelight. He has long sought to assume the preeminent role Egypt played in the pre-Camp David era as the main Arab voice in African and nonaligned organizations and to earn recognition as a leader in the Arab, Islamic, and Third Worlds. We expect Qadhafi will use his office to try to ease his international isolation by meeting with and gaining at least the tacit acceptance of other African heads of state who have rejected him in the past. [redacted]

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Qadhafi almost certainly will try to influence the election of the OAU secretary general and the five assistant secretaries, scheduled to take place during the Tripoli summit. Placing someone sympathetic to Libyan interests or susceptible to Libyan influence in these positions would give Qadhafi a voice in OAU affairs during the next four years. At present, no Libyan holds any of the senior Secretariat offices. The slate of candidates is not yet definite, but according to US embassy reports Sierra Leone's Foreign Minister Abdulai Conteh seems to be the front-runner in the campaign for secretary general. Press reports indicate that incumbent Secretary General Edem Kodjo of Togo, who has a history of creating controversy in the OAU, is not being offered for reelection by his government. We believe that Libya may favor the candidacy of Malian Foreign Minister Blondin Beye who, according to embassy reports, defended Libyan involvement in Chad, [redacted]

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In our view, Qadhafi's behavior as head of the OAU will fluctuate from brashness and aggression to moderation and conciliation. [redacted]

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continue covert efforts to maintain Libyan influence in Chad—by bribing officials and providing arms, training, and money to certain of the country's factions. Habre's suspicion of Qadhafi's motives will, in our view, limit whatever constructive role the OAU might play. [redacted]

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We believe Qadhafi may decide that his own interests are best served by maintaining, at least for the near term, the appearance of promoting peace in Chad. Such a move could help him deflect criticism from his detractors during the next year while running little risk, in the long run, of thwarting his efforts to strengthen Libyan influence in Chad. At the same time, Qadhafi almost certainly will continue to look for ways behind the scenes to encourage the emergence of a Chadian government amenable to Libyan influence. [redacted]

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#### **OAU Issues Facing Qadhafi**

**Chad.** OAU efforts to end Chad's civil strife led to the establishment of a transitional Chadian government in 1979, pending national elections. Nevertheless, renewed factionalism quickly eroded the government's veneer of unity, fighting resumed, and Chadian President Goukouni in late 1980 turned to Libya for troops to push forces led by Chadian rebel leader Habre out of N'Djamena. Last year's OAU summit in Nairobi called for a cease-fire in Chad and the establishment of an OAU peacekeeping force. Qadhafi withdrew his troops in November 1981 under OAU and other international pressure, and the OAU deployed a multinational peacekeeping force to act as a buffer between Goukouni and Habre. A committee headed by OAU Chairman Moi continued to pursue a settlement, but failed to convince Goukouni to negotiate with Habre. Habre decided to take matters into his own hands with a series of steady military advances that culminated in the takeover of N'Djamena in early June 1982. By mid-July, the peacekeeping force had left Chad. [redacted]

Habre is trying to ease factional tensions in Chad and, if successful, may be able to stave off a renewal of civil war. In our judgment, Chad's deep-seated animosities and economic problems will make longer term stability tenuous. [redacted]

We believe Qadhafi would be unlikely to pursue with any real enthusiasm further OAU efforts to ensure a lasting reconciliation in Chad. Qadhafi wants any solution in Chad to favor clients over whom he has influence and is not interested in representation for all parties. Past behavior suggests that Qadhafi will

**Western Sahara.** Until last year the OAU showed little enthusiasm for tackling the Western Sahara imbroglio. We believe this was a reaction to the traditional African view that Western Sahara was an Arab problem and to Moroccan threats to withdraw from the OAU should it recognize the Polisario-backed Saharan Democratic Arab Republic (SDAR). Morocco's King Hassan provided the first breakthrough at the Nairobi summit last year when he agreed in principle to an OAU-supervised referendum. We believe Hassan may have counted on being able to control the mechanics and outcome of the referendum and also may have hoped that his cooperation would encourage the OAU to back down on its move toward accepting the SDAR as a member. [redacted]

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An implementation committee set up during the 1981 summit drafted a resolution calling on the unnamed "parties in conflict" to cooperate with the committee in establishing a cease-fire. In early 1982 Moi assumed responsibility for negotiating a cease-fire date and terms for a referendum. [redacted]

