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**THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE**

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

National Intelligence Officers

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11 January 1982  
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MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence  
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

THROUGH: Chairman, National Intelligence Council

FROM: National Intelligence Officer for Strategic Programs

SUBJECT: Prospects for 1982 in Soviet Strategic Programs Area

1. In this note I will confine my remarks to the area of Soviet strategic forces, which I regard as the most critical of my concerns. My observations are in two categories: the major Soviet program developments that we should expect to see this year, and the major issues in the national security community. [REDACTED]

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Soviet Strategic Program Developments

2. In 1982 the Soviets will continue deployments of a variety of new or modernized strategic systems but no major new systems will be deployed for the first time:

--Replacement of SS-17, SS-18, and SS-19 ICBMs with the more accurate MIRVed variants.

--Additional long range MIRVed SS-N-18 missiles on D-class SSBNs.

--Further deployments of SS-20s, Backfires, and Fencer bombers; retirement of some older missiles and bombers.

--Further deployments of SA-10 and Modified Foxbat interceptor low-altitude-capable air defense systems. [REDACTED]

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3. Testing will continue for, and we expect to gain an improved understanding of the characteristics of several major systems that could be deployed in the next several years (projected initial deployment is indicated):

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--SS-NX-20 SLBM (1984) for the Typhoon SSBN.

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- Long-range RAM-P bomber (1986).
- SS-NX-21 SLCM (1984), for deployment on submarines.
- ALCMs (1986), for potential deployment on Backfire and RAM-P.
- ABM interceptors.
- RAM-K (1984) and RAM-L (1984) air defense interceptors.
- AWACS aircraft (1983). [ ]

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4. Flight testing will probably begin in 1982 for several new or modernized missile systems (projected initial deployment is indicated):

- Medium-sized solid propellant ICBM (1984), similar in size and weight to MX.
- Small-sized solid propellant ICBM (1985), for mobile deployment.
- Improved SS-18 and SS-19 variants (1985).
- Improved long range liquid propellant SLBM (1984) to replace SS-N-8 or SS-N-18. [ ]

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5. We may learn more about several programs [ ]

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- Three new or improved solid-propellant land-based missiles.
- Improvements in the late 1980s for ICBMs, IRBMs, and SLBMs.
- Mobile basing modes for new ICBMs.
- New peripheral attack bomber.
- Various ABM programs.
- Directed-energy programs. [ ]

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Likely Important Security Issues

6. Soviet strategic force developments are of high interest to the community. The Defense Department and Congress will continue to focus on a number of problems that relate to their examination of US program decisions:

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--The capabilities of Soviet weapon systems against US Minuteman silos and various basing modes for MX. The increasing vulnerability of US silos is portrayed well in the new NIE 11-3/8. A ballistic missile defense for MX in silos, [redacted] will probably become increasingly attractive to DoD this year, and we will need to examine Soviet capabilities against it.

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--The vulnerability of US command, control, and communications (C<sup>3</sup>). The US strategic modernization program has heavy emphasis on improving C<sup>3</sup> and there is increasing awareness of the implications of this weakness for US strategic doctrine and force programs. [redacted]

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--The capabilities of Soviet bombers against future US continental air defenses. As a result of the recent identification of the long-range RAM-P bomber, there will be added impetus in DoD for improved air defenses.

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7. I have sensed an increasing level of interest in strategic defense issues. The potential improvements in Soviet strategic defenses in the next ten to twenty years may be greater than those for offensive systems, given the high level of capability the latter have achieved. Preparations for the review of the ABM Treaty scheduled for this fall will intensify the examination of strategic defense, perhaps including air defense and civil defense. The IIM on Soviet BMD,

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scheduled for March/April will doubtless generate considerable concern over US ballistic missile defense programs and US offensive missile capabilities against Soviet ABMs. While the deployment of a ballistic missile defense for MX might become DoD's preferred solution to ICBM vulnerability, attention needs to be focused more clearly on which side would gain the greatest overall advantage, in the near term and in the long term, with more widespread ABM deployment by both the US and the Soviet Union. [ ]

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8. The portrayal of the strategic balance will be quite different this year. Neither the Annual Report to Congress by the Secretary of Defense, scheduled for delivery later this month, or the new NIE 11-3/8, will have the usual comparisons of US and Soviet strategic force levels, before and after a nuclear exchange. (The statement by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff will continue to show these figures.) Instead, the Joint Net Assessment Report, due in a few months, will address the strategic balance. Congress is likely to complain strongly about this, and will probably not be satisfied with our "net assessment" agreement with DoD. However, I believe that, without these comparisons, we are doing a better job of addressing Soviet strategic force capabilities in this NIE 11-3/8 than in the past. I believe it is important that we continue to support the idea of doing net assessments jointly with DoD, and that we extend the scope of this effort to those subjects such as US bombers against Soviet air defenses, which the Intelligence Community alone cannot examine very well. [ ]

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9. Arms reduction proposals for both intermediate and intercontinental range nuclear forces will be examined at length this year. The Intelligence Community has a key role both in the monitoring area and in the projections of Soviet forces under various limitations. [ ]

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10. The changes over the last several years in US strategic doctrine have resulted in greater emphasis on US force and C<sup>3</sup> endurance in a protracted nuclear conflict. The debate on these matters is quite confused, in part because of a lack of understanding of Soviet views in the Defense community, Congress, and the public. There will be increasing concern with the limitations in being able to evaluate the effects of attacks on Soviet military capabilities--a more difficult task than just calculating the damage against a set of fixed targets.

