Zaire:
Mobutu and the Military

An Intelligence Assessment
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Zaire: Mobutu and the Military

An Intelligence Assessment

This assessment was prepared by [Redacted]. Office of African and Latin American Analysis. Comments and queries are welcome and may be directed to the Chief, Southern Africa Division, ALA, on [Redacted].

The paper has been coordinated with the National Intelligence Council and the Directorate of Operations.
Zaire: 
Mobutu and the Military

Key Judgments

we believe that President Mobutu has greater reason now to be concerned about possible challenges to his regime than at any time in the past several years. We further believe that Mobutu’s popular standing is at an alltime low and that most Zairians would probably welcome his demise.

Contributing to Mobutu’s woes are serious and deepening economic troubles. Soft markets for Zaire’s mineral exports, the burden of annual debt service, and stagflation and unemployment have combined to produce conditions that appear worse than at any time since the turbulent years just after the country became independent in 1960. anti-Mobutu rebels may be preparing to launch guerrilla operations in Zaire’s mineral-ri Shaba Region later this year. Such attacks could further damage Zaire’s already depressed economy by disrupting at least temporarily mining operations in Shaba, which account for approximately 60 percent of Zaire’s foreign exchange earnings.

Zaire’s 42,000-man armed forces—Mobutu’s principal base of support and means of imposing order on his historically unruly country—are in poor condition, largely as a result of actions he has taken to maintain their loyalty. We believe that the armed forces probably would be unable to crush a well-organized military or guerrilla campaign or cope with widespread internal disorders stemming from the worsening economic conditions.

The weaknesses of the armed forces have made Zaire dependent on external military aid. We believe, however, that in the event of a crisis most foreign governments that previously have come to Mobutu’s rescue would be reluctant to do so again.

Despite these problems, we believe there is a slightly better-than-even chance that Mobutu will remain in office over the next two years or so. Guerrilla attacks in Shaba may not occur, and if they do they may be too localized, at least initially, to pose a direct threat to Mobutu’s power. Other

Information available as of 30 June 1982 has been used in the preparation of this report.
Zairian opposition elements are weak and disorganized, and spontaneous internal disorders may not materialize on a wide scale in spite of deteriorating economic conditions. Finally, Mobutu is adroit at manipulating the armed forces and Zairian politics to assure his continued control.

Should Mobutu's hold on power start to slip, we believe the extent of US willingness to continue backing him would be a major factor in either arresting or accelerating his decline.

We have seen no signs of serious military plotting against Mobutu, but a coup cannot be ruled out. If one does occur, we believe it might be led by junior officers or enlisted men. The regime that would follow probably would be somewhat less friendly toward the United States, at least initially. Nevertheless, Zaire probably would remain Western oriented and would continue to depend on the West for assistance and markets for its mineral exports.
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Zaire:  
Mobutu and the Military  

The military has played an important and at times crucial role in Zaire’s history, imposing a modicum of order in a country that has been riven by ethnic antagonisms, regional tensions, and secessionist episodes. The armed forces have been both President Mobutu Sese Seko’s principal base of support and a potential threat to his regime since he came to power in a military takeover in 1965. We believe that the fate of his government in the next several years will depend in large part on the armed forces—on their capacity to deal with threats to the regime and on Mobutu’s ability to retain their loyalty.

Challenges From Without and Within
The challenges that face Mobutu—and could require him to use the shaky armed forces—are diverse. They include the threat of military or guerrilla attacks by rebels now in neighboring states and the possibility of internal uprisings. We believe that these challenges are greater than at any time in the past several years.

Organized Threats to Mobutu. The so-called Front for the National Liberation of the Congo (FLNC), in our view, poses the greatest organized threat to Mobutu’s government.

Angolan- and Zambian-based rebels, who invaded Zaire’s economically vital Shaba Region in 1977 and again in 1978, may be stepping up preparations to launch guerrilla or military operations some time this year. The rebels, who harbor longstanding ethnic grievances against the regime and complain of the government’s exploitation of Shaba’s mineral wealth, have stated that they hope not only to seize control of Shaba, but to topple Mobutu as well.