The search for a diplomatic solution has in effect been pushed aside while OAU members decide how to handle the membership question. At the Council of

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Ministers meeting in February 1982 Secretary General Kodjo seated the SDAR as the OAU's 51st member, sparking a walkout by Morocco and 18 other countries and throwing proceedings into confusion. According to US diplomatic reports, Kodjo argued at the meeting that his action was required by the Charter because the necessary simple majority of states had recognized the SDAR. Opponents, according to the same reports, contended that the SDAR is not an independent and sovereign state and pointed out that the OAU-proposed referendum in Western Sahara had not yet been held. Embassy reports indicate Qadhafi is widely assumed by Africans to have engineered the SDAR's admission. Although these allegations are unsubstantiated, we believe they have reinforced longstanding moderate opposition to Qadhafi's chairmanship. The membership issue has upset several OAU ministerial and committee sessions since February and is almost certain to erupt again at the summit [redacted]

We believe that Qadhafi's support of the SDAR—an outgrowth of his attraction to the SDAR's revolutionary rhetoric, his opposition to Arab monarchies, and his desire to see the establishment of another radical Muslim state—may be sorely tested in the next few months. Qadhafi's discussions with representatives of other African governments, according to embassy reports, reveal his concern that opposition to the SDAR admission does not prompt a large-scale boycott of the summit. We believe this concern might motivate him to support a compromise on the SDAR admission that would accommodate attendance by both radicals and moderates, perhaps involving temporary suspension of the SDAR's membership or deferral of the issue to another meeting. But to maintain his credentials with other radical Arab states, Qadhafi will eventually have to reaffirm his support of the SDAR. We believe that Qadhafi's pro-SDAR bias probably will prevent any significant progress during the next year on the OAU proposals for settling the Western Sahara conflict. [redacted]

**African-Israeli Relations.** Most Sub-Saharan OAU states maintained diplomatic relations with Israel throughout the 1950s and 1960s, with the Africans benefiting from Israeli technical assistance and trade and aid programs. In return, Israel was able to count on black African support to prevent Arabs from

turning the OAU and the UN into anti-Israeli forums. Relations were deteriorating by the early 1970s, however, due to Arab offers of financial aid and cheap oil to the Africans and African unhappiness over Israeli ties to South Africa. A dramatic change occurred during the 1973 Arab-Israeli war when almost all African countries severed formal relations with Israel. An OAU resolution in November 1973 called on member states to maintain the severance pending Israel's withdrawal from all occupied Arab territory and the Palestinians' recovery of their national rights. [redacted]

Efforts by Arab states, led by Qadhafi, to strengthen the show of anti-Israeli, Afro-Arab solidarity during OAU proceedings have met with limited success.

[redacted] many black African leaders are disillusioned by the paucity of Arab aid, increasingly resent the Arab states' emphasis on Arab issues in the OAU, and are reluctant to support harsh, Libyan-backed condemnation of Israel. Moreover, openly available data indicate that Israel has continued to develop its commercial interests in Sub-Saharan Africa since the 1973 break. Official Israeli statistics reveal that Israeli-African trade has grown to a larger volume than before 1973, and that Israeli firms will be involved in various projects totaling \$2 billion over the next three years. [redacted]

Despite Zaire's announcement in May 1982 that it would join the three other OAU members—Malawi, Lesotho, and Swaziland—that have formal diplomatic relations with Israel, no other OAU state has restored full ties. In our judgment, Israel's military action in Lebanon in June 1982 will further inhibit any African states from taking such a move. Africans probably fear an Arab withdrawal of economic assistance or oil supplies. Moreover, some OAU members may agree with Nigerian President Shagari that a resumption of diplomatic relations should be accomplished through an OAU initiative, in view of the Organization's resolution in 1973. [redacted]

Both Zaire's move and the recent Israeli invasion of Lebanon are likely, in our judgment, to provoke renewed—and heated—discussion at the Tripoli summit of the OAU's stance toward Israel. Based on