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There is a greater role than in the past for the Intelligence Community in helping inform the US policy and planning community. We will have to be more helpful in describing Soviet strategic force operations in dynamic terms and at a greater level of detail. In particular, the significance to their war-fighting capabilities of the destruction or disruption of various fixed and mobile Soviet military facilities, needs to be much better understood. We will need to focus our analyses to a greater extent on such problems. The new NIE 11-3/8 will be very helpful in clarifying Soviet concepts of nuclear warfare. I believe that it will create a much more vivid impression of how different the Soviet view of nuclear warfare is from the traditional view in the West. The material on Soviet force operations in the Estimate has received favorable review from a wide variety of reviewers and participants in the Estimate, and is likely to stimulate new directions in analysis, along the lines needed by the Defense community. [ ]

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11. The new NIE 11-3/8 may be depicted as being a much more "hardline" Estimate, with the insinuation that this has come about because of pressures from a "hardline" Administration. Interestingly enough, a number of our reviewers who are not in the "hardline camp" have commented favorably on the draft thus far, and consider it improved in many ways over the recent Estimates. I agree, however, that the Estimate is less moderate in its portrayal of Soviet strategic programs and capabilities, but I believe this portrayal is realistic in the face of the evidence that is carefully reviewed and evaluated in the Estimate. [ ]

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*Lawrence K. Gershwin*

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## WHAT TO LOOK FOR IN 1982

1. The imposition of martial law in Poland represents the triumph of the most reactionary forces in the Soviet empire, sets the stage for further crises in the empire, and reinforces the confrontational aspects of East/West relations.

2. Soviet behavior in Poland has shown that the USSR's ruling elite values political control above all and will press vigorously for the reestablishment of traditional totalitarian control mechanisms despite their likely negative impact on economic productivity. By the same token, the Polish events display unmistakably the bankruptcy of Marxist-Leninist ideology and the economic stagnation brought about by adherence to Soviet-style centralized planning.

3. These negative phenomena prevail throughout the empire, but most acutely in the USSR itself. Because of its commitment to the totalitarian model, fear of public disorder, and vested career interests, the Soviet leadership is not likely to institute any meaningful economic reforms and will only grudgingly tolerate some economic reforms elsewhere (e.g., as in Hungary). The Soviet Union, therefore, emerges as a country with little political or economic attractiveness to others -- one relying increasingly on military might to conquer (Afghanistan), retain control (through a proxy as in Poland), intimidate (Norway, Pakistan), or increase its influence (as through military assistance in the Third World).

4. In Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union is satisfied with Jaruzelski's crackdown so far and will continue to press the Polish leadership as a whole in order to ensure that it stays on the present repressive course. The Polish leadership is likely to do so in the coming year -- despite the economic and social costs of a recentralized, totalitarian method of rule. Romania may soon present another sort of problem in that its relatively independent foreign policy depends greatly upon Ceausescu's personalized, nationalistic style of rule. Ceausescu's position could be undermined by deteriorating economic performance arising from policy and planning miscalculations, raw materials shortages, and mounting external payments problems. Although Ceausescu himself will strive not to sacrifice his independence for Soviet economic assistance, any major upheavals or leadership dissensions may be exploited by Moscow for its own ends. The USSR will continue to follow the situation in Yugoslavia closely. So far the collective leadership has remained cohesive but it may soon be more severely tested by poor economic conditions and ethnic rivalries -- the disturbances in Kosovo being of most immediate concern to Belgrade. The Party congress currently scheduled for the spring should give us a better indication of how well the leadership as currently structured can cope with mounting problems.

5. Outside of Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union sees the US as its principal competitor. By virtue of its size, military power, economic might, and historical role as the defender of freedom, the US continues

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to be an inspiration to numerous people now under Moscow's domination and the major impediment to Soviet designs outside of its empire's borders. The primary goals of Moscow's policy toward the US will remain to circumscribe it militarily and to isolate it from its traditional allies. Arms control will be a primary vehicle to achieve both of these goals: to get some control over any US modernization programs, and to present any US hesitation to accept Moscow's proposals as proof of American bellicosity which imperils the entire world. The US response to this Soviet diplomatic and propaganda challenge will lay the major part in determining its success or failure.