The group suffers from factionalism and supply shortages. In view of these apparent weaknesses and the failure of large-scale FLNC invasions of Shaba in the past, we believe that any new rebel hostilities will take the form of sabotage and hit-and-run operations, quite possibly against Shaba’s vulnerable mining facilities.

If the rebels were to acquire a significant quantity of Soviet arms, we believe this would substantially boost their capabilities and morale and would speed their timetable for launching guerrilla operations.

Guerrilla attacks could further damage Zaire’s already depressed economy by disrupting at least temporarily operations at mining facilities in Shaba, which account for approximately 60 percent of Zaire’s foreign exchange earnings. Such attacks could also drive out from Shaba many of the 20,000 expatriates—mainly Belgians and French—who play a key role in running mining operations.

Other armed insurgent groups opposed to the Mobutu regime pose far less of a threat in our view. The second-largest rebel organization, the People’s Revolutionary Party (PRP), has operated in eastern Zaire, in the area of Lake Tanganyika, for over a decade. It achieved some notoriety in 1975 by kidnapping three US students from a research station in Tanzania. Periodic Army sweeps in recent years have hampered the activities of the 500 to 1,000 rebels associated with the PRP. We believe this group is unlikely to
The Military: Background, Structure, and Mission

The Zairian armed forces had their origins in the Force Publique, a highly centralized and tribally mixed body created by the Belgian colonial administration to maintain order. The Force Publique’s African soldiers mutinied shortly after independence in 1960, casting the country into a period of violence and internal conflict that paved the way for Mobutu to take power in a military coup five years later.

Today, Zaire’s armed forces include an 18,000-man Army, a 2,750-man Air Force, a 1,050-man Navy, and a 20,000-man Gendarmerie. Mobutu, who serves both as Commander in Chief of the armed forces and as the equivalent of Defense Minister, exercises his authority through the Secretary of State for Defense, Vice Admiral Lomponda, and the Chief of Staff of the Zairian Armed Forces, General Singa.

The Army, by virtue of its size, mission, and command of resources, is the predominant service. It consists of infantry, airborne, and armored units deployed in the country’s three military regions. Its mission is to maintain internal security and defend the country against external attack.

The Air Force is charged with airlifting troops and materiel to trouble spots within the country, providing fighter support for ground forces, and performing reconnaissance functions. Its inventory includes C-130 Hercules and Buffalo DHC-5 transport aircraft, Mirage V and Aermacchi MB 326 fighter-bombers, Cessna 150 and 310 aircraft, and Puma and Alouette III helicopters.

Zaire’s small Navy includes patrol boats and other small naval craft deployed along the Atlantic coast, in the mouth of the Congo River, and on Lake Tanganyika. Its responsibilities include surveillance of Zaire’s territorial waters, protection of maritime and fishing fleets, and provision of assistance to police and customs officials in combating smuggling and illegal entry into the country.

The Gendarmerie, which is composed of civilian police units whose members have received paramilitary training, is responsible for helping to maintain internal security. It is a separate and equal branch of the armed forces but is the least well funded, equipped, and disciplined of the services.
Top Officers

Vice Admiral Lomponda  
Secretary of State for Defense

A skillful infighter . . . gained Mobutu’s confidence as Navy Chief of Staff and head of President’s military staff . . . friendly toward the United States.

Lieutenant General Boteti  
Deputy Chief of Staff, Armed Forces

An Equateurian, reported to have good connections to Mobutu’s inner circle . . . lacks formal military training but is intelligent and has reputation for appointing able subordinates . . . honest by Zairian standards . . . cooperative with Western officials.

General Singa  
Chief of Staff, Armed Forces

Longtime loyalist but an outsider because he is from Haut-Zaïre Region . . . popular with military officers due to skill and courage he displayed during Shaba invasions . . . may retire in next year or two . . . pro-Western.

Major General Eluki  
Chief of Staff, Army

Has advanced rapidly, thanks to his ambition and Equateurian tribal ties . . . performed poorly during the first Shaba invasion, raising questions about his abilities . . . thought to be pro-Western.

