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Date 4 JAN 91 HRP 89-2

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Comment on:

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A/ Coordination, methods of

1. Participation all the way through (tried but obvious difficulties)
2. The present method
3. The committee method
 - a. Past failures (See LLM)
 - b. Various attempts and recommendations of G/SI
 - c. Apparent method proposed by report
4. The only method, in which DCI has authority to bring about coordination
(Note: emphasis should be on practical experience as opposed to
excellent theorizing of committee)

B. Selection, for projects, of what actually constitutes "national intelligence."

1. Getting this from Agencies: How? also Why?
2. Deriving from knowledge of policy thinking. Obvious
3. Arriving at in ORE independent of anybody. Objectionable as
report says, but (a) hasn't/actually been done, and (b) has, in ~~some~~ some
degree, been necessary.
4. Getting by order from NSC and other groups. Good, and has been

in the area of intelligence guidance
done, but has limitations, ~~There exists a report saying guidance~~

5. Getting from authoritative body (preferably single rather than multiple) which would have access to all sources of guidance and authority to determine what should be done. This has become the official method except that the authority is lacking. (and what i mean, gentlemen is that ipb's aren't it as even two meetings have shown)

C. Producing real National Estimates (this would be largely dependent on above but would be the place for main refutation regarding "miscellaneous reports" including why SR's, why some ORE's look like descriptive treatises, how we came to produce IM's on Korean antimony, and related topics)