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ODP #1-384

Washington, D.C. 20505

Resource Management Staff

IHC/MM 80-2408
26 March 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

VIA: Deputy to the DCI for Resource Management

STATINTL FROM: [redacted]
Director, Information Resources Office

SUBJECT: Project SAFE

REFERENCE: A. Your memo of 21 March, Subject: Concern Regarding SAFE (Tab A)

STATINTL B. Memo from [redacted] Chairman, STAP to DCI dtd 18 Mar 1980, Subject: Questions Regarding SAFE (Tab B)

1. I appreciate the opportunity to comment on the issues raised by the STAP Panel in connection with the SAFE Project. As background to our comments, I should point out that last year, after discussions between the D/DCI/RM, the DDCI, and DDA, it was determined that the focus of our interest in SAFE was to be "the areas of resource allocation and the relationship of SAFE to other programs on a Community-wide basis."* Although we have continued to review the development of Project SAFE, our primary attention has been in accordance with the above quoted limitations. Consequently, we are not prepared to comment, except in general terms, on many of the concerns raised in the referenced STAP memorandum.

2. Of the four principal concerns listed in your memo of March 21st, only one falls within the scope of IRO's responsibility as set forth in paragraph 1 above, namely:

> "What actions are underway to ensure that the Intelligence Community has access to CIA SAFE and that CIA SAFE has access to DIA SAFE as well as such systems as COINS and SOLIS?"

*Memo from DDCI to D/DCI/RM dated 16 March 1979, Subject: Project SAFE

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3. It is appropriate that your concerns along these lines be addressed because:

- o At the DCI's semiannual review in May 1979, it was stated that a direct physical link between the DIA and CIA systems would be provided.
- o Our review of the current version of the System Requirements Specifications indicates that such a communications connection between CIA and DIA SAFE systems is not included in the specifications.
- o I have discussed this deficiency to the attention of the SAFE Project Manager and he states that such a requirement will be added by amendment; that, although this has not yet been accomplished, such an amendment will be prepared in the near future.

4. We believe that it is crucial to the ultimate development of the types of intercommunication which are set out in your subject memorandum that this requirement be now formalized in the SAFE documentation since, if properly specified, it will provide the technical capability to enable:

- o CIA analysts to access DIA files.
- o CIA analysts to access other Community files through the DIA SAFE interface with the COINS network which is included in the current requirements documents.
- o DIA analysts to access CIA SAFE files.
- o Analyst to analyst communications between DIA and CIA analysts.
- o The capability to permit other Intelligence Community components to access CIA SAFE facilities by going through the DIA interfaces with the COINS or AUTODIN networks.

5. It should be noted that the provision of the physical links and the technical capabilities to accomplish the above listed functions will not, in and of itself, result in the implementation of any of these functions. None of the SAFE documentation, either emanating from DIA or CIA, calls for these functions to be provided. Indeed, the original CIA SAFE documentation specifically provides that the CIA SAFE system will be a closed system accessible only by CIA personnel. The position has been taken by some that CIA has no validated requirement for access to any non-CIA system, including DIA SAFE. The results of

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the IHC-sponsored Analyst Support Study indicate that this is probably not the case. Nearly half of the CIA analysts interviewed said they regularly access outside data bases such as SOLIS, the COINS files, CIRC II, and the NPIC data system. Furthermore, analyst-to-analyst communication across agency lines was ranked the second most important source of information by CIA analysts and the most important source by DIA analysts. As automated systems develop and improve and analysts become increasingly confident in their use of and reliance upon direct access to automated systems, requirements for and the value of access to external systems should increase still further.

Not dependent on SAFE links

6. The management of the Consolidated SAFE Project Office is working under a handicap in this area. There has been, to our knowledge, no extensive formal review or update of CIA's functional requirements on the user side since the decision was made to combine the two programs. Without any formal statement of requirements from the CIA analytical community (primarily NFAC) which the system is designed to support, it is difficult for those charged with designing and implementing the system to anticipate what those needs may be. Therefore, we suggest that either you or some other appropriate authority should give to the SAFE Project Office some appropriate guidance which addresses these areas of concern.

7. We would call to your attention the fact that providing any access to the CIA system from DIA and more especially from elements of the Intelligence Community outside of DIA raises serious security issues. The resolution of these issues will probably require action on your part to modify the present interpretation of existing security policies, or in some cases amendments thereto. If you should decide that the combined SAFE systems should provide the types of intercommunication and outside access which are outlined in your areas of concern, then someone (possibly the Computer Security Subcommittee of the DCI Security Committee) should probably be tasked with the responsibility of defining the security issues, suggesting possible solutions, and performing appropriate risk analyses so that they may be submitted to you for resolution. If this is undertaken, IRO should probably be involved in some way since decisions on these issues will undoubtedly have major long-term effects on the feasibility of improving the interagency exchange of information and could also have a substantial impact on the resources which will be needed to satisfy Community ADP requirements.

8. General comments on other concerns expressed by you based upon our limited perspective are:

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- We are informed that [redacted] of OCR is coordinating the CIA user interface with the CSPO; that he is completely aware of the status of the project and consults regularly with the CSPO.

- In the development of a project such as SAFE, it is extremely important that a well defined single point of contact between the users and developers be established and maintained. Otherwise, the system developers will be faced with conflicting statements of requirements.

- If, in fact, the established lines of communications with the users are not adequate, perhaps the reason is attributable to a lack of an effective framework within NFAC to provide a continuing review of SAFE as it develops. If this is the case, we are not aware of it.

- We see no evidence that "major portions of the proposed operational capabilities are unspecified." It is, however, probably true that NFAC should direct more attention to the general issue of what its requirements for open source material are and how these should be met, either through SAFE or other means.

- The decision to place SAFE on a design-to-cost basis necessarily implied some scaling down of the original requirements for the initial version. In consonance with this, NFAC did review and set priorities on the original SAFE requirements.

- It is our assessment that the CSPO is proceeding with development so that NFAC's highest priorities will be met first and the design will accommodate the later addition of those functions which now enjoy a lesser priority.

- If some of the capabilities which this approach will require to be deferred are considered to be important enough to warrant it, NFAC should develop a justification for their inclusion in the initial version of SAFE and the issue should be addressed during program review.

9. In conclusion, I would take this opportunity to inform you of two initiatives we are taking in conjunction with the DDO which may have an impact on the future development of SAFE.

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- The development of a user language for SAFE will result in a common user language for DIA & CIA. We are exploring the possibility that this could become the initial step for developing user language standards for use throughout the Community. This will require the cooperation of the SAFE Project Office if it is to succeed.

- We expect the IHC to recommend the development of a distributed system of bibliographic information storage and retrieval systems. If this is to be done, the facilities of both the DIA & CIA SAFE systems in this area will have to function as part of an overall Community system. If this is to be accomplished, the interconnection of the two systems could taken on added importance.

STATINTL [redacted]

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