2 Other key military figures are listed at appendix A.
25X1
25X1 pose a major danger to the government in the future even if it enters into an informal alliance with the FLNC.

Some Zairian exiles based in Europe also have loose ties to the FLNC. These dissidents—of whom Mobutu’s former Prime Minister, Nguza Karl-I-Bond, is best known—are organized into as many as 50 small anti-Mobutu groups. They do a great deal of cache plotting but lack the military resources to overthrow Mobutu by force and generally have only tenuous links to Zairians inside the country.

We believe that the prospect of large-scale military action involving Zaire and any of its nine immediate neighbors is slight at this time. In the past several years, Mobutu’s efforts to improve relations with neighboring states have been at least partially successful, and none of them appears likely to attack Zaire militarily.

Threat of Spontaneous Unrest. A threat to Mobutu’s rule also could arise if worsening economic problems spark civil disorders in key urban areas. Although public opinion in Zaire is difficult to measure, we believe, based on US Embassy and open source reporting, that high inflation, unprecedented unemployment, and recurring shortages of basic necessities have eroded Mobutu’s popular standing in recent years, as has widespread mistreatment of civilians by members of the military. We believe, in fact, that Mobutu’s popular standing is at an all-time low and that most Zairians outside of his native region of Equateur would probably welcome his demise.

Zaire’s economic troubles are in part the result of the depressed world prices for its principal exports—copper, cobalt, and industrial diamonds—that have prevailed in international markets in the past several years. Longstanding government mismanagement and corruption have aggravated the country’s poor economic performance and added to popular restiveness.

If, indeed, urban discontent is smoldering, some incident—perhaps a clash for any reason between troops and civilians—could spark serious disorders in Kinshasa or another city. In view of Mobutu’s success in suppressing organized dissent, we believe that such a disturbance would be largely spontaneous. Serious unrest in one city could, in our judgment, have a “demonstration effect” in others. The geographical isolation of many of the country’s urban centers and the poor communications among them, however, lessen the likelihood that uncontrollable disturbances would occur simultaneously throughout the country.

Major turmoil seems less likely in rural areas. Most people in the countryside have long lived at subsistence levels, and they have been relatively less affected by the country’s economic decline. In many remote areas of Zaire, the central government’s sway is only weakly felt, if at all.

Prospects for the sort of economic recovery that would mitigate urban discontent are not good. We believe that world copper and cobalt prices are unlikely to rise much, if at all, before the end of this year. Moreover, although Mobutu has introduced some modest economic reforms, he has resisted taking major steps recommended by Western governments and international financial organizations. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) last fall suspended disbursements under a three-year, $1.1 billion loan because of Zaire’s failure to comply with limitations on government spending and domestic credit. The loss of these funds has aggravated Zaire’s difficulties in repaying public and private creditors, according to US Embassy reporting, thereby making them reluctant to extend new loans needed to finance essential imports.

The Plight of the Military

The Military’s Ineffectiveness. In our judgment, Zaire’s armed forces generally are poorly prepared to deal with either a reasonably well-organized military or guerrilla campaign against the regime, or widespread spontaneous urban disorders.

Some units, notably the Special Presidential Brigade and the 31st Airborne Brigade in Kinshasa, would, in our view, acquit themselves reasonably well in a crisis. Most units, however, are ill trained, ill equipped, and
Zairian Army Brigade Headquarters

The 13th, 12th, and 14th Brigades make up part of the Kinshasa Division.
ill disciplined and almost certainly would perform poorly.

The three brigades of the Kamanyola Division, which together with the slightly more effective 21st Infantry Brigade are responsible for Shaba’s defense, are particularly weak. US officials in Zaire report that the division receives limited material support from Kinshasa and constitutes little more than an armed rabble.

Moreover, corruption is endemic at all levels in the armed forces and adversely affects morale and readiness. Senior officers routinely pocket the pay of their troops and steal food and other supplies intended for their units. Officers at lower levels also misappropriate funds and materiel. As a result, soldiers in the lower ranks often are paid irregularly, if at all, and lack basic provisions for themselves and their families. Many make ends meet by extorting money and goods from civilians.