6. Moscow's heavy reliance on military power has been partially self-defeating, because it has stimulated establishment of the operational foundations of an anti-Soviet US-Western Europe-Japanese-PRC alliance. But that de facto alliance is itself marked by contradictory impulses, some of which are fundamentally outside of Soviet control (e.g., the US dilemma over the PRC and Taiwan) but others which are subject to Soviet manipulation, the most important being the US-FRG rift.

7. Since it continues to see Europe as the principal East-West battleground, the USSR is giving priority attention to that continent and in particular to Germany -- a nation whose undetermined place in the European concert of nations has brought about two wars in this century. After 1945, a vanquished Germany was divided and the two halves eventually incorporated into opposing alliances. Now three interrelated developments in the half hitherto firmly anchored in the Western alliance are offering the USSR political and economic openings. First, the FRG, particularly under Schmidt's leadership, is seeking to play a more important role in the East-West field -- still beneath the umbrella of the alliance but, in effect, more independent from it. Second, there is the reemergence of the old geopolitical strand of German thinking that seeks closer ties with Moscow. Third, there is a convergence of big business and labor desires for closer economic ties to the East -- another repetition of a trend which marked German policy in the 20's and 30's. The USSR has already had some success in capitalizing on these impulses and will continue its efforts to do so.

8. In Asia, despite its previous failures, Moscow may soon perceive new opportunities to improve its relations with Japan. That country's motivation is mainly economic as it looks for new sources of raw materials and markets to high technology goods. Any progress in Soviet efforts to split the European alliance will make it easier for Moscow to persuade Japan that the USSR meets both of Japan's trading needs.

9. The USSR will also continue to pay great attention to any opportunity to move China away from the US. It will maintain a high military capability along its border, refuse to make any significant concessions (particularly on the disputed border question), but will also make sporadic efforts to reopen a dialogue. Its primary effort is still damage-limitation; but this could be transformed into a drive for positive gains if PRC-US relations deteriorate.

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10. In the Third World, opportunities for Soviet interference will arise either because of the inability of native politicians to create a viable order (e.g., Angola in 1975 or Iran today) or because of the rejection by significant elements of the population of an economic order which is perceived as exploitative (Nicaragua in the 1970s, El Salvador today). Areas for potential Soviet gains can be categorized as follows:

- Low risk, moderate gain: This includes most countries of Africa, many of which can be influenced through the use of proxies (Cuba in the past and possibly Libya in the future).
- Moderate risk, high gain: Iran.
- High risk, high gain: Central America.

The degree of Soviet exploitation of opportunities in all of these areas will be tempered by their perception of the possibility of direct US-Soviet military conflict, which the Soviet leadership will strive to avoid.

11. In the long run, the USSR cannot escape from its internal problems by external action. The impending succession already influences Soviet behavior, as various political leaders attempt to position themselves; and this will be an increasingly important factor as the septuagenarians who form the core of the Soviet leadership begin to die. Upon Brezhnev's departure from the scene -- through death, incapacitation, or a coup -- the Politburo will be faced with the difficult task of maintaining a ruling consensus in an empire beset with troubles and in the face of continued deaths in their own midst. Sharp policy disputes are likely at this juncture, and it is quite possible that some leaders might argue for either a more or less conciliatory policy toward the West -- if only to serve their own short term personal ends. Such a situation could, therefore, present the US with new dangers or an opportunity to steer the USSR into a more accommodating posture. While there is no certainty of this happening, the US should at least be prepared for this contingency.

12. In summary, in 1982 we can expect the following:

- Within the USSR and its empire, tightened controls but the possibility of some minor and ineffective economic reforms.
- In Soviet policy toward the US and its allies, a drive to isolate the US
- In Soviet-Chinese relations, continued low-key efforts to keep relations from worsening

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and to block any strengthening of US-Chinese ties.

- In the Third World, continued instigation of anti-Western activities and granting of support -- mainly military -- to anti-Western governments and movements. Two areas bear special watching.
- In Iran, Moscow will stand ready to increase Soviet involvement (political, economic, subversive, and even military) while trying to avoid provoking the injection of US military power into the region.
- In Central America, the Soviets will display even greater care to keep a low profile so as not to provoke the US, but will continue to support the consolidation of Sandinista power in Nicaragua and to use that country as a funnel for the provision of support to neighboring insurgent movements.

13. The overall picture which emerges is of an internally troubled USSR trying to keep the lid on its own empire and simultaneously heavily engaged throughout the world. So far it has been generally successful in both areas. Moscow's ability to sustain these successes in the future will depend in no small part on the ability of the US to reconcile the most important differences within its own camp and to evolve an effective but not overly provocative anti-Soviet policy. The Soviet succession period could present the US with increased opportunities to influence Soviet behavior.