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analysis of his past behavior, we believe Qadhafi will lead some Arab members in a strong condemnation of African recognition of Israel, broadened to include expressions of solidarity with the Palestine Liberation Organization and radical Middle Eastern states and attacks on US policy in the Middle East. Qadhafi may hope that diverting attention from the divisive SDAR admission problem to the Israeli issue will reduce chances for a moderate walkout at the summit. But Arab denunciation of African-Israeli ties could intensify the OAU's internal discord by resurrecting the Arab/non-Arab split. [redacted]

#### **African Maneuvering Before and After the Summit**

Opposition to Qadhafi's chairmanship and dissatisfaction with the handling of the SDAR's admission to the OAU have generated talk among moderates of a boycott of the summit. Support for a boycott, however, appears to be waning, according to reports from US embassies in Africa, perhaps due to concern for the OAU's future and fear of Libyan reprisals. In our judgment, summit attendance will be adequate to ensure a quorum (two-thirds, or 34 of the members) barring any serious misstep by Qadhafi. We believe some moderate heads of state are likely to express their disapproval of the SDAR seating or of Qadhafi's chairmanship by sending lower ranking delegations to Tripoli. Qadhafi would be angered if other African leaders fail to attend and is likely to view low attendance as a deliberate slight. [redacted]

Attendance could be substantially higher if OAU members are able to settle the SDAR problem before the summit. Several of the moderates still favoring a boycott have indicated, according to US embassy reports, that they will send delegations if the seating issue is resolved before the start of the summit. State Department reports indicate that both moderates and radicals have been working to find a settlement. But time is running out, and none of the proposals has thus far generated widespread support. Some OAU members, according to embassy reports, have suggested postponing the summit to allow more time for resolving the SDAR issue. [redacted]

In the unlikely event of failure to achieve a quorum, Qadhafi's accession to the chairmanship could be complicated. OAU rules do not govern selection of a new chairman under extraordinary circumstances.

We believe moderates would challenge any attempt by Qadhafi to claim the office in the absence of a quorum. If the summit is postponed, as has been suggested by some members, Moi might be persuaded to continue as chairman, but reportedly he is anxious to divest himself of the OAU office. In our judgment, Qadhafi would agree to a postponement if he were confident about becoming the next chairman. [redacted]

If the OAU fails to reach a satisfactory resolution of the SDAR issue, we believe continuing debate over the legality of the SDAR's membership would encourage radical/moderate polarization and make it difficult for Qadhafi to maintain a position of neutrality. Attempts by Qadhafi to steer the OAU toward the radical camp could prompt some moderates to leave the organization, but we believe that OAU members' concern with unity will motivate the majority of them to tolerate all but the most egregious behavior by Qadhafi. Moderates may simply choose to weather Qadhafi's chairmanship as they did Idi Amin's in 1975-76. Some Africans may look to other forums such as the Franco-African summit in Kinshasa in September as an alternative setting for discussing the OAU's future. Traditionally an annual gathering of leaders of former French colonies and France, the Franco-African summit has expanded in recent years to include non-Francophone African countries. [redacted]

#### **The Soviet Role**

We believe that whatever benefits the Soviets receive from Qadhafi's chairmanship will derive largely from his use of the OAU to denounce the United States. Moscow does not have the ability, however, to manipulate him. The Libyan leader is particularly sensitive about superpower involvement in African affairs, and we expect that he will react strongly to any Soviet attempt to dictate specific foreign policy actions. [redacted]

Moscow, in turn, is concerned about Qadhafi's unpredictability and adventurism, according to US assessments, as well as his long-term goal of fashioning a pan-Islamic bloc of nations, with Libya at the core, that would challenge the superpowers. Heretofore, Soviet initiatives in its relationship with Libya have been confined largely to providing arms, and we believe that Moscow prefers to maintain a certain [redacted] 25X1

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**OAU Members' Alignment on SDAR Admission and Expected Summit Attendance**

Prior to Secretary General Kodjo's seating of a delegation from the Saharan Democratic Arab Republic at the Council of Ministers meeting in February 1982, 26 states had recognized the SDAR: <sup>a</sup>

Algeria	Madagascar
Angola	Mali
Benin	Mozambique
Botswana	Rwanda
Burundi	Sao Tome and Principe
Cape Verde	Seychelles
Chad	Sierra Leone
Congo	Swaziland
Ethiopia	Tanzania
Ghana	Togo
Guinea-Bissau	Uganda
Lesotho	Zambia
Libya	Zimbabwe

Nineteen states withdrew from the meeting in protest of the seating:

Cameroon	Mauritius
Central African Republic	Morocco
Comoros	Niger
Djibouti	Senegal
Equatorial Guinea	Somalia
Gabon	Sudan
Gambia, The	Tunisia
Guinea	Upper Volta
Ivory Coast	Zaire
Liberia	

<sup>a</sup> Leaders of the recently elected government of Mauritius indicated prior to their election that they support the SDAR, and we expect that Mauritius also will recognize the SDAR.