The armed forces also suffer from severe shortages of equipment and maintenance problems. According to US officials in Kinshasa, most Army units lack adequate communications gear. In addition, the out-of-service rate for vehicles in some units is 100 percent, and rates of 50 to 75 percent are not uncommon. Recurring shortages of gasoline and oil limit the use of military vehicles that are in working condition, as does the country’s deteriorating transportation network.

Logistical problems likewise have long undermined the combat effectiveness of naval and Air Force units. In recent years, most of the Navy’s vessels have been inoperative due to mechanical failures and lack of spare parts. The Air Force has an equally unimpressive record in keeping its squadrons of transport aircraft, fighter bombers, and helicopters airborne. Of seven C-130 aircraft Zaire purchased from the United States in the 1970s, only two are in operation and one of these is used as Mobutu’s presidential plane.

**Mobutu’s Manipulation of the Military.** The Zairian military is a poor fighting force in part because it is subject to many of the same economic constraints, social cleavages, and administrative shortcomings that afflict the country as a whole. Beyond this, however, we believe that the armed forces’ failings stem to a considerable degree from steps Mobutu has taken to ensure military loyalty. He appears far more concerned about maintaining his control over the armed forces than about their ability to defeat some future enemy.

Mobutu has sought to bolster his position in a number of ways that have, taken as a whole, weakened the armed forces. Senior officers use their positions for private gain, and we believe Mobutu allows this in order to maintain favor with these officers. We also believe that he is unlikely to introduce more than cosmetic reforms in the military any time soon, since a reduction in corruption and mismanagement would lessen the stake that senior commanders now have in perpetuating his rule.

The Zairian leader’s increasing reliance on officers from his home region of Equateur and his own tribe, the Ngbandi, in staffing senior command positions also has detracted from the military’s professionalism as well as its multiracial character. The Mobutu regime has discriminated against non-Equatorians in military recruitment, training, and promotions, according to US Embassy reporting. Those most disadvantaged have been natives of Shaba, Bandundu, Kasai Oriental, and Kasai Occidental Regions, areas in which anti-Mobutu sentiment has historically been strong.

Mobutu has exploited personal rivalries among military leaders to strengthen his position. He encourages differences among key military officials in order to reinforce their suspicions of each other and their dependence on him. As a result, we believe that there is no single leader who is capable of rallying broad support within the military against Mobutu.

Mobutu also has attempted to control the armed forces by frequently reshuffling senior commanders and purging officers whom he regards as politically
Principal Army Units

Special Presidential Brigade
Elite, 2,000-man Kinshasa-based unit, elements of which are charged with protecting the President and other senior officials.

This Israeli-advised unit is regarded as highly loyal to Mobutu; brigade personnel receive two to three times normal military salaries; approximately 95 percent are from the President's home region and many from his tribe.

31st Airborne Brigade
This Kinshasa-based unit, which is trained, equipped, and commanded by the French, is designed to serve as a quick-reaction force; it maintains a relatively high level of combat readiness and is the most effective of regular Army units.

21st Infantry Brigade
This Belgian-trained unit is assigned a key role in the defense of Zaire's economically vital Shaba Region, but it is poorly equipped and has only a modest combat capability.

41st Commando Brigade
This unit, based at Kisangani and specializing in counterinsurgency and commando operations, is being formed with Chinese advisory assistance; components organized thus far appear well trained and disciplined, but their effectiveness in combat would be severely limited by their lack of vehicles, communications equipment, and other materiel.

Once fully formed, the brigade should enable the government to exercise greater authority over eastern parts of Zaire over which Kinshasa traditionally has had little control.

Kamanyola Infantry Division
This Shaba-based unit is severely under strength and in a poor state of readiness; elements of the division are dispersed throughout the Shaban countryside and generally neglected by the central government; troops supplement their inadequate pay and rations by hunting, farming, and extorting money and goods from the civilian population, with whom they have few ethnic ties.

Elements of the division would not put up an effective defense of Shaba in the face of a large-scale invasion or well-organized guerrilla campaign; the division probably will have to be restructured and completely retrained before it can adequately perform its mission.

13th Infantry Brigade
Like the Kamanyola Division, this unit is without foreign advisers, receives little support from Kinshasa, and is in a poor state of readiness; the brigade is based at Kalemie in eastern Zaire and is responsible for the defense of areas of the country near Lake Tanganyika.

1st Armored Brigade
The main base of this mechanized unit is at Mbanza Ngungu, about 50 miles southwest of Kinshasa; the brigade's inventory includes T-62 and T-59 tanks obtained from China, many of which are nonoperational, and armored vehicles of French and US manufacture.

The brigade is in a poor state of readiness due to inadequate vehicle maintenance, lack of spare parts, fuel thefts, and desertions.
unreliable, as well as by periodically tinkering with the military’s organizational structure. In doing so, he has sought to prevent his senior commanders from developing independent power bases that they might use to challenge his authority.

Mobutu has tried to retain power by creating an extensive network of informers who have thoroughly penetrated all ranks of the armed forces. US Embassy reports state that members of the President’s tribe hold positions in the military intelligence service in disproportionate numbers. The head of the intelligence unit, Colonel Bolozé, is a brother-in-law and trusted confidant of Mobutu. Mobutu also relies indirectly on the presence of foreign advisers—French, Belgian, Chinese, and Israeli—in several of the Army’s key units to serve as a stabilizing influence and to lessen prospects of a military move against him.

Belgians, Chinese, and Israelis provide training and advisory assistance while French advisers actually command the key 31 st Airborne Brigade in Kinshasa.

The Significance of Foreign Military Support
Foreign military aid serves at least marginally to enhance the capabilities of Zaire’s armed forces and to give donor states a stake in Zairian stability. Mobutu probably hopes that by involving foreign governments in the training and equipping of his key military units he can ensure that those states will assist him in the event of attacks or disorders that his forces are unable to handle.

Friendly countries played key roles in helping to defeat FLNC rebels during the Shaba invasions of the late 1970s. Moroccan forces spearheaded the drive to repulse the FLNC rebels in 1977, and French Legionnaires played a similar role in 1978. We believe that Mobutu would once again appeal for external military assistance, possibly including US combat troops, in the event of a major threat to his government.

In our judgment, Mobutu’s prospects for receiving such support from his traditional European friends—Belgium and France—are significantly poorer now than they were several years ago. Although Paris and Brussels have not taken a public position on the issue, we believe, based on all available reporting, that if a major crisis arose that threatened the lives of their citizens living in Zaire, they would send troops to evacuate some or all of their nationals. Nonetheless, domestic political constraints would make both governments reluctant to commit combat troops to shore up the Mobutu regime. We believe that Morocco might be willing to come to Mobutu’s rescue again, although our knowledge of Rabat’s intentions in this regard is very limited.

Mobutu is probably worried about the degree of support he could expect from Washington in a crisis. US Embassy reports indicate that he has been disappointed with the level of military assistance that the United States has offered in the past several years and has resented Congressional complaints about his regime’s corruption and mismanagement. Other reports indicate such concerns prompted him to announce in May that Zaire would reject US aid in the coming fiscal year.

Mobutu’s doubts about the extent of military support he can count on from Zaire’s traditional friends have led him to look elsewhere for military aid. His main success in this regard has been his acquisition of Israeli assistance for his elite presidential guard force.

Mobutu’s Prospects
Mobutu’s twin strategies of maintaining a politically reliable military—even at the cost of forgoing a more effective fighting force—and of relying on foreign support in the event that a serious crisis arises, have served him well during the almost 17 years he has been in power. But the gravity of the threats he now faces is having some effect on his willingness to sacrifice any additional capacity at the cost of alienating his friends. In our view, Mobutu is now more ready than ever to accept outside help, even from the United States or Israel, if he needs it.