Five other states do not recognize the SDAR:

Egypt	Mauritania
Kenya	Nigeria
Malawi	

Some of the states that opposed the SDAR's admission have proposed a boycott of the Tripoli summit. Morocco and Egypt hoped to maintain the solidarity of the countries that withdrew and to pick up backing from other moderates. But support for a boycott has waned, and our analysis

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indicates that a quorum (two-thirds, or 34, of the members) probably will not be blocked. We expect that at least 35 countries (other than the SDAR) will send delegations to the summit:

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Algeria	Mauritania
Angola	Mauritius
Benin	Mozambique
Botswana	Niger
Burundi	Nigeria
Cape Verde	Rwanda
Central African Republic	Sao Tome and Principe
Congo	Seychelles
Ethiopia	Sierra Leone
Ghana	Swaziland
Guinea	Tanzania
Guinea-Bissau	Togo
Kenya	Tunisia
Lesotho	Uganda
Libya	Upper Volta
Madagascar	Zambia
Malawi	Zimbabwe
Mali	

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*Nine countries are expected to boycott if the SDAR seating remains unsettled:*

<i>Cameroon</i>	<i>Liberia</i>
<i>Djibouti</i>	<i>Morocco</i>
<i>Equatorial Guinea</i>	<i>Senegal</i>
<i>Gambia, The</i>	<i>Zaire</i>
<i>Ivory Coast</i>	

*Four are expected to boycott under any circumstances:*

*Egypt  
Gabon  
Somalia  
Sudan*

*We have insufficient information to determine the intentions of Comoros or the new government in Chad.*

distance from Qadhafi to avoid being associated with any diplomatic gaffes he might make. We also expect the USSR, which is concerned about accusation by African moderates of meddling in regional affairs, to do little more than extend rhetorical support to radical efforts to make the OAU an anti-US forum.

**Implications for the United States**

In our view, Qadhafi's chairmanship of the OAU will work against US interests in Africa, though—overall—the impact of this development will be tempered by the organization's limited power. We believe the ways in which a Qadhafi chairmanship will work against US regional interests are both direct and indirect. The direct impact will be through his conscious and eager exploitation—often with Soviet and Cuban support—of opportunities to discredit US foreign policy in Africa and the Middle East. The indirect impact will occur mainly through the diminution of the OAU's ability to act as a constructive—if often irresolute—agent of peaceful conflict resolution.

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Qadhafi is in a position to seize on several anti-US propaganda issues at the outset of his chairmanship. Thus, we believe he will use the OAU to attack US policy in southern Africa. He will probably also accuse the United States of meddling in the Chad and Western Sahara conflicts. The precise formulation of a suitable posture on US Middle Eastern policy for OAU consumption may take a bit longer to evolve, but he is not likely to pass up that opportunity either.

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We believe that Qadhafi is unlikely to make any effort to revitalize the OAU peace effort in Western Sahara or to spearhead any possible future OAU role in promoting a lasting, anti-Libyan coalition of the several Chadian factions. In our judgment, continuation of the fighting in Western Sahara may lead

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Morocco's King Hassan to turn to the United States for additional military assistance. In Chad, we believe Qadhafi will use covert action to undermine any anti-Libyan government. [redacted]

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Any open attempt by the United States to become actively involved in the efforts of some moderates to derail the summit or to prevent Qadhafi from acceding to the chairmanship or exercising his authority in that post would be attacked by most other African states as blatant interference in Africa's internal affairs. Qadhafi would fully exploit the propaganda value of any such initiatives as evidence of US meddling, thus damaging US efforts to gain African backing of Washington's Africa policy [redacted]

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