3 See appendix B for details on foreign equipment and technical assistance to Zaire’s armed forces.

4 Furthermore, in recent months US efforts to interest France, Belgium, and West Germany in undertaking a comprehensive assessment of the Zairian military’s material needs have not been notably successful. Paris, and to a lesser extent Brussels and Bonn, apparently would prefer to avoid broadening their military assistance programs in Zaire at this time.
faces, and the probable reluctance of external benefactors to prop up his regime once again, call into question his prospects for remaining in power.

Despite Mobutu’s problems, however, we believe there is a slightly better-than-even chance that he will remain in office over the next two years or so. We have several reasons for this assessment:

- A guerrilla campaign in Shaba may not materialize, and if it does, we believe that—even given the FLNC’s weaknesses and Shaba’s relative isolation from Kinshasa and other key urban centers—it may remain too localized, at least initially, to pose a direct threat to Mobutu’s hold on power.

- Other Zairian opposition elements remain weak and disorganized, and we believe many of them are inhibited by fears that the United States, Belgium, or France would intervene militarily to save Mobutu in a crisis.

- Despite widespread suffering, sustained urban disorders may not occur, partly because Zairians have long been accustomed to severe hardship and partly because Mobutu thus far has prevented the emergence of any leadership or organization around which the urban poor might coalesce.

- If serious urban disturbances do occur, the distances and poor communications among Zairian cities would work against their spreading throughout the country.

- We believe that Mobutu, at least for the near term, can count on the military’s support—particularly the Kinshasa-based 31st and Special Presidential Brigades—in the event of domestic turmoil, especially considering the success he has had in manipulating the armed forces to ensure their loyalty.

The longer Mobutu manages to hold on to power, the better will be his chances of riding out some of his international problems. While the outlook for the world metals markets is not good through the end of the year, subsequent recovery in the industrial nations might well relieve some of the problems Zaire now faces in boosting export earnings. And, despite some recent posturing by Mobutu over US and IMF support, financial imperatives are likely to compel Mobutu to reach at least a temporary accommodation with the IMF. Thus, if Mobutu is still in power a year from now, he is likely to have had to implement at least some modest economic measures to reassure the international banking community. These measures—along with possible increases in exports—should improve his chances for expanding imports and the goods available to Zairians.

In sum, Mobutu, in our view, remains a highly skilled politician and manipulator who can probably continue to suppress his critics, play potential rivals off against each other, and marshal enough internal and external support to stay in power. Should Mobutu’s hold on power start to slip, the extent of US willingness to continue backing him would be an important factor in either arresting or accelerating his decline.

A decision by Washington to distance itself from Mobutu would, in our view, have broader repercussions for his regime than the mere loss of US assistance. Such a US initiative would tend to shake the confidence of international private and public lenders in the future of the Mobutu regime, possibly prompting them to withhold some new loans. In our judgment, it also would tend to embolden Zairian critics of the Mobutu regime, who probably would seek to exploit the government’s weakened position.

Nonetheless, we believe that under such circumstances Zaire’s other outside backers—most importantly, France and Belgium—might not follow the US lead, partly from a desire to protect their substantial economic interests in Zaire. Mobutu, for his part, almost certainly would seek to strengthen ties with Paris and Brussels to compensate for any loss of US support.

A Military Takeover?

Although the greatest probability, in our judgment, is that Mobutu will surmount or circumvent his current difficulties and remain in office in the near term, we can envision several less likely but plausible scenarios that might result in his replacement by a military-dominated government. Mobutu, now 51, could die
accidentally, from natural causes (although his health is reported to be good), or from an assassin’s bullet, in which case we believe the military would intervene in Kinshasa to maintain order and ensure continuity in government.

The possibility also exists that Zaire’s mounting economic problems or new rebel attacks will at some point result in widespread and uncontrollable disorders that prompt senior military commanders to force Mobutu out and assume power in an effort to restore order. We believe Mobutu’s top commanders would take such action only if they concluded that their privileges and influence were endangered. We do not attach a high probability to this scenario over the next two years or so, but we do not rule it out. Until a stable government was established, Kinshasa probably would gradually lose power to regional and local authorities. Outright attempts at secession by the various regions would not necessarily occur, however. Secessionist sentiment, in our view, would be dampened by memories of the anarchy and bloodshed that accompanied several breakaway efforts during the 1960s and by the greater sense of national identity that exists among educated Zairians today.

We believe that a military-dominated regime—particularly one controlled by junior personnel—might be somewhat cooler at first toward the United States than the present government, if only because Washington’s longstanding and close identification with Mobutu. Available diplomatic reports state, however, that most Zairian officers are basically well disposed toward the West. Unlike their counterparts in many other less Western-oriented African countries, they have had little exposure to Marxist and other leftist influences. In addition, we believe that almost any successor government, whether civilian or military, would feel compelled by economic imperatives to look to the United States and other Western countries for aid, investment capital, and markets for Zaire’s mineral exports.

In the event that Mobutu were replaced through a military takeover, factional strife within the military probably would increase, particularly between Equatorians and non-Equatorians, unless a new strongman emerged as Mobutu did in the 1960s. Meanwhile, the inability of military officers to run the government themselves—we believe very few have the necessary education and skills—would probably compel them to turn to civilians to oversee the day-to-day management of the country. Thus, perhaps after a brief period of military rule, they might well install a pliable civilian leadership while acting as power brokers behind the scenes.
Appendix A

Principal Military Personalities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Native Region</th>
<th>Tribe</th>
<th>Age</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lomponda, Wa Botende</td>
<td>Vice Admiral</td>
<td>Secretary of State (Vice Minister) for National Defense</td>
<td>Equateur</td>
<td>Mongo</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Singa, Boyenge Mosambay</td>
<td>General</td>
<td>Chief of Staff, Armed Forces</td>
<td>Haut-Zaïre</td>
<td>Babua</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boteti, Nkoko'e Nkanga</td>
<td>Lieutenant General</td>
<td>Deputy Chief of Staff, Armed Forces</td>
<td>Equateur</td>
<td>Mongo</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eluki, Monga Aundu</td>
<td>Major General</td>
<td>Chief of Staff, Army</td>
<td>Equateur</td>
<td>Budja</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Essale, Yoka Lokole</td>
<td>Brigadier General</td>
<td>Commander, First Military Region</td>
<td>Equateur</td>
<td>Mongo</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Itambo, Mukina Wa Kambara</td>
<td>Lieutenant General</td>
<td>Commander, Second Military Region</td>
<td>Kivu</td>
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<td>Danga, Ngobokoli</td>
<td>Lieutenant General</td>
<td>Commander, Third Military Region</td>
<td>Equateur</td>
<td>Ngbandi</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kikunda, Ombala</td>
<td>Major General</td>
<td>Chief of Staff, Air Force</td>
<td>Haut-Zaïre</td>
<td>Lokele</td>
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<td>Mavua, Mudima</td>
<td>Captain</td>
<td>Chief of Staff, Navy</td>
<td>Bas Zaïre</td>
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<tr>
<td>Molamba, Pene Lowa</td>
<td>Brigadier General</td>
<td>Chief of Staff, Gendarmerie</td>
<td>Kasai/Kivu</td>
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<td>Bolozi, Gbudu Tanikmpa</td>
<td>Colonel</td>
<td>Chief, Military Intelligence</td>
<td>Equateur</td>
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<td>Bosange, Pompese Bakole</td>
<td>Colonel</td>
<td>Chief, Presidential Military Office</td>
<td>Equateur</td>
<td>Mongo</td>
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<tr>
<td>Babia, Will Malobia</td>
<td>Lieutenant General</td>
<td>Former Defense Minister</td>
<td>Haut-Zaïre</td>
<td>Zande</td>
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</table>

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Appendix B

Major Sources of Military Assistance

**Belgium**

Brussels funds most of the cost of maintaining about 110 Belgian military advisers in Zaire, a number that has remained relatively constant in recent years and which is unlikely to change dramatically in the near future. Of this number, approximately 70 serve as instructors at the Army staff college in Kinshasa, the basic infantry training center at Kitona, the commando training school at Kota Koli, and other instructional facilities. Another 20 are at Army headquarters in Kinshasa, and a like number are acting as advisers/trainers with the 21st Infantry Brigade in Shaba.

Belgium provides little equipment and financial support to the Zairian military, in part because of domestic budgetary and political constraints, but has supplied small amounts of materiel, such as uniforms and medicines, to assist the 21st Brigade. Some 37 Zairian military personnel underwent training in Belgium last year, and Brussels earlier this year made a Belgian Air Force C-130 transport plane available to Kinshasa to ease Zaire’s logistical problems.

**China**

Since 1974, Beijing—at no cost to Zaire—has trained more than 230 Zairian military personnel in China, furnished a variety of weapons, including 16,000 small arms and some heavier ones, over 80 tanks, several small naval vessels, and numerous vehicles.

Approximately 40 Chinese military advisers are helping to set up the 41st Commando Brigade; the first of its three 780-man battalions completed training early last year. A second battalion currently is being trained, and the Chinese advisory effort will continue at least into 1984. Beijing last year agreed to provide military technicians, some of whom have now arrived in Zaire, to refurbish the country’s Chinese-built tanks and patrol boats. China is undertaking the project over a two-year period on a cost-only basis financed under an interest-free loan. Some 44 Zairian military personnel currently are undergoing training in China, including 37 seamen and seven artillerymen.

**Egypt**

Under a current military agreement, Cairo is providing training to approximately 20 Zairian military personnel in Egypt and has sold Zaire an assortment of equipment, including small arms, armor, and vehicles.
France

There are currently around 130 French military advisers in Zaire, of whom approximately 75 are helping to command, train, and equip paratroopers of the 31st Airborne Brigade in Kinshasa. Another 25 are serving as instructors at the 1st Armored Brigade’s armored car school at Mbanza-Ngungu in Bas-Zaire. Paris plans to increase the number of advisers assisting the armored unit later this year but to withdraw an equal number of enlisted men and junior officers assigned to the 31st Brigade. A small number of French military advisers are involved with the Zairian Air Force’s Mirage and helicopter programs.

France provided about $3.2 million in military grant aid last year, a level of assistance that the Mitterrand government has pledged to maintain for the foreseeable future. Some 43 Zairian military personnel underwent training in France last year. Paris also supplied uniforms, boots, and miscellaneous equipment to elements of the 31st Brigade that deployed to Chad last November as a part of the Organization of African Unity Peacekeeping Force.

Israel

Since early this year, at least five Israeli military officers have been in Kinshasa helping to train and equip the Special Presidential Brigade.

We believe that the number of Israeli military advisers and the level of Israeli material support may increase in view of Zaire’s restoration of diplomatic relations with Israel in May.

North Korea

Approximately 130 North Korean military advisers began training and equipping the Kamanyola Division in 1975. The aid mission was withdrawn a little more than a year later, however, due to the slow pace of the training effort and political strains related to the two countries’ support for opposing factions in the Angolan civil war.
West Germany

In recent years, Bonn has provided grant aid in the form of trucks, spare parts, communications equipment, and medical supplies. Its military assistance, which is administered by four West German military personnel, will be worth $1.6 million during the period of 1982-83.

United States

US military aid to Zaire declined from approximately $28 million in fiscal year 1977 to $6.1 million last year, according to open source reporting. This year it amounts to $10.5 million, including $7.5 million in military foreign sales credits and $3 million in grant aid under the Military Assistance Program. Zaire's failure to meet payments due under foreign assistance legislation, however, has blocked the obligation of some military assistance funds earmarked for Zaire in the current year. We believe that Mobutu's decision, announced in May, to reject US assistance now under consideration by the Congress may deprive Zaire of some US military and other aid in the coming year.

In the past, US credits have helped to finance most of the country's inventory of military vehicles, nearly all of its airlift capability (including C-130 transport planes and spare parts), some naval craft, and much of the military's communications equipment. In recent years, the US has trained annually about 60 Zairians in the United States under the International Military Education Training